Eastern Europe in the Soviet Empire, 1945-90

I Recapitulation - the Soviet Union and the failure of Communism

Last time we were talking about the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. We noted long-range factors, which included the deep structures of Russian autocracy, geographical isolation from Europe, nationalism, religious traditions, Russia's old fashioned social structure (notably a weak middle class), and its rather detached and quixotic intelligentsia, quite different from the intellectuals in the West who wrote for a middle-class audience.

We also noted some short range factors contributing to the collapse of the USSR, notably the peculiarly authoritarian form the Communist party took under Bolshevism, the intimidating role leader, Josef Stalin, and its tendency toward isolation as a privileged enclave within the larger society. Significant too was the superpower rivalry in which the USSR became engaged after the Second World War in its global political contest with the United States for forty-five years. It diverted so much of the economic resources of the country toward armaments and defense.

II Historical Realities of eastern Europe under the aegis of communist regimes, 1945-90

Today I want to trace the parallel fortunes of the communist nations of eastern Europe in the contemporary age. We want to understand why they foundered as well. As a background we must look at their circumstances.

1) the geography of eastern Europe (map)

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland Belarus

Czechoslovakia Ukraine

Hungary Moldava

Yugoslavia Romania

Albania Bulgaria

 2) Eastern Europe possessed a mixed ethnic population, together with a variety of religious beliefs, thus creating a complicated picture of eastern European identity (map) the large number of ethnic Slavs and communicants of the eastern-rite Orthodox Christian Church provided a basis for some sense of kinship with Russia. But such a "pan-Slav" identity was a convenient fabrication, dating from days when these eastern European people lived under the Hapsburg or Ottoman empires and looked to Russia as an imaginary benevolent guardian. 3) the nation-states of eastern Europe were new creations, dating from the peace treaties concluding the First World War (1918-20). Intended to fulfill nationalist aspirations, these new nation-states could not do so successfully, given the heterogeneity of the populations in many of them.

4) Few of these nations had any experience of, or success with, political democracy during the interwar years.

5) During the Second World War, the German Nazis occupied much of eastern Europe. Some of these nations became client states of the Nazi regimes: notably Croatia, Hungary, and Romania. Communist insurgents, known as Partisans, were prominent within the military resistance to German occupation during the war years and so were in a position to take power after the liberation of this region by the Soviet Red army in the last days of the war.

6) The countries of eastern Europe were liberated but then ruthlessly exploited economically by the Red army.

7) After the war, the Soviet Union quickly established its sphere of influence in eastern Europe. The nations of eastern Europe became the "eastern bloc," client states of the Soviet Union economically, politically, diplomatically, and militarily.

8) All of the eastern European nations adopted communist regimes beholden to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Some states, notably Yugoslavia, established a greater measure of autonomy than others, but none was permitted to consider alternative models of government.

9) Because the Soviet Union chose to exploit rather than aid these countries, they failed to participate fully in the economic recovery and dramatic move toward prosperity in western Europe. Eastern European nations were not recipients of the economic largesse of the American Marshall Plan.

10) Because of a commitment to egalitarianism and a common communist identity, nationalist sentiments remained muted during this era.

11) Because only the communist party was officially recognized and the activities of trade unions limited, there were no forums for the expression of political dissent or labor discontent. Journalists, trade union leaders, intellectuals, and opposition politicians had few means of criticizing their governments. The felt need to express criticism of the policies of these communist governments and the influence of the Soviet Union in their internal affairs, therefore, became the rallying point for informal groups that sought means of reforming these regimes or at least liberalizing their policies. Opposition to communism would emerge not so much as opposition to its egalitarian ideal as to its suppression of free speech. Clandestine or at least unofficial political movements of opposition would focus on the struggle for freedom of opinion. This was a right enjoyed in the west since the late eighteenth century, won in the French and American revolutions.

Note the irony. The movement that claimed to be the most radical expression of the modern revolutionary movement --- communism --- in practice failed to accord citizens the most basic right for which that movement stood --- political liberty. III Why did Communism fail in eastern Europe?

That begs the skeptical preliminary question, did it fail?

The precipitous collapse of all of the regimes of eastern Europe in popular insurrections in 1989 seems prime facie evidence that communism did fail because of its inadequacies as a political philosophy for the late twentieth century. In the end, the communist regimes had virtually no popular support. One notes, however, that many of the politicians that had led them survived in the new political order by changing their political label to "socialist" or some other more benign term. The old communists adapted quickly to the new political discourse of "free societies," even when they were cynical about it.

Did communism fail utterly?

Considering the problem from our vantage point, one could make a strong case for that viewpoint. But in the midst of the communist era, the answer was less clear. While these eastern European countries never achieved the prosperity of the west, they did provide far-reaching social services. If these societies were not wildly prosperous, neither were they completely impoverished. Communism did meet minimal economic and social needs, and in fact provided a higher standard of living than their predecessors had known. Some, such as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, were comparatively prosperous, if viewed in terms of their gross national product on a global scale.

Why did communism fail in eastern Europe? and was its failure inevitable?" Consider some of the long-range factors:

1) the oppressive presence of Soviet influence, economically, politically, militarily

2) governmental leaders who were compliant with Soviet wishes

3) a politics based on the unrivaled supremacy of a Communist party that was inherently undemocratic.

4) the mediocre quality of life. If minimal social and economic needs were met, communism provided what was a dour existence.

One notes the want of creature comforts, inferior consumer products for daily life, the shortages of basic foods, the long queues for shopping everyday. Simple tasks of shopping and commuting were time-consuming. Consumer goods that were commonplace in the west, automobiles and television sets, even fashionable clothing of the youth culture, such as blue jeans, were exorbitantly expensive and required savings and sacrifice.

Work could be dull, with little opportunity for advancement. A culture of minimal effort emerged in the workplace, for individual initiative went unrewarded.

After the fall of communism and the reunification of Germany, for example, workers and youth from the former eastern state found the pace of life too fast and the expectations for effort difficult to accept. There were material deprivations in the culture of everyday life, but more depressing was the boredom of a culture with little variety and few incentives for individual expression. 5) communism - an inhuman ideal? Finally, we must ask whether communism as a philosophy of life was compatible with human needs. One must ask whether it was based on an inadequate view of human nature. Of course, communist theorists and their apologists, contended that communism would inspire a process of socialization in which human nature would be transformed. Marx himself believed that humans possessed a "species-being," an authentic human nature that would be realized in the struggle to create a communist society. But he was vague about how that society might be conceived, and tended toward aesthetic descriptions, as in his German Ideology: "We shall hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, drive cattle in the evening, and read philosophy after dinner." His image evokes a tableau of a personally fulfilling day, but creates a fantasy that never became real in the political culture of twentieth-century communism. Even if human nature is malleable, communism in the practice of the late twentieth century in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was unable to socialize its citizens to its way of life. The need for privacy, initiative, variety, and personal fulfillment, remained strong, perhaps rendered more enticing by comparison with life in the liberal societies of the west. If individual expectations of life's possibilities were fewer than in the west, they were still far higher than anything communist culture could aspire to fulfill. Why did it fail? Here are some short-range factors to consider:

1) insidious comparisons with Western free societies. In this respect, the erection of the Berlin Wall by the east German government in 1961 backfired, for west Berlin was a showcase of Western prosperity and creativity, whereas east Berlin was shabby and depressing.

2) the intrusiveness of Soviet authority into the affairs of these eastern European nations if they deviated at all from Soviet requirements. The military intervention of the red army on several occasions to repress popular movements for reform created deep resentment that undermined the vestiges of respect for the communist system. It crushed the human spirit.

3) the inability of the east European regimes to adapt to the changing realities of the contemporary world: the electronic revolution, the making of a global economy.

4) the court of world opinion, which had more open access to activities in these countries and was able to publicize abuses more effectively than ever before. It was no longer possible for the eastern bloc to remain a closed society.

5) the quality of communist leadership --- insufficiently intimidating and yet reluctant to undertake structural reform.

Was the collapse of Communism "inevitable"?

A recent study by the historian Charles Meier, The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, argues that the collapse of the communist societies of eastern Europe, particularly those that were fairly prosperous, such as east Germany, was by no means inevitable. He sees the 1970s as a crucial decade in which east European statesmen lacked political foresight and so missed opportunities for reform that might have salvaged communist institutions. He notes that:

-leaders clung to Stalinist conceptions of authoritarian communism that had lost their appeal and even their capacity for intimidation;

-authoritarian micro-management of the economy stifled innovation needed to compete in the new global economy of consumer goods and electronic technologies;

-mounting public debt resulted from economic obsolescence. Even the once prosperous east German state collapsed under the weight of its debt to become the client of its capitalist rival, west Germany.

-the problems of the failing economies of these late communist societies were exacerbated by the emerging global economy from which they could no longer isolate themselves.

 Meier goes so far as to argue that the dissolution of the communist states of eastern Europe might be construed as a transition rather than a fall. He notes the emergence of the informal political caucuses of intellectuals and labor leaders during the late 1970s --- the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the New Forum in east Germany, the Democratic Forum in Hungary --- as a new kind of political formation that quickly attracted mass popular support without even trying. Meier interprets them as colloquies (informal discussion groups) for the constituent elements of civil society to express their grievances and needs apart from the aloof and intransigent communist parties. During the late 1980s, these groups were remarkable for their open discussions about the future of societies that had been intimidated into silence by their governments for forty years. In the face of this expression of popular democracy, leaders of the communist parties had little to offer.

On the other hand, the collapse of the communist system was implicit in the relationship between the Soviet Union and its client states in the eastern bloc. Soviet intervention in their affairs deepened the sense of despair about ever improving the quality of life there. But Soviet reluctance to intervene (as Gorbachev eventually expressed in his "Sinatra" doctrine, was construed in these states as a want of resolve, and it proved fatal to the communist system. So one might make a plausible case for the "inevitability" of the fall of communism, given the convergence of long-range and short-range problems in eastern Europe by the 1980s.

IV How did the revolt against communism transpire?

The revolt emerged in stages, different countries taking the lead at different times. We note:

1) the comparative autonomy of Yugoslavia under Jossip Broz (Marshall Tito), beginning in 1948. The Soviet Union under Stalin did not intervene militarily, but Tito established a Soviet-style communist system;

2) the movement for reform of the communist system in Hungary in 1956, and its brutal repression;

3) the movement to revitalize and liberalize communism in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and its repression;

4) the suppression of the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1981;

5) the electoral victory of Solidarity in Poland in June 1989 triggers change everywhere in eastern Europe over the following six months.