HST287: 28-Oct-2004
Reading Notes

Flyvbjerg, Bent Making Social Science Matter. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

The Science Wars

Flyvbjerg begins with a remembrance of the Sokal Affair and suggests that 1) the natural and social sciences are indeed at war and that 2) the social sciences should not follow the methodological  practices or the standards of the natural sciences. Something else is needed.

He goes on to suggest that that "something" is phronesis.

Definitions:

My Detour:

Why was Sokal hoax so well-received?:
Science, Technology, & Human Values, Autumn 1997 v22 n4 p506(17)
The Sokal affair in context. (physicist Alan Sokal's experiment designed to determine whether parody of cultural studies will pass as serious academic paper) Stephen Hilgartner.

http://web1.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark/422/210/53544563w1/purl=rc1_EAIM_0_A20123225&dyn=5!xrn_1_0_A20123225?sw_aep=vol_b92b

1) "Differences in prehoax perceptions. In the late twentieth century, physics enjoys the status of the most scientific of sciences."
2) "Differences in the institutional resources of the targets. As a well-established profession, social work could fight back with a variety of institutional resources, such as professional codes and ethics committees."
3) "Differences in how the cases fitted into the agendas of interested commentators and media gatekeepers. The humanities and social sciences in contemporary American universities have been at the center of the so-called culture wars, receiving considerable attention on campuses, in popular books, and in the mass media."

"A third irony arises from my comparison of the Epstein and Sokal controversies. The contrasting fates that these experiments enjoyed cannot be attributed to differences in methodological strength; instead, the contrast poses a fascinating puzzle about the public construction of credibility. And to solve such puzzles, we need careful social and humanistic studies of science."

But what about the meme? One big difference between Epstein's study of 1990 and Sokal's article of 1996 was the Internet!!

2) Rationality, body, and intuition in human learning

Dreyfus and Dreyfus's levels of human learning process:
So: "rationality may endanger sensiticity to context, experience, and intuition"

3) Is theory possible in social sciences

Brownian motion, even science isn't scientific
not Kuhnian paradigms: pre-paradigm argument, Asimov's psychohistory is possible? no wrong question
Foucault p. 36

4) Context counts

Dreyfus and Bourdieu:context is everything
Science: Theory must be explicit, universal, abstract, discrete (no human interest), systematic (rules, laws), complete and predictive

The arguments:

5) Values in social and political inquiry

Habits of the heart
social questions: where are we going, is this desireable, what should be done

6) The power of example

Misunderstandings of case studies:

7) The significance of conflict and power to social science

must have a well developed conception of power

Habermas: it's not subjectivity, it's intersubjecticity: "clarify your presuppositions!"

p. 91: the 5 requirements, also see article

8) Empowering Aristotle

Foucault: power is inherent in everything, power comes from below, power cannot be acquired (it flows), where ther is power there is resistance

theory must always be considered with praxis

9) Methodological guidelines for a reformed social science

"The result of phronetic research is a pragmatically governed interpretation of the studied practices. ..it does not try to develop theory or universal method...Phronetic social science explores historic circumstances and current practices to find avenues to praxis. The task of phronetic social science is to clarify and deliberate about the problems and risks we face and to outline how things may be done differently, in full knowledge that we cannot find ultimate answers to these questions or even a single version of what these questions are." (p. 140)

11) Social Science that matters



Questions

1) Flyvbjerg builds his argument that a strictly "scientific" approach to social sciences will not work, then proposes an alternative. It's an interesting, appealing approach. But does his initial assumption apply to all forms of social science research that is modeled on natural science methods? Are there any areas of social science that do respond well to these methods? (I'm wondering about the predictive nature of studying populations for purposes of assigning insurance risks, or economics, etc.)

2) There are two jokes/phrases about research, especially funded research
 - "If we knew what we were doing it wouldn't be called research."
 - "Don't apply for research funding until after you have your research results."
The first represents a traditional definition of what research is for, the second, a more practical analysis of the current situation that determines what/whose research will actually get done. Sadly, I wonder if Flyvbjerg's approach addresses the former, but not the latter.

3) Not a question, more of my usual cherche le web:
The Sokal Affair!!
In an article titled "The Sokal Affair in Context" (Science, Technology, & Human Values, Autumn 1997), Stephen Hilgartner compares Sokal's hoax to a similar one by Epstein and asks why Sokal's made such a big splash. He concludes that some of the reasons had to do with the fact that Sokal was a physicist (thus a deified scientist), that the field of social work was better able to fight back, thus prolonging the controversy, and that the case made a media splash because it "fitted into the agendas of interested commentators and media gatekeepers. The humanities and social sciences in contemporary American universities have been at the center of the so-called culture wars, receiving considerable attention on campuses, in popular books, and in the mass media."

He concludes that "the contrasting fates that these experiments enjoyed cannot be attributed to differences in methodological strength; instead, the contrast poses a fascinating puzzle about the public construction of credibility. And to solve such puzzles, we need careful social and humanistic studies of science."

But, of course, reading this fresh after Foucault, epistemes, and discourses, etc. we must ask "what does he leave out" (Flyvbjerg doesn't mention it either). The Epstein hoax was in 1990. Sokal was 1996. What happened in between? The web had reached the public consciousness and online communication had expanded immensely. The Sokal affair was, I believe, an early example of what is now being called a "meme." http://maxwell.lucifer.com/virus/alt.memetics/what.is.html
Would the fervor over Sokal's article have reached the same pitch so quickly without being fueled by online discussion groups, etc.? Just what was the impact? Now that would be an interesting question to pursue. (And where do memes fit in with Foucault's ideas of powers, Habermas's democratic discourse, and Flyvberg's phronesis: are they casuses or effects, are they different from traditional modes of discursive flow, or the same-old same-old but maybe faster?)


hope.greenberg@uvm.edu, Created/updated: 24-Oct-2004/28-Oct-2004
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