

Plus Ça Change?: Evidence on Global Trends in Gender Norms and Stereotypes

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ABSTRACT

Gender norms and stereotypes that perpetuate inequality are deeply embedded in social and individual consciousness and are, as a result, resistant to change. Gender stratification theories propose that women's control over material resources can increase bargaining power to leverage change in key institutions, prompting a shift to more equitable norms. By extension, policies that permit women to take on paid employment should serve as a fulcrum for gender equitable change. Is there any evidence to support this hypothesis? To test this requires a means to capture gender norms and stereotypes. The World Values Survey provides just such a mechanism, with a series of gender questions that span a 15-year period and more than 70 countries. This paper uses that data to analyze determinants of trends in norms and stereotypes over time and across countries.

Plus Ça Change?:¹ Evidence on Global Trends in Gender Norms and Stereotypes

I. Introduction

Inequitable gender norms and stereotypes are embedded in political, legal, cultural, and economic domains. Because these domains operate so as to structure access to and control over resources, they also reproduce, strengthen, and legitimate the gender system based on inequality. Gender inequality thus has both material and psychological/social dimensions. What is the relationship between these two dimensions?

Macrostructural theories of gender stratification, systemic in nature, link the level of gender inequality to factors influencing women's bargaining power (Blumberg 1984, 1988; Chafetz 1989). The degree of gender stratification has been argued to be inversely linked to the level of economic power women have and the control over the material resources this generates. Increases in women's ability to participate in economic production and to control the distribution of their production then can enhance their status and reduce physical, political, and ideological oppression.

It has also been noted that gender systems are undergirded by attitudes and behaviors that legitimize male control and undervalue women. Thus gender social definitions—that is, ideology, norms, and stereotypes—are a critical link in a gender-stratified system. Most feminist theorists agree that the cultural domain in which institutions reproduce beliefs and attitudes that shape female and male behavior are key components of a gender-stratified system. The perpetuation of gender norms and stereotypes that cause women and men to internalize as legitimate the current system of inequality results in a

perception that the gender order is “natural”—or, as some claim, “hardwired”—rather than socially constructed to benefit males.

If macrostructural theories have merit, it follows that expansion of women’s access to resources may be a vehicle for transforming an unequal gender system. In economies with well-developed labor markets, an increase in women’s share of employment, for example, may provide them with the power to promote change at multiple levels—in the household and in institutional domains that create and reinforce gender norms and stereotypes. Numerous factors might stimulate increases in women’s share of economic activity—rapid economic growth, structural change in the economy, or even economic crisis that reduces men’s access to income. We can hypothesize that women’s increased economic activity is likely to exert a positive effect on gender equality, and should produce changes in gender norms and stereotypes, although with a lag. This paper tests this hypothesis using data from the World Values Survey. In particular, I assess the effect of changes in women’s economic activity on trends in gender norms and stereotypes to determine if there is a significant causal relationship.

II. The Link Between Women’s Relative Economic Power and Gender Norms and Stereotypes

The stratified gender system that results in material inequality between women and men is buttressed by social definitions—that is, a set of gender ideology, norms, and stereotypes. These serve to devalue women and support traits and behaviors for men and women that reinforce the gender division of labor and male power. Gender *ideologies* justify the gender imbalance in power and resources. Gender *stereotypes* describe the manner in which men and women presumably differ, usually in ways that justify to some extent the gender division of labor. And finally, gender *norms* specify acceptable behavioral boundaries

for women and men, congruent with the gender division of labor and male power.

Inculcation of these norms results in negative consequences attached to acts that transgress defined gender boundaries. Those consequences may be in the form of social stigma, with violation of one's gender identity often leading to anxiety and distress.²

Social definitions thus play an important role in reducing resistance to gender inequality in favor of men. To the extent that social definitions instill an acceptability of gender gaps in everyday behavior, there is less need to employ overt forms of power to maintain gender hierarchies. Such norms and stereotypes affect not only adults, but perhaps more importantly, also children's socialization, with children internalizing the boundaries placed on their behavior and the behavioral expectations they learn.³

What then are the pivotal targets that will leverage change for greater gender equality? Two important targets stand out: the gender division of labor that structures control over material resources, and the psychological/social system that creates gendered personalities and behavior with the use of social definitions whose effect is to legitimate the status quo. In the former, the target variables to leverage change are women's access to paid employment and equal pay, thus contributing to greater gender income equality. In the latter case, a remedy is the acceptance of a set of feminist social definitions, facilitated by women's entrance into high status positions in institutions. Women's representation in academia, in religious organizations and leadership roles, and in legislative positions can act as a fulcrum for change.

Some have raised doubts about the latter strategy's prospects for success. Chafetz (1989) argues, for example, that engendered personalities and behavior are set in childhood. Increasing women's access to institutions that mold social definitions may

eventually have an effect on women and men, such that children are able to observe more gender equitable behavior in the household, but this process may take a very long time. Further, even if social definitions change (leading to a gender equitable transformation of children's socialization), men's power over resources will inhibit progress in material equality between men and women. Increasing women's access to income is therefore likely to yield more immediate results in improving women's economic empowerment, hastening the alteration of power dynamics within the household that shape children's perceptions.

This is not to suggest that simultaneous efforts to change norms and stereotypes should be eschewed, as norms themselves inhibit the effectiveness of women's access to income. For example, Barbara Burnell and Johanna Ratzel (2005) find evidence for India that the effect of wages on bargaining is mediated by cultural norms that shape women's sense of agency. Nevertheless, it is important for economists to understand the effect that women's access to income can have on gender norms and stereotypes, since this has implications for the effects of employment-stimulating macroeconomic policies.

Also focusing on bargaining power, Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth (2005) link the relative strength of patriarchal norms to the relationship between the mobility of male economic assets to the mobility of female economic assets, which can be related to the structure of the economy. Thus different modes of production shape intra-household bargaining power. For example, in labor-intensive agriculture, the requirement of physical strength as an agricultural input encourages a gender division of labor that gives men command over assets that are more mobile than female household-labor specific assets.⁴ In post-industrial economies where brawn matters less, gender norms and attitudes are more egalitarian. This is because, they argue, families in such societies choose to socialize their

daughters in more gender-neutral ways to assist them in securing a stable livelihood. Subsistence in such a scenario, as well as specialization in unpaid caring labor, would be economically costly. The key point here is the argument that the structure of the economy has a significant influence on gender norms and stereotypes.

While the structure of the economy is a slow-changing variable, even in the shorter run, some argue, the state of the macroeconomy may also exert an independent effect on trends in gender norms and stereotypes. One view is that economic growth may facilitate a positive change in women's well-being and gender roles (World Bank 2001; David Dollar and Roberta Gatti 1999). Empirically, this argument is based on regressions of gender gaps in educational attainment on levels of development (measured as per capita income). The reasoning behind this correlation is asserted to be that in low-income gender-stratified societies, women are at the back of the queue for economic resources. With higher per capita incomes, proportionally more resources reach the back of the line and lead to changed perceptions about gender roles. This view suggests that growth is itself sufficient to improve gender equity (World Bank 2001).

In principle, periods of economic expansion *can* result in increased income to fund social spending and safety nets, and permit women to enlarge their share of employment and managerial slots. Such conditions can promote gender equity without a frontal assault on norms and stereotypes that might provoke male resistance and backlash. Whether or not women benefit from economic growth, however, depends on the distributional effects of growth in three areas: within the household, in labor markets, and at the level of the state. That is, women benefit only if the net distributional effect, via these three pathways, is positive. It is an empirical question as to whether growth yields such results, particularly in the current context of liberalization.

A growth process that increases gender inequality by marginalizing women from paid employment, or in which inequality grows due to women's segregation in the lowest wage jobs may not facilitate a revision of gender ideology in favor of women. Numerous scholars argue that the current era of globalization *cum* economic liberalization has indeed had a deleterious effect on women's income opportunities and conditions of work (Lourdes Benería 2003; V. Spike Petersen 2003; Stephanie Seguino 2006). There is, for example, an increased use of home workers, primarily women (Ping-Chun Hsiung 1996; Elisabeth Prügl 1999; Petersen 2003) as a response to greater competitive pressures on firms to reduce costs. The lower wages paid to home workers and the reduction in overhead costs, while beneficial to firms, reinforces gender norms and stereotypes of women whose work is linked to the home and their role as caretakers, perpetuating women's designation as secondary wage earners. This type of work limits women's ability to bargain in the household for better distribution of work and labor. These factors suggest that economic growth in the current period of globalization may not promote a movement to more equitable gender norms and stereotypes.

Further, rather than growth promoting greater gender equality, it may very well be that its opposite—economic crisis, measured as negative growth rates of GDP—provokes a return to norms and stereotypes that undermine gender equality. Diane Elson (1991, 2002) has provided a trenchant analysis of structural adjustment programs which, by contributing to economic stagnation, cuts in public expenditures on health, education, and food subsidies, have negatively affected women's well-being. She argues that women bear an undue burden of stimulating growth in liberalized economies where the role of the state is reduced, and macroeconomic volatility is heightened.

Economic crises of this kind have led in many cases not only to increases in women's unpaid labor burden, but also of their "distress" sales of labor in the informal sector in order to replace income lost from male wage cuts or job losses (Nilufer Cagatay and Sule Olzer 1995; Maria Floro 1995; Joseph Lim 2000).⁵ Rather than contributing to gender equitable norms, periods of economic crisis may in fact exacerbate gender tensions. This is because economic crisis can have negative effects on men's income generating possibilities, undermining masculine "male breadwinner" norms (Sylvia Chant 2002).⁶

In some cases, women who take on paid employment during economic crisis feel even more pressure to accede to male-dominant norms in the household as a way to assuage men's perceptions of their diminished status in the workplace (Naila Kabeer 2000). Evidence from Latin America links the growth of inequality in that region, due in part to economic liberalization and associated structural adjustment policies, to increases in domestic violence, precisely because of the negative effect of such policies on male income and their loss of status (Soledad Larraín 1999).

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003) take a different approach, attributing what they call the "rising tide of gender equality" to the process of modernization, with agricultural societies reflecting traditional values that undermine women's choices and power and post-industrial societies reflecting the most gender egalitarian attitudes. They note that growth alone is insufficient to ensure gender equity, citing the examples of high per capita income countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. What is it then about modernization that can promote gender equity? The authors have linked this to changes in cultural legacies and religious traditions, and also to the role of the state in post-industrial societies⁷ in expanding women's agency via affirmative action, equal pay, and other forms of legislation and social protections.

Along those lines, some authors suggest that changes in social institutions which embody and perpetuate social definitions of female subservience will influence women's access to income-generating opportunities, such as employment. To test this hypothesis, Morrison and Jutting (2005) use regression analysis on a new and unique data base to evaluate the effect on female employment of a variety of institutional characteristics proxied by polygamy, female genital mutilation, percentage of 15-19 year olds ever married, and access to capital. They find evidence that education and growth have little effect on women's employment and instead that social institutions are a major determinant of female employment. There is, however, an issue of causality the paper does not address since it is a purely cross-sectional analysis.⁸ Are the institutions causing female employment or is it the reverse? More importantly, we want to know what causes social definitions to change, an issue that paper does not take up.

To summarize, for the purposes of empirical analysis, female share of employment, structure of the economy, and economic growth are potentially distinct but separate factors that affect gender norms and stereotypes.⁹ Social role theory undergirds the choice of female share of employment as the indicator of women's increased control over material resources. Were the requisite data available, it would also be useful to test the effect of female relative wages and female share of income on gender norms and stereotypes, insofar as these better capture female relative economic power identified by Blumberg (1988) as a fulcrum for change. However, gender-disaggregated income data is lacking; there are no sources of internationally comparable data on female share of income.¹⁰

Agriculture as a share of GDP is used to capture the structure of the economy. We would expect more patriarchal attitudes, the larger the share of agriculture in GDP. This follows from Iversen and Rosenbluth (2005), who hypothesize that different modes of

production shape intra-household bargaining power, with labor-intensive agriculture giving men command over assets that are more mobile than female household-labor specific assets.

Because norms and stereotypes are slow-changing variables, it is likely that women's greater economic activity and macroeconomic variables will operate with a lag. There is little research in the economics literature that would give guidance on how long it takes for norms and stereotypes to change. The social psychology literature, however, shows that attitudes that reflect underlying norms can change in relatively short periods of time.¹¹ For instance, there is cross-cultural evidence to demonstrate that norms and stereotypes have changed relatively quickly in response to political and economic transitions (Amanda Diekmann, Wind Goodfriend, and Stephanie Goodwin 2004; Amanda Diekmann, Alice Eagly, Antonio Mladinic, and Maria Cristina Ferreira 2005).

An interesting example of the flexibility of gender norms and stereotypes is outlined in a study that evaluates the effects of an experimental intervention in Brazil (Gary Barker, Marcos Nascimento, Marcio Segundo, and Julie Pulerwitz 2000). "Program H" ("H" refers to *homens*, Portuguese for men) was designed to improve the attitudes¹² and reduce the risk behaviors of young Brazilian men as a means to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS. It has been increasingly recognized that the promotion of safe sex requires a change in the attitudes of young men. Risky behaviors have been found to be associated with more traditional gender attitudes among young men (Alison Clarke, Sherry Hutchinson, and Ellen Weiss 2004). "Program H" used interactive group activities and "social marketing" to help young men question traditional gender norms related to masculinity, and to promote the abilities of men to engage in more gender-equitable relationships with their female partners. Barker, Nascimento, Segundo, and Pulerwitz (2000) found a substantial reduction in gender inequality attitudes from the baseline after 6 months. A one-year follow up study showed

that the change in attitudes persisted. While this intervention represents a concerted effort to change norms, it is clear that change is possible in a relatively short period of time.

For the purposes of this study, then, I chose five-year lags under the assumption that some time is required for women's employment to affect their own perceptions of their status and to influence societal attitudes. It would be useful, as more data becomes available, to test the data for rates of change, using longer lags. However, data constraints make such an investigation in the present study impossible.

III. Descriptive Data Analysis of Trends in Norms and Stereotypes

The World Values Survey provides a mechanism to capture gender norms and stereotypes, with a series of gender questions that span four waves, conducted over a 20-year period.¹³ This first wave only covered 22 countries, and so is not included in this analysis. This paper uses data from the second, third, and fourth waves to assess the causes of differences in gender attitudes over time and across political units. The 1990-93 survey covers 42 political units; the 1995-97 survey covers 54 political units. The 1999-2001 survey covers 60. In all, over 80 independent countries and Puerto Rico have been surveyed in at least one wave of this investigation. These include almost 85 percent of the world's population.

The World Values Survey data are collected through face-to-face interviews. In most countries, some form of stratified multistage random probability sampling was used to obtain representative national samples. Other sampling procedures used included cluster sampling, multistage sampling utilizing the Kish-grid method, purposive sampling, and quota sampling (Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basáñez, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Loek Halman, and Ruud Luijkx 2004).¹⁴

Two types of questions from the World Values Survey are analyzed. One type directly reflects the degree of adherence to norms and stereotypes about the gender division of labor, gender power, and men's and women's relative right to access to resources and opportunities. The second set of questions more indirectly reflects gender attitudes, providing information on attitudes towards those with less power and resources in society (a measure of altruism), as well as self-assessment of control over own lives, well-being, and interest in politics. Both sets of questions are shown in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here].

Each wave added new countries to the sample, and thus the survey results for the full sample are not strictly comparable over time. I therefore present trends over time only for a fixed sample, restricted to those countries included in the second, third, and most recent waves. Only four of the relevant questions were asked in all of these waves. (See Appendix, Table A.2 for a list of countries in the fixed and full samples). Gender-disaggregated responses by region¹⁵ are shown in Table 2, as well as the change in responses.

[Table 2 about here].

Several observations are relevant about these data. First, in almost all cases, men's opinions suggest they adhere more strongly to gender inequitable norms and stereotypes than women. The difference is quantified as the "gender gap" in attitudes—simply the female percentage in agreement less the male percentage; the gap is statistically significant in most cases.¹⁶ Second, the change in responses to these questions is indicative of an attenuation of patriarchal norms and stereotypes in most cases. For example, in response to the question "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women," all regions show a decline in the percent of females who agree, with the exception of Asia. In most regions, male agreement has also declined, with the exception again of Asia as well as Sub-

Saharan Africa. The case of the transition economies is noteworthy. The decline in agreement with this question has been dramatic for both men and women. It is possible that the 1990 survey coincided with privatization and the rapid rise of unemployment in these economies that resulted in fierce competition for the sharply reduced number of jobs. If this is the case, it would suggest that economic crisis can lead to resurgence of gender inequitable norms.¹⁷

The case of Asia is an interesting one. Responses in 2000 may have been influenced by the Asian financial crisis, which led to sharp increases in unemployment. In some countries, such as South Korea, women were exhorted to leave jobs to make room for men as the “rightful breadwinners” (Ajit Singh and Ann Zammit 2002). The result was that women’s unemployment rate rose much more rapidly than men’s during the crisis in South Korea. Again, economic crisis that threatened men’s access to jobs may have led to a resurgence and reacceptance of patriarchal norms by both men and women.

Interestingly, the increase in the percentage of Asian women surveyed who agree with this statement is greater than that for men, and is statistically significant. In contrast, the percentage of men in Sub-Saharan Africa who agree with that statement jumped by 10 percentage points from 1990 to 2000, while the percentage of women in agreement declined. Given that the Sub-Saharan region has undergone a long-term growth slow down as compared to Asia’s abrupt crisis—and given that women have greater financial responsibility for care of children in Sub-Saharan Africa—the gender gap in change of attitudes is not surprising. A final observation on the responses to this question, also valid for the remaining questions, is that differences between regions are sometimes as large as or larger than gender differences.

The remaining three questions in Table 2 refer to stereotypes about women's roles as parents. The results here are somewhat contradictory. The view that women have to have children to be fulfilled is held by women and men in roughly the same percentages across regions, though OECD and Latin American countries adhere less strongly to this view than other regions. Over time, however, there has been a marked decline in the percentage of both men and women who hold this view, and in all cases, the decline is statistically significant.

Even in 1990, a large majority of respondents, both male and female, agreed that working mothers can have close relationships with children—although women more than men held that view. Since that time, there has been a substantial increase in the percentage of men and women in agreement with that statement—again with women reflecting a greater increase in gender-equitable attitudes.

On the other hand, the responses to the question on the degree of fulfillment housewives experience suggests some nostalgia and ambivalence about changing gender roles for both men and women. This is especially apparent in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, both regions where crisis and/or slow growth have led to greater unpaid labor and care burdens for women. This may be read as a compensatory shift in attitudes, to accommodate and adjust to changing economic fortunes and women's more limited access to remunerative employment.

It is often claimed that men are threatened by women's movement into the paid labor market, leading to a backlash in attitudes calling for women's return to their role as caretakers (Claudia Minolti, Alejandra Rotania, and Irma Vichich 1991; Susan Fleck 1998). These results do not support that view, and are particularly noteworthy because the period 1990 to 2000 is one of slow growth, increasing joblessness, and economic crisis for some

regions including Asia, transition economies, and many Latin American and African economies. As will be seen in the next section, however, the econometric results are not entirely consistent with this generalization, and instead, suggest a negative effect of economic crisis on equitable norms and stereotypes.

Table 3 presents descriptive gender-disaggregated data on norms and stereotypes for questions asked only in the 1995 and 2000 waves. The percentages are unweighted country averages. In addition, I provide some illustrative data on questions reflecting social attitudes on degree of life satisfaction, control, and altruism that are of interest. The results are mixed. The percentage of men and women who believe that men make better political leaders fell slightly. The gender gap in attitudes is quite wide, but has not diminished over this time period.

The percentage of men and women who believe both husband and wife should contribute to income is very high, and the gender gap small. One explanation for this result is that the role of male as parent, whose primary concern is for his children's welfare, trumps masculinist norms that are threatened by female contributions to income. There has been little change in male agreement with this statement, but the percentage of women agreeing has declined. There is also a decline in the belief that boys more than girls deserve a university education. Most striking about these data is the low percentages of both women and men who hold that attitude.

[Table 3 about here].

Interestingly, there is a sharp decline in life satisfaction for both men and women, but much stronger for women over this time period. The gender gap in feelings of freedom and control over lives is very small, and changes are not statistically significant for men or women.¹⁸ Women and men rated the degree of control they feel over their lives quite

similarly in 1995. Both groups perceive themselves as having less control by 2000, but the decline is not statistically significant. There is a wide gender gap in interest in politics, however. Interestingly, both men and women indicate a declining interest in politics, a trend that is slightly more accentuated for men.

The last question in Table 3 reflects attitudes towards income equality. A common theme of the feminist economics literature is that globally, women are more economically vulnerable than men due to their greater representation in contingent employment and limited access to social safety nets. This experience could lead to women's stronger support for redistributive programs.¹⁹ On the other hand, if women are experiencing increases in access to and control over income relative to men, their support for redistributive programs may decline. The results are consistent with the latter hypothesis. The percentage of men and women who believe incomes should be made more equal has decreased, though for men, the decrease is smaller. Economic trends that have destabilized men's perceptions of their security may be a causal factor, as well as shifts in their economic status relative to women and relative to other men.

Most striking about these data is that, for most questions and most regions, the trend is toward more gender equitable attitudes both from 1990 to 2000 and from 1995 to 2000. The magnitude and direction of change in men's attitudes is quite similar to that of women and, in some cases, their movement towards gender equitable attitudes exceeds that of women. The one exception to this generalization is from 1995 to 2000 in which there is an increase in the percent of both men and women who believe that women have to have children to be fulfilled.

III. Econometric analysis

Are improvements in gendered norms due to women's increasingly visible economic role that empowers them in the home and in the public domain? I test this hypothesis econometrically for several questions in the World Values Survey. The econometric analysis uses generalized least squares (GLS) estimation with robust standard errors.²⁰ The data set is the three most recent waves of the survey and covers 78 countries and Puerto Rico. Due to missing observations, the panel is unbalanced. This should not present problems of consistency so long as the reason for which the panel is unbalanced is uncorrelated with the error term. In the case of the World Values Survey data, addition or exclusion of questions in various waves of country surveys appears to be random, and therefore, estimates are likely to be consistent.

The independent variables are female share of employment, female share of parliamentary seats (for one question), agriculture value-added as a share of GDP to capture the structure of production, and growth rate of GDP²¹ (See Table A.1 in the Appendix for a list of variables, definitions, and sources). All except the agriculture variable are measured as the average over the previous 5 years.²² The lagged approach is used since independent variables are likely to affect attitudes with some delay. Agricultural share of GDP, a slower moving variable, is measured for the current period.²³ I perform a robustness check, using female share of the labor force in place of female share of employment, and include levels of per capita income as an explanatory variable to proxy for level of development and structure of production.²⁴ As noted previously, wage (and income) data would be good measures of women's economic empowerment. Wage data are sparse, however; relying on this variable would significantly reduce the sample size.²⁵ Specifically, in these tests, the goal is to

determine whether there is an independent effect of women's share of economic activity on gender norms and stereotypes, after controlling for region (intended to capture cultural differences), agriculture's share of GDP to reflect structure of the economy, the growth rate of GDP, and time dummies, the latter included to capture exogenous changes that influence gender norms not otherwise specified in the empirical model. Table 4 reports results for males and females for each question. The omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa.

The dependent variable is alternatively the percentage of men and women in each country who agree with the statement. For the statement "Men have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce," female share of employment has a negative effect on the percentage of both men and women who agree with this statement. While the effect on men is stronger, the difference is not statistically significant. The share of agriculture in GDP has a positive effect on agreement with this statement, suggesting a gender inequitable correlation, if not causation. Growth of GDP has a negative effect on the belief in men's right to a job, and again the effect on men is stronger than on women. Several regional dummies are also significant, indicating that culture matters as does level of development (insofar as regions reflect similar stages of development). It is notable that even controlling for region that female share of employment has an independent effect on norms and stereotypes.

The significant effect of growth on attitudes is also of interest. The negative sign on this variable may be a signal that periods of economic crisis—that is, a shrinking economic pie during macroeconomic contraction—contribute to more gender inequitable attitudes. This would particularly be so if men have also suffered during these downturns, challenging traditional lines of gendered power in the household. Such an interpretation would be

consistent with the extensive analysis by feminist economists that have highlighted the negative effects of economic crisis on families and the tendency for women to engage in “distress” sales of labor as a response to crisis.

The results for the question “Women need children to be fulfilled” are quite similar to those for the first question, with the OECD and Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) dummies indicating a much lower percentage of men and women who adhere to this view as compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. Other regional dummies were not significant. Also, the impact of economic growth on attitudes was much smaller than in the first question. The difference between the coefficients on female share of employment for men and women are again not significantly different. The share of agriculture in output, however, has a positive significant effect on the coefficients for both men and women, but the effect on men is smaller, and significantly so.

On the ability of working mothers to have as good a relationship with their children as housewives, female share of employment has a positive and indeed virtually identical effect on men and women’s attitudes. The social experience of women moving into paid employment, it appears, undermines negative stereotypes about the effect of women’s paid work on children’s well-being. The growth rate of GDP is not significant in this case nor are any of the regional dummies or agriculture’s share of GDP. The R^2 on this regression is relatively lower than the others, indicating additional important factors may be at work here that are not specified in the model.

In the regression assessing the determinants of agreement with the statement that men make better political leaders than women, female share of parliamentary seats (lagged 5 years) is added as an explanatory variable. In the same way that increased female employment may ameliorate perceptions of women’s worth as economic beings, their

participation in political life might be expected to enhance perceptions of their value as leaders. The effect of that variable on women's responses to this question is insignificant (but negative, as would be expected). Men's agreement also declines as the female share of parliamentary seats increases, but this effect is statistically significant. Female share of employment has no effect, nor does the agricultural variable. Regional dummies are surprisingly not significant after controlling for these other factors. The coefficient on growth is negative, indicating that economic downturns lead to lower acceptance of women as political leaders—or that growth contributes to more positive perceptions of males as leaders. Why this would be so is not readily apparent.

Finally, on the statement that university education is more important for boys than girls, female share of employment has a negative significant effect on this bias for men, but is insignificant for women. Growth has a strong negative effect for both men and women, while the share of agriculture in GDP is insignificant. Dummies for LAC and OECD countries are significant, and indicate substantially smaller percentages of men and women hold those views than in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.

[Table 4 about here].

In sum, the results for all five questions are quite consistent in that they identify the potential for an increase in women's economic activity relative to men's to reduce gender-biased norms and stereotypes, an effect that is independent of the performance of the economy and regional cultural norms. On the two questions related to women's role as workers in the productive sector of the economy, the share of agricultural output in GDP appears to contribute to gender inequitable norms and stereotypes.

As a robustness check, I rerun these regressions using female share of the labor force in place of female share of employment. The reason for using female share of the labor force

is two-fold. First, the data for this variable are more readily available and its inclusion allows us to expand the number of observations in our sample. Second, it may be that women's identification of themselves as being economically active (even if they can't find a job) is sufficient to leverage changes in norms and stereotypes.

In addition, I control for natural log of per capita GDP to account for the possibility that the level of development of a country can contribute to greater gender equity in line with the reasoning of Inglehart and Norris (2003), although to some extent regional dummies capture level of development as noted earlier. The inverted-U hypothesis, which links women's increased labor force participation with the level of development might be expected to lead to collinearity between these two variables. As seen below, this does not appear to be a problem with these data, perhaps because this analysis uses female share of the labor force, rather than the simple female rate of participation.

Table 5 reports the results of these regressions. Per capita GDP is significant in most cases, and as might be expected, its inclusion causes the t-statistics on the OECD dummy to become smaller in some questions, suggesting that this variable is preying for per capita income. The results are otherwise very similar to those with female share of employment: female share of the labor force attenuates rigid gender norms and stereotypes for men and women. This result suggests that, apart from the effect of "modernization" on cultural values (Inglehart and Norris 2003), women's role in the economy has an independent effect on gender norms and stereotypes.²⁶

[Table 5 about here].

V. A Note on Class

Women's and men's class location may affect the degree to which they adhere to traditional gender norms and stereotypes. Women's class position, which can of course be influenced by their male partners' class position, may be a factor determining the extent to which they are motivated to work in the paid labor force. Globalization has led to deterioration in outcomes for low-income males as well as females. Competition for employment and family tensions over shifting gender access to income may cause norms and stereotypes that men in low-income households hold to differ from those of men in other classes as well.

To consider this question, I examine the data from the 1995 wave for several questions by class and gender. The data are presented in Table 6, with class self-reported by respondents. There are two generalizations that can be made from these data. First, men in all classes hold more patriarchal views than women on every question, whether that be in reference to economic, political, or educational issues. Second, among men and women, the richest and poorest hold the most discriminatory attitudes, while those in middle-income groups have more gender equitable attitudes.

There is one caveat to this last generalization. On the question of whether both husband and wife should contribute to household income, if we infer that that agreement indicates a more gender equitable attitude, both rich men and rich women are less egalitarian than those in other classes, including low income groups. This may be due to the fact that masculinist norms trump economic need in high income households, underscoring the role of wealth as a contributing factor to the disempowering "trophy wife" effect.

Interestingly, the gender gap in attitudes (again measured as female percentage minus male percentage) was smallest for the statement "If women earn more than men, it is bound

to create problems,” with the exception of the wealthiest income group. This question is not strictly a values question. It reflects observations about the effect on household dynamics of women transgressing a long-held gender norm that men are the breadwinners and heads of household. There seems to be gender agreement that income inequality in favor of women is likely to be disruptive, and this view again is especially pronounced in high and low income households.²⁷

These results suggest that although there are class differences in attitudes, the gender difference persists across income groups, to a greater or lesser extent. More investigation into the causes of greater degree of patriarchal attitudes at the extremes of the income distribution would be a fruitful endeavor. This finding raises another question. Given the growth of income inequality globally, with the size of the middle income groups shrinking, will there be greater movement toward gender inequitable attitudes if this trend persists? Perhaps not, as the data in this paper imply a trend toward more gender equitable attitudes. Nevertheless, given the time that it takes for norms and stereotypes to solidify via the transmission to children (a kind of cohort effect), this is a potential problem in the future.

[Table 6 about here].

VI. Conclusions

The expression “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” implies that while surface phenomena may change, profound transformation is harder to come by. Is that the case with gender-biased norms and stereotypes? We seek to answer that question using data from the World Values Survey, and find evidence that things *do* change. All in all, the evidence suggests that norms and stereotypes are shifting in a gender-equitable direction. This is true for both men and women, although the gap between men’s and women’s attitudes continues

to exist and has closed on few issues. Even though women internalize gender norms and stereotypes, they appear to do so to a lesser extent than men.

The regression results further suggest that women's economic empowerment is one factor in this shift, whether that occurs by example or through persuasion. Previous studies have argued that structural change of the economy and modernization that are the major factors behind this shift with women's increased share of employment an outcome of those processes (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2005). The results presented here show that that women's increased share of employment has an independent effect on norms and stereotypes, even after controlling for region, macroeconomic condition, and the structure of production, although each of these additional variables also explains some of the differences as well as trends in norms and stereotypes.

It is somewhat more challenging to interpret the results on the effects of growth. It would seem simplistic to infer that economic growth in the recent period has been of a kind that unambiguously reduces patriarchal attitudes, given the widespread evidence of harsh and often insecure work arrangements women have been able to secure. It may be more useful to explain the role of macroeconomic conditions as related to the social effects of an expanding or contracting economic pie. One interpretation is that as the economic pie expands, there is less male resistance to female economic empowerment, even though relative economic standing is shifting in favor of women. Another is that during periods of economic crisis (negative GDP growth), patriarchal attitudes resurge.

The policy implications of these results are significant. Barbara Bergmann (2001), for one, has long claimed that the key to gender equity is expanding women's participation in paid labor, arguing that policies that glorify women's caretaker role and keep them out of the labor market will undermine the possibilities for progressive change. Her stance seems to be

vindicated by the results presented here. Policies that enable women to combine work with care responsibility thus appear to be a fruitful avenue to promoting still greater improvement not only in well-being but in hastening the dismantling of restrictive norms and stereotypes that inhibit women and give men justification for their superior material and social status.

Table 1: World Values Survey Gender Questions on Norms and Stereotypes, and Attitudes

Gender Norms and Stereotypes

1. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women (Q 61).
2. Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled, or is this not necessary? (Q 93).
3. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work (Q 98).
4. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (Q 99).
5. Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income (Q 100).
6. Men make better political leaders than women (Q 101).
7. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl (Q 103)

Social attitudes

1. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (Scale of 1 to 10, with 1=unsatisfied). (Q 65)
 2. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. (Q 66).
 3. How interested would you say you are in politics? (Q 117)
 4. Should incomes be made more equal, or do we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort? (Q 125).
-

Table 2. Norms and Stereotypes: Responses by Region, 1990 to 2000
(Percent in agreement, unless otherwise noted)

	1990						2000						Percentage Point Change 1990 to 2000					
	All ^a	Asia	Latin America	OECD	Sub-Saharan Africa	Trans-ition	All	Asia	Latin America	OECD	Sub-Saharan Africa	Trans-ition	All	Asia	Latin America	OECD	Sub-Saharan Africa	Trans-ition
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.																		
Males	37.7	45.4	30.9	28.6	48.3	49.7	33.6	46.3	31.7	18.0	58.6	29.2	-4.1*	0.8	0.8	-10.6*	10.3*	-20.5*
Females	30.9	36.3	25.0	26.7	39.0	41.9	26.2	39.6	23.7	16.1	37.5	23.5	-4.6*	3.3*	-1.4	-10.6*	-1.5*	-18.4*
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-6.8*	-9.2*	-5.9*	-1.9*	-9.3*	-7.8*	-7.3*	-6.7*	-8.0*	-1.9*	-21.1*	-5.7*						
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled, or is this not necessary? (% in agreement)																		
Males	58.75	70.3	59.0	43.3	76.1	87.0	54.7	69.5	53.6	39.2	68.7	69.5	-4.1*	-0.8	-5.4*	-4.1*	-7.4*	-17.5*
Females	58.68	73.0	58.2	40.6	76.2	87.4	54.6	70.5	55.1	36.1	69.4	71.2	-4.0*	-2.5*	-3.2*	-4.5*	-6.8*	-16.2*
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-0.1	2.7*	-0.7	-2.7*	0.1	0.4*	-0.1	1.0	1.5	-3.1*	0.7	1.7*						
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.																		
M	66.49	69.9	66.2	66.5	66.7	61.9	74.6	81.8	71.9	74.0	74.6	74.5	8.1*	11.9*	5.7*	7.5*	7.9*	12.6*
F	71.72	70.2	73.5	74.3	69.9	66.0	80.1	85.8	82.4	81.3	80.7	79.6	8.4*	15.6*	8.9*	7.0*	10.8*	13.5*
<i>Gender Gap</i>	5.2*	0.3	7.3*	7.8*	3.2*	4.1*	5.5*	4.0*	10.4*	7.3*	6.1*	5.1*						
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.																		
M	68.02	72.6	70.8	62.7	48.1	71.0	66.9	82.2	72.1	63.1	54.3	64.0	-1.1	9.6*	1.4	0.4	6.2*	-6.9*
F	64.47	69.8	65.1	59.7	49.9	64.6	63.5	83.7	68.0	58.8	54.3	56.8	-1.0	14.0*	2.8*	-0.9*	4.4*	-7.7*
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-3.6*	-2.9*	-5.7*	-3.1*	1.8	-6.4*	-3.4*	1.5*	-4.2*	-4.3*	0.0	-7.2*						

Note: The gender gap is simply the female percentage in agreement with the statement minus the male percentage. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant difference (or change) at 5% level.

^a "All" is the unweighted average for all countries in the fixed sample.

Table 3. Gender differences in norms/stereotypes and social attitudes, all countries,
1995 to 2000
(Percent in agreement, unless otherwise noted)

	1995	2000	change
<i>On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.</i>			
Males	47.8	46.2	-1.5*
Females	37.4	35.9	-1.5*
Gender Gap	-10.4*	-10.3*	
<i>Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income.</i>			
Males	82.3	82.2	-0.1
Females	85.9	84.1	-1.8*
Gender Gap	3.7*	2.0*	
<i>A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.</i>			
Males	26.0	24.5	-1.5*
Females	20.9	19.2	-1.7*
Gender Gap	-5.1*	-5.3*	
<i>Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? (% very happy or happy)</i>			
Males	79.7	66.3	-13.5*
Females	79.4	57.2	-22.2*
Gender Gap	-0.3	-9.0*	
<i>How much freedom and control (1-10 with 1 no control)?</i>			
Males	6.9	6.6	-0.3
Females	6.8	6.3	-0.5
Gender Gap	-0.1	-0.4	
<i>How interested would you say you are in politics? (% Very interested)</i>			
Males	19.7	12.0	-7.7*
Females	12.8	6.4	-6.4*
Gender Gap	-7.0*	-5.7*	
<i>Should incomes be made more equal? (% in agreement)</i>			
Males	17.3	15.3	-2.0*
Females	19.4	16.1	-3.2*
Gender Gap	2.0*	0.9*	

Note: The percentages are unweighted country averages. The gender gap is the female percentage in agreement with the statement minus the male percentage. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant difference (or change) at 5% level.

Table 4. Influence of gender equality and macroeconomic variables on attitudes

	Q61		Q93		Q98		Q101		Q103	
	<u>Men right to job</u>		<u>Women need children to be fulfilled</u>		<u>Working mom can have as good relationship with children</u>		<u>Men better political leaders</u>		<u>University education more impmt. for boys</u>	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
F share employment	-0.371 (1.74)*	-0.336 (2.39)***	-0.305 (1.87)*	-0.287 (1.78)*	0.710 (3.63)***	0.719 (2.41)**	0.241 (1.36)	-0.108 (0.68)	-0.053 (0.47)	-0.268 (1.84)*
Agriculture	0.414 (2.88)***	0.581 (3.52)***	0.644 (3.31)***	0.474 (2.91)***	-0.191 (1.02)	-0.154 (0.73)	-0.094 (0.98)	0.188 (0.94)	-0.025 (0.20)	-0.001 (0.99)
Growth GDP	-0.636 (3.15)***	-0.698 (2.92)***	0.218 (0.62)	0.004 (0.16)	-0.348 (1.34)	-0.179 (0.95)	-0.606 (3.57)***	-0.551 (2.31)***	-0.467 (2.63)***	-0.676 (3.74)***
Asia	13.40 (2.34)**	0.811 (0.15)	2.312 (0.39)	5.026 (0.79)	8.771 (1.14)	7.524 (0.95)	19.07 (0.93)	2.663 (0.15)	0.432 (0.66)	-7.374 (0.75)
Transition	0.974 (0.16)	-10.98 (1.89)*	0.827 (0.16)	-0.641 (0.11)	-0.833 (0.11)	-4.380 (0.56)	6.278 (0.31)	1.232 (0.07)	9.16 (1.36)	-18.38 (0.68)
MENA	32.95 (3.37)***	22.83 (2.31)***	-0.101 (0.13)	2.701 (0.32)	5.249 (0.58)	-5.085 (0.45)	33.84 (1.59)	27.99 (1.49)	-5.631 (0.76)	-8.31 (0.68)
LAC	-3.824 (0.63)	-16.63 (2.66)***	-15.14 (2.51)***	-13.57 (2.27)**	0.533 (0.07)	-2.166 (0.27)	-1.155 (0.05)	-9.92 (1.01)	-11.26 (1.72)*	-19.46 (2.01)**
OECD	-6.912 (1.08)	-22.33 (3.77)***	-34.48 (4.34)***	-31.37 (4.28)***	2.972 (0.37)	-1.365 (0.16)	-11.18 (0.55)	-22.74 (1.28)	-17.85 (2.74)***	-28.02 (2.94)***
F share parliament							-0.094 (0.42)	-0.365 (3.40)***		
C	33.76 (3.73)***	57.32 (6.27)***	76.14 (7.42)***	76.32 (7.44)***	46.33 (3.69)***	41.77 (2.53)**	20.41 (0.87)	58.34 (3.32)***	30.95 (4.50)***	53.52 (3.79)***
Adjusted R ²	0.713	0.809	0.740	0.743	0.345	0.435	0.782	0.790	0.606	0.637
N	90	90	100	100	93	93	50	50	63	63

Note: N is the number of countries in the sample with data measured as country averages. Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) denote significance at the 1 percent level, two (**) at the 5 percent level, and one asterisk (*) at the 10 percent level. Omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa. Coefficients on time dummies, significant only for Q93, not reported here.

Table 5. Robustness check: Influence of gender equality and macroeconomic variables

	Q61 Men right to job		Q93 Women need children to be fulfilled		Q98 Working mom can have as good relationship with children		Q101 Men make better political leaders		Q103 University education more impt. for boys	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
	F share of labor force	-0.851 (3.84)***	-0.878 (3.94)***	-0.322 (0.91)	-0.410 (1.23)	0.856 (3.08)***	0.840 (2.06)**	0.001 (0.75)	-0.345 (1.05)	-0.128 (0.62)
Log(Per capita GDP)	-3.471 (4.62)***	-5.047 (4.96)***	-4.988 (3.48)***	-3.856 (2.79)***	2.807 (1.94)*	3.152 (2.00)**	-4.641 (0.74)	-2.622 (2.08)**	-1.961 (2.62)***	-2.745 (1.98)
Growth GDP	-0.638 (6.96)***	0.759 (6.22)***	0.030 (0.11)	-0.074 (0.33)	-0.185 (0.68)	-0.103 (0.39)	-0.890 (4.98)***	-0.745 (3.82)***	-0.311 (2.79)***	-0.449 (3.34)***
Asia	12.27 (3.24)***	4.804 (1.05)	7.274 (1.02)	8.436 (1.19)	0.362 (0.06)	-1.214 (0.19)	6.513 (0.62)	-2.626 (0.26)	7.577 (1.38)	5.131 (0.63)
Transition	5.95 (1.56)	-2.721 (0.59)	7.010 (1.00)	6.557 (0.99)	-3.01 (0.63)	-7.960 (1.66)*	0.582 (0.06)	0.724 (0.78)	1.005 (0.18)	-1.317 (0.17)
MENA	27.01 (4.62)***	22.65 (4.06)***	3.224 (0.40)	4.682 (0.58)	-2.757 (0.43)	-11.44 (1.72)*	15.41 (1.35)	14.83 (1.26)	3.502 (0.59)	6.421 (0.73)
LAC	-11.16 (2.85)***	-20.86 (4.23)***	-15.30 (1.98)**	-14.21 (1.86)*	2.340 (0.42)	-1.601 (0.28)	-11.47 (1.11)	-15.63 (1.62)	-2.860 (0.50)	-8.074 (0.92)
OECD	-12.27 (3.24)**	-12.14 (2.22)**	-26.16 (2.89)***	-23.63 (2.80)***	-3.725 (0.59)	-10.96 (1.73)*	-19.50 (2.12)**	-24.42 (2.83)***	-5.207 (1.03)	-8.581 (1.05)
F share parliament							0.111 (0.75)	-0.183 (1.33)		
C	93.41 (8.68)***	123.57 (12.07)***	121.84 (7.70)***	115.51 (7.44)***	18.67 (1.39)	14.28 (0.77)	63.21 (3.14)***	95.47 (4.48)***	40.21 (3.71)***	71.01 (4.79)***
Adjusted R ²	0.708	0.789	0.706	0.689	0.570	0.269	0.735	0.770	0.605	0.564
N	136	136	149	149	138	138	58	58	73	73

Note: N is the number of countries in the sample with data measured as country averages. GLS panel data estimation with robust standard errors. Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) denote significance at the 1 percent level, two (**) at the 5 percent level, and one asterisk (*) at the 10 percent level. Omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa. Coefficients on time dummies, significant for but Q 101, not reported here.

Table 6. Class-disaggregated responses to selected questions, 1995 Wave
(% that Agree/Strongly Agree)

When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.

	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	Lower
<i>Males</i>	50.1	47.1	53.0	51.2	67.0
<i>Females</i>	34.6	38.8	40.5	37.8	48.7
Gender gap in % who agree with statement	15.5*	8.3*	12.5*	13.4*	18.3*

A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.

	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	Lower
<i>Males</i>	33.5	25.4	29.4	27.4	40.1
<i>Females</i>	19.4	16.9	18.1	19.5	29.2
Gender gap in % who agree with statement	14.1*	8.6*	11.3*	7.9*	10.9*

Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income.

	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	Lower
<i>Males</i>	82.6	79.2	81.7	82.7	84.3
<i>Females</i>	84.5	85.2	87.6	88.6	87.3
Gender gap in % who agree with statement	-1.8	-6.0*	-5.9*	-5.9*	-3.0*

Men make better political leaders than women do.

	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	Lower
<i>Males</i>	61.3	54.7	59.5	57.0	67.8
<i>Females</i>	43.6	41.9	43.2	42.1	55.6
Gender gap in % who agree with statement	17.7*	12.8*	16.3*	14.3*	12.2*

If a woman earns more than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.

	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	Lower
<i>Males</i>	55.0	43.0	47.1	46.3	56.1
<i>Females</i>	44.0	44.0	46.2	46.2	52.8
Gender gap in % who agree with statement	11.0*	-1.0	0.9	0.1	3.3*

Note: The gender gap is the female percentage in agreement with the statement minus the male percentage.
Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant difference (or change) at 5% level.

APPENDIX

Table A.1. Data Definitions and Sources

Variable	Source
Agriculture Value Added as % of GDP	World Development Indicators 2005 (online).
Female share of employment	<i>Laborstat</i> , International Labour Organization. (http://laborsta.ilo.org/)
Female share of labor force	World Development Indicators 2005 (online).
Female Share of Parliamentary Seats	Millennium Development Goals, Taskforce on Gender Equality (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp)
GDP growth	World Development Indicators 2005 (online).
Per capita GDP	World Development Indicators 2005 (online).

Table A.2

Fixed Sample

Argentina
 Britain
 Bulgaria
 Chile
 China
 Finland
 Germany
 India
 Japan
 Mexico
 Nigeria
 Poland
 Portugal
 Russia
 Slovenia
 South Africa
 South Korea
 Spain
 Sweden
 USA

Full Sample

Albania	Czech Republic	Israel	Poland	Venezuela
Algeria	Denmark	Italy	Portugal	Vietnam
Argentina	Dominican Rep.	Japan	Puerto Rico	Zimbabwe
Armenia	Egypt	Jordan	Romania	
Australia	El Salvador	Latvia	Russia	
Austria	Estonia	Lithuania	Singapore	
Azerbaijan	Finland	Luxembourg	Slovakia	
Bangladesh	France	Macedonia	Slovenia	
Belarus	Georgia	Malta	South Africa	
Belgium	Germany	Mexico	South Korea	
Brazil	Ghana	Moldova	Spain	
Britain	Greece	Netherlands	Switzerland	
Canada	Hungary	New Zealand	Tanzania	
Chile	Iceland	Nigeria	Turkey	
China	India	Norway	Uganda	
Colombia	Indonesia	Pakistan	Ukraine	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Iran	Peru	Uruguay	
Croatia	Ireland	Philippines	USA	

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ENDNOTES

¹ “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” is a French idiomatic expression, which literally translates as “The more things change, the more things stay the same.” Metaphorically, it can be translated as “History repeats itself.” Or, to expand that, “That which has been is what will be, and that which has been done is that which will be done. So, there is nothing new under the sun.”

² Individuals may have multiple goals and diverse identities that sometimes clash. Gender identity, however, has been cited as being of singular importance in shaping individual actions and societal pressures. For analyses of how identity affects economic behavior, see Nancy Folbre (1994) from a gender perspective as well as George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000).

³ How children absorb gender roles continues to be debated. Social learning theory emphasizes the importance of direct reinforcement and modeling in shaping children’s behavior and attitudes. Cognitive theories, such as gender schema theory, posit that children very early recognize that they are a boy or a girl, not both. This categorization serves as a magnet for new information and the child begins assimilating new experiences into this schema. Broad distinctions between what kinds of behaviors and activities go with each gender is acquired by observing other children, and through the reinforcement they receive from their parents.

⁴ It should be noted that while Iversen and Rosenbluth may be accurate in their representation of agricultural societies in earlier periods, their generalization of the gender division of labor is not universally applicable today. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, women and men both participate in agriculture, but often there is a gender division of labor in crop production.

⁵ “Distress” sales of labor refer to women’s increase in paid labor time in response to declines in income or wages of other family members (often husbands’), with the idea that in order to maintain a target level of household income, women must increase their time in paid labor.

⁶ Structural adjustment programs that lead to economic crisis, informalization of labor, and more insecure work conditions have also in some cases have created the conditions for increase in sex work as one of the view viable alternatives for generating income for women (Kamala Kempadoo 1999, 2004). Both women and men (but primarily women) are engaging in this work. To what extent this affects gender norms, given the sexualization of women’s paid labor, is unclear.

⁷ Post-industrial societies are defined in this study as the 20 most affluent states in the world.

⁸ The authors argue that these institutions are exogenous in that they have been in practice for many years, if not decades or centuries. For this reason, they view the customs as pre-dating current trends in female employment.

⁹ It is useful at this point to recall the evidence on the U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation and GDP per capita. This finding implies that poor and rich countries experience high female labor force participation rates, whereas middle income countries are characterized by low female labor force participation. Theorists have attributed this relationship to changes in labor market structure, social norms regarding the nature of women's work, and cultural factors such as religion, social mobility, and family structure. This argument is compatible with that made by Inglehart and Norris (2003) who argue that modernization of cultural norms leads to gender equitable changes in norms and stereotypes. See, for example, Claudia Goldin (1995). Using a relative measure, Cagatay and Olzer (1995) find that at earlier stages of development, women's share of the labor force falls, and attribute this to urbanization and a separation of productive from reproductive work, with women finding it difficult to combine both roles. As growth proceeds, however, relative female labor force participation rises with the commodification of domestic labor, falling fertility, and more education for women. Both approaches use per capita income as a measure of the stage of development. This suggests that in the empirical analysis, there may be some collinearity between GDP and women's share of employment or feminization of the labor force.

¹⁰ Two possible sources are the International Labour Organization's *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (various years) and the United Nation Development Programmer's (UNDP) *Human Development Report* (also, various years). In the former, gender-disaggregated wage data, primarily for the manufacturing sector, are reported, but data for many countries are missing. With regard to the UNDP, which provides data on female share of income, data are often only estimated, based on the assumption that on average women earn 75 percent of men's income. This is because, again, country-level data on which to make reliable estimates are simply not available. I have therefore used only female access to paid employment as a second best alternative.

¹¹ Psychologists who investigate the dynamics of gender norms and stereotypes, however, are not so much focused on the length of time it takes for change to occur as they are on the factors that induce change.

¹² Attitudes, of course, are not strictly speaking norms and stereotypes. But attitudes towards various subject matters are based on the underlying set of gender definitions that a person holds.

¹³ Data are available at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the sampling method, see Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-Medrano, Halman, and Luijkx (2004). The Kish-grid system ensures that the household member to be interviewed is selected entirely at random and has an equal chance of being interviewed. It thus avoids the possible bias that can be caused by interviewers interviewing only the most accessible household members. The modified quota sampling approach used is described as follows. "Some surveys used a probability model (area sampling) down to the household level, but switched to a quota design at this last stage" (2004: 390).

¹⁵ No countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were included in the 1990 wave.

¹⁶ The gap is positive in those cases where the question is posed in a gender equitable fashion and negative when the question is posed such that agreement suggests a more patriarchal attitude.

¹⁷ To some extent, an explanation for the declines in the transition economies must be found at the country level. The data reveal a wide dispersion in average male and female attitudes to the question about jobs. For example, while in Russia the percentage of men who agreed with this statement was 50.0% in 1990, falling to 42.5% in 2000, Slovenia reveals on average more equitable norms held by men, with 34.0% agreeing in 1990 and 17.9% in 2000.

¹⁸ Regionally disaggregated data, however, show a sharp decline in feelings of control over lives in Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹⁹ It is sometimes claimed that women are more altruistic than men, that is, exhibit greater empathy (James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund 2001; Alessandro Innocenti and Maria Grazia Paziienza 2006). This also may be a factor motivating women's greater support for redistributive programs (Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth 2006; Torben Iversen, Frances Rosenbluth, and David Soskice 2005). Insofar as this is viewed as a fixed trait, we would not expect to see evidence that gender differences in empathy change over time. And yet, the evidence presented in this paper suggests changes over time in both men's and women's attitudes towards redistribution.

²⁰ GLS is a method for dealing with cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity may be a problem in a panel data analysis such as this if, for example, the quality of enumeration differs between countries, leading to larger variances in responses. I also conducted these analyses with OLS and results were very similar.

²¹ GDP is inherently a problematic measure. While it is often viewed as an indicator of access to material resources, it undercounts much of women's production, and gives credit to some kinds of economic activity that have harmful effects. There is a good deal of research that shows that growth is not equal to well-being, and indeed, it was precisely this recognition that led to the development of Amartya Sen's capabilities approach. Interpretation of the effects of this variable then should be viewed with caution and a clear understanding of the limitations of this measure. In fact, it may be useful to read this variable as a measure of commodification of economies rather than as an indicator of the size of the economic pie. The question of how to measure material resources available for distribution is one that feminist economists have been grappling with in recent years in exploring the impact of globalization *cum* liberalization on well-being. Absent a more generalizable measure of material well-being, however, GDP remains the single quantifiable measure widely available.

²² Thus, for example, the average of female share of employment from 1985 to 1989 is used to explain gender norms and stereotypes in 1990, and so on.

²³ That is, agriculture's share of GDP in 1990 is used to explain gender norms in stereotypes in 1990. For consistency, it would have been useful to measure agriculture with the same lagged approach as used for the remaining variables. However, that would have caused a dramatic reduction in the sample size since, for most of the transition economies, these data are not available before 1990.

²⁴ Robustness checks seek to determine how sensitive the results are to the model specification. In this case, I vary the choice of variables used to measure female access to work and the structure of the economy to assess whether these variables continue to produce the same effect on norms and stereotypes.

²⁵ In regressions (not reported here) in which I did use female relative wages, that variable was insignificant. But sharply reduced sample size leads me to be cautious about those results.

²⁶ Inglehart and Norris (2003), as noted, also make the point that the relationship between level of development and gender equitable attitudes may well have to do with the role of the state in implementing policies such as affirmative action, equal pay, reproductive rights, and equitable access to education may play an important mediating role. Governments in higher income countries have been more active in implementing such policies, although certainly some lower income countries have also adopted some of these policies (e.g., Viet Nam and a number of transition economies). Thus, level of development does not adequately proxy for the role of the state in influencing gender norms and stereotypes.

²⁷ In the regionally disaggregated data, we find that in the OECD and LAC regions, a higher percentage of women than men agreed with this statement.