In a curious coincidence, just a day after I sent out an essay I had written on the ‘Tablighi Jama‘at (TJ) and Politics’ to subscribers of my email list, a friend of mine in Canada forwarded me an article by an American writer on precisely the same topic.  Bearing the revealing title ‘Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions’, I knew precisely what the author’s thesis was all about even before I began reading it.
A random Internet search revealed some interesting features of the author. Alex Alexiev is the vice-president of the Washington-based Centre for Security Policy, a right-wing pro-Zionist think-tank. He served for almost two decades as a senior analyst with the national security division of the Rand Corporation, another dubious right-wing American research organization, in the course of which he directed numerous research projects for the American Department of Defence. He is seen in neo-conservative circles as an ‘expert’ on Islam and is regularly invited to speak at meetings and write for journals that espouse the American imperialist cause. Interestingly,  Alexiev’s on the TJ is hosted on the official website of the Middle East Forum, an American institution headed by none other than the notorious neo-conservative and fanatically pro-Zionist writer Daniel Pipes, who specializes in the demonisation of Islam and Muslims. The site describes itself working ‘to define and promote American interests in the Middle East’.
Before I go on to discuss Alexiev’s article, a few words about myself are probably in order. I have spent three years studying the TJ, which was the subject of my doctoral dissertation. I have written a book (The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama ‘at, Orient Longman, 2001) and several articles on the TJ, some of which can be accessed on the Internet. In other words, while I do not claim to be an ‘expert’ on the TJ, I am reasonably familiar with the subject, which is precisely why I am forced to respond to Alexiev’s arrogant display of sheer ignorance on the subject.
I need to make another point before I discuss Alexiev’s thesis. Like Alexiev, I am not a Muslim. Hence, like him, I cannot be expected to defend, leave alone champion, the TJ’s theological vision. How could I do that, when the TJ stands for a extremely literalist and narrow understanding of Islam, considering all non-Muslims to be doomed to eternal perdition in Hell? Yet, at the same time as I vehemently disagree with how the TJ dismisses all non-Muslims as ‘aberrant’, I cannot also agree with Alexiev’s equally illegitimate sweeping generalization of all Tablighis as ‘terrorists’. My intention here, therefore, is not to defend the TJ’s theology, but, rather, to defend the vast majority of the Tablighis who have nothing whatsoever to do with ‘terrorism’, contrary to what Alexiev seems to allege.
Having made these basic clarifications, let me take up the various claims that Alexiev makes about the TJ in the order that they appear in his article. The subtitle of the article--   ‘Jihad’s Stealthy Legions’—neatly summarises what the essay purports to discuss. Ignoring diverse Muslim understandings and interpretations of the term ‘jihad’, Alexiev uses it only in the sense of armed conflict and confrontation with non-Muslims. As the instances that he cites in the course of the article reveal, he appears to regard militancy as somehow inherent in Islam and as a natural expression thereof. There is no recognition whatsoever of the fact that social contexts influence people’s interpretations of religion, and that militant interpretations of Islam (or of any religion, for that matter) might, in a sense, emerge from situations of exclusion, marginalization and oppression. Since militancy or ‘terrorism’ comes to be seen as integral to Islam, the role of imperialist powers such !
as the United States or of local dictatorships (often allied to the former) in creating conditions of oppression that lead to the emergence of radical interpretations of Islam is conveniently overlooked.
To Alexiev, the millions of Tablighi activists all over the world are little more than jihadist clones. They are all tarred with the same brush, as alleged purveyors of terror, or so Alexiev seems to believe. The diverse reasons why Muslims join the TJ, and, most relevant in the context of the present discussion, their diverse and often conflicting political stances, are completely ignored, as the Tablighis come to be collectively branded as ‘the largest group of religious proselytizers of any faith’ and as fervently committed to the ‘explosive growth of Islamic religious fervour and conversion’.
Alexiev’s major argument is that Tablighi protestations of being apolitical are simply fraudulent and that, in fact, the TJ aims, through its ‘stealthy legions’ at nothing less than a ‘planned conquest of the world’. In order to back up his claim, he quotes a range of sources, almost all non-Muslim white Western scholars and writers, in addition to some Indian and Israeli intelligence officers, whom he takes to be leading authorities on Islam and the TJ. His complete avoidance of Tablighi sources themselves is probably deliberate, because this would obviously seriously question the thesis that he seeks to put forward.
Based on these carefully selected sources, Alexiev claims that recent events, of Tablighi activists in some countries being involved in jihadist movements, clearly indicate that the TJ is no harmless religious movement. I do not deny that some Tablighi activists have indeed been involved in radical religio-political movements, but to claim, as Alexiev seems to, that this is the product of a hidden policy of the Tablighi leaders or of the TJ as such, is complete nonsense. The TJ has no fixed membership and the leaders of the movement do not exercise a total control on TJ activists. Any Sunni Muslim can join in the work of the movement, spending a day to several months at a stretch in its preaching work, and then choose to continue with the movement or dissociate from it. Many Muslims I know treat the TJ as what they call a ‘spiritual battery charger’, going off on Tabligh tours once in a while but not identifying themselves as Tablighis as such. Given the extremely fluid stru!
cture of the movement, it is possible that some Muslims might associate with the TJ while at the same time or later be involved in radical Islamist movements. Conversely, large numbers of Muslims might join in the preaching work of the TJ while at the same time remaining aloof from conventional or militant politics, leading fully ‘normal’ lives. In either case, the leaders of the TJ do not provide them any instructions or guidance on political affairs, this being left entirely to the discretion of the individuals concerned.
Because the TJ leaders rarely, if ever, refer to actual political events and do not instruct TJ activists on political affairs, individual Tablighi activists can adopt a range of political stances, quiescent or radical, on their own volition, contrary to what Alexiev alleges. Nor is the claim that the Tablighis are necessarily radical or violent valid. Thus, for instance, it is well-known that in Pakistan, President Ayub Khan deliberately sought to court the Tablighis to counteract the influence of the Islamist Jama‘at-i Islami. Interestingly, the leading ideologue of the TJ, Maulana Zakariya Kandhwalvi, penned a tract (at the behest of Ayub Khan, some critics allege) bearing the revealing title of ‘Finta-i Maududiyat’ (‘The Strife that is Maududism’), alleging that the Islamist vision as spelled out by the founder of the Jama‘at-i Islami, Sayed Abul Ala Maududi was anathema and not ‘Islamic’ at all! Likewise, it is known that in Israel the TJ has been allowed to freely func!
tion, while Islamist groups protesting against the Zionist occupation have been fiercely suppressed. In India, the radical Hindu chauvinist group Shiv Sena actually went out of its way in order to arrange for a grand Tablighi gathering in Mumbai some years ago. In short, the Tablighi slogan ‘We talk only about the heavens above and the grave below and not what is in between’ , which most Tablighis strictly abide by, has been found by a range of anti-Muslim groups to actually serve their own interests in so far as this helps depoliticize Muslims and thereby counter more assertive Islamic groups. This explains why a range of Islamist groups have actually been heavily critical of the TJ, some going so far as to allege that it is actually a creation of various ‘enemies of Islam’ to drain Islam of what they call the ‘spirit of jihad’. This seriously brings into question Alexiev’s thesis of the TJ as a radical jihadist outfit.
In order to back  his claim of the TJ being a covert political outfit, Alexiev cites the instance of Pakistan, where, in recent years, some Tablighi activists have been involved in politics, some even rising to top political positions. This, of course, is undeniable, but the question to be asked is if this has been the result of a conscious decision on the part of Tablighi authorities or whether, instead, this has happened because of the loose command structure of the movement, where the leaders do not dictate individuals’ political choices and careers. This question Alexiev probably deliberately ignores. The evidence of Tablighi radical political activism that Alexiev provides in discussing Pakistan is carefully trimmed to suit his argument and to exclude any incriminating evidence of the role of American imperialism in actually promoting Islamist radicalism.  Thus, for instance, he cites the interesting case of Javed Nasir, a Tablighi activist who served as director of Pak!
istan’s dreaded secret service agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, without caring to mention the close nexus between the American establishment and the ISI. Likewise, while citing the case of Rafiq Tarar, a Tablighi activist who served as President of Pakistan for a short period, Alexiev does not care to deal with the crucial issue of the close and continuing collaboration between the United States and the Pakistani political establishment.
The TJ, if Alexiev is to be believed, aims at conquering the entire world and establishing a global Islamic caliphate. ‘The movement does not consider individual states to be legitimate’, he claims. He cites Marc Gaborieau, whom he describes as a ‘French Tablighi expert’, as insisting that the TJ’s ‘ultimate objective’ is nothing short of a ‘planned conquest of the world’ in ‘the spirit of jihad’. I have great respect for Gaborieau as a person and as a scholar—I know him personally—but I do not think he is an ‘expert’ on the TJ, and nor, I think, does he claim that stature. But leave that alone. Alexiev’s argument that the TJ regards existing states as illegitimate is completely unfounded. It might well be true that the TJ dreams of the day when all the world will become Muslim and would live under a single Muslim Caliph, but till that happens (an eventuality that it postpones into the indefinite future) it comfortably accommodates itself to the reality of existing nation st!
ates. In this it is no different from other Islamist groups or, for that matter, from evangelical Christian groups that expect the imminent arrival of Jesus who would set about establishing the Kingdom of God on earth.
The argument that the Tablighis are necessarily hostile to individual states (and the implication, therefore, that they are committed to destroying them through armed jihad) is further questionable on the basis of the very evidence that Alexiev proceeds to cite. He writes that ‘from its inception, the extremist attitudes that characterize Deobandism permeated Tablighi philosophy’, and notes that the founder of the movement, Muhammad Ilyas himself being a graduate of the Deoband madrasa. Little does Alexiev know (or, if he does know, he carefully conceals it) that leading Deobandis actually passionately supported the concept of Indian nationalism, uniting Hindus, Muslims and others in a common Indian nationhood, vigorously opposing the dreams of a global Caliphate of Islamists like the Jama‘at-i Islami, as well as the Muslim nationalism of the advocates of the Pakistan movement.
In order to further reinforce his argument of what he considers as the Tablighis’ dangerous political designs, Alexiev claims to have discovered what he calls a ‘synergistic relationship between Saudi Wahhabis and South Asian Deobandis’. He writes that in recent years the Saudis have resorted to ‘large-scale’ financing’ of the TJ. Curiously, he cites no evidence or sources to back this argument, and simply dismisses Tablighi claims that TJ missionaries must bear their own expenses. Clearly, Alexiev has little regard for the sharp differences between the Deobandis and the Saudi ‘Wahhabis’, which, in recent years, has resulted in furious fatwa battles in South Asia and elsewhere between the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith, a scriptural reformist group closely linked to the Saudi ‘Wahhabis’, with each branding the other as virtually ‘un-Islamic’. He ignores the significant fact that the Tablighi missionaries are prohibited from preaching in Saudi Arabia, presumably because the S!
audi ‘Wahhabis’ do not believe that the TJ is really ‘Islamic’ enough. In fact, Saudi opposition to TJ ideology is so extreme that Tablighi books are not allowed to be imported into the country.
All this, of course, does not mean that the Saudis would necessarily be averse to using the TJ to promote their own interests. But Alexiev stretches the point too far, going to the extent of deliberately misinterpreting a controversial fatwa by the chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, in order to make the argument of an allged close nexus between the TJ, the Saudi ‘Wahhabis’ and terrorism. The fatwa that he cites is hosted on a ‘Wahhabi’ website (http://www.fatwa-online.com), and, curiously enough (and Alexiev deliberately chooses to remain silent on this) is contained in a section titled ‘Deviant Groups’, where the TJ is bundled together with a range of other Muslim sects that the Saudi ‘Wahhabis’ deem as ‘un-Islamic’, including the Shi‘as and the Ahmadis.
In what could only be described as an act of disgraceful intellectual dishonesty, Alexiev quotes from a line of a single fatwa of Bin Baz hosted on the site, claiming that this ‘most influential Wahhabi cleric’ recognized what he is said to have regarded as the ‘good work’ of the TJ, and encouraged his ‘Wahhabi brethren’ to join TJ preaching parties so that, in Bin Baz;s words, they could ‘guide and advise them’.
The fatwa in question, in actual fact, provides precisely the opposite advice! That itself is evident from the very title of the fatwa: ‘The Final Fatwa of Shaykh 'Abdul-'Azeez ibn Baaz Warning Against the Jamaa'ah at-Tableegh’.
For the benefit of readers let me quote the question put to Bin Baz on the TJ and his fatwa in response thereto:
“Question: Your Excellency, we hear about the Jamaa‘ah at-Tableegh and that which their da‘wah entails. So would you advise me to join this Jama‘ah?. I anticipate your guidance and advice, and may Allah reward you immensely.
Response: Whoever invites to [the path of] Allah, then he is a muballigh [one who conveys the message (of Islam)], [as the Hadith mentions]: ‘Convey from me, even if it be a [single] ayah (Qur’anic verse); However, the Jama‘ah at-Tableegh [originally] from India have [sic.] many deviations. They have some aspects of  bid‘ah [innovation] and shirk [polytheism], so it is not permissible to go (out) with them, except for a person who has knowledge and goes (out) with them to disapprove of what they are upon and to teach them (the truth). If, however, he goes (out) to follow and adhere to them, then no. That is because they have deviations, mistakes and lack of knowledge. However, if there was a  Jama‘ah doing tableegh other than them, from the people of knowledge, then (it is permissible to) go out with them for daw'ah purposes. If there was a person of knowledge who goes out with them to enlighten and guide them, along with teaching them such that they leave their falsehood an!
d embrace the way of Ahlus-Sunnah wal- Jama‘ah [the Sunni community], (then that is good)”.
In other words, as this fatwa indicates, Bin Baz clearly regarded the TJ as ‘deviant’, and as propagating ‘un-Islamic’ beliefs. He seems not to have even regarded them as fellow Sunnis, and hence not as proper Muslims, because for the ‘Wahhabis’ only Sunnis are Muslims. All this, of course, is crudely covered up by Alexiev in his frantic effort to link the TJ with the ‘Wahhabis’ in order to press his claim of the TJ being a secret terrorist outfit inspired by ‘Wahhabi’ zeal and flush with Saudi petrodollars.
In an even more strongly worded fatwa hosted on the same site, which Alexiev probably deliberately ignores, Bin Baz goes so far as to announce that the Tablighis are destined to perdition in Hell, alleging that they are ‘opposed’ to the Sunni path, and, hence, for all purposes, are not Muslims at all. In this regard Bin Baz refers to an alleged saying of the Prophet Muhammad, according to which, after the death of the Prophet, the Muslims would be divided into 73 sects, 72 of which, because they would deviate from the path of the Prophet, would be punished in hell, and only one sect, which continued in the Prophetic path, would enter heaven. Bin Baz believes that the one chosen sect is represented by himself and his fellow ‘Wahhabis’, and that all others groups who call themselves ‘Muslims’ are to be punished by God in hell. In response to the question if the TJ is also among the 72 hell-destined Muslim sects, Bin Baz declares: ‘They are from the 72 [sects]. Whoever opposes !
the ‘aqeedah [belief] of Ahlus-Sunnah [Sunnism] enters the fold of the 72 [sects]’.
Likewise, Alexiev deliberately turns a complete blind eye to similar fatwas and statements hosted on the same website and delivered by other leading ‘Wahhabi’ ‘ulama. Let me cite just two these to argue against Alexiev’s mischievous attempt to club the TJ with the Saudi ‘Wahhabis’ in order to portray the TJ as a hidden cover for ‘Wahhabi’ ‘terrorism’ and dreams of world conquest.
1.      Statement of Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Ibraheem Al-ash-Shaikh on the TJ issued in a note to  the Saudi Prince Khalid Ibn Sa'ud, leader of the Royal Court:
“I inform your Excellency that there is no good in this organization [TJ] for certainly it is an organisation of innovation and falsehood which I have discovered by reading their pamphlets which were attached to their requests. We found it to comprise of falsehood, innovation and the inviting to the worshipping of graves and shirk (polytheism). Quite simply, something which (we) cannot remain quiet about. Therefore, we shall Inshallah (God willing) put forward a refutation revealing their misguidance and falsehood”.
2.      Fatwa of Shaikh Muhammad Naasiruddin al-Albani regarding the TJ , in response to a question if it was possible for Muslims to ‘go out’ with the TJ:
“The Jama‘ah at-Tableegh does not uphold the manhaj [path] of the Book of Allah and the sunnah [practice] of His Messenger (sal-Allaahu `alayhe wa sallam) and that which our Pious Predecessors were upon. And if the situation was such, then it is not permissible to go out with them because it defies our manhaj in calling to the manhaj of the Pious Predecessors [...] They say their da‘wah (‘invitation’, message) is based upon the Book of Allah and the sunnah; however this is mere idle talk for certainly they have no ‘aqeedah (belief) upon which they are united […] This is because their da‘wah is built upon amassing (the people) […] and in reality they do not really have any culture. More than half a century has passed and there has not appeared from amongst them a scholar”.
After claiming that the notion of TJ apoliticalness is unfounded and that the TJ is actually hand-in-glove with the Saudi ‘Wahhabis’ in a join plot to take over the world, Alexiev proceeds to argue that the TJ has now ‘radicalized to the point where it is now a driving force of Islamic extremism and a major recruiting agency for terrorist causes worldwide’. ‘For a majority of young Muslim extremists, joining Tablighi Jamaat is the first step on the road to extremism’, he says, quoting French and American intelligence sources to back his claim. He uncritically accepts these sources claims as valid in order to construct an image of the TJ as what he himself calls a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’.
I do not deny that some Muslims who join the ranks of militant Islamist groups may well have been associated, at some point in their lives, with the TJ. In fact, it is likely that the powerful rhetorical appeal of the TJ might well enthuse some Muslims in some countries, who perceive themselves as oppressed, to graduate on to more activist and radical Islamist organizations. The point, however, is that this is probably not a result of a conscious decision or official policy of the TJ as such. To repeat what I said earlier, the TJ is open to all Sunni Muslims, and any Sunni can join a Tablighi tour for any period of time that he wants. The leaders do not provide any guidance to TJ activists on political affairs. Hence, it is hardly surprising that some of them might gravitate towards radical Islamist groups. These, however, are only a very small minority, although Alexiev seems to imply that most Tablighis follow that career path. Alexiev also deliberately ignores the fact th!
at many of those who leave the TJ to join radical Islamist groups do so precisely because they find the Tablighi approach too mild and docile and politically un-involved. Further, he also turns a complete blind eye to the millions of Tablighis—certainly the vast majority—who have nothing to do with radical Islamism at all. But even more distressing is the fact that he refers to the phenomenon of radical Islamism in a sociological vacuum, as if local dictatorships and Western imperialism had nothing whatsoever to do with it.
In this way, Alexis builds his case for the West to clamp down on the TJ, arguing that ‘at best’ it is a  ‘powerful proselytizing movement that preaches extremism and disdain for religious tolerance, democracy, and separation of church and state’, and ‘at worst’ it represent[s] an Islamist fifth column that aids and abets terrorism’. ‘Contrary to their benign treatment by scholars and academics, Tablighi Jama‘at has more to do with political sedition than with religion’, he argues. ‘If the West chooses to turn a blind eye to the problem, Tablighi involvement in future terrorist activities at home and abroad is not a matter of conjecture; it is a certainty’, he announces.
The message is clear: any form of resistance to Western hegemony simply cannot be tolerated. ‘The war on terrorism cannot be won unless al-Qaeda terrorists are understood to be the products of Islamist ideology preached by groups like Tablighi Jamaat’, he says, in an appeal for what is nothing short of a war on the TJ itself. Ominous portents, indeed.