AFFIRMATIVE SECTION

CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION THROUGH DIALOGUE NETWORKS
page 2

NUCLEAR DE-ALERTING
page 23

CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AFFIRMATIVE

My partner and I are glad to be here to debate the resolution, RESOLVED: THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE IS FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA.

A friendly and peaceful relationship between Russia and the United States is imperative for the future of both nations and to the world. We believe that the way we interact with Russia should reflect that hope. If you want to create a good relationship with a nation, you learn to communicate and cooperate in meaningful ways. There will not always be agreement, but a relationship built on these principles will make for a better 21st century for us all.

CONTENTION ONE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS SELFISH AND SHORT-SIGHTED

A. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY EMPHASIZES RUSSIAN INFERIORITY AND DEEMPHASIZES CONSULTATION

1. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT CONSULTED WITH RUSSIA AS A PARTNER, BUT REMINDS THEM OF THEIR INFERIORITY

Michael J. Mazarr, director of the New Millennium Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1998 Spring; Pg. 11, HEADLINE: Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P. , acs-VT99
	But the administration has erred too far in the other direction -- offering kind words but little tangible evidence of support or partnership, and in fact (on issues from NATO expansion to Caspian Sea oil claims) taking steps seemingly calculated to remind Russians of their newfound inferiority. There is more than symbolic import to the fact that the sum total of all outside aid to Russia has amounted to less than $ 7 billion a year since 1991 -- four one-thousands of combined U.S., European Union, and Japanese annual GDP. The upshot is a higher risk of a collapse of reform and rise of anti-Western nationalism -- not an inconsiderable risk, involving, as it does, a country still in possession of thousands of nuclear weapons.

2. THE RESULT IS THAT USA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP WILL DETERIORATE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	Of course, no one can predict the future. I will try to do so, however, and make the prediction that the U.S. -- Russian relationship will quite likely deteriorate over the next few years. I say this because the relationship has already deteriorated substantially over the past few years.

B. RUSSIA REACTS TO THIS POLICY WITH DISAPPOINTMENT AND INCREASED ANTI-AMERICANISM

1. RUSSIA VIEWS LACK OF CONSULTATION AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE US TO FORCE RUSSIA OUT OF WORLD POLITICS

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	Thus since the Cold War ended, Moscow has given Washington no persuasive reason to consult Russia on issues of international and military initiatives - but Moscow continues to view this lack of consultation as a deviation from the proclaimed strategic partnership and as an attempt by the United States to squeeze Russia onto the sidelines of world politics.

2. CURRENT USA POLICY IS CREATING STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN RUSSIA AND ONLY A NEW SPIRIT OF CONSULTATION CAN RESET THE SITUATION PROPERLY

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	Negative perceptions of U.S. intentions, combined with an absence of satisfactory answers to the above questions, have created strong anti-American attitudes in Russia. Obviously, the success of the bilateral relationship depends on more than the leaderships of Russia or the United States; individual leaders will have their own policies, but they must respond to public perceptions. If the relationship had been carefully nurtured rather than allowed to drift, NATO and other issues could have been talked through at critical levels of the two bodies politic, thus strengthening cooperation. Instead, lack of full dialogue inadvertently sharpened tension. Now, only intense discussion can reset the course.

PLAN: The United States will substantially change its foreign policy towards Russia through the following mandates:
	1. A network of dialogue channels will be established using the Inter-Tajik Dialogue model explained by Chufrin and Sanders.
	2. The United States will consult with Russia before implementing any substantial foreign policy initiatives and invite their comments and/or involvement. This will be done through newly established dialogue channels.
	3. These procedures will be established using a Presidential Order directed at the State Department. Funding and enforcement through normal means.

CONTENTION TWO: A PROGRAM OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION IS THE BEST APPROACH TOWARDS AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

A. THE BEST WAY TO IMPROVE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA IS TO COOPERATE WITH THEM MORE FULLY NOW

Paul Marantz, Prof. Political Science Univ. British Columbia, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 99 , acs-VT99 
	The West can best prepare for the political storms that he ahead, not by giving up on its relationship with Russia, but by deepening its cooperation with Moscow and by demonstrating that any future Russian rejection of cooperation with the West would harm Russia's national interests by jeopardizing much of what that country has gained in recent years. The stronger Russia's stake in cordial relations with the West is, the greater the probability that these relations will withstand future shocks.

B. ADOPTION OF THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION MODEL WOULD PREVENT FUTURE CONFLICTS

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 A fresh political discussion would stimulate both sustained dialogues and cooperative action in key arenas of the relationship, such as the interaction in the Near Abroad, and it would provide the opportunity for those specialized groups to share their insights to produce an understanding of the dynamics of the overall relationship. It would help to assess realistically both the intentions and the capabilities of the two sides to act together or at least to refrain from confronting each other on concrete political issues. This careful attention to the conduct of the Russian-U.S. relationship would contribute significantly to the prevention of renewed conflict.

C. THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM WOULD CONTAIN SIX PRIMARY COMPONENTS

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	A comprehensive agenda for this complex of dialogues might include the following:
 1. A bilateral discussion of issues that are legacies of the Cold War. Many such issues continue to demand attention, particularly those concerning weapons of mass destruction. Carrying through on nuclear disarmament, creating an international regime for the control and reduction of nuclear weapons, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are responsibilities that Russia and the United States must assume as global powers. They must also work to promote a complete ban of such weapons and curb illegal trade in nuclear materials, arms of all kinds, and technology that fuels arms races.
 2. Dialogue on Russian-U.S. interaction in the Near Abroad and other arenas of geopolitical interaction. Such talks could involve a frank discussion of the real interests of each country in places where key interactions take place, a discussion of principles that might govern international and regional peacekeeping operations when they take place outside the framework of the United Nations, and a determination of the acceptability under international principles of the involvement of governments and NGOs in the internal social and economic development of newly independent countries. The purpose would be to identify those activities most likely to cause tension between Russia and the United States. 
 3. Reinforcing the bilateral economic relationship between Russia and the United States. This is central to the overall relationship, as are issues concerning the organization of the global economic system. Interactions in these areas also reveal underlying strengths and tensions in the dynamics of the relationship. Although it is difficult to find individuals in business and banking who will give time to dialogues of this sort, work in this area could perhaps be accomplished if existing business organizations could be persuaded to devote a portion of their time to these issues.
 4. Covering a variety of new global issues involving the interests of both countries. These include the drug trade, international terrorism, environmental problems, international health threats, and women's and human rights issues.
 5. Strengthening civil society. Because both countries are struggling to develop and strengthen their own brand of civil society, it is important for citizens of the two countries to understand thinking on both sides about this subject.
 6. Interacting with the media. Because journalists play such an important role in conveying and nourishing perceptions and misperceptions, fuller interaction in this area is important.

D. THERE WILL BE MANY FUTURE CONFLICTS AND PROBLEMS, BUT THEY WILL ALL BE BETTER IF WE DEVELOP A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA

Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99
	To the contrary, we all recognize that the future will hold conflicts and new threats that we can only guess at now. Our conviction is that we will be able to cope with them more successfully if we can develop a cooperative relationship with Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union. And we aim to do so in a way that, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has put it, "encourages Russia's modern aspirations rather than accommodates its outdated fears."

We believe that the adoption of this proposal would gain a number of important advantages, as well as allowing us to turn most potential negative disadvantages. At this time we offer three advantages.

ADVANTAGE ONE: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION PREVENTS A NEW COLD WAR

A. IF WE KEEP RUBBING RUSSIA'S NOSE IN ITS COLD WAR DEFEAT, A NEW WORLD WAR COULD BEGIN

The Washington Times, March 1, 1998 [SECTION: Part B; COMMENTARY; FORUM; Pg. B5. HEADLINE: What if the bear bites back? \\ jan]VT99 
	In "Who lost Russia. . . our new rival?" (Feb. 18), Pat Buchanan perceptively writes, "Much of the blame rests with a haughty U.S. foreign-policy elite that has done its level best to rub Russia's nose in its Cold War defeat - as it thumped its chest and trumpeted America's claim to be the 'world's only superpower'. " Instead of viewing Russia as a potential friend or partner after the -fall of the Soviet Union, those who seek to destroy her continue to demonize and demoralize her with one thought in mind. . . . her total destruction. Russia today is in deplorable condition. Her economy is in shambles. Russian women are leaving Russia for better opportunities only to find out that dreams of a better life are shattered after being humiliated by being forced to sell their bodies to greedy foreigners in order to feed their children. Her people are suffering and her once proud soldiers are begging in the streets, reminiscent of Germany's humiliation after its defeat in World War 1. However, it appears that we are on the road to making the same colossal mistake a second time; but it should be remembered that Germany's humiliation after World War I was the catalyst for World War 2. "

B. UNLESS RUSSIA IS INCLUDED IN WORLD AFFAIRS, THE ARMS RACE WILL RETURN

Dmitry Gornostayev, Russian Press Digest, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: Primakov Follows Ideas Of Gorchakov , acs-VT99
	 It is important for Russia to occupy an optimal place in the currently crystallizing system of international relations. The tabling to excessively high claims that are not adequately substantiated and that fail to take into account the changes that have occurred in the world, the Foreign Minister pointed out, may be fraught with a return to the dangerous arms race.

ADVANTAGE TWO: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION PREVENTS A DANGEROUS NATIONALIST BACKLASH IN RUSSIA

A. IT IS DANGEROUS TO ASSUME THAT RUSSIAN HUMILIATION OVER BEING CAST OUT OF WORLD POLITICS WILL NOT CAUSE A NATIONALIST BACKLASH

JAMES MEEK, February 11, 1998 [Journal of Commerce. SECTION: EDITORIAL/OPINION; Pg. 6A HEADLINE: Russia's spasmodic decline \\ jan]VT99 
	It has been left to a handful of old geopolitical hands, including President Carter's security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, to put the case that, threat or not, Russia is simply not a major player at this time. In an interview in an obscure Central Asian newspaper, carried by Russia's Interfax news agency, he spoke harshly of ""the Russian elite's illusions about its privileged geopolitical position and special role." 
	Mr. Brzezinski's line - he also likes to say that Russia has as much right to be involved in the Middle East peace process as Brazil - may be extreme, but there is much truth in it. 
	For the moment, at least, and for decades to come, perhaps. It has become a cliche of reportage from Moscow to suggest that somehow, somewhere, someday, the waters of bitterness at national humiliation will rise too high and the dam will burst across the world, Yet it hasn't happened, and it would be comforting for the West to assume it never will. 
	It's a dangerous assumption to make. The vanishing of Russia's weight in the world forces the remaining strong powers, the United States first of all, to fabricate their own constraints on freedom of military action. Otherwise they will overreach themselves, and it will not matter if the counter-blast comes from a revived Russia next century or if Russia's comeback is only one part of it.

B. SEE NATIONALISM DISADVANTAGE FOR IMPACT

ADVANTAGE THREE: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION PREVENTS RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO REINTEGRATE THE FORMER SOVIET STATES

A. RUSSIA'S MAIN OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP FROM BEING PUSHED TO THE MARGINS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WHETHER THEY CHOOSE A PEACEFUL OR MILITARY ROUTE FOR THIS IS YET TO BE DETERMINED.

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	Over the next several years, Russian foreign policy could take a number of distinct courses. Here I discuss three specific scenarios: the nationalist "power" scenario, "Cold War II," and a more moderate "survival" scenario. In each case, Russia's supreme objective will be to prevent its marginalization in world politics and to reverse the decline in its influence. Each scenario represents a different means by which Russia would seek this core objective.

B. IF RUSSIA IS NOT INTEGRATED INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM, IT WILL IMPLEMENT A HARD-LINE POLICY OF LAND COLLECTION

Valery V. Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, March, 1998 /Apnil, 1998 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 107. HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia \\ jan]VT99 
If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement a hard-line policy of "land collection" on its southern and western flanks. It will also adopt a confrontational attitude toward Western nations and probably China; Moscow will again begin supporting any state that opposes U.S. interests. It will likely start with Muslim nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Cuba and North Korea. The weakness of Russia's conventional forces will probably lead it to rely on veiled threats of nuclear blackmail, using the above countries and groups, among others. Such a policy will allow Moscow back into the negotiation process in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, marking its return to serious international policymaking. It would also mobilize and unite Islamic elements in Russia and the CIS, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by casting Russia as the ally and friend of Islam. At one stroke, it would counter both the West and China, which is dealing with Muslim unrest of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.

STATUS QUO FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS A SHAMBLES

USA FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE AND “ADRIFT”

Holger Jensen, international editor of the Rocky Mountain News, The Fresno Bee, September 29, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: U.S still searching for Russian doctrine in post-Cold War era acs-VT99
	Today we have no doctrine for dealing with post-Communist Russia. U.S. policy is as adrift as the Russians themselves who, seduced by McDonald's, Levi Strauss and Wonderbras, wonder if they have any national identity left.

CLINTON’S RUSSIA POLICY IS CONTRADICTORY AND AMBIGUOUS TOWARDS RUSSIA

Yegor T. Gaidar, the director of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997; Pg. 64; HEADLINE: A view from Russia; US foreign policy acs-VT99
	Clinton's ambiguous attitude toward Russia is a case in point. With the changes wrought by the end of the Cold War, he faced two alternatives in devising a policy toward Russia. Much in the way that Britain and France treated Germany after the First World War, Clinton could consider Russia a potential enemy and therefore aim at its weakening or isolation. Or, as the Allies treated Germany and Japan after the Second World War, Clinton could establish a long-term partnership with Russia through which it would be incorporated into the alliance of developed market democracies.
In typical Clinton fashion - indeed, is there any other leader who talks so frequently in his speeches of avoiding "false choices?" - he is trying to do both. Clinton's decision to extend (largely unchanged) a military alliance created to deter the Soviet threat suggests that he is intent on "containing" Russia. But the president's efforts to promote Russia's integration into the Group of Eight and other international institutions argue that the opposite is true. These contradictory impulses and actions reflect his administration's lack of overall strategic guidelines. They leave the strong impression that Clinton's foreign policy is determined by immediate reactions to internal and, to a lesser degree, external factors.

USA FOREIGN POLICY LACKS COHERENT FOCUS AND A POST COLD WAR VISION

R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99
	Ideally, a nation's foreign policy should reflect its values, character and politics. In that sense, America's foreign policy in these post-Cold War years is just about right.
A fragmented, hyphenated nation plagued by interest-group politics is projecting a fragmented, hyphenated foreign policy dominated by so many lobbies and interest groups that, on any given day, there seem to be hundreds of policies out there, baffling the rest of the world.
 Meanwhile, the U.S. administration, which was hired to frame a foreign policy embodying the nation's role in the world, still seeks a coherent concept to replace the anti-communist Cold War doctrine that served so well for more than 40 years.

US FOREIGN POLICY IS FRAGMENTED AND LACKS A FRAMEWORK

R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99
	 In this atmosphere, the United States has not stated a set of clear foreign policy goals and made its action around the globe fit this framework. Instead, it has a rash of little policies, a few set by the White House, some by the Pentagon, some by Departments of the Treasury or Commerce. Is our policy toward China, for instance, aimed at containing China's military power (Pentagon), or keeping it friendly to American investment (Commerce)? The answer is both, or neither.

CLINTON HAS BEEN TOO PREOCCUPIED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON RUSSIA

John F. Harris; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), May 5, 1998, Pg. 1 HEADLINE: Clinton Under Pressure to Test Bond With Yeltsin // acs-VT99
	Mr. Clinton, the argument goes, has devoted his time to such things as expanding NATO, traveling in Africa and courting China in anticipation of his trip there next month but has let Russia slip from the central place it deserves in U.S. foreign policy. Adding to the distractions has been Mr. Clinton's preoccupation with legal matters, including the investigation led by the independent counsel Kenneth Starr into some of his business dealings and allegations of sexual impropriety.

LACK OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION ARE ENDANGERING AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

US RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE SHAKY BECAUSE THE US HAS BEEN INCREASING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE FORMER SOVIET STATES AND HAS CONTINUALLY SNUBBED RUSSIA'S INTERESTS IN THOSE AREAS

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	Partly as a result of the Russian failure, Washington refused to accord Moscow special status in the region and strove instead to gain influence equal to Russia's through the development of ties with other CIS countries. Of particular importance in this connection was the establishment of a special U.S. relationship with Ukraine aimed, in the eyes of many Russian observers, at preventing close ties between Moscow and Kiev. But the anti-Russian bias in U.S. policy toward CIS states went well beyond Ukraine: The United States supported the Azeri and Kazak position on the status of the Caspian Sea, preferred the "Dayton solution" of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to Moscow's suggestions, and championed the Turkish proposal concerning the Caspian oil pipeline. All these positions were at odds with the aims of the Russian government, and U.S. efforts to establish political, economic, and military counterweights in the post-Soviet space to balance Russia's influence have considerably complicated U.S.-Russian relations.

RUSSIA HAS LOST ITS INFLUENCE IN MOST AREAS OF THE GLOBE, AND THE US USES THIS POWER IMBALANCE TO FURTHER ITS OWN INTERESTS AT THE EXPENSE OF RUSSIA

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	To the United States, on the other hand, it has become clear that the democratic transformation of Russia is an extremely complicated and painful process, that the relations between the two countries have under-gone radical changes in America's favor, and that, as a result, the economic, technological, and social gaps between the two countries are likely to grow in the near future. This widening power gap helps to explain the failure of the Russian-U.S. partnership to become the axis of international relations it was during the Soviet-U.S. stand-off. Those relations were of a different quality -- between equal adversaries. When it ceased to be a superpower, Russia lost its grounds for establishing equal, mutually beneficial relations with the only remaining ID superpower, the United States. This decline in influence has not been lost on U.S. officials determining foreign policy priorities in the post-Cold War era.
	It has also become obvious to U.S. policymakers that Russia is no match to the former Soviet Union in its influence on different regions of the world. It has lost its weight not only in Latin America and Africa, but also in the Middle East, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and East Asia traditional areas of Russian national interests and influence. Russia is no longer able to mold the position of the Arabs, as did the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The same can be said, notwithstanding Western assumptions to the contrary, of Russian influence over the Serbs, who had treated Russia as their sole ally and patron for centuries.

THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT THE US WILL LIVE UP TO ITS COMMITMENT TO CONSULT RUSSIA. IF THE US CONTINUES TAKING RUSSIA FOR GRANTED, RELATIONS WILL BE KILLED.

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. I Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	But only time will tell if the historic obligations and commitments will be honored. By fulfilling the commitment, the United States would act in accordance with President Clinton's concept that U.S. security and its support for economic and social modernization in the post-Cold War era depend on the state of U.S.-Russian relations. The realization of the most important U.S. foreign policy goals maintenance of peace and international security and creation of a just world order -- will be impossible without Russia's active cooperation. But that cooperation cannot be assumed, and will not be forthcoming, if the United States continues to take Russia for granted. It is dangerous, indeed, to tease a wounded bear.

CURRENT POLICY DOES NOT TREAT RUSSIA LIKE AN IMPORTANT PARTNER

CLINTON’S RUSSIA POLICY HAS LUCKILY SURVIVED THIS FAR, BUT IT WILL SOON BEGIN TO FAIL UNLESS THERE IS A CHOICE TO MAKE RUSSIA A FRIEND

Yegor T. Gaidar, the director of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, Foreign Policy, December 22, 1997; Pg. 64; HEADLINE: A view from Russia; US foreign policy acs-VT99
	 So far, Clinton's success at tactical implementation has made up for his foreign policy's missing strategic core. He has managed to pull off the seemingly impossible: to implement NATO enlargement without causing irreparable damage either to democratic elements in Russia's political establishment or to U.S.-Russian relations. But here in Moscow, just how much longer Clinton can count on tactics to save him from having to choose between Russia as enemy or ally is unclear.

THE USA HAS NOT TREATED RUSSIA AS AN IMPORTANT COLLABORATIVE PARTNER

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	 For Russia, the lesson from the wars and diplomatic crises of the 1990s in the Gulf and former Yugoslavia is that the US, despite its promises, has not treated Moscow as an equal partner in the post-Cold War age. Instead, it sought to humiliate Iraq, once a Soviet ally, and pressure Serb-led Yugoslavia which, with Greece, is Russia's most sympathetic friend. Most seriously, the US pressed ahead with Nato's expansion into central and eastern Europe despite what Russia believed was a firm assurance that, if Moscow withdrew its forces from former Warsaw Pact states and permitted Germany's unification, enlargement would not go ahead. In short, the Russians are no longer sure that close co-operation with the US reaps the right results. To some extent, Russia's decision to act as a broker in the re- cent US showdown with Saddam Hussein over UN weapons inspections could be partly justified by the support that Moscow garnered in the Arab world for its show of sympathy towards an Arab country being "bullied by Uncle Sam".

AMERICAN POLICY DOESN’T ALLOW RUSSIA TO SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY

Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1998, p. 3., Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 25, 1998; Pg. 8,HEADLINE: Iraq Accord Reached: How Big Was Russia's Role? acs-VT99
	In 1998, everything proceeded according to a different scenario. The US made preparations for the public punishment of Hussein, and when Russia balked, in an attempt to keep the situation from moving toward a military option, the Americans, from force of habit, tried to tell the Russian leadership that it must not support Hussein. . . .

USA NEEDS TO DEVELOP BROAD RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN SOCIETY, NOT PIN ALL ITS HOPES ON YELTSIN

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
Russian specialists have long criticized the Clinton administration for pinning relations with Moscow on personal ties with Yeltsin the man, rather than broader support for reform, the policy. Many thought the administration lucky that Yeltsin won re-election in 1996, now that it is known how ill he was then.
The luck of that policy, however, is now clearly running out. The administration will have to rethink Russia policy if it hopes to continue playing an influential role in Moscow.

RUSSIA FEELS ALIENATED BECAUSE THE USA WILL NOT LET RUSSIA BE A PART OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIA BELIEVES THAT THE US IS TRYING TO HUMILIATE THEM BY IGNORING THEM IN FOREIGN POLICY 

 GENNADY ZYUGANOV, FEBRUARY 4,1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CPRF LEADER \\ jan]VT99 
Zyuganov: As regards Russia's national interests and security many of our opponents are trying to humiliate Russia, to cut it down to size. They have violated the treaty on conventional armaments, violated the parity of forces that existed in Europe, they flagrantly did this. And today, disregarding everything, proceeding only from the thesis that if a country wants to join NATO, including if this is wanted by the Baltic states, it should definitely be admitted. And this instead of making a careful analysis of possible consequences tomorrow.

THE RUSSIAN'S BELIEVE THAT THE US IS RELEGATING THEM TO JUNIOR PARTNER STATUS AND WANT TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM HAVING ANY POWER IN THE WORLD 

Oleg Vladykin, February 5, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: U.S. Knows Russia's 0 Place. SOURCE: OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, No. 5, p. 2 \\ jan]VT99 
	Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee general Lev Rokhlin said to a recent press conference that the United States did not consider Russia an equal power any longer, writes OBSHCHAYA GAZETA. 
	Last week, Rokhlin said, one of the Russian secret services forwarded a secret document to the President and other top Russian leaders, which was entitled: "A New Military and Political Course of the United States Toward Russia." In his opinion, the memo was a convincing proof that Russia's national security was being increasingly threatened. 
	OBSHCHAYA GAZETA has obtained that document and reproduces it in full. It says that the U.S. Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in late 1997 that the era of equal partnership between America and Russia ended together with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent change in the world balance of power. In the new situation, the United States should compel the international community to recognize its right to use force to achieve its political and economic objectives. In international politics, Russia should play the role commensurate with its real and economic potential. Partnership with Russia is possible only on one condition -- its leadership should recognize and accept the status of a junior and dependent partner. Moreover, Russia should not be allowed to interfere in the zones of U.S. vital interests. 
	The authors of the Russian secret memo to the President say that the Americans have concluded that Russia is past the critical point still allowing it to restore its defense and economic potential and will be unable to oppose the U.S. in the 21st century.

ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS INCREASING IN RUSSIA. THE FEEL AS IF THEY ARE BEING PUSHED OUT OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS BY THE US

Andy Bowers, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99 
	BOWERS: And in another similarity to the great game, Russia and the U.S. are currently struggling for influence over the massive oil wealth of the Caspian Sea region. But there's also in Russia a growing disenchantment with America, after a postcommunist love affair with all things Western. And as the U.S. seems intent on bombing Iraq despite Russian objections, it's easy to find that disenchantment on the streets of Moscow. SOUNDBITE OF A STREET MOSCOW RESIDENT (VIA TRANSLATOR): Russia is trying to play a more important role, but maybe some people don't want us to have our own voice. I'd say our attitude toward America is worse than it used to be. It's no longer heaven for us, and I think they like us less, too. MOSCOW RESIDENT (VIA TRANSLATOR): America is the world's policeman. They think they're the strongest in the world and can dictate their will to every other country. 
0
RUSSIA IS ANGERED BECAUSE THE US HAS BECOME THE SOLE SUPERPOWER

Andy Bowers, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99 
	ANDY BOWERS, NPR REPORTER: During CNN's international town meeting on the Iraq crisis yesterday, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the U.S. as the "indispensable nation," trying to make the world a safer place. Such sentiments may please Americans, but they rankle in Russia, For decades, the Soviet Union competed strongly with the U.S. for influence around the world. But with the fall of communism, Russia had far too many problems of its own to worry much about flexing its muscles abroad. Some argue Moscow is still in a poor position to project its influence very far. They point to the debacle in Chechnya and Russia's fragile economy as evidence. But many in Russia firmly believe that the U.S. has become a little too indispensable since the end of the Cold War.

RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT A WORLD IN WHICH THE US IS THE LONE SUPERPOWER

Andy Bowers, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99 
	BOWERS: Alexei Pushkov is foreign affairs columnist for the newspaper Nivsny Mayagosyeta. He points out that Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov has repeatedly promoted what he calls a "multi-polar" world -- one, in other words, not dominated by the U.S. China supports this notion, and so does Pushkov. PUSHKOV: We don't think that it, first of all, that it's a good thing for the world to be ruled from one center because this center may be wrong. The Americans have committed a number of mistakes in their history -- take the Vietnam War; take Somalia. The United States cannot always be right and it creates a number of dangers. The second reason is that Russia just do not think that if the world is ruled from one place, it will correspond to Russian interests.

RUSSIA DOES NOT WANT TO BE A JUNIOR PARTNER TO THE US

Milt Bearden, March 2, 1998 [the senior CIA. official in charge of the covert action program in Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1986 through 1989. The New York Times. SECTION: Section A; Page 17; Column 1; Editorial Desk. HEADLINE: Lessons From Afghanistan \\ jan]VT99 
	Russia rejects the idea of being a junior partner to the United States in foreign policy, preferring to create its own role in global politics. Moscow also has a pressing interest in recovering the $9 billion it is owed by Iraq. France, too, wants to establish its independence from American policy.

RUSSIA PERCEIVES THAT THE US BELIEVES THEM TO BE IRRELEVANT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BECAUSE THE US DOES NOT CONSULT THEM ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear // jan]VT99 
	Despite all these good wishes, the hopeful U.S.-Russian partnership has had a bumpy ride over the last year. Each side has blamed the other for the relationship's decline; each had its own opinion about the reasons for the tremendous gap between solemn declarations and sober reality. Moscow noticed that U.S. security planners seemed to regard Russia as nothing but a repository for a large number of nuclear weapons of uncertain accountability. The United States failed to consult Russia on many vital issues of world politics increasingly, Moscow perceived that Washington considered it irrelevant to world events, at least for the time being.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IS PUSHING RUSSIA INTO ANTI-AMERICANISM

AS LONG AS RUSSIA IS IGNORED, ITS SUSPICIONS OF THE USA WILL GROW

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	 Russia still feels that its size, power and experience should translate into greater international influence. Until that happens, suspicions will linger in Moscow that the US is not according post-communist Russia the respect it deserves.

YELTSIN IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE DUMA TO STAND UP TO THE US

Amatzia Baram, FEBRUARY 23, 1998 [Amatzia Baram is a professor of Middle East history at the University of Haifa and a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The New Republic. SECTION: Pg. 19. HEADLINE: THE ODD COUPLE \\ jan]VT99 
	To be sure, Primakov is trying to act in what he believes is his country's best interest -- and lifting the sanctions on Iraq is a top priority. Iraq still owes Russia at least $7 billion from the pre- 1990 war era, and Saddam has promised to resume payment as soon as the oil embargo is lifted. In addition, Russian sources report that Russian firms and government agencies have signed contracts with Iraq since February 1996 to the tune of ten or eleven billion dollars. Once the embargo is lifted, Russia will participate in developing the huge oil fields of West Qurna and North Rumeila. Iraq has also asked to buy Russian antiaircraft and antitank missiles. Finally, Yeltsin is under pressure from a very nationalist Duma to demonstrate independence from, and even defiance to, the U.S.

RUSSIA HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT MAKE ANY MORE CONCESSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES IN FOREIGN POLICY.

Marina Kalashnikova, February 11, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: In Moscow, Cohen Will Have Been Put Before Nuclear Boundary \\ jan]VT99 
	U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen due to Moscow tomorrow [February 12] will have to face the new Russian determination not to make any more concessions to his country and the West in general, says KONMERSANT-DAILY. Boris Yeltsin has clearly outlined Russia's foreign policy interests and it was not just for effect that he mentioned a third world war in connection with putative U.S. strikes against Iraq. Coming out in support of Moscow, Minsk has prepared "a nuclear sensation" of its own for Cohen. America is being given to understand that she will not be the only one responsible for the new world order.

 THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR RUSSIA TO BE INTEGRATED PEACEFULLY INTO THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY IS CLOSING. WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE US WILL ONLY MAKE MATTERS WORSE.

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the
Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99
	The years to come in many ways will be decisive for the fate of Russia, the development of the democratic process, and the alignment of political forces there. Both Russian foreign policy and the context of international relations in which it operates face serious challenges. Although the Soviet superpower disappeared from the world political map, its primary successor, Russia, has remained an important player in the international community -- a player, it was hoped, that would contribute to world stability abd strengthen democracy in international relations. And indeed, the Kremlin's 1992 foreign policy concept stressed Russia's responsibility as a great power for the maintenance of global and regional security, the preservation of peace, and the development of stable international relations based on the supremacy of law, democracy, and human rights. The document stated Russia's three "circles of interests" in the field of international relations: the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, the West, and others.
	Early hopes for a warm, broad-based Russian-US partnership that would draw Russia fully into the world community of democratic states have been dashed by exaggerated expectations, a lack of vision and political will (especially on the US side), and recurrinq Cold War symbols of hostility. It is not generally recognized just how close the West is to losing a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to ensure that Russian reform takes place and to bring Russia definitively into the group of peaceful, prosperous democracies. As I will suggest below, realistic scenarios for outcomes in Russian politics over the next several years no longer include an ideal option. At this point, the best we may be able to do is to prevent a new confrontation between the former Cold War adversaries in an arrangement that I call the survival scenario.
	This is a depressing conclusion as we approach the 10-year anniversary of the end of the Cold War. But it is the only honest one. Continued wishful thinking about the state of relations between Russia and the West will only postpone needed initiatives even further.

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ACT NOW TO CREATE A NEW SYSTEM OF ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIA

EARLY ENGAGEMENT OF RUSSIA BY THE USA IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID CATASTROPHE

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 51 , acs-VT99 
	Second, the United States should try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors-above all the succession issue-over which the United States has little control. There is a danger, moreover, that Yeltsin's health could suddenly deteriorate or that lie could become incapacitated. This could result in a prolonged paralysis in U.S.-Russian relations. In the meantime, important arms control treaties such as START and CFE Could collapse. By the time the Russians are in a position to reengage, it may be difficult-or too late-to repair the damage.

THE PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE ARE BASED ON HOW QUICKLY FORMER OPPONENTS ARE INCLUDED IN THE NEW SYSTEM -- THUS, RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE QUICKLY INCLUDED

Gwynne Dyer, Univ. of Toronto, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), May 5, 1998, Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Bigger NATO may be an even bigger mistake // acs-VT99
	In the early post-Cold War days, it was clearly understood by American policy-makers that the priority was to include Russia in the system. Anybody with a grasp of history knows that after a great war, the prospects for lasting peace depend on how fast and how well you reintegrate the defeated powers into the system.

AFTER THIS ROUND OF NATO EXPANSION, OUR MAIN GOAL SHOULD BE ENGAGEMENT OF RUSSIA

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Plain Dealer, May 7, 1998; Pg. 11B, HEADLINE: RUSSIA'S ROLE IN AN EXPANDED NATO // acs-VT99
	Following the Senate's vote to ratify the expansion of NATO, the next historic task for the Euro-Atlantic community is to engage Russia. This will take time, but success will signal the resolution at last of the fateful dilemma that 20th century Europe was unable to solve on its own: How to deal with the rise of German and of Russian power, respectively.

EACH YEAR THAT WE KEEP RUSSIA IN A PRO-WESTERN MODE MAKES IT MORE CERTAIN THAT IT WILL STAY THERE

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	The next few years will confront Russia with a supreme test. Can the nation realize its aspirations through internal reconstruction and international cooperation, or will it once again seek to make its mark by resorting to military force and exploitation of international tensions?
Each year that Russia continues as a partner of the West strengthens the forces that favor development over expansionism. A younger generation aspiring to be Western gradually replaces the older one mired in nostalgia for the Soviet past. A business class emerges that has little use for militarism, along with a new breed of politicians who cater to an electorate more concerned with living standards than imperial grandeur.

LACK OF RUSSIAN INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM IS A SOURCE OF FUTURE DISASTER

Gwynne Dyer, Univ. of Toronto, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), May 5, 1998, Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Bigger NATO may be an even bigger mistake // acs-VT99
	 After 23 years of war against revolutionary France ended with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815, France was a full member of the "Concert of Europe" within three years - and Europe had half a century of peace. After World War I, defeated Germany was isolated and punished - and the next war came in only 21 years. After World War II, defeated Germany and Japan became full U.S. allies within 10 years - and the great powers have been at peace ever since.
If the analogy holds for the Cold War (and it probably does), then either Russia should belong to a transformed NATO already, or NATO should already have disbanded. Neither of those things has happened, and that may be the source of future disaster.

COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION CAN FORESTALL A RISE IN RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

TO AVOID A FLARE UP OF DANGEROUS RUSSIAN NATIONALISM, THE USA MUST COOPERATE AND CONSULT WITH RUSSIA ON FOREIGN POLICY

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 200201 , acs-VT99 
	This is precisely why, as contributors to this volume have suggested, the West must be careful not to provide nationalist forces with additional fuel to fan the flames that they have already started through their rhetoric. This means that the West should be sure to involve Russia in important world affairs. Furthermore, the West and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), should be flexible in assisting Russia to transform politically and economically by not setting down rigid terms that could be, and often are, interpreted as infringements on Russia's sovereignty. In sum, although Russia's foreign policy seems to have become much more coherent and somewhat more stable) domestic circumstances in Russia are such that a dramatic and sudden shift in foreign policy orientation should not be discounted as a possibility in the near future .

NOT COOPERATING AND CONSULTING WITH RUSSIA ON FOREIGN POLICY FUELS DANGEROUS NATIONALIST ELEMENTS

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 197, acs-VT99 
	 The lesson for the West, as Marantz points out, is that the international environment can be a critical factor in the formulation of Russian foreign policy. Western states must be careful to craft policies that are not construed by Russia as potentially threatening to their national security or as snubbing Russia's international status as a major player in world affairs. This could play into the hands of nationalist forces in Russia and drastically alter Russian foreign policy by helping to strengthen the influence that these forces have in the formulation of such policy.

RUSSIA WILL DETERMINE ITS FUTURE, AND A COOPERATIVE POLICY IS NECESSARY, NOT A POLICY OF SPECIAL FAVORS BECAUSE THAT MOBILIZES NATIONALIST ELEMENTS

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 The choice will be made by the Russians themselves; the West can influence the decision only marginally. The situation calls for a subtle policy that mixes toughness with understanding of Russian sensitivities. No special favors should be granted. They only whet the appetites of nationalists who interpret undeserved concessions to mean that the world is so anxious to bring Russia into the international community that it is prepared to show boundless tolerance for its behavior. 

COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION CAN FORESTALL A NEW COLD WAR

USA COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA WORKS TO STOP A RETURN TO THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OLD SOVIET REGIME

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	As Russia continues its difficult transition away from communism, the voices of pragmatism and economic rationality will continue to do battle with those of the old Soviet foreign policy elite. It will be a long process whose outcome will partly depend on the internal succession struggle after Yeltsin. But it will also be affected by how the outside world treats Russia and whether the United States and its allies continue to seek cooperative ties or return to a neo-containment policy.

GREATER USA-RUSSIA COOPERATION CAN FORESTALL A NEW COLD WAR

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. xi acs-VT99 
	Russia and America must know each other better. This, I believe, will guarantee that the coldwar era can never return. We are two great countries, two great peoples. We have our own historical destinies, our own cultures, our own national values. We both have much to be proud of. So let us strengthen our dialogue through various channelsculture, science, economics, and politics--not suppressing or opposing but rather complementing and enriching each other.

THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION MODEL IS EFFECTIVE AND TESTED

IMPROVED CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS WILL REMOVE MISPERCEPTIONS AND SUSPICIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA, PREVENTING CONFRONTATIONS IN THE FUTURE

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Given these examples of misunderstanding, misperception, and misinterpretation, Russia and the United States must develop corrective mechanisms that would help them to clarify troublesome questions and remove potential suspicions. We propose developing improved consultative mechanisms both in the government and in the public arena as essential tools to prevent the gradual slide of the Russian-U.S. relationship toward the confrontations of the past.

DIALOGUE GROUPS ARE A GOOD WAY TO CREATE NEW AVENUES OF CONSULTATION AND COMMUNICATION

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 To begin, the two governments need to change the way they talk with each other and the way they analyze their relationship. They need a different format that permits them to probe the deeper concerns that affect the relationship. Subjects such as domestic politics, which are normally barred from diplomatic discourse, need to be a regular part of the agenda, and exchanges of policy views need to give way in certain circumstances to genuine dialogue. That is not to say that formal sessions will become unnecessary; rather, in addition to regular meetings of officials working on the same problems, the two governments should bring together at regular intervals a group of officials charged with keeping their fingers on the pulse of the overall relationship and analyzing its dynamics, looking as far into the future as possible.

A DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSES LARGER POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	Reestablishing a continuing dialogue is essential not only because it creates conditions for discussing highly complicated problems that have a direct bearing on Russian and U.S. interests but also because it addresses larger political and security issues critical to the prevention of future conflict. The Experience of Inter-Tajik Dialogue

THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS TASK FORCE HAS BEEN TESTING THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM SINCE 1992 IN TAJIKISTAN

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Although many such forums ceased to function, some survived and continue to provide opportunities for dialogue on a broad range of specific issues. For instance, the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force, formed in 1981 to analyze Soviet and U.S. interests and interactions in developing world conflicts, decided in 1992 to enlarge its agenda to include three components:
1. It would focus on the new arenas of Russian-U.S. interaction in conflict areas -- the area now called the Near Abroad. n15
 2. It would conceptualize the process of sustained dialogue that participants had developed through the experience of semiannual meetings through the 1980s with a cumulative agenda built as each meeting began where the last ended. We published this conceptualization in "A Public Peace Process," which laid out a five-stage process of systematic dialogue to change relationships caught up in deep-rooted human conflicts.
 3. It would apply that five-stage process in one of the conflicts that had broken out on the territory of the former Soviet Union as perhaps the first experience for U.S. and Russian citizens to undertake a joint peacemaking mission. It chose Tajikistan.

THE TAJIKISTAN DIALOGUE CONSULTATION EXPERIMENT WAS ABLE TO COOPERATE EFFECTIVELY WITH ALL SIDES

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 The Inter-Tajikistani Dialogue within the framework of the Dartmouth Conference has become, among other important things, a live experience in Russian-U.S. cooperation in the Near Abroad. This dialogue began under Russian-U.S. cochairmanship in March 1993 and, by the end of 1996, had held 17 meetings at generally regular intervals. It has become the longest and most persistent public dialogue of this type among conflicting parties in the former Soviet republics, creating a unique public forum where people of sharply different and sometimes opposing political persuasions have learned to listen to each other, to think together, and finally to work out common proposals. The participants in the dialogue submitted their proposals to the Tajikistani government and its opposition at official negotiations mediated by an emissary of the U.N. secretary-general. Individual participants also started their own NGOs as a beginning of civil society in Tajikistan.

THE TAJIKISTAN DIALOGUE CONSULTATION EXPERIMENT HAS SUCCEEDED IN REDUCING CONFLICTS AND CREATING TRUE USA-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP -- IT SHOULD BE EXPANDED

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 The Inter-Tajik Dialogue demonstrated an ability to produce constructive ideas aimed at conflict resolution and peace-building as well as an ability to present these ideas to individuals and groups that can make them a reality.
Now entering the phase of post-conflict peace-building, participants are acutely aware that these efforts are essential in preventing a new outbreak of civil war. The extended in-depth experience in practical cooperation among the citizens of Russia and the United States working together in the Near Abroad also suggests that new modes of cooperation are possible provided the two sides develop a full understanding of each other's intentions and ways of working.

THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS TASK FORCE AND INTER-TAJIK DIALOGUE SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO USA-RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Building on the experience of Soviet-U.S. political dialogues during the Cold War and on the more recent experience of dialogue groups such as the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force and its Inter-Tajik Dialogue, it would be desirable both to proliferate the experience of citizens working together in areas of common concern and to "reinvent" a larger Russian-U.S. political dialogue. By this we mean not a mere resumption of the meetings on problems of peace and security that existed between the two countries during the Cold War, but an opening of a fresh political dialogue that would reflect new global realities as well as new sets of national priorities in both Russia and the United States. Such a dialogue may help to develop a more mature partnership between the two countries in the years to come -- one that is freer of illusions, false expectations, and new fears.

THE BEST SYSTEM IS TO CREATE A NETWORK OF DIALOGUES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA EMBRACING ALL AREAS OF TENSION AND DISAGREEMENT

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Those insights from individual dialogues should be brought together as the agenda for a dialogue network on the state of the relationship. Two main points should be kept in mind when creating such a network of dialogues:
The first point is that Russia and the United States need a complex of dialogues on particular aspects of the relationship. Some of these are already underway; others are not. Both Russia and the United States will continue to learn much about their overall relationship by investigating the friction-generating interactions of the two countries in specific places, such as the Near Abroad. Those frictions tell a lot about the tension between objective interests and about tension among the interests and intentions as perceived or misperceived by citizens of the two countries. They reveal the underlying dynamics of the overall relationship. 

THE DIALOGUE CONSULTATION SYSTEM WOULD BE EASY TO IMPLEMENT THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	This article is not intended to recommend a particular agenda or mode of operation for a revitalized Russian-U.S. dialogue, but to make the case for one. Suffice it to say that the era of electronic communication would make possible the kind of communication described here at costs that could be managed. What is required is acceptance of the need for such focus on the overall relationship -- acceptance both by participants and by potential funders. It is not common to think in those terms, yet the need for such a focus is critical.

SUCCESS IN ONE BIALOGUE AREA WILL CREATE NEW UNDERSTANDING IN OTHER AREAS AND IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 The dialogue on the Near Abroad demonstrates how dialogue and experience in Russian-U.S. interaction in one area can lead to deeper insight into the dynamics of the relationship. That insight into the evolving relationship, kept constantly fresh through sustained dialogue focusing on the overall relationship, is the first essential step toward preventing renewed conflict.

THE SOONER CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BEGIN THE BETTER

THE WORLD’S FUTURE DEMANDS THAT WE CREATE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA NOW

Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99
	 First, we need to articulate an intellectually compelling explanation of the strategic importance of our relations. Russia remains a key player in Europe and, as its economy and political stability improve, is likely to become even more influential. Also, Russia's democratic path matters to us and to the future of Europe. What happens there will ultimately have political, economic, and security consequences for its neighbors and us. Consequently, what ought to be done now is to lay a solid foundation for a constructive relationship with Russia for decades to come.

THE SOONER THE USA TRIES TO ENGAGE RUSSIA IN FULL COOPERATION THE BETTER THINGS WILL BE IN ALL SCENARIOS

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. X, acs-VT99 
	There are thus strong incentives for the United States to try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors-above all the succession issue-over which the United States has little control. Even if the U.S. effort to engage the Russians fails, the United States would be in a better position to repair relations later if it tries to engage Russia now than if it does not try at all .

WE CAN CONSULT AND COOPERATE WITHOUT AGREEING ON EVERYTHING

COOPERATION WITH DISAGREEMENT IS VERY VEASIBLE

Igor Shchegolev, TASS, May 12, 1998, HEADLINE: Russia must remain a great power with growing influence // acs-VT99
	In relations between Russia and United States, a period of "some illusions and heightened expectations" is over and these relations are now rising to a level of equitable interaction. It is necessary to maintain positive dynamics in relations with America without at the same time bowing to it. It is necessary to make clear patiently and in the spirit of cooperation "our position on those questions where differences exist in principle in our views," the president added.

THE VALUE OF A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USA OUTWEIGHS ALL AVAILABLE INCENTIVES TO COOPERATE TOO CLOSELY WITH THE ENEMIES OF THE USA

Daniel Williams; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1997, Pg. 7, HEADLINE: Russia's Balancing Act; How to Stand Up to U.S. but Avoid Conflict acs-VT99
	So far, however, the economic stakes in keeping good relations with Washington appear to outweigh such dealings. The United States is a potential source of high technology and investments. Expectations of loans from the World Bank and help from the International Monetary Fund also depend on good relations with Washington, Russian observers contend.

IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR THE USA AND RUSSIA TO FIND COMMON SOLUTIONS IF THEY WORK TOGETHER

Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99
	 The question before us is whether Russian interests inevitably clash with our own. The issues that I have described so far offer cases of disagreement -- sometimes major disagreements. But they also provide powerful evidence of common interests and of our ability to find common solutions. 

CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION IMPROVE USA FOREIGN POLICY AT ALL LEVELS

THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH RUSSIA IS TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE WITH IT WHENEVER POSSIBLE

Abram Chayes, Prof. Law Harvard, 1997; MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: Russian and American Perspectives, p. 536 , acs-VT99 
	The most intelligent way of addressing the realities and complexities that continue to beset the area of the former Soviet Union would be to engage Russia in a truly cooperative enterprise for dealing with external and domestic controversies through the major international organizations. In some cases, the task is straightforward-for example helping to strengthen the OSCE both financially and politically. in others, the United States must face complex issues and competing objectives-such as NATO expansion. With respect to the European Union, the United States may have limited influence. Most important is the energetic, imaginative, and sensitive joint involvement in the daily activities of these organizations. Hardest of all is that in such a venture the United States may have to accept the unaccustomed role of equal or perhaps junior partner when it is more appropriate for another country or group of countries to take the lead. 

USA POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA MUST INVOLVE CREATING COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH MANY PARTS OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 54, acs-VT99 
	In a broader sense, given the uncertain state of Yeltsin's health, the United States needs to begin looking beyond the Yeltsin era and develop lines of communication to all major political forces. In particular, Washington needs to establish more intensive contacts with regional leaders. Many regions are already beginning to conduct their own foreign policy, especially in the economic field' This trend is likely to intensify, as the process of decentralization gains greater momentum, and means that Moscow will be less able to dominate both foreign and domestic politics. Hence developing good ties to regional centers of power in Russia will become more important.

RUSSIA NEEDS TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE USA AS A PARTNER

Interfax news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0801 gmt 12 May 982, BBC Summary of World , May 13, 1998, SECTION: PART 1 Former USSR; YELTSIN ADDRESS AT FOREIGN MINISTRY; HEADLINE: Russia should not "prostrate itself" before USA in its foreign policy // acs-VT99
	President Boris Yeltsin has spoken of the need for Russia to maintain the positive trend in relations with the USA, but " not to prostrate itself" before that country. He was delivering a speech to senior members of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
 The president said that, "after a period of some illusions and exaggerated expectations, the Russian Federation and the USA are working together as equals" .
 In Yeltsin's opinion, one should patiently and in a spirit of cooperation explain Moscow's position on the issues on which there is principled disagreement with Washington.

ENCOURAGING POWERS LIKE RUSSIA TO BE INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY SOLVES IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND ENHANCES THE PRESTIGE OF THE USA

Michael O'Hanlon & Julien Hartley, Brookings Institution, The Washington Post, December 16, 1997, Pg. A27, HEADLINE: Why Not Let Russia Play a Role? acs-VT99
	 Letting countries such as Russia and France occasionally play a greater role on the world stage is a sign not of U.S. weakness but of wisdom and indeed of confidence. It can help the United States manage an array of thorny issues ranging from NATO expansion to U.N. reform to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Right now we suffer much more from a perception that we are overbearing and domineering than from one that we are weak or rudderless. Washington's influence in the Mideast region is not fragile, nor are Primakov's maneuverings at cross purposes with core American interests.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN ENGAGING RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS WHEN THEY EMERGE

Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99
	Developing Relations with Russia's Emerging Democratic Leaders
 While some progress in this area has been made, we have not taken full advantage of numerous opportunities to bolster the growth and institutionalization of democracy in Russia and to forge better ties with Russia's democratic leaders. For example, our routine contacts and assistance have been limited to a relatively small number of senior Moscow-based officials. Not enough has been done at the local and regional level, despite numerous opportunities to forge strong ties between American local and state governments and their Russian counterparts. The federal government can and should be a catalyst for such efforts.

NATO EXPAMPLE SHOWS THAT ESTABLISHING A CONSULTATION PROCESS IS PRODUCTIVE, BUT IT NEEDS TO GO FURTHER

THE AGREEMENT TO MAKE RUSSIA A CONSULTANT TO NATO DID NOT DETERMINE WHICH SCENARIO WILL HAPPEN IN RUSSIA, BUT THE CONSULTATION WITH RUSSIA HELPED EASE TENSIONS A LITTLE.

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington 0 	 Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	Has the agreement, the Founding Act of Mutual Relations signed in Paris last May, given a definite answer to the question of which scenario Russia will eventually choose? I am afraid the answer is no. The agreement has not removed the numerous problems inherent in NATO expansion. Despite solemn declarations at the time, the accord merely mirrors vitally important disagreements. Some NATO commitments are shallow and Russia's role remains rather undetermined; Russia was playing a weak hand. Under these circumstances, however, the mere fact that NATO reached an agreement with Russia and took into account its interests was a step in the right direction.

EVENTS IN THE IRAQI GULF WAR SHOWDOWN SHOWED THAT RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE CONSULTED AND CONSIDERED

THE IRAQI CRISIS PROVES THAT RUSSIA WANTS TO BE CONSIDERED A PLAYER IN WORLD AFFAIRS. THE US NEEDS TO TREAT THEM AS IF THEY MATTER

JAMES MEEK, February 11, 1998 [Journal of Commerce. SECTION: EDITORIAL/OPINION; Pg. 6A HEADLINE: Russia's spasmodic decline \\ jan]VT99 
	Boris Yeltsin's recent ""world war" outburst in Moscow and the role Russia's shuttling diplomats are playing in the latest round of the Saddam Hussein saga raises the nagging question of how much the bedraggled former superpower matters in the world today. 
	The Russian president's comments appear to have been based on a widespread belief in Moscow that the United States is threatening first use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. Rather than suggesting Russia might bring its own nuclear arsenal into play, Mr. Yeltsin was expressing genuine anger and bewilderment that Washington is still thinking in terms of force, when Russia believes it has enabled a breakthrough in negotiations with the Iraqis. 
	They claimed that last time, and the breakthrough became a breakdown. Yet then, as now, there was a sense that Washington valued Moscow's role as an intermediary significant enough to come up with a compromise if America felt unsure about a military strike. 
	From mighty power to go-between: A humiliating fall for those, like Russia's communists or the radical nationalists of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's far- right party, who think of Russia as a creature which must be either strong or beaten. 
	How far this attitude extends to the public as a whole is increasingly debatable. Asked how Russia should respond to the Iraq crisis, a revealing public-opinion poll held in Moscow in recent days showed 44 percent against any Russian involvement, 23 percent for Russia acting as an honest broker, and a surprising 7 percent calling for Moscow to join the United States in getting rid of Saddam. Only 6 percent said Russia should help the Iraqi dictator.

RUSSIA IS STANDING UP TO THE US IN IRAQ BECAUSE THEY WANT TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THEY ARE STILL A MAJOR WORLD PLAYER

James Meek, February 10, 1998 [The Scotsman SECTION: Pg. 13. HEADLINE: Russia might be desperate but it is no partner in crime \\ jan]VT99 
	So what are Russia's motives in trying to avert a US strike against Iraq now? They have nothing to do with mutual love. 
	Russians have no special affection for Iraqis: indeed recent developments in the Caucasus have heightened their sense of cultural separation from the Islamic world. The Iraqis don't like the Russians either, remembering the arrogance of Soviet military instructors in days gone by. Russia is struggling to make peace in Baghdad, at the risk of ending up looking foolish, for two reasons. One is to show a high-handed United States that it still counts for something in world diplomacy. It is trying to prove that Washington does not have complete freedom of action on the world stage. 

IRAQ ILLUSTRATES THAT RUSSIA UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR AND THE US INTERESTS WILL NOT ALWAYS BE CONSISTENT BUT THAT THEY WANT THEIR INTERESTS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

Alexey K. Pushkov, March 5, 1998 [Pushkov is a foreign affairs columnist at the Nezavissimaya Gazeta in Moscow. The Daily Yomiuri. SECTION: Pg. 5. HEADLINE: Russia-U.S. ties enter new stage as 'controlled rivalry' appears \\ jan]VT99 
	Does this mean that by opposing the military option, Russia wants to subvert U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East? No, but it does mean that Russia will not necessarily agree with the ways the United States chooses to defend its interests. It also means that Russia wants its own interests to be taken into account. Russia does agree that Iraq should be deprived of any means to fabricate weapons of mass destruction. It does agree with the United States that all U.N. resolutions should be fulfilled to the letter, But it does not think that the use of military force is the best way to solve the crisis.

NUCLEAR POLICY AFFIRMATIVE

The end of the Cold War has taken our attention away from a very serious problem. The United States and Russia stand on the precipice of an all-out nuclear exchange. Therefore, my partner and I stand resolved: that the United States should substantially change its foreign policy towards Russia.

OBSERVATION 1: RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A VERY FRAGILE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP.

SUBPOINT A. THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE IS VERY REAL.

USA IS DEVELOPING A WIDE NEW ARRAY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

William M. Arkin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 21, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: What's "new"? new US nuclear weapons plans defy antinuclear rhetoric acs-VT99
	No new nukes, huh? Despite promises from Clinton, a host of new weapons--warheads, missiles, and more--are in the pipeline.
Variations on the U.S. pledge to build "no new nuclear weapons"--a post-Cold War catechism--have now been recited by President Bill Clinton, the military, Energy Department officials, and the head of Strategic Command. But despite their assorted pledges, a wide variety of new nuclear weapons are under development.

RUSSIA IS FOCUSING ON CREATION OF NEW LONG RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, October 30, 1997, HEADLINE: ICBMs Won't Boost Reform acs-VT99
	 This comprehensive nuclear defense doctrine is already being actively implemented. Two weeks ago, Sergeyev told me that he had "amassed" all currently available Defense Ministry procurement funds to begin immediate mass production of a new intercontinental strategic nuclear missile, or ICBM, called Topol-M or SS-27. "The first Topol-M regiment (a Russian regiment has 10 ICBMs) will be fully operational before Jan. 1, 1998," he said. This decision also means there will be no conventional defense procurement for the time being.

THE US AND RUSSIA ARE STILL ON HAIR TRIGGER POSTURE. NUKES COULD BE LAUNCHED WITHIN A MATTER OF MINUTES

Pavel Felgenhauer, February 19, 1998 [Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security affairs editor for Segodnya. The Moscow Times HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: U.S. as Rogue Superpower.\\jan]VT99 
	The Americans were saying that Congress and the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton are too slow and basically uninterested in scrapping nuclear weapons. Great opportunities to move forward quickly in disarmament were lost in the early '90s. Russian goodwill was squandered. So today the United States and Russia are still in a hair-trigger position - with nuclear arms aimed at each other and ready to launch at a minute's notice.

SUBPOINT B. RUSSIAN DEFENSE DOCTRINE IS NOW FAVORING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVER CONVENTIONAL MEANS.

RUSSIA'S ARMED FORCES ARE IN DISARRAY SO THEIR IS A LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY WILL INCREASE THEIR RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE. THIS COULD CAUSE AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH BECAUSE MUCH OF THEIR EARLY WARNING SYSTEM WAS LOST WHEN THE SOVIET UNION BROKE UP

Ambassador James Woolsey, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 served as the President's first CIA director., Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY\\jan]VT99 
One of the most serious aspects of the current situation in Russia is that the degree of corruption and the physical problems of the Russian State have created a very poor state of moral, pay and behavior inside the Russian military forces. The conventional forces most of them are in worse shape, but even the strategic rocket forces are not immuned to these problems. And, there are some uncertainties that the general staff and the strategic rocket forces face with respect to nuclear weapons. First of all because their conventional forces are in such poor shape, the Russian's are moving toward a doctrine of potential first use of nuclear weapons and a much higher reliance on nuclear weapons than they had before. Tongue-in-cheek, I might say, they are adopting the views of the earlier Kissinger circa late 1950's earlier 1960's with respect to reliance on nuclear weapons. They have lost some important warning systems that are outside of Russia that were in the Soviet Union but are not in Russia. And it is quite troubling to contemplate what might happen in some crisis if there were a misunderstanding such as there might have been impart with respect to the famous recent innocent of the Norwegian sounding rocket. 

SUBPOINT C. THE START II NUCLEAR WEAPONS TREATY PROCESS HAS LITTLE HOPE OF SURVIVING IN THE STATUS QUO.

YELTSIN IS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE DUMA TO GET START-2 PASSED

Alexei Bausin, Russian Press Digest, May 28, 1998, HEADLINE: Warhead Will Not Be Counted Before Autumn, SOURCE: OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, p. 6, acs-VT99
	 The executive authorities regard ratification as a priority objective. This especially applies to the Defense and Foreign Ministries. Fortunately, the Defense Ministry is headed by a man who has a good command of the issues involved and understands the importance of the Treaty for Russia. But the President and his staff are unwilling to enter into political negotiations with the Duma in the belief that they have a monopoly on foreign policy and security matters. Judging by Yeltsin's position in the past years, he does not regard ratification of the START-2 Treaty as one of his priority concerns.

START-2 IS NOW DEAD IN THE RUSSIAN DUMA

John F. Harris; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), May 5, 1998, Pg. 1 HEADLINE: Clinton Under Pressure to Test Bond With Yeltsin // acs-VT99
	 Some Russia specialists say passage of START-2 is even less likely after the NATO vote and after Mr. Yeltsin had to expend vast amounts of political capital in Parliament last month to install a new prime minister, Sergei Kiriyenko.

PLAN:

We offer the following plan to alleviate the existing nuclear tensions between Russia and the United States.

1. The United States, in close cooperation and consultation with Russia, will immediately de-alert all of its land-based nuclear weapons and encourage Russia to do the same.

2. This plan will be implemented by executive order to the Defense Department. Funding is guaranteed through the DOD.

OBSERVATION 2. DE-ALERTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL ALLEVIATE US/RUSSIA NUCLEAR TENSIONS.

DE-ALERTING WOULD PREVENT AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD LEAD TO FURTHER CUTS BY THE US AND RUSSIA

Jonathan S. Landay, February 20, 1998 [The Christian Science Monitor, SECTION: UNITED STATES; Pg. 4 HEADLINE: Nuclear Disarmament With Low-Tech Approach\\jan]VT99 
	Rocks and dirt don't sound like a recipe for averting an atomic cataclysm. Yet, piling tons of debris atop the lids of nuclear-missile silos that would take days to clear is among a host of steps collectively called "de-alerting" - gaining support as ways in which the United States and Russia might advance post-cold-war stability. The idea: The more time the sides require to mount massive nuclear attacks, the less danger of inadvertent conflict. Furthermore, advocates say, taking most missiles off the high-alert hair-triggers on which they remain six years after the Soviet Union's demise would encourage the former foes to slash armories below levels now being contemplated.

DE-ALERTING WOULD SOLVE FOR A RUSSIAN ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR LAUNCH EVEN IF ITS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM BREAKS DOWN COMPLETELY.

Mike Moore, February 10, 1998 [Mike Moore is editor of the Chicago-based Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago Tribune SECTION. COMMENTARY; Pg. 15; ZON'E:N. HEADLINE: HOW SAFE SHOULD WE BE FEELING? NOT VERY\\jan]VT99 
	The United States and Russia are systematically reducing the numbers of strategic weapons, but not in a qualitatively equal way. While the United States can keep its nuclear enterprise in high polish, ready for instant use, Russia's nuclear capability is rusting away, figuratively if not literally. 
	It is inconceivable that either the U.S. or Russia would launch a preemptive strike, even in a time of high tension. But in the nuclear calculus, one must always reckon with the possibility that one side might attack, however reluctantly, if it feared that its adversary was making preparations. 
	That kind of Cold War reasoning is alive today. The military mind is weaned on worst-case scenarios, and in times of crisis, that makes everyone edgy. Under extreme stress, people make mistakes, miscalculate. Warning systems fail, command-and-control chains break down. 
	Russia's early-warning systems are clearly decaying, its bomber and submarine forces are rotting from lack of maintenance and its comm and-an d -control chain is suspect. From a Russian perspective, that makes it ever more important for Russia to keep its ground-based missiles on full alert. 
	Do we in the United States really want Russian land-based missiles to remain on a hair trigger? Mutual de-alerting would buy time in a future crisis, greatly adding to stability and enhancing the possibility of reasoned thought.

RUSSIA IS IN FAVOR OF DE-ALERTING

SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, February 18,1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. "PERSPECTIVES OF A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD"\\jan]VT99 
Secondly, the advocacy of de-alerting nuclear weapons, taken them off the status where they can be fired instantaneously, has been taken up by both governments. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the principal military leaders, have prepared a report suggesting certain ways that weapons might be taken off alert, and that is being circulated in the US government now. The foreign minister of Russia, Mr. Primakov, has stated publicly " Russia believes that we should proceed to de-alert to some degree our nuclear weapons. " So we should expect to see that happen before too long.

IT IS CRITICAL THAT THE UNITED STATES WORKS WITH RUSSIA IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE SAFETY OF THEIR NUCLEAR SYSTEM

Thomas L. Friedman, February 18, 1997 [International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France). SECTION: Opinion; Pg. 8. HEADLINE: Iraq Is Bad, but the Biggest Proliferation Threat Is Russian\\jan]VT99 
	The United States should be doing everything it can to work with Russia, not only on Iraq but to shrink Russia's own nuclear arsenal, which is the greatest proliferation threat in the world today. 
	Attention shoppers: Russia has thousands of weapons of mass destruction. It has hundreds of unemployed or underemployed nuclear scientists. And it has only the loosest controls over its nukes and nuclear materials, and it has a signed nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States that has not been implemented.

THE US IS PROPOSING DE-ALERTING TO MAKE START II A REALISTIC TREATY

Jonathan S. Landay, February 20, 1998 [The Christian Science Monitor, SECTION: UNITED STATES; Pg. 4 HEADLINE: Nuclear Disarmament With Low-Tech Approach\\jan]VT99 
But that does not mean it is ignoring the concept altogether. In fact, the US is considering adapting de-alerting steps to help implement the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 11), which is languishing unratified by the Russian parliament. START 2 originally required the sides to cut their warheads to no more than 3,500 each by 2003. But the Russian parliament's foot-dragging forced them last year to push the deadline to 2007. Worse, Moscow can scarcely afford the huge expenses of destroying the missiles and warheads due to be scrapped. Accordingly, the US is looking at de-alerting as a low-cost alternative that would take those systems off-line as close to the original deadline as possible. A high-level administration panel is reviewing a range of options, including some forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The goal is to formulate proposals to present to Moscow once START 2 is ratified, senior officials say. They decline to discuss options under review but note Russia's objection to removing warheads. "We have not reached any conclusions," says one official. "All of the ideas that you have heard in the public discussion are among those that we have been looking at, and there are others."

ADVANTAGE: THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN WILL DRAMATICALLY REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
 
THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH IN RUSSIA IS INCREASING BY THE WEEK

Jonathan Power, March 14,1998 [NEW STRAITS TIMES-MANAGEMENT TIMES. HEADLINE: Another Cold War in the making\\jan]VT99 
The second profound mistake was to allow Senator Jesse Helms to effectively torpedo ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that was meant to reduce the number of long-range nuclear weapons from 6,000 to 3,500. By holding up ratification at a crucial time in 1995, Helms allowed his obscure counterparts in the Russian parliament a chance to assault it in Moscow. 
	The momentum to rid the two nuclear superpowers of their massive armouries has been totally undermined. Russia's command and control systems are visibly deteriorating, as are the rockets themselves. The risks of an accidental launch are increasing by the week.

RUSSIA COULD RESPOND TO A CRISIS WITH NUKES IN A MATTER OF MINUTES

Maxim Bulantsev, February 6, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: Russian missile troops ready to repulse attack - commander\\jan]VT99 
	It will take minimum time for the Russian Strategic Missile Troops to respond to an attack of a possible enemy, troops commander-in-chief Vladimir Yakovlev said at a meeting of the State Duma on Friday. 
	Asked about the troops' readiness to repulse an aggression against the background of a mounting tension in the Persian Gulf and the reports on the U.S. possible use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iraq, Yakovlev said "the Russian missile troops are permanently on the alert and are ready to give an adequate response to an armed aggression of any enemy to order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief -- the President of Russia. "

RUSSIAN COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEMS ARE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING. THERE IS A REAL RISK OF AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH

Jonathan S. Landay, February 20, 1998 [The Christian Science Monitor, SECTION: UNITED STATES; Pg. 4 HEADLINE: Nuclear Disarmament With Low-Tech Approach\\j an]VT99 
He says the threats posed by the dire state of Russia's nuclear corn m and-an d -control systems must be addressed. They say Moscow's serious economic problems have left its systems beset by neglect, technical problems that inadvertently switch missiles to combat mode, and an unreliable early-warning radar network. Meanwhile, the officer corps is seething over poor pay and a loss of privileges. As evidence, they cite an incident in 1995, when President Boris Yeltsin came within minutes of ordering an attack on the US after Russian officers mistook a scientific rocket from Norway as a nuclear missile targeted at Moscow by an American submarine.

LAND-BASED MISSILES ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT OF ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH

Mike Moore, February 10, 1998 [Mike Moore is editor of the Chicago-based Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago Tribune. SECTION: COMMENTARY; Pg. 15; ZONE- N. HEADLINE: HOW SAFE SHOULD WE BE FEELING? NOT VERY\\jan]VT99 
	Both sides can deliver nuclear warheads by bombers, submarines or by land-based missiles. In arms control argot, bomber- and submarine-delivered weapons are said to be "stable" deterrents. Submarines are hard to find and track, so they can afford to ride out an attack against their homeland before retaliating. In fact, U.S. submarine commanders are supposed to head toward the surface if they get a launch order and tune to commercial radio bands. If ballgames are being broadcast and disc jockeys still are playing golden oldies and rock, that's a tip-off that the country is still around. 
	Meanwhile, bombers take hours to get to their targets, which means they can be called back if there has been a mistake. 
	But land-based missiles are in a use-'em-or-lose-'em category. If the proper "command authority" believes the other side has attacked, the decide-to-launch time is figured in minutes.

AN ACCIDENTAL RUSSIAN LAUNCH CAUSED BY AN ERODING COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEM WOULD PLUNGE THE WORLD INTO A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST OF MORE THAN 5,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN 30 MINUTES

Jonathan S. Landay, February 20, 1998 [The Christian Science Monitor, SECTION: UNITED STATES; Pg. 4 HEADLINE: Nuclear Disarmament With Low-Tech Approach\\jan]VT99 
Arms controllers have been advocating de-alerting for several years, contending that it would create a more accurate reflection in strategic terms of the new political relationship between Moscow and Washington, Some say the US should take such steps unilaterally to induce a stillinsecure Russia to follow. The concept is winning new adherents as concerns grow that a lack of funds is seriously eroding Russia's nuclear command-and-control systems, raising the danger of an errant or unauthorized launch that could trigger a US response. Within 30 minutes, the sides could plunge into a nuclear holocaust, exchanging the more than 5,000 warheads they still keep on 24-hour high alert.

RUSSIANS ARE INCREASING RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BECAUSE OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES, RUSSIA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRY IN THE WORLD TO THE USA

John F. Harris; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), May 5, 1998, Pg. 1 HEADLINE: Clinton Under Pressure to Test Bond With Yeltsin // acs-VT99
	 There is only one country in the world that has some 10,000 nuclear weapons that still could be turned against the West, said Michael McFaul, a Stanford University political scientist who travels frequently to Russia and knows many of the Clinton administration's Russia experts. ''It's still the most important relationship we have,'' he said, ''but you would not know that from Clinton's agenda or how he is spending his time.''

RUSSIAN EXPENDITURES FOR LONG RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL INCREASE BY 100% TO 150%

Thomas L. Friedman; International Herald Tribune, August 1, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: But What About the U.S.-Russian Relationship? acs-VT99
	 Mr. Arbatov said that even with a smaller defense budget he expected that appropriations for long-range nuclear weapons would grow by 100 to 150 percent over the next two years.

RUSSIA PLANS TO LET ITS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY DISINTEGRATE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, October 30, 1997, HEADLINE: ICBMs Won't Boost Reform acs-VT99
	 After hearing what the liberal Yabloko deputies had to say, high-ranking Defense Ministry officials, who were also present, could only say "thanks" and agree with every word. Sergeyev is a career strategic nuclear missile general, and the "comprehensive" reform draft he has put together is in essence a nuclear reform plan.
One of Sergeyev's close military advisers told me last week that the "gist of our plan is to run military reform under a nuclear umbrella." This means that conventional forces are not essential and may be allowed to disintegrate further for several more years, until economic growth begins to fill state coffers. In the meantime, nuclear deterrence will guard Russia against all of its foes.

BECAUSE RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE WEAK, GREATER RELIANCE IS BEING PUT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING FIRST USE AND LIMITED USE DOCTRINES

The Toronto Star, December 8, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: Nuclear arms strategies in flux U.S., Russia say they'll use weapons to deter attacks acs-VT99
	"A number of Russian observers advocate placing greater reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the deficiencies of (Moscow's) conventional forces," the CIA told Congress in material released last week. Some Russian officials, the agency added, even "have called for developing first-use and limited-use nuclear options to prevent a regional conflict from expanding into a broader war."

RELYING ON NUCLEAR FORCES AND NOT FUNDING CONVENTIONAL FORCES MAY REQUIRE RUSSIA TO ACTUALLY USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A BORDER SKIRMISH

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, October 30, 1997, HEADLINE: ICBMs Won't Boost Reform acs-VT99
	 Still, the Sergeyev nuclear umbrella reform plan does not sound good. A sudden U.S. nuclear attack is hardly possible while Russia still has at least a dozen operational ICBMs. So to find new targets, some Russian generals are already spreading nuclear deterrence strategy to possible local and regional conflicts. But if Russia were ever to use nuclear weapons in a local conflict against hostile guerrillas - in Chechnya, for example - it would never win or gain lasting military advantage. The only result would be a devastating political, moral and radioactive fallout.

RUSSIAN MILITARY DESPISES PLANS TO RELY ON NUCLEAR FORCES FOR DEFENSE

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, October 30, 1997, HEADLINE: ICBMs Won't Boost Reform acs-VT99
	 The war in Chechnya showed the Russian army to be in dire need of modern conventional weapons and better organization to fight or successfully deter regional threats from rogue forces. It hardly needs new ICBMs without delay. Sergeyev may have persuaded Arbatov and Lukin, but not the vast majority of Russia's military that despises him as a nuclear rocket professional.

NATO EXPANSION HAS SLOWED RUSSIA’S ATTEMPT TO DEEMPHASIZE ITS NUCLEAR FORCES

William Drozdiak The Washington Post, The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN), May 2, 1998, Pg. A5, HEADLINE: RUSSIA'S ANTI-NATO ROLE CREATES CONCERN // acs-VT99
	 While costs and internal politics might be the true causes for the delay, NATO experts say they are troubled by recent comments from senior Russian defense officials emphasizing that nuclear weapons must assume greater military importance because NATO-allied troops and conventional weapons will be closer to Russia's border.

RUSSIA IS BEGINNING TO PERCEIVE THE UNITED STATES AS A ROGUE SUPERPOWER WHICH COULD LEAD THEM TO INCREASE THEIR RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Pavel Felgenhauer, February 19, 1998 [Pavel Felgenhauer is defense and national security affairs editor for Segodnya. The Moscow Times HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: U.S. as Rogue Superpower.\\jan]VT99 
	But the United States could not care less about international law. Washington apparently believes it can attack Iraq or any other nation at will, especially if that nation has no means of retaliating against U.S. territory. 
	The U.S. military has thousands of megatons of weapons of mass destruction. The United States is the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons to destroy hundreds of thousands of civilians in 1945. The United States used poisonous chemical agents in Vietnam. The United States has killed many more innocent civilians during this century than Saddam Hussein. The United States is apparently ready to kill again. 
	More and more Russians believe the United States is a rogue superpower and that only nuclear warheads aimed at U.S. cities can keep the Big Satan at bay. If bombs fall on Baghdad, this may become the prevailing view in Moscow.

A MOVEMENT IS INCREASING AMONG YELTSIN'S OPPOSITION TO UPGRADE THE MILITARY AND TO INCREASE ITS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Radio Russia, February 11, 1998 [Moscow, in Russian 1400 gmt I I Feb 98. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. February 13, 1998 HEADLINE: Opposition leaders call for stronger armed forces.\\jan]VT99 
	[Correspondent] Gennadiy Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, believes the statement claiming that Russia has no external enemies to be a harmful delusion. He is convinced that the country's military doctrine should be aimed at preserving the missile umbrella into the 21 st century. The People's Patriotic Union's efforts, with the help of nationally orientated capital, are capable of preventing the disintegration of the army, Zyuganov stressed. But this is possible only if the leadership of the country changes. 
	Army cuts are not acceptable, Gen [Lev] Rokhlin, the head of the State Duma's Defence Committee, said and promised demonstrations under the slogan "The people and the army are united" on an unprecedented scale, which would coincide with the celebrations to mark Russian Army Day.

START 2 IS THREATENED IN THE STATUS QUO

WITHOUT PASSAGE OF START-2, BOTH RUSSIA AND THE USA WILL HAVE TO SPEND HUGE SUMS ON DEFENSE SYSTEMS

Alexei Bausin, Russian Press Digest, May 28, 1998, HEADLINE: Warhead Will Not Be Counted Before Autumn, SOURCE: OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, p. 6, acs-VT99
	Duma Defense Committee deputy chairman does not expect early ratification of START-2 Treaty by lower house of parliament.
Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee and Director of the Center of Geopolitical and Military Prognosis, says in an interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that he does not expect early ratification of the START-2 Treaty by the lower house of parliament. He notes that the reason why Washington has indicated that a new Russo-American summit is ruled out before Duma ratification of the START-2 Treaty is that the U.S. Administration wants know where it stands before making a decision to earmark funds for military programs for many years ahead. If the State Duma does not endorse it, the United States will have to channel enormous sums of money into its strategic forces. If the Treaty is ratified, more funds will spent on conventional weapons.

WITHOUT THE RATIFICATION OF START 2, THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS INEVITABLE

Naomochi Fujimoto and Debra Lau, September 14, 1997 [The Daily Yomiuri. HEADLINE: Engagement the key to pacifying the dragon McNamara also emphasizes need for elimination of nuclear weapons; Japan urged\\jan]VT99 
	With the United States and Russia yet to ratify START 2, McNamara expressed the fear that the "indefinite combination of human fallibility and the large stocks of nuclear weapons will lead to the destruction of nations." 
	He credited a report by the Canberra Commission recommending the elimination of nuclear weapons, praising former Ambassador Ryukichi Imai, one of the signatories to the document. Following this move, the U.S. Naval Academy of Scientists issued a similar report, and, earlier this year, 19 retired U.S. four-star generals and admirals and 42 non-U.S. high-ranking admirals and generals also expressed support for the proposal. 
	"So, this idea that we should dramatically reduce existing nuclear forces and actually go to elimination is not pie-in-the-sky--it's not only the view of idle dreamers, but (also of many senior civilian and military security experts," McNamara said.

START III WOULD DRAMATICALLY CUT THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF THE US AND RUSSIA

Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., 1997 [The Christian Science Monitor. April 29, 1997. HEADLINE: It's Time to Break the Nuclear Monopoly\\jan]VT99 
The news from Helsinki of a possible START III accord is certainly welcome. The agreement between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin could reduce United States and Russian strategic arsenals to as low as 2,000 warheads each in 10 years. But US policymakers should not feel constrained by the parameters of this new agreement. Nor should they necessarily wait to implement further reductions in our current 7,000 nuclear warheads until this agreement is ratified. Rather, old arms control notions of nuclear parity should yield to new realities that are the product of two revolutions - one geopolitical and one military.

USA IS WILLING TO PAY FOR WEAPONS DISPOSAL COSTS IF START-2 IS RATIFIED

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	 Leonov [Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov Professor of MGIMO and a constant participant on Channel 3 program "Russky Dom"]: According to US media reports, if I remember them correctly, and if I don't, I think our colleagues from the Foreign Ministry will correct me, the US is willing to provide funding if we ratify and implement the treaty, but it will not give us even a penny to keep these weapons at their present level. 

DE-ALERTING SOLVENCY EXTENSIONS

THE MAJORITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPERTS FAVOR DE-ALERTING

Mike Moore, February 10, 1998 [Mike Moore is editor of the Chicago-based Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago Tribune. SECTION: COMMENTARY; Pg. 15; ZONE: N. HEADLINE: HOW SAFE SHOULD WE BE FEELING? NOT VERY\\jan]VT99 
	De-alerting is not a radical idea. The International Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons endorses it, as do a passel of retired U.S. and Russian generals and admirals. The National Academy of Sciences is for it. Virtually all of the heavy-hitters in the arms control field advocate it. Most important, Lee Butler, former head of the Strategic Air Command and a principal architect of today's nuclear doctrine, favors it.

DE-ALERTING WOULD PREVENT A FIRST STRIKE

Mike Moore, February 10, 1998 [Mike Moore is editor of the Chicago-based Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago Tribune. SECTION: COMMENTARY; Pg. 15; ZONE: N. HEADLINE: HOW SAFE SHOULD WE BE FEELING? NOT VERY\j an]VT99 
	De-alerting, like everything else in the world of nuclear weapons, has complexities and nuances. But at its core is a simple notion: Do something to ensure that missiles cannot be fired quickly. The Russians would monitor our de-alerting procedures; we would monitor the Russians. Given that, neither side would be able to launch a surprise attack, which means that neither would fear a "bolt from the blue," to use Reagan-era terminology.

ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH EXTENSIONS

AN ACCIDENTAL RUSSIAN LAUNCH WOULD INVOLVE HUNDREDS IF NOT THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CURRENT US DOCTRINE WOULD CAUSE A MASSIVE RETALITORY STRIKE

Stephen S. Rosenfeld, 1997 [The Washington Post. January 31, 1997. HEADLINE: Wake Up -The Nightmares Not Over\\jan]VT99 
	Hence the nightmare scenario of an accidental Russian launch that, under prevailing American doctrine, would trigger a first strike or quick second strike aimed at a full range of Russian military targets, including command and control, nuclear and conventional forces and the capacity to wage war. Since Russian missiles are similarly postured, the Henry L. Stimson Center reports, "an accidental Russian launch could trigger an overwhelming and unnecessary disaster for both countries." Against this remote but imaginable contingency, the much-cited dangers of a rogue missile attack begin to be reduced to size. A rogue attack would presumably involve only a missile or two; an accidental Russian launch, hundreds if not thousands. A defense can be devised against a limited attack, not against a concerted attack. There is a chance of deterring a rogue launch by a credible threat of nuclear response, but by definition an accidental launch cannot be deterred.

THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH IS UNACCEPTABLY HIGH

Jim Lobe, 1997 [Inter Press Service. June 19, 1997. HEADLINE: U. S.-DISARAMENT: SCIENTISTS CALL FOR NEW NUCLEAR POLICY\\jan]VT99 
	"As a result, the dangers of initiation of nuclear war by error (e.g. based on false warning of attack) or by accident (e.g. by a technical failure) remain unacceptably high." It also noted that "the end of the Cold War has created conditions that open the possibility of serious consideration of proposals to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons." 
	The report, prepared by a NAS committee headed by retired Army Major General William F. Burns, joined a swell of criticism from experts over the failure of the administration to move more aggressively to defuse the nuclear threat. It began last December when the former commander of Washington nuclear arsenal, ret. Air Force George Lee Butler, called on all countries to rid the world of nuclear weapons. 

AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH FROM RUSSIA IS A REALISTIC THREAT BECAUSE OF THE DETERIORATION OF THERE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

Donald M. Rothberg, 1997 [The Chattanooga Times. February 20, 1997. HEADLINE: U.S., Russian missiles still on alert\\jan]VT99 
	Blair said the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange is made greater by "clear signs of continuing deterioration of the Russian nuclear command and control system." 
	He said the bureau responsible for command and control of the Russian nuclear rocket forces "is virtually bankrupt. "

IF AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH WERE TO OCCUR FROM RUSSIA, IT WOULD LILT THE UNITED STATES

Donald M. Rothberg, 1997 [The Chattanooga Times. February 20, 1997. HEADLINE: U.S., Russian missiles still on alert\\jan]VT99 
	He also said that despite statements by Yeltsin, Russian missiles remain targeted on the United States. 
	"If a Russian missile does fire accidentally, it's going, to go to its Cold War target," said Blair. "It's not going to land in the ocean the way U.S. missiles have been programed to do."

RUSSIA: STATUS QUO AND FUTURE

This section talks about specific events and conditions in Russia. To find out if something is happening or not happening, good or bad, increasing or decreasing, this is the section to consult.

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA
page 33

REFORMS IN RUSSIA
page 39

RUSSIAN ECONOMY
page 43

RUSSIAN DEMOCRITIZATION
page 49

BORIS YELTSIN -- RULER OF RUSSIA
page 58

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME
page 69

NATIONALISM IN RUSSIA
page 81

ELECTION 2000
page 84

RETURN OF COMMUNISM
page 89

RECONQUEST OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
page 92

RUSSIAN MILITARY AND NUCLEAR ISSUES
page 96

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS WITH MAJOR POWERS
page 112

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE USA

RUSSIA WILL BE EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT TO THE USA IN THE CENTURY TO COME

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Russians will make this fateful choice and be its principal victims or beneficiaries. But its consequences to Americans, Europeans, and other who share this shrinking globe should not be underestimated. Contrary to the widespread view in the United States that Russia is essentially irrelevant or of secondary concern, our continental country, stretching from Eastern Europe to upper Asia, will be important in the next century because of its location between east and west, its possession of weapons of mass destruction, its natural resources, and its potential as a consumer market.

RUSSIA IS AT A CRITICAL POINT, AND THE FATE OF RUSSIA IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE USA

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	The parallel I'm suggesting is this: Like Britain in 1942, Russia in 1997 is still in the throes of a titanic struggle. We Americans have a huge stake in how that struggle turns out. Our goal, like that of many Russians, is to see Russia become a normal, modern state -- democratic in its governance, abiding by its own constitution and by its own laws, market-oriented and prosperous in its economic development, at peace with itself and with the rest of the world. That, in a nutshell, is what we mean -- and more to the point, what many Russians mean -- by the word reform.

WHAT IMPACTS RUSSIA IMPACTS AMERICA

Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service, The Patriot Ledger , March 24, 1998; Pg. 01, HEADLINE: Cleaning Russia's house ; Russian upheaval may be dramatic gesture acs-VT99
	Nearly a decade after the Soviet Union crumbled, America still tenses when Russia convulses.

RUSSIA’S EVOLUTION INTO A PROSPEROUS DEMOCRACY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Newsday (New York, NY), October 23, 1997, Page A46, HEADLINE: SOROS GIVES RUSSIA $500 MILLION: U.S. PLEASE COPY acs-VT99
	 In the big picture, there is no foreign policy goal more important to the United States, and to much of the world, than the success of democracy in Russia. If Russia becomes a successful, democratic state it will profoundly and positively influence events in the next century. Just think of the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on the Cold War in the second half of this century because Russia was viewed as a dangerous enemy.

RUSSIA IS NOT IN DEEP TROUBLE -- IT IS DOING BETTER THAN EVER

IMPROVEMENTS ON MANY FRONTS HAVE LED RUSSIA TO A “TAKE OFF” POINT IN ITS DEVELOPMENT

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
While none of these developments is decisive, each is significant in its own right. Moreover, there is a synergy among them -- the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Together they may mark a takeoff point in post-Soviet Russia's evolution as a modern state.

RUSSIA IS A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY WITH A STRONG PARLIAMENT AND COOPERATES CLOSELY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE USA

Nikolai Morozov, TASS, March 19, 1998, HEADLINE: US diplomat describes US-Russian relations as good, close; acs-VT99
	At present Russia is a democratic country with a strong parliament which closely cooperates with the government. Russia develops cooperation with the United States and other world countries on the most important and serious problems, Talbott stressed.

RUSSIA IS STRONGLY ON THE MOVE AND GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	 All of this demonstrates that Russia is on the move, both at home and on the world's economic and political scene. But this time, its status is not founded on military might but on the basis of sound diplomacy and constructive regional policy. Clearly, the Russians are hoping the links with its neighbors will help accelerate Russia's recovery and establish vital long- term economic partnerships. There is every reason to believe that this summer's trend will continue.

RUSSIA IS IN ITS BEST POSITION IN 450 YEARS BECAUSE ITS CURRENT GOVERNMENT HAS SUCCEEDED IN INITIAL REFORMS

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	Few propositions about today's world can be stated with greater certainty: Never in its nearly 450 years has the modern Russian state been less imperialist, less militarized, less threatening to its neighbors and the world, and more receptive to Western ideals and practices than it is in 1998. This is obvious to anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Russian history.
This state of affairs is the result of a series of complex, often difficult choices made by the first post-Communist regime. Some of the most fateful decisions were made between 1991 and 1996, when Russia was reeling from economic depression, hyperinflation, market reforms, and postimperial trauma. Many a nation facing incomparably milder dislocations has succumbed to the temptation of nationalism as a means of securing cohesion. From Argentina to China, Malaysia, and Indonesia, countries have resorted to this palliative in recent years to dull the pain of market reforms or economic reversals.

IN 1998, RUSSIA IS STILL STANDING, AND STRONGER THAN EVER AS PROBLEMS ARE BEING ADDRESSED

Dmitry Zaks, The Moscow Times, December 30, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia's Biggest Stories of 1997 acs-VT99
	But as 1998 rolls in, Russia is still standing - in some respects, stronger than ever. Inflation has been all but tamed, the ruble remains remarkably steady and economic reforms seem to be taking hold. Mir, for all its troubles, is still flying, and Russia is slowly regaining its status on the international diplomatic stage.

WHILE MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN, THINGS ARE IMPROVING IN RUSSIA IN ALL MAJOR AREAS

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 This is not to say that Russian reform has scored a knockout blow against crime; corruption, the uglier manifestation of nationalism and the other forces arrayed against it; or that the Russian economy is home free; or that old Soviet attitudes and habits are gone forever. But it is to say that Russians today can be more confident than a year ago that their country will make it -- not just as a safe, secure, unitary state, but as a law-based, democratic society, increasingly integrated with the growing community of states that are similarly constituted and similarly oriented.

RUSSIA’S FUTURE LOOKS EXTREMELY BRIGHT AND PROMISING

GIVEN ITS CURRENT PROGRESS, RUSSIA WILL EMERGE BY 2020 AS A STRONG AND STABLE NATION

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 366 , acs-VT99 
	Since 1991, Russia has broken so dramatically with its absolutist past that the break cannot be ignored or underestimated. The almost uni formly rosy predictions for China and the almost uniformly gloomy ones for Russia seem wrong to me. Political reform is not the only advantage Russia has in its favor. Unlike China, whose population is still dominated by rural poverty and illiteracy, Russia is an increasingly urban nation with a literacy rate of 99 percent. Nearly 80 percent of the Russian economy is in private hands. Inflation, a feature of all postcommunist countries, has dropped from 2,500 percent in 1992 to 130 percent in 1993'. The natural resource base is unparalleled. Richard Layard of the London School of Economics and John Parker, a former Moscow correspondent for The Economist, predict that by the year 2020 Russia "may well have out stripped countries like Poland, Hungary, Brazil and Mexico with China far behind." They are more optimistic than I am read), to be, but it is not an unreasonable view.

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA IS MORE PROMISING NOW THAN AT ANY TIME IN ITS HISTORY

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 362 , acs-VT99 
While it is undoubtedly true that daily life in Russia today suffers from a painful economic, political, and social transition, the Russian prospect over the coming years and decades is more promising than ever before in its history. Or as the former deputy prime minister Yegor Gaidar has put it, "Russia today is not a bad subject for long-term prognostication, and a very inappropriate subject for short-term analysis." I see no reason that Russia cannot make a break ,vith its absolutist past much in the way that German), and Japan did after the war. 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIA MEAN THAT THE PAST HAS CHANGED FOREVER AND THE FUTURE LOOKS PROMISING

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 367 , acs-VT99 
	The most famous of all nineteenth-century visitors to Russia, the Marquis de Custine, ended his trip and his narrative by Nvriting, "One needs to have lived in that solitude without tranquillity, that prison without leisure that is called Russia, to appreciate all the freedom enjoyed in other European countries, no matter what form of government they have chosen. . . . It is alway's good to know that there exists a society in which no happiness is possible, because, by reason of nature, man cannot be happy unless he is free." But that has changed. An entirely, new era has begun. Russia has entered the world. and everything, even freedom, even happiness, is now possible.

IT IS POSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA TO BE STABLE, PROSPEROUS, AND DEMOCRATIC IN THE FUTURE

Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko faction in the State Duma, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, OCTOBER 6, 1997, HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE LEADER OF THE YABLOKO FACTION acs-VT99
	Q: One more question: do you yourself believe in a democratic future for Russia? After listening to you today, I have grave doubts. 
Yavlinsky: I have absolutely no doubts that a free, democratic and dignified country can be built in Russia. It will not be the greatest or strongest power in the world, but it will be far better than it was or is today. This can be achieved, I have absolutely no doubts about that.

RUSSIA WILL BECOME A PEACEFUL MEMBER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, AND CURRENT EVENTS DEMONSTRATE THIS

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	The military doctrine that the government of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993 declares that Russia "does not regard any state to be its adversary." The May 1997 NATO- Russia agreement reaffirmed the premise. Although not admitted to NATO, Russia has been given a seat on the alliance's Permanent Joint Council, which assures it, if not of a veto, then of a voice, in NATO deliberations. Given that in last year's presidential election Russian voters rejected the communist candidate for one committed to democracy and capitalism, it is not unreasonable to assume that in time Russia will become a fullfledged member of the international community.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS SHOW THAT “YOUNG RUSSIA” WILL BE THE KEY TO A PEACEFUL AND STABLE RUSSIA

GENERATIONAL SHIFT MEANS THAT RUSSIA WILL BECOME MORE AND MORE STABLE AND PEACEFUL

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	Few places on earth have seen as little peace of any kind as Russia and its environs. But here again, I reiterate: There is reason for optimism. In addition to the ones I've already mentioned, I'd like, in conclusion, to add one more. It's generational -- or, to be even more blunt, biological. The dynamic of what is happening in Russia today is not just Westernizers versus Slavophiles; it is also young versus old -- and the young have a certain advantage in at least that dimension of the larger struggle between the old and the new.

YOUNG RUSSIA IS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE WAY THINGS ARE IMPROVING

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	Perhaps the single-most significant and hopeful statistic I've seen is this: Although 65% of those Russians over the age of 65 think things got worse over the last year, 60% of those under 35 think things got better. So among the positive trends underway in Russia is perhaps the most basic one of all, the one represented by the actuarial tables.

USA SHOULD GEAR ITS POLICIES TOWARDS YOUNGER RUSSIANS WHO ARE THE KEY TO RUSSIAN STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 Hence, to the extent possible, our policy toward Russia should be geared toward the younger citizens of Russia who will decide who they are, where they belong, how they relate to Europe and to the outside world. The essence of our policy, in short, is: give them time -- give them time to consolidate the reforms that constitute the good news of the past few years; give them time to beat back the forces that have generated the bad news; give them time to work out their identity and destiny in ways that will not only best serve a modern Russia's real interests but that will also be, to the greatest extent possible, compatible with our interests as well.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS SHOW THAT RUSSIA WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL AND FREE SOCIETY

Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 237-238 , acs-VT99 
	Furthermore, there clearly exist in Russia substantial groups who do accept the desirability of Russia's becoming a normal post-imperial country and of conducting politics in a civilised fashion. These attitudes are much more common among the young than the old. The simple processes of generational replacement would therefore lead one to expect a secular trend towards a more desirable outcome.

RUSSIA REPRESENTS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD

THE NEW RUSSIAN STATE -- A UNIQUE STRUCTURE -- REPRESENTS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE WEST AND TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	Russia still is struggling with post-communist transition. Yes, great achievements have been made. But we are not out of the woods yet. We do not have a stable democracy, civil society, the rule of law, and truly free media in Russia. We do not have a thriving market economy in the Western sense, complete with a working legal and court system, a culture of small business, a system that is hospitable to the private sector and investment-generated growth.
What we have is a new type of state that combines elements of the market with a highly centralized economy, powerful business and political oligarchies, and a strong overlay of criminality. This state represents a threat to the United States, to the West, and to the Russian people.

CURRENT INSTABILITY IN RUSSIA WILL LAST FOR ANOTHER GENERATION

Steve Rodan, The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1998, Pg. 2, HEADLINE: Israel, US dispute effectiveness of Congress sanctions on Russia // acs-VT99
	The Pentagon recently held a conference of Russian experts to discuss the future of the federation. Participants said the conclusion was that the current instability in Russia would last at least another generation.

 THERE IS NO FOREIGN ANALOGY FOR THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 366 , acs-VT99 
	In trying to analyze the situation in Russia and the Russian prospect, all analysts, myself included, tend to grope for analogies with other countries and other eras. The rise of oligarchy summons Argentina, the vacuum of power evokes Weimar Germany, the dominance of the mafia hints at postwar Italy, the presidential constitution recalls de Gaulle's constitution of 1958. But while Russia's problems alarm the world on occasion, none of these analogies takes into account the country's possibilities.

RUSSIA’S PROGRAM OF REFORM IS SUCCEEDING

THE QUICK PACE AND SUCCESSES OF RUSSIAN REFORM ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO GOOD POLICIES AND STRONG LEADERSHIP

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	 It's not luck that's produced these results; it's a combination of strong leadership with vision, good policy and political willpower. There is no doubt about Russia's resolve and capability to change, stabilize and forge a market economy. In fact, this quick pace exceeds all expectations, even our own here in America.

THERE IS HOPE THAT A REFORMIST RUSSIA WILL WIN OUT

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 There is nothing preordained about the outcome of this clash of alternative futures. But there is reason for hope that the latter-day Westernizers will prevail over the latter-day Slavophiles. Let me explain why.

THERE IS NO RETREAT FROM CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA -- NOW THE DECISION IS OVER DEMOCRATIC OR OLIGARCHIC CAPITALISM

Yekaterina Grigoryeva, Russian Press Digest, September 19, 1997, HEADLINE: It Was So Under Peter The Great, It Will Be So Under Boris I, SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, pp. 1-2 acs-VT99
	 As for that choice, Chubais explained it in this way. Russia has already made its choice between communism and capitalism and is now at a "new historical road fork" -- an oligarchic or a democratic capitalism. He said he was for the latter option. But his political opponents, Russia's biggest bankers, speak also in favor of a "democratic capitalism."

RUSSIAN CITIZENS STILL FAVOR MARKET REFORMS, BUT AT A SLOWER PACE

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 129 , acs-VT99 
	But this did not mean that Russians wanted the reform process to end. Of those surveyed in 1995, 73 percent thought that market reforms were necessary. Only 27 percent wanted the process stopped. What they did oppose was the current direction of the reform process. Fifty percent of those questioned thought that market reforms should provide people with adequate social protection. The overwhelming majority (77 percent) were critical of the new economic elites who, they thought, were only interested in making as much money as possible and who paid little attention to the concerns of the larger society. While they did not wish to return to the kind of life that existed in the USSR before 1985, they disliked the growing disparity between the rich and the poor that Russian capitalism was exhibiting. In short, when asked what they thought the Russian road to capitalism should look like, their vision closely resembled the social democratic attributes of modem welfare states.

RUSSIA’S PROGRAM OF REFORMS IS A DISMAL FAILURE

CURRENT REFORMS HAVE LED TO A MELT DOWN OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 183-184 . acs-VT99 
	Today, I would characterize our society as a melt-down, a kind of magma produced by the catastrophic explosion of the vast spaces historically formed around Russia. We are witnessing the growth of a sharp opinion split concerning property, territory, and spirituality. Instead of a vigorous multi-faceted economy, we see a complete exhaustion of all types of economic endeavor. The public (state) economic sector has been looted and vandalized. Taxes have choked the collective (stock company) property and business. Even the private sector, which continues to live off the ruins of state property, has been depressed. 

THE ATTEMPTED TRANSITION TO A FREE ECONOMY HAS THROWN MILLIONS INTO POVERTY AND THREATENED THEIR FREEDOM

Rertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs- of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 55 , acs-VT99 
	The symptoms of extreme poverty are already visible in Russia's largest cities. According to one estimate, there are now 60,000 homeless children in MOSCOW. They have been augmented since 1992 by the 4 million migrants and refugees caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In Moscow, Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, supported by President Yeltsin, has begun deporting thousands of homeless people. As one of the mayor's legal advisers, Aleksandr Zolin, argued, "we're not saying there should be an iron curtain separating Moscow from the rest of the country, but we don't need homeless vagrants or beggars here." In denying political rights to the homeless, Zolin advocated a new Russian concept of freedom: "If people can afford to live here," he argued, "they are welcome, if they cannot they should stay where they are. In our view, there is no freedom without financial means." According to official statistics, as many as 45 million Russians were poor at the beginning of 1995.37 If Russia implements this concept of freedom, the liberty of millions would once again be at risk.

INCOMPLETE REFORMS HAVE LEFT THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY A WRECK

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	 Right now, Russia outperforms hardly anyone. In this, the seventh year of market reform, only a small segment of the Russian economy can truly be said to be operating under market conditions, and most of that is finance-related activity based in Moscow. The rest of the economy remains not just outside the real market, but largely insulated against it. Essentially all of the agricultural sector and most of manufacturing persist in a nearly self-contained system that operates without market prices and almost without money.

CURRENT REFORMS HAVE DESTROYED THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 7 acs-VT99 
The radical reforms started in January 19925 have brought catastrophic results. Today it is clear that the real goal of the "reformers" was the destruction of Russia's economy under the slogan "The state must be removed from managing the national economy." The country has been deeply damaged by the principle that calls for maximum exports of raw materials and semifinished goods and encourages unlimited imports of food and industrial products. As a result of this grave distortion, gross domestic output has declined by 40 percent. The production base of the economy and the network of economic ties have both been undermined. Enterprises are forced to reduce the volume of production radically because of declining orders and purchases, shrinking investments, unrealistic prices, and their diminishing ability to compete. 

CURRENT REFORMS HAVE DESTROYED RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 7 acs-VT99
	The foundation of our agriculture has been virtually destroyed. Agricultural production has been decreased by one-third. Our country has lost its food security and become dependent on foreign imports: 54 percent of the food consumed in Russia (70 percent in its urban centers) comes from abroad. 

RUSSIAN ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURE ARE COLLAPSING UNDER CURRENT REFORMS

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 141 , acs-VT99 
The results of Yeltsin's governing are catastrophic. Never before has our country sustained in time of peace such a destructive blow to the national economy-industnial output has been halved. The most severe losses have been suffered by the previously most advanced, progressive, and promising sectors: machine building, instrument and machine-tool making, and the electronic, electrical, light, and food industries. Our agriculture is rapidly disintegrating, and living standards have declined precipitously, resulting in a sharp social polarization into the very rich and the very poor.

AFTER FIVE YEARS OF REFORM, THE POOR ARE WORSE OFF AND THE NEW RICH ARE IN CONTROL

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	 In its July 12 special Russian survey, the Economist said, "Five years of reform, and most Russians are far poorer than they were. A few are far richer, and they are the ones who seem to be running the show. It is not that the vulgarians are at the gates; they are inside them."

THE RICH GET RICHER, AND EVERYONE ELSE IS MUCH WORSE OFF

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 In the meantime, while the big boys -- they are all men -- fight over an ever larger piece of the Russian economic pie, the government has been unable to create economic conditions in which the majority of Russians can thrive. The problem is not only that the majority of Russians remain worse off than before the economic transition began, but that they cannot become better off. The economy is stagnating at half its 1989 level. Real incomes have fallen by a third, and living standards in most regions have deteriorated to levels not seen in decades. Government attempts to curb inflation resulted not only in tremendous wage and pension arrears, but also in the government's inability to pay its bills for the goods and services it consumed. This led to total disarray in payments, with up to 75 percent of goods and services either paid in kind, or by promissory notes that cannot be cashed, or transacted through illegal channels to dodge taxes entirely. 

YELTSIN’S DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC REFORM IS HIMSELF A CORRUPT SWINDLER

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	 Yeltsin's Western supporters many find this latter charge outrageous, but their current hero and de facto head of the Russian government, Chubais, is already endangered by documented charges that he has done some considerable looting of his own. (Virtually no one in Moscow, not even pro-Yeltsin journalist, takes seriously the Kremlin's recent "anti-corruption" campaign, promoted by the recently arrived 37-year-old Nemtsov.) On July 1 Izvestia, Moscow's most authoritative and generally pro-Kremlin newspaper, reported that Chubias had received a $ 3 million interest-free loan from a leading bank, which he then helped to win control of a large oil company. And suspicions that Chubais may have personally pocketed U.S. Agency for International Development funds channeled through Harvard University's Institute for International Development to a network of quasi-private centers he and his cronies created are being investigated in Washington and Moscow. If Chubais, the architect of privatization since 1992 and patron saint of Russian's ruling political-financial oligarchy, is not safe, can anyone in or around the Yeltsin regime really feel secure?

RUSSIA'S GOVERNMENT IS NOT RESTRAINED. BY LAW, SO ALL LAW IN RUSSIA FAILS AS A RESULT

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 166-167 , acs-VT99 
	Finally, if the existing institutions of power are not guided or restrained by laws, then what is the sense of speaking about any crimes except the shortened list of Gospel commandments, "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal"? In other words, does it make any sense to use, in a social and scientific discourse, concepts that are not institutionally supported and morally justified? Would it not be easier to speak a human tongue to wild beasts? So far, the only person who managed to do so was St. Francis of Assisi.

SHOCK THERAPY IS A VIABLE METHOD OF REFORM

SHOCK THERAPY REFORM DESCRIBED

NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997 RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p. 291 H acs-VT99 
	 In other words, what a society at this transitional stage requires is a "shock" reform of its system of political institutions implying preservation of the existing political forces and new constitutional arrangements as a form of a nation-wide consensus between them, instead of preservation (or slow transformation) of the old institutions and forcible elimination of one of the political forces. "Shock therapy" must thus be employed in the political, not in the economic sphere. It seems that such shock therapy in the political field, based on a preliminary consensus about procedures of politics, is the society's only chance to avoid the institutional traps described above and forestall the competition of legitimacies and the ensuing superimposition of the institutional and political conflicts, i.e. a situation fraught with the downfall of new democratic institutions and restoration of authoritarianism (albeit in a novel, "revolutionary", disguise). 

ONLY A SHOCK THERAPY REFORM CAN SUCCEED IN CREATING A NEW STABLE SYSTEM

NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997; RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p.291-292 H acs-VT99 
If institutional transformations are carried-out in a "shock" manner, the disbalance of legitimacies (of which the dynamics have been described above) does not occur, for all the institutions are established at once and their very system embodies the consensus achieved in the field of operational experience. It is this absence of a conflict of legitimacies that seems to account for the successful, i.e. comparatively "painless", cases of democratisation (that, unfortunately, happen to be an exception rather than a rule): the institution of a democratic regime in the United States in the late 18th century or Spain's democratic revival in the 1970s. In both cases the executive and the legislative were renovated simultaneously which facilitated a nation-wide consensus about the proper balance between them and helped keep the political process within the framework of this balance. The two nations could safely proceed with the necessary "adjustments" of the separated powers then and develop a viable system of mutual checks and balances, a task that would appear almost hopeless should a political conflict assume the form of an institutional one.

SHOCK THERAPY REFORM SUCCEEDED IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997; RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p.292 , acs-VT99 
	In less remote circumstances (in time, as well as in space) comparatively successful transformations of this kind have been fulfilled in a number of East European countries, e.g. Poland and Hungary, where the appropriate strategic consensus has been reached at the "nationwide" "round-tables" prior to the constitutional reforms. The nations that saw their old regimes collapse before such a consensus was worked out (Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) had to pay the heavy price of disintegration for this absence of a "shock" constitutional reform.

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS IN VERY ROSY SHAPE

THE RECESSION IN RUSSIA IS ENDING, AND THE COUNTRY IS EMBARKING ON A GROWTH CYCLE

Alexei Berezhkov, January 29, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: Seven-year-long recession ending in Russia \\ jan]VT99 
	The seven-year-long recession is ending in Russia and the country is embarking upon an economic growth cycle. This is one of the most important world economic events of the past decade. 
	This view was expressed by Anirwan Banejee, Director of the New York Institute for the Study of Economic Cycles, who analysed, at the request of the Wall Street Journal, Russian statistics on the economic situation in the country. 
	These figures, the newspaper notes, apparently reflect the true situation. The International Monetary Fund began to use the figures of the Russian State Statistical Board last month in its calculations and holds that they testify to economic recuperation. "We presume that these figures are absolutely trustworthy," IMF Moscow representative Martin Gilmann said. Just as the other economists, he is sure that such sectors as metallurgy, automobile-building, and oil extraction are now on the upgrade. The Statistical Board's figures for these sectors are beyond doubt.

RUSSIA IS GROWING ECONOMICALLY AND CONTROLLING INFLATION

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 Second, in the economy, after 5 years of virtual free fall, Russia's gross domestic product seems finally, in 1997, to be stabilizing and may be registering a real upturn. That achievement, combined with the government's success in slaying the beast of hyperinflation, means that Russia can focus more on taking advantage of its immense human and natural resources to build a world-class market economy.

RUSSIA HAS RACKED UP AN IMPRESSIVE LIST OF ECONOMIC SUCCESSES

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	By most counts, Russia has scored a large number of economic successes this summer. Is it by luck or good policy. On the domestic front, things seemed to be going the right way. The income gap between Russia's rich and poor narrowed for the first time in five years. Industrial production, for the first time in six years, registered a slight increase (0.8 percent), primarily as a result of output by small firms and joint ventures. Those figures don't even take into consideration the shadow economy, which is estimated at minimally $129 billion a year and takes in almost 50 percent of the country's economic activity.
 And the list continues. The government made a dent in paying off pension arrears. The stock market continued to soar at a breakneck pace, privatization of the largest monopolies went as scheduled (albeit not without charges of controversy and mishandling) and Russia's foreign reserves increased from $15 billion in January to $23.8 billion by the end of the second quarter.
 The trade surplus grew by $2.2 billion to $11 billion (although foreign trade turnover in general slightly decreased). President Yeltsin signed an important decree protecting the rights of investors in Russia's financial and stock markets. The government's anti-corruption campaign got off the ground.

RUSSIAN COMPANIES ARE SCORING IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	 Many Russian companies registered stunning performances. Gazprom made it to 146 on Fortune Magazine's Global 500 list on the world's largest companies, and was rated second on Business Week's list of 200 leading companies. Three Russians made Forbes richest people in the world list (Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khadorovsky and Vagit Alekperov).

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC SIGNALS ARE IMPROVING

Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99
	 Let me turn to economic issues. Last year, the Russian government brought inflation down to record lows and kept the ruble stable. With U.S. support, the international financial institutions provided necessary assistance -- linked, of course, to structural reforms and sound fiscal policy. The Russian stock market enjoyed a surge of Western portfolio investment.

ECONOMICS IS THE TRUE MEASURE OF MODERN POWER, AND RUSSIA MAY BE ABLE TO TRANSITION INTO FUTURE SUCCESS

Josef Joffe, Time, April 6, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Three's A Crowd; Yeltsin's attempt to create an axis of power comes off as sheer anachronism acs-VT99
	Today, the grand chessboard has changed. The stakes are welfare, not warfare, and the balance sheet is more important than the balance of power. Winning and losing have to do with the strength of a nation's economy and the stability of its socio-political arrangements. Boris Yeltsin, of all people, should understand this. The Soviet Union collapsed precisely because it insisted on playing the arms game while its economy rotted away and its people succumbed to political cynicism. Today, Russia has a real chance of taking home the Big Prize of democracy and market economics.
But watching Yeltsin's antics, one wonders. His imagination seems limited to thinking up bolted drinking cups. These might be good for boozing. But in the 21st century, a high-speed road link between London and Moscow is worth more than an anachronism by the name of axis.

RUSSIA IS IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC REFORMS TO HELP COUNTERACT THE EFFECTS THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CRISIS IS HAVING ON ITS ECONOMY

VANORA BENNETT, February 19,1998 [Los Angeles Times. SECTION: Business; Part D; Page 1; Financial Desk; HEADLINE: ADVERTISING & MARKETING; NEWS ANALYSIS,RUSSIA'S DELAYED REACTION; STABILIZATION PLAN COMES MONTHS INTO ASIAN CRISIS\\jan 
	Economists say the stabilization program--even if late--shows that reformers have at last figured out how to deal with their first imported financial crisis in six years of capitalism. 
	"This is the first time the Russian government's ever had a crisis where they're directly affected by foreigners," said economist Al Breach of the Russian-European Center for Economic Policy. "They had to show everyone they understood what was needed. They've done it. They've learned to make all the appropriate noises. " 
	Reformers say they will now move to tackle the underlying problems that left them vulnerable to the Asian turbulence. They say Russia will spend less, will rely less on borrowing from fickle foreigners and will collect taxes more efficiently. They say these measures will cut the budget deficit-which last year came to a whopping 7% of gross domestic product--to less than 5% this year.

RUSSIAN ATTITUDES CHANGED RAPIDLY AND BY 1993 WERE PROFOUNDLY PROMARKET

Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 233 , acs-VT99 
	It was clear that, despite substantial reservations, over time a number of important features of the market had become accepted: these included the development of co-operatives, private ownership I of small businesses, free pricing (within limits), even by 1993 the acceptability of getting rich by honest means.

CITIZENS OF POST COMMUNIST NATIONS DO NOT LINK LIBERAL DEMOCRACY TO PROSPERITY AND WILL ENDURE HARDSHIP AS LONG AS THEY HOPE THINGS WILL IMPROVE

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 25 , acs-VT99 
The citizens of many postcommunist countries do regard economic prosperity as a central feature of liberal democracy, but they seem prepared to endure material hardships so long as they believe that economic circumstances will ultimately irnprove.

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS IN SHAMBLES

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IS OVER 100 YEARS BEHIND THAT OF THE USA

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	 The first step in understanding Russia's economic prospects is to acknowledge just how small that economy is now and is likely to remain. Russia today has about 150 million people, roughly what the United States had in 1950. Russia's total economic product, however, is in terms of market value only one-quarter the size of America's in 1950. To put it another way, Russia is currently running more than a century behind the United States in overall economic performance.

WITHOUT A FINANCIAL STRENGTHENING OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY NOW IT WILL BE LEFT BEHIND FOR A LONG TIME TO COME

Daniil Osmolovsky. Kommersant-Daily, April 25, 1998, pp. 1, 3. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, May 27, 1998; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Kiriyenko Wins Confirmation on Third Try acs-VT99
	Since without an industrial upswing and the financial strengthening of leading Russian-owned businesses, sooner or later Russia will completely lose its economic independence and be shunted to the sidelines of world technical progress for a long time to come, the official pursuit of fiscal priorities in economic policy must be accompanied by a deliberate industrial policy. This means a radical lightening of the tax burden and a set of measures to stimulate foreign investment.

RUSSIAN TAX COLLECTION SYSTEM HAS BROKEN DOWN DUE TO BARTER TRADING AND PAYMENTS -- NO MONEY IN THE TREASURY AS A RESULT

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	 Consider the findings of a recent government audit of the country's 210 largest corporate taxpayers. Those companies, which account for most of the taxes paid, paid 85% of their federal tax obligations, but only 10% of that amount was in cash. The rest was in the attributed value of products delivered and services performed.
As a result, the total cash revenue available to the Russian federal government last year, not including amounts borrowed or raised from selling state property, was barely $ 36 billion. It is not likely to be any greater this year.
 To put it mildly, no matter how wise or skilled one happens to be, it is extremely difficult to direct the fortunes of 150 million people with a sustainable resource base of $ 36 billion a year.

RUSSIAN INDUSTRY HAS BROKEN DOWN INTO A BARTER ECONOMY

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	 The major commodity-producing enterprises have set up an elaborate set of barter arrangements that allows them to sustain production under conditions highly buffered from market discipline.
 They induce state orders for their products and use them to meet federal tax obligations. They provide goods and services for local governments in lieu of taxes.

RUSSIA’S ECONOMY IS IN A CRISIS OF MISMANAGEMENT

Daniel Williams, Washington Post Foreign Service, The Washington Post, May 01, 1998, Pg. A28, HEADLINE: Yeltsin Fills Posts Mostly With Old Standbys; Russian Leader Positions Chubais and Berezovsky to Continue Their Rivalry // acs-VT99
	 Russia faces severe economic problems from a combination of mismanagement and adverse economic factors, notably the decline in prices for oil and gas, the country's main exports. The Yeltsin government has been notoriously inefficient in collecting taxes and paying wages to state employees. Economic growth, a key goal for the year, remains elusive. "The choices for any government would be narrow," Piontkovsky said. "It will have to work in a difficult period."

RUSSIA'S ECONOMY IS FRAGILE. THE SLIGHT AMOUNT OF GROWTH IT EXPERIENCED LAST YEAR COULD EASILY BE REVERSED

Anatoly Chubais, February 11, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: Anatoly Chubais: Decade Of Stagnancy And Slump In Russia Has Ended. SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, pp. 1, 3\\jan]VT99 
	To back up his optimistic statement, Chubais offered the following figures: it was precisely in 1997 that Russia's gross domestic product grew by 0.4 percent; industrial production, instead of declining, rose by 1.9 percent; average real wages increased by 3.5 percent, retail trade turnover went up by 1. 5 percent, the gap between 10 percent of the wealthiest and 10 percent of the poorest has narrowed instead of becoming wider- the mortality rate has dropped, while the inflation rate in 1997 was I I percent, an unprecedented low index for all the past ten years. 
	But, there is one "but," Chubais explained, This swivel from "Minus" to "plus" in Russia's economic development represents a very weak, or to more precise, extremely fragile tendency, and in no way can it be viewed, as irreversible.

RUSSIA'S ECONOMY IS IN SHAMBLES AND THE RUBLE IS ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE

Konstantin Levin, February 17, 1998 [HEADLINE: Chubais Kills President's Dream. Russian Press Digest. SOURCE: KOMMERSANT-DAILY, p. 1\\jan]VT99 
	First Vice Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais has said that the 1998 budget might be revised to cut government spending, reports KOMMERSANT-DAILY. This means, the paper comments, that the current government financial policies have suffered a fiasco. Only two or three months back the Government considered the budget "hard to fulfil yet fulfillable." Now many government officials say privately that state expenditure should be cut 5 percent. This pessimism is quite explainable -- the Finance Ministry says this year's inflation rate may reach 10 percent, not the planned 5 to 7 percent. In other words, the budget, which has not yet been finally approved by the Duma, may become a big headache for the Government. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that President Boris Yeltsin personally pushed the budget and even came to the opposition-dominated Duma last December to give a medal to communist Speaker Gennady Seleznyov. 
	Many connect this gloomy development in Russia with the negative consequences of the financial Crisis in South East Asia which compelled foreign investors to withdraw their money from the Russian market, As a result, the ruble was on the brink of collapse. 
	The situation is really Serious, the paper notes, because no one seems to know how to remedy it. Even the IMF which, unfortunately, missed the crisis on the Asian financial markets, is at a loss unable to offer a way-out of the sudden budget problem in Russia.

RUSSIAN BANKING SYSTEM IS ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 129 // acs-VT99 
Despite an unprecedented growth in the number of banks and the amount of capital, Russia's banking system is still very vulnerable and subject to serious crises. The reasons for this are many, including poor legislative support of its functioning, lowquality management, the limited number of services offered, and the prevailing orientation toward "revolving" state-supplied money rather than toward rendering services to real people or even enterprises.

RUSSIA'S NEW CAPITALISTS HAVE MADE A MOCKERY OF THE SUPPOSED TRANSITION TO A FREE ECONOMY

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 127, acs-VT99 
	At the beginning of this chapter we posed the question whether the new economic elite is living up to the expectations of free market reformers. The answer seems clear. Thus far, the evidence suggests that Russia's new capitalists have yet to follow patterns of behavior that inform some of the basic assumptions of the free market theory of privatization. History, culture, and institutional constraints continue to undermine radical reformers' assumptions about capitalist behavior.

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC DISASTER IS CREATING MORE POOR AND THEN KILLING THEM

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAVE CAUSED A RAPIDLY RISING DEATH RATE -- UP 40% SINCE 1990

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 137-138 , acs-VT99
 	Radical economic reform in Russia has paid little attention to the positive principles of freedom. The focus on financial stabilization and rapid privatization has undermined living standards and increased inequality and insecurity. Inflation has finally diminished, but the cost has been a continuing decline in both aggregate production and real wages, which are now more than 50 percent below their pre-reform levels. As we noted in Chapter 2, financial constraints have reduced spending on health and social services. Partly as a result, the number of deaths increased by approximately 40 percent between 1990 and 1995, a total rise of almost 1,700,000 people.

UNLESS RUSSIAN ECONOMY IMPROVES IN TERMS OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION A HUGE SPECTER OF POVERTY LOOMS

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 55 , acs-VT99 
 Nevertheless, some apprehension may be called for. If it takes too much longer for Russia to emerge from its profound economic depression, the welfare of the poor will continue to deteriorate and a significant percentage of Russia's young people will not have escaped the social deprivation associated with poverty. Nor is the resumption of economic growth by itself a solution to the problems of the poor. As we have suggested, one of the major causes of poverty in Russia has been the growth in inequality. Therefore, social and economic policies to reduce income inequality and to repair the broken social safety net are also necessary. 

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLICY RESULTS

FOCUS ON ECONOMIC CONCERNS HAS NOT MADE WAR LESS LIKELY

George Will, Washington Post Writers Group, The Chattanooga Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A4, HEADLINE: Arms control fantasies acs-VT99
	 In On the Origins of War, Donald Kagan, the Yale historian and classicist, notes that one current theory of war's obsolescence holds that free markets and the communications revolution have sublimated aggressive energies in commercial relations that are too valuable to disrupt by violence. But, Kagan notes, "over the past two centuries the only thing more common than predictions about the end of war has been war itself."

HOW ECONOMIC TROUBLES IN ONE PART OF THE WORLD EFFECT OTHER PARTS IS UNKNOWN AND UNSTUDIED

DAVID E. SANGER, The New York Times, June 3, 1998, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: Central Europe May Catch Russia's Cold, U.S. Warns, acs-VT99
	 At the heart of that issue -- and of Mr. Rubin's comments today -- is the question of how economic troubles in one part of the world worsen troubles elsewhere, a little-studied subject that has suddenly become a top challenge in foreign policy. 

THE SOVIET ECONOMY DIDN’T FAIL, IT WAS SABOTAGED FROM WITHIN BY GREEDY ELITES

Stanislav Menshikov, Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Monthly Review, October, 1997; Pg. 49; HEADLINE: Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System; acs-VT99
	 This book is an eye-opener for anyone who is tired of the prevailing wisdom about today's Russia. As Kotz and Weir convincingly show, the Soviet economy did not fall apart by its own momentum. It was intentionally destroyed by members of its own elite who became increasingly anti-Communist and procapitalist. It was not a revolution from below since the popular majority still favored socialism, in spite of its many flaws. It was a "revolution," or rather counter-revolution from above led by Boris Yeltsin and the elitist coalition that supported him.

DEFINING DEMOCRACY

DEMOCRACY CAN BE DEFINED IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS, IT IS NOT A NORMATIVE STANDARD

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 4 , acs-VT99 
Because the general notion of democracy has been interpreted in many different ways, it is essential to begin by discussing some of these variations and their implications for the study of postcommunist countries. After all, during their heyday Marxist-Leninist regimes claimed to be quintessential ly democratic and ridiculed the "bourgeois" democracies found in other parts of the world. More to the point, proponents of liberal democracy have long disagreed among themselves about which institutional arrangements constitute the essence of a democratic system. Equally significant, some admirers of the advanced industrial democracies prefer to call such systems "polyarchies" and to treat democracy as a set of normative standards against which all political systems must be measured, in order not to gloss over the serious defects of contemporary liberal polities." 

NEO-LIBERALISM AND POLYARCHY ARE THE TRUE WORLD SYSTEMS, NOT CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY

John Bellamy Foster, Monthly Review, September, 1997; Pg. 51; HEADLINE: Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony acs-VT99
	Neoliberalism is usually thought of as a purely economic philosophy, stemming from the work of the arch-conservative economist Friedrich Hayek and other twentieth century economists (particularly those associated with the University of Chicago), and involving an attempt to construct a much more complete justification for a pure, self-regulating market economy than could be found in the work of Adam Smith himself. Yet, neoliberalism - it is important to understand - also has its political component in the dominant model of liberal democracy, termed "polyarchy" by one of its leading proponents, Robert Dahl.

RUSSIA WILL SUCCEED IN MAKING THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

MANY SCHOLARS BELIEVE THAT RUSSIA CAN MAKE A TRANSITION INTO DEMOCRACY FOR MANY REASONS

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 24 , acs-VT99 
	Other scholars have taken a different approach that stresses the compatibility of postcommunist political culture with democratization in many countries. Research along these lines has revealed that major West European democracies and some East European countries show broad if incomplete similarities in political culture - and that some East European citizens exhibit greater acceptance of the rights of ethnic minorities than do most West Europeans. Analysts of this school have often stressed the depth of the ideological erosion that occurred during the final decades of communist rule. Arguing that postcommunist political culture is more prodemocratic than MarxistLeninist propaganda would lead one to expect, they have suggested that memories of the violence and repression experienced under communism have strengthened citizens' attachment to attitudes of tolerance and nonviolence conducive to democrat izat ion. Adherents of this school of thought also maintain that intergenerational turnover strongly favors democratization because younger citizens are more enthusiastic about a transition to democratic politics and market economies, partly because they can adapt more easily and have longer time-horizons in which to enjoy the personal benefits of reform.

THE INNER NATURE AND HISTORY OF RUSSIA SHOWS THAT DEMOCRACY CAN TRIUMPH THERE

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 97-98, acs-VT99 
 The view that Russia cannot free herself of despotism tends to give primary weight to the external political and not the inner character of Russia's historical experience. Indeed, the potential for tragedy and returning tyranny remains; but the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras show that hatred of despotism and the spirit of freedom are not alien to Russia. It won the day in 1989, in August 1991, and in October 1993. Russia now has the task of securing its peace in freedom rather than despotism. It a daunting task, but is it an impossible task? This is a question the new Russia will have to answer in the travail of its rebirth.

THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT AND PARLIAMENT NOW HAVE A FEASIBLE WORKING RELATIONSHIP

Peter Shearman, Prof. Political Science Univ. Melbourne, 1997, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 25 , acs-VT99 
	Second, the previous system ic conflict between parliament and president has been replaced with a more normal and more functional relationship between these two key political institutions, despite the difference in policy orientation. There will continue to be disagreements over specifics , but the parliament and the governmental apparatus have demonstrated a greater ability to compromise and engage in more constructive relations.

RUSSIAN POLITICS IS LARGELY PERSONAL NOW, BUT WILL ADVANCE INTO A COMPETING PARTY SYSTEM 

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 116, acs-VT99 
As Gennadii Burbulis has pointed out, many Russian citizens may not be able to articulate their interests programmatically, but can identify individual political leaders as embodiments of their own political preferences. Thus, while it may be highly personalized and centered on leaders, the nascent political system is developing a more structured character."' There are grounds for believing, therefore, that along with the emergence of a more competitive and pluralistic environment for social interests, the foundations for a competitive party system are being formed.

RUSSIA WILL NOT STRAY FROM ITS DEMOCRATIC PATH

Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service, The Patriot Ledger , March 24, 1998; Pg. 01, HEADLINE: Cleaning Russia's house ; Russian upheaval may be dramatic gesture acs-VT99
	 -- Is democracy endangered in Russia? 
While political instability is certain to result, there are no signs that Russia is likely to stray from its democratic path, rocky though it has been for years.
The commitment to democracy has survived serious internal crises every year since Yeltsin took office in 1991. This time is expected to be no different.

RUSSIA IS CURRENTLY A DEMOCRATIC STATE

CURRENT RUSSIAN POLITICS IS BASED ON COMPROMISE AND RETENTION OF THE LEGAL CONSTITUTION

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 86-87 , acs-VT99 
	Second, the major political actors made policy decisions using constitutional procedures of legislative deliberation and majority decision, requiring compromise with other players, rather than by going outside the constitutional rules. Even the president avoided provoking a confrontation with parliament by bypassing the legislative process or exercising his decree powers beyond the limits of parliamentary tolerance. on a number of occasions the president accepted parliamentary decisions that he opposed, or settled for compromise agreements both in policy and personnel. As in the French Fifth Republic, contextual factors appeared to influence the distribution of power between president, government and parliament a good deal. Perhaps it is fair to conclude that the structure of incentives built into the institutional framework contributed to overcoming the destabilizing polarization between supporters and opponents of liberal reform which brought down the failed provisional regimes of the 1989-91 USSR and 1990-93 RSFSR constitutions.

CURRENT RUSSIAN POLITICS IS CHARACTERIZED BY CHECKS AND BALANCES WHICH PROMOTE STABILITY

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 86, acsVT99 
	First, no single seat of power or ideological camp dominated the political arena. The semi -presidential or "presidential -parliamentary" character of the regime gave the presidency a dominant position but not exclusive power over policy making. Executive power was divided between presidency and government, and checked by the Constitutional Court and and parliament. Parliament itself was decentralized through bicameralism and the dispersion of power in the lower chamber across an an array of left, centrist, and liberal partisan factions, each of which had a share of power in decision-making. Neither parliament nor government was firmly in the hands of a majority party or coalition. Parliamentary majorities were constructed out of broad coalitions that usually included large numbers of centrist deputies. The government was internally diverse. It often took positions in a rather nonideological, ad hoc way, staking out a centrist position to win the support, depending on the issue at hand, either of opponents or proponents of liberal reform. Its pragmatic strategy allowed it over and over to reach compromises with parliament, enabling the passage of legislative acts and the avoidance of a showdown with its parliamentary opponents.

RUSSIAN POLITICS, LONG ONLY THE PROVINCE OF ELITE PLAYERS, IS OPENING UP TO OTHER ACTORS

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 27-28, acs-VT99 
Today, Russian politics remains a mainly elite game, played by competing government organisations and the leaders of stateaffiliated corporate groups. It is, however, opening up and more players are joining the field. These newcomers now include regional leaders and Mite groups who often attempt to assert their own interests over those of Moscow.

RUSSIAN PEOPLE ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

RUSSIAN VOTERS HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED A DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL ORDER

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 124, acs-VT99 
	Boris Yeltsin decided to press on with the election, despite the risk of rejection by an unhappy electorate. The Russian people, in turn, made their decision. By their own free voice they endorsed the democratic social contract on which the new republic rested and rejected a return to the Soviet order. Yeltsin was given a second term and his communist challenger was turned aside.

THERE IS A DEEP DEMOCRATIC CURRENT IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY THAT CAN BE TAPPED FOR REFORM

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 96, acs-VT99 
	The democratic movement that emerged under Gorbachev and was extended under Yeltsin finds as many roots in Russian history as does the autocratic legacy. It has its antecedents in recurrent efforts at reform and civil democracy during the last two centuries in Russia. Among these were the miscarried Decembrist rising in the cause of a constitution in 1825, the reforms and emancipation of the serfs under Tsar Alexander 11, the local self-government or zemstvo movement, the post- 1905 parliamentary Duma, and the brief eight months of the provisional government in the 1917 Russian Revolution before Lenin took power in October and established the communist dictatorship.

RUSSIANS WANT AN ORDERLY SOCIETY, BUT ALSO VALUE CIVIC RIGHTS STRONGLY

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 115 , acsVT99 
As William Reisinger et al. observe, confirming the findings of other researchers, individual civic rights are widely valued in Russia, but tend to be accompanied by a strong desire for political order. Thus while there is evidence of severe disillusionment, distrust, and alienation on the part of citizens toward the present regime, there is also evidence of abstract support for democratic principles.

RUSSIAN POPULACE AND POLITICAL CULTURE IS NOT AUTHORITARIAN, AND IS INTERESTED IN FREE POLITICS

Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 231-232 , acs-VT99 
	Chapter 5 presented evidence about issues related to Russian political culture. It found that in some respects, mass attitudes did not conform to stereotypes of an 'authoritarian' or 'subject' political culture. There were substantial degrees of support for the principle that the people should indeed choose their leaders. Majorities also appeared to favour the protection of a range of human rights: in particular freedom of movement, of speech and the press, and also freedom of association. There also appeared to be a higher degree of interest in politics than one might have imagined, although this seemed to have declined over time.

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IS NOT ABSOLUTE IN RUSSIA, BUT STRONG ENOUGH TO SURVIVE IN THE SHORT RUN

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 115 , acs-VT99 
	The evidence from public opinion surveys in fact is ambiguous. As negatively as Russians evaluate the present political arrangement, they continue to express high levels of support in the abstract for liberal freedoms, with elites tending to be still more inclined to support democratic values than ordinary citizens. The great majority of Russians consider themselves to have more political freedom than they did under the old regime. Two thirds and more of Russians surveyed in 1993 report themselves to be freer to say what they think than they were in the past, freer to join any organization they wish. and to practice any religion."' High proportions of the public continue to express support for certain general principles of democracy, such ;is freedom of speech and a free media. I'll At least in the short run, moreover, support for democratic principles appear to be more stable than support for the institutions of a market economy.

RUSSIA’S FREE ELECTIONS SHOW IT HAS COME OF AGE AS A DEMOCRATIC STATE

RUSSIA'S SUCCESSFUL RECORD OF FREE ELECTIONS SHOWS IT IS READY FOR DEMOCRACY AND SHAKEN OFF ITS SOVIET PAST

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 126, acs-VT99 
Though Yeltsin's heart trouble and a host of economic and other problems clouded the prospects for his second term, the election was an undeniable victory for Russian democracy. Only a decade earlier, high politics in this vast country was pawn to unpredictable power struggles behind Kremlin walls. The shift to nationwide elections to determine who governs Russia was an historic transformation. Boris Yeltsin helped lead the way to this transformation. 

SUCCESSFUL RUSSIAN ELECTIONS MEAN IT HAS TURNED THE TIDE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 That danger has not disappeared altogether, but it has diminished, and -- like Britain after El Alamein -- Russia may have turned the tide; it may be on the brink of a breakthrough. It has happened with a constellation of several events, of which I'd like to single out four.
First, in domestic politics, there was the presidential election 14 months ago. With Boris Yeltsin's victory over Gennady Zyuganov, the communist electoral tide began to recede from its high-water mark.

RUSSIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN HAVING FREE ELECTIONS

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Perhaps the most often cited examples of successful Russian democracy are the Russian elections. Over the past three years, elections have become an accepted part of Russian life. This was hardly always the case. A mere three years ago, debate raged in Russia as to whether the ruling authorities would even allow elections to occur. But from the December 1995 Duma elections to the June 1996 presidential race to the subsequent gubernatorial and regional legislature elections, again and again elections have been successfully held in the Russian Federation. In many of those contests, notably the Duma election and some regional gubernatorial races, opposition candidates from the communist and other parties have won and taken office. With minor exceptions, voting and ballot counting have been peaceful and relatively free, while voter turnout has been higher than that of the United States. 

RUSSIANS ARE FREER NOW THAN AT ANY TIME IN THEIR HISTORY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 RUSSIA'S CURRENT democratic institutions also deserve a mixed review. Certainly there are reasons for optimism. Russians are freer than at any time in their history. They can now read what they like, travel, talk, worship, and assemble. Russia's citizens have quickly grown accustomed to these liberties. Technological advances such as the Internet, fax machines, and mobile phones will make it impossible for any one source ever to monopolize information in Russia again. Through this continuous contact with the world, with each passing day, Russia becomes a more normalized society.

RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY OFFERS MANY IMPORTANT POLICY BENEFITS

RUSSIA AS A DEMOCRACY CAN OFFER A UNQUE PARTNERSHIP TO SOLVE MANY OF THE WORLDS GREATEST PROBLEMS

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	A Western-style democracy in Russia would be a partner with the West in confronting the challenges of the 21st century. Russia and the West would work together better to maintain control over weapons of mass destruction and would be more likely to cooperate in containing regional conflict in explosive areas like the Caucasus and Middle East. Finally, the rule of law would govern business relations and allow for economic development and growth beneficial for both societies.

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA IS THE CAUSE OF ITS MASSIVE DEMILITARIZATION, NOT A WEAK ECONOMY

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Russia's epoch-making choice to disarm is the result of democratization, not of a weak economy, as is often suggested -- as if insecurity, hatred, wounded honor, messianic fervor, and a dictator's will did not regularly override economic considerations in determining the priorities of nations. The shrinking of Russia's armed forces is due to the loosening of the state's grip on the economy and to the new constraints imposed on imperialism, aggression, and brutality by public opinion, a free press, and competitive politics. The public's pressure to end the war in Chechnya is a case in point. Slow to bestow on Russia its other blessings, democracy has already made high defense expenditures and imperial adventures difficult to sustain.

RECENT CHANGES IN RUSSIA HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY SHIFTS IN PUBLIC OPINION

Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 238 , acs-VT99 
	However, the disjunctions between public opinion and Government policy have, as yet, had less dramatic implications than the emergence of fascism. Clearly it was possible to govern without popular support for many policies for a period of time, but the continuing pressure for a moderation of economic policy and for a somewhat more authoritarian form of political leadership was finally reflected in the changes to the composition of the Russian Government after the December 1993 elections.

BARRIERS PREVENT RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY FROM MATURING

RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY IS BETTER THAN IT WAS, BUT HAS FAR TO GO TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 In sum, Russian democracy still has a long way to go. True, elections are held, freedoms are respected, parties exist, and the media express divergent views, but such minimum democratic institutions exist in both Latin American and Western democracies. Russia is better off with its imperfect institutions than without them, but they do not yet properly reflect the people's needs and will.

RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY CANNOT FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE IT LACKS A REAL OPPOSITION

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	Russia lacks an effective opposition. Under strong pressure from more radical activist, the leadership of the Communist Party, which remains by far the largest and best organized in the country, has called from a nationwide "political strike" in the fall, but many observers doubt its resolve. Since losing the presidential election to Yeltsin last year, its leader, Gennady Zyuganov, has repeatedly prevented a parliamentary vote of no confidence in the government, despite the efforts of two otherwise dissimilar young leaders of smaller opposition parties in the Duma -- the liberal democrat Grigory Yavlinsky and the nationalist Sergei Baburin. Nor have any effective opposition leaders emerged outside the Moscow political establishment. A television blackout has largely muffled the anger roar of GEn. Aleksandr Lebed, and trade union officials seem unwilling to mobilize their membership fully.

RUSSIAN MEDIA IS NOW UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ECONOMIC OLIGARCHS

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	The Russian media also earns a mixed review. On the one hand, Russians have a variety of news sources from which to choose. Opposition newspapers exist, and journalists are free to do investigative reporting and write their own opinions. The November book payment scandal, where senior members of Yeltsin's economic team were revealed to have accepted $ 500,000 for writing a book on privatization, first broke in the Russian media. Political leaders appear on programs like Hero of the Day and Itogi to explain their views to the people. Even so, in the past two years the media has become entirely controlled by the oligarchs, who are part of the government and use their editorial boards and programmers to promote their own selfish agendas.

THE PROBLEM IS LAW IN RUSSIA -- IT IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 115-116 , acs-VT99 
And hardly any proof is needed that real administrative activity in the USSR and present-day Russia is to a great extent the practice of defying law. One can easily observe the Communist practice of violating constitutionally stipulated civil rights or the recent practice of ignoring the legislative activity of Russia's representative power under the pretext that the laws adopted are "Impracticable" (a ready example is provided by numerous ill-fated laws and decrees concerning the restoration of individual savings depreciated through the economic reform of 1992). And with a dossier being kept on every "criminal i zed" bureaucrat that could be used to dismiss and perhaps even repress him/her at any time, it is much easier for political leaders to, ensure obedience on the part of the bureaucracy.

UNIFYING SOCIAL CONCEPTS AND SYMBOLS ARE LACKING IN RUSSIA TODAY

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 136137 , acs-VT99 
	Confusion with and disaffection from market reforms is exacerbated by another important aspect of the devolutionary process: the breakdown of important social symbols and values. Unlike the great revolutions of the past, the discredited ideology of Soviet communism has not given birth to a more compelling sense of purpose toward which society is moving. The idea of an open society - the appeal to freedom from the oppressive constraints of the state --- is an important force for modernization. 16 But it does not answer the question, Freedom for what?

THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT (DUMA) IS WITHOUT REAL POWER IN RUSSIA

Judith Matloff, Chicago Sun-Times, March 24, 1998, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Politics as usual in Russia acs-VT99
	 The Duma is basically a fangless institution, however, and the dismissals seemed to be more a product of Yeltsin's manipulation of his own inner circle, analysts said.

THE CURRENT YELTSIN REGIME WAS NOT DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED

RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA WERE FIXED

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 180 . acs-VT99 
According to the norms accepted in the entire civilized world, the recent presidential elections in Russia cannot be considered democratic, equal, or honest. From the very start, candidates found themselves in unequal situations. The entire state machine worked for the incumbent President who also received huge financial support including donations from very dubious sources. Numerous instances of open attempts to pressure voters and to falsify election results were noted. We have initiated approximately one hundred criminal cases involving flagrant violations of the election laws.

THE CURRENT RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION WAS PASSED IN A TOTALLY RIGGED ELECTION

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 18 acs-VT99 
Today we know enough to state that in December 1993 the Constitution was adopted as the result of a fraudulent addition of nine million ballots to the tally. This fact was confirmed by the published results of an American electronic-intelligence data survey which has not been challenged by the central authorities nor by the Election Commission. Unfortunately this can no longer be checked because all the documents have been destroyed.

YELTSIN’S ACTIONS TO DISSOLVE THE SOVIET UNION WERE EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL

Stanislav Menshikov, Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Monthly Review, October, 1997; Pg. 49; HEADLINE: Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System; acs-VT99
	 The real anticonstitutional coups were on Yeltsin's part, first in December 1991 when he (together with the Ukraine's Kravchuk and Shushkevitch from Belarus) illegally dissolved the Soviet Union, and then the October 1993 tank assault on the Russian parliament (the "White House," as it was then called) and the arrest of its leaders. Once again, the latter episode demonstrates the largely anticapitalist composition of the first Russian parliament. Real democracy was introduced in Russia before Yeltsin came to power. I visited the White House many times and still recall the spontaneously free democratic spirit which reigned in that body. It was like inhaling fresh air as compared to the predominantly procapitalist propaganda in most of the progovernment media.

 ARGUMENTS THAT DEMOCRACIES STAY OUT OF WARS HAVE BEEN DISPROVEN ON MANY LEVELS

Stephen M. Walt, professor of political science University of Chicago, Foreign Policy, March 22, 1998; Pg. 29; HEADLINE: International relations: one world, many theories; acs-VT99
	 It is therefore ironic that faith in the "democratic peace" became the basis for U.S. policy just as additional research was beginning to identify several qualifiers to this theory. First, Snyder and Edward Mansfield pointed out that states may be more prone to war when they are in the midst of a democratic transition, which implies that efforts to export democracy might actually make things worse. Second, critics such as Joanne Gowa and David Spiro have argued that the apparent absence of war between democracies is due to the way that democracy has been defined and to the relative dearth of democratic states (especially before 1945). In addition, Christopher Layne has pointed out that when democracies have come close to war in the past their decision to remain at peace ultimately had little do with their shared democratic character. Third, clearcut evidence that democracies do not fight each other is confined to the post-1945 era, and, as Gowa has emphasized, the absence of conflict in this period may be due more to their common interest in containing the Soviet Union than to shared democratic principles.

TRANSITION FROM YELTSIN’S RULE IS THE CRITICAL ISSUE IN THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA

WHEN YELTSIN DIES ALL HELL WILL BREAK LOOSE IN RUSSIA

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	 Business concerns allied with presidential candidates are busily acquiring newspapers, radio stations, and TV channels while security services are using eavesdropping against members of the government to acquire compromising materials for their political enemies. When Boris Yeltsin dies or steps down, all hell will break loose. And while I hope that the players will understand that following the path of law and the constitution in the minefield of Russia's politics is in their interest, no one can be certain that this is what will happen. The high courts of Russia have not yet established themselves as the guarantors of the constitution and the rule of law.

THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF RUSSIA IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON YELTSIN’S TENURE IN OFFICE

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	Every political figure we met -- liberal, Communist and nationalist, as they are somewhat misleadingly typecast in the Western media -- agreed that the country's fragile political stability rests largely upon Yeltsin's tenure in office, but no one knew the real state of his health.

IF YELTSIN DIES, THERE WILL BE A DISTURBING POWER VACUUM

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
Chernomyrdin was fired, Russian analysts say, for becoming a presidential rival. They say Kiriyenko, a former banker in government for less than a year, was chosen because he won't be a political threat to Yeltsin. Critics say he is too inexperienced for the prime minister's job.
If Yeltsin dies in office, Russia's constitution says the prime minister becomes interim president and must call elections within four months.

YELTSIN'S HEALTH ISSUES HAVE REPLACED DECISION MAKING WITH JOCKEYING FOR POWER

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 3, acs-VT99 
Yeltsin's health problems have aggravated these problems. His long absences have encouraged political infighting and jockeying for power among his chief aides. As a result, the decisionmaking process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their own special interests on the foreign policy agenda.

YELTSIN IS STRONG AND IN CONTROL

YELTSIN HAS SHOWN THAT HE IS THE STRONGEST POLITICAL FIGURE IN RUSSIA

Daniil Osmolovsky. Kommersant-Daily, April 25, 1998, pp. 1, 3. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, May 27, 1998; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Kiriyenko Wins Confirmation on Third Try acs-VT99
	In obtaining the State Duma's approval of his nomination of Sergei Kiriyenko for the position of Prime Minister, Boris Yeltsin has proved that he is still the country's strongest political figure. For that very reason, his main task now will be to make the most constructive use of his colossal constitutional powers.

YELTSIN IS CONSISTENT AND LOGICAL -- HE INTENDS TO REMAIN IN CONTROL

Pavel Felgenhauer, defense and national security affairs editor of Segodnya, The Moscow Times, March 26, 1998, HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: Yeltsin's Stagnation Politics , acs-VT99
	Yeltsin may seem deceptive and unpredictable, but his actions are always consistent with his overall determination to accumulate and keep power. Personal connections and merit mean nothing when a minister or an aide become a potential threat.

SOMETHINGS DON’T CHANGE -- YELTSIN IS THE BOSS

ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., AND EVGUENII VOLK, Heritage Foundation,, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: YELTSIN'S GAMBIT: POLITICAL CRISIS IN MOSCOW acs-VT99
	Despite the dramatic changes in Russia's political field, some important aspects remain the same. Most conflicts between the United States and Russia lie in the realm of foreign policy and security: the supply of missile technology and nuclear reactors to Iran, support of Iraq, close cooperation with China, and the failure of the communist- dominated State Duma to ratify the START II arms control agreement. All of these policies are sanctioned by Boris Yeltsin and need to be taken up with him. Even in his frailty, Boris Yeltsin remains the true boss of Russia. 

CURRENT LEVEL OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN RUSSIA SEEMS TO HAVE WORKED VERY WELL

Daniil Osmolovsky. Kommersant-Daily, April 25, 1998, pp. 1, 3. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, May 27, 1998; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Kiriyenko Wins Confirmation on Third Try acs-VT99
	The gist of the proposals that are being heard most often now is that the Constitution should be revised to limit the President's powers. However, four years under the 1993 Constitution have demonstrated the workability and effectiveness of the present model of presidential authority -- even when the President himself was physically unable to perform his duties. . . .

YELTSIN’S PRESIDENCY HAS BEEN A TRIUMPH

YELTSIN HAS BEEN ABLE TO ALLOW DEMOCRACY TO TRIUMPH

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 100- 10 1 , acs-VT99 
	Regardless of the future, Yeltsin's rise as leader -of the movement for a democratic Russia in seeming defiance of all odds and his staying power in dire circumstances have been little short of astonishing. From the time of his entrance onto the political stage in the mid-1980s he survived a series of lethal challenges from various adversaries. Without him the democracy movement would probably have come to a halt soon after the death of Andrei Sakharov. Within a period of a little more than two years after his national election as President of Russia, Yeltsin parried the attack of two sets of coup leaders and delivered a riposte that brought them down. The coup attempts in August 1991 and in October 1993 were counterrevolutionary and aimed at restoration in some form of empire in the former Soviet territories. 

YELTSIN HAS BEEN ERRATIC, BUT HAS ALSO BEEN A POWERFUL FORCE FOR GOOD AND FOR PEACE WITH THE NEAR ABROAD

Fred Hiatt, editorial page staff of The Washington Post, The Moscow Times, April 11, 1998, HEADLINE: Perils of Disengagement , acs-VT99
	In this context, it's important to remember that Yeltsin, erratic as he is, has been mostly a force for good - for helping his compatriots understand that the 14 other former Soviet republics are not Russian suzerainties. Russia could destabilize all these nations - by withholding gas and oil, by military threat, by encouraging ethnic Russians to make trouble. Yeltsin has played those cards, but far less than he might have. At home, he has stocked his government with Jews, ethnic Germans and others perceived in Moscow as "non -Russian."

YELTSIN HAS OVERCOME HEALTH AND ALCOHOL PROBLEMS

YELTSIN HAS OVERCOME HEALTH CHALLENGES

Dmitry Zaks, The Moscow Times, December 30, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia's Biggest Stories of 1997 acs-VT99
	Russia's wild year seemed to end much as it began - with Yeltsin shuttling between work and the hospital.
Despite some daunting medical problems, Yeltsin met his biggest challenge for 1997: He managed to stay alive, keeping communist and nationalist rivals safely outside the Kremlin and reformers on the inside.

ALCOHOL HAS NOT MADE YELTSIN VULNERABLE, HIS RECORD SHOWS THAT

EDITORIAL; The Press (Christchurch). March 27, 1998; Pg. 4; HEADLINE: Upheaval in Moscow , acs-VT99
	 Drinking may have blunted his wits, but it has not dented his durability. Sacked from Communist Party posts in 1987, he was elected to the Russian parliament two years later. In 1991, when hardliners launched a half-hearted coup against the then Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, it was President Yeltsin who called Russians to resistance. His victory ended communist rule in Russia and led to the collapse of the Soviet Union four months later.

YELTSIN HAS NOT LOST HIS MARBLES

Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service, The Patriot Ledger , March 24, 1998; Pg. 01, HEADLINE: Cleaning Russia's house ; Russian upheaval may be dramatic gesture acs-VT99
	 -- Has Yeltsin lost his marbles?
Probably not. This is not the first time the mercurial leader has upended his government. Last March, for instance, he eliminated several ministries and ousted more than a dozen ministers.

YELTSIN IS AS FIT AS A FIDDLE

Alexei Pushkov, Russian Press Digest, April 3, 1998, HEADLINE: Sergei Kiriyenko And "Big Eight"SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, p. 6 acs-VT99
	No one is going to deny that Yeltsin looked fit as a fiddle last week when he launched the big shake-up, and then received a number of leading foreign statesmen. In fact, at times, it seemed that Yeltsin was his former strapping self.

YELTSIN WAS THE STAR OF THE G-8 CONFERENCE -- HE IS WELL AND IN CONTROL

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	On the foreign affairs front, Russia's performance was no less impressive. The Group of 7 largest economies at their Denver summit for the first time since 1975 included Russia as an equal participant. President Yeltsin stole the show with his statesmanlike demeanor, and his delegation displayed unexpected professionalism.

YELTSIN WILL NOT BE A LAME DUCK PRESIDENT

Judith Matloff, Chicago Sun-Times, March 24, 1998, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Politics as usual in Russia acs-VT99
	 Since his 1996 heart surgery, several illnesses have forced Yeltsin to take time off, and he often bounces back by strengthening his position with a political juggling act such as firing ministers.
The latest surprise occurred just days after Yeltsin returned to work on Friday after being ill for several days.
"This is consistent President Yeltsin behavior," said one diplomat. "Yeltsin is doing everything he can to show that he is not a lame-duck president, short of announcing his candidacy for 2000."

YELTSIN WILL FINISH HIS TERM IN SPITE OF AGE AND HEALTH

EDITORIAL; The Press (Christchurch). March 27, 1998; Pg. 4; HEADLINE: Upheaval in Moscow , acs-VT99
	 President Yeltsin is now 67. For all of his often wayward governance and extended absences, he apparently remains determined to complete his second term. Those who thought him finally ready to accept health and age constraints have again been surprised.

YELTSIN HAS STOPPED DRINKING SO MUCH

Dmitry Zaks, The Moscow Times, December 30, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia's Biggest Stories of 1997 acs-VT99
	His doctors say Yeltsin no longer goes on wild boozing sprees.

YELTSIN AND CLINTON HAVE AN EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP

YELTSIN AND CLINTON HAVE A CLOSE AND PRODUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP

JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: Clinton's Call-Boris Policy Still Vital but Has Its Limits acs-VT99
	So on the surface, at least, it's back to business. Remarkably, the Boris-and-Bill show just keeps on running. Between the two of them, the presidents of the United States and Russia survive elections, coup attempts and scandal. Their personal attributes are often open to question; their tenacity is not.
 In the view of the administration, the warmth between Clinton and Yeltsin remains a crucial element of American foreign policy --one that can help determine the outcome of issues ranging from North Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion to Russia's help for Iran.

CLINTON WORKS MORE CLOSELY WITH YELTSIN THAN ALMOST ANY OTHER WORLD LEADER

John F. Harris; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), May 5, 1998, Pg. 1 HEADLINE: Clinton Under Pressure to Test Bond With Yeltsin // acs-VT99
	Rejecting charges of high-level inattention, White House officials say Mr. Clinton talks with Mr. Yeltsin more than he does with any foreign leader except Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talks more frequently with Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov of Russia than with any of her other counterparts.

YELTSIN’S GOVERNMENT SHAKE UP (APPOINTING KIRIYENKO) WAS A SUCCESS

YELTSIN’S GOVERNMENT SHAKE UP WAS A SUCCESS

David McHugh Staff Writer, The Moscow Times, May 13, 1998, HEADLINE: President Applauds Primakov's Policy Line // acs-VT99
	 On Monday, U.S. President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, said that Yeltsin "made a gamble and won" when he suddenly dismissed his Cabinet in March, launching the country into a monthlong government crisis. Berger said that the new prime minister, Sergei Kiriyenko, had formed "probably the most reformist government in seven years of Russian democracy," The Associated Press reported.

KIRIYENKO IS WELL ABLE TO BE PRIME MINISTER OF RUSSIA

JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: Clinton's Call-Boris Policy Still Vital but Has Its Limits acs-VT99
	 Talbott heaped praise on Russia's new acting prime minister, Sergei V. Kiriyenko, who is only 38 years old and has only a year of government service in Moscow.
 "There's an awful lot of instant conventional wisdom that he's a transitional figure," Talbott said. "The fact that he's inexperienced and unseasoned in the Soviet mind-set is not all bad, to put it mildly." Kiriyenko, he went on, "could be on the cutting edge of the passing of the torch from one generation to another."

KIRIYENKO IS “GOOD NEWS” FOR USA-RUSSIA RELATIONS

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	President Clinton last week extended a warm welcome to new Russian Prime Minister Sergei V. Kiriyenko, calling his confirmation "good news" for Russia and the United States.

KIRIYENKO AS PRIME MINISTER SIGNALS NO POLICY CHANGES

Vasily Romantsov, TASS, April 28, 1998, HEADLINE: USA sees no changes in Russia's position: spokesman , acs-VT99
	A spokesman for the US State Department said on Tuesday that the USA saw no changes in position of the Russian government following the appointment of Sergei Kiriyenko as country's new prime minister.
James Foley said the main direction in Russia's foreign policy is cooperation with the United States and other western countries. According to him, the USA is optimistic about prospects of cooperation with Russia on a number of issues, including the ratification of the START-2 treaty.

KIRIYENKO FACES SERIOUS CHALLENGES, BUT WILL CONTINUE PREVIOUS POLICIES

ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., AND EVGUENII VOLK, Heritage Foundation,, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: YELTSIN'S GAMBIT: POLITICAL CRISIS IN MOSCOW acs-VT99
	 Kirienko will need a lot of luck and hard work to improve Russia's economic performance and make democracy and the free-market economy more secure. One of his key challenges will be achieving transparency in economic decision making, both in the government and in corporate boardrooms -- especially important in view of the lessons drawn from the economic crisis in Asia. It is imperative to achieve the rule of law to boost the confidence of Russians in the workings of free markets and to attract a steady flow of foreign investment. The United States should wish Kirienko well and look for ways to assist him as he formulates his agenda. He may be a moderating influence in the Washington-Moscow nexus. As Kirienko manages the economic dimension of ties between the United States and Russia, he is likely to continue the policies of his predecessor.

YELTSIN SHAKES UP HIS GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THEY NEED TO BE SHAKEN UP

ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., AND EVGUENII VOLK, Heritage Foundation,, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: YELTSIN'S GAMBIT: POLITICAL CRISIS IN MOSCOW acs-VT99
	 There is also the "Yeltsin legacy" explanation for the shakeup. Yeltsin was not happy with the pace and performance of economic reform. Both the Land Code and Tax Code are stalled in the legislative pipeline. Salaries have not been paid on time. Yeltsin wants to leave Russia more prosperous and stable than it was when he received it from the bankrupt communist rule in 1992. He may feel that he needs a new team of competent technocrats to do the job.

YELTSIN’S PRESIDENCY HAS BEEN A DISASTER

YELTSIN’S POLICIES HAVE BEEN A DISASTER AS THE COUNTRY COLLAPSES

Mikhail Gorbachev, former leader of the Soviet Union, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), December 14, 1997, Pg. 41A, HEADLINE: For the change Russia needs, Yeltsin regime must leave power acs-VT99
	 The policies of Boris Yeltsin's regime have turned out to be disastrous. Industrial decline has surpassed any ever suffered in peacetime by a civilized country. The plight of the population remains grave. Attempts by the International Monetary Fund, the United States and Europe to aid Russia's weakening economy have been too feeble.
 Officialdom, largely corrupt, holds sway over the country. The criminalization of society has reached dangerous proportions. The citizens' personal safety and the security of their property are under constant threat, as are their rights and freedoms.

CURRENT REGIME IS NOT CAPABLE OF RATIONALLY DIRECTING RUSSIA’S FUTURE

Mikhail Gorbachev, former leader of the Soviet Union, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), December 14, 1997, Pg. 41A, HEADLINE: For the change Russia needs, Yeltsin regime must leave power acs-VT99
	 Our mortality rate exceeds the birth rate by a factor of 1.6. A crass mass culture is destroying national and spiritual values. The federal power structures are decayed and helpless. The defense establishment is in tatters.
The current regime has shown it is not the least bit capable of rationally directing Russia's development.

YELTSIN HAS AN ALCOHOL PROBLEM

EDITORIAL; The Press (Christchurch). March 27, 1998; Pg. 4; HEADLINE: Upheaval in Moscow , acs-VT99
	In the past, his clownish antics have led critics to underestimate his powers of survival. For example, he arrived at a police station soaking wet after falling into a river in 1989. In 1994, he failed to emerge from his plane to meet then prime minister of Ireland, Albert Reynolds, at Shannon airport. At that time, the president was widely reported to have an alcohol problem.

YELTSIN’S RECENT BEHAVIOR THREATENS THE STABILITY OF RUSSIA

The New York Times Editorial, International Herald Tribune, March 25, 1998, Pg. 10, HEADLINE: No Quick Fixes acs-VT99
	Mr. Yeltsin's achievements over the years have been impressive, but his increasingly mercurial leadership, marked by erratic pronouncements, frequent health crises and sudden removal of top aides, now threatens to undermine Russia's political stability and the confidence of foreign governments and investors.

YELTSIN'S REGIME WILL QUICKLY PASS AND CANNOT SUCCEED

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 81 acs-VT99 
The regime of the "Yeltsinoids" is a brief pass ing episode in the life of Russia. Deprived of any significant intellec tual resources, it cannot pursue an intelligent policy, except for the Kremlin's court intrigues and the mercenary interests of the corrupt bureaucracy.

YELTSIN IS NOT MENTALLY ABLE TO RUN RUSSIA

STRATEGIC ADVISORS ADMIT THAST YELTSIN CANNOT THINK CLEARLY

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
 "I'm concerned about the president's physical and mental weakness, especially the mental weakness," Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Strategic Studies center, an independent think tank, said in an interview. The incoherence of Yeltsin's statements, he says, is "going from bad to worse" and "I think it's past the point of no return."

YELTSIN ONLY WORKS A FEW HOURS A DAY AND HIS LOGICAL MIND IS ALMOST GONE

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
 Even when Yeltsin is officially said to be at work -- either in the Kremlin or more often at a country home outside Moscow -- his schedule has to be limited for health reasons, aides say.
 Two advisers who occasionally see Yeltsin and who spoke separately with USA TODAY on condition of anonymity, say the president can now work a maximum of three to four hours a day. They also say he often suffers from memory lapses, loss of concentration and difficulty in understanding material presented to him.

EVEN YELTSIN’S SUPPORTERS ADMIT HE CAN’T RUN THE COUNTRY

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
 "The president's health prevents him from doing practical political work every day," a key adviser, Boris Berezovsky, recently told reporters.
 Berezovsky, the oil and media tycoon who financed Yeltsin's re-election in 1996, is one of the few people who can still see the Russian president on a daily basis and make that kind of statement with authority.

YELTSIN IS IN DECLINE AND HAS VERY LOOSE CONTROL OVER RUSSIA

The Economist, February 14, 1998, ]SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs; EUROPE, Pg. 49. HEADLINE: Russia's part-time president\\jan]VT99 
President Boris Yeltsin is in decline. Russia is drifting with him AN AIR of fin-de-r(grave)egne hangs over Russia, for all that President Boris Yeltsin's second term has run less than half its course. His minions hint that he may seek a third term. If so, Russia could face six more years' stagnation, not two. Physical decay accounts for much of the problem. Mr Yeltsin, 67 this month, was not looking too bad by recent standards during his brief visit to Italy this week. But he has been a fugitive presence in the Kremlin since his heart by-pass operation in November 1996. He communicates with the country almost exclusively through recorded television clips and scripted radio broadcasts. His occasional public appearances yield moments of worrying eccentricity. His powers of concentration appear to be failing him.

YELTSIN HAS LOST ALL CONCEPT OF REALITY AND HIS POLICY DECISIONS ARE BEING DICTATED BY HIS ADIVSORS. THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS WORLD WAR III COMMENTS

Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, January 7, 1998 [SECTION: Vol. XLIX, No. 49; Pg. 8 HEADLINE: In Sweden, 'Tired' Yeltsin Offers Major Arms Cuts\\jan]VT99 
	The Russian opposition has suggested its own theory of why the "Stockholm sensations" came out. It boils down to the following: The head of state has completely lost all concept of reality and is being guided by some not very professional "promptings" from his inner circle. Russian Federation Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov blames everything on the President's advisers, who did an outrageously bad job of preparing for the visit. Zyuganov advises the President to replace them with more qualified specialists, who, apparently, should be sought in the ranks of the Communist Party. The panicky mood has also spread to the Duma as a whole: The Deputies summoned the Mnister of Defense to yesterday evening's meeting of the chamber with the aim of getting some explanations from him. But after Boris Yeltsin's unexpected appearance in the Duma [see pp. 1-3 of this issue], a draft resolution prepared by [Lev] Rokhlin and [Viktor] Ilyukhin, Chairmen of the Committees on Defense and Security, in which the President's statements in Sweden were termed "unconstitutional and populist," was not even put to a vote....

STAGE MANAGED MEDIA SHOWS OF YELTSIN ARE NO LONGER CONVINCING

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
Russian and Western analysts in Moscow note that attempts to hide Yeltsin's condition with stage-managed television appearances are no longer convincing. Typically the Russian leader is shown making a prepared statement of 20 seconds or so duration.
But it has been more than a year, these analysts say, since Russian television has shown Yeltsin engaged in an extended conversation, demonstrating that he understands what is said and can respond coherently.

CLINTON’S RUSSIA POLICY HAS DWINDLED DOWN TO A YELTSIN DEATH WATCH

EDITORIAL, Sacramento Bee, December 27, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: RELYING ON A MORTAL YELTSIN MAKES BAD POLICY acs-VT99
	President Clinton's Russia policy, which began with bold strokes and strategic vision of an active partnership, has dwindled into wishful thinking about Yeltsin's hospital charts and what the Russian president will do now that he has recovered from his latest emergency hospitalization for a "cold."

YELTSIN'S HEALTH SITUATION MEANS THAT NEW POLICIES MUST BE INITIATED BY THE USA

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 51 , acs-VT99 
This has several implications for U.S. policy. First, the uncertainty surrounding Yeltsin's health means that the burden of creative thinking in U.S.-Russian relations will fall on the United States. If there are new initiatives designed to break the current deadlock, they will have to come from Washington not Moscow.

YELTSIN HAS OPERATED AS A DICTATOR, NOT AS A DEMOCRAT

YELTSIN OPERATES AS A DICTATOR OUT OF CONTROL

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 8 acs-VT99 
	Today the president is not subject to any control and not accountable to anybody. The tsars were at least afraid of God, but Yeltsin is not afraid even of God. He plays the role of a judge, a prosecutor, and a benefactor. He appoints and fires anyone he pleases, and he is not held liable for anything. 

YELTSIN'S APPROVAL RATING 3 PERCENT

BOB PACKWOOD, March 2, 1998 [Journal of Commerce. SECTION: EDITORIAL/OPINION; Pg. 7A. HEADLINE: Time is ripe for US-Russia free trade\\jan]VT99
 With an approval rating, of 3 percent in one recent poll, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's domestic popularity has fared about as well as the Russian economy. Since 1990, the former superpower's economic output has shrunk by 43 percent, compared with a "mere" 25 percent in the United States during the Great Depression.

YELTSIN GOVERNMENT HAS ACTED TO PROTECT ITS POWER, NOT PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	 * Democratic reform within Russia: Yeltsin's tendency to do only those things that serve to protect his power has proven the biggest obstacle to such reform, but two additional blows against democratic reform have been struck by the Yeltsin government: first, the disastrous military operation in the separatist region of Chechnya -- begun without parliamentary approval and conducted without regard to human rights or human life -- and second, the extent to which the Yeltsin administration manipulated the media and the government's budget to gain a victory in the 1996 presidential elections.

YELTSIN ACTS TO KEEP BLAME AWAY FROM HIMSELF

Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service, The Patriot Ledger , March 24, 1998; Pg. 01, HEADLINE: Cleaning Russia's house ; Russian upheaval may be dramatic gesture acs-VT99
	They view it as a dramatic gesture by a theatrical politician given to unvarnished attempts to shift blame for the country's every woe away from himself. And it also appears to be an attempt by Yeltsin to influence the political jockeying now under way for the 2000 presidential election campaign, which he is entertaining entering even though he may be prohibited by law from a third term.

REAL POWER EXISTS IN YELTSIN'S FRIENDS, NOT IN PARLIAMENT

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 9 acs-VT99 
The government is not controlled by the legislature. Real power is concentrated in the hands of those around Yeltsin. This is the "second government," which issues decrees, writes directives, engages in political manipulations, and arbitrarily disbands, forbids, or uses force.

YELTSIN IS AN AMERICAN PUPPET

USA SUPPORT HAS ALLOWED YELTSIN TO CREATE A NATION OF ONE MAN RULE

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
 Yavlinsky thinks American support helped Yeltsin turn post-communist Russia into a country of one-man rule with a new constitution giving most power to the president.
"The entire social and political power base is Yeltsin and only Yeltsin," Yavlinsky said. "This isn't a democracy. It's not a civil society. It's Byzantium."

YELTSIN IS AN AMERICAN PUPPET

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 80 acs-VT99 
	But some more sophisticated readers will remark: "It is not that simple. Yeltsin and company could never have stayed in power after all they have done to Russia were it not for the powerful and extensive support of the West. Strictly speaking, Yeltsin can hardly be considered an independent political figure. He is a puppet whose strings are being pulled from across the ocean. America, our main geopolitical opponent, has become the indisputable world leader. America is the real source of hostile influence."

AMERICA IS A PUPPET OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERESTS

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 80 acs-VT99
 	The most thoughtful readers may add further arguments: "But even & United States is not quite independent. Look more closely. This is not a traditional state but an overgrown commercial-industrial corporation. As such, it has no national interests but hides under this term the interests of an international financial oligarchy. This worldwide corporation uses the political, military, and economic power of America as an instrument to achieve mercenary interests and purposes. The cosmopolitan elite of international capital is the real behind-the-scenes orchestrator of Russia's troubles." 

USA POLICIES ABOUT THE RUSSIAN MAFIA ARE INADEQUATE AND DANGEROUIS

RUSSIA FACES UNLIMITED CRIMINALIZATION OF ITS SOCIETY AND THE USA IGNORES THIS REALITY

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	Even Yuri Luzkhov, the powerful mayor of Moscow and a candidate to succeed President Boris Yeltsin in 2000, who is not exactly a paragon of probity, said in a recent interview that Russia now faces "unlimited criminalization of the economy and of the government itself." But the Clinton foreign policy team has adopted the ungainly posture of the proverbial ostrich and cannot see that Russia is now controlled by a semi-criminal oligarchy, a small circle of financiers and those in government who do their bidding.

WHEN THE USA IGNORES THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA IT ONLY ENCOURAGES ITS EXPANSION

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	At the G-8 (G-7 plus Russia) summit in Denver last month, President Clinton said that if Russia continues on its present course "we will see more good things ahead." Did the president inadvertently give Russia's organized crime syndicates a green light? Knowledgeable Russian voices are saying that the United States, by not facing facts about today's Russia, is creating the climate for the further criminalization of the state.

USA FBI DIRECTOR’S STATEMENT THAT THE RUSSIAN MAFIA IS NOT A THREAT LACKS CREDABILITY

Reuben Johnson, The Moscow Times, December 3, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Shirks 'Tough Love' acs-VT99
	Overnight total reversals of one's previous position or beliefs tend to be the products of either profound religious experiences, or acts of political expediency that sacrifice truth for the pursuit of some other agenda.
Since there is no gospel according to Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, one has to assume that FBI Director Louis Freeh's recent statement here in Moscow that the Russian mafia is no longer a threat in the United States - and that there is no connection to their activities and smuggling of arms and nuclear materials - can be attributed to the latter impulse.

THE USA NEEDS TO RECOGNIZE THE RUSSIAN MAFIA AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY

Reuben Johnson, The Moscow Times, December 3, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Shirks 'Tough Love' acs-VT99
	 Their study is prefaced by a number of unambiguous and resolute statements as to why the United States should be concerned and publicly consistent about the issue of the Russian mafia. One of the key findings is that "Russian organized crime constitutes a direct threat to the national security interests of the U.S." The study further recommends strongly that the problem "should receive public recognition from the president of the United States as a national security threat."

IT IS A GREAT ERROR TO DISMISS THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME

Reuben Johnson, The Moscow Times, December 3, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Shirks 'Tough Love' acs-VT99
	The idea that Russian organized crime is no longer anything to be worried about is utterly comical. In Washington, the well-known and highly respected Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, has dedicated months of investigation to this issue and recently published a 90-page study on the threat posed to U.S. national security by Russian organized crime.

FUSSING OVER IRAN DISTRACTS US FROM THE REAL ISSUE -- THE RUSSIAN MAFIA

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	The fuss over Iran -- the major investment by the French oil company, Total, and the alleged indirect support of Russia for Iran's nuclear bomb program -- is taking our eyes off the real ball.
It was the same three years ago when Central Intelligence Agency leaks about North Korea's bomb ambitions were part of an effort to steamroller President Clinton into ordering the bombing of North Korea's nuclear installations.
The real issue in terms of imminent danger, both then and now, is the Russian mafia.

ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA IS UNIQUE AND EXPLAINABLE -- NOT AS MUCH OF A THREAT AS MANY BELIEVE

POWERFUL SOCIAL FORCES MOVE RUSSIA AWAY FROM THE CORPORATIST CRIMINAL STATE

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	THE RUSSIAN economy today shows signs of evolution toward Western-style capitalism on the one hand and the consolidation of corporatist, criminal-style capitalism on the other. Western conventional wisdom emphasizes the former and thus sees a Russia moving steadily toward a market economy. Indeed, Russia has managed to lower inflation and, within reasonable limits, stabilize its currency. Moscow is a boomtown. Some of the newly established and privatized corporations that operate with international mentalities and ambitions are making their way to the top. Certain regions of the country have received favorable international credit ratings, and a handful of Russian companies have held successful international bond issues. Young people are now ready to adapt to the new market system and steer clear of crime as the country develops new rules. The International Monetary Fund, while occasionally delaying tranches of its $ 10 billion loan because of poor tax collection, always seems to reinstate them after promises by senior Russian officials to do better. All this seemingly points toward the path of a normalized Western market economy.

UNDERGROUND "GRAY ZONES" ARE ESSENTIAL FOR EVENTUAL STABLE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 53 , acs-VT99 
	We hypothesize that hierarchical social networks in "gray zones" play a special role in the formation of collectively stable strategies, since, for instance, in playing the dilemma game it is necessary somehow to coordinate the first moves of the participants; and only then, after the participants make sure that cooperation is possible, does the culture of cooperative behavior evolve. 
	In previous studies of revolutions and transition societies, the phenomenon described above received too little attention. There may have been a prejudice against explaining historical events in terms of "conspiracy theories." However, conspiracies are not the essence of the matter here. What is important is that in " gray zones" a natural process of self-organization must and does evolve, and this process often includes diverse provocations, treachery, and meanness.

SO-CALLED RUSSIAN MAFIAS ONLY FILL IN TO MAKE SYSTEMS WORK TO BENEFIT THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 107 // acs-VT99 
	Criminal groups control liquor-selling kiosks, as well as markets, especially those of manufactured goods and second-hand cars. They do not cause much trouble to private citizens (as is usually the case for any "mafia"); rather, they try to impose order on the territories they control. Naturally, they struggle for spheres of influence; especially fierce were their showdown* in 199293, at the time when small trade was rapidly growing. Now that mafia street battles are not so common, we may assume that the spheres of influence probably have been divided. 

OFFICIAL CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA INCREASES ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 116 , acs-VT99 
	So anyone who addressed a state institution in order to obtain permission, a license, official registration, or any other document, the legalization of which presupposed some work on the part of the administration, faced a dilemma: either prepare the documents him/herself, redoing them over and over again and then waiting for a long time before the decision was made; or resort to the services of the cooperative under the auspices of the same adminis trative body and, after paying, get the necessary papers without any trouble and delay. Anyone acquainted with the habits of the Soviet bureaucracy knew the solution: you had to pay, especially since the payment required was quite reasonable. It goes without saying that in most cases the people working in cooperatives were just the same functionaries of administrative bodies whose official duty was to work with the documents.

CITIZENS PREFER GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION TO THE ALTERNATIVE -- TOTAL GOVERNMENT FAILURE

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 116-117 // acs-VT99 
	Despite its moral ambivalence, this new situation was met by most citizens with a sigh of relief, since it was much easier to pay than to face endless refusals. But the moral climate in administrative bodies, where corruption became accepted as something quite natural, no doubt suffered considerably. After administrations were replaced in a number of large cities in 1991, new "democratic" authorities openly declared that functionaries, whose salaries were usually rather low (through the depreciation of the ruble and tremendous deficits in state and local budgets, they virtually worked gratis), had the right to reasonable remuneration for their work at the clients' expense. It is absolutely clear what impact such statements had on functionaries of administrative bodies and in which direction their interests were reoriented.

BANKING SPHERE IS NOT DEEPLY CRIMINALIZED

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 121 // acs-VT99 
I do not believe that the banking sphere in Russia is seriously criminalized. Accusations of this sort are constantly being made against banks by Russia's press (which is prone to see criminalization in every instance). They speculate about the criminal origin of a considerable proportion of bank capital in Russia, citing different figures (as a rule, several dozen percent). These allegations, however, are rather doubtful. One can hardly imagine that proper "criminal groups," which obtained their money by racketeering, robbery, and so forth, might not only have billions of dollars at their disposal but also take the risk of putting them in banking, a sphere kept under the closest control by the authorities (the origin of a bank's own capital, unlike the money in its accounts, can be effectively traced through rather elaborate procedures).

ORGANIZED CRIME IN RUSSIA CAME ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE “POWER BUYOUT” OF FORMER COMMUNISTS -- OTHERWISE THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL TRANSITION WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY BLOODY

"POWER BUYOUT" OF FORMER SOVIET BUREAUCRATS MADE THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION FROM COMMUNISM POSSIBLE

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 115 , acs-VT99 
 Thus, the idea of a "power buyout" resulted in the total corruption and extension of the powers of the medium stratum of the former Soviet bureaucracy, which in the Soviet period had been controlled by Party committees and law-enforcement bodies. Under the new circumstances, older control structures collapsed without being replaced by representative power bodies with control capabilities. As a matter of fact, the events of October 1993 were a decisive victory for the medium stratum of the postSoviet bureaucracy, which, after the disbandment of the Soviets and under the cover of the new Constitution, ultimately eliminated any control on the part of society. 

THE RUSSIAN SHADOW ECONOMY STARTED GROWING LONG BEFORE THE FALL OF COMMUNISM

Stanislav Menshikov, Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Monthly Review, October, 1997; Pg. 49; HEADLINE: Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System; acs-VT99
	The shadow economy per se was estimated to account for 15 percent of the Soviet GDP by the end of the 1980s (today ranging from 25 to 40 percent, but now a very different creature - characterized mainly by tax evasion). More importantly, it was closely connected with the lower and middle levels of the economic bureaucracy, making them both parts of one undercover capitalist chain of operators in the pores of Socialism. When private business was legalized towards the end of Gorbachev's rule, they started laundering their businesses and previously accumulated assets. Some of the richest people of today come from this semi-criminal strata. Mr. Gusinsky, head of the Most-Bank group, started as a construction manager with underground operations, and so did Mr. Smolensky, head of the Stolichny Bank, another important financial institution. Both stand (or at least stood) close to Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, an important potential contender for top power in the country. None of them come from the Party machine.

FORMER COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ARE NOW THE GODFATHERS OF ORGANIZED IN RUSSIA

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	 Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, the ranking Democrat on the Senate subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, wrote in his recent book, "The New War," that "the real power lies with the Russian godfathers and their allies - former KGB officials with important positions in the economy, whether privatized or still under state control, and corrupt politicians in high office."

RUSSIA IS LARGELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ELEMENTS

CLOSE TO 2/3 OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS CONTROLLED BY ORGANIZED CRIME

John Lloyd, January 31, 1998 [The Times. HEADLINE: Red alert\\ jan]VT99 
	Though it is the suborning of the state, not necessarily the growth of the mafia, which is the deepest threat both to Russia and to us, Russian organised crime, by virtue of its sheer scale, is already a global problem. General Mikhail Yegorov, the former interior minister, said in May 1994 that organised crime groups had grown from 785 in the last days of the Soviet Union to 5,691 - a figure which the UN endorsed in the same year, estimating that these groups numbered some three million people. By 1996, Russian figures showed the gangs had swollen again, to around 8,000. These gangs directly control - again, according to Russian figures - 40 per cent of private businesses, 50 per cent of Russian banks and 60 per cent of state-owned companies. Some estimates even suggest that up to 80 per cent of the banks are under some form of mafia control, and that two thirds of the entire economy is crirninalised.

TWO THIRDS OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY IS CONTROLLED BY ORGANIZED CRIME

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	 Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which is in charge of combating organized crime, reckons that 40 percent of private business, 60 percent of state-owned enterprises, and more than half of 1,747 banks are controlled by crime syndicates. All told, roughly two-thirds of the Russian economy is under the sway of organized crime. Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, New York Republican, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee, calls Russia "virtually a full-fledged kleptocracy."

POWERFUL CRIMINALS IN RUSSIA RUN FOR PARLIAMENT TO GAIN LEGAL IMMUNITY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	The law making Duma members immune from prosecution should be immediately repealed. The large number of criminals running for Duma seats to gain immunity is repulsive. How can a legislature fight corruption when its members have their own deals on the side?

RUSSIA IS IN A STRANGE STATE OF QUASI-REFORM WHERE CORRUPTION SPREADS AND REFORM STAGNATES

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	* Internal economic reform: Russian President Yeltsin's irresolute support for reform over the past five years has left Russia with an economy in a strange state of "quasi-reform," stifling market-based economic growth and allowing the spread of corruption at all levels. (The Clinton Administration's attempt to move the focus of our aid program to regions of Russia that we believe are interested in reform may be the clearest sign yet that reform at the center in Russia has slowed to a stop.)

IMPOSSIBLE TO ACT AGAINST RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME BECAUSE THEY ARE IN LEAGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME SYNDICATES ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	 All major Western intelligence services have reported to their political masters that Russia's syndicates enjoy the protection of the ruling oligarchy that consolidated its power during Mr. Yeltsin's illnesses in 1996. But Western governments continue to look the other way, much the way their predecessors pooh-poohed Soviet links to international terrorist groups during the Cold War. 

RUSSIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT IS CORRUPT, SO IT CANNOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, P. 118-119 , acs-VT99 
If, however, both the state administration and the economy are corrupted, insulating law-enforcement agencies from corruption is a difficult task. Combating corruption in these agencies continues (the recent data on it were made public by President Yeltsin in his first electoral speech in Ekaterinburg in February 1996), but, as journalistic investigations reveal, the results of these efforts are rather modest. Some law-enforcement officers not only are linked to criminal groups but exact tribute directly from businessmen.

RUSSIAN STATE OFFICIALS ARE MORE LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY THAN BUSINESS PEOPLE

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 108 , acs-VT99 
Gaidar's sentiments on this matter are expressed - with particular clarity in his contrasting characterization of the social groups that seemed to symbolize the Soviet past and the market-driven present: Let us not forget that the state official is always potentially more criminogenic than the businessman. The businessman can enrich himself honestly, if only he is left alone. The state official can enrich himself only dishonestly. Thus the bureaucratic apparatus carries within itself a much greater potential for mafia activity than business does. Moreover the framework of the bureaucratic (including the punitive) system may readily provide a framework for a mafia-like system.

BANKING SYSTEM IS CONTROLLED BY ORGANIZXED CRIME

BANKS ARE INCLUDED IN "GRAY ZONES" OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 127 , acs-VT99 
The early history of commercial banks and the concrete economic conditions (the shocktherapy , reform) of the initial period of the development of the banking system determined key features of the banking business in present-day Russia. These features appear common to the development of economic institutions in cc gray zones" in general.

BANK MANAGER MURDER SHOWS CRIMINALIZATION OF RUSSIAN BANKS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 134 , acs-VT99 
	The very large proportion of high-ranking bank managers among the victims of assassinations indirectly indicates that the banking business is still in serious danger of crimmialization.

BANK MANAGERS ARE TARGETS FOR RUSSIAN MAFIAS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 133-134 , acs-VT99 
	Much more serious are the problems that arise inside Russia due to the uncertainty of the banks' future under the permanent manipulation of administrative norms. Instability is definitely counterproductive to banking insofar as banking is inherently intended to make contracts more reliable and to stabilize economic behavior. Under Russia's instability, large banking operations appear rather risky. At the same time, the system of civil suits is virtually inoperative; the cheated party has no real chance of satisfying its claims. Under such circumstances, an unusually severe alternative system of assuring contracts has emerged that uses hired killers. According to a statement made by the Association of Russia's Banks on the occasion of the assassination of the well-known television journalist and businessman Vlad Listyev, sixteen high-ranking bank managers were killed in 1994. In 1995, the situation became much more aggravated: by September 1995, the number of bankers killed during the year was about eighty. 

IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME EXPANSION MEANS A RUSSIAN CORPORATIST CRIMINAL STATE

INCREASED CRIMINALIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY THREATENS TO CRUSH FUTURE HOPES FOR A CIVIL SOCIETY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 69 , acs-VT99 
And the unprecedented criminalization of Russian society, triggered by the hasty "white" revolution, has produced the threat of a new "black" revolution, which would seek to exterminate the still weak sprouts of civil society, new moral practices, and democratic institutions.

RUSSIA IN IN DANGER OF BECOMING A MAFIA STATE 

John Lloyd, January 31, 1998 [The Times. HEADLINE Red alert\\jan]VT99 
	Russia is now in danger of becoming a mafia state - the first time this has happened to a major world power. The daily toll of contract murders is just a reflection of a fundamental lawlessness that has entered into the governance of the society itself. In November, the government went into crisis - not because of a fall in the rouble or a run on the banks, but because Anatoly Chubais, first deputy prime minister And A key figure in the past five years of Russian economic reform, had, along, with three of his closest colleagues, been accused of accepting a large payment from a Russian corporation for a book never written.

RUSSIA IS VEERING TOWARDS THE CORPORATIST CRIMINAL STATE AS A MODEL

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 With such problems, despite the good news about the Russian economy over the last year, it is clear that the Russian market is still veering toward the corporatist, criminalist, oligarchic path.

IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME WILL GAIN CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A SERIOUS RISK EXISTS THAT THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AND NUCLEAR FORCES WILL FALL INTO CONTROL OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME SYNDICATES

John Lloyd, January 31, 1998 [The Times. HEADLINE: Red alert\\jan]VT99 
	The CSIS report also warns of the prospect of strategic nuclear missile systems in the hands of a disintegrating military becoming "subject to criminal control". The Russian military is in a desperate according to its own commanders, terminal - position. Its hugely reduced draft is disproportionately criminal; its soldiers and officers receive no pay for months on end; it was humiliated in the Chechen war (during which its officers sold weapons to the enemy, and at the end of which it effectively lost a piece of Russian territory); and its generals are overwhelmingly venal. In February 1996, General Igor Rodionov, the former defence minister, described the military as in "a horrible state of decay... Russia might soon reach the threshold beyond which its rockets and nuclear systems cannot be controlled". That May, he was fired.

THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE PLAN IN PLACE TO CONTROL NUCLEAR TRADE BY RUSSIAN MAFIA GROUPS

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	 Mr. Freeh promised "drastic steps to prevent and detect" nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Russian criminal gangs. Yet at the same time he admitted that the Russian syndicates, with former KGB officers in the hierarchy, run the most sophisticated criminal operations ever seen in the United States. What "drastic steps" does Mr. Freeh have up his sleeve? Former CIA director John M. Deutch, commenting on the statement that "the U.S. government is effectively organized to address the terrorist threat," said two words: "Ha, ha."

RISK OF NUCLEAR ATTACK BY RUSSIAN OUTLAWS IS NOW GREATER THAN THE RISK OF ATTACK BY THE SOVIETS DURING THE COLD WAR

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	 "The director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, has warned that Russian organized crime networks pose a menace to U.S. national security and has asserted that there is now greater danger of a nuclear attack by some outlaw group than there was by the Soviet Union during the Cold War," the Washington Post reported.

IF WE FAIL TO STOP THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MAFIA, IT WILL BE THE GREATEST TRAGEDY SINCE HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	 No doubt Washington would like to deal with this grave crisis without having to throw into relief its past errors. Common sense suggests the White House is working with Moscow to try quietly to buy off the would-be nuclear terrorists.
One wishes the authorities well, for if they fail it will be the greatest tragedy to befall humanity since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA HAVE LED TO UNPRECEDENTED PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	 Crime and corruption, especially in the armed forces and the military -- industrial complex, are threatening the world with an unprecedented proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yeltsin's own chemical weapons adviser, General Kuntsevich, was arrested for attempting to sell large amounts of binary weapons components to Syria. According to Russian newspapers, Iran has spent $ 25 million bribing senior Russian Defense Ministry officials and generals in order to acquire nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Russian foreign trade experts told me repeatedly that Russia is creating an impression of upholding the law while violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) vis-a-vis Iran. For an appropriate sum of money, you can buy today anything that was found in the Soviet arsenal -- and those were some very nasty toys.

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME WILL PROVIDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS, WHO WILL USE THEM

WHEN RUSSIAN MAFIA TRADES IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WILL BE WITH TERRORIST GROUPS WITH A VERY SPECIFIC AGENDA

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	 If they do trade in nuclear weapons, the danger will not be with governments with a fixed address, where Washington, Moscow, London, Paris or even Beijing know where to retaliate.
It will be with a free-lance terrorist group of no fixed abode, determined to use blackmail to secure a particular objective. It could be to force the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Kurdish areas or Israel from its settlements in the West Bank or to demand release of jailed Colombian drug barons.

TERRORISTS ARE NOW WILLING TO USE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AGAINST INNOCENT POPULATIONS

John M. Deutch, former director of the CIA, Foreign Policy, September 22, 1997; Pg. 10; HEADLINE: Terrorism; the possibility of the use of more sophisticated weapons acs-VT99
	For years, the conventional wisdom stated that weapons of mass destruction did not serve the goals of terrorists. Mass murder, it was argued, would only prompt a global backlash against the cause that the terrorists claimed to serve. It has been noted that "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." Regrettably, Aura Shinrikyo proved to be the exception to that rule. In fact, we see a disturbing new trend occurring across the globe. More and more terrorists are using powerful explosives to attack mass-civilian targets. So despite last year's decline in terrorist incidents, there was a drastic increase in casualties (311 people killed and 2,652 wounded).

ROGUE STATES WILL NOT USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT THE RUSSIAN MAFIA WILL

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	 Iran, even if it is trying to develop a nuclear bomb, North Korea, if it has ever been, are both unlikely ever to use them. "Rogues" they may be. Suicidal they are not.
Both live in neighborhoods where a move to deploy such weapons would be met with a debilitating blitzkrieg. As Pakistan does, these countries would keep their nukes in the background, partly deterrent, partly prestige item.
The Russian mafia -- and the people it does business with -- is another matter.

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME IS A DIRECT THREAT TO THE USA

RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME PRESENTS A SERIOUS SECURITY RISK TO THE US

John Lloyd, January 31, 1998 [The Times. HEADLINE Red alert\\jan]VT99 
	We in the West have good reason to fear a criminalised Russia. A two-year study on Russian organised crime by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a body close to the CIA, claims that the situation "constitutes a direct threat to the national security interest of the United States by fostering instability in a nuclear-armed power" . William Webster, the former CIA director who chaired the CSIS study, wrote: "If the forces of organised crime are not stymied, Russia will complete its evolution into a criminal-syndicalist state."

RUSSIAN CRIME GANGS HAVE ENGAGED IN MASSIVE FOREIGN EXPANSION, INCLUDING CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY IN THE USA

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	Russia's 200 largest crime gangs (out of some 8,000 groups that operate throughout the former Soviet republics) are now global conglomerates. The 26 principal syndicates have established a presence in the United States, where they negotiated division of labor arrangements with American, Sicilian, Colombian and Mexican criminal organizations. FBI Director Louis Freeh has testified before congressional committees that these clandestine groups have established working relationships with counterparts in 50 other countries, up from 29 countries in 1994.

RUSSIAN MAFIA TERRORIST THREAT IS BEING COMBATED

RUSSIA AND THE USA ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO FIGHT INTERNATIONAL CRIME
 
THE INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, July 7, 1997 EDITORIAL; Pg. A04, HEADLINE: Partners against crime acs-VT99
	"Partners. " Twenty years ago, the word would not have been used to describe the relationship between the United States and Russia. Back then, the buzz was about who would blow whom off the map first. And the foreign policy of choice was described by the acronym M.A.D. (Mutual Assured Destruction). Then the Berlin Wall fell, as the foundational weaknesses of Soviet communism became apparent even to the communist rulers. And the rest is history. Today, both countries are channeling their resources away from killing each other to ruling the world. Not only are they partners in space, but also partners in fighting crime. International crime, that is.

TERRORISM IS ON THE DECLINE IN THE WORLD -- A 25 YEAR LOW

John M. Deutch, former director of the CIA, Foreign Policy, September 22, 1997; Pg. 10; HEADLINE: Terrorism; the possibility of the use of more sophisticated weapons acs-VT99
	International terrorism has declined steadily since the late 1980s. Last year represented a 25-year low, with reported incidents down from a peak of 665 in 1987 to 296 in 1996. Although the United States' unique position as a political, economic, and military world leader will always make it a choice target for terrorists, statistics reveal that nations everywhere share this burden. In 1996, less than 25 percent of reported terrorist incidents targeted the United States or its citizens abroad. More than 30 other countries were victimized, with some of the worst attacks occurring in Great Britain, Israel, Peru, and Sri Lanka.

NATIONALIST FORCES ARE NOT A MAJOR THREAT TO RUSSIA’S FUTURE

AGAIN AND AGAIN RUSSIA HAS NOT GIVEN IN TO POWERFUL NATIONALIST INFLUENCES IN THE COUNTRY

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 In Russia, too, the nationalist Left, known as the "national patriots," has continually urged pugnacity in foreign policy. Since 1995, the nationalists have enjoyed a plurality in the Duma, the lower house of parliament. Indeed, early in 1996, the Duma actually voted to annul the Belavezhskie agreements of 1991, which formalized the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Such actions elicit a deafening chorus of support from the flagships of the leftist- nationalist media -- Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossia, and Zavtra, with a combined daily press run of over half a million -- and from the nearly 300 pro-Communist local newspapers.
Yet even when President Boris Yeltsin has been handed opportunities to propitiate the nationalists and reap a political windfall, he has passed them up -- as he did in the case of NATO expansion. After much bluster, Yeltsin chose to sign the NATO- Russia Founding Act and to accommodate the United States and its partners, rather than reprise the Cold War even rhetorically. " More than once, the East and the West have missed opportunities to reconcile," Yeltsin said in February 1997 when the final negotiations with NATO got underway. "This chance must not be missed." Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the nationalist opposition and chairman of the Russian Communist party, meanwhile, was calling the Founding Act "unconditional surrender" and a "betrayal of Russia's interests."

RUSSIAN PUBLIC DOESN’T CARE ABOUT THE THREAT FROM THE WEST, AND NO NATIONALIST POPULIST MOVEMENT WILL BE CREATED BECAUSE OF ANTI-USA SENTIMENT

MICHAEL R. GORDON, The New York Times, May 2, 1998, Section A; Page 6; HEADLINE: NATO Is Inching Closer, But Russians Don't Blink // acs-VT99
	 Much of the Russian public is too consumed with the daily economic grind to care. Like many Americans, Russians have turned inward since the end of the cold war. Russia's biggest challenges are the payment of back wages, tax reform and other social and economic concerns, not foreign policy. Public opinion surveys have shown that half of those polled are indifferent about NATO enlargement. Those that have a view, however, tend to be negative.
 The temperate Russian response minimizes the risk that a populist could rise to power on a tidal wave of anti-American sentiment.

NATIONALISM CAN’T REALLY TAKE HOLD IN RUSSIA BECAUSE IT AUTOMATICALLY EXCLUDES TOO MUCH OF THE POPULATION

Holger Jensen, international editor of the Rocky Mountain News, The Fresno Bee, September 29, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: U.S still searching for Russian doctrine in post-Cold War era acs-VT99
	Nationalism also wouldn't do, at least not the kind preached by xenophobic legislators and the Russian Orthodox Church, since it excludes a quarter of the population -- especially those living in 20 ethnic republics -- who are neither Slavic Russians nor Orthodox Christians.

RUSSIAN CITIZENS ARE DETERMINED TO REJECT COMMUNIST AUTHORITARIANISM OR HARD-LINE NATIONALISM

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 367 , acs-VT99 
	Not least in Russia's list of advantages is that its citizens show every indication of refusing a return to the maximalism of communism or the xenophobia of hard-line nationalism. The idea of Russia's "separate path" of development is increasingly a losing proposition for communists and nationalists alike. The highly vulgarized versions of a national idea -- Zyuganov's national bolshevism or the various anti-Semitic, anti-Western platforms of people like Aleksandr Prokhanov -- have repelled most Russian voters, no matter how disappointed the), are with Yeltsin. Anti-Semitism, for example, has no political attraction, as many feared it would; even Lebed, who has betrayed moments of nationalist resentment, has felt it necessary to apologize after making various racist comments. He will not win as an extremist. Rather his appeal is to the popular disgust with the corruption, violence, and general lack of integrity associated with the Yeltsin 
government. 

RUSSIA IS TOO WEAK TO EVEN BEGIN TRYING TO ENFORCE ITS NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS

Amos Perlmutter, professor of political science and sociology American University, The Washington Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A17, HEADLINE: A new Russian foreign policy? acs-VT99
	To begin with, the effort to "restore" Russia's status in the international system is more fictional than real. As a weak state, Russia is in no position to fulfill Mr. Primakov's and other nationalist orientations.

NATIONALISM CAN BE PRODUCTIVE "CIVIC NATIONALISM" NOT EXCLUSIONARY ETHNIC NATIONALISM

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 10 , acs-VT99 
	Whether linked to the collapse of an established state or not, manifestations of nationalism and efforts to democratize can affect each other in very different ways. Careful observers have distinguished between two types of nationalism: inclusionary "civic" nationalism, which is compatible with the observance of individual rights, and exclusionary ethnic nationalism, which tends to subordinate such rights to the collectivist claims of the nation." 

PREVIOUS RUSSIAN ELECTIONS SHOW THAT NATIONALIST FEELING CAN BE USED TO PROMOTE A VIABLE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 126-127, acs-VT99 
	Russians now had a genuine choice to make in a real, not sham election. They were torn between aversion to anarchic conditions in a time of troubles and fear of a return to stifling despotism. The result was tension between Russia's venture in democracy and the revival of its historic national sentiment. Boris Yeltsin's efforts to reconcile the two movements bore fruit in the election's outcome. 
	After Yeltsin, the prospects for a democratic Russia will turn on whether the country's leadership continues the effort to harmonize Russian patriotism and democracy for the sake of civil peace and the common good, or, conversely, whether Russian leaders who take the helm will drive the two apart in the name of imperial power and glory. In any case, the election of 1996 will serve to caution future leaders that the Russian people will not easily yield up their newly acquired political right. 

NATIONALIST ELEMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN LEGISLATURE ARE NO MORE DANGEROUS THAN AMERICAN NATIONALISTS IN CONGRESS

F. Seth Singleton, Prof. Political Science Pacific Univ., 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 122 , acs-VT99 
	Some Westerners persist in seeing Russian nationalism as sinister, but in fact it now resembles the often irrational nationalism fed by electoral democracy in other places, for example the HelmsBurton law in the United States. In 1996 Russian voters utterly rejected ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii, who won only 5.6 per cent of the votes in the first round of the presidential poll. 

NO COUP WILL TAKE PLACE IN RUSSIA

THE COURSE OF REFORMS IN RUSSIA IS IRREVERSIBLE -- GOVERNMENTS WILL CHANGHE PEACEFULLY AND WITHOUT CRISIS

Judith Matloff, Chicago Sun-Times, March 24, 1998, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Politics as usual in Russia acs-VT99
	"There is no governmental crisis in the country," ousted Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said after losing the job he had held since 1992. "This is a natural and routine process of renewing power. One thing is clear: The course of reforms in Russia is irreversible."
Yeltsin said he needed a fresh government to re-energize economic reforms, which he said were moving too slowly, jeopardizing the future of democracy in Russia. 

NO COUP WILL TAKE PLACE IN RUSSIA, AS NO GROUP CAN BE CONFIDENT OF SUCCESS

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 117, acsVT99 
Social power has' become sufficiently plural, however, that few groups can be sure that they would succeed if they bid to seize power by force: both the 1991 and 1993 coup attempts failed. Many organized political actors are therefore likely to calculate that they are better off playing by the rules in the hopes of improving their positions for the future. After enough rounds, their behavior would become mutually selfreinforcing.

MILITARY RULE IS THE LEAST LIKELY POST COMMUNIST AUTHORITARIAN OUTCOME

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 7 , acs-VT99 
As of the mid-1990s, direct military rule seemed the least likely postcommunist authoritarian outcome. Historically, one-party states have proven less susceptible to military coups than have other forms of authoritarianism.

MILITARY IS RELUCTANT TO GET TOO INVOLVED IN POLITICS

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 7-8 , acs-VT99 
 Ruling communist parties exercised especially close civilian control over their military professionals, and this heritage of subordination appears to have shaped military behavior in most postcommunist countries. The rare episodes in which the armed forces have intervened collectively to affect the selection of national leaders have usually been precipitated by "demand pull" from feuding politicians eager to defeat their rivals rather than by any military desire to rule . That said, it should be noted that irregular military forces and militias have played a sizable role in the politics of some postcommunist countries, especially those parts of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia that have become embroiled in warfare. In a number of countries the parlous economic and social condition of the regular military has facilitated transfers of weapons and personnel to irregular military forces. Although irregular forces have caused a change of government leadership in only a few cases, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, they frequently have had a strong effect on the political balance inside their "host" states, whether those states are nominally democratic or authoritarian in character .

A MILITARY GENERAL WILL NOT SUCCEED YELTSIN

The Economist, February 14, 1998, [SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs-, EUROPE, Pg. 49. HEADLINE: Russia's part-time president\\jan]VT99 
	The prospect of a general in the Kremlin is still, thankfully, a distant one. The bankers and media tycoons who secured victory for Mr Yeltsin in 1996 are busily eyeing up the civilian candidates to succeed him. Most are thought likely to rally behind Mr Cher-no -myr- 1 din -though last week Vladimir Gus-in-sky, who runs both a bank and a television station, declared his support for Gri-gory Yav-lin-sky, leader of Yab-lo-ko, a social-democratic party, in the parliamentary elections next year that will precede the presidential race. Yuri Luzh-kov, the mayor of Moscow, and Boris Nem-tsov, a first-deputy prime minister, are also plausible presidential candidates.

NO SINGLE POLITICAL EVENT WILL DICTATE THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA -- IT IS AN ON-GOING PROCESS

NO PARTY OR ELECTORATE EXISTS TO PRODUCE THE KIND OF DREAM RUSSIA SOME AUTHORS IMAGINE

EDWIN G. DOLAN, president of the American Institute of Business and Economics in Moscow, International Herald Tribune, April 15, 1998, Pg. 9, Russia Today , acs-VT99
	The problem is not that democracy in Russia is still shaky. Democracy in Russia is working: Russia's elected leaders reflect the thoughts of the voters on the important issues of the day. There is no political party in Russia today that represents the kind of changed Russia that Mr. Friedman dreams of. The votes are not there to support such a party.

REALLY IMPORTANT CHANGES AND DECISIONS ARE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL RUSSIANS IN AN ON GOING PROCESS OF POLITICAL CHANGE, NOT BY COUPS OR A SINGLE ELECTION

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Unlike previous choices in recent Russian history, the decision will not be made on a single day by a coup or an election. Rather, it will evolve through the many decisions made by Russia's millions of people, leaders and ordinary citizens alike, over the coming years. Even President Boris Yeltsin's sacking of much of his cabinet in March, while deeply disturbing, was one more bump along the road, not the end of the journey. Nevertheless, the route chosen will be no less important than the choices made earlier in the decade in its effect on the society in which our children and grandchildren live.

ELECTION IN 2000 WILL BE A THREE-WAY RACE, POSTRUING WILL BE ESSENTIAL

IN THE NEXT ELECTION, IT WILL BE REFORMERS VS. NATIONALISTS VS. COMMUNISTS

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 364 , acs-VT99 
	If Yeltsin dies sooner rather than later, his circle will either follow the letter of the constitution and go forward with presidential elections after three months or it will find an excuse to avoid them. The latter choice would be unforgivable, and would go a long way toward negating the limited progress since 1991. Russia has yet to prove it can undergo a peaceful and orderly transfer of power-one of the most crucial tests in the development of a democracy. If the government does go forward with elections, however, the likely combatants would include Chernomyrdin, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, General Lebed, and communist leader Gennady Zyuganov.

THE NEXT ELECTIONS WILL NOT JUST BE BETWEEN REFORMERS AND COMMUNISTS, BUT WILL INVOLVE OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS

EDITORIAL, Sacramento Bee, December 27, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: RELYING ON A MORTAL YELTSIN MAKES BAD POLICY acs-VT99
	 In any event, Russian politics no longer present a binary choice between the Communist Old Guard and Yeltsin. Other faces and forces will dominate the next elections. Russian society has moved beyond the model of trickle-down stability that Washington assumes still prevails.

NATIONALIST LUZHKOV AND COMMUNIST ZYUGANOV ARE THE MOST LIKELY OPPONENTS TO REPLACE YELTSIN

Georgi Shakhnazarov, the Soviet Academy of Political Science, The Daily Yomiuri, August 18, 1997, SECTION: Pg. 6, HEADLINE: INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD/Boris Nemtsov: Yeltsin's heir apparent? acs-VT99
	The most dangerous rivals, however, will be those who did not receive Yeltsin's blessing but who are nonetheless capable of winning the presidency without it. Today, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and the Communist leader Zyuganov are contenders, but there is always a chance that a new star might suddenly rise over Russia's political horizon.

RUSSIAN CRITICISM OF THE USA WILL INCREASE, BUT IT IS ALL ABOUT POSTURING FOR THE 2000 ELECTION

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 In addition, we can expect a growing rhetorical shrillness in the next two years, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strives to please the contenders in the 2000 presidential election -- all of whom seem far more susceptible than Yeltsin to the nationalist temptation. Russian behavior in the latest Iraq crisis, when a clearly disengaged Yeltsin mouthed a bizarre line about World War III, is a foretaste of things to come.

LEBED AS NATIONALIST CANDIDATE

CONTINUING USA-RUSSIA DISAGREEMENTS MAY PAVE THE WAY TO A DANGEROUS LEBED PRESIDENCY IN 2000

Tad Szulc, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1998, Part M; Page 1; HEADLINE: FOREIGN POLICY; THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY acs-VT99
	 * Russia may be one of the greatest problems for the United States today and into the new century. In securing, for no strategically compelling reason, the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the administration gratuitously antagonized Russia at a time when Moscow is agonizing over its destiny. Small wonder, then, that Russian policy under Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov frequently defies U.S. positions while striving to rebuild Russian I influence. Moscow has not gone along with Washington's desires to press the Serbs over Bosnia and Kosovo, and Vajpayee over India's nuclear tests. The Russian Parliament refuses to ratify the 1993 arms-reduction treaty with the United States. Washington and Moscow already are at odds over control of the Caspian Sea oil. Rising Russian nationalism under these conditions may well lead to the election, as president, of Gen. Alexander I. Lebed, who has aspirations to be a modern Peter the Great. 

LEBED IS NOT INTERESTED IN A VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF YELTSIN. HE WANTS TO BECOME PRESIDENT THROUGH A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PROCESS

Yuri Kovalenko, January 21, 1998 [HEADLINE: General Lebed Counts His Soldiers.Russian Press Digest\\jan]VT99 
	Assessing his chances, Lebed said he was pleased that his rating remained stable ("second or third"), though today he is "formally no one." His aim is to build up his own political movement to take over power "peacefully and legitimately." "I am not interested in putsches, coups and other such silly things," he said. As for his possible allies, he pointed at Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky. A Lebed - Yavlinsky alliance is quite possible, he noted, though Yavlinsky himself is not especially enthusiastic about the idea. At a grassroots level, however, this alliance is a fait accompli, he added. Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, also cited by many as Lebed's possible ally, has refused to cooperate. "But one should understand him," Lebed explained. "Luzhkov has to maneuver on a very thin ice."

LEBED OR THE NATIONALISTS COMING TO POWER WILL TURN THE PERSIAN GULF INTO A NUCLEAR BATTLEGROUND

David Broder, syndicated columnist for The Washington Post, The Times-Picayune, May 26, 1998; Pg. B07, HEADLINE: REVIVING THE NUCLEAR NIGHTMARE acs-VT99
	Now we have the fiery General Lebed well-positioned to try to succeed Boris Yeltsin as president of Russia in the next election. People are beginning to think again what could happen if Russian nationalists come to power and decide that NATO expansion is a threat to the mother country.
 Already Russia is building a nuclear power plant for Iran. All it has to do is let down the guard on its atomic weapons inventory and the Persian Gulf could suddenly become a much more dangerous place.

LEBED IS NOT A DANGEROUS FUTURE LEADER OF RUSSIA

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 364 , acsVT99 
	Lebed's popularity is the highest of the four, but who he is, what sort of president he would be, is unknown. Lebed is considered "flexible" and "educable" by many Western visitors to Moscow, but his is a flexibility born mainly of ignorance. Lebed is a military man, but unlike Colin Powell or Dwight Eisenhower-to say nothing of his hero, de Gaulle-he has hardly any experience beyond the military. Lebed must be given credit for signing a peace treaty with the Chechens during his short tenure as security minister. He is also, by most accounts, a decent and honest man, which sets him apart from most who have set foot in the Kremlin. 

 ZYUGANOV AND THE COMMUNISTS HAVE LITTLE CHANCE TO WIN THE NEXT ELECTION

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 364 , acs-VT99 
	Lebed's potential rivals are probably more fixed in their views and political behavior, but they are not a promising lot. Zyuganov still has supporters, especially among the oldest and poorest sectors of the population, but he has little or no chance to win if he repeats the tactics and rhetoric of 1996. The communists would do well to jettison any memory of the past and adopt, as some are proposing, a new name for the part), and younger faces to run it. A party of social democrats is inevitable in Russia, but not under Zyuganov. 

RUSSIAN ELECTIONS ARE NOT FAIR

RUSSIAN ELECTIONS SEEM FAIR, BUT SPENDING LIMITS WERE IGNORED

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Although the recent elections are a positive development in the creation of Russian democratic institutions, some disturbing trends point to trouble in the future. While international observers have cited Russian balloting as free and fair, Russian campaigns -- most notably the 1996 presidential election -- have been notoriously unfair. Spending limits are routinely ignored. While no actual figures have been disclosed, the 1996 Yeltsin presidential campaign is estimated to have cost at least $ 500 million. Some put it at an even $ 1 billion. (By comparison, Bill Clinton's primary and general election campaigns that year together cost $ 113 million.) Officially, Russian presidential campaigns could spend only $ 2.9 million, but Yeltsin's overspending neither elicited a major outcry nor started judicial proceedings.

RUSSIAN ELECTIONS ARE AT RISK OF BECOMING TOOLS OF THE CENTERS OF POWER

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Electoral politics, like much else in Russia, are also at a fork in the road. As Russian political consultants learn more tricks of the trade, the danger increases that they might join with the robber barons to try to turn future Russian elections into nothing but window dressing for irremovable oligarchic rule -- as was the case in the Soviet Union, where results were predetermined and the people were an afterthought.

RUSSIAN MEDIA WAS PROFOUNDLY BIASED PRO-YELTSIN IN THE LAST ELECTION

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	Perhaps even more disturbing is the often cited European Institute on the Media survey that documents the media's flagrant pro-Yeltsin bias. According to the EIM, Yeltsin enjoyed 53 percent of all media coverage, while his closest competitor, Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party, received only 18 percent. Yeltsin appeared on television more than all the other candidates combined. Moreover, election coverage was extremely slanted in the president's favor. Giving candidates a point for each positive story and subtracting a point for each negative one, Yeltsin scored +492 before the first round of the election; Zyuganov earned -313. In the second round, Yeltsin had +247 to Zyuganov's -240, despite the fact that Yeltsin disappeared from the public eye a week before the election.

COMMUNIST CONTROL OF RUSSIA WOULD BE VERY GOOD

NEW FEDERAL COMMUNIST POLICIES CAN PREVENT A NUCLEAR MELTDOWN OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 68 acs-VT99 
	However, blinded by perestroika enthusiasm and angry nihilism, the ultrarevolutionaries are recklessly destroying the building of our statehood, which they have condemned and labeled totalitarian. 
	Let us assume that the state does collapse. What would follow-a radioactive meltdown? We can already feel its hot breath. 
	I think there is another road to the future. It leads through strengthening and developing the federal state that had historically formed in our country, clearly differentiating between the rights and duties of the center and those of the sovereign republics. As an indispensable condition for renewing our Union, we must sign new and binding Union and Federal agreements.

THREE ROADS AVAILABLE FOR RUSSIA: BLOODY CIVIL WAR, A MAFIA STATE LIKE COLUMBIA, OR A NEW DEMOCRATIC COMMUNISM

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 93 acs-VT99 
	A difficult and intensive search for a way out of the impasse is taking place. It is as if Ilya Muromets were standing at the intersection of three roads: I one road, if followed, would transform our entire country into a vast Chechnya. This "bloodbath formula" is completely unacceptable even to the most radical and irrational minds. The second road would lead to the transformation of our country into a magnified Colombia, where politics and the mafia merge and the latter is radically politicized. The outlines of such a state already exist--the readiness to engage in unlimited repression inside our country and the willingness to use nuclear blackmail outside it. Those currently in power in the Kremlin have no moral brakes or ethical constraints. The third road calls for democratic development on the basis of the Russian national state philosophy, high spiritual values, and a historical tradition that could bring together the past and the present, creating a worthy future for our people.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY CAN STOP THE ENSLAVEMENT OF RUSSIA AND THE WORLD

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 65 acs-VT99 
	 The reborn Communist Party of Russia should make patriotism its banner in the struggle for the minds and hearts of our people, while remaining faithful to the historical achievement of friendship among all peoples living in Russia. In this way, we will strengthen our people's confidence in the party of workers, allow the communists to find reliable allies, and help establish a constructive dialogue and cooperation in the whole spectrum of opposition parties and movements. In doing this, given the efforts to impose on humankind a barracks lifestyle in the "new world order," our struggle for the revival of Russia will become a contribution to the fulfillment of our international duty. Only a powerful Russia will be able to prevent the coming of a one-dimensional existence under the conditions of a new world order and allow all peoples to live according to their historical traditions, spiritual values, and long-developed ideals. Fostering Russia's return to great-power status is now a natural goal of the opposition in general and of the reborn Communist Party in particular.

WESTERN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES WILL EXPLODE AND COLLAPSE, AND RUSSIA MUST REMAIN INDEPENDENT

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 129-130 , acs-VT99 
	The threat of an explosion is inherent in Western consumer civilization itself. For hundreds of years, this civilization has advocate material wellbeing, rejecting "Ideal" goals that did not promise material gains and superprofits. But today, production can be expanded only if the volume of natural resources and manpower involved in ae economic cycle constantly continues to increase. From century to century , the West has sucked in minerals and cheap colonial labor, new territories and spheres of influence, goods, money, ideas, and brains. The mechanism is so constructed that it simply cannot stop; stopping would mean the end of the dominance of the West. 
	Even a reduction in the rate of growth causes serious intrasystemic crises. And a significant reduction in consumption with a collateral lowering of standards of living would break the "free world" into smithereens. The urgent need to delay the inevitable day of radical change---the halting of the mechanism -- motivates the West increasingly to separate itself from the rest of humankind. 
	The collapse of the West would cause a chain reaction worldwide. All fault lines will break open, "hot points" will flare up, and conflicting regions will be engulfed in flames. If this were to occur, Russia could save itself from total chaos and global disaster only if it works in advance to strengthen its state system and its ideological, political, economic, and military self-sufficiency. 

COMMUNIST PARTY WILL UTILIZE DEMOCRACY, NOT FORCE, TO SAVE RUSSIA

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA- a political autobiography, p. 185 , acs-VT99 
	The second lesson is that the election was an opportunity to demonstrate that we reject power methods of struggle and stand for peaceful competition. We must continue to resist any attempts to use force to solve socio-political problems, even though the worsening situation for ever larger segments of the population threatens to lead to terribly destructive spontaneous disorders.

BEST SOLUTION FOR RUSSIA IS TO MOVE FORWARD WITH SOCIALISM

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 5 acs-VT99 
The entire history of humankind in the twentieth century demonstrates that we should move forward to socialism. And in doing so, we should not discard the positive experience of the past but rather thoroughly analyze it and adopt what was good in it.

SOCIALISM FAILED IN RUSSIA BECAUSE OF THE COSTLY ARMS RACE, NOT BECAUSE IT WAS FLAWED

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 7 acs-VT99 
	Objective reasons contributed to the defeat of socialism. Socialism had failed to realize its full potential in such important areas as labor productivity, the well-being of average workers, and the involvement of broad masses of the people in the creative process. Russia had been drawn into an exhausting arms race, and, in trying to catch up economically with the West, we fell into imitating Western values and observing Western priorities.

COMMUNIST CONTROL OF RUSSIA WOULD NOT SAVE RUSSIA

THE COMMUNIST IDEAL CANNOT SAVE RUSSIA, NOR CAN OTHER EXISTING FORCES

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 The communist ideal can still bring people into the streets, but the current brand of communism has compromised itself and lost its mobilizing character, and it is sapped by squabbling between factions. The monarchical-Orthodox value system harking back to the days of the czars and the Holy Russian Empire -- Moscow as the "third Rome" -- has the support only of a small group within the intelligentsia. Moreover, traditional religions and cultures can compensate for economic pain, but they tend to divide rather than unite people in countries with mixed heritages. Businesspeople's views are reasonable and intelligent, but being wholly material, they lack the force of a universal idea and so fail to generate much support at election time or any other time. Western democratic ideals have been badly tarnished in Russians' eyes as elections and other trappings of liberal democracy have failed to turn their country into a stable democracy. Instead it is becoming, according to a 1997 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, a "criminal-syndicalist state" controlled by a troika of gangsters, corrupt government officials, and crooked businessmen who accumulate vast wealth by exploiting the "vulnerabilities of a society in transition."

[SEE IMPACT TO ELECTION DISADVANTAGE]

COMMUNISTS ARE NOT AS POPULAR AS IT WOULD SEEM FROM THEIR SHARE IN PARLIAMENT

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	The preponderance of communists in parliament grossly overstates their popularity. It came about because in regional elections they present a single slate, while the disunited democratic parties are prone to field a dozen or more candidates.

AN ATTEMPT TO REINTEGRATE AND CONQUER FORMER SOVIET STATES WILL NOT TAKE PLACE

DESPITE THE DIRE PREDICTIONS OF MANY SOURCES, RUSSIA AND ITS PEOPLE ARE NOT WILLING TO GO TO WAR WITH OTHER PARTS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been dire warnings about impending conflicts between Russia and the former Soviet states because of Russia's inability to accept the loss of its internal empire. Commentators who focused on the rhetoric of certain Russian politicians, Duma members, and commentators -- as opposed to the deeds of the Russian government -- made dire predictions about a future Russian -- Ukrainian conflict or the uprising of the Russian Diaspora in the CIS. But today, the Russian population, and much of the leadership, have come closer to accepting the breakup of the Soviet Union than at any previous time. And despite the nostalgia for the past, the majority of Russians are unwilling to pay the military or economic costs that any forceful reintegration of the former Soviet Union would entail.

91RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY GUIDELINES ARE SAFE AND LOGICAL, AND DO NOT INCLUDE RECKLESS EXPANSIONISM

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	 As Russian foreign policy has become more active, it bears the imprint not only of Primakov, but also of Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and those who interests lie more in economic integration with the West than geostrategic influence.
 The main themes of this new foreign policy are:
 * Resolving long-term irritants in relations with the CIS, the West, and Asia;
 * Promoting stability over instability in the CIS; and
 * Focusing above all on pragmatic, largely economic goals, as opposed to the more traditional pursuit of geopolitical aggrandizement and neo-imperial dreams that we associate with the traditional foreign policy -making team.

RESTORING THE OLD SOVIET UNION IS IMPOSSIBLE

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 RESTORING THE Soviet Union to its former self is impossible. Elites, old and new, in the newly independent states are intent on preserving their nations' sovereignty. Every former Soviet republic has held presidential and parliamentary elections and adopted a new constitution. Everywhere the search for a national identity is under way, and people increasingly think of themselves not as Soviet citizens but as Ukrainians, Kazaks, or Azerbaijanis.

RUSSIA HAS CHOSEN TO ACCEPT THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORDER, NOT TO CHANGE IT

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	In the end, the fundamental choice that Russia had to make in foreign policy was whether to accept the existing international order or seek to alter it. Russia chose to accept it. Moscow may bemoan the unfairness of the score -- it does so often and loudly -- but it is not trying to change the rules of the game.

CURRENT RUSSIAN POLICY IS TO GAIN PRESTIGE AND POWER THROUGH ECONOMICS, NOT THROUGH MILITARY

The Buffalo News, May 13, 1998, Pg. 6A, HEADLINE: YELTSIN SPEAKS OF PARITY WITH U.S. // acs-VT99
	Russia is regaining equal footing in its relationship with the United States after a period of "illusions and exaggerated expectations," President Boris Yeltsin said Tuesday.
 Yeltsin spoke to senior diplomats at Russia's Foreign Ministry. But his timing -- days before a meeting with President Clinton and the leaders of six other industrialized countries in Birmingham, England -- indicated he was addressing a wider audience.
 "We inherited from the former Soviet Union the status of a . . . power based on a powerful military complex but with no solid economic foundation," he said. "It is the task of our domestic and foreign policies to do away with this imbalance."
 Yeltsin said it also was time to do away with domination by a few world powers and move toward a multipolar world in the 21st century.

REACTIONARY FORCES WHO WANT TO REBUILD THE OLD RUSSIAN EMPIRE WILL FAIL

'Respublika Armenia', Radio, Yerevan, in Russian 25 Oct 97, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 29, 1997, HEADLINE: Baku takes cautious step towards direct talks with Karabakh acs-VT99
	[A] When the Soviet Union existed there was confrontation between the USSR and the USA. Now Russia is a partner of the United States of America. There are some reactionary forces who dream of resurrecting the Soviet Union and restoring the conflict between Russia and the USA. In Armenia there are forces which are hoping to win territory in this confrontation. But the world has changed. This will not happen.

POWERFUL RUSSIAN POLITICAL AND BUSINESS ELITES OPPOSE ANY ATTEMPT TO REINTEGRATE FORMER SOVIET STATES

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 The newly emerged powerful Russian political and business elites, on the other hand, are generally opposed to reintegration, at least for the foreseeable future. Given a high diversity of political situations in former Soviet republics as well as differing levels of economic development, many Russian elites believe reintegration would be too costly politically and economically either to Russian interests or to their own.

RUSSIA HAS GIVEN UP ITS LOST EMPIRE, AND SIMPLY WISHES TO COUNTER BALANCE UNITED STATES INFLUENCE BY WORKING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WITHOUT CREATING A CONFRONTATION WITH THE USA

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	 Almost seven years after the end of communist rule, the collapse of the empire is broadly accepted by Moscow's foreign policy establishment - if not by parliament's dominant communist and nationalist factions - as the practical reality that defines the scope of Russian foreign policy. 
The main challenge is to find a way to counterbalance the global power of the US, without allowing relations with Washington to deteriorate into confrontation.
Russia considers that the US throws its weight around too much, and is keen to build relationships with influential countries, including China and France as UN Security Council members, that appear to share this view.

RUSSIAN REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOVIET STATES WOULD BE A GOOD THING

USA SHOULD SUPPORT FORMER SOVIET INTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA TO LIMIT DANGEROUS CHINESE AND IRANIAN INFLUENCE

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 There is an alternative. The United States could begin supporting integration in the territory of the former Soviet Union rather than the forces that divide the region. This would limit Chinese and Iranian maneuvering, introduce economic and strategic equilibrium, and improve America's relations with Russia. At the same time, Russia, along with the smaller countries of central and eastern Eurasia, must work to develop values capable of uniting disparate elements within states and drawing the broader region together into a more stable system. A tour d'horizon of Eurasia provides abundant evidence of the costs of the current course of disintegration and drift. 

RUSSIA WILL REINTEGRATE WITH FORMER SOVIET PARTS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER -- BETTER TO HELP THEM DO IT

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	EITHER THE disintegration in Russia will continue or a new system of values will emerge to unite the nations of Eurasia. If Russia manages to develop a new national idea capable of bringing together its people and urging it to leadership, and again displays an inclination for integrating Eurasia, there are two possible scenarios: "hard" and "soft" integration.
 If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement a hard-line policy of "land collection" on its southern and western flanks. It will also adopt a confrontational attitude toward Western nations and probably China; Moscow will again begin supporting any state that opposes U.S. interests. It will likely start with Muslim nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Cuba and North Korea. The weakness of Russia's conventional forces will probably lead it to rely on veiled threats of nuclear blackmail, using the above countries and groups, among others. Such a policy will allow Moscow back into the negotiation process in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, marking its return to serious international policymaking. It would also mobilize and unite Islamic elements in Russia and the CIS, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by casting Russia as the ally and friend of Islam. At one stroke, it would counter both the West and China, which is dealing with Muslim unrest of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.

FORMER SOVIET STATES ARE SUPPORTIVE OF REINTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	Outside Russia, where there is still popular support for the traditional Russian and Soviet state, the idea of reintegration has strong appeal. Fierce political rivalry in a number of the former Soviet republics has pushed opposition forces and clans toward alliances with Russia. A policy of hard integration by the Kremlin could allow it to regain some control in several troubled states.

FORMER SOVIET STATES COULD REINTEGRATE THROUGH THE C.I.S.

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 The other form Eurasian integration could take is that of a gradual movement toward union, as in the EU. The CIS, headed by a practically powerless executive secretariat, cannot be called an operating structure for integration. The customs union -- consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan -- functions, at best, as a free trade zone. The April 1997 Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia, however, is a step in the direction of real integration. The agreement's soft brand of integration has a tremendous political advantage over a more rigid formula for unification with or entry into the Russian Federation; Belarusan sovereignty is not diminished, and Russia is not laden with economic burdens it cannot afford to bear.

IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WEST FOR RUSSIAN REINTEGRATION TO TAKE PLACE

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 It is clearly to the West's advantage to promote certain kinds of regional integration in Eurasia. The rapid rise of any player, especially China or Iran, or a radical Islamic revolution could harm Western interests. Western unity would be shaken if one or more of its own, whether Germany, Turkey, or Japan, tried to secure its own zone of influence. The intervention of NATO forces in future conflicts in the region, probably at the request of the parties involved, could cause further disintegration, perhaps resulting in loss of control over weapons of mass destruction.

PRESSURE AND HELP FROM THE WEST COULD MAKE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF FORMER SOVIET STATES POSSIBLE

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 The West has levers that it can push to help shape politics in Russia and other CIS states today, including influence over opposition leaders. With NATO expanding to the borders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and so long as Russia is weakened militarily and increasingly dependent on the West economically, Western influence is likely to grow. Economic integration supported by the West would be a powerful stabilizing factor in the region.

RUSSIA NEEDS A NEW MISSION OR ELSE IT WILL SELF-DESTRUCT, AND REINTEGRATION IS THE RIGHT ANSWER

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 Having lost faith in its guiding principles, Russia may descend into chaos and destroy itself, along with the region, unless it discovers new values that can sustain it. Nations, like people, do not live by bread alone, nor by sophisticated weaponry. They need, above all, the spiritual foundation that a great ideal and its related set of values provide. Large states and empires have always been built on an idea; the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. global leadership would not have existed but for the American belief in manifest destiny. The state should deploy such an idea with care, and citizens are right to regard it cautiously. But with its deep emotional appeal, it fires the disparate members of a society to work for the common interest rather than for selfish gain. One need look only at the monumental plants and public works built in the early decades of communism by workers laboring not for wages but for a better future

UNLESS THERE IS REINTEGRATION TO DRAW PEOPLES OF EURASIA TOGETHER, THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM COULD BE DESTROYED

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 If the region cannot come up with an idea that embodies the aims and aspirations of its many peoples and draws them closer together, and if the major powers continue to jockey for influence and thus exacerbate divisions, the international security system could be destroyed and international rules of conduct undermined. An order would once again have to be built, not on principles of law and justice, but around the balancing of interests and forces. That would mark a new and inauspicious "beginning of history."

VOLUNTARY REUNIFICATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION INTO A NEW UNION WILL TAKE PLACE

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 15-16 , acs-VT99 
	Voluntary reunification is inevitable. It is a matter of common sense. Time will soon tell what form this reunification will take. 
	The document adopted by the Duma in March 19966 cannot physically or legally resurrect the USSR as it existed before December 199 1. This is perfectly understood even by those who shout the loudest about the fragmentation of the USSR. But at the same time, it is also clear to everyone that there is a real need for a definitive political and moral assessment of the Belovezh Agreements (which had been undertaken behind the backs of the peoples of the USSR and against their will). Without such an assessment, it will-be impossible to begin the reintegration of the post-Soviet realm. 
	Five years of disunion have demonstrated that no single republic can climb out of the crisis by itself. It is our political and moral right to abrogate these agreements. But this does not mean that tomorrow someone will forcibly be joined with someone else. No one is about to challenge someone else's sovereignty. The right to reunite belongs to the people and no one else. But we would take all necessary steps to reestablish (on a voluntary basis) fraternal ties among Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This would start the incremental voluntary reestablishment of a federal union state.

RUSSIA IS STILL A DANGEROUS MILITARIZED STATE

RUSSIA’S MILITARY IS DECAYING BUT STILL VERY POWERFUL, AND ESPECIALLY SO IN TERMS OF TROOPS ALREADY STATIONED IN THE FORMER SOVIET STATES

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	Although Russia's armed forces are demoralized and starved for money, their command structure remains largely intact and extends over most of what was once the Soviet Union. With the exception of the three Baltic states and Azerbaijan, Russian troops are deployed in every one of the ex-Soviet republics: 24,000 in Tajikistan, 15,000 in Turkmenistan, 5,000 in Uzbekistan, and so on. In Armenia, which has traditionally relied on Russia for protection from Turkey and other Muslim neighbors, Moscow has secured a 25-year basing right for its troops, in return for which it sent Armenia $ 1 billion worth of military equipment. The ostensible mission of these Russian expeditionary forces is to defend the former republics' borders and protect their ethnic Russian residents. In reality, they also serve as the vanguard of Russia's imperial drive. 

RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING IS STILL “US VS. THEM” AND DEMANDS TO BE SHOWN RESPECT

Stephen Blank, Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998 Pg. 9, HEADLINE: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT acs-VT99
	Russian military thinking has retained the Soviet "us vs. them" approach and the most sterile forms of correlation-of-forces theory. n4 This militarized view of world politics and defense requirements inhibits Russia's desperately needed military reform. Russia still sees security mainly in military and zero-sum game terms where Russia must be an equal and opposing pole of the United States. n5 Accordingly, Russia did not lose the Cold War and remains a great global power by virtue of its potential. Hence, it deserves a seat at all "presidium tables" of world politics, despite its manifold weaknesses. n6 Moreover, Moscow holds that the West owes it something.

RUSSIA HAS FAILED TO DEMILITARIZE BECAUSE IT CANNOT BREAK WITH THE SECURITY IDEOLOGIES OF THE PAST

Stephen Blank, Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998 Pg. 9, HEADLINE: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT acs-VT99
	 The failure to demilitarize the political process and the environment within which security policy is formulated and executed has had a decisive and lasting significance for foreign policy. Perhaps the deepest source of Russian objections to NATO enlargement and NATO's superior power is that enlargement thwarts Russia's and other states' dream of a unilateral hegemony in Europe. Moscow's imperial project reflects and is bound up with a revival of traditional modes of thinking and acting in foreign policy that graphically illuminates the failure to make or consummate a revolutionary break with the past. And Europe has duly noted that failure.

RUSSIA WILL USE ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO DEFEND ITSELF WHILE IT TAKES 10 YEARS TO CREATE A NEW HIGH TECH MILITARY

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 Until they have designed the new military hardware and secured sufficient funds to procure it -- a period of between ten and 20 years, in their estimation -- Russian generals intend to rely on the nuclear deterrent. They have revoked Brezhnev's 1982 "no-first-use" pledge and, in view of the superiority of NATO's conventional forces, adopted NATO'S own flexible response strategy, formulated when Soviet conventional forces enjoyed the upper hand.

RUSSIAN MILITARY WAS SWITCHED TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AS A FOCUS IN ORDER TO PRODUCE WINNING HIGH TECH WEAPONS FOR THE FUTURE

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 Russia's new military doctrine, approved by the Yeltsin government in 1993, following U.S. practice calls for a shift in defense allocations from procurement to research and development. Hoover Institution Fellow Richard F. Staar estimates that 1997 expenditures on high-technology R&D will account for 40 percent of the defense budget. Drawing on Russia's excellent scientific talent in the field of military technology, the new doctrine projects designing, with the help of supercomputers imported from the United States, prototypes of directed-energy weapons, electronic warfare equipment, and stealth aviation. Naval weaponry is to be emphasized as well. Russia recently established an Academy of Military Sciences to study "military futurology" so as to anticipate developments among potential enemy nations and thus insure itself against shocks like Operation Desert Storm. Such a program can be carried out with the limited funds currently allocated the armed forces. First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshkin boasts that it will enable Russia to produce weapons "that have no equivalent in the world."

RUSSIA HAS REORGANIZED AND TONED DOWN THEIR MILITARY

SIZE OF RUSSIA’S MILITARY HAS DECLINED RAPIDLY, AND THEY HAVE ENDED 200 YEARS OF FORCED MILITARY SERVICE

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Along the way, the Russian army's manpower shrank from around 4 million in January 1992 to 1.7 million by late 1996. In July 1997, Yeltsin signed decrees mandating a further reduction, to 1.2 million. Gen. Igor Rodionov, minister of defense at the time, referred to himself as "minister of a disintegrating army and a dying fleet." Finally, Yeltsin announced the coup de grace for Russian militarism: elimination of the draft and the move to an all-volunteer force of 600,000 by the year 2000. While the transition may well take longer than three years, for a Russian leader even to talk of ending almost two centuries of conscription proves how far the country has moved from the traditional Russian (let alone Soviet) militarized state. Already Russian courts are throwing out by the dozen cases brought by the army against "deserters" who exercised their constitutional right to alternative service.

RUSSIA HAS EXPERIENCED A PROFOUND REORIENTATION AND MILITARISM IS UNLIKELY TO RETURN

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Clearly, demilitarization is an expression of Russia's profound reorientation. The very criteria of national greatness have changed. Last June, in a televised address to the nation on the seventh anniversary of Russia's Declaration of State Sovereignty, Yeltsin said, "A great power is not mountains of weapons and subjects with no rights. A great power is a self- reliant and talented people with initiative . . . . In the foundation of our approach to the building of the Russian state . . . is the understanding that the country begins with each of us. And the sole measure of the greatness of our Motherland is the extent to which each citizen of Russia is free, healthy, educated, and happy." Unless this new consensus is extinguished by economic catastrophe and a return to dictatorship, Russian militarism is unlikely to revive.

RUSSIA IS REFORMING ITS MILITARY TO MAKE IT MORE EFFICIENT
 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, January 21, 1998; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: RUSSIA'S REFORMERS UNEASY OVER OUTLOOK\\jan]VT99 
	Separately, Yeltsin said Tuesday that his large-scale military reform is a success so far, having overcome resistance from the top brass and even the government's political opponents. He said Russia had managed to cut its armed forces by 200,000 troops over the past year and had conducted an inventory of all military assets. 
	Troop numbers are due to be slashed further, to 1.2 million by the end of the year from the current 1.5 million. The reform is aimed at making the armed forces compact, mobile, efficient and technologically up to date.

ALL PARTIES IN RUSSIA AGREE THAT YELTSIN’S MILITARY REFORMS ARE REAL AND EFFECTIVE

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, October 30, 1997, HEADLINE: ICBMs Won't Boost Reform acs-VT99
	The Council on External and Defense Policy, a well-known, Moscow-based think tank, held a public round-table debate on military reform. But there was no real debate. Leading opposition deputies from the liberal State Duma faction Yabloko, Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the committee on foreign policy, and Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the committee on defense, both heaped praise on President Boris Yeltsin and Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev.
Arbatov said, "Yeltsin has come to his senses and begun real reforms together with Sergeyev."

THE COMPARISON OF RUSSIA AND CHINA SHOWS THAT DEMOCRACY IS THE BEST ANTIDOTE TO MILITARISM

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 It is the connection between democratization and national-security policy that makes Russia's situation so different from China's. Unlike the Russian reformers, China's leaders opted for nationalism to unite the nation during its dizzying economic transformation. As long as China remains authoritarian, its military buildup is likely to continue. And a democratic evolution will take time.

RUSSIA IS IN THE MIDST OF A HUGE REORGANIZATION AND CUTBACK IN ITS MILITARY

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	 In addition, Mr. Yeltsin launched a complete overhaul of the Russian military, involving a massive scaling back, reorganization and reform of the armed forces. It is the most comprehensive restructuring and military overhaul in the history of Russia. 

RUSSIA’S MILITARY IS NO LONGER AN INTERNATIONAL THREAT

RUSSIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN RAPIDLY DEMILITARIZING ITSELF

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	At the same time, a demilitarization historically unprecedented in speed and scope was underway in Russia itself. "Reduction" is a ridiculous euphemism for the systematic starvation to which Yeltsin has subjected the Soviet armed forces and military-industrial complex. In just a few years, the Russian defense sector -- once the country's omnipotent overlord, master of its choicest resources, source of national pride, and livelihood of one-third of the Russian population -- has been reduced to beggary.
In 1992, acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar ordered an 80 percent cut in defense procurement. Thus began the process of squeezing the military's share of Russian GDP from at least 20 percent to between 5 percent and 7 percent today. Yeltsin has promised to shrink it to 3 percent by the year 2000. According to Sergei Rogov, director of the USA-Canada Institute in Moscow, the armed forces' spending on organization and maintenance was at least 2.5 times lower in 1996 than in 1990; on procurement and military construction, 9 times lower; and on research and development, an astounding 10 times lower. When the government implemented an across-the-board spending "sequester" in May 1997, defense was again hit hardest. Its funding, already delayed, was slashed 20 percent.

RUSSIAN MILITARY WILL SOON BE INSUFFICIENT TO DEFEND ITSELF, SO RUSSIA MUST BE DEFENDED BY OTHERS

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	In reality, Russia can probably afford a military of no more than 400,000 personnel. But at that level, it could not possibly perform traditional missions against the opposition of any major military establishment. Because Russia cannot guarantee its own security in the form of a traditional security establishment, in effect, the outside world is going to have to guarantee Russia's security for it. At present, neither Russia nor the rest of the world seems close to accepting this unavoidable implication.

RUSSIA CANNOT AFFORD THE MILITARY ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT ITSELF

ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, May 15, 1998, HEADLINE: Brookings Scholars Warn World Must Guarantee Russia's Security// acs-VT99
	According to Steinbruner and Gaddy, Russia is currently running more than a century behind the United States in overall economic performance. While Russia plans to preserve a military establishment of 1.2 million people, such a force is far beyond what Moscow can afford.
"In reality, Russia can probably afford a military of no more than 400,000 personnel," the authors write. "But at that level, it could not possibly perform traditional missions against the opposition of any major military establishment," they add. As a result, the Brookings team suggests that "the outside world is going to have to guarantee Russia's security."
The authors conclude that given the combination of an economy far weaker than most people recognize and security concerns much greater, Russia is sitting on "pressures of volcanic proportions." They warn that, "In the end, it will be our problem as well as Russia. " 

RUSSIA'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE IN SHAMBLES AND CORRUPTION IS RUNNING DEEP

Greg Myre, January 21, 1998 [AAP NEWSFEED. HEADLINE: CIS: YELTSIN SAYS MILITARY NOW SUPPORTS HIS REFORM CAMPAIGN\\jan]VT99 
	The once-proud military has been in sharp decline since the Soviet break-up, and there's broad aareement that it needs new direction in the post-Cold War world. But there's been no consensus on what the new Russian military should look like. At present, many officers live in tents because there isn't enough housing The conscripted troops come mostly from the ranks of the poor and ill-educated, while youths who are better off find ways to avoid the draft. Corruption is rife, with about 30 generals and admirals currently facing criminal charges. All these factors contributed to the humiliating, defeat at the hands of Chechen rebels in the 1994-6 war for control of the southern territory.

RUSSIA DOES NOT HAVE A MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE STATUS QUO

Mikhail Semyonovich Surkov, chairman of the Defense Committee, FEBRUARY 4, 1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CPRF LEADER \\j an]VT99 
Surkov- I believe that the question about military threats is more for me to answer than Gennady Andreyevich. Of course, I understand that Gennady Andreyevich will be able to answer tl-iis question, but still. Russia's main trouble is that to this day we do not have a military doctrine. A doctrine demands that we identify threats and the sources of threats. Today Russia is one of the few countries in the world with the exception, perhaps, of Uganda and countries like that, that does not have a militafy doctrine. Instead of a doctrine we have presidential messages, at best. Now what are the tasks of the railway troops? As you know well, railway troops and railway construction troops, which were under the command of Colonel General Marchuk, have now been reorganized. We still have railway troops, though, and they are commanded by Colonel General ... (inaudible)... What will happen with them tomorrow? They will be part of the Armed Forces.

RUSSIAN MILITARY IS MEANINGLESS AND POWERLESS

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 18, acs-VT99 
		On February 1997, then Minister of Defence Igor Rodionov publicly stated that Russia's protracted economic crisis threatened to reduce the armed forces to nothing by 2003, and that even the strategic nuclear forces were in a state of near-total collapse. 

START 2 WILL/WILL NOT BE PASSED

CURRENT RUSSIAN POLICY IS EQUITABLE AND CONMSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE USA, ESPECIALLY ON ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

Yelena Tregubova, Russian Press Digest, May 8, 1998, HEADLINE: Foreign Policy Must Be Economical, SOURCE: RUSSKY TELEGRAF, p. 1 // acs-VT99
	But in all likelihood, in order not to irritate his overseas colleague, it is expected that Yeltsin will instruct his diplomats to continue their efforts for establishing "equitable" and "constructive" cooperation with the United States. The Russian President will most likely emphasize the need to fulfill the Russo-American accords on disarmament: the Foreign Ministry will likely be instructed to step up its work with the Duma in order to ratify SALT-2 without delay, and after that, to get down to brass tacks on hammering out a SALT-3 treaty.

US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE STILL GOOD IN THE STATUS QUO WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE RATIFICATION OF START II

TASS, February 17, 1998 [HEADLINE Russo-US relations are dynamic, Yeltsin says\\jan]VT99 
	The relations between Russia and the United States are still marked by "positive dynamics", President Boris Yeltsin believes. He regards the ratification of the Russo-American START-2 treaty as an urgent task of the State Duma. 
	"Commercial and economic cooperation is on the whole developing successfully. Of great importance for safeguarding strategic stability is the package of agreements on the delimitation of the strategic and non-strategic ABM systems. This allowed us to go over to the concrete discussion of the principal parameters of the START-3 treaty," Yeltsin stated in his State-of-the-Nation message to the Parliament, the 65-page text of which was handed out to members of the Russian Parliament on Tuesday. "It is an urgent task to ratify the START-2 treaty," Yeltsin stressed. 

START-2 WILL LIKELY PASS AS PUBLIC OPINION MOBILIZES AROUND IT

John F. Harris, Washington Post Staff Writer, The Washington , May 04, 1998, Pg. A16, HEADLINE: After NATO Vote, Doubts on U.S.- Russia Rapport // acs-VT99
	 Perry likewise played down some of the recent bumps in the Russia relationship. He predicted that START II is likely to pass soon in the Duma, as more Russians awaken to the fact that the treaty is in their self-interest, although he said he is generally opposed to using summits as a way to force actions by other countries.

RUSSIAN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT SUPPORTS START-2 RATIFICATION

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	Q: What are the main problems in the way of ratification? 
Polyakov [Polyakov Mikhail Mikhailovich, acting chief of the International Treaty Directorate of the Defense Ministry]: The question should be put to the representatives of the legislative branch of government. The Defense Ministry and other elements of the executive branch have already said that the treaty must be ratified. And now it is reaffirming its view. The Defense Ministry has confirmed its view. I have often attended the meetings of the State Duma and I confirm that the Defense Ministry's position on this issue is very clear. 

IF START-2 IS NOT RATIFIED, THERE WILL BE NO IMF BAIL OUT FOR RUSSIA

Daniil Osmolovsky. Kommersant-Daily, April 25, 1998, pp. 1, 3. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, May 27, 1998; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Kiriyenko Wins Confirmation on Third Try acs-VT99
	 In this connection, a great deal depends on whether or not world financial institutions approve of the actions of Kiriyenko's government. It cannot be ruled out that by late summer or early autumn, the Russian Cabinet will have to ask for emergency financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund, as well as from private foreign investors who take their cues on interest policy from the IMF. . . .
But if the Kremlin is unable to get the lower chamber of parliament to ratify the START II Treaty, the Russian authorities can say good-bye to all their hopes for goodwill from the United States in general and the IMF in particular. . . .

START-2 RATIFICATION IS A DEAD ISSUE

Thomas L. Friedman; International Herald Tribune, August 1, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: But What About the U.S.-Russian Relationship? acs-VT99
	 Fourth, in the wake of the NATO expansion there is ''no chance whatsoever'' that Russia's Parliament will ratify START-2 by this fall, said Mr. Arbatov, a supporter of the treaty. If START-2, which calls for the United States and Russia to slash long-range nuclear weapons from 7,500 to 3, 500 each, is not ratified before NATO expansion is ratified by the Western parliaments, the treaty will probably remain in limbo. ''Yeltsin promised at Helsinki that he would move quickly on START-2,'' said Mr. Arbatov, ''and when he came back to Moscow he immediately 'forgot' about it.''

RUSSIAN PARLAIMENT WILL NOT RATIFY START-2 BECAUSE OF INADEWUATE FUNDING

Xinhua News Agency, MAY 14, 1998, HEADLINE: russian lower house not to approve start, DATELINE: moscow, may 14; ITEM NO: 0514270// acs-VT99
	chairman of russian state duma (lower house) gennady seleznev said here thursday that because of a shortage of money, the duma had no right to endorse the second strategic arms reduction treaty (start 2). the itar-tass and interfax news agencies reported that seleznev made the remark in a speech at the moscow institute on international relations. he said the major barrier to the approval of the treaty was financial problems. so far, the state duma had received no financial and economic feasibility reports from the government on the ratification of the treaty. he said money was needed for the destruction of nuclear weapons. however, the state budget did not include money for that purpose, which made it impossible for state duma to endorse the treaty. in recent years, the united states has been pressing russia for a quick endorsement of start 2. russian president boris yeltsin expressed the same hope in his tuesday speech on russia's current foreign policies and tasks.

USA HAS NOT FINISHED RATIFYING START-2 EITHER

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	 [Vasilyev Anton Vsevolodovich, first deputy director of the Foreign Ministry Department on Security and Disarmament ] You know, I do not agree that the United States has ratified the treaty. The United States Senate has given its consent to the ratification of the treaty and the three supplements to it, without the protocol that was signed already later. This means that the American side will still have to bring the ratification process to the end. Without the final ratification by the United States, without Russia's ratification of the treaty we cannot begin full-scale talks on START-3. 

START-2 IMPROVES RUSSIA’S SECURITY

RATIFICATION OF START-2 WILL BENEFIT RUSSIA AT MANY LEVELS

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	Leonov [Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov Professor of MGIMO and a constant participant on Channel 3 program "Russky Dom"]: We will benefit politically too. We will stop being a laughing stock that signed the treaty six years ago but has not ratified it yet, justifying it by disagreements in our views. That is, there is some sort of a petrified conflict in our society. But there are no serious arguments for not ratifying the treaty. The principle of reasonable sufficiency indicates that the warheads to be left after the ratification of the treaty will be enough to ensure Russia's military security. I am sure that it will be economically beneficial. I am sure that it will bring calm to our society and to the world public opinion which still entertains fears that Russia is going to make an about-face turn which is why it does not ratify the treaty. All these problems would have been solved at one stroke. I am a strong supporter of ratification of the treaty, an early ratification and I think that the obstacles should be removed from that path. 

START-2 IMPROVES RUSSIAN SECURITY

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	Vasilyev [Vasilyev Anton Vsevolodovich, first deputy director of the Foreign Ministry Department on Security and Disarmament]: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs that I represent fully believes in the expediency of the speediest ratification of the START- 2 Treaty. The treaty has been discussed for already five years and the main arguments of its supporters and opponents are well known. I would like to say just a few words about what in my opinion is of the greatest importance. Firstly, mention here has already been made of the concept of the security of the Russian Federation. This is the basis of our philosophy in the sphere of security. We are building the edifice of our security on this concept. Well, I would like to say that as it is indicated in the concept, that has been approved by the President of the Russian Federation, it is the main task of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to ensure nuclear deterrence with the aim of averting both a nuclear war and a conventional large-scale or regional war and also of fulfilling allied obligations. In order to fulfill this task the Russian Federation must have a nuclear potential capable of guaranteeing the infliction of damage to any aggressor state or a coalition of states. The START-2 Treaty ensures the fulfillment of this task. The treaty makes it possible to reduce our strategic nuclear force parallel to a simultaneous reduction of the nuclear force of the United States, in other words it gives us a possibility to ensure a rough balance of strategic nuclear forces, to ensure the prevention of a substantial preponderance of the level of strategic nuclear forces of one side over the other. And in this respect, I agree with those who say that the treaty facilitates the optimization of our country's spending on the maintenance and modernization of its strategic nuclear force. 

START-3 IS COMING ANYWAY

THE US IS WILLING TO START NEGOTIATING START III IN THE STATUS QUO

Andrei Varlamov, March 13, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: US proposes to Russia to consider START3 framework\\jan]VT99 
	The United State has proposed to Russia to start expert consultations on the framework of the START-3, which may be aimed to cut the number of warheads instead of nuclear arms carriers, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said in an interview with the Podrobnosti program of the Russian RTR television channel on Friday. 
	"Our colleagues at the negotiations are ready to discuss the START-3 framework at an expert level," the minister said. Sergeyev was informed about that in a letter of U. S. Defense Secretary William Cohen. Diplomatic efforts to the effect are being taken at the summit level and the level of foreign ministries. 
	"We hope, and the U. S. side shows understanding, that it will be a matter of nuclear warheads. We became keen on carriers at the previous stages," he said.

START-3 WILL CUT NUCLEAR WEARHEADS TO A MUCH LOWER LEVEL, AND RUSSIA IS COMMITTED TO IT

Paul Bedard; The Washington Times, May 18, 1998, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: Clinton, Yeltsin eye further cuts in arms // acs-VT99
	Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin want to begin work on a START III treaty that will cut warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 each.
"President Yeltsin reaffirmed in the clearest and most unambiguous terms his own personal commitment and that of his government to continue working with the United States to address these problems and to do so very promptly," Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said.

INDIA NUCLEAR TEST HAS ACCELERATED PROGRESS ON START-3 AGREEMENT

Paul Bedard; The Washington Times, May 18, 1998, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: Clinton, Yeltsin eye further cuts in arms // acs-VT99
	President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin yesterday used nuclear tensions in South Asia to push for a START III treaty slashing nuclear warheads.
"I think all of us, because of the India nuclear tests [last week], feel an even greater sense of urgency to change the debate again over nuclear issues toward less, not more - to change the whole direction here," Mr. Clinton said after meeting with a healthy looking Mr. Yeltsin for 45 minutes.
The two leaders said the tests should push the Russian legislature's lower house, the State Duma, to approve START II, the strategic arms reduction treaty reducing nuclear warheads in each country to 3,500. The U.S. Senate already has approved the treaty.

THE US HAS AGREED TO CONSIDER START III BEFORE THE DUMA RATIFIES START 2

Agence France Presse, March 13, 1998 [HEADLINE: Russian official: US proposes consultation stage of START III negotiations\\jan]VT99 
The United States has proposed to Russia that the two countries begin the expert consultations stage of the START III negotiations on nuclear arms reductions, Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev said on Russian television on Friday. 
	"Our colleagues at the negotiations are ready to discuss the START III framework at the expert level," Sergeyev said. 
	The Russian defence minister said he learned of the US decision in a letter from US Defence Secretary William Cohen.

RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SECURE AND SAFE FROM ACCIDENTS

RUSSIAN CONTROLS OVER ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE MORE STRINGENT THAN THE CONTROLS THE US HAS

Air Force Magazine, February, 1998 [SECTION: Pg. 74. HEADLINE: Security of the Russian Nukes\\j an]VT99 
	"For example, in the United States we have a two-person policy involving nuclear weapons. In other words, you have to have a minimum of two people in order to get close to a nuclear weapon. In Russia it's the three-person policy.... I'm talking about access to a nuclear weapon itself. The launching of a nuclear weapon is very complicated. It is very -- the controls are very robust. There are a lot of safeguards built in. Trust me.... 
	"At our [weapon storage] sites, you need two people to go do that, who understand what they are doing, whatever tasks they are going to do. In Russia you need three people. And, oh, by the way, in Russia, when you open up that igloo, you have to have a written order signed by the full colonel, who is the special technical unit commander, whereas we don't have those specific kinds of requirements."

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SAFE AND SECURE

Air Force Magazine, February, 1998 [SECTION: Pg. 74. HEADLINE: Security of the Russian Nukes\\j an]VT99 
	"I saw one site, and I was assured by General Yakovlev and General Kirillov, who is the commander of the 27th Rocket Army [and] who accompanied me on this leg of the trip, that what I saw was representative. And if what I saw was representative, yes, I have confidence in the safety and security of their nuclear weapons stockpile. 
	"They are deadly serious about this. This is a very valuable resource. It is something that in the wrong hands would be a very dangerous resource, and they go to great lengths. The security personnel, I was told, and just from what I saw, I would tend to believe, that they are elite. They call themselves the 10-Alpha Force. They are regularly tested by an anti-terrorist group that comes around to these kinds of facilities and attempts penetration."

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SAFE. THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE IS STRICTER THAN THE UNITED STATES

Mikhail Shevtsov, February 19, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: Safety control in Russian missile forces excels - US commander\\jan]VT99 
	Russia's nuclear weapons safety control is much more rigid than that of the United States, a topranking military official said on Thursday. 
	"In the past 38 years, nuclear safety control system made it possible to avoid malfunctions in nuclear ammunition in the Russian strategic missile forces," Vladimir Yakovlev, the commander-inchief of the Russian strategic missile forces, told a news conference disclosing a number of the system's technical aspects. 
	According to Yakovlev, any launcher or missile with nuclear warheads is permanently controlled by 10 to 24 parameters. Every six hours, 3-4 days or six months, the number of these parameters grows to 280-3,000, ultimately reaching 10,000 every three years. 
	"In case at least one of these parameters is outside the norm, the missile is never put on combat duty" until all deviations from the norm are removed, Yakovlev said. 
	In his words, on top of the regular routine, around 1,500 nuclear safety checks are held annually in the country's strategic missile forces.

RUSSIA IS COMPLYING WITH START H AND THEIR NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE SAFE FROM ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH

Andrei Varlamov, March 13, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: US proposes to Russia to consider START-3 framework\\ jan]VT99 
	In the opinion of Sergeyev, "the START-2 will cost less than the START-1 and there is hope the START-3 will be cheaper than the START-2. . . At the Helsinki meeting the Russian president achieved a considerable progress: the fulfillment of the first phase of the START-2 was postponed till 2004, and the fulfillment of the final phase was postponed till 2007. " 
	That will enable the country "to exhaust the service life of Russian strategic armaments currently on combat duty... We have not removed a single missile or destroyed a single silo that have not exhausted their warranty and service lives," Sergeyev noted. 
	"The strategic missile forces are ready for combat, controllable and reliably protected from any unauthorized actions or attempts of such," he said.

RUSSIA IS DRASTICALLY CUTTING BACK ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

RUSSIA WILL FOLLOW CHINA’S NUCLEAR EXAMPLE -- A FEW HUNDRED WARHEADS ARE ALL THAT IS NEEDED

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	Leonov [Nikolai Sergeyevich Leonov Professor of MGIMO and a constant participant on Channel 3 program "Russky Dom",]: We have always used China's experience. China did not multiply nuclear weapons. Having produced several hundred warheads, China stopped building up its military potential. 

RUSSIA IS CUTTING ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

The Des Moines Register, February 19, 1998 [SECTION: Main News Pg.006. HEADLINE: Russia cuts its nuclear program.The country doesn't have enough money to finance the plants.\\jan]VT99 
	Moscow, Russia Russia will shut down three of eight plants involved in nuclear weapons production amid severe money shortages, a top government official said Wednesday. 
	Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov said Russia's military nuclear program has been cut by half over the past six years and now accounts for only 10 percent of the nuclear industry output. He did not specify the names of the plants.
 	The past year has been the worst year for the military nuclear program in terms of financing. The government provided only 30 percent of budget funds earmarked for the purpose, the ITAR-Tass news agency quoted Mikhailov as saying.

RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR FORCES WILL DECLINE QUICKLY AS THEY ARE SCRAPPED FOR LACK OF FUNDS

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and national security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, December 4, 1997, HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: Yeltsin Rhetoric Old Tactic acs-VT99
	 Today, Russia's nuclear deterrent is slowly disintegrating for lack of funds. Russian and Western defense experts alike agree that in the coming years an increasing number of warheads will be decomissioned because the aging ballistic missiles that carry them will be scrapped. The only thing experts disagree on is the exact timetable and final scope of this inevitable Russian unilateral "disarmament."

RUSSIA OPPOSES NEW NUCLEAR TESTING

MICHAEL R. GORDON, The New York Times, May 14, 1998, Section A; Page 13; HEADLINE: NUCLEAR ANXIETY: IN RUSSIA; Kremlin Soft-Pedals Its Rebuke to India, and Opposes Sanctions // acs-VT99
	Having decided to stop nuclear testing, the Russian military is not happy to see other nations flout the call for a worldwide ban on nuclear explosions.
"We deeply regret this action," Vladimir Rakhmanin, the chief spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, said. "We believe we may influence India through political and diplomatic means."

RUSSIA WILL CEASE ALL PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION BY 2000

Newsday (New York, NY), September 24, 1997, Page A17, HEADLINE: RUSSIA, U.S. OK PLUTONIUM HALT acs-VT99
	Russia will halt all production of weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000 and has assured U.S. Vice President Al Gore that it has strict control over its existing nuclear weapons, officials announced yesterday after high-level negotiations between the former Cold War adversaries.
The subject of nuclear security dominated talks between Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, reflecting nagging concerns in the West that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the wrong hands and that some may have gone astray in the chaos of Russia's post-Soviet transition.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE GOOD -- THEY GUARANTEE SECURITY AND PREVENT ATTACKS, ESPECIALLY AS USED BY THE RUSSIANS

RUSSIANS VIEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS GIVING THEM SECURITY, BUT NOT AS METHODS OF INFLUENCE OR EXPANSION

Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99
	 Second, nuclear weapons, being the ultimate means of ensuring security, do not have a direct relationship to the political situation in the world. For most Russian strategic planners, it does not really matter whether other nuclear-weapon states are seen as enemies, opponents, or even partners; nuclear weapons are insurance against the worst possible development. At the same time, the utility of nuclear weapons in daily policy is limited; they cannot help attain Russia's foreign policy goals in the Balkans or prevent NATO expansion, but at the same time they do not preclude cooperation.
 In this view, the security role of nuclear weapons is primarily symbolic -- their actual use is not seriously contemplated. This was underscored by the 1994 agreement on the "detargeting" of nuclear weapons and reduction of their alert status. n4 In 1992 Russia made a proposal to store ballistic missile warheads separately from missiles. This proposal was subsequently rejected by the Russian military, but only because of the lack of storage facilities; an analogous measure was implemented for heavy bombers pursuant to the Bush-Gorbachev initiatives in the fall of 1991. n5

RUSSIANS RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO PRESERVE THEIR SECURITY THROIUGH DETERRENCE

Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99
	First, in the view of most Russian military planners, strategic nuclear weapons are the foundation of international security because they are believed to prevent a war among the major powers and possibly regional wars as well. Nuclear weapons also are seen to guarantee Russia the status of a great power and provide it a last line of defense, meaning that potential foes will hesitate even to test where the last line lies. Theater and tactical nuclear weapons are viewed as providing defense against potential local threats, which are usually associated with Russia's "southern flank" (the border of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] with Islamic countries and China). Nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, also are seen as fulfilling an additional deterrent role -- that of providing security for other newly independent states. Russia's military doctrine mentions that nuclear weapons could be used in response to an attack against Russia's allies. The Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security (May 1992), as well as bilateral agreements with some of the states not party to the Tashkent Treaty (including Belarus), indirectly provide for a Russian "nuclear umbrella" by employing language that closely parallels relevant provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE AN EXCELLENT DETERRENT TO WAR AND ATTACK

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER; professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Houston Chronicle, May 20, 1998, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: Just have to live with spread of nuclear weapons // acs-VT99
	In fact, nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent for states that feel threatened by rival powers. Simply put, no state is likely to attack the homeland or vital interests of a nuclear-armed state for fear that such a move might trigger a horrific nuclear response.
Not surprisingly, therefore, states are often tempted to acquire nuclear weapons to enhance their security.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE ULTIMATE IN DETERRENCE AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS KNOW IT

Fred Weir, The Moscow Times, May 20, 1998, HEADLINE: A 2-Faced India Policy// acs-VT99
	The point is, nuclear weapons are the last word in deterrence. Many of the Western hawks who are today slamming India are the same people who will proudly maintain that NATO's nuclear resolve kept the peace through 50 dangerous years of Cold War, or that Ronald Reagan's precipitous arms buildup in the 1980s played a positive role in bringing communism to its knees. If the West is telling India to forego the same methods, what does it offer in return?

RUSSIA IS NOT ASSISTING OTHER NATIONS IN ACQUIRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

RUSSIA HAS NOT COOPERATED WITH NATIONS TRYING TO BUILD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in English 1951 gmt 9 July 1997, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 11, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia denies helping others develop weapons of mass destruction acs-VT99
	Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Tarasov brushed off accusations that Russia has allegedly helped some countries implement programmes to create weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery.
Speaking at a briefing on Wednesday [9th July], Tarasov said that such accusations are contained in a special CIA report prepared for the US Congress and presented recently in Washington.
 " Russia has strictly fulfilled, and continues to fulfil, its international obligations on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles for their delivery. It cooperates with foreign countries in strict compliance with Russian legislation based on the recommendations of international export control regimes," he said. Russia's export control system meets international standards, which has been repeatedly stated by high-ranking officials, including from the United States, the spokesman said.

RUSSIA FOLLOWS INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PROLIFERATION REGULATIONS

Asia Times, July 14, 1997: Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Moscow dismisses proliferation charges acs-VT99
	" Russia has strictly fulfilled, and continues to fulfill, its international obligations on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles for their delivery," Tarasov said. "It cooperates with foreign countries in strict compliance with Russian legislation based on the recommendations of international export-control regimes." He added that Russia's export-control system meets international standards, and that this has been repeatedly stated by high-ranking officials, including those from the US.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAQ AND INDIA IS MONITORED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Asia Times, July 14, 1997: Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Moscow dismisses proliferation charges acs-VT99
	 On the substance of the accusations made against Moscow, Tarasov reiterated that cooperation with Iran and India is aimed exclusively at the development in these countries of nuclear power engineering and of scientific and technological potential. He said that all supplies to these countries are closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and added that Russia does not export nuclear materials or technologies to Pakistan.

CHARGES THAT NUCLEAR MATERIALS ARE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR ARE DENIED BY THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY

Newsday (New York, NY), September 24, 1997, Page A17, HEADLINE: RUSSIA, U.S. OK PLUTONIUM HALT acs-VT99
	 This week's U.S.-Russian meetings coincided with fresh concerns about the Kremlin's ability to keep tabs on nuclear weapons. Alexei Yablokov, a prominent scientist and former adviser to Boris Yeltsin on environmental matters, said in a letter in the current issue of the weekly Novaya Gazeta that he considered it plausible that the Russian leadership lacks a full accounting of its nuclear arsenal.
Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev insisted after Yablokov's concern was published Monday that the Kremlin's nuclear arsenal is under control.

WHILE MOST CHARGES OF DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN DISPROVEN, THE RISK STILL REMAINS REAL

John M. Deutch, former director of the CIA, Foreign Policy, September 22, 1997; Pg. 10; HEADLINE: Terrorism; the possibility of the use of more sophisticated weapons acs-VT99
	 The second "new" aspect of terrorism is the growing possibility that terrorists will seek more bang for the buck and make use of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical, or biological. The intelligence community has received more than 100 reports alleging the diversion of nuclear components from the former Soviet Union over the last few years. Fortunately, to date most of this reporting has proved untrue. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Russian society and its economic difficulties have subjected the nuclear security system of the former Soviet Union to stresses and risks that it was not designed to withstand. Thousands of individuals employed within the Russian nuclear complex - many of whom have knowledge and access to nuclear materials - receive salaries that are barely at subsistence level, raising the possibility that they might be susceptible to offers from anyone in the market to buy nuclear components.

RUSSIANS KEEP A TIGHT LID ON THEIR NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND OBEY INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

The Des Moines Register, October 13, 1997, Pg.7, HEADLINE: Russian arms exports again gain strength acs-VT99
	Russian officials insist they keep a tight lid on nuclear technology and materials that could be used to make atomic bombs. And they maintain that they observe all U.N. arms embargoes and other international agreements.

RUSSIA IS A CONDUIT FOR SPREADING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ALL OVER THE WORLD

RUSSIA IS UNABLE TO PAY THE GENERALS AND SCIENTISTS THAT CONTROL THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE FOR MONTHS ON END. THIS DRAMATICALLY INCREASES THE RISK OF LOOSE NUKES

Crocker Snow Jr., February 17, 1998 [The Worldpaper. HEADLINE: 'There would be life after Doomsday' Nuclear statistics obscure a sea\\jan]VT99 
	Other experts agree A landmark 1995 study by four authors at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government entitled Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy concluded that: "The number one threat to American national security is loose nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material from Russia. " The authors, led by the school's former dean, Graham Allison, stated that, "It is more likely than not that weapons-usable enriched uranium will soon fall into the hands of a rogue state or terrorist group, who will fashion a crude nuclear device..." 
	It's been three years since this study was completed. "There are fewer instances of theft or attempted theft than I would have thought," says Allison, referring to the book that documented six such cases in which the perpetrators were caught and captured. "But on the other hand the conditions for the Russian generals and scientists who have custody of the weapons has become much worse than we anticipated. The Russian government has been unable to pay some of these custodians for periods of three and four months. It puts them under tremendous pressure."

MANY MEMBERS OF THE FORMER SOVIET SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT ARE AIDING WOULD BE PROLIFERATERS

Ambassador James Woolsey, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 served as the President's first CIA director., Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY\\jan]VT99 
A second problem with Russia is that many of those who managed the Soviet Unions security establishment, whether in technologgy and intelligence or in military expertise, are now for hire on both the white and the black markets. This makes Russia serious source of proliferation for example, to Iran as the chairman mentioned, a recent series in Izvestia spoke in some detail about a senior Russian military officers having provided assistance to Aum Shinrikyo prior to Aum's chemical attack in the Tokyo subway. And one of the most difficult acts of all this is the inter-penetration of the security services, organized crime and some aspects of Russian business.

THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA IS RIPE FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION THROUGH A FRIGHTENING NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PATHS

Nurith Aizenman, Washington Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 17; HEADLINE: National security for sale; government privatization and nuclear terrorism acs-VT99
	But this good news also had a dark side: once the nuclear warheads were taken apart, the bomb-grade uranium inside would be more vulnerable to theft. Meanwhile, hundreds of tons of bomb-grade uranium in Russia's existing stockpile lay scattered across the country in insecure storage sites -- guarded, if at all, by demoralized soldiers and nuclear workers who in many instances had not been paid, or even fed, by the cash-strapped Russian government in months. Given the small quantity of enriched uranium required to build a nuclear bomb, the possibilities for disaster seemed limitless: a terrorist group might break into one of the many nuclear warehouses that lacked even rudimentary electronic detection systems and make off with enough uranium to blow up Manhattan. A starving soldier might sneak home a few handfuls of the stuff to sell on the black market -- where it could be snapped up by eager buyers from Iraq, Iran or North Korea. A highly trained, but unemployed nuclear worker might be forced to make ends meet by going to work for one of those rogue nations. And most disturbing of all, in a quest for hard currency, the Russian government might itself be moved to sell wholesale quantities of nuclear material to the highest bidder. (In fact, in 1995 evidence surfaced that the head of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Victor Mikhailov, was trying to reach just such an arrangement with Iran).

CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA ARE ALLOWING NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS AND SCIENTISTS TO SPREAD OVER THE GLOBE

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER; professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Houston Chronicle, May 20, 1998, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: Just have to live with spread of nuclear weapons // acs-VT99
	But today the Soviet Union is no longer there to dampen proliferation in its former sphere of influence. Instead, its collapse has raised the risk that nuclear weapons, materials and scientists will seep to the rest of the world.

THE SOVIET COLLAPSE HAS CREATED A CHEAP UNDERGROUND MARKETPLACE FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER; professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Houston Chronicle, May 20, 1998, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: Just have to live with spread of nuclear weapons // acs-VT99
	Second, nuclear knowledge will continue to spread, and the cost of developing nuclear weapons will continue to fall. In the 1940s only the richest states could contemplate building nuclear forces. Today more nations can aspire to nuclear status, and the number of potential aspirants will grow in the future as the price of building these weapons drops further. The Soviet collapse accelerates this trend by creating the potential for a cheap, underground marketplace for nuclear materials.

RUSSIAN POLICY IS TO SELL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER NATIONS

Martin Sieff; The Washington Times, April 26, 1998, Pg. A9, HEADLINE: Russia keeps hard-line foreign policy despite new premier , acs-VT99
	 Even First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, a leading champion of democracy and free-market reform, has publicly urged the selling of Russian nuclear technology ovserseas.
"If there is a single defining principle as to the direction of Russian foreign policy, it is: 'Do your own thing,' " said Keith Bush, a Russia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

ISRAELI OFFICIALS SAY THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT COULD STOP NUCLEAR TRANSFERS IF IT WANTED TO

Steve Rodan, The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1998, Pg. 2, HEADLINE: Israel, US dispute effectiveness of Congress sanctions on Russia // acs-VT99
	Israeli officials responsible for monitoring the transfer of Russian technology to Iran disagree. They said Moscow now has the same capability of stopping transfers of any military technology as the Kremlin did under the former Soviet Union. 
At a meeting yesterday, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu urged visiting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Possulvalyuk to take steps to halt Russian involvement in Iran's armament efforts. Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and Foreign Ministry Director-General Eytan Bentsur made similar requests in their meetings with him yesterday.

PORTABLE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DEVICES ARE ON THE LOOSE

Konstantin Eggert , Russian Press Digest, October 7, 1997, HEADLINE: General Lebed Intends To Find "Nuclear Briefcases" SOURCE: IZVESTIA, p. 1 acs-VT99
	"I am still convinced that portable nuclear charges do exist," Alexander Lebed said at a Berlin conference devoted to Russia's foreign policy. According to him, in August last year unidentified sources told him one of them was in the hands of Chechen fighters. Although no evidence of the truth of the report was found, Lebed (then Security Council Secretary) ordered the establishment of a commission with his deputy at the head for the purpose of locating "the nuclear briefcases."
 Lebed said the commission had gathered enough evidence pointing to the existence of such weapons. They were developed in the United States some 30 years ago, he claimed, and at that time the Soviet Union was on a par with the United States [in the military sphere].

LEBED BELIEVES BRIEFCASE SIZE NUCLEAR DEVICES ARE LOOSE

Konstantin Eggert , Russian Press Digest, October 7, 1997, HEADLINE: General Lebed Intends To Find "Nuclear Briefcases" SOURCE: IZVESTIA, p. 1 acs-VT99
	Lebed gave a reminder that he was the first politician to raise the question of "nuclear briefcases" with an American Senator in May. In his opinion, all of them should be located and destroyed to prevent them landing in the hands of terrorists and insane persons.

STOLEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE USED

Jonathan Power, The Baltimore Sun, October 14, 1997, Pg. 11A, HEADLINE: Threat of the Russian nuclear mafia acs-VT99
	 In conversation, Munir Ahmed Khan, the former chairman of the world's nuclear watchdog body, the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirms that opinion here is moving in the same direction as Mr. Freeh's.
 Mr. Khan, commenting on the recent allegations made by the former Russian general and national security adviser, Alexander Lebed, that the mafia has stolen Soviet-era nuclear suitcase bombs, says that if this is true they would be usable:
 "Competent nuclear scientists, of which there are many out of work and in economic difficulties, could be hired to keep them operational." His view is contrary to statements made by Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin's government.

RUSSIA OBEYS INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFER PROTOCOLS

RUSSIA OBEYS INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFER NORMS AND PROTOCOLS MORE RIGOROUSLY THAN THE NATIONS OF THE WEST

MISCHA GABOVITSCH, Moscow News, September 4, 1997, HEADLINE: EXPORTING RUSSIAN ARMS acs-VT99
	In its arms trade, Russia complies with a maximum of ethical norms; unlike the United States and France, who sell arms to Taiwan, Russia does not sell arms to non-recognised states and to adversaries of its strategic partners. The British could say a lot about France's behaviour during the Falklands War....
 For example, Moscow refused to sell arms to Pakistan, so as not to heat up the situation in South Asia. In the case of arms deliveries to Indonesia and China, Russia is not breaking any international agreements.

ACCUSATIONS THAT RUSSIA SUPPLIED BALLISTIC MISSILE EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AND EGYPT ARE FALSE

Asia Times, July 14, 1997: Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Moscow dismisses proliferation charges acs-VT99
	 Tarasov also dismissed assertions that Russia had supplied equipment for ballistic missiles to Iran and Egypt. He noted that an investigation conducted by relevant bodies had not revealed any violations by Russian exporters of national missile technology export-control rules.

YELTSIN WANTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN

Paul Bedard; The Washington Times, May 18, 1998, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: Clinton, Yeltsin eye further cuts in arms // acs-VT99
	During the wide-ranging meeting - their first in a year - Mr. Clinton won new assurances from Mr. Yeltsin to clamp down on Russian sales of sensitive missile technology to countries such as Iran.
"It is clear that President Yeltsin wants to stop this flow of technology," National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger said.

RUSSIA IS TRANSFERRING ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO BOTH INDIA AND IRAN

RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS ENCOURAGING ILLICIT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO IRAN

Steve Rodan, The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1998, Pg. 2, HEADLINE: Israel, US dispute effectiveness of Congress sanctions on Russia // acs-VT99
	"Today, the technology transfer is being encouraged by the (Russian) government and is part of its foreign policy of renewing alliances in the Middle East," a senior Israeli official said.

RUSSIA IS HELPING INDIA LAUNCH SEA BASED MISSILES

Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: INDIA - US TRYING TO THWART TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY , acs-VT99
	Russia is helping India to build a sea-launched ballistic missile that can carry a nuclear warhead and strike deep into Pakistan, say senior Clinton administration officials, who fear the programme will inflame simmering tensions in South Asia.
The New York Times, in its lead story on Monday, says the assistance has continued for at least three years, despite assurances from Russia that its scientists are not contributing restricted technology to India s missile programme.
US Vice President Al Gore and other senior administration officials have appealed to Russian officials to halt the support, with little success.

INDIA DENIES RUSSIA IS HELPING IT BUILD MISSILES, AND SO DO THE RUSSIANS, BUT THEY ARE

Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: INDIA - US TRYING TO THWART TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY , acs-VT99
	The Indian government had denied on Monday The New York Times report that Russia was helping India build ballistic missiles that could strike deep into Pakistan. ''India does not have any project of its kind, a defence ministry spokesperson said on Monday.
The New York Times report had said, ''The assistance had continued for at least three years despite assurances from Russia that its scientists are not contributing restricted technology to India s nuclear programme.

RUSSIA HAS HELPED INDIA DEVELOP A SEA LAUNCHED MISSILE WHICH WILL IGNITE TENSIONS WITH PAKISTAN

Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: INDIA - US TRYING TO THWART TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY , acs-VT99
	 It [NYT] says India, which had long had military ties with Russia, has been trying for years to develop a series of more powerful missiles. Although not tested, the sea- launched missile, the Sagarika, is said to have a range of nearly 322 km and is meant to be launched from submerged submarines.
 That would be a technological breakthrough for India in its arms race with Pakistan. American intelligence officials regard the simmering rivalry one of the most dangerous flashpoints for conventional or even nuclear war. The two countries have fought three wars since independence.

FREE RUSSIA HAS A NEW AND UNIQUE FOREIGN POLICY WHICH RECEIVES BROAD SUPPORT IN RUSSIA

RUSSIA NOW AS A NEW FOREIGN POLICY UNIQUE FROM ITS PAST

Amos Perlmutter, professor of political science and sociology American University, The Washington Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A17, HEADLINE: A new Russian foreign policy? acs-VT99
	Crises in Southeast Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East obscure a much more significant event that has been evolving over the last decade, i.e. a new Russian foreign policy. To deal with this important issue a group of Council of Foreign Relations specialists have addressed themselves to describing, analyzing and evaluating the meaning of a new Russian foreign policy, and have published a book, edited by Michael Mandelbaum, "The New Russian Foreign Policy. "

NATIONALISTS, REFORMISTS, AND NEO-COMMUNISTS ALL SUPPORT EXISTING RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Martin Sieff; The Washington Times, April 26, 1998, Pg. A9, HEADLINE: Russia keeps hard-line foreign policy despite new premier , acs-VT99
	 Some Russian diplomats, speaking on the condition of anonymity, have said Mr. Primakov resents efforts by American conservative critics in Congress and the media to paint him as singlehandedly directing a new anti-American policy. Political sources in Moscow and U.S. analysts agreed that this picture is very misleading. They said Mr. Primakov's real power comes from the fact that he is implementing policies that enjoy broad consensus support in Russia among extreme nationalists, neocommunists and reformist democrats.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER YELTSIN HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED DUE TO GOVERNMENT SHAKE UPS

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	WITHIN hours of President Boris Yeltsin's dismissal of his government last month, Russia's seasoned Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was at pains to emphasise that there would be no foreign policy changes. "We will defend our interests, without sliding towards confrontation," he said.
If the policy is to remain the same, that is doubtless because the problems facing Russia will remain largely the same, too.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS PART OF A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS, AND IS NOT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV

Martin Sieff; The Washington Times, April 26, 1998, Pg. A9, HEADLINE: Russia keeps hard-line foreign policy despite new premier , acs-VT99
	Mr. Primakov has been widely criticized in the United States for his background as a top Soviet strategist in the 1960s and 1970s at the height of the Cold War and for his vigorous efforts since his appointment two years ago to forge close ties with China, Iran and Iraq.
Russian political sources said these policies did not originate with Mr. Primakov alone but reflected the broad consensus of the political establishment in Moscow.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS BACKED BY A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND WILL NOT CHANGE WITH CHANGING HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Martin Sieff; The Washington Times, April 26, 1998, Pg. A9, HEADLINE: Russia keeps hard-line foreign policy despite new premier , acs-VT99
	 Russian foreign policy is backed by a broad political consensus and won't change, whoever becomes prime minister, but it will come into increasing conflict with the United States, experts warn.
"There is a growing and fundamental discrepancy between Russia and the United States in their approaches to foreign policy, " said Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center.
"There is no question that Russia is refusing to walk in lockstep to the United States any more."

CURRENT RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ENJOYS BROAD SUPPORT THROUGHOUT RUSSIA

Martin Sieff; The Washington Times, April 26, 1998, Pg. A9, HEADLINE: Russia keeps hard-line foreign policy despite new premier , acs-VT99
	 "Clearly, it is not just Primakov's priorities that are setting policy in Moscow. It is Russian policy in general not to allow the United States to act as if the world was a U.S. protectorate," Mr. Simes said.
 Mr. Bush said most Russian policy-makers believe Mr. Primakov is working on their behalf to make sure a weakened, economically crippled Russia remains a major power in the world.
 "Most of the deputies in the Duma [the main house of the Russian parliament] are very happy with Primakov," Mr. Bush said. "Most Russians believe Primakov is making the best possible case for Russia in international affairs while playing from a very weak hand."
RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IS WEAK, DANGEROUS, AND INEFFECTIVE

RUSSIA IS WEAK IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY AND CANNOT LEAD OR FOLLOW

Stephen Blank, Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998 Pg. 9, HEADLINE: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT acs-VT99
	 That Russian power in all these areas is declining or becoming more irrelevant to the modern world while the government dithers and becomes less relevant to international issues eludes virtually all those involved in foreign policy. Russian invocations of multipolarity serve more to gain status or inhibit solutions than to assume responsibility or offer a positive agenda for multilateral action abroad. 

IRAQ PROVES THAT YELTSIN'S FOREIGN POLICY IS DRIVEN BY PUBLIC SENTIMENT AND POLITICAL FACTIONS
 
John Hall, February 19, 1998 [The Richmond Times Dispatch. SECTION: GENERAL, Pg. A-12. HEADLINE: LETTING IRAQ ISSUE POISON TEES WITH RUSSIA WOULD BE WRONG\\jan]VT99 
	Zhirinovsky is sometimes a useful fool. His outburst, and Yeltsin's agitated response, was a timely demonstration that Yeltsin has a domestic political problem on his hands - from Communists, brownshirts and unfortunately from a big segment of ordinary Russian public opinion. Yeltsin is not free - despite his soaring popularity - to join American policy aimed at punishing Saddam Hussein. Iraq is a neighbor and former ally of Russia, and the best we can hope for is that Yeltsin stands aside for Clinton as Mikhail Gorbachev did for George Bush, and that there will be no lasting damage between Washington and Moscow.

RUSSIAN PEACEFUL TALK CANNOT HIDE ITS PROVOCATIVE INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, October 27, 1997, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Desperately seeking a new Russia acs-VT99
	The Russians must understand that no amount of talking about peace can mask or compensate for their real- life actions, whose effect is the very opposite of such talk. Moreover, Russia cannot expect to be treated like a responsible, developed democracy, rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the Soviet empire, if it relapses into vintage, Soviet-era foreign policies. Indeed, as much as Russia would like to be viewed as the mirror image of its previous incarnation, and welcomed as a Great Power not only in size but also in international prestige, Moscow must understand that that mantle cannot be assumed; rather, it must be earned.

RUSSIA IS ACTING TO DESTABILIZE ASIA ON ALL FRONTS

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	First, Russia is arming and assisting Iran: Just how many contracts can Russia claim had existed before Yeltsin's September 1994 pledge to close out arms sales to Iran after existing contracts expired?
Second, Russia is providing advanced military technology to China.
Third, Russia has actively supported -- with covert arms and direct military support -- ethnic separatist rebellions in Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Fourth, Russia has tried to manipulate the New Independent States of Central Asia by closing off their energy exports through Russian-controlled pipelines.

RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY IS SUCCESSFULLY HELPING CREATE A BETTER WORLD AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS

IT IS IN RUSSIA’S BEST INTEREST TO BE EVERY NATION’S FRIEND, WHICH IS THE POLICY THEY ARE FOLLOWING

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 Indeed, as soon as the Communist Party fell from power, the government that succeeded it abandoned all pretense that the country faced threats from without. If the Soviet regime required international tension, its democratic successor needs peaceful relations with other countries so that it can cut military spending and attract foreign capital. It is clearly in Russia's interests to be on the best of terms with the rest of the world, especially the United States.

YELTSIN’S FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN FULL OF SUCCESSES

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	Yeltsin can point to some successes: a blossoming relationship with China, improving ties with Japan, membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum and, last month, the first annual trilateral summit with the leaders of France and Germany.

RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY HAS STRESSED PEACEFUL PARTNERSHIP AND ENHANCED ECONOMIC TIES TO ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS

DEBORAH ANNE PALMIERI, Journal of Commerce, August 29, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Russia's productive summer acs-VT99
	 Russian foreign policy strategy clearly displayed an effort to reach out to its neighbors and regional strategic partners in order to foster political goodwill and enhance economic ties. Its display of neighborliness included overtures to Ukraine, Azerbaijan and other former Soviet republics and the signing of key cooperation agreements with Japan. On his visit to China, the Russian prime minister and Li Peng signed billions of dollars in trade and energy deals, including a $7 billion agreement to supply China with natural gas from Siberia and provide electricity and a gas pipeline.

SUSPICIONS ABOUT EVIL RUSSIAN INTENT TOWARDS THE REST OF THE WORLD ARE INCORRECT AND DANGEROUS

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	There is still a lot of skepticism on this point that resonates in our national debate about Russia and U.S. policy. Many experts and commentators start from a presumption of guilt about Russia's strategic intentions. They nurture a suspicion that Russians are predisposed genetically, or at least historically, to aggression and imperialism.
 I believe that's the wrong way to think about the issue. The right way is the one Ian Buruma articulated in his book, The Wages of Guilt. He was writing about two other great nations -- Germany and Japan -- whose peoples were, not so long ago, feared, and hated, as inherently militaristic. "There are," said Buruma, "no dangerous peoples; there are only dangerous situations, which are the result, not of laws of nature or history, or of national character, but of political arrangements."

RUSSIA WILL PURSUE ITS VITAL INTERESTS IN FOREIGN POLICY, NOT IDEOLOGY

The Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1998, Pg. 2A, HEADLINE: Moscow's into tough love again , acs-VT99
	Vladimir Averchev, a member of parliament with the generally liberal Yabloko bloc, says it's more complicated than that.
A new and different Russia is emerging, he says, and is pursuing a foreign policy based on its national interests, rather than on ideology. Primakov may bring a Soviet style, but with him are many younger politicians and business leaders who do not disagree with the approach.
"Some conflicts are inevitable," Averchev concludes.

RUSSIA HAS ESTABLISHED SUCCESSFUL RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

Paul Marantz, Prof. Political Science Univ. British Columbia, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 96-97, acs-VT99 
	If we step back from day-to-day events and survey the entire period of post-Communist Russia's relations with the West from January 1992 to the present, there are more reasons for satisfaction than disappointment. It is true, of course, that the euphoria that accompanied the end of the Cold War and the birth of the new Russia has long since dissipated. The honeymoon in East-West relations, like most honeymoons, did not last long. However, it has been replaced not by marital violence or bitter divorce, but by a mature recognition of the importance of sustaining the relationship through improved communication, understanding of the other side's viewpoint, and hard work.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ASIA IS BASED ON RATIONAL AND LOGICAL CONCEPTS

F. Seth Singleton, Prof. Political Science Pacific Univ., 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 121-122 , acs-VT99 
Russian policy in Asia, particularly since the consolidation of the Yeltsin government in 1993, can be summarized in five main points. First, Russia will try to avoid major crises in Asia; currently, security can better be provided by diplomacy and accommodation than by confrontation. Second, Russia will hold on to its sphere of influence in the 'near abroad', which in Asia extends to the borders of the former Soviet Union but not beyond. Third, Russia will do whatever it can to further its economic interests. Trade expansion, including arms sales, becomes a virtual imperative. Fourth, Russia will defend its prestige as a great power, even if this leads to occasional inflexibility. Finally, Russian leaders must listen to the voices of nationalist voters, particularly on such emotional issues as illegal Chinese immigration, Russians in northern Kazakhstan, or the Kurils.

RUSSIAN ASIAN POLICY IS BASED ON SOUND PRINCIPLES AND IS CONTROLLED BY PUBLIC OPINION

F. Seth Singleton, Prof. Political Science Pacific Univ., 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 122 , acs-VT99 
	In sum, Russia now follows a normal foreign policy towards Asia, devoid of ideological propaganda or messianic spirit, and influenced by public opinion. In the late 1990s, policy in Asia will seek accommodation and avoid confrontation, but it may shift toward greater assertiveness with the political and economic stabilization of the Russian state. Russians recognize the fragility of the present Asian era of good feelings and hope it will last long enough for their recovery to take hold. 

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IS AIMED AT CREATING JOBS AT HOME FIRST AND FOREMOST

Konstantin Eggert, Russian Press Digest, August 23, 1997 HEADLINE: Russia Must Not Drive Itself Into Impasse, SOURCE: IZVESTIA, p. 3 acs-VT99
	 Russia's foreign policy is directly dependent on the country's economic situation. "Any encroachment on the interests of Russian exporters and manufacturers is unacceptable" since what is at stake is jobs in Russia. It is "absolutely necessary" for Russia to develop diversified economic ties with the United States, the European Union, China, South-East Asian nations and Japan. Moscow's "constrained" relations with Tokyo are entering "a new phase."

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY WILL NOT BE ITS MAIN FOCUS -- DOMESTIC POLICY WILL BE

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Except in these instances, Yeltsin ranks foreign policy a distant second to his domestic agenda and uses it to accommodate the opposition rather than to expend his political capital.

A STABLE AND FREE RUSSIA IS THE BEST FOREIGN POLICY POSSIBLE

SOLVING RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IS THE BEST WAY TO MAKE IT A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTOR TO WORLD AFFAIRS

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelph! Paper 310, p. 73 , acs-VT99 
	Russia's place in the international arena undoubtedly depends on the future of its political and economic reforms. Russia needs to become a constructive player and to take some responsibility for maintaining regional peace and stability. This is in the interests of Russia, the region and the West as a whole.

AN ISOLATED AND IMPOVERISHED RUSSIA IS BAD NEWS FOR WORLD PEACE

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 75 , acs-VT99 
An isolated, sullen, impoverished Russia would present a greater challenge to a stable world order than a healthy, competitive Russia that is part of that order.

USA-RUSSIA RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT AND WILL STAY THAT WAY

USA RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ARE VERY STRONG AND VERY CLOSE NOW

Nikolai Morozov, TASS, March 19, 1998, HEADLINE: US diplomat describes US-Russian relations as good, close; acs-VT99
	U. S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott described American-Russian relations as good and close.
Talbott told journalists in Bucharest on Thursday that the contacts between U. S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov confirmed this fact. Albright and Primakov had cooperated during the Iraqi crisis and continued to maintain dialogue to ease tension in Kosovo.
Rather fruitful and exclusively personal relations with Russian partners were useful not only for the United States and Russia, but for the entire world, and for the region where Romania is located, the American diplomat said.

A NEW COLD WAR BETWEEN THE US AND RUSSIA WILL NOT OCCUR

Alexey K. Pushkov, March 5, 1998 [Pushkov is a foreign affairs columnist at the Nezavissimaya Gazeta in Moscow. The Daily Yomiuri. SECTION: Pg. 5. HEADLINE: Russia-U.S. ties enter new stage as 'controlled rivalry' appears\\jan]VT99 
	Let us be certain: The dispute over Iraq has not and will not lead to another Cold War. With the communist system gone, and global rivalry no longer corresponding to Russia's goals or to its present possibilities, there are simply no grounds for a new Cold War. Neither does a new confrontation correspond to U.S. interests.

THE USA HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN INTEGRATING RUSSIA INTO THE WORLD COMMUNITY

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 We are not just letting this happen -- we are helping make it happen. We are doing what we can to ensure that the international community is as open as possible to Russia. That's why we pushed in Denver for the expansion of the G-7 agenda to become the Summit of the Eight. That's also why, in Helsinki, President Clinton and President Yeltsin set a joint goal to work toward Russian accession in 1998 to the World Trade Organization and to launch a dialogue in Paris that will accelerate Russia's admission to the OECD.
 Then there's the Asia-pacific Economic Cooperation forum. When Secretary Albright and the other APEC ministers meet in November in Vancouver, they will be setting the criteria for new members, and we will support Russia's admission to APEC as it meets those standards.

USA-RUSSIA RELATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPROVING STEADILY SINCE 1991

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, MAY 12, 1998, HEADLINE: ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION ON THE START II RATIFICATION PROCESS // acs-VT99
	 [Polyakov Mikhail Mikhailovich, acting chief of the International Treaty Directorate of the Defense Ministry ]
Nobody can deny the fact that Russian- American relations have substantially improved since 1991. We no longer regard each other as we did some ten years ago. The presidents of the two countries have announced the non-targeting of the respective missiles. And this shows that we should view the overall situation with due account for all factors. 

THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER WILL NOT ALLOW FOR A USA-RUSSIA CONFRONTATION, EVEN AS A LOW KEY RIVALRY REMAINS

Alexei K. Pushkov; Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policies. 
 International Herald Tribune, April 2, 1998, SECTION: Opinion; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Russia and America Aren't Foes but Have to Be Rivals acs-VT99
	The ''end of ideology,'' at least of the Communist one in the case of Russia, precludes a new global confrontation. It does not preclude rivalry between Russia and the United States due to difference of interests. However, the Iraqi crisis showed that it can be a rivalry of partners, and not that of antagonists. Such rivalry supposes a capacity to listen to each other and a desire to reach a balance of interests.

USA FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS ARE MADE SO THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES IN RUSSIA

CURRENT USA POLICIES ARE MADE WITH AN EYE TOWARDS INFLUENCING RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Kenneth R. Timmerman.; The American Spectator, May, 1998, HEADLINE: Strobe Talbott: Russia's Man In Washington // acs-VT99
	 Weldon and congressional leaders all agree that Talbott is the man driving the administration's reckless neglect of Russian roguishness. "U. S. policies toward Russia are being calculated to Strobe Talbott's estimation of how it will affect internal Russian politics," a top aide to majority leader Trent Lott said. "I think instead we should peg our policies to Russian behavior."

CLINTON DOESN’T MAKE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS BASED ON DOMESTIC POLITICS, BUT HAS A CLEAR STRATEGY

Morton M. Kondracke, Roll Call, JULY 7, 1997, HEADLINE: Surprise! Clinton Is a Good Foreign Policy President acs-VT99
	 But contrary to the rap that his foreign policy is driven simply by domestic politics, there is a distinct vision to Clinton's view of the US place in the world, if not exactly a grand strategy.
 One scholar has identified seven models for the shape of the world's future, and the evidence suggests that Clinton isn't confused about which one he believes in.
 Clearly, Clinton thinks that the United States is the world's lone superpower, the "indispensable nation" without which nothing useful can be achieved. Some Clinton aides say that, de facto, the world lives under a Pax Americana and that Clinton wants to keep it that way.

USA WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT REFORMIST ELEMENTS IN RUSSIA

Andrei Shchitov, TASS, September 18, 1997, HEADLINE: Washington "encourages" reforms in Russia - US diplomat acs-VT99
	U. S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott called efforts of Russian reformers a real feat. The United States supported and will support as well as encourage Russian reforms, he added at a meeting with reporters, which was held at the editorial office of the Foreign Policy magazine published in Washington by the Carnegie Foundation to promote universal peace.

CLINTON ACTS AND MAKES DECISIONS BASED ON HOW THEY WILL BE RECEIVED IN RUSSIA

MICHAEL S. LELYVELD, Journal of Commerce, May 26, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Sanctions on Russia face veto; Senate passes Iran penalties after president delays action acs-VT99
	 The president's decision to delay punishing the Russian proliferators seems to have less to do with congressional strategy than with softening the blow in Moscow, said one Democratic staff member. By waiting until after the vote, Mr. Clinton can tell President Boris Yeltsin that Congress forced him to take some action against Russian companies.

USA AND RUSSIA HAVE A GOOD RELATIONSHIP -- THEY DISAGREE ABOUT SOME ISSUES OPENLY, BUT AGREE ON ALL THE MAJOR ONES

RUSSIA WILL DISAGREE WITH THE USA ON ONLY MARGINAL FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, NOT ON THE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ONES

Daniel Williams; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1997, Pg. 7, HEADLINE: Russia's Balancing Act; How to Stand Up to U.S. but Avoid Conflict acs-VT99
	Because Russian complaints about the dominant role of the United States in the world form the background music for Russian policy, an impression has been created of growing hostility. Certainly, the days of unquestioning cooperation with America that marked the last years of the Soviet Union are over, Russian observers say. But they pointedly argue that Russia cannot afford a break with Washington. '' Russia is likely to deviate from the United States only on the margins,'' said Andrei Kortunov, director of the Russian Research Foundation. ''But the name of the game now is still integration with the West, the quest for financial credits, the need for investment, so full independence of action is limited.''

RUSSIA IS SEEKING FOR COOPERATIVE AND PRODUCTIVE WAYS TO DISAGREE WITH THE USA

Martin Sieff; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 4, 1998, Pg. A1, HEADLINE: Russia raises stakes against NATO; Tensions increase as Moscow balks at alliance's growth // acs-VT99
	"The Russian government is following a general approach of seeking to find areas where it can define itself in opposition to perceived interests of the United States and where it can find other countries that share its concern," said Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution, former chief State Department analyst on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

RUSSIA MAINTAINS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USA BUT DOES DISAGREE WITH MIDDLE EAST POLICIES

David McHugh Staff Writer, The Moscow Times, May 13, 1998, HEADLINE: President Applauds Primakov's Policy Line // acs-VT99
	 While seeking to maintain good relations with the United States, Primakov has sought to counterbalance American influence in the Middle East and in relations with China. Russia and the United States have also clashed over Russia's relations with Iraq and Iran, considered outlaw states by the American government.

RUSSIA IS BECOMING AN ALLY LIKE FRANCE: FRIENDLY BUT WILLING TO DISAGREE

Amos Perlmutter, professor of political science and sociology American University, The Washington Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A17, HEADLINE: A new Russian foreign policy? acs-VT99
	Leon Aron suggests an historical analogy in the post-perestroika Russian foreign policy with Gaullism, a Russian assertiveness in international politics. Mr. Aron is suggesting it rapidly moved from protest to opposition. According to Mr. Aron, there are three Russian foreign policy options: Russia sharing a nuclear superpower role with the United States; Russia as a great power; and third, Russia a regional superpower, meaning Russia's influence will project in the south and east toward Iraq, Iran, China and India. It is not yet clear which option will prevail.

RUSSIA, LIKE FRANCE, WILL DISAGREE WITH AMERICAN POLICIES, BUT IT WILL NOT BECOME AMERICA’S ENEMY

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Inevitably, given its history, geography, and domestic politics, Russia will find much to dislike in U.S. actions and will challenge them often -- rather as France does. In poll after poll since the fall of the USSR, a majority of Russians has agreed that the United States was "using Russia's current weakness to reduce it to a second-rate power." Wherever the United States provides an opening, either by seeming not to care much about an issue or, as in Iraq, by seeming to hesitate, Russia is likely to assert its claim to be reckoned with as a major international player.
Yet this Russian assertiveness must not be mistaken -- any more than French prickliness is -- for anti-Americanism of the kind professed by the Soviet Union, by Iran in the 1980s, or by Iraq, Cuba, and Libya today. Russia's truculence is not informed by ideology. It is not directed to strategic objectives inimical to the vital interests of the United States, and it is not part of a relentless, "antagonistic" struggle "to the end." Rather, it is pragmatic and selective. And when America's wishes are communicated at the highest level, forcefully and unambiguously, Moscow is likely to moderate its opposition and even extend cooperation, as it did in Bosnia.

RUSSIA IS TAKING ON A ROLE LIKE THAT OF FRANCE -- A FRIENDLY CRITIC OF THE USA

John F. Harris, Washington Post Staff Writer, The Washington , May 04, 1998, Pg. A16, HEADLINE: After NATO Vote, Doubts on U.S.- Russia Rapport // acs-VT99
	 And he said recent tensions over Iraq and Yugoslavia are an evolution of the U.S.- Russia relationship, not a reversion to Cold War antagonisms. " Russia is developing its own voice," Perry said. "It's developing an identity more like a France, which is a friendly country but has its own interests" that sometimes run counter to Washington's.

RUSSIA AND THE USA DO NOT HAVE A GOOD FOREIGN POLICY RELATIONSHIP

INCREASINGLY, RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY HAS COME INTO CONFLICT WITH THE USA

Martin Sieff; The Washington Times, April 26, 1998, Pg. A9, HEADLINE: Russia keeps hard-line foreign policy despite new premier , acs-VT99
	 Russian policies over the past few years have increasingly come into conflict with American ones in a number of areas.
* Belarus, Russia's closest ally in Eastern Europe, is putting diplomatic heat on Poland, which is joining NATO.
* Russia is turning up pressure on Latvia - a candidate for the next proposed phase of NATO expansion - over its alleged treatment of its Russian ethnic minority.
* Washington is angry over Russian arms and nuclear technology sales to Iran. Russia has replied that it desperately needs the hard currency, and that many of the sales have been carried out by private companies.
* Russia and China have openly forged a strategic understanding to prevent any unnamed third power - by implication the United States - from imposing its will uncontrollably around the world.
* Russia wants to resolve Iraq's conflict with the United Nations over arms inspections so that economic sanctions can be lifted and Baghdad can repay billions in debts to Moscow.

US RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE TENUOUS IN THE STATUS QUO

THE HARTFORD COURANT, February, 15,1998 [SECTION.- COMMENTARY, Pg. C2 HEADLINE: RISKING A BREAK WITH RUSSIA\\j an]VT99 
	The tenuous nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship was further dramatized last week when a Washington Post reporter, citing, unnamed sources, wrote that Russian companies have sought to sell equipment to Iraq that could be used to manufacture biological weapons. Moscow vehemently denied the allegations while Washington said it could not confirm them. But some members of Congress were inclined to be believe the worst, not trusting Russia in the first Place.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ELITE IS IN AN ANTI-USA MOOD

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	Russia's foreign policy elite is in the middle of yet another anti-Western swing of the sort we have come to witness for the past 300 years.
That elite is basically the former Soviet foreign policy and security elite. Those few who were brought to the Foreign Ministry building on Smolenskaya Ploshchad' during the tenure of Eduard Shevardnadze have left or were pushed out. There were very few civilians who were introduced into the MO building on Arbatskaya Ploshchad' or into the security decision-making process in the presidency, such as the former national security adviser Baturin. They, too, were pushed out or coopted.

US AND RUSSIAN INTERESTS ARE ON DIVERGENT PATHS

Alexey K. Pushkov, March 5, 1998 [Pushkov is a foreign affairs columnist at the Nezavissimaya Gazeta in Moscow. The Daily Yomiuri. SECTION: Pg. 5. HEADLINE: Russia-U.S. ties enter new stage as 'controlled rivalry' appears\\jan]VT99 
	In this post-Cold War world, the actions of Russia and the United States are not motivated anymore by global rivalry or ideology but by the logic of their interests. Those interests do not necessarily collide but rather lie in different dimensions. This is due to the difference of challenges and threats Russia and the United States are facing in the modern world.

US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE COOLING IN THE STATUS QUO

Martin Sieff, February 2,1998 [The Washington Times. SECTION: Part A; WORLD; BRIEFING/GLOBAL ISSUES; Pg. A12. HEADLINE: Space dependence: A vulnerability, Leaders warn of inadequacy in U.S. control, // jan]VT99 
	Attitudes among Russian military and political leaders toward the United States were no longer friendly, as they were five to 10 years ago, the general said. "There is a great deal of hostility, animosity, and they are not very friendly. It is becoming worse," he said.

THERE IS NO DANGER OF A RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE AGAINST THE WEST

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DANGER OF A COMING RUSSIA-CHINA ALLIANCE AGAINST THE WEST

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	China is relevant to this discussion in another respect as well. Of all the morbid fantasies about a "Russian menace," the coming Sino-Russian alliance against the United States is intellectually the most embarrassing. How plausible is a lasting accord between two giant nations that vie for regional supremacy, share nearly 3,000 miles of border (much of it in dispute), and have competed for centuries for the huge, underpopulated land mass east of the Urals? Like history's other pair of perennial combatants, Germany and France, Russia and China will come together only when both are stable and prosperous democracies -- that is, not in our lifetime, and perhaps not in our children's -- by which time their joining forces is unlikely to threaten the United States. 

RUSSIA AND CHINA WILL NOT TEAM UP IN A STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH AGAINST SUCH ALLIANCES

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	First of all, it must be made very clear that a new Sino-Russian partnership does not in any way represent a resurrection of the former Sino-Soviet political and military alliance. It is well known that staying out of such alliances is one of the cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy. Entering into such alliances also goes against Russian national interests.
 Therefore, the aim of the signatories to the Sino-Russian Moscow Declaration was not to create another bloc or alliance but to express their negative attitude towards continuation of the "Cold War approach" in the political quarters of some Western countries.

NO MATTER HOW MUCH CHIAN AND RUSSIA IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS, RELATIONS WITH THE USA WILL BE MORE IMPORTANT TO BOTH OF THEM

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 To be sure, there will be periods of Sino-Russian rapprochement. Today, Russia sells China submarines and MIGs, and Chinese migrant workers and entrepreneurs flood the Far East and Siberia, setting up Chinese-language schools for their children and opening the best restaurants in Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok. Russia will try to play the Chinese card in its dealings with Washington, just as China will try to play the Russian card -- but the United States will remain far more important to both than they will be to each other. Just as certainly, rapprochement will alternate with periods of Sino-Russian tension and perhaps outright hostility.

CHINA AND RUSSIA WILL NEVER BE TOO TIGHT AS ALLIES

Natasha Fairweather, The Moscow Times, October 11, 1997, HEADLINE: Examination of Russia's Turn to the East acs-VT99
	Harada believes that although China and Russia's interests may coincide in the short term, this cannot endure. Fear of China remains deep-rooted in the Russian psyche. And as the Russian military's hold over the Far East continues to weaken, the dwindling number of Siberians will look nervously upon the burgeoning population of the barren lands of northern China.

HISTORY SHOWS THAT A RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS IS INEFFECTIVE AND NOTHING TO FEAR

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 45-46, acs-VT99 
	To present a unified position is one thing, but whether such a position can bring about any real political change is quite another. So far at least, a unified Sino-Russian position has created no tangible political result. Indeed, Russia and China have had difficulty agreeing on many specific issues. As was demonstrated during Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in 1996, China is happy to support Russia when the issue concerned does not affect its own interests or influence, for example, NATO enlargement. China's opposition to NATO enlargement in fact had no impact on the process. However, while Russia might expect to play a greater role in the Asia-Pacific region, China will not support Russia where its critical interests are at stake or where its own influence might be challenged. This was clearly demonstrated by China's cautious attitude to Russia's involvement in the Korean Peninsula issue. There is thus a limit to the viability and unity of the positions the two countries can adopt, even on a case-by-case basis .

CHINA WILL NOT WAGE WAR AGAINSTTHE WEST

CHINA WILL NOT GO TO WAR BECAUSE ITS ECONOMY IS TOO INTEGRATED INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM
 
Fred Edwards, assistant city editor, The Toronto Star, July 7, 1997, Pg. A15, HEADLINE: Fear of conflict with China overblown Differences are great between it and Soviet Union acs-VT99
	China, however, is fully integrated into the global economy. Bilateral trade with the United States is worth about $ 60 million a year; direct foreign investment last year was $ 42 billion.
 Any conflict with China, therefore, would be extremely disruptive to the international economy, and would be devastating for the economies of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, key U.S. friends in the region.
 The Chinese economy also would suffer.

CHINA IS NOT ANOTHER VERSION OF THE OLD SOVIET EMPIRE, AND IS NOT NEARLY AS DANGEROUS

Fred Edwards, assistant city editor, The Toronto Star, July 7, 1997, Pg. A15, HEADLINE: Fear of conflict with China overblown Differences are great between it and Soviet Union acs-VT99
	 While there is no doubt China has a nasty government, an increasingly assertive foreign policy and ever stronger military forces, there are significant differences between it and the old Soviet Union that suggest these concerns are exaggerated.

JUDGE CHINA BY ITS ACTIONS, NOT BY YOUR FEARS. FEARING CONFLICT WITH CHINA ONLY MAKES CONFLICT MORE LIKELY

Fred Edwards, assistant city editor, The Toronto Star, July 7, 1997, Pg. A15, HEADLINE: Fear of conflict with China overblown Differences are great between it and Soviet Union acs-VT99
	 China, however, should be judged by its actions, not by fears about what it might do. If Beijing contravenes international standards, whether on human rights, trade practices or in foreign relations, the West should take firm counter-measures.
 But to base policy on the expectation of conflict risks making conflict more likely.

CHINESE EXPANSION IS WITHIN ITS OWN REGION AND DOES NOT THREATEN OTHER MAJOR POWERS

Fred Edwards, assistant city editor, The Toronto Star, July 7, 1997, Pg. A15, HEADLINE: Fear of conflict with China overblown Differences are great between it and Soviet Union acs-VT99
	China, on the other hand, is projecting its power only in its own region, notably in the South China Sea. This is a concern, particularly for countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. It is not, however, a threat to Western security in the way the expansion of Soviet power was. China poses no ideological threat.

CHINA AND RUSSIA AGREE THAT THE USA SHOULD DOMINATE THE WORLD, SO AN AXIS BETWEEN THEM IS A NATURAL RESULT

BY 2010 RUSSIA WILL BE ABLE TO TIP THE BALANCE OF WORLD POWER AWAY FROM THE USA AND TOWARDS CHINA

Gwynne Dyer, Univ. of Toronto, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), May 5, 1998, Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Bigger NATO may be an even bigger mistake // acs-VT99
	 In the world of 2010, the two greatest powers will probably be the United States and China - and Russia will be third, with the choice of throwing its weight either way. Maybe that won't matter, because it will be a peaceful world where military alliances are a thing of the past. But maybe it won't be that kind of world.

BOTH CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE COMMITTED TO A MULTI-POLAR WORLD

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	 That understanding of commonality of basic Sino-Russian national interests in the present world received new proof during another summit meeting of Russian and Chinese leaders held in Moscow in April this year, when President Yeltsin and Mr Jiang Zemin signed a joint declaration on principles of a new international world order.
In this declaration, Russia and China categorically rejected any designs to establish a uni-polar world system and supported the concept of a multi-polar world order which, in their opinion, would help to preserve world peace and security in the interests of all countries and not of a selected few.

RUSSIA AND CHINA OPPOSE THE US BEING, THE SOLE SUPERPOWER. THEY WANT THE WORLD TO BE MULTI POLAR

Zhon-guo Xinwen She news agency, February 18, 1998 [Beijing, in Chinese 18 Feb 98. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 21, 1998. HEADLINE: Premier says multipolarity a Russian-Chinese response in dealing with USA\\jan]VT99 
	A reporter asked: Can the Russo-Chinese strategic cooperative partnership restrain the desire of the United States to exclusively dominate [du ba 3747 7218] the world? 
	Li Peng replied: China and Russia agreed that the world should be multipolar and not be led by one or two countries. Various countries in the world, which can all bring into play their individual roles, should manage world affairs. 
	He reiterated: China will not seek world hegemony and opposes any country in doing so. China and Russia hold that multipolarization is beneficial to world peace and stability. As permanent members of the U-N Security Council, both China and Russia are countries of important influence in the world. China and Russia share bipartisan or similar viewpoints and stances in many major international and regional issues as well as maintaining close contacts and consultations. Under the current situation of multipolarization and accelerated development, it is of vital significance that the two countries, in accordance with the Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership, further strengthen their cooperation in international affairs. The Chinese side is willing to work with Russia to push forward a peaceful solution to the Iraqi arms inspection crisis...

AS US INFLUENCE INCREASES, CHINA WILL MOVE TO CLOSER TIES WITH RUSSIA

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 19 , acs-VT99 
China saw a multipolar post-Cold War world as most likely to foster its political and economic development. Perceived US 'hegemony' became a threat to this new order, and to Beijing's preference for rigid principles of state sovereignty. 12 Russia's appeals to partnership therefore chimed with China's concerns about the implications of US strength. 

CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE STRONG PARTNERS WITH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP

RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE NOW MOVING TO A “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP”

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	Not only did it describe the current Sino-Russian relationship as one of equal and trustworthy partnership, but it also stated an intention of both sides to develop strategic cooperation in the 21st century that would be mutually advantageous and help to preserve peace and security in the Asia-Pacific, as well as in the world at large.
 Naturally, this document invited much comment on the nature of such a "strategic partnership" and raised questions as to what could be its consequences for other countries.

RUSSIA AND CHINA THINK OF THEMSELVES NOW AS GOOD PARTNERS

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	A REVIVAL of close political and economic ties between Russia and China, a phenomenon unthinkable only a decade ago, has become one of the most remarkable events in international relations.
Indeed, after almost three decades of fierce ideological, political and even military confrontation, Moscow and Beijing regard each other now, if not as friends-in-arms as they were in the late 1940s and early 1950s, then certainly as good partners.

RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONS ARE AT AN ALL TIME HIGH

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	 The recent improvement in Russia's relations with both China and Japan reflects a coincidence of interest between Primakov and Kremlin reformers interested in improving external economic ties. Today, Russian -- Chinese relations are better than at any time since Mao Tse-tung took power in 1949. Now that ideological rivalry is no longer an issue, past tensions have been defused.

CHINA FEELS LIKE IT NEEDS RUSSIA ON ITS SIDE IN ORDER TO FEEL SAFE

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	 As to China, it needed good relations with Russia to proceed with its own reforms using, for these purposes, vast Russian natural resources as well as certain technologies.And, of course, in its quarrels with the US and its allies over the future of Taiwan, China was particularly interested to have Moscow on its side.

CHINA WANTS TO BE FRIENDS WITH RUSSIA TO COUNTERBALANCE THE WEST AND TO MODERNIZE ITS MILITARY

Andrey Grachev, Publicist, Moscow News, August 7, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia Is Looking to the East acs-VT99
	China, for its part, is interested in demonstrating a rapprochement with Russia, in order to increase its political weight in the eyes of the West with the "Russian card," and to modernize its army on the basis of Russia's more state-of-the-art technology, raising the standard of its equipment to the level of its new strategic ambitions.

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN COOPERATION HAVE SPREAD A ZONE OF PEACE IN ASIA

RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE REACHED NEW AND IMPORTANT BORDER AGREEMENTS

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	These border agreements undoubtedly helped to resolve many sensitive and delicate issues in Sino-Russian relations, including long-standing and potentially explosive territorial disputes. Besides, they also helped to establish a proper climate for resolving still outstanding border problems, the biggest of which being a large influx of illegal Chinese immigrants into Russia. 

CHINA AND RUSSIA WORK TOGETHER TO KEEP STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 51-52 acs-VT99 
	China's desire to promote stability is a key factor in prompting Russian leaders and analysts to view Beijing as a strategic partner Russian supporters of partnership see it as a means to stabilise the southern and eastern Russian periphery. Moscow believes that Beijing can help in resisting the 'Western, and particularly the Turkish, advances in Central Asia and the Caspian Oil Basin', and 'provide Moscow with a lever on Pakistan, obliging it to rein in the Afghan Islamists and prevent the destabilisation of Tajikistan'. Press reports claim that Chinese diplomats in Islamabad have sought assurances from the Pakistani government to that effect. Russia has attempted to invoke the twin threats of NATO expansion to China's borders (through Central Asia's participation in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and PFP) and Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Tajikistan to draw China - at least superficially into its preferred strategic understanding.

RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE WORKING TO DEMILITARIZE CENTRAL ASIA

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	 Both countries [RUSSIA AND CHINA] also signed demilitarization agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan limiting troop deployments along these borders. Russia and China fear the rise of fundamentalist Islam on their borders and within their societies, and this has also brought them closer together.

RUSSIAN SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA IS STABILIZING THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 72-73 , acs-VT99 
	On terms of its security, Russia has achieved significant and concrete arms-reduction and CBMs with China along their common borders. Russia has also improved its security relations with Japan and South Korea, particularly in the area of CBMs. This web of bilateral security ties could help to stabilise the security environment of North-east Asia

RUSSIA AND CHINA WORKED TOGETHER TO REIN IN A DISRUPTIVE RUSSIAN GOVERNOR OF THE MARITIME PROVINCE

Gennady Chufrin, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, October 10, 1997 HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance acs-VT99
	 These agreements held even when Mr Yevgeni Nazdratenko, governor of the maritime province, disagreed with the way the Sino-Russian border was demarcated in some areas and tried to start an ultra-nationalistic obstructionist campaign on this issue.
This unfortunate incident was resolved, however, in a very amicable fashion by the Russian and the Chinese governments who, acting in the larger interests of mutual cooperation, compromised their positions on the disputed border area. The second part of the problem (demilitarisation of the border) was resolved when the Moscow Declaration was supplemented by an agreement between Russia and China, also signed in April this year. According to this agreement, Russia assumed an obligation to reduce, within two years, the size of its armed forces in a 100-km border zone with China by 15 per cent, while Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kirghizia, who joined this agreement, declared a complete withdrawal of troops from their borders with China.

RUSSIA AND CHINA WORK TOGETHER TO DEFUSE NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 63-64 , acs-VT99 
Russia and China have parallel interests on the Korean Peninsula, not least preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Both countries tried to reposition themselves towards the end of the Cold War by cooling relations with their erstwhile ally Pyongyang and developing closer ties with Seoul. In November 1992, Yeltsin announced that Russia would abandon or modify the 1961 Soviet-North Korea Treaty, particularly Article I which promised Russian assistance in the event of conflict. Bilateral relations declined steadily, culminating in South Korean President Kim Young Sam's visit to Moscow in June 1994, during which he and Yeltsin declared a I constructive and mutually complementary partnership'. China was more cautious, preferring to maintain ties with Pyongyang while recognising Seoul. 

RUSSIA AND CHINA HAVE INHERENTLY CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND ARE NOT ABLE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA INVOLVE SERIOUS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 9-10 acs-VT99 
	However, the substance of the relationship belies its rhetoric. China's rise as an East Asian power prompts fears in Russia about Beijing's long-term intentions; cross-border ties remain fraught, mutual suspicions high and cultural differences stark. Two-way trade has proved volatile and will almost certainly not reach its declared target by 2000. Elements in Russia have resisted border agreements. Rather than compatible partners, the two countries are more realistically competitors for US and European capital and diplomatic attention.

RUSSIA AND CHINA ARE NOT HOSTILE POWERS, BUT A TRUE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT EMERGED

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 11 acs-VT99 
	As a result, Russia and China's relationship in the late 1990s is uneven, largely rhetorical and elite-driven, complicating the stillincomplete normalisation process. Both countries understand the risks of returning to outright confrontation, but, despite statements to the contrary, a 'normal' relationship has yet to be established.

RUSSIA AND CHINA WANT ASIAN STABILITY BUT ARE NOT ABLE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY TO PROMOTE IT

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 57-58 acs-VT99 
Central Asian stability is a common goal of Russia and China; their policies towards the region and each other are mutually supportive. However, there is little evidence that shared concerns have led to overt coordination or partnership. Russia and China have signed an intelligence-sharing agreement that presumably covers Central Asia and Afghanistan. But relations are best described as suspended competition rather than active cooperation or a diplomatic framework to enhance strategic interests.

CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA ARE DANGEROUS

CLOSER USA TIES TO CHINA MAKE ASIAN NATIONS FEEL LIKE THEY NEED TRO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER; professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Houston Chronicle, May 20, 1998, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: Just have to live with spread of nuclear weapons // acs-VT99
	Another case of clashing interests involves China and India. The United States wants to avoid a confrontation with China by engaging it diplomatically and economically, which is why Clinton will visit Beijing next month.
India fears China's growing power, however, and is already suspicious that the United States is trying to reach an accommodation with China at India's expense. So Clinton's visit may solve one problem but worsen another by causing anxiety in India, making it feel less secure and more convinced than ever that it needs a robust nuclear deterrent.
All these factors combine to make it likely that other states will follow in India's footsteps. This means that the United States will have to learn to live with the spread of nuclear weapons in the decades ahead.
We should try to manage and contain this process, but we cannot stop it.

GOOD RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ALLOW CHINA TO ENGAGE IN SEA LANE POWER PROJECTION

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 73-74 , acs-VT99 
	The Yeltsin government's defence and strategic cooperation with China, combined with a commitment to lessening military pressure along their joint border, highlights the most troubling aspect of China's rise - its alteration from an inward-looking, continental power to a growing regional player on its southern and eastern maritime fringe. As one Pentagon analyst has explained: 'By securing its land relationships and tidying up immediate borders, China can pursue longer-term interests, which lie increasingly in the sea lanes' which are of direct strategic concern to the partnership could potentially influence China's development in one of two ways.

CHINA WILL ATTACK A WEAK RUSSIA

A WEAK RUSSIA IS A TARGET FOR CHINESE ADVENTURISM

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 30 acs-VT99 
	These debates reflect the fact that Moscow cannot maintain its past levels of control over Russia's Far East, and that its position is declining as China's strength grows. As former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar explained in 1995: 'With our weakness, our huge unassimilated territories in the Far East, we provoke a threat' . As in European Russia, the Far East's population has fallen from a peak in 1991 of 8.1m to 7. 8M. By contrast, some 74m people live in Heilongjiang and Jilin, and over 100m in the north-east as a whole (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and Inner Mongolia). Former Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Shakrai has claimed that the population could decline by as much as two-thirds by 2010, warning that 'for the first time in four centuries China has surpassed Russia's rate of economic growth'.

IF CHINESE EXPANSION IN OTHER AREAS IS BLOCKED, IT WILL TURN ON RUSSIA

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 75 acs-VT99 
	Russian analysts and political leaders are also aware of the implications should China adopt a more assertive stance in the future." Russian analyst Dmitry Trenin argues that, over the next 10-15 years, 'the relative weakness of Russia and strength of China will become clearer' and that 'it is this reality that Russian leaders should bear in mind today'.-' Aleksey Arbartov warns: “The hope of 'placating' China with huge shipments of arms and military technology, securing its border trade, and taking advantage of the mounting friction in Chinese-japanese relations is just as naive and anti-historical as it is dangerous for Russia. Nothing will keep China from turning to the north at the convenient time if its access to the east and south I is blocked by strong forces.”

CHINA SEEKS TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE FAR EAST PROVINCES AT THE EXPENSE OF RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 48 , acs-VT99 
	It has been argued that, with considerable economic gains at stake, China will increase its involvement in the region at Russia's expense, either strategically or economically. Central Asia and Mongolia will thus become the arena in which Sino-Russian strategic tensions are most likely to be played out. One Russian analyst has warned that China is 'moving toward a leading position in the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet era'.

DECAYING STATE OF RUSSIAN SIBERIA MAKES IT RIPE FOR CHINESE ADVENTURISM -- IT HAS ALL THE RESOURCES THEY NEED!

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 Economics and demographics may well determine developments in the region. Russia's Far East and Siberia are dying. Only 24 million people live in the two regions, which comprise 60 percent of the territory of the Russian Federation, and the population is falling. The region's huge enterprises, symbols of bygone industrial power, are no longer competitive, and it is too late for them to modernize. Poor transportation and communications and high energy prices and railroad tariffs help make for a considerably worse economic situation than elsewhere in Russia. Across the border in rapidly developing China, demographic pressures and the strain on resources are astounding and will only increase. China's current population is 1.26 billion, and the annual number of births is triple that of Europe and Russia combined. In recent years, China, 80 percent of whose power comes from coal, has developed a serious energy shortage. Coincidentally, 80 percent of the world's known coal deposits are in Russia's Siberia and Far East. Siberia also has enormous manganese and iron ore deposits and vast forests. All these resources are virtually useless to Russia at present because people are needed to exploit them and people are in short supply in Siberia. But in China they are not.

IF RUSSIA WEAKENS, CHINA WILL BECOME DOMINANT IN EURASIA

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 Traditional Western analyses of the Soviet Union assumed Chinese economic weakness and the West's maintenance of its competitive edge, in spite of China's demographic advantage. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the state of the Russian economy, little prevents China from gaining economic and political dominance in Eurasia, including the Far East. 

RUSSIA AND JAPAN HAVE EXCELLENT AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS

JAPAN AND RUSSIA RELATIONS ARE BETTER THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1905

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	 Russian -- Japanese relations are also better now than they have been since Japan defeated Russia in 1905. The bilateral ties have been improving quietly but quite dramatically, given Japan's repeated refusal to form a partnership with Russia until the question of the Kurile Islands is resolved in Japan's favor.

JAPAN SEEKS STRONG RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA TO AVOID FUTURE ASIAN CONFLICTS

Vassily Golovnin, TASS, April 15, 1998, HEADLINE: Peace treaty no longer hinges on territorial issue , acs-VT99
	Professor Kenichi Ito, president of the Japanese international forum, a leading foreign policy expert of the Japanese government.
 Ito said Tokyo now proceeds in its relations with Russia from the need to build new stable international order in North East Asia in the post-Cold War period. Japan now declares, specifically, in favour of establishing special partnership among the four leading powers of the region -- China, Russia, United States and Japan. Full normalisation of relations between Moscow and Tokyo has become the most important factor in this process, and the two countries now stand the best of chances to improve relations, Ito said.
Japan is ready to give friendly economic assistance to Russia.

JAPAN WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIA AND HELP RUSSIA DEVELOP PEACEFULLY

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 51 , acs-VT99 
The success of Russia's attempts to democratise, create a market economy and practise diplomacy based on law and justice has become of vital interest to Japan. Japan's desire to play a greater role in the international arena requires it to cooperate more closely with Russia. Furthermore, the political and economic significance to the region of the autonomous Russian Far East has increased. 

RUSSIA-JAPAN COOPERATION IS ALREADY HIGHLY DEVELOPED AND SUCCESSFUL

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 57 , acs-VT99 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russo-Japanese security dialogue has steadily developed. It now includes bilateral policy-planning talks; exchanges of defence scholars; annual consultations on preventing incidents at sea beyond the territorial waters and the air-space above them; and the Japanese, Russian and US Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security. As mentioned above, Russia and Japan have also begun to cooperate on eliminating nuclear weapons and nuclear waste. 

RUSSIA AND JAPAN SECURITY COOPERATION WILL CONTINUE

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 59, acs-VT99 
	As a result of the changed strategic structure of North-east Asia, both countries have a common interest in developing their security ties. Needless to say, there are also limitations here. Russia cannot, for example, expect to engage in arms sales or military cooperation that might damage the Japanese-US security alliance. Russo-Japanese security relations will thus remain primarily in the areas of security dialogue, exchanges and confidence-building measures. Since Russia appears to accept the need to tone down its ambitions in this area, its stated security-policy objectives and their implementation are likely to remain compatible, at least in the short term.

RUSSIA AND JAPAN WILL PEACEFULLY SETTLE THEIR TERRITORIAL DISPUTE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

THERE WILL BE A RUSSIA-JAPAN TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT BY 2000

Suvendrini Kakuchi, Inter Press Service, April 20, 1998, HEADLINE: JAPAN- RUSSIA: MANY SMILES, LITTLE PROGRESS ON ISLANDS ROW , acs-VT99
	The tiny islands, known as the southern Kuriles by Russia and the Northern Territories by Japan, were occupied by Soviet troops at the end of the Pacific War. Since then, the dispute has blocked the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia, though diplomatic ties were restored in 1956.
Japan refuses to sign a peace accord till the islands are returned, while Moscow wants joint economic cooperation on the islands as a first step toward a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the official goal for signing the treaty is the year 2000.

RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN OVER TERRITORIES HAS RESULTED IN ECONOMIC BENEFIT FOR RUSSIA

Suvendrini Kakuchi, Inter Press Service, April 20, 1998, HEADLINE: JAPAN- RUSSIA: MANY SMILES, LITTLE PROGRESS ON ISLANDS ROW , acs-VT99
	 Instead of concrete progress on the disputed islands, what emerged from the summit was an agreement to expand economic cooperation despite the territorial dispute.
This is seen in many quarters as a sign that Yeltsin got many of the things he aimed for from the Japanese side, without making significant concessions to resolve the islands dispute.

JAPAN IS FRUSSTRATED WITH RUSSIA BECAUSE YELTSIN HAS OUT-NEGOTIATED THEM ON TERRITORIAL ISSUES

Suvendrini Kakuchi, Inter Press Service, April 20, 1998, HEADLINE: JAPAN- RUSSIA: MANY SMILES, LITTLE PROGRESS ON ISLANDS ROW , acs-VT99
	While officials here see the need to push sagging bilateral ties forward into the 21st century, they do not seem to know quite how to deal with chaotic Russian politics or with a skillful politician like Yeltsin who now seems, once again, to have managed to delay Japan's efforts to get the islands back.

JAPAN IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE TOO MUCH, AND IS PROCEEDING WITH CLOSER TIES WITH RUSSIA ANYWAY

Suvendrini Kakuchi, Inter Press Service, April 20, 1998, HEADLINE: JAPAN- RUSSIA: MANY SMILES, LITTLE PROGRESS ON ISLANDS ROW , acs-VT99
	It is clear that Hashimoto is having to expand ties with Russia anyway, despite the territorial dispute, because Russia is an important player in global affairs, analysts add.
While Tokyo's foreign policy is heavily dependent on its ties with the United States, officials have become acutely aware of the need to nurture ties with its neighbor to the northeast.
There are several clues showing Hashimoto to be putting the territorial issue on the back burner, including his statement yesterday that Tokyo would dispatch experts from the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and international trade and industry in early May to discuss investment in Russia. 
Despite the territorial row, a foreign ministry official argued: "The bilateral relationship is in best shape in 50 years."

RUSSIA AND JAPAN HAVE ARRIVED AN EFFECTIVE COMPROMISE OVER THEIR TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

F. J. Khergamvala, THE HINDU, April 22, 1998, HEADLINE: Disputed islands Russia asked to concede but not cede, acs-VT99
	There is for the first time the appearance of the contours of how Russia and Japan might eventually resolve their dispute over territory.
Money and land will be the two commodities that will be bartered, leaving open only the question of the price and time frame.
For the past two days, Japanese dailies have been giving somewhat conflicting versions of the specifics of what the Prime Minister, Mr. Ryutaro Hashimoto, proposed to his guest, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, during their weekend retreat summit in a Japanese rural setting. During the press conference that followed the summit, Mr. Hashimoto said he had made a proposal to Mr. Yeltsin but neither he nor his officials privy to the details agreed to elaborate. Mr. Yeltsin too conceded a serious proposal was on the table which he said he would study carefully and voiced optimism about its outcome.

RUSSIA AND JAPAN HAVE DRAWN ON LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS TO SETTLE THEIR TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

F. J. Khergamvala, THE HINDU, April 22, 1998, HEADLINE: Disputed islands Russia asked to concede but not cede, acs-VT99
	The demarcation proposed is to the north of the four islands, thus confirming what a Japanese spokesman said. That Russia and Japan agreed to a solution based on the 1993 Tokyo Declaration that clearly identifies the four islands by name.
The reference is to the islands called Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shkotan and the Habomai group of islets. The Russians call it the southern Kuriles and Japan calls them the Northern Territories. The islands have been a legal football in most previous Russian and Soviet agreements with Japan and though the two have agreed to settle their problems in line with historical records, law and justice, Mr. Hashimoto and Mr. Yeltsin seem to recognise that present day strategic economic imperatives count equally heavily. Elements of the following, tailored to the present situation will influence the settlement: The Soviet-German agreement of 1990, the Sino- Russia agreement of 1997; the British-Argentine approach on the Falklands-Malvinas; Mr. Yeltsin's decade long views on the Russia -Japan relationship; a Sino-Portuguese agreement on Macao; Japan's need for huge amounts of oil and gas plus Russia's need for huge amounts of money.

RUSSIA WILL USE THE TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN TO BOLSTER ITS ECONOMY

F. J. Khergamvala, THE HINDU, April 22, 1998, HEADLINE: Disputed islands Russia asked to concede but not cede, acs-VT99
	 On some details there are striking parallels with the 20-year 1990 Soviet-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Partnership and Cooperation.' Japan is providing a use as you please' $ $ 1.5 billions credit to Russia and a Japanese spokesman clarified that Mr. Yeltsin had said in February he might use it for housing for defence personnel. In 1990, a untied German loan of a larger amount was used for the same purpose. To stretch another parallel, just as Germany's Mercedes-Benz announced a deal to produce buses in the then Soviet Union just a few days before the treaty, so too Toyota has announced its plant in Russia after the recent summit talks in Japan.
Just as Japan desires to quench its energy thirst with Russian gas and oil so too did Germany then sign a parallel oil and gas agreement from the Soviet Union together with the signing of the treaty. Oil, gas and petroleum products made up 60 per cent of Soviet sales to West Germany in 1989 and East Germany got 100 per cent of its needs from Moscow. These pointers suggest that the entire Russian-Japanese treaty will rest on the Russian economic demands and the main component will be Japanese funded energy projects and infrastructure.

FRANCE-GERMANY-RUSSIA ALLIANCE IS NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT

FRANCE-GERMANY-RUSSIA TROIKA IS NOT AIMED AT THE USA

Steven Erlanger; New York Times Service, International Herald Tribune, April 13, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: New 'Troika' In Europe Throws Off Washington , acs-VT99
	 Mr. Kohl went out of his way to stress that this ''big troika'' was not aimed at the United States - much the same message that the Americans so often try to send the Russians about NATO expansion. ''This meeting is, naturally, not directed at anyone else,'' he said, and he made sure the agenda stuck to Continental, rather than trans-Atlantic, issues.

FRANCE-GERMANY-RUSSIA SUMMITRY DOES NOTHING TO HELP YELTSIN

Steven Erlanger; New York Times Service, International Herald Tribune, April 13, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: New 'Troika' In Europe Throws Off Washington , acs-VT99
	As it happened, the troika summit itself had little substance, and it was much overshadowed by Mr. Yeltsin's impulsive decision, a couple of days before, to fire his prime minister and the entire cabinet. Having just returned to work after another illness, Mr. Yeltsin behaved bizarrely, calling for a post-summit press conference before the summit meeting itself began.

FRANCE-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP TRADES OFF WITH USA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP

Steven Erlanger; New York Times Service, International Herald Tribune, April 13, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: New 'Troika' In Europe Throws Off Washington , acs-VT99
	The United States regards the new Russia as something of a pet project, if not exactly a client. Helping Russia to feel part of a wider Europe, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlarges, is fine as far as it goes. But the Americans want to be sure that any special French-German understandings with Russia will not undercut an already fraying U.S.- Russia relationship.

NEGATIVE SOLVENCY SECTION

Nothing works in Russia. Wqhatever the affirmative tries, check out evidence against it here.

USA CANNOT CHANGE THINGS IN RUSSIA
page 134

WESTERN IDEAS DO NOT WORK IN RUSSIA
page 135

EXISTING RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE COUNTED ON
page 136

SENDING MONEY TO RUSSIA WILL NOT WORK
page 137

CAPITALISM WILL NOT WORK IN RUSSIA
page 138

FOREIGN AID WILL NOT WORK IN RUSSIA
page 140

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION FAILS
page 141

ORGANIZED CRIME STOPS ANY ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THINGS
page 143

FOREIGN POLICY CANNOT BE CHANGED
page 145

ARMS & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS CANNOT BE CONTROLLED
page 149

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS FAIL
page 153

DE-ALERTING FAILS
page 154

SOLVENCY: THE USA CAN’T REALLY INFLUENCE EVENTS IN RUSSIA

USA HAS ONLY MODEST INFLUENCE ON EVENTS IN RUSSIA

Abram Chayes, Prof. Law Harvard, 1997; MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: Russian and American Perspectives, p. 532 , acs-VT99 
	 What can probably be said with some confidence is that, with the exception of its almost obsessive commitment to the shock therapy prescription (now widely recognized as a mistake), the United States has had only modest influence on developments in Russia. Its impact has been even smaller on the evolution of ethno-national relations within the successor states of the Soviet Union and within Russia itself. This was the inevitable consequence of the limited character of U.S. commitments and contacts.

USA PREFERENCES DO NOT CARRY MUCH WEIGHT IN THE WORLD ANY MORE

Tad Szulc, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1998, Part M; Page 1; HEADLINE: FOREIGN POLICY; THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY acs-VT99
	 U.S. views and desires, no matter how well-founded, do not carry special weight anymore, a reality that Washington finds hard to grasp. Military clout alone is insufficient. President Bill Clinton may be ill-served by his top advisors, or he might not listen to them, but the time has come for him to fix his foreign policy. 

ONLY RUSSIA CAN MAKES IT CHOICES, NOT THE USA FOR IT

Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99
	 The United States cannot make Russia's choices for it. Only the Russian people can make choices that will last. But we need to understand what the choices are. As President Bill Clinton has said, Russia has "a chance to show that a great power can promote patriotism without expansionism; that a great power can promote national pride without national prejudice."

THE USA CANNOT DICTATE WHAT HAPPENS IN RUSSIA AND CANNOT BUY CHANGE

Michael J. Mazarr, director of the New Millennium Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1998 Spring; Pg. 11, HEADLINE: Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P. , acs-VT99
	It goes without saying that Washington cannot dictate what goes on in Russia, that Russia is too big to be "rescued" with some gigantic infusion of cash. 

US FOREIGN POLICY GOALS WITH RUSSIA CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COOPERATION WITH OTHER STATES

Abram Chayes, Prof. Law Harvard, 1997; MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: Russian and American Perspectives, p. 534 , acs-VT99 
	U.S. policy has begun to take account of the interdependence, both in economic and security terms. Perhaps its most serious defect has been the hubris of behaving as if U.S. goals could be achieved by unilateral efforts without a far greater concerted effort through the Western alliance and the array of international organizations operating in the area. Given the U.S. domestic political climate, the agenda of the Clinton administration was ambitious. But accomplishing the objectives it identified will require more than a unilateral effort. The territory, both literally and figuratively, is simply too broad and the available resources-money, expertise, and time are too limited.

SOCIAL REFORMS BASED IN WESTERN THOUGHT FAIL IN RUSSIA

WESTERN SOCIAL CONCEPTIONS DO NOT FIT RUSSIAN SOCIAL REALITIES

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 74 acs-VT99 
	Modem Western civilization is based on an atomist-mechanical picture of the world. The traditional bonds uniting people in a patriarchal society were cast off under the slogan: "Each person is a free atom of humankind!" A marketplace individualism became the basis of man's worldview and his economic and political ("one person -- one vote") assumptions. Hence the absolutization of individual rights, which in the national sphere justified melting smaller nationalities into larger nations and in the social sphere stood for competition - a "war of all against all." 
	In Russia, such a complete atomization has not taken place, even over the past seventy-five years. The individual continues to feel part of a collective structure of one type or another - a labor collective, a collective farm, or a brigade. (Alexander Yakovlev thus writes angrily: "We need willpower and wisdom gradually to destroy the Bolshevik community -- the collective farm... Here there can be no compromise ... decollectivization must be conducted lawfully but forcefully.") The most important spiritual category for Eurasians is the people [the nation], which is rejected by our Westernizers. The perception of the people as a single organism, a sort of social microcosm, was formulated by the Eurasian L. Karsavin as follows: "One can speak about a body of people.... My biological organism is a concrete process, my concrete interaction with other organisms and with nature.... A nation living in a given territory is the same kind of organism (only it is supra individual). It has its own body.

YELTSIN'S REFORMS HAVE FAILED BECAUSE WESTERN SOLUTIONS ARE NOT RIGHT FOR RUSSIA

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 19 acs-VT99 
	Boris Yeltsin's regime has thoughtlessly tried to bring the "blessings" of neoliberalism to Russia, whose economy and character are quite different from those in the West. The results have been disastrous: The gross domestic product and living standards have fallen drastically. Mr. Yeltsin's promises to increase social spending and improve living conditions are merely an electoral maneuver.

REFORMS MUST FIT IN WITH THE CHARACTER AND HISTORY OF RUSSIA IN ORDER TO WORK

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. xiii , acs-VT99 
	The main reason for our disagreement is our belief that this course of reforms either underplays or completely ignores Russia's national specific features, depending instead on Western models. We support reforms, but we believe that to succeed they must be based on Russia's own historical experience and traditions.

CURRENT VAIN EFFORTS AT REFORM WILL BE REPLACED BY A SYSTEM MORE IN HARMONY WITH RUSSIA'S PEOPLE AND HISTORY

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 119 , acs-VT99 
	On our country, especially in its complex political and economic situation, it is not easy to predict the near future. However, both the logic of unfolding events and the objective tendencies of selfpreservation make it possible to say that "democracy" in its present form will inevitably be replaced with a socioeconomic and political system that is more in harmony with the national spirit of the people.

WORKING WITH THE EXISTING RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT CANNOT SUCCEED

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT AND CAN NOT CONTROL THE COUNTRY

Steve Rodan, The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1998, Pg. 2, HEADLINE: Israel, US dispute effectiveness of Congress sanctions on Russia // acs-VT99
	"The Russian government doesn't control the country," said Max Singer, a leading American strategist and US Defense Department consultant who is also a researcher for Bar Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. "If I wanted something I wouldn't go to Yeltsin or the Foreign Ministry. The world is making a big mistake taking Russia seriously."

RUSSIA CAN SUCCEED BUT ONLY IF THE WEST STOPS SUPPORTING THE CURRENT REGIME

Mikhail Gorbachev, former leader of the Soviet Union, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), December 14, 1997, Pg. 41A, HEADLINE: For the change Russia needs, Yeltsin regime must leave power acs-VT99
	 In spite of everything, I believe in Russia's future. The future depends, first and foremost, on Russia itself. But the West will also have to figure out whom it supports in Russia. 
Isn't the West working to back those who are no longer capable of conducting reform and, along with them, those who entirely reject reform within the framework of democracy?
If Yeltsin's regime in Russia suits someone in the West, that, of course, is a different story. But in such a case, they should know: For most of the Russian population, it is unacceptable.

YELTSIN'S HEALTH MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA TO REACH A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. X , acs-VT99 
	The uncertain state of Yeltsin's health also means that it may be difficult for Russia to achieve consensus on important issues such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the Conference on Forces in Europe (CFE), and NATO's offer of a partnership or charter with Russia. The burden of creative thinking therefore will fall on the United States. If there are new initiatives designed to break the current deadlocks, they will have to come from Washington not Moscow. 

RUSSIAN CHANGE IN 1991 LEAD TO A NEW, UNTRAINED GROUP OF PEOPLE GAINING POWER AND INFLUENCE

NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997; RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p.53 , acsVT99 
	In 1991 Russia underwent a radical change in the type and style of social development: tentative institutional innovations introduced and monitored by the establishment culminated in the collapse of old institutions and the ascent of a counter-elite. If the vocabulary of political science is to consist of words with reasonably fixed meanings, the event can only be termed a revolution. The spectacular change in the conditions and span of vertical social mobility characteristic of a revolution paved the way to positions of power for people with the mentality of marginal outsiders, politicians who not only lacked a definite and stable social basis but demonstrated a tendency to break away from whatever links that connected them to their society.

CURRENT RUSSIAN REFORMS ARE MERELY A HIDDEN COUNTER REVOLUTION

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997 MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 61 acs-VT99 
	Russia is experiencing a truly unique period in its history. A historical rollback is taking place disguised as "democracy" and "a return to the world community." In practice, a political shift is occurring behind the scenes that fits the concept of a counterrevolution. It began approximately in 1989, reached its peak in August 1991, and at the moment is metastasizing throughout all the strata of our society and all the spheres of the economy, in the process changing the fundamental principles of human relations.

DON’T SEND MONEY TO RUSSIA!

THE MONEY FLOWS OUT OF RUSSIA IN CAPITAL FLIGHT FASTER THAN IT FLOWS IN

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	Suffice it to say that annual capital flight, estimated even by the government that abets it to be more than $ 2 billion a month, continues to exceed all foreign investment, aid, credits and loans, including those from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

NEW RUSSIAN RULING ELITE HAS GREED AS THEIR ONLY IDEOLOGY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 The new ruling elite is neither democratic nor communist, neither conservative nor liberal -- merely rapaciously greedy. In an interview published in the Financial Times in November 1996, one Russian tycoon claimed that the country's seven largest bankers, who became the core of Yeltsin's reelection campaign, controlled more than half the Russian economy. No one doubts that these nomenklatura capitalists have had a profound impact on the Russian economy, but their market of insider deals and political connections stands in the way of an open economy that would benefit all Russian citizens. The robber-baron market cannot tackle important social and economic questions. It is primarily concerned with issues that affect its masters' short-term power and prosperity.

RUSSIA IS ADDICTED TO IMF FUNDS, BUT ADDITIONAL HELP ONLY MAKES THINGS WORSE

Sergei Rogov, US and Canada Studies Institute Director, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, DECEMBER 9, 1997, HEADLINE: INTERVIEW REGARDING RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	The U.S. played a rather more important role by extending economic cooperation through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in which it has the final say. That would seem to be a welcome sign, but Russian economy is increasingly behaving like a drug-addict. The requirements set to us by the international financial institutions regarding the strategy and tactics of reform tend to aggravate the economic crisis in Russia. Of course it would be wrong to blame the Americans and the World Bank for crude miscalculations in the conduct of economic reform in Russia. Our blunders are our own. But the drugs that they have prescribed have merely worsened the malaise. The sharp drop of government spending caused an even deeper slump of production. The Americans played the key role in getting us into the London and Paris Clubs, and in advancing negotiations on Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. On the one hand, this is a plus for us, but in the short term the conditions on which Russia is joining the international trade organizations are very unfavorable for us. 

RUSSIA HAS ABSOLUTELY NO CASH TO SPEND ON ANYTHING

ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, May 15, 1998, HEADLINE: Brookings Scholars Warn World Must Guarantee Russia's Security// acs-VT99
	John Steinbruner, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Clifford G. Gaddy, Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program, calculate that the total cash revenue available to the Russian government last year was barely $36 billion. Given such a small revenue base, the authors conclude it is "extremely difficult to direct the fortunes of 150 million people with a sustainable resource base of $36 billion."

IMPLEMENTATION OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA IS NOT POSSIBLE

PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CAPITALISM HAVE CREATED ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, BLOCKING FUTURE REFORMS

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. xiii , acs-VT99 
	This study reveals that Russia has chosen a different road to capitalism. Guided by free market ideology, market reforms have resulted in dramatic declines in living standards that limit the forward movement of liberalization. As another participant in our symposia, labor economist Richard Freeman, warned, the ability to promote market reforms will ultimately depend on convincing the Russian people "to accept transitional costs while protecting them against the excesses of incipient capitalism." 

CAPITALISM IS INCONSISTENT WITH RUSSIA SOCIAL VALUES AND HISTORY AND WILL NOT TAKE ROOT

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 137 , acs-VT99 
	The main reason for our sociopolitical ailment is the attempt at capitalist restoration, which has undermined the material and spiritual foundations of our society and state and is making the vast differences between Western civilization and Russian civilization ever more apparent. Capitalism is inconsistent with the flesh and blood, with the being, with the habits, and with the psychological makeup of our society. Capitalism once led our society to a civil war, and now it will not take root in Russian soil. 

THE AMOUNT OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY CONTROLLED BY BARTER TRADING MAKES A FREE MARKET IMPOSSIBLE

Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko faction in the State Duma, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, OCTOBER 6, 1997, HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE LEADER OF THE YABLOKO FACTION acs-VT99
	But I will explain to you that barter accounts for 75 percent of the Russian economy. Who can tell me what sort of market economy it is if cash flows constitute just 25 percent of the total? Let anyone explain how the market can operate in the economy where barter constitutes 75 percent -- well, barter constitutes 46 percent and bills of exchange another 30 percent. This is the key question. 

THE FOCUS ON PRESERVING JOBS HAS STABILIZED RUSSIA BUT CRIPPLED THE PROGRESS OF REFORM

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	 Because one of this system's main objectives is to preserve jobs, it has had a major positive effect in maintaining a remarkable degree of social and political stability in Russia. But that stability comes at a huge cost. The key is the shrinking federal budget.

CAPITALISM WILL ONLY MAKE RUSSIANS SLAVES TO THE WEST INSTEAD OF SLAVES TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY

NATO EXPANSION, MILITARY CONVERSION, AND FINANCIAL LINKS WILL MAKE FORMER SOVIET SLAVES NOW THE SLAVES OF WALL STREET

BOB DJURDJEVIC, The Washington Times, May 17, 1998, Pg. B5, HEADLINE: Rekindling NATO to fuel Cold War II . . . // acs-VT99
	Of course, not. But as Col. Hackworth notes: "No sweat. The arms gang has set up a U.S.-backed loan program with their porker pals in Congress. Of course, American taxpayers will guarantee it."
And, of course, Wall Street will fund it. Once that happens, the formerly free and sovereign Eastern European nations will become the financial slaves of the New World Order, just as surely as the Southeast Asian countries did, when they took Wall Street's money. So the former Soviet-East Side Gang's dominions will have become Wall Street's minions. New masters, new chains, same old slavery.

CURRENT REFORMS OPERATE TO KEEP RUSSIA IN ECONOMIC ENSLAVEMENT AS A SOURCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 83 acs-VT99 
	In politics, the ancient principle "divide and conquer" is being practiced in its modem version. In economics, the goal is to integrate our national economy into the global economic system as a peripheral structure incapable of independent existence by breaking up the unified national economic complex, denationalizing property, concentrating on the priority development of rawmaterials and extraction branches, and suffocating high-technology industries and fundamental sciences. 

USA FOREIGN AID DOESN’T WORK IN RUSSIA

RUSSIAN AID FROM THE USA FOR REFORMS HAS BEEN WASTED

Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99
	 Meanwhile, U.S. assistance programs to Russia, including those that have been properly targeted to assist in democratization and economic reform efforts, have been plagued by international bureaucratic warfare, poor coordination, and mismanagement. While some of the horror stories about the misuse of American aid and resources being wasted may be exaggerated, it is nevertheless highly significant that almost all of the Russian political leaders, across the entire political spectrum, are highly critical about the way in which American aid is being delivered. This stands in notable contrast with the way in which the Marshall Plan was perceived by its recipients. 

RUSSIA’S PROBLEMS ARE NOT DUE TO THE LACK OF ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES -- THERE HAS BEEN QUITE A LOT

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	 Let me say, in anticipation of the question, that the relationship has not deteriorated because the West has not done enough to aid Russia since 1991. If you consider U.S. aid provided to Russia in all its forms through the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. government agencies, and then add in other forms of assistance -- the assistance provided by the European Union; the bilateral aid provided by other countries, such as Japan; the contracts provided to the Russian Space Agency for participation in NASA's Space Station program; the investment guarantees, loans, and feasibility studies done to encourage investment and joint ventures in Russia; the generous debt rescheduling provided to the Russian government by the Paris Club of official creditors and the London Club of commercial creditors, which will save the Russian government several hundreds of millions of dollars in annual budget expenditures for several years; and the low-cost loans provided by the International Monetary Fund and those approved and made available to Russia by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development -- you realize that a sizable amount of aid has been provided over the past five to six years.

FOREIGN AID IN 1999 IS LIKELY TO BE CUT

FRANK A. AUKOFER, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 26, 1998, Pg. 3, HEADLINE: Foreign aid steps to center of debate Congress to begin discussing Clinton request to increase spending acs-VT99
	 But in an era of balanced budgets and priorities that are primarily domestic, the pressures will be in the other direction, and the 1999 foreign operations appropriation is likely to end up below the administration's $14 billion request.

CANNOT FORCE DEMOCRACY ON RUSSIA

THE USA NEEDS TO STOP TRYING TO FORCE DEMOCRACY ON NATIONS WHO ARE NOT READY FOR IT

Matthew Miller; U.S. News & World Report, The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 30, 1997, Pg. B-7, HEADLINE: Is democracy right for every nation? acs-VT99
	Those looking for a bold political New Year's resolution should try the following: The United States resolves not to keep forcing democracy on countries that aren't ready for it. That's the provocative yet persuasive thesis of Robert Kaplan's cover story in December's Atlantic Monthly. Kaplan is the talented reporter and analyst who has spent years in war-torn Africa and the Balkans.

DEMOCRACY CANNOT BUILD A NATION, ONLY RULE A NATION WHICH HAS ALREADY FORMED -- IT TAKES TIME

Matthew Miller; U.S. News & World Report, The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 30, 1997, Pg. B-7, HEADLINE: Is democracy right for every nation? acs-VT99
	 Democracy doesn't form states successfully," Kaplan writes, "only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements." It doesn't come via "moral fiat," a U.S. diplomatic specialty. Our own founding fathers, Kaplan believes, were clear-eyed about such truths. So was Alexis de Tocqueville, everyone's favorite student of democratic institutions.
These men knew from history that democracy doesn't form states or strengthen them, at least initially. "Multiparty systems are best suited to nations that already have efficient bureaucracies and a middle class that pays income tax," Kaplan argues.
Democracy works, he says, where the big issues, like borders and power-sharing, have already been resolved, "leaving politicians free to bicker about budgets and other secondary matters."

WHEN DEMOCRACIES DEVELOP TOO EARLY THROUGH PRESSURE, THEY BECOME “ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES”

Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY, December 30, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Ballots don't always stop the world's bullets Democracy as strategy is hit or miss acs-VT99
	In the journal Foreign Affairs, managing editor Fareed Zakaria argues that while more countries are holding elections, the number of what he calls "illiberal democracies" is on the rise.
"The whole emphasis of American foreign policy should be much more on political liberalization than elections," Zakaria says. "That means impartial court systems, clean bureaucracies, freedom of assembly and the press."

DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ARE NOT EFFECTIVE

USA DEMOCRACY ASSISTSANCE PROGRAMS ARE HYPOCRITICAL BECAUSE THEY TELL PEOPLE WHAT TO DO

Wendy Koch, Hearst Newspapers, The Stuart News/Port St. Lucie News (Stuart,FL), October 26, 1997, Pg. A18, HEADLINE: U.S. MASTER AT PUTTING ITS NOSE IN FOREIGN ELECTIONS acs-VT99
	Barbara Conry, a foreign policy analyst at the libertarian Cato Institute, said the U.S. work with foreign political parties carries "at least a little hypocrisy and misplaced self-righteousness."
Conry said it's often hard for Americans working in emerging democracies to decide what's a real democrat and what isn't. "It's really just not clear; there's a lot of fragmentation," she said.

USA DEMOCRACY PROMOTION PROGRAMS HAVE FAVORED YELTSIN

Wendy Koch, Hearst Newspapers, The Stuart News/Port St. Lucie News (Stuart,FL), October 26, 1997, Pg. A18, HEADLINE: U.S. MASTER AT PUTTING ITS NOSE IN FOREIGN ELECTIONS acs-VT99
	*In Russia, U.S.-funded workers trained political activists in 1995 and 1996, a move that helped dozens of reform democrats win local, regional and national elections. The activists campaigned last year for President Boris Yeltsin's re-election.

USA DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE HELPS ENTRENCHED POLITICAL PARTIES

Wendy Koch, Hearst Newspapers, The Stuart News/Port St. Lucie News (Stuart,FL), October 26, 1997, Pg. A18, HEADLINE: U.S. MASTER AT PUTTING ITS NOSE IN FOREIGN ELECTIONS acs-VT99
	Supporters argue that if the United States does not help new parties gain a foothold in authoritarian countries, it is actually helping well-entrenched ruling parties.

CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME STOPS REFORMS

CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA EVEN STOP CRITICAL REFORMS FROM TAKING PLACE

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	Crime and corruption in Russia surpass anything we have seen in Sicily and are approaching some Latin American models. They cause Russia to lose up to $ 40 billion a year to capital flight, and scare away foreign investors. Crime is making the policy process, as well as business activities, in Russia murky and dangerous. In addition to having corrupt officials on the highest level in the Kremlin, we now read reports of price lists for individual Duma votes which circulate in Moscow. Key bills, such as the Land Code, the tax reform bill, and production-sharing agreements for oil exploration were stalled in the Duma.

ECONOMICALLY, CRIMINAL CORPORATE OLIGARCHIES ARE TAKING CONTROL

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 But while Russia has its economic success stories, many aspects of the economy suggest that it is moving toward a corporatist market in which corruption is rampant. The most important of these trends is the rise of the Russian oligarchs, who have created a form of robber-baron capitalism. Far from creating an open market, Russia has consolidated a semi-criminal oligarchy that was already largely in place under the old Soviet system. After communism's collapse, it merely changed its appearance, just as a snake sheds its skin.

CORRUPTION PROBLEM IN RUSSIA PREVENTS IMPROVEMENT IN LIVING STANDARDS

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Furthermore, Russia is bedeviled by a corruption problem reminiscent of Latin America's in the 1970s and 1980s. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ranks Russia as the most corrupt major economy in the world. Graft permeates the country, from street crime to mafia hits to illegal book deals in Kremlin corridors to rigged bids for stakes of privatized companies. Recent polls by the Public Opinion Foundation show that Russians believe the best way to get ahead is through contacts and corruption. When asked to select criteria needed to become wealthy in today's Russia, 88 percent picked connections and 76 percent chose dishonesty. Only 39 percent said hard work. Anyone who attempts to start a small business in Russia will encounter extortion demands from the mafia, so there is no incentive for entrepreneurship. Better to stay home and grow potatoes at your dacha. A crime-ridden market cannot be effective. With no certainty about the future, with or without inflation, nobody will invest. Such a market can support the current level of consumption -- which for the majority of the population means semi-pauperhood -- for some time, but it does not and cannot provide any progress.

ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CRIME AND CORRUPTION CANNOT SUCCEED

LAW ENFORCEMENT IS DEEPLY CORRUPT IN RUSSIA

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 112, acs-VT99 
	Government corruption. One reason government laws and decrees have done so little to reduce organized crime is that the law enforcement organs themselves are deeply corrupted. A widely-cited anecdotal indication of the severity of police corruption was the story by the Interior Minister, Anatolii Kulikov, that upon his appointment to the position in summer 1995, he had sent a truck carrying a cargo of vodka on a 700-kilometer trip across southern Russia. Out of the twenty-four times that police stopped the truck, they had demanded bribes twenty-two times." As a result of his investigations, General Kulikov declared that he had fired a number of senior police officials, including four generals. One official fired was the deputy chief of police Of MOSCOW.

CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA IS DIFFERENT, NOT JUST BRIBERY', AND CANNOT BE PROVEN

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 112 // acs-VT99 
	The main reason why corruption goes unpunished is that it is by no means necessary to give money from hand to hand to influence the decision made by a bureaucrat. There are plenty of relatively clean ways to reward the one who has facilitated the necessary decision, because many people in Russia combine their work in governmental bodies with commercial or consulting activities, travel abroad at the expense of various sponsors, and so forth. To control every tie of this kind and prove that the decision was made in payment for a certain "compensation" is virtually impossible.

FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS INSUFFICIENT, AND MUST INCLUDE LARGE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS

IN RUSSIA FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE AND CARRIED OUT BY CORPORATIONS AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT

Rustam Narzikulov, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, November 19, 1997; Pg. 27 SOURCE: Nezavisimaya gazeta, Oct. 17, 1997, pp. 1-2. acs-VT99
	And so Rem Vyakhirev faced the powerful US foreign-policy machine one-on-one. This situation is typical of Russian foreign policy for the past several years. Instead of the Russian government defending the interests of our country's companies in foreign markets, we have the reverse: Our major firms make life easier for Moscow's diplomats. . . .
[For example,] every new Polish and Bulgarian government starts out by initiating negotiations with Gazprom and notifying the company's executives of changes in their countries' foreign and domestic policies. It has reached the point where future [Russian]VT99 gas deliveries to Israel are regarded in Tel Aviv as a crucial factor in Middle East politics. . . .

YELTSIN ADMINISTRATION DEPENDS ON THE COOPERATION OF VARIOUS ECONOMIC GROUPS

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies,july, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 31 , acs-VT99 
	The Yeltsin administration depends heavily on the support of sympathetic economic groups - so much so that it would have difficulty refusing requests for special consideration of foreign trade policy. At the same time, it must be careful not to exaggerate the policy impact of lobbying by economic groups, particularly in external strategic policy terms.

RUSSIAN MASS MEDIA MAKES BETTER RELATIONS DIFFICULT

RUSSIAN MEDIA IS ALMOST UNIFORMLY HOSTILE TO THE USA

Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99
	Even a casual perusal of the Russian media evidences a profoundly disturbing phenomenon: Russian commentators, of whatever stripe, are hostile to American goals and policies. This criticism is not limited only to the hard-line, pro-communist newspapers. Both the reformist as well as the pro-government newspapers and magazines have been doing the same thing.
 Significantly, the criticism is broad in nature. In addition, to complaining about Washington's policies on NATO enlargement, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the former Yugoslavia, etc., the Russian commentators routinely grouse about the unipolar nature of the existing international system, cite the evils of American hegemonism, and muse about the need to create offsetting power centers such as an anti-American alliance comprised of such powers as Russia, Germany, France, China, and Japan.

RUSSIAN MEDIA’S ANTI-USA BIAS IS HURTING RELATIONS

Paula J. Dobriansky; Council on Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT acs-VT99
	 This is wrong. The commentaries should not be ignored -- they do matter, and they are not prompted by congressional actions. While Russia is evolving along its democratic path, public opinion -- especially elite opinion -- matters a great deal. In fact, I believe that it can be said that there has never been a time in our bilateral relations when public diplomacy mattered more. The fact that most Russian opinion-makers appear to hate the current international arrangements and view the U.S. as Russia's enemy is very unsettling and has long-term negative implications for Russia's foreign policy. 

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE DUMA MAKE BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS DIFFICULT

CURRENTLY THE PROSPECT FOR A STABLE USA-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP SEEM DIM DUE TO THE SENATE AND THE DUMA

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and national security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, December 4, 1997, HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: Yeltsin Rhetoric Old Tactic acs-VT99
	 The U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma are deadlocked by mutual distrust and suspicion. What's worse, these legislative animosities adequately reflect the attitudes of foreign policy elites in Moscow and Washington. Yeltsin is desperately trying to bridge the gap with "peace initiatives" because he badly needs Western aid and support, but in the long term, the prospect of a stable U.S.- Russia "partnership" seems dim.

BEING NICE TO THE RUSSIANS DOESN’T SEEM TO HELP

FAILURE TO CRITICIZE RUSSIAN POLICIES ONLY INCREASES THEIR IRRESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Kenneth R. Timmerman.; The American Spectator, May, 1998, HEADLINE: Strobe Talbott: Russia's Man In Washington // acs-VT99
	Russia's roguish behavior these days is uncannily reminiscent of Soviet behavior during the Cold War, and critics of the Clinton administration think they know why. " Russia respects strength, consistency, and candor," says Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Penn.), a student of Russian history and a Russian speaker. "If they do something wrong, you have to call them on it." Instead, the Clinton administration has consistently turned a blind eye to Russian misdeeds and found excuses for Russian boorishness. The architect of this pernicious policy toward Russia is a former Time magazine journalist who has admitted to a close personal and professional relationship to an alleged top KGB agent during the Cold War--Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott..

RUSSIA IS INCAPABLE OF CONTROLLING ITS TRANSFERS OF ARMS AND SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES

THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS INCAPABLE OF STEMMING THE FLOW OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Amos Perlmutter, professor of political science and sociology American University, The Washington Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A17, HEADLINE: A new Russian foreign policy? acs-VT99
	The Russian predicament is that in the absence of central power it is unable to stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction to countries like Iran and Iraq. Former nomenklatura and communist elites converted to ruthless corporate capitalists demonstrate that in the economic area, and especially in foreign trade and military sales, they are more powerful than the Russian state.

RUSSIA TRIED TO STOP THE TRANSFER OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA BUT COULD NOT

Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: INDIA - US TRYING TO THWART TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY , acs-VT99
	The administration received ''certain commitments that the Russian role did not involve the missile design and that it ''would continue to be circumscribed, the senior administration official said.
 Since then, however, intelligence reports have continued to raise questions about Russia s involvement, the official and others said. Another official who tracked the reports said the help had included ''significant engineering services, as well as parts and equipment necessary to build and launch the missile.
 The assistance appears to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1993 agreement between Russia and the United States to stop helping India or any other country develop ballistic missile technology, the daily adds.

RUSSIAN DIRECTIVE TO STOP HIGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO IRAN HAS NOT DONE ANY GOOD

Steve Rodan, The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1998, Pg. 2, HEADLINE: Israel, US dispute effectiveness of Congress sanctions on Russia // acs-VT99
	US and Israeli officials do agree that the executive order issued in January by then-Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has not stopped the flow of technology to Iran.
"Iran is pursuing its weapons program with unabated vigor," said US Senator Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, during a hearing last Thursday. "Missile cooperation with Russia is increasing. Nuclear cooperation is continuing."

EXAMPLE OF INDIAN MISSILES SHOWS RUSSIA CANNOT CONTROL ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT’S ARMS TRANSFERS

Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: INDIA - US TRYING TO THWART TRANSFER OF RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY , acs-VT99
	The New York Times says the help to India offers another instance of Russia s unwillingness or inability to control exports of missile technology and suggests a wider pattern of proliferation, the officials and arms experts said. It quoted the official as saying that the pricise nature of Russia s aid is not clear. The administration first approached Russia with its concerns as early as the spring of 1995. At that time, the officials said, Russia acknowledged that scientists from quasi-public research institutes that grew out of the Soviet military-industrial complex were providing technological help for the Sagarika missile.

SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA FOR INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONS DEALINGS ARE INEFFECTIVE

SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA FOR TRADE DEALS WILL NOT WORK

Editorial, The Jerusalem Post, October 27, 1997, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Desperately seeking a new Russia acs-VT99
	 Today's mantra, that sanctions don't work, has become a self-fulfilling prophesy; indeed, such measures are so rarely and selectively imposed that they have lost their deterrent value.

SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIAN FIRMS WILL ENDANGER RELATIONS AND FAIL TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL

DAVID E. SANGER, The New York Times, October 16, 1997, SECTION: Section A; Page 1; HEADLINE: On Russian-Iranian Oil Deal, U.S. Sanctions May Backfire acs-VT99
	It did not help that Mr. Chernomyrdin apparently made no mention of the Iran investment last month when he met Vice President Al Gore in Moscow, in one of a series of discussions to promote Russia's conversion to a market economy. Any step to interfere with Gazprom's access to world capital markets would constitute a major setback to American participation in that effort, and would undoubtedly anger the Prime Minister.
 For its part, Gazprom has no intention of backing down. The company has said repeatedly that it would ignore American "threats" and declared that the financial losses incurred by breaking its deal with Iran "would be greater than those incurred by sanctions against us."

SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS WILL FAIL

NORMAN KEMPSTER, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles TimesMay 20, 1998, Part A; Page 4; HEADLINE: GOP May Retaliate For Waiving Of Sanctions; Politics: White House Efforts On Free-Trade Accord, U.N. Funding Could Be Jeopardized, House Staff Member Says. // acs-VT99
	John Howard, director of international policy and programs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said the sanctions legislation amounted to a "dubious policy" that did the United States no good and invited retaliation from the Europeans.

SANCTIONS WORK AGAINST ROGUE STATES, BUT NOT AGAINST RUSSIA -- GAZPROM EXAMPLE

The Moscow Times, October 18, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Should Not Meddle In Gas Deal acs-VT99
	While sanctions have in the past proven a useful weapon against rogue states, for example against Serbia and Iraq, the United States is wasting its time trying to pressure Gazprom and its partners to drop their deal.
The U.S. policy of isolating Iran at any cost is too far out of step with world opinion, including the opinion of its key allies. They do not share U.S. hysteria over Iran and believe now is the time to try to bring that country back into the international community.

SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIAN GAS FIRMS CANNOT SUCCEED

The Moscow Times, October 18, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Should Not Meddle In Gas Deal acs-VT99
	 The State Department has been reluctant to respond, partly because there were no obvious sanctions it could impose on Gazprom, a purely European company, and partly because Russia would resent what it sees as a U.S. attempt to impose its foreign policy on the rest of the world.

IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN COMPANIES WILL CREATE SERIOUS ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS

DAVID E. SANGER, The New York Times, October 16, 1997, SECTION: Section A; Page 1; HEADLINE: On Russian-Iranian Oil Deal, U.S. Sanctions May Backfire acs-VT99
	Instead, officials are discovering anew that imposing sanctions on foreign companies that defy American policy -- in this case by doing business with a country that supports terrorism -- raises numerous unforeseeable problems.
The issue is not whether Washington can stop the investment in Iran. That is clearly beyond its reach. Instead, it is whether Gazprom should be allowed to raise $1 billion in world financial markets, including the United States, next month -- money that will go right into the company's coffers just as it is preparing to write the Iranians a fat check.

EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN LIMITING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS IS DAMAGED BY SANCTIONS

NORMAN KEMPSTER, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles TimesMay 20, 1998, Part A; Page 4; HEADLINE: GOP May Retaliate For Waiving Of Sanctions; Politics: White House Efforts On Free-Trade Accord, U.N. Funding Could Be Jeopardized, House Staff Member Says. // acs-VT99
	In exchange for Clinton's action [lifting sanctions against companies dealing with Iran]VT99, the EU promised to be more vigilant in preventing European companies from assisting Iran's nuclear weapons and missile programs and to join the United States in an international effort to prevent the resale of property expropriated without just compensation.

US CANNOT STOP RUSSIA FROM DEALING WITH IRAN, OR IRAN FROM GETTING WHAT IT WANTS

SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA WILL NOT STOP TRANSFERS TO IRAN, AS IT WOULD GOP THROUGH CHINA AND THE UKRAINE

Steve Rodan, The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1998, Pg. 2, HEADLINE: Israel, US dispute effectiveness of Congress sanctions on Russia // acs-VT99
	US critics, however, say congressional sanctions on Russia alone would not stop Iran's missile and nuclear weapons program. They said China and the Ukraine continue to supply Iran with help in its ballistic missile and mass destruction weapons program, including biological and nuclear.
But the critics say both Israel and the US are playing down Chinese participation in Iran's military programs. On April 29, The Washington Times reported that the Clinton administration has drafted a space cooperation agreement with Beijing that permits the transfer of technology to a Chinese agency that is a key developer of weapons-related technology.

USA CANNOT SUCCEED IN INFLUENCING RUSSIA’S GAS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

The Moscow Times, October 18, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Should Not Meddle In Gas Deal acs-VT99
	In the case of Gazprom's relatively innocent gas venture, Russia is even less likely to give in to U.S. pressure. If it is forced to dispense with Goldman -Sachs' services, it will simply seek out a European finance house as an alternative.
The United States must realize that despite its position as the only remaining superpower, there are restrictions on the extent to which it can impose its foreign policy priorities on its neighbors. Gazprom's gas deal in Iran is a case where it is not worth the effort.

FRENCH WILL DO THE GAS DEAL WITH IRAN EVEN IF RUSSIA DOES NOT

WILLIAM SAFIRE The New York Times, October 5, 1997Section 4; Page 15; HEADLINE: Essay; The Boris & Jacques Show acs-VT99
	French President Jacques Chirac met with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow to cook up an Iranian natural-gas deal that would (1) enrich their business interests, (2) gain a diplomatic foothold in the Persian Gulf by helping terrorists obtain missiles and (3) distract their restive unemployed by sticking a thumb in the U.S. eye.

SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA FOR DEALING WITH IRAN WILL CREATE A CRISIS

IF THE US SANCTION RUSSIA FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH IRAN, RELATIONS WILL HAVE THEIR WORST CRISIS SINCE THE COLD WAR

CRAIG R. WHITNEY, March 15,1998 [The New York Times. SECTION: Section 4; Page 4; Column I; HEADLINE: The World; The Not- S o- Superpower Society \\ jan]VT99 
	Russia said last week that it would continue to defy American opposition to its helping Iran build a nuclear power plant, and should the United States decide this month to inflict sanctions on Total or other French and Russian interests under the despised extraterritorial Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, American relations with both France and Russia could enter one of their worst crises since the cold war.

THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT OF IRAN IS CAUSING STRAINS IN US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Alexei Pushkov, March 6, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: On Razor's Edge. SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, p. 6 \\ jan]VT99 
	Because of this, Washington pursues a policy of "containment" in respect to Iran, i.e., international isolation and sanctions, and insists that Moscow stop cooperating Tehran in the military-technical and nuclear power engineering spheres. 
	Here, the author examines Russia's interests in the area of the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and Transcaucasia. And these interests require steady, stable and even partnership relations with Iran. Iran has never threatened Russia, nor is it threatening Russia today, the author points out. 
	Meanwhile, the Americans have been using various channels to send signals to Moscow, giving us to understand that our partnership with Tehran could result in the most undesirable consequences for American- Russian relations. On its part, Moscow suspects Washington of intentions to squeeze Russia out of the Iranian market under various pretexts, and in general, to precipitate a divorce between Moscow and Tehran.

SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA FOR DEALING WITH IRAN WILL DAMAGE THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY AND RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

DAVID E. SANGER, The New York Times, October 16, 1997, SECTION: Section A; Page 1; HEADLINE: On Russian-Iranian Oil Deal, U.S. Sanctions May Backfire acs-VT99
	 But stopping that deal threatens to unravel delicate negotiations with European allies over United States sanctions policy, and to interfere with Washington's efforts to stabilize the rickety Russian economy

SANCTIONS OVER THE RUSSIAN GAS DEAL WITH IRAN WOULD BECOME A FULL BLOWN CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE USA AND RUSSIA

The Moscow Times, October 18, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Should Not Meddle In Gas Deal acs-VT99
	No one can fault the United States for trying to stop terrorism, but it would be stupid for Washington to provoke a major confrontation with Moscow over the $ 2 billion deal Gazprom has just signed to develop Iranian natural gas fields.
Hotheads in Congress who have objected to the deal between Gazprom and a French and Malaysian consortium are calling on the White House to enforce the provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act that target companies investing in states that sponsor terrorism.

ARMS CONTROL DEALS WITH RUSSIA FAIL

ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS ARE WISHFUL THINKING

George Will, Washington Post Writers Group, The Chattanooga Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A4, HEADLINE: Arms control fantasies acs-VT99
	Liberalism and (which is much the same thing) wishful thinking favor arms control as a means of taming the unruly world with pieces of paper. However, two attempts at arms control are collapsing simultaneously, with reverberations in a third conflict that has an arms control dimension.

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BINDING, BECAUSE NATIONS WILL ACT IN THEIR OWN SELF INTEREST

George Will, Washington Post Writers Group, The Chattanooga Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A4, HEADLINE: Arms control fantasies acs-VT99
	However, arms control is usually impossible until it is unimportant. Arms control agreements usually renounce superfluous weapons or accept limits higher than anticipated procurements. Nations will abide by only those arms limitation agreements that do not seriously inconvenience their pursuit of security and other national interests. As India's euphoria about the nuclear tests demonstrates, those interests can have a huge psychological component.

RUSSIA WILL NOT SIGN START II UNLESS SEVERAL CONCESSIONS ARE MADE BY THE WEST

Mikhail Shevtsov, February 9, 1008 [TASS. HEADLINE: US guarantees for START-3 signing needed \\ jan]VT99 
	The conditions on which Russian parliament can ratify the START-2 strategic offensive arms reduction treaty include U. S. guarantees that it will sign the START-3 treaty, strictly observe the 1972 ABM treaty and refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in territories of new NATO members, Major-General Roman Popkovich, member of the State Duma Defence Committee, told Itar-Tass on Monday.

RUSSIA WILL NOT RATIFY START 2 UNLESS THE US GUARANTEES THAT START 3 WILL BE RATIFIED

Alexander Nikolayevich Shokhin, February 3, 1998 [LEADER OF OUR HOME IS RUSSIA. Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH ALEXANDER SHOKHIN \\ jan]VT99 
	As for the consequences of possible strikes, the LDPR faction, for example, suggests withdrawing from the regime of sanctions in order to demonstrate our disagreement. I don't think we should take this path and put ourselves in opposition to the international community. But the passage of certain documents through the Duma, such as START2, will most certainly be affected. It has already been affected since START-2 does not guarantee a parity between Russia and the US. Such a parity is secured only by START-3. In their minds Duma deputies have already linked the two -- they would be prepared to ratify START-2 if there are advanced talks on START-3 so that we would know at least approximate quantitative benchmarks to lead to the ratification of START-3 in the future following the ratification of the previous treaty. But if new circumstances arise, for example, lack of agreement between Russia and the US on the settlement of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, it may most certainly affect this and other treaties.

DE-ALERTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFUL

RUSSIA WOULD NOT ACCEPT DE-ALERTING BECAUSE THEIR MILITARY IS DEPENDENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jonathan S. Landay, February 20, 1998 [The Christian Science Monitor, SECTION: UNITED STATES; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Nuclear Disarmament With Low-Tech Approach \\ jan]VT99
	While de-alerting sounds appealing, other experts say it would be hard to implement. Facing deep decay in its conventional forces as the NATO alliance expands into its backyard, Russia is becoming more reliant on nuclear weapons for its security. Among other things, it has a "launch on warning" policy that requires its leaders to authorize a devastating counterstrike within minutes of detecting an attack but before the incoming warheads land. Says a senior US official: "The Russians are ... shifting their nuclear doctrine in the direction of greater reliance on nuclear weapons. One of the factors we have to consider is that they may be very suspicious, not to say negative, about ideas that would make their nuclear forces slower to generate."

THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT DE-ALERTING UNLESS IT IS PROVEN THAT IT CAN BE VERIFIED

Jonathan S. Landay, February 20, 1998 [The Christian Science Monitor, SECTION: UNITED STATES; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Nuclear Disarmament With Low-Tech Approach \\ jan]VT99
	A key difficulty, another official says, is designing reliable arrangements to verify that each side abides by any agreement because de-alerting - as opposed to outright destruction - is reversible. Furthermore, it is easier to monitor Russian missiles, most of which are based on land, than US weapons, many of which are aboard submarines. Overcoming verification hurdles is critical for the administration effort. Legislation passed by the GOP-led Congress prohibits it from spending funds on de-alerting unless the president certifies that any accord can be monitored effectively and subjects the US and Russia to the same rigorous standards.

COUNTERPLAN SECTION

OPEN SOCIETY FUND COUNTERPLAN
page 156

RUSSIAN REGIONS COUNTERPLAN
page 165

CONSULTATION COUNTERPLAN
page 167

OPEN SOCIETY COUNTERPLAN

THESIS: The Fund for an Open Society is a philanthropic organization financed by billionaire George Soros. He has recently made a long term commitment to help Russia which is in the hundreds of millions, and he has billions to spend. This counterplan suggests that whatever project needs to be done in Russia would be better done by the Fund for an Open Society than by the American government.

TEXT:

The programs specified in the affirmative plan will be carried out through the Fund for an Open Society, a private philanthropic organization funded by George Soros. Normal FOS means will be used.

ONE: THE COUNTERPLAN IS NOT TOPICAL

It is not a part of the foreign policy of the United States but of a private group funded by citizens.

TWO: THE COUNTERPLAN IS COMPETITIVE

You would want to choose the counterplan over a combination of the plan and the counterplan because:

1. REDUNDANCY: The counterplan enacts the programs called for by the affirmative, and there is no compelling reason to do it twice.

2. NET BENEFITS: The counterplan funding will not trade off with other assistance to Russia or other nations, but is part of an on-going open commitment to Russia by Soros.

3. NET BENEFITS: The counterplan avoids the disadvantages of USA action which we will be defending in this debate.

THREE: OPEN SOCIETY ACTION IS AVAILABLE AND EFFECTIVE

A. SOROS GIVES TO HELP CREATE “OPEN SOCIETIES” AND IS FOCUSED ON RUSSIA

EDITORIAL, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, October 30, 1997; Pg. B7, HEADLINE: 'SAINT GEORGE' SOROS PUTS POWER OF GIVING TO WORK acs-VT99
	 This makes Soros's interest in public policy rare indeed. His passion is not for marble memorials but for what Karl Popper, his tutor at the London School of Economics, called the "open society."
In many ways, Soros is more ambitious than earlier philanthropists, such as Carnegie. His interests are both more international (he operates in more than 30 countries) and broader in scope.
He has tried to do foreign-policy jobs that governments used to regard as theirs. In 1996, he spent almost $200 million promoting democracy in Eastern Europe, outspending the American government on providing aid to Hungary, the former Yugoslavia and Belarus.

B. SOROS RUSSIAN GRANTS ARE MUCH LARGER THAN AMERICAN EFFORTS

Newsday (New York, NY), October 23, 1997, Page A46, HEADLINE: SOROS GIVES RUSSIA $500 MILLION: U.S. PLEASE COPY acs-VT99
	 The question, then, is: If Soros' donation makes so much sense, why is the U.S. government contributing less to Russia's transition - only $95 million a year - than a single businessman, even an extremely wealthy businessman? There is no excuse for this. In fact, the folly of expanding NATO and spending tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to modernize the armed forces of Eastern Europe makes even less sense in this context. Better to spend the money to promote democracy and avoid costly new arms races in Europe.

C. SOROS-STYLE GRANTS ARE ABLE TO HELP DO WHAT GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT

The Nation, October 13, 1997; Pg. 4; HEADLINE: As the world Turners acs-VT99
	Turner's flamboyant gift is a reminder, like George Soros's worldwide Open Society ventures, that wealth has grown so concentrated that a handful of billionaires have the economic power of governments--and like governments, their foreign policies matter. (Let it be noted that unlike the United States, Soros and Turner at least incorporate in their foreign policies some recognition that capitalism doesn't solve most social problems.)

SOROS GRANTS ARE FLEXIBLE AND EFFECTIVE MEANS TO ASSIST RUSSIA

SOROS RUSSIAN GIFT WILL BE NEGOTIATED AS IT GOES ALONG

Daniela Deane, USA TODAY, October 21, 1997, Pg. 9A, HEADLINE: Soros to give Russia up to $500M U.S. financier targets health, military reform acs-VT99
	 The new gift, of between $ 300 million and $ 500 million over the next three years, makes Soros a bigger donor than the United States, which last year gave Russia $ 95 million in foreign aid. Soros said details and the exact amount of the gift haven't been worked out. He has already donated $ 350 million to Russian causes over the past 10 years.

DONORS LIKE SOROS CAN DO WHAT NATIONS CAN’T, ESPECIALLY IN MILITARY AREAS

Matthew Miller, U.S. News & World Report, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, November 2, 1997; Pg. 5J, HEADLINE: Mega-Philanthropists; If challenge is too big for a government, call George Soros or Ted Turner acs-VT99
	 That is good news, because today's mega-philanthropists can do things that governments can't. Mr. Soros and Mr. Turner don't need to get 51 percent of the public to sign on to their plans; they consult their consciences (and maybe Jane Fonda) and act. They can stick with ambitious visions for the long term.
 In some cases, they also are freer to act where it matters most. Mr. Soros, for example, can retrain disgruntled Russian soldiers, helping defuse a potential powder keg, while U.S. agencies face restrictions on aid to foreign militaries. Indeed, Mr. Soros' announcement a week ago _ the foreign policy of a single individual _ now makes it politically easier for Boris Yeltsin to proceed with his planned layoff of thousands of unneeded officers.

SOROS GRANTS TO RUSSIA TARGET THEIR MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

Newsday (New York, NY), October 23, 1997, Page A46, HEADLINE: SOROS GIVES RUSSIA $500 MILLION: U.S. PLEASE COPY acs-VT99
	 But the road to democracy has been difficult in Russia. Corruption, inefficiency, disappointment, nationalism, inflation - those are just a few of the problems that the Russian people have had to endure. Yet democracy has survived and has even begun to thrive, although in small ways. Soros' contribution is important because it is targeted at some of the most difficult problems that Russia faces. Life expectancy has actually declined in Russia in the last 10 years and infant mortality has grown to resemble that of some Third World nations. Large infusions of money into its health-care system could make a difference. Being able to provide jobs for military officers who no longer have a place in the armed forces is also essential.

RUSSIA IS A SEETHING CAULDRON OF DANGER WAITING TO BOIL OVER, AND SOROS FUNDS ARE THE ANSWER

EDITORIAL, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), October 22, 1997, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: BOUQUETS FOR SOROS; BOOS FOR AMERICA acs-VT99
	 Six years later, Russia remains a desperate place. Ultra-nationalists and former communists enjoy wide appeal among demoralized people, many of whom have not received pensions or paychecks from government jobs. Corruption, mismanagement and crime are rampant. True, some Russians have become prosperous capitalists, but most eke out a marginal life.
	 Which is why George Soros, the Hungarian-born American financier, stepped in. Soros said the democratically-elected government of President Yeltsin remains ''precarious'' but deserves Western aid and confidence. He also said Russia ''must deliver (to its people) if it wants reform to continue.''

SOROS TARGETS AREAS IN RUSSIA WHICH DESPERATELY NEED HELP

Daniela Deane, USA TODAY, October 21, 1997, Pg. 9A, HEADLINE: Soros to give Russia up to $500M U.S. financier targets health, military reform acs-VT99
	American financier George Soros, who admits he has "Messianic fantasies," announced Monday he would pour up to half a billion dollars in aid into Russia over the next three years, making him a bigger donor there than the United States government.
Speaking at a news conference in Moscow, the Hungarian-born multi-billionaire said the money would go to health care and military reform, areas where he said the country desperately needs help.

SOROS RUSSIAN PROGRAMS PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AN OPEN SOCIETY

EDITORIAL, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), October 22, 1997, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: BOUQUETS FOR SOROS; BOOS FOR AMERICA acs-VT99
	 Soros's $ 500 million gift makes him a bigger donor to Russia than the United States. In addition, he has already given Russia $ 260 million to promote democratic institutions, or an ''open society'' as he calls it. To Soros goes three cheers for his generosity and foresight.

SOROS WILLING TO ACT IN RUSSIA TO MEET BASIC HUMAN NEEDS

Daniela Deane, USA TODAY, October 21, 1997, Pg. 9A, HEADLINE: Soros to give Russia up to $500M U.S. financier targets health, military reform acs-VT99
	 "Under the Soviet system, the state played an all-pervading paternalistic role," said Soros, 67. "After the collapse of the Soviet Union, conditions have swung to the other extreme. The state is unable to meet its social obligations and many vital needs remain unfulfilled."
 Among the programs that will receive funding are an effort to fight tuberculosis and improve medical care for mothers and children, subsidies for books in schools and libraries, developing the Internet and retraining soldiers leaving the military.
 Through his Open Society Institute, Soros is the highest-profile philanthropist promoting the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe since the Soviet Union's fall in 1991.

SOROS FUNDS TO RUSSIA ARE TARGETED NOW FOR HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND MILITARY RETRAINING

Newsday (New York, NY), October 23, 1997, Page A46, HEADLINE: SOROS GIVES RUSSIA $500 MILLION: U.S. PLEASE COPY acs-VT99
	The gift that billionaire financier George Soros will be contributing to Russia - up to $500 million to help improve health care and education and to retrain the military for civilian jobs - is an important statement about how a great fortune can be used to help the world. It also illustrates by comparison how inadequate are the efforts of the United States to help Russia make it as a democracy.

SOROS GRANTS TO RUSSIA WILL ASSIST WITH HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND MILITARY RETRAINING

EDITORIAL, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), October 22, 1997, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: BOUQUETS FOR SOROS; BOOS FOR AMERICA acs-VT99
	George Soros, the billionaire philanthropist, is a walking Marshall Plan. Soros is giving $ 500 million during the next three years to a struggling Russia. His money will help improve Russia's appalling health care, retrain its poverty-stricken soldiers for civilian jobs and expand its education system.

SOROS HAS ENOUGH MONEY TO FINMANCE THE COUNTERPLAN

SOROS CAN AFFORD TO GIVE MORE THAN AMERICA CAN

Matthew Miller, U.S. News & World Report, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, November 2, 1997; Pg. 5J, HEADLINE: Mega-Philanthropists; If challenge is too big for a government, call George Soros or Ted Turner acs-VT99
	The very rich are different from you and me: Their charitable giving matches that of entire countries.
Take George Soros, the multibillionaire currency speculator and philanthropist. The other day, Mr. Soros announced a stunning new gift: In addition to the $ 1.5 billion he already has donated abroad, he will send a fresh $ 300 million to $ 500 million to struggling Russia over the next three years to improve health care, boost education and train downsized military officers for civilian jobs.

SOROS IS WILLING TO GIVE WHATEVER IT IS REALLY NEEDED

EDITORIAL, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, October 30, 1997; Pg. B7, HEADLINE: 'SAINT GEORGE' SOROS PUTS POWER OF GIVING TO WORK acs-VT99
	President Clinton's friends call him "a national treasure." And for Time magazine, he is simply "Saint George."
What has transformed a speculator into a saint is his habit of giving money away. Soros is America's most ambitious philanthropist since Andrew Carnegie. He spends two-thirds of his time and half his income on good works.

SOROS WANTS TO GIVE AWAY AT LEAST $5 BILLION, AND LOVES TO GIVE TO RUSSIA

EDITORIAL, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, October 30, 1997; Pg. B7, HEADLINE: 'SAINT GEORGE' SOROS PUTS POWER OF GIVING TO WORK acs-VT99
	At 67, Soros has already given away $1.5 billion and is parting with hundreds of millions of dollars a year.
He hopes eventually to give away the bulk of his fortune, which is now about $5 billion but may grow bigger on the back of his Quantum hedge fund. This month, he said he would give up to $500 million to Russia in the next five years, for health, education and helping to turn soldiers into civilians.

SOROS IS WILLING TO FUND CONTROVERSIAL PROJECTS WITH HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Robert Fresco. STAFF WRITER, Newsday (New York, NY), September 26, 1997, Page A67, HEADLINE: SOROS GIFTS BRING ACCLAIM, CRITICISM acs-VT99
	Soros, 67, has been a key player on the world scene since 1984, giving away $1.5 billion. In addition to his international efforts, he also has supported some high-profile and often controversial domestic causes, including liberalization of drug laws and aid to legal aliens. Fortune magazine recently listed him as the top giver in this country, with a total of $350 million going to various causes last year.

GIFTS BY ONE WEALTHY DONOR INSPIRE GIFTS BY OTHERS

Robert Fresco. STAFF WRITER, Newsday (New York, NY), September 26, 1997, Page A67, HEADLINE: SOROS GIFTS BRING ACCLAIM, CRITICISM acs-VT99
	Speaking in Bucharest, Soros called Turner's gift "a wonderful gesture. There are many causes that need support now, including land-mine removal, women's empowerment, population control and the building of open societies. I hope other very wealthy people will be inspired to emulate Mr. Turner."

SOROS VOWS TO GIVE AWAY OVER $3.5 BILLION BEFORE HE DIES

Daniela Deane, USA TODAY, October 21, 1997, Pg. 9A, HEADLINE: Soros to give Russia up to $500M U.S. financier targets health, military reform acs-VT99
	 Soros vows to give away all his assets, now valued at $ 3.5 billion, before he dies.

SOROS ALSO INVESTS BILLIONS IN RUSSIAN BUSINESS VENTURES WHICH NEED ASSISTANCE

Daniela Deane, USA TODAY, October 21, 1997, Pg. 9A, HEADLINE: Soros to give Russia up to $500M U.S. financier targets health, military reform acs-VT99
	 Soros has invested about $ 2 billion in business ventures in Russia. He said he has not profited from any of his philanthropic contributions.

SUCCESS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN SHOWS SOROS CAN SOLVE PROBLEMS

GEORGE SOROS IS A ONE-MAN MARSHALL PLAN IN THE FORMER COMMUNIST WORLD

EDITORIAL, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, October 30, 1997; Pg. B7, HEADLINE: 'SAINT GEORGE' SOROS PUTS POWER OF GIVING TO WORK acs-VT99
	However, in the ex-communist world Soros is hailed as a one-man Marshall Plan.

A RUSSIAN MARSHALL PLAN IS THE BEST WAY TO AVOID FUTURE DICTATORSHIPS

EDITORIAL, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), October 22, 1997, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: BOUQUETS FOR SOROS; BOOS FOR AMERICA acs-VT99
	After the collapse of communism, many foreign policy experts advised Washington and its Allies to do themselves a favor and start a Marshall Plan for Russia. 
The benefits for the Western alliance would be manifold. An economically strong Russia whose people are well-fed, clothed, given proper health care and education would not succumb to demagogues and dictators who prey on human misery.

MARSHALL PLAN SAVED EUROPE WHEN IT WAS DOWN AND OUT AFTER WORLD WAR TWO

EDITORIAL, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), October 22, 1997, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: BOUQUETS FOR SOROS; BOOS FOR AMERICA acs-VT99
	 The Marshall Plan for war-devastated Europe had rested on that cornerstone. And it worked. The United States sent $ 13 billion worth of assistance to Europe, including aid to former arch-enemy Germany. The money rebuilt ravaged societies and staved off the rising threat of communism in countries ripe for the picking.

MARSHALL PLAN OPTION FOR RUSSIA WAS REJECTED

EDITORIAL, News & Record (Greensboro, NC), October 22, 1997, Pg. A14, HEADLINE: BOUQUETS FOR SOROS; BOOS FOR AMERICA acs-VT99
	 Lessons from the Marshall Plan were regrettably ignored when communism collapsed in the former Soviet Union. Tight-fisted and self-absorbed, America and its Allies blew the chance for stabilizing Russia. 

CRITICS OF SOROS ARE WAY OFF BASE

CRITICS OF SOROS MISS HIS REAL IMPACT -- HELPING PEOPLE, NOT FOREIGN POLICIES

Daniela Deane, USA TODAY, October 21, 1997, Pg. 9A, HEADLINE: Soros to give Russia up to $500M U.S. financier targets health, military reform acs-VT99
	"They're missing the spirit of what's being done," says Michael Vachon, a spokesman for the Open Society Fund, which directs much of Soros' charitable work. "George Soros is not a country. He's helping hospitals, promoting health care, assisting libraries."

MALAYSIAN CRITICISM OF SOROS ARE BIGOTED SCAPEGOATING

Robert Fresco. STAFF WRITER, Newsday (New York, NY), September 26, 1997, Page A67, HEADLINE: SOROS GIFTS BRING ACCLAIM, CRITICISM acs-VT99
	 Earlier this month, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, in statements focusing on Soros' "Jewish origin," accused him of causing the devaluation of the country's currency through his companies' foreign exchange operations.
"Mahathir is using Soros as a scapegoat for problems he has created in his own country," commented Michael Vachon, a spokesman for the Open Society Fund, which directs much of Soros' charitable work.

PERMUTATION: GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS CAN BE EXPANDED BY SOROS

Matthew Miller, U.S. News & World Report, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, November 2, 1997; Pg. 5J, HEADLINE: Mega-Philanthropists; If challenge is too big for a government, call George Soros or Ted Turner acs-VT99
	Today, it is U.S. government officials who view their work as seed capital, hoping in Russia, for example, to hand their ideas off to deep-pocketed philanthropists who can ramp demonstration projects (computers in courthouses and incubators in hospitals) up to the needed scale. "It's just too big for us," as one U.S. official told me. Not for George Soros, though. There is something funny about that.

RELYING ON DONORS LIKE SOROS PROMOTES ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM

GIVING POWER TO SOROS PROMOTES A DANGEROUS FORM OF ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ABSOLUTISM

David Pryce-Jones, The American Spectator, December, 1997, HEADLINE: Corruption Rules the World // acs-ln
George Soros and other foundations, are a kind of top-down amalgam of activity, where citizens have no say, and cannot throw the rascals out. Marginalizing or bypassing parliamentary representation, this evolving form of globalizing absolutism breeds impotence and yet more cynicism. Finally, the effort to introduce democracy into the developing world has come to nothing. 

GIVING RICH INDIVIDUALS LIKE SOROS NEW POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS DANGEROUS

DeWayne Wickham, USA TODAY, October 30, 1997, SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Soros' giving a blessing -- and also a concern // acs-ln
 Soros has set up foundations in 40 countries through which he funnels his charitable giving. Most of it is used to promote the spread of democracy and capitalism. That's a commendable goal but not the end game for Soros. 
But there's a danger in allowing members of the Fifth Estate -- people who are ultimately motivated by profit, not the personal freedom of others -- to supplant the role of governments in international relations.

RELIANCE ON RICH INTERNATIONAL DONORS [LIKE SOROS] GIVES DANGEROUS POWER TO AN UNCONTROLLABLE ELEMENT

DeWayne Wickham, USA TODAY, October 30, 1997, SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: Soros' giving a blessing -- and also a concern // acs-ln
Members of the Fifth Estate, such as Soros, media mogul Rupert Murdoch and Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates, operate across these borders. They have money enough to fill the foreign-aid void created by the death of the Soviet Union and by U.S. budget cutbacks. How they and others use their wealth to affect the affairs of other nations ought to be a matter of great concern.
While they have the ability to do so, they lack the portfolio of a government minister. They are neither elected to public office nor the designated representatives of someone who is. To the extent that they influence the actions of governments around the world -- and they do -- they are a new force to be reckoned with.

SOROS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PLAY GOD

David Warsh, Globe Staff, The Boston Globe, January 13, 1998, Pg. D1, HEADLINE: The greatest villain // acs-ln
Peter Brooke, a Boston venture capitalist who founded Advent International:
 "And who is Soros anyway to play God with these emerging countries? Who is he to say that Malaysia is unworthy, that South Korea was no good yesterday but OK today, that Russia is a good bet? Somehow these emerging economies need to be developed before they come prey to the economic forces that are part of the developed world.

SOROS CURRENCY SPECULATION DESTROYED THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ECONOMIES

GEORGE SOROS IS A MENACE TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

David Warsh, Globe Staff, The Boston Globe, January 13, 1998, Pg. D1, HEADLINE: The greatest villain // acs-ln
Peter Brooke, a Boston venture capitalist who founded Advent International:
 "So Mr. Soros has done us no favors. He has played God. He has re-ordered who should get what, how and when. He has been lionized for his generosity to Russia after raping Southeast Asia. 
 "He is a menace and in time will be recognized as such."
 Strong words. But sophisticated, measured, and ultimately correct.
 But Brooke's is the voice of international responsibility. Look for it to become the dominant interpretation of events in the coming days and years.

SOROS HAS BEEN THE CAUSE OF MUCH HUMAN SUFFERING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

David Warsh, Globe Staff, The Boston Globe, January 13, 1998, Pg. D1, HEADLINE: The greatest villain // acs-ln
Peter Brooke, a Boston venture capitalist who founded Advent International:
 "But the assault on the Malaysian ringgit, the Thai baht, and the Indonesian rupiah by Soros and his ilk has gone too far. Twenty years of uninterrupted growth and social progress have been imperiled. Political and human suffering will be the result."

GEORGE SOROS IS THE BIGGEST VILLAIN IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA ECONOMIC COLLAPSE

David Warsh, Globe Staff, The Boston Globe, January 13, 1998, Pg. D1, HEADLINE: The greatest villain // acs-ln
Peter Brooke, a Boston venture capitalist who founded Advent International, "There are plenty of villains in the Southeast Asia story. Starting with the ruling political families (the Suhartos and the Mahathirs), progressing through the business leadership (which over-leveraged industry), to the central banks and the International Monetary Fund, and ending with George Soros, there is plenty of blame to pass around.
 "However, in the end, I have the feeling that Soros will come away as the greatest villain of all," said Brooke of the billionaire financier whose successful foreign currency speculations have driven several Asia currencies to fire sale levels.

SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD BE A LOT BETTER OFF IF SOROS HAD LEFT IT ALONE

David Warsh, Globe Staff, The Boston Globe, January 13, 1998, Pg. D1, HEADLINE: The greatest villain // acs-ln
Peter Brooke, a Boston venture capitalist who founded Advent International:
 "The hard lesson is that these economies are not developed. They are fragile, need protection, and will take generations to develop. What mistakes their leaders have made would have been corrected in time without the shock treatment provided by Mr. Soros and his friends. They would have found solutions on their own in a way that would have allowed them to maintain their dignity."

MANY ASIANS BLAME SOROS FOR THEIR ECONOMIC DOWNFALL

Roy Culpeper, president of the North-South Institute, The Financial Post, November 18, 1997 ; Pg. 29, HEADLINE: DOWNSIDE OF OPEN FINANCIAL MARKETS: There is a price to be paid for G7 policies of liberalization // acs-ln
Many Asians believe financial speculators such as George Soros are responsible for the possible demise of their 'economic miracle,' with its stunning double-digit growth rates and historically unprecedented pace of development. 

SOROS IS THOUGHT OF AS A VILLAIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

John Ridding and James Kynge, Financial Times (London), January 13, 1998, Pg. 08, HEADLINE: Complacency gives way to contagion // acs-ln
Dr Mahathir, for example, conducted a highly visible campaign to blame others for Malaysia's problems.
 At the 30th anniversary celebrations of the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) in July, he delivered a vintage performance. George Soros, the US financier, he declared, was the arch-villain in a conspiracy to impoverish south-east Asian nations by attacking their currencies.
 Mr Soros denied any involvement in attacking the ringgit, Malaysia's currency, and Dr Mahathir did not supply evidence to back his claim. But for weeks in August Mr Soros became a national bete noire; everyone from bankers to taxi drivers lambasted him.

REGIONAL COUNTERPLAN

THESIS: The Russian central government is characterized by inefficient gridlock. This counterplan does the affirmative plan towards the regional governments, which are strong and healthy, instead. This better gains the affirmative advantage and avoids nationalism and other disadvantages linked to the Russian central government.

We advocate the following counterplan:

The United States shall adopt the affirmative plan but its efforts and assistance will be channeled towards the Russian regional governments, not towards the central government in Moscow.

ONE: NOT TOPICAL
A. The counterplan is not topical because it takes action towards specific regions in Russia, no to Russia as a whole..
B. Topical counterplans are justified. Once the affirmative chooses its plan all other policy options become negative ground to test the desirability of the affirmative plan. The affirmative does not have to defend the entire resolution so there is no reason why rejected affirmative ground should not become ground for the negative. The burden of competition remains and checks abuse.

TWO: COMPETITION
The counterplan is net beneficial because it solves as well as the affirmative but avoids the probnlems of Russian central government gridlock and the nationalism disadvantage. 

THREE: SOLVENCY

A. ATTEMPTS TO ASSIST RUSSIA WILL WORK BETTER IF THEY ARE TARGETED TOWARDS THE RIGHT REGIONS

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 Devolution of power is a new reality in today's Russia. Kremlin politics still matter, but outsiders' policies can better promote reform if they pay more attention to the ''Federation'' part of the Russian Federation. -

B. BECAUSE OF GRIDLOCK IN MOSCOW, REGIONS IN RUSSIA HAVE LARGELY GONE THEIR OWN WAY

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 The political and economic levers of Moscow's power collapsed in 1991. No well-functioning system of central power has replaced the old regime. Regional governors and legislatures have taken up the slack 
 The Russian executive and legislative branches have frequently deadlocked on important issues, such as land reform, with the result that the regions have made their own decisions and gone their own way.

FOUR: STRENGTHENING REGIONS HELPS SOLVE FOR NATIONALISM AND EXPANSIONISM

A. REGIONAL DEVOLUTION OF POWER IN RUSSIA MAKES IT FAR MORE DIFFICULT FOR AN AUTHORITARIAN STATE TO RE-EMERGE IN RUSSIA

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	Boris Yeltsin may be the president, but significant political power is flowing from Moscow to the regions. Democratically elected regional leaders have growing power in Russia's politics, economics and even foreign policy. Russia's evolution toward a decentralized federal state has important and positive implications, including a reduced likelihood that Russia will revert to a Soviet-style authoritarian state any time soon.

B. POWER HAS DEVOLVED TOWARDS THE REGIONS, AND THAT KEEPS THE MOSCOW ELITE UNDER CONTROL AND STOPS EXPANSIONIST POLICIES

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 Moscow still sets the general approach toward reform and is still an important arbiter of political power and dispenser of resources. Moscow retains control of the security forces. The Russian Federation is not disintegrating. But the underlying shift in power tothe regions is clear. The diffusion of power in Russia has important implications. The ability of Moscow to amass economic and military resources for an expansionist foreign policy has significantly diminished. This diffusion of power helps check and balance central authority. Democracy in the regions, as well as in Russia's cities, tempers imperial tendencies in the Moscow elite.

REGIONAL COUNTERPLAN EXTENSIONS

USA SHOULD TARGET REGIONS WHERE REFORMS ARE WORKING FOR SPECIAL ASSISTANCE

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 The United States and other Western countries should target their assistance on regions and municipalities where local leaders are committed to reform. An important lesson from the past five years of U.S. assistance to Russia is that a committed and effective Russian partner makes all the difference in helping political and economic reform happen. The focus should be on training for regional officials in good governance and in creating the right business conditions to stimulate investment.

MOST OF RUSSIA’S REGIONAL GOVERNORS ARE NOW DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED AND ARE SHARING POWER WITH MOSCOW

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 Most governors of Russia's regions now have been elected democratically. These elections have empowered governors whose focus is on promoting the interests of their regions. The governors now automatically sit in the upper house of the Russian Parliament, which gives them greater ability to defend regional interests.
 The Kremlin and various regions have agreed to some 30 power-sharing treaties. These treaties define the respective power of the center and the regional governments, and increase regional autonomy.

PROGRESSIVE REGIONAL GOVERNORS HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL AT INTRODUCING EFFECTIVE REFORMS

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 Crucial decisions on reform are made at the regional level. Reform has prospered in regions where the governors are progressive - Samara, Novgorod, Nizhni Novgorod - and had setbacks where governors are Communist or corrupt.
 Regional leaders are increasingly active in foreign affairs. Governors in the Far East are engaged on a range of issues with Asian neighbors.

EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA'S THIRD LARGEST CITY SHOWS THAT REFORM AND DEMILITARIZATION CAN SUCCEED

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 365 , acs-VT99
	Beyond Moscow, the most encouraging region is centered around Nizhny Novgorod, where young and progressive politicians like Boris Nemtsov have made good on their promises to create "capitalism in one country." One of the biggest problems with the Soviet economy was that it ,vas so heavily militarized; Nizhny Novgorod, the third-largest city in the country, has been one of the most militarized of all. And yet not only, has the city managed, through privatization, demonopolization, and bond issues, to create thriving service and production economics, it has also managed to convert 90 percent of its collective farms to private hands.

REGIONS HAVE GAINED GREATER AND GREATER CONTROL OVER THEIR RESOURCES

Lee Hamilton; the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, International Herald Tribune, July 16, 1997, Pg. 8 HEADLINE: Pay Attention to Russia's Reforming Regions acs-VT99
	 The Russian Federation is still evolving, but the important point is that the constituent parts of Russia now matter. Resource-rich regions such as Tatarstan, for example, have signed advantageous treaties that give them a greater share and greater control over their resources.

POWER AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES MUST BE DECENTRALIZED FROM MOSCOW FOR RUSSIA TO DEVELOP EQUALLY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	Finally, both power and financial resources must be decentralized. Russia will be doomed to instability and underdevelopment as long as 85 percent of the nation's money remains concentrated in Moscow. Local initiatives and entrepreneurship should be encouraged if the fruits of economic growth are to be shared among Russia's numerous regional, social, and ethnic groups.

CONSULTATION COUNTERPLAN

THESIS: Just taking Russia for granted is a very dangerous foreign policy. BEFORE adopting the affirmative plan to make sure that they feel included and involved. They may disagree, but we will have consulted them. After consultation, the plan can be adopted.

We advocate the following counterplan:

The United States shall inform Russia and consult them about our planned actions and ask if they wish to be involved in the process. Then the United States will: (read affirmative plan).

ONE: NOT TOPICAL
A. The counterplan is not topical because it takes the action of consultation before it acts to change its foreign policy, hence the counterplan is extra topical.
B. Topical counterplans are justified. Once the affirmative chooses its plan all other policy options become negative ground to test the desirability of the affirmative plan. The affirmative does not have to defend the entire resolution so there is no reason why rejected affirmative ground should not become ground for the negative. The burden of competition remains and checks abuse.

TWO: COMPETITION
The counterplan is net beneficial because it solves as well as the affirmative but avoids the consultation disadvantage. The affirmative takes Russia for granted. 

Marshall Goldman, March 8, 1998 [professor at Wellesley College specializing in the Russian economy. He also serves as associate director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. THE ORLANDO SENTINEL SECTION- EDITORIAL; Pg. G3 HEADLINE: DON'T DARE TAKE INTERESTS OF RUSSIANS FOR GRANTED\\jan]VT99
The Cold War is over, and we've got to bring them in. This means that we can't just act unilatually. It's not necessary that we have consensus on everything. But we can't take the Russians' interests for granted.

THREE: SOLVENCY
The counterplan doesn’t allow Russia to change the policy option in any way, therefore it solves as well as the affirmative plan.

FOUR: CONSULTATION IS A SUPERIOR PROCESS

EARLY ENGAGEMENT OF RUSSIA BY THE USA IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID CATASTROPHE

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 51 , acs-VT99 
	Second, the United States should try to engage Russia sooner rather than later. The longer the United States waits, the more complicated and messy Russian politics is likely to become and the more Russian policy is likely to be influenced by domestic factors-above all the succession issue-over which the United States has little control. There is a danger, moreover, that Yeltsin's health could suddenly deteriorate or that lie could become incapacitated. This could result in a prolonged paralysis in U.S.-Russian relations. In the meantime, important arms control treaties such as START and CFE Could collapse. By the time the Russians are in a position to reengage, it may be difficult-or too late-to repair the damage.

DISADVANTAGE SECTION

NATIONALIST TAKE OVER
page 169

REFORM INCREASES THE RUSSIAN MAFIA
page 191

RUSH TO REFORM DISASTER
page 196

ELECTION 2000
page 209

DIPLOMATIC PARTNERSHIP
page 221

RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR
page 235

CHINA-USA RELATIONS
page 241

CONSULTATION
page 252

US FOREIGN POLICY AND LEADERSHIP
page 253

NATIONALIST TAKE OVER

THESIS: Russia is at a crossroads between choosing an integrative path with its neighbors or pursuing a nationalistic path -- where Russia tries to dominate world affairs. Strong nationalist feeling exists in Russia, among its people and the military, and if those nationalist feelings are increased, nationalist forces will be able to impose their dangerous policies on the nation. Their policies feature a new arms race, a new cold war with the West, and a war to reconquer the former Soviet Union.
Two transition scenarios:
*Yeltsin gives in to nationalist feelings and adopts their policies. [co-optation version]
*Military coup gives nationalists control over the government. [coup version]
We suggest using the “coup” version when the affirmative acts to decrease Russia’s military might, and the “co-optation” version at other times.

NATIONALIST TAKE OVER [co-optation version]

A. RUSSIA IS AT A CROSSROADS -- BECOME PRO-WESTERN IN ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS, OR ALLOW POWER HUNGRY RUSSIAN ELITES TO PULL IT INTO A NEW MILITARISM

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 IT IS IMPOSSIBLE at this time to foresee which path Russia will choose, pro-Western or anti-Western. The country's political structures are too fragile and the mood of its people too volatile for predictions. Russia's true national interests demand a pro-Western alignment and integration into the world economy. The ambitions and emotional needs of Russia's elite, however, pull in the opposite direction: away from the global economic order dominated by the industrial democracies and toward reliance on military power as well as rapprochement with countries that for one reason or another are hostile to the West. The latter course is alluring because catching up with the West militarily would be much easier for Russia than catching up economically.

B. AFFIRMATIVE PLAN MOBILIZES RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

--INSERT LINKS FOUND ON LINK PAGES

C. YELTSIN MAY BOW TO NATIONALIST PRESSURES IF THEY GROW

Fred Hiatt, editorial page staff of The Washington Post, The Moscow Times, April 11, 1998, HEADLINE: Perils of Disengagement , acs-VT99
	 But as would-be successors jockey for Yeltsin's job, the atmosphere could change. Yeltsin's prime minister-designate, Sergei Kiriyenko, hasn't announced an economic program, but he felt compelled first thing to disclose that his father was Jewish, hoping thereby to defuse what might have become a whispering campaign against him. Already, Luzhkov has laid claim to parts of Ukraine and inflamed Muscovite prejudices against darker-skinned residents from the south. Yeltsin is not above bowing to such winds if they gain strength.

D. THE RUSSIAN NATIONALIST LEFT WANTS TO AGGRESSIVELY MOVE AGAINST OTHER FORMER SOVIET STATES

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	One aimed at reviving something resembling the former USSR as quickly as possible. The cost -- in treasure, world opinion, and even blood was no object. All means were acceptable, including the stirring up of nationalist and irredentist passions among the 25 million ethnic Russians living in the region. Moscow was urged to threaten recalcitrant states with the " politicization" of their Russian communities and the redrawing of borders to reclaim areas with large Russian populations, like northern Kazakhstan and eastern Ukraine. This imperial, revanchist, and ideological agenda was advocated largely, though not exclusively, by the nationalist Left.

E. A REFORMIST RUSSIA CAN HELP SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS, A HOSTILE RUSSIA WILL BE THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PROBLEM

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	We are not neutral bystanders. There is no doubt where our own national interest lies: Quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia's reformers, those who look outward and forward rather than inward and backward for the signposts of national revival. A Russia that reflects their aspirations is likely to be part of the solution to the world's many problems. Conversely, a Russia that erects barriers against what it sees as a hostile world and that believes the best defense is a good offense -- such a Russia could be, in the 21st century just as it was in much of the 20th, one of the biggest of the problems we and our children will face.

NATIONALIST TAKE OVER [coup version]

A. RUSSIA STANDS ON THE BRINK OF A WIDESPREAD MILITARY REVOLT

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	 It was in this context that the specter of a military "mutiny" suddenly and unexpectedly emerged inside the Yeltsin camp itself. All but unreported in the U.S. press, the Rokhlin affair, as it became known, shook Moscow in June and July. In a seven-page open letter to the "Commander in Chief," which he sent to garrisons across the country and then published in opposition newspapers, Gen. Lev Rokhlin accused Yeltsin of surrounding himself with brazenly corrupt advisers, willfully destroying the army and the defense industries, betraying Russian national interests and acceding to NATO expansion and thus America's "diktat over Europe's political and military order."
 Such charges have long been leveled by Communists and radical nationalists, but Rokhlin is neither. Previously a top army commander under Yeltsin and now chairman of Parliament's Armed Forces Committee, he was elected to the Duma as a member of the main pro-government party. Two points in his open letter were therefore a bombshell. Yeltsin, he wrote, was purposely impoverishing the army in favor of Interior Ministry troops, which are to be used as a Praetorian Guard in the event of popular unrest. " Russia is being turned into a police state," he insisted. And he called upon the military to "close ranks" and defend itself against the Yeltsin government.

C. USA HARD LINE POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA ONLY HELPS FUTURE RUSSIAN DICTATORS

Jess Frost ; teaches Russian language at Clark College, The Columbian (Vancouver, WA.), April 05, 1998, SECTION: B; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: SUPPORT RUSSIA, NOT NATO ANTAGONISM acs-VT99
	With her vast resources and talented people, Russia one day again will be a powerful force on the worlds stage with our help or without it. Over that reality, we have no control. But whether shell be led by a democrat or a dictator is a reality we must try to influence. And we’d better well understand that atavistic, Cold War policy today helps despots in Russia, not democrats.

D. MILITARY IS A POWERFUL FORCE PRESSING FOR REINTEGRATION OF FORMER SOVIET STATES

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	The main instrument of "reintegration" today is the Russian army, and this is worrisome because its formidable officer corps is society's most embittered and vindictive group. Anyone who spends an hour with Russian generals cannot but feel the intensity of their resentment against the West as well as against their own democratic government for reducing to the status of a negligible force the army that defeated Nazi Germany and was acknowledged by the U.S. military as a peer. The dethroned Communist Party nomenklatura has adapted to the new era by appropriating some of the state's wealth and continuing to manage much of the rest. But the generals, dependent on government allocations, have had no such opportunity, and they seethe with humiliation both personal and professional.

E. A REFORMIST RUSSIA CAN HELP SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS, A HOSTILE RUSSIA WILL BE THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PROBLEM

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	We are not neutral bystanders. There is no doubt where our own national interest lies: Quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of Russia's reformers, those who look outward and forward rather than inward and backward for the signposts of national revival. A Russia that reflects their aspirations is likely to be part of the solution to the world's many problems. Conversely, a Russia that erects barriers against what it sees as a hostile world and that believes the best defense is a good offense -- such a Russia could be, in the 21st century just as it was in much of the 20th, one of the biggest of the problems we and our children will face.

RUSSIA IS ON THE BRINK OF GIVING IN TO NATIONALIST AUTHORITARIANISM

NOW IS THE TIME WHEN RUSSIA WILL CHOOSE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 Yet doubts linger because so much about post-communist Russia is unfinished and unsettled. Fledgling democracy contends with ancient authoritarian traditions; private enterprise struggles against a collectivist culture; frustrated nationalist and imperialist ambitions impede the enormous task of internal reconstruction. Russians, bewildered by the suddenness and the scope of the changes they have experienced, do not know in which direction to proceed. A veritable battle for Russia's soul is in progress.

RUSSIA IS STILL AT THE CROSSROADS OF ITS HISTORY

Mikhail Gorbachev, former leader of the Soviet Union, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), December 14, 1997, Pg. 41A, HEADLINE: For the change Russia needs, Yeltsin regime must leave power acs-VT99
	Today Russia is extremely complicated and contradictory. Its prospects are not yet clear. Contrary to what Russia's leadership says, Russia actually has not yet made a choice. It is still at a fork in the road.

RUSSIAN PUBLIC’S ANGER OVER ITS FOREIGN POLICY MAKES IT RIPE FOR FASCISM

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	Naturally, this united opposition to Yeltsin's foreign policy does not hold anything good either for the elections in the year 2000, or for his place in History. For it is only a small step from such a "patriotic consensus" to what Andrey Galkin, the well-known historian of Fascism, calls "getting used to Fascist values." More than this, he thinks that in today's Russia, "this habituation is evident, not least in intellectual circles who until recently were congratulating themselves on their democratism."

"TOP DOWN" REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA IS FAILING, AND THE STAGE IS SET FOR THE BACKLASH OF TRADITIONALISM

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 68-69 , acs-VT99 
	Historical processes are quite important in a book dealing with the rise of crime in postCommunist Russia, a society in transition. Today, after a short period of "white" revolution in Russia (the economic reforms of 1992-93), the prospect of a "black" revolution is real again. Vocal reactionaries are calling for a return to Russia's traditional ideology of "derzhavnost "' and declaring the 1991-93 events to be a "criminal revolution," and similar ideas are now expounded not only by Communists. Moderate and especially extreme left-wing Communists have created an unimaginable union with "deizhavniki," many of whom (for example, the 'inventor of the term "criminal revolution," Stanislav Govorukhin) behaved like anti-Communists during perestroika. Incidentally, the same kind of union existed in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when some monarchists and other groups of the intelligentsia devoted to the traditional ideology of statism and "derzhavnost "' supported Stalin in his struggle against Leo Trotsky; for them, Stalinism was above all a return to traditional moral practices.

WE SHOULD VIEW RUSSIA AS OUR BIGGEST SECURITY CONCERN IS NOT GUARANTEED 

Doctor John Deutch, FEBRUARY 12, 1998 [served as President Clinton's deputy secretary of Defense and then CIA director, Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY \\ jan]VT99 
I want to review very briefly for the committee the judgements that I have about the security challenges our country face and also to highlight a few defense and intelligence programs that I believe deserve this committee's strong support. First of all, Russia. Russia should continue to be our top security concern even though we don't have the same adversarial relationship that we had during the Cold War. Why? Because Russia still possesses 20,000 plus nuclear weapons and at the same time there is widespread corruption. The absence of honest and accountable government in Russia and absence of administrative functions which are slowing Russia's erratic and periodically movement towards a democratic goverment and a market- oriented economy. Thus it is critical that we follow internal political developments in Russia most slowly, most carefully and we must also follow, as carefully as possible, Russian foreign policy activity for example, as the Chairman mentioned, relations with Iran which are an indicator of Russian attitudes towards the United States and the West.

LINK: TRYING TO REFORM RUSSIA FROM THE TOP DOWN CREATES A NATIONALIST BACKLASH

TRYING TO ACHIEVE A "TOP DOWN" REVOLUTION IN RUSSIAN LIFE LEADS TO HUGE BACKLASH FROM CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 63 , acs-VT99 
	When political leaders initiate a revolution "from the top," that is, a "white revolution," they face a rather complicated dilemma Institutional borrowings are necessitated mostly by foreign-policy considerations, such as keeping the military balance with neighboring states or protecting national independence. At the same time, the borrowing of both new moral practices and the corresponding formal institutions is dangerous from the standpoint of domestic policy. Such borrowing encourages the consolidation 	of "traditionalist" conservatives, who owe their popularity not so much to the attractiveness of their program for the population but rather to the social expenses of the "structural" violence needed to implant new social institutions, together with new supporting moral practices, into traditional society. A "white revolution," unless it is based on an aggressive ideology ready to justify these very substantial social expenses, is usually confined to innovations in rather limited spheres-military buildup, scientific and technological innovations, and bureaucratization.

TOP DOWN REVOLUTIONS ONLY RESULT IN LONG TERM INSTABILITY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 65 , acs-VT99 
	The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have produced many attempts to carry out "white" revolutions. Examples readily come to mind: Egypt and Thailand (then Slam) in the nineteenth century, Turkey after its defeat in World War 1, Iran after World War 11 and up to 1978, and numerous Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Even a cursory comparison of these developments shows that "white" revolutions usually prove quite unstable, which is attributable not only to the gap between the elites that conduct these revolutions and the masses of the population that uphold traditions but also to the fact that the forces that instigate "white" revolutions usually have a rather vague idea of the real situation in their countries and even of the new order they hope to establish

WHEN "TOP DOWN" REVOLUTIONS FAIL, BACKLASH IS SERIOUS AND BRUTAL

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 67 , acs-VT99 
A "black" revolution is usually a reaction to the inconsistency of a "white" revolution, coupled with its leaders' inadequate understanding of the real meaning of the transformations they are trying to produce (e.g., the reforms initiated by the Iranian Shah in the 1960s) or the utopian character of the social constructions introduced by a "white" revolution (e.g., the failure of "war communism" in Russia in 1921). The reaction of society to the virtual failure of a "white" revolution may be prompt, as in Iran in 1978, or delayed, as in the USSR in 1922-29, but the outcome is the same, namely, the return to fundamental traditional values, whatever the ideological decorations accompanying this return.

"TOP DOWN" REVOLUTION IS SEEN BY THE MASSES AS A CRIMINAL ACT, SO THEY TURN TO DANGEROUS TRADITIONALIST ELEMENTS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 67 , acs-VT99 
	In the eyes of the masses, the elites that attempt to carry out a "white" revolution look like a group with criminal intent if the revolution fails. The newly established social institutions, and, most important, the moral practices that support them, are quickly outlawed and exterminated. Society does not merely return to its "prerevolutionary" state. All the evolving embryos of the new state, including the goals and methods of the recent transformation, are destroyed to please the "moral fundamentalism" of tradition. Society reverts not to the initial point of transformation but to a certain "ideal tradition," which never really existed and which is the same kind of social utopia as the dreams of the radical revolutionaries who failed to realize their plans precisely because they were utopian. 

LINK: INCREASED SOCIAL INEQUALITY FEEDS NATIONALIST FEELING

WIDENING INCOME GAP MERELY FUELS THE NEO COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	In real terms, government pensions and wages were cut to 40 percent or less of their original value, and the government still cannot collect enough taxes to cover these expenses. Tax receipts have fallen to less than 20 percent of the country's GDP. Meanwhile, external debt has skyrocketed, and domestic debt, which was next to nothing just a decade ago, has reached almost 15 percent of GDP. Servicing these debts, paid out to local bankers and foreign speculators at exorbitant interest rates, will take no less than 25 percent of total government expenditure in 1998. The current Russian market economy has created a handful of super-wealthy individuals while leaving the rest behind to struggle. It is no wonder that these economic policies resulted in some 250 communists and 50 ultranationalist Zhirinovskyites being elected to the 450-seat State Duma in 1995.

RISING SOCIAL INEQUALITY CREATES OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUTHORITARIAN FORCES TO GAIN CONTROL

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 136 , acs-VT99 
	The frailty of labor peace suggests that the divisions between winners and losers continue to pose a threat to political and social stability. In a society where increasing numbers of Russians feel excluded from the process of change, the possibility of a social explosion cannot be ruled out. Not surprisingly, when Russians were asked in early 1996 whether "order or democracy was more important for Russia now," only 9 percent chose democracy. 15 In a period of devolution the desire for order is understandable, but under such circumstances people are more likely to be manipulated by groups seeking authoritarian solutions rather than democratic ones.

RISING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY INCREASES THE DANGER OF AN AUTHORITARIAN MOVE IN RUSSIA

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 138 , acs-VT99 
 One factor, however, has not changed: the increasing divide between winners and losers in the transition to capitalism. Growing inequality and insecurity are the seeds of social disorder. The real battle for democracy in Russia is no longer between communism and capitalism. Russia's newly won freedoms are threatened by the growing divisions between winners and losers. Without greater attention to social democratic reforms, the specter of authoritarianism will continue to haunt Russia's fragile experiment with capitalism.

VARIOUS LINKS -- THINGS WHICH FEED RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

TRYING TO GET RUSSIA TO ADOPT FOREIGN "ADVANCED" PRACTICES ONLY RESULTS IN A BACKLASH TO PREVIOUS METHODS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 57 , acs-VT99 
	Attempts to spur this process by designing new moral practices or borrowing them from "advanced" societies are possible, but their socially painful realization often ends in failure. In this event, a return to well-known and long-established moral practices emasculates the legislation and institutions that have been brought in to support "artificial" moral practices, which may lead to real tragedy not only for individuals but for entire social groups.

LINK: WHEN PUBLIC OPINION BECOMES MORE ANTI-AMERICAN, IT FEEDS THE FIRES OF ULTRANATIONALISM AND CHAUVINISM IN RUSSIA -- ATTEMPTS TO CONTAIN RUSSIA BECOME COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Ultranationalistic and chauvinistic forces in Russia exploit the population's disenchantment with the West and have renewed suspicions about the West's ulterior motives. Yet, many conservatives in the United States inadvertently help these Russian forces in their anti-Western campaign. Acting on the assumption that the collapse of the Soviet Union came as a result of Western political and military pressure and not as a result of the USSR's internal contradictions, these conservatives remain locked in their Cold War mentality, which is reflected in their attempts to make or influence U.S. policy toward Russia and its Near Abroad. Their "containment of Russia" rhetoric does not go unnoticed in Russia; chauvinistic forces use such comments as incontestable proof of aggressive U.S. intentions.

LINK: NATO EXPANSION FORCES MODERATES TO JOIN WITH THE NATIONALIST HARD-LINERS

Thomas L. Friedman; International Herald Tribune, August 1, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: But What About the U.S.-Russian Relationship? acs-VT99
	 Third, Russia is now embarking on a major debate about how much to downsize its conventional armed forces, and ''NATO expansion will figure into every discussion and paper written on the military reform question.''
 Hard-liners are already using it to embarrass advocates of sweeping reform. Even centrist Russian strategists now argue that with NATO expanding, and Russia's army shrinking, Russia will have to rely more heavily on nuclear deterrence and a doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons.

LINK: NATO EXPANSION INTO THE BALTICS WILL BE VERY DIFFERENT, AND WILL PROMOTE RUSSIAN AUTHORITARIAN NATIONALISM

John F. Harris, Washington Post Staff Writer, The Washington , May 04, 1998, Pg. A16, HEADLINE: After NATO Vote, Doubts on U.S.- Russia Rapport // acs-VT99
	 Dimitri K. Simes, a prominent Russian analyst at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and a supporter of the first round of NATO expansion, said, "Once you start talking about the Balts, and to some extent Ukraine, it's a totally different story." NATO membership for these nations, he said, could lead Russia to "abandon its current moderation" and give leverage to those Russian leaders who are "more assertive, and more prepared to stand up to the United States. "

LINK: ACTION AGAINST THE SERBS WILL FUEL RUSSIAN NATIONALISM AND THREATEN RELATIONS WITH NATO

Paul J. Saunders, assistant director of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, Newsday (New York, NY), August 20, 1997, Page A39, HEADLINE: IT'S NOT IN U.S. INTEREST TO BE WORLD COP acs-VT99
	 It is important to remember here the outburst of anti-Western sentiment in Russia following the initial NATO air strikes against the Serbs. The admittedly flawed NATO- Russia Founding Act would also be undermined and, as a result, we could be back at square one on NATO enlargement, with the added difficulty of genuine public opposition within Russia. 

LINK: RUSSIAN QUESTION THE MOTIVES BEHIND OUR ASSISTANCE -- PATIENCE AND EMPATHY WOULD BE A BETTER POLICY

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	Assistance of any kind, no matter how well-meaning, must take into account Russian people's suspicions of the motives behind it, irrational as these may be. Immense patience and empathy are required in dealing with Russia's halting progress toward democracy; failure to display them only helps anti-Western forces.

LINK: RUSSIAN ELITES ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIA’S LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL STATURE, AND YEARN TO BE POWERFUL AGAIN

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 Russia is torn by contradictory pulls, one oriented inward, hence isolationist, the other imperialist. The population at large, preoccupied with physical survival, displays little interest in foreign policy, taking in stride the loss of empire and the world influence that went with it. People pine for normality, which they associate with life in the West as depicted in foreign films and television programs. Depoliticized, they are unresponsive to ideological appeals, although not averse to blaming all their troubles on foreigners. But for the ruling elite and much of the intelligentsia, accustomed to being regarded as citizens of a great power, the country's decline to Third World status has been traumatic. They are less concerned with low living standards than the loss of power and influence, perhaps because inwardly they doubt whether Russia can ever equal the West in anything else. Power and influence for them take the form of imperial splendor and military might second to none.

LINK: THE MORE WE FEAR RUSSIAN THREATS AGAINST OTHER STATES IN EUROPE, THE MORE WE INCREASE ITS LIKELIHOOD BY FOSTERING RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	 Russia's view is that Nato's new members - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all due to join next April - and other alliance hopefuls want membership as insurance against a possible resurgence of Soviet-style aggression. Moscow rejects this as an unjust aspersion on post-communist Russian foreign policy. Even Russian liberals say such fears in countries on Russia's western borders may turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies, particularly if a nationalist-inclined politician such as Yuri Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow, were to replace Yeltsin as president.

LINK: INSULTS TO HONOR CAN BE AS IMPORTANT A CAUSE OF WAR AS NATIONAL INTERESTS

George Will, Washington Post Writers Group, The Chattanooga Times, May 26, 1998, Pg. A4, HEADLINE: Arms control fantasies acs-VT99
	 Remember, Kagan says, what Thucydides listed first among the three things that cause people to go to war: "honor, fear and interest." Liberal optimism about taming the world rests on the hope that fear can be assuaged and interests accommodated. But honor is a more volatile variable. Kagan says that if we understand the significance of honor to include deference, esteem, respect and prestige, it is an important motive of modern nations.
Kagan believes that considerations of material gain or even ambition for power itself frequently play a small role in bringing on war, and that "often some aspect of honor is decisive." Which is one reason why threats of material losses from economic sanctions are weak enforcements of arms controls and will be utterly futile against an India feeling its oats.

LINK: ATTEMPTS TO APPEASE NATIONALIST SENTIMENT IN RUSSIA ONLY ACCELERATE ITS POWER

Fred Hiatt, editorial page staff of The Washington Post, The Moscow Times, April 11, 1998, HEADLINE: Perils of Disengagement , acs-VT99
	Some in the West seek to defuse such nationalist sentiment by deferring to it. They would derail or delay the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They would pay court in Russia - as German Chancellor Helmut Kohl shamefully did last month - by suggesting that they sympathize with Russia in its Latvia dispute. They would give Russia a veto over Latvia's joining the European Union by suggesting, as Kohl and others have, that border disputes with Russia should be disqualifying.
 This kind of appeasement does Russia's democrats no favor. Every country, no matter how small, has the right to plot its own course. If Primakov and Luzhkov can make gains in the West by threatening Russia's weaker neighbors, they will only do it more. Russians who favor civilized, equitable relations will be weakened.

LINK: OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT IN RUSSIA'S FAR EAST ANGERS RUSSIAN HARD-LINERS

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 50 , acs-VT99 
	More recently, Russian conservatives have been concerned by Japanese and US economic and political interest in the region. Tokyo initially directed economic aid to the Central Asian republics in preference to Russia. The US has made clear its commitment to Central Asian sovereignty, free exploitation of Caspian Sea resources and security links, including Central Asia's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme. Kyrgyzstan embraced PFP to counter Russian pressure, while Kazakstan developed contacts with the US military, such as a 1997 arrangement for US P-30 Orion aircraft to undertake aerial surveys for the Kazak government. The Russian nationalist press speaks conspiratorially of US infiltration in the area, even suggesting that the Voice of America radio station has used Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan as a base for broadcasts into China.

LINK: US ATTEMPTS TO USE RUSSIA TO COUNTER BALANCE CHINA INFLAMES RADICAL RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 76 , acs-VT99 
	It is important to recognise the largely benign outcome of the present relationship for three reasons. First, debate over Russia's role as a counter-balance to China only inflames nationalist and anti-US sentiment in Russia. Conservatives portray their country as caught between allegiance to the US on the one hand and to China on the other. Western appeals for caution over future Chinese action against Taiwan or in the South China Sea are viewed as a 'trap' to force Moscow to act as a 'second front' against Beijing. Many Russians suspect that those who criticise Russia's overtures to China do so to undermine the limited but profitable, relationship with Beijing.

STRONGER NATIONALIST FORCES WILL CO-OPT THE YELTSIN REGIME
[CO-OPTATION VERSION]

YELTSIN IS LOSING CONTROL OF FOREIGN POLICY. HE IS BEING PUSHED TO BE MORE NATIONALISTIC

The Economist, February 14, 1998, ]SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs-, EUROPE; Pg. 49. HEADLINE: Russia's part-time president \\ jan]VT99 
	Nor is it only Russia's economy that needs new management. In foreign policy too, Mr Yeltsin has lost his balance. He used to be the dominant figure in a double-act with Yevgeny Primakov, the foreign minister. Mr Yeltsin would charm the West, while Mr Primakov devilled among the old Soviet client-states. In recent diplomacy towards Iraq, however, Mr Primakov seems to have persuaded his boss that it is Bill Clinton, not Saddam Hussein, who poses the bigger danger to world peace. Last week Mr Yeltsin said Mr Clinton "might trigger off a world war". This week he said that "attempts by some countries ... to assume a role of leader are unrealistic and even dangerous. " Much more of this, and Russia will have a cool welcome from the G7 group of big industrialised countries when Mr Yeltsin takes his seat at the Birmingham summit this spring.

YELTSIN'S POLITICAL POWERS ARE FAILING HIM. HE WILL CHANGE HIS POLICIES IF HE IS UNDER ENOUGH PRESSURE TO DO SO

The Economist, February 14, 1998, ]SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs-, EUROPE; Pg. 49. HEADLINE: Russia's part-time president \\ jan]VT99 
	And increasingly, Mr Yeltsin's political powers seem to be failing him too. He is no longer the master of any game save that of shuffling his ministers and advisers with disruptive frequency. His lack of commitment and clarity in economic policy has helped condemn Russia to a recession far longer and deeper than that of most other transitional economics. Even now, Mr Yeltsin seems to view declarations of intent as an acceptable substitute for action. Last month he presented his government with a 12-point economic programme of dizzying banality, seemingly the work of his Kremlin advisers. Last week he proclaimed without warning a quite different, and much tougher, agenda urged on him by Anatoly Chubais, the leading, reformer in the government. And next week, when Mr Yeltsin is due to give his annual policy address to parliament? It will depend on who has his ear, or on the severity of the crisis to be managed.

YELTSIN CANNOT IGNORE THE NATIONALIST PARLIAMENT. HE WILL BOW TO THEIR PRESSURES

JAMES MEEK, March 10, 1998 [The Guardian (London). SECTION: The Guardian Foreign Page; Pg. 13. HEADLINE: Moscow sees world through eastern eyes \\ jan]VT99
 	The row, early last week, prompted the kind of solidarity Moscow showed in respect of Iraq. Gone are the days when a pro-Western foreign ministry and presidency ignored Russia's nationalist parliament. 
	The ultra-nationalist parliamentary faction leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky kicked off with a noisy protest in the Duma. Mr Primakov picked up the ball and passed it to Mr Chemomyrdin, who touched it down in the Kremlin.
 	Western Europe and the US look like facing the same Russian unanimity on the latest Yugoslav crisis. The chance of keeping Moscow behind sanctions, let alone military action, is slim.

RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS A BASTION OF OLD SOVIET THOUGHT, AND WILL ACT UP IF YELTSIN WEAKENS

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Any worsening of Yeltsin's health will increase the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic corps -- perhaps the most recalcitrant institutional relic of the past and a class whose fall from the pinnacle of Soviet society, in both material comfort and prestige, can be likened only to that of the military. Predictably, Russian diplomats' zeal to defend the reformist regime has often been less than overwhelming.

STRONGER NATIONALIST FORCES WILL COUP
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RUSSIAN MILITARY COUP IS VERY LIKELY -- 60% OF RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPERTS AGREE

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	In a recent survey, 60 percent of Russian experts on military affairs responded that a coup, mutiny or complete disintegration of the army is likely within eighteen months. Indeed, several ranking political figures remarked privately that by comparative political science criteria, the Russian military should have taken power two or three years ago.

RUSSIA HAS SHOWN A SERIOUS INABILITY TO CONTROL ITS ADVENTURESOME MILITARY

Stephen Blank, Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998 Pg. 9, HEADLINE: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT acs-VT99
	 Nowhere is this more visible than in the failure to institute effective civilian, democratic controls over the armed forces. As a result of this failure, during the crucial years of 1992 -- 1994 Russia undid Moldova's integrity, launched coups in Azerbaijan, dismembered Georgia and allowed Abkhazia to break away, transferred billions of dollars to Armenia in violation of its own Tashkent Collective Security treaty with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), invaded Chechnya despite signing Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) declarations prohibiting such activities five days earlier, failed to democratize control over the military, and waged intermittent economic warfare against the CIS's other members, especially in energy policy. The absence of control over the military and the willingness to defy Europe in pursuit of diminished sovereignty for the CIS bespeak Russia's failed democratic transition.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY IS IN SHAMBLES AND BECOMING UNCONTROLLABLE

Andrei Zolotov Jr., February 5, 1998 [The Moscow Times. HEADLINE: Rokhlin Blames Policy for Army Deaths \\ jan]VT99 
	Lev Rokhlin, the radical chairman of the State Duma's defense committee, said Wednesday chronic under-funding and lack of political leadership was behind a recent spate of deaths in Russia's armed forces.
 	"The army is being destroyed, broken, is going under, but there is no concept of (military reform)," the former general said at a news conference in Moscow.
 	In the last two weeks alone, at least 13 soldiers have died in a series of accidents and armed rampages by servicemen under the influence of drink and drugs, In the most recent incident in western Siberia on Monday, a tank ran over a column of infantry troops killing four and wounding five others.
 	Rokhlin said the recent deaths were a direct result of the government's negligent approach to the military.
 	The lack of political will to improve the situation in the army has resulted in untrained draftees, lack of combat readiness and unpaid officers who have to moonlight as guards or porters to feed their families, Rokhlin said.

AT LEAST 20 GENERALS ARE BECOMING ACTIVE IN POLITICS IN RUSSIA AND ARE BEING ELECTED TO THE DUMA

Oleg Odnokolenko, January 30, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: Generals Go Into Opposition. \\ jan]VT99
 	A couple of Generals leaving military service in favor of politics can be regarded as an isolated incident but when the number of Generals dabbling in politics approaches 20, this is a clear trend. At the moment two Generals are claiming the Duma mandate vacated by Irina Khakamada -- former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov and former head of the Federal Border Service Andrei Nikolayev. Nikolayev's decision to go into politics and the reaction of the left-wing opposition to it are symbolic. According to information available to SEGODNIYA, Duma Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin, one of the leaders of the left-win-, majority in the legislature, has promised Nikolayev electoral support on behalf of the entire left-wing bloc. Nikolayev is the latest favorite of the left-wing opposition -- until now their sympathies and pledges Of Support have been on Rodionov's side.

RUSSIAN GENERALS ARE NO LONGER UNWILLING TO GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS

Dmitry Zaks, The Moscow Times, December 30, 1997, HEADLINE: Russia's Biggest Stories of 1997 acs-VT99
	 The Kremlin could bide its time only because Russia's military has been reluctant to interfere openly in politics. Retired generals Rokhlin and Alexander Lebed have changed that, although so far, they have been unable to significantly tap into the army's discontent.

DEFENSE, THE MILITARY, AND THE SECURITY SERVICES HAVE BEEN UNTOUCHED BY REFORM

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	 While "democrats," despite all accusations of corruption, made their mark in the economic policy realm, the Defense Ministry, the military, the security services, and the foreign policy apparatus remained untouched, almost pristine in their Soviet mindset. The "inside the Ring Road" crowd -- the Moscow equivalent of our inside-the-Beltway milieu -- is still sore from losing the Cold War.

RUSSIAN MILITARY HARD-LINERS ARE USING THIS PERIOD OF MILITARY DECAY TO FORGE A NEW AND POWERFUL FUTURE RUSSIAN FORCE

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	It is common knowledge that Russia's armed forces are destitute and demoralized. Officers drive taxis; soldiers engage in crime for the money. There is so much draft-dodging that officers are believed to constitute half of military personnel. While some generals find the situation intolerable and virtually threaten mutiny, the more far-sighted view it as a temporary setback that they can exploit to revamp the armed forces. Their ambition is to lay the groundwork for a military establishment so effective that its mere presence will guarantee Russia what they deem its rightful place among nations.

THE DUMA IS DOMINATED BY HARD-LINERS WHO VIEW THEIR WEAKENED MILITARY AS A SIGN OF DEFEAT AND HUMILIATION

Greg Myre, January 21, 1998 [AAP NEWSFEED. HEADLINE: CIS: YELTSIN SAYS MILITARY NOW SUPPORTS HIS REFORM CAMPAIGN \\ jan]VT99 
Despite Yeltsin's assertions, opposition to his proposals remains strong.
 	Many senior officers rose through the ranks during the Soviet era when budgets, equipment and personnel requests were seldom denied.
 	Parliament is dominated by Communists and other hard-liners who see the military's decline as the ultimate symbol of lost Soviet power and glory. Even some of Yeltsin's supporters say the restructuring plan remains murky despite years of debate.
 	"Military reform, declared many times from 1992 to 1997, has not just failed or remained unimplemented, but its concept has not even been worked out," retired Gen. Lev Rokhlin, the chairman of the Defence Committee in parliament's lower house, said recently. 
	With his broad powers, Yeltsin can initiate some military reforms on his own. But the project is unlikely to succeed unless the military and parliament are working toward the same ends.

NATIONALIST ROKHLIN WOULD LOVE TO LEAD A MILITARY UPRISING
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ROKHLIN WILL USE ALL MEASURES TO REMOVE YELTSIN FROM POWER EVEN IF IT MEANS A MILITARY REBELLION

Sven Gunnar Simonsen, January 1, 1998 [doctoral candidate at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He is currently conducting research at the University of 0 California at Berkeley's Center for Slavic and East European Studies. Jane's Intelligence Review. SECTION: EUROPE, Vol. 10; No. 1; Pg. 14. HEADLINE: Rokhlin enters the political fray \\ jan]VT99 
Already, Rokhlin's assurances that the DPA will work only within the law and the constitution seem rather hollow. In July, Rokhlin reportedly stated that if army officers "rise in rebellion and march to Moscow", he would be among, them. Since then, he has suggested that the DPA might submit to the Duma a proposal to impeach the president and change the government (which would be legal but hardly effective), and he has, above all, promised to concentrate the DPA's energies into a joint opposition thrust at the regime: "We shall lead the people out into the streets and stay there until the president and government resign."
 
ROKHLIN WANTS TO TOPPLE YELTSIN THROUGH A MASSIVE MILITARY PROTEST

Sven Gunnar Simonsen, January 1, 1998 [doctoral candidate at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He is currently conducting research at the University of California at Berkeley's Center for Slavic and East European Studies. Jane's Intelligence Review. SECTION: EUROPE; Vol. 10; No. I Pg. 14. HEADLINE: Rokhlin enters the political fray \\ jan]VT99 
The barriers keeping Russian officers out of politics are being challenged with increasing fervour. Most recently, Lev Rokhlin, a key general and chairman of the parliament's Committee for Mlitary Affairs, has set up a movement aiming, to topple the Yeltsin regime through mass military protest. 

BECAUSE YELTSIN HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REFORM THE MILITARY, UNHAPPY GENERALS ARE BECOMING ACTIVE IN POLITICS -- ROKHLIN HAS THE INTENT OF TOPPLING YELTSIN

The Economist, February 14, 1998, [SECTION: World Politics and Current Affairs; EUROPE; Pg. 49. HEADLINE: Russia's part-time president \\ jan]VT99 
	Another victim of Russia's drifting has been the army, which Mr Yeltsin has promised to reform time and again, but which has gone on decaying. Its neglect 0 	I'D is giving a succession of rebellious generals an entry into politics, each claiming the sympathy of a million despairing soldiers. 
	General Alexander Lebed was an early contender for the military protest vote. He ran for the presidency in 1996 and finished third with 15% of the vote. He says he will run again in 2000, and he may warm up by running for a regional governorship in Siberia in April. Last year he was joined on his soap-box by General Lev Rokhlin, a more plainly mutinous figure who has made common cause with the communists. This year a third general may overshadow them both. He is General Andrei Ni-ko-la-ev, who resigned last month as head of Russia's border guards and who plans to run for a seat in the Duma, the lower house of parliament. General Nikolaev, much admired by the press, is also tipped as a presidential contender. The hardline interior minister, General Anatoly Ku-l-i-kov, has remained edgily within the government's ranks so far but clearly has bigger ambitions.

IMPACT: RUSSIA HAS NO CHOICE ONCE IT GOES NATIONALIST -- IT WILL ADOPT THE POWER SCENARIO

EXTERMIST RUSSIANS REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE FACT THAT RUSSIA'S ECONOMY CANNOT SUPPORT A REVITALIZED MILITARY OPTION

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	In answering this challenge, Russian officials are left today with a meager set of options. If they choose the first scenario, power Russia, it will mean suicide -- economic and diplomatic isolation, world condemnation, perhaps even war. As its name implies, the second scenario would most probably lead to another cold war. The third scenario is very difficult and, unfortunately, humiliating for Russia. But Moscow has just two alternatives: Revive with the assistance of the technically developed and wealthy West, or oppose it. There is no other way, no nationalistic option that allows for rapid economic progress while rejecting relations with the West. Such is the dilemma of Russia today, a dilemma many of its extremist politicians refuse to confront.

WHICH SCENARIO RUSSIA TAKES WILL DEPEND UPON US ACTION. ALIENATING RUSSIA WILL BRING ABOUT THE POWER SCENARIO

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	At the same time, Russia's choice in these matters will depend partly on U.S. and Western policy on the determination, precision, and foresight of the Western effort to integrate Russia into the community of democratic nations. It is not in the U.S. interest to back a weak, humiliated Russia against a wall; alienating Russia will only bring about the disastrous power scenario and thus recreate a military threat to the West that has, at least for the time being vanished. NATO expansion in the absence of a viable Russian threat makes as little sense as disbanding NATO would have made during the Cold War; the West cannot take such a step without undermining both arms control treaties with Russia and the course of democratic reforms in Russia.

IN THE POWER SCENARIO, RUSSIA WILL MOBILIZE AROUND AN OUTSIDE ENEMY, DENUNCIATING ALL ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, MASSIVELY REARMING ITS MILITARY, AND INCREASING ITS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington 0 Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	The first and by far most dangerous possibility is what I call the power scenario. Supporters of this option would, in the name of a "united and undivided Russia," radically change domestic and foreign policies. Many would seek to revive a dictatorship and take urgent military steps to mobilize the people against the outside "enemy." Such steps would include Russia's denunciation of the commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons; suspension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and refusal to ratify both START 11 and the Chemical Weapons Convention-, denunciation of the Biological Weapons Convention; and reinstatement of a full-scale armed force, including the acquisition of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, as well as medium- and short-range missiles such as the SS-20. Some of these measures will demand substantial financing, whereas others, such as the denunciation and refusal to ratify arms control treaties, would, according to proponents, save money by alleviating the obligations of those agreements. 
	In this scenario, Russia's military planners would shift Western countries from the category of strategic partners to the category of countries representing a threat to national security. This will revive the strategy of nuclear deterrence -- and indeed, realizing its unfavorable odds against the expanded NATO, Russia will place new emphasis on the first-use of nuclear weapons, a trend that is underway already.

THE POWER SCENARIO WOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN RUSSIA'S NEAR ABROAD.

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	The power scenario envisages a hard-line policy toward the CIS countries, and in such circumstances the problem of the Russian diaspora in those countries would be greatly magnified. Moscow would use all the means at its disposal, including economic sanctions and political ultimatums, to ensure the rights of ethnic Russians in CIS countries as well as to have an influence on other issues. Of those means, even the use of direct military force in places like the Baltics cannot be ruled out.

RUSSIA HAS LEADERS WHO ARE WILLING TO CARRY OUT THE POWER SCENARIO. THE COUNTRY WOULD REACT THE WAY WEIMAR GERMANY DID TO THE RISE OF HITLER

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	Some will object that this scenario is implausible because no potential dictator exists in Russia who could carry out this strategy. I am not so sure. Some Duma members -- such as Victor Antipov, Sergei Baburin, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and Albert Makashov, who are leading politicians in ultranationalistic parties and fractions in the parliament -- are ready to follow this path to save a "united Russia." Baburin's "Anti-NATO" deputy group boasts a membership of more than 240 Duma members. One cannot help but remember that when Weimar Germany was isolated, exhausted, and humiliated as a result of World War I and the Versailles Treaty, Adolf Hitler took it upon himself to "save" his country. It took the former corporal only a few years to plunge the world into a second world war that cost humanity more than 50 million lives.

THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE POWER SCENARIO IS STARTING TO EMERGE IN RUSSIA

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	There are signs indicating that this scenario is emerging. The new military doctrine has actually reversed the pledge never to use nuclear weapons first. Earlier this year, Ivan Rybkin, secretary of Russia's Security Council, said, "Everyone must know that in case of a direct challenge our response will be fully fledged, and we are to choose the use of means." n 13 Later, in an interview, he said that parliamentary ratification of START 11 has become "almost impossible." n14 The Duma has again postponed the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Russian military planners are claiming that the only feasible military response to NATO expansion is the redeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons closer to Russia's borders.

ECONOMICS WILL NOT PREVENT THE POWER SCENARIO FROM OCCURRING, IT WILL JUST INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE USED

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99 
	I do not believe that Russia has the economic strength to implement such a scenario successfully, but then again, Germany's economic situation in the 1920s was hardly that strong either. Thus, I am afraid that economics will not deter the power scenario's would-be authors from attempting it. Baburin, for example, warned that any political leader who would "dare to encroach upon Russia" would be decisively repulsed by the Russian Federation "by all measures on heaven and earth up to the use of nuclear weapons." n10 In autumn 1996 Oleg Grynevsky, Russian ambassador to Sweden and former Soviet arms control negotiator, while saying that NATO expansion increases the risk of nuclear war, reminded his Western listeners that Russia has enough missiles to destroy both the United States and Europe. I Former Russian minister of defense Igor Rodionov warned several times that Russia's vast nuclear arsenal could become uncontrollable. In this context, one should keep in mind that, despite dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals -- and tensions -- Russia and the United States remain poised to launch their missiles in minutes. I cannot but agree with Anatol Lieven, who wrote, "It may be, therefore, that with all the new Russian order's many problems and weaknesses, it will for a long time be able to stumble on, until we all fall down together." 

IMPACT: QUICK MILITARY BUILD UP WILL ENSUE

OPINION LEADERS IN RUSSIA WANT THEIR COUNTRY TO BE A SUPERPOWER, AND FOR THAT IT WILL NEED A POWERFUL MILITARY

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 MANY INFLUENTIAL persons in Russia want to regain not only the empire but the status of superpower. Russia cannot attain the latter objective by economic means, which in the modern world confer such rank; its partial inclusion in the Group of Seven is little more than a public relations ploy to compensate it for its forced acquiescence to the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. Russia's claim to be a world power has traditionally rested on military prowess, and the temptation is to resort to this expedient once again.

BECAUSE RUSSIA ISN’T ECONOMICALLY STRONG ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE OTHER NATIONS, IT WILL UTILIZE MILITARY MEANS

The Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1998, Pg. 2A, HEADLINE: Moscow's into tough love again , acs-VT99
	 A foreign policy adviser to Shevardnadze, Gela Charkviani, asks why Russia doesn't try to win influence through business and trade instead of through bullying with sanctions and army bases.
The answer to that, says Trenin, is that Russia cannot compete economically with other countries. The day will come, he says, "when the ruble is more effective than the rifle."
But don't look for that to happen any time soon.

IMPACT: RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS RISKS NUCLEAR WAR

RUSSIA CANNOT DE-EMPHASIZE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL PRESSURES

Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99
	 At the same time, the Russian government has to satisfy the perceptions held by relevant interest groups, such as political parties, the military, the defense industry, research centers, and others, or at least a majority of such groups. This makes the adoption of a minimalist approach to the definition of "unacceptable damage" and corresponding requirements for the force posture unlikely, because the government has to factor in views of nationalists and/or groups with an intrinsic interest in high levels of weapons.

THE RISK OF A NUCLEAR WAR IS GREATER NOW THAN IT WAS DURING THE COLD WAR, AND THE US AND RUSSIA HAVE ENOUGH WEAPONS TO DESTROY ALL LIFE ON THE PLANET

SENATOR ALAN CRANSTON, February 18, 1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. "PERSPECTIVES OF A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD " \\ jan]VT99 
Cranston: A strong movement is developing all over the world to reduce and eventually to end the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Leaders and countless citizens are shocked that the United States and Russia still follow the nuclear policies they followed during the Cold War. We both still keep deadly weapons on dangerous hair-trigger alert, able to be fired in a matter of seconds. We both still hold to a highly dangerous launch-on-warning policy. It's as if we were still enemies, which plainly we are not. In some ways, nuclear dangers are greater now than during the Cold War -- for example, the danger that terrorists will get and use nuclear weapons. Each country, US and Russia, still possess enough nuclear weapons to destroy every man, woman and child in both countries and conceivably all people everywhere. Over 35,000 nuclear weapons still exist on earth, with more one million times -- more than one million times -- the destructive power of the bomb used at Hiroshima.

RUSSIANS FEEL THEY NEED NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DETER CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AND NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99
	 Fourth, there is widespread agreement that a retaliatory capability must be retained at any cost, or nuclear weapons could turn into an instrument of political blackmail. Few, if any, serious Russian experts and politicians believe that the United States would actually use nuclear weapons even if it had a clear superiority. Many think however, that the loss of retaliatory capability could make Russia vulnerable to conventional attacks (for example, similar to the limited strikes in Iraq and Bosnia) and thus reduce its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. 

RUSSIAN MILITARY ACCEPTS THE NOTION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS INSURE PEACE BY THREATENING UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE

Nikolai N. Sokov, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Summer; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: Russia's Approach to Nuclear Weapons, acs-VT99
	 Third, there is broad agreement among Russian experts and politicians that nuclear weapons ensure Russian and international security through the threat of inflicting "unacceptable damage" in a retaliatory strike. This belief makes the preservation of a second-strike capability the key element in the nuclear equation. There is, however, no consensus on the definition of "unacceptable damage" or how many weapons would be needed to inflict it. Interpretations vary from one nuclear warhead to several hundred. The Duma's Committee on Defense mentioned 200 deliverable warheads as the threshold, although it is recognized that "unacceptable damage" is a perceptual category that cannot be precisely quantified. n6 The central point is that each side perceives the potential damage from a retaliatory strike as unacceptable -- that is, Russia thinks that it can inflict damage upon the United States that the United States would consider unacceptable, and the United States thinks Russia can, indeed, inflict damage that would be unacceptable. The actual capability of the nuclear potential is largely beyond the point.

IMPACT: A NATIONALIST RUSSIA WILL SPREAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DANGEROUS NATIONS

RUSSIA ACTS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS INFLUENCE, AND WILL ASSIST IN PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TO ACHIEVE IT -- IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	With regard to fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, here, once again, Russia is playing a role intended to regain its power over its "sphere" rather than to combat this global threat.
First, the cooperation between Russia and Iran is extensive and, as we have all heard reported in the press, now appears to involve the sale of missile components and technology in addition to the advanced conventional weapons and civilian nuclear reactors it has previously encompassed.
Second, Russia remains a friend to Saddam Hussein, the dictator in Iraq. That friendship is exhibited in the negotiations at the United Nations, where Russia seeks to lessen the sanctions on Iraq even as Hussein refuses to meet U.N. requirements for inspections of suspected WMD sites. (With regard to Iraq, has there yet been a satisfactory answer to the questions, raised in a press report a few years ago, that Russian ballistic missile gyroscopes were found to have been smuggled into Iraq?)
Third, it is reported that Russia is seeking to reinvigorate its military sales to Syria -- sales that may include some advanced weaponry, perhaps including chemical warheads.

ONCE RUSSIA CREATES A MULTIPOLAR WORLD BECAUSE OF PROLIFERATION, THEN THEY CAN ACT TO CONSOLIDATE NATIONS NEAR THEM

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	 Such challenges -- creating the "multipolar world" that prevents the United States from exercising global leadership -- will stretch American forces to the limit and, de facto, will make the U.S. less able and willing to assist or support states beyond the regions I have just mentioned. In other words, the U.S. will be less able to assist or support the states neighboring Russia as they seek to consolidate their independence from Russian domination.

RUSSIA FACILITATES THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TO FORECLOSE USA MILITARY OPTIONS IN THOSE REGIONS

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	The object of Russian policy seems not so much to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as to lay the groundwork for a series of challenges to America's ability to project military force successfully around the world. Whether in the Persian Gulf or the Straits of Taiwan, Russian military technology is creating the groundwork for those challenges today, as we speak.

IMPACT: NATIONALISTS WILL CONTROL RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO RAPID NATIONALIST FLUCTUATIONS

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 194, acs-VT99
	Of course, this shift to a more pragmatically based foreign policy does not necessarily mean that Russian policy is now coherent or stable. It is still vulnerable to nationalist overtures and open to rapid fluctuations based on the different conceptions that various actors involved in the Russian political system have concerning the objectives that Russia should strive for in the future and concerning the means of achieving these objectives.

INTERNAL RUSSIAN AFFAIRS ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Paul Marantz, Prof. Political Science Univ. British Columbia, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 98 , acs-VT99 
	Nonetheless, there is no denying the fragility of current EastWest relations. The main threat to the continuation of a constructive relationship between Russia and the West arises not in the realm of foreign policy but from the explosive situation within Russia. The economic crisis in Russia has not abated, law and order are breaking down, political infighting is as vicious as ever, new political institutions lack widespread legitimacy, the conspicuous consumption of the newly rich angers people, Yeltsin's health is precarious, there exists a strong feeling of humiliation within the military, and there is a very real danger that the continued deterioration of the population's standard of living will lead to an upsurge of anger against the West for supposedly foisting an alien, unworkable economic programme on Russia.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS A PRODUCT OF RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 200 , acs-VT99 
	This pressure brings us back to a main point emphasized in the chapters of this volume, the fact that domestic politics matter in foreign policy formulation. The importance of this issue is especially vivid in the case of Russia, where simultaneous political and economic reforms have created an environment in which policies can and have changed swiftly. We have already witnessed how nationalist pressures have forced the Yeltsin regime to modify its policies. Nationalists have been calling for even greater changes and, if ever given a larger role in formulating foreign policy, would certainly have a different set of priorities based on a different conceptual framework and different perceptions of the international environment. Although the outcome of the December 1995 parliamentary elections seemed to provide nationalists and communists with Just such an opportunity to acquire a greater role in policy-making, the re-election of Yeltsin as president in July 1996 promises to limit their influence. Nevertheless, the domestic situation in the Russian Federation remains uncertain, especially with the growing concerns about Yeltsin's health and his ability to complete his term in office.

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IS BEING DRIVEN BY THE NATIONALISTS IN THE DUMA

Alexander Shumilin, February 28, 1998 [The Moscow Times. HEADLINE: Pro and Con on Iraq \\ jan]VT99 
	President Boris Yeltsin's statements about the possibility of a third world war if the United States bombed Iraq shows that the warm relations between Moscow and Washington have cooled considerably. What emerged from the crisis was nothing less than a demonstration of the simple readiness of Moscow to oppose Washington. Russia's foreign policies seemed under the influence of the opposition in the State Duma - or, to be more exact, of the Communist Party and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party. For neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Kremlin issued any statements that distanced themselves from the hooligan-like behavior of the LDPR leader in Baghdad.

IMPACT: NATIONALISTS WILL ASSIST TERRORISTS IN ATTACKING US SHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS WANT TO BLOW UP USA CARRIERS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 18, 1997, HEADLINE: Nationalist leader Zhirinovskiy urges support for anti-American groups in Iraq, SOURCE: Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1032 gmt 17 Nov 97 acs-VT99
	Russia must support those groups in Iraq that are prepared to strike at the Americans, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] leader told a news conference in the Interfax head office in Moscow today. "The Americans will pull out immediately if one aircraft carrier is blown up in the Gulf. Corpses and coffins destined for the United States will make Clinton' s prestige fall," he said.

RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS BELIEVE RUSSIA SHOULD UNITE WITH IRAQ AND HELP IT WAGE WAR ON THE USA

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 18, 1997, HEADLINE: Nationalist leader Zhirinovskiy urges support for anti-American groups in Iraq, SOURCE: Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1032 gmt 17 Nov 97 acs-VT99
	 "Who prevents us from taking a different position on Iraq?" Zhirinovskiy asked rhetorically. "The Americans could be forced from the Middle East if force is used against them the way they do it to others, not by ourselves but by the local political structures which are prepared to do so," he said. "Striking a blow, but not by Russia" must be the goal of Russian policy in the Gulf, Zhirinovskiy said. " People are there whom Russia could help so that the United States would be less interested in the region," he said.
 "Who could stop us if we change our stance and win support in the Arab world? An alliance with the Arab world is inevitable for us because no alliance with the West is possible. But we are continuing to betray [the Arabs]. The Arab world will rally eventually, but without us," Zhirinovskiy said.

IMPACT: NATIONALISTS WILL ATTEMPT TO REINTEGRATE THE FORMER SOVIET STATES THROUGH CONQUEST

THE COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS WILL ATTEMPT MILITARY REINTEGRATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET STATES

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Finally, a wide range of public groups, movements, and political parties, ranging from Communists to nationalists, strongly supports early and comprehensive reintegration. The Communist Party probably takes the most radical stand on this issue. The Communists and their allies became the largest single bloc in the new parliament elected in December 1995. They passed a resolution renouncing the December 1991 agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union. Communists have voiced the intent to approach the governments, parliaments, and peoples of all former Soviet republics with a proposal for a voluntary restoration of a single state. They justify their stand not only by results of public opinion polls on this issue held periodically in Russia but also by the results of similar polls conducted in other former Soviet republics, like one in Belarus in December 1995.

RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IT HAS THE TREATY OBLIGATION TO MILITARILY INTERVENE IN FORMER SOVIET STATES IF IT IS NEEDED

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	Moscow interprets the terms of the mutual security treaty as giving it license to intervene militarily in any CIS country where, in its judgment, the commonwealth's security is threatened. Russian troops guarding the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan have engaged in desultory clashes with Muslim fundamentalist forces. A Russian general stationed in Central Asia declared recently that if hard-line Islamist Taliban units from Afghanistan menaced Tajikistan, his troops would intervene. Thus a modified Brezhnev Doctrine is still in force: Moscow regards any country that was once part of the Soviet Union as falling within the sphere of its security interests. Decolonization has been quite halfhearted.

RUSSIA HAS ALREADY USED MILITARY FORCE TO BRING GEORGIA BACK INTO THE RUSSIA ORBIT OF CONTROL

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 Georgia is a classic case of Moscow's use of military power for imperial objectives. Moscow overcame Georgia's reluctance to join the CIS by inciting a 1992 rebellion of the Abkhaz minority inhabiting the northwestern region of the country. With Russian political and military backing, the Abkhazians expelled 200,000 ethnic Georgians and declared independence. Unable to quell the rebellion, Tbilisi was forced to request aid from Moscow, which consented to provide it so long as Georgia joined the CIS and acquiesced to 15,000 Russian troops on its territory, along with a Russian "peacekeeping" force in Abkhazia. As soon as Tbilisi met these conditions, the Abkhaz rebellion abated. President Eduard Shevardnadze's efforts to rid his country of the putative Russian peacekeepers have so far proved unavailing. Russian forces guard Georgia's land and sea borders with Turkey; since other troops are stationed on Armenia's western border, Russia has direct access to Turkey along the old Soviet frontier.

BROAD COALITION IS PREPARING FOR A HUGE WAR TO RECLAIM THE EMPIRE

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	 The people at the General Staff's Academy, and even more so those in the People's Patriotic Alliance, aren't just anyone. The latter hold a majority of seats in the State Duma. And what they are planning, as we can see, is not a "small war," like the Chechen campaign, but a big one - to get back the Ukraine, the Baltics and Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaidjan. This can not happen without great bloodshed.

THE RUSSIAN PSYCHE DEMANDS THAT IT HAVE AN EMPIRE, AND PLANS ARE DEVELOPING TO RECAPTURE IT

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	 Why is this happening, or will possibly happen? Because we all grew up in conditions where Russia was a superpower, playing one of the first fiddles in world politics. It is understandable that many people have been psychologically traumatized by its sudden fall down to the level of a "normal" great power, and that, in the words of political scientist Kirill Kholodkovsky, has given birth to a powerful "nostalgia for those days when our country was if not respected, then at least feared." I am not mentioning the fact that for 15 generations, Russia was an empire. For the imperial ideologists, the abyss between yesterday's super-power status and today's normality is absolutely unbridgeable. It is not surprising that the central chapter of Alexander Dugin's sumptuously produced volume " Russia's Geo-Political Future" (which, incidentally, was approved by the Strategy sub-faculty of the General Army Staff's Academy) is called just that - " Russia is Unthinkable Without an Empire." Nor is it surprising that the People's Patriotic Alliance of Russia (whose core is formed by the Communist Party) has proclaimed as its official goal, in the words of its chief ideologue Alexey Podberezkin, "to create conditions favorable to restore within a short historical period the great Russian State, including its territorial aspect." So as to eliminate doubt as to which state is meant, he adds that his Union is intending to restore it "in the framework of those borders which existed until 1991."

RUSSIA STILL HAS DANGEROUS GOALS TO DOMINATE ITS FORMER SOVIET STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE

Stephen Blank, Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998 Pg. 9, HEADLINE: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT acs-VT99
	 Tragically, Russia still pursues objectives and policies in Europe that its power does not merit, that are unsustainable, and which ultimately endanger its own security.
 Russia seeks equality with the United States at the expenses of all other states, an exclusive unchallenged sphere in the CIS, and the demilitarization of Central and Eastern Europe so that the great powers alone could later revise their status. It aspires to revise regional borders and still seeks to assign the Central and East European states, not to mention the CIS, a diminished sovereignty and legitimacy.

RUSSIA HAS STATED THAT FORMER SOVIET STATES ARE INDEPENDENT, BUT IT DOESN’T BELIEVE IT OR WANT IT TO STAY THAT WAY

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 MOSCOW ACKNOWLEDGED the sovereign status of the former Soviet republics, but it is a recognition that comes from the head, not the heart. The patrimonial mentality embedded in the Russian psyche, which holds that everything inherited from one's forefathers is inalienable property, works against accepting the separation of the borderlands as a fait accompli. It prompts Moscow to strive for their gradual economic, political, and military "reintegration" with Russia -- which, given the disparity in their respective size and population, can only mean reducing the former republics once again to the status of clients. In this endeavor the government is abetted by the Orthodox Church, which claims authority over all Orthodox Christians of what was once the Soviet Union. 

IMPACT: ATTEMPTS TO REINTEGRATE MEANS WAR WITH THE WEST

ALLOWING RUSSIA TO DOMINATE ITS EURASIAN “SPHERE OF INFLUENCE” WILL LEAD TO ATTEMPTS TO REINTEGRATE FORMER NATIONS, RESULTING IN WAR AND RUINATION 

Stephen Blank, Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998 Pg. 9, HEADLINE: REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA AND NATO ENLARGEMENT acs-VT99
	 Russia's demands for a privileged sphere of influence in its own "backyard" is unacceptable. This sphere cannot be maintained except through war and Russia's own ruination, because the CIS members will not accept what is clearly an unenforceable and illegitimate hegemony. Thus, Europe has no option but to unite against Russia's exorbitant claims. Hence, Russian moves to integrate the CIS in economics, politics, culture, and defense from above invariably weaken Eurasian security and reinforce anti-democratic tendencies and the structural militarization of Russian policies and institutions. An imperial restoration is the single greatest threat to peace in Europe and Russia because Russia cannot afford that temptation, though it still chases after it. 

RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO REINTEGRATE FORMER SOVIET STATES WILL LEAD TO CONFLICT WITH THE WEST

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	Moscow's encroachments on the sovereignty of its onetime dependencies present a serious potential threat to East-West relations. The situation is not entirely clear-cut, since the West tacitly recognizes all lands that were once part of the Soviet Union as Russia's legitimate sphere of influence while insisting that Russia respect the sovereignty of the separated republics. If the past is any guide, in the event of an overt conflict between Russia and another of the former republics, the European allies are unlikely to go beyond expressions of regret. The United States, however, is almost certain to react more harshly, especially if the victim of Russian intimidation is Ukraine or one of the countries adjoining the Caspian Sea -- the former because of its geopolitical importance, the latter because of those oil-rich states' potential contribution to the world economy.

IMPACT: WAR ABROAD WILL ALSO MEAN CIVIL WAR AT HOME

SEARCH FOR ENEMIES IN RUSSIA BEGINS ABROAD BUT ENDS UP AT HOME

NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997; RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p.21 , acs-VT99 
	Once formed, a political culture of this sort develops its own mechanism of self-perpetuation. The core of this mechanism is the relentless "search for Enemy". The process is self-contradictory. On the one hand, the Enemy must be uncovered and, destroyed, because he is the Enemy; on the other hand, the Enemy must persist, because in his absence this type of political culture becomes meaningless and cannot function. It is obvious that whatever political force occupies "the niche" at the moment, it cannot be treated in a purely empirical manner, but must be "reconsidered" from the standpoint of ontological dualism. "The Enemy" is mystified out of all proportions and stripped of practically all meaningful sociological characteristics: it may now be called "The World Imperialism", or "The Judeo-Masonry", or "The Islamic Threat", or "The Empire of Evil".
 	Under these circumstances any "outside" candidate for the role of the Enemy quickly fades into a mere symbol and becomes almost anonymous. On the contrary, "internal" enemies (symbolic by definition, for the body politic is still considered a mystic unity) concretise and multiply. Dualistic mentality generates the abhorrent reality of mass terror:

NATIONALISM’S RISE IN RUSSIA CAN MEAN ONLY WAR WITH NEIGHBORS OR CIVIL WAR

Holger Jensen, international editor of the Rocky Mountain News, The Fresno Bee, September 29, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: U.S still searching for Russian doctrine in post-Cold War era acs-VT99
	 As Sergei Rogov, head of the USA-Canada Institute, pointed out at a seminar conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute: "While Communism suppressed ethnicity, post-Communism raised it to the surface." Hence, "nationalism would be disastrous for Russia, leading either to conflict with neighbors or civil war." The solution, he said, is for Russia to develop a "supra-national identity above and beyond ethnicity."

REFORMS FEED THE MAFIA

THESIS: Reforms and attempts to create a new system in Russia create “gray zones” during the transition into which Russian criminal organizations, the Russian Mafia, inserts themselves. This allows them to control that new part of society. Every new reform helps the Russian mafia to take over that society and turn it into a corporatist criminal state.

A. RUSSIA STANDS AT A CROSSDROADS: CRIMINAL CORPORATE OLIGARCHY OR WESTERN STYLE DEMOCRACY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	RUSSIA FACES a watershed decision. The vital question for Russia is whether it will become a quasi-democratic oligarchy with corporatist, criminal characteristics or take the more difficult, painful road to becoming a normal, Western-style democracy with a market economy. Communism is no longer an option. That was settled in the 1996 presidential election.

B. REFORMING RUSSIA TOO QUICKLY WILL ONLY ACCELERATE THE RISE OF MAFIAS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 53-4 , acs-VT99 
	Of course, such developments disgust "civilized society." However, the only way to curb them (if it proves impossible to evade them entirely) is to reduce "gray zones" as soon as possible and to minimize the distance between the law and social practice. And since social practice is a rather conservative phenomenon, usually more conservative than legislation, a transition society must be very cautious in adopting new legislation. Radical and reformist laws, which contradict the 'established and deeply rooted political culture, may stimulate ' the growth of "gray zones" and the emergence of "mafias." 

C. IMPACTS

1. A CRIMINAL CORPORATE STATE WOULD TURN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO BLACK MARKET PRODUCTS FOR THE HIGHEST BIDDER

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 IN OCTOBER 1996, Vladimir Nechai, the director of a nuclear complex near the Ural city of Chelyabinsk, killed himself because he lacked the money to pay his employees and could no longer ensure the safety of his plant's operations. His suicide underscored the most serious threat to all players in the post-Cold War world: loss of control of the Soviet arsenal of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The increasing risks of chaos in a nuclear power are also evident in the rumors of nuclear smuggling. Russia has thousands of tons of nuclear, chemical, and biological material. Under the rule of a corrupt oligarchy, uranium and anthrax could become black market commodities available to the highest bidder. The control of Russia's weapons of mass destruction is an issue of world safety that cannot be ignored by Russia or the West.

2. CORPORATE CRIMINAL STATES DENY CIVIL LIBERTIES

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	Corporatist states, marked by high-level criminality but bearing the trappings of democracy, differ more than is sometimes recognized from Western-style market democracies. Their markets are driven by oligarchs whose highest goal is increasing their personal wealth. Freedom of the press and other civil liberties are suppressed. Laws are frequently ignored or suspended and constitutions obeyed only when convenient. Corruption is rife from the streets to the halls of power. Personalities, contacts, and clans count for more than institutions and laws. For examples, one need only reflect on the unhappy experiences of many Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s.

BRINK: RUSSIA IS AT A CROSSROADS. IT WILL EITHER BECOME A DEMOCRATIC STATE OR A STATE RUN BY ORGANIZED CRIME.

John Lloyd, January 31, 1998 [The Times. HEADLINE: Red alert \\ jan]VT99 
	Russia's foremost reformer in parliament, Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko group, toured the US in the autumn of 1996 with one message to his audiences, private and public - that Russia had shifted "from a closed criminal system under communism to an open criminal system". The support Russia gets from the West, claimed Yavlinsky, bewilders the Russian people who do not understand why the international community should support a regime they believe corrupt. "Russia now stands at a crossroads," he said in a speech at Harvard. "Will it be a normal, open democracy? Or will it be a Latin-American type, corporatist, criminal oligarchy- as is the present tendency?" But the choice is made harder for those who want the latter course by the very nature of the present regime. In February 1996, a group of Yeltsin's closest aides and advisers gathered in the Kremlin to discuss his re-election - then looking doubtful, with the communists riding high in the polls and his ratings floundering. Yet there was no great air of gloom, A participant in the meeting told me that General Alexander Khorzakov, the man responsible for Yeltsin's personal security and then the closest man to the Russian president, took the floor and said, "Money will be no problem at all in this campaign. Everyone in Russia who has made a rouble, has made it because of Boris Nikolayevich (Yeltsin)".

TRYING TO IMPOSE A NEW ORDER ON A COLLAPSING OLD ORDER CREATES NEW AND DANGEROUS GRAY ZONES FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 155 , acs-VT99 
	If the "older order" collapses suddenly and entirely, such a totalitarian hierarchy spreads quickly over the whole of society (we discussed this in Chapter 4) and contributes to the creation of a "new ideological order."
 	If, however, the "older order" has not been destroyed completely, the liberated man creates embryos of a new order at his own will and discretion, utilizing the limited resources available to him. This leads to a disintegration and atomization of society. Completely new conditions emerge favoring an unprecedented flourishing of personality, but society as a whole transforms into one large "gray zone" in which multiple systems of "local law" function. These "local law" systems are established by those who possess temporary, and sometimes purely ephemeral, power due to their personal energy, charisma, or circumstances.

WITHOUT LEGAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY WILL REMAIN IN THE GRAY ZONE

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations,, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 152 , acs-VT99 
	For instance, in March 1996, the Moscow Revenue Service revealed an underpayment of taxes (in the amount of 600 billion rubles, that is, some $130 million) by the stock company Gazprom, the gas-industry monopoly of Russia. Under such circumstances, many influential politicians throughout the country are not very sympathetic to the process of privatizing profitable enterprises. And this conflict of interests within the Russian political elite further obstructs the creation of institutional and legal support for private property in Russia. Without effective state assurances of property rights, the privatized sector of the national economy will remain in the "gray zone," and it will be almost impossible to decriminalize it. 

LINKS: ASSISTANCE AND PROMOTED REFORM IN RUSSIA INCREASE THE GRIP OF ORGANIZED CRIME

HELPING RUSSIA NOW ONLY FEEDS AND EXPANDS ITS ORGANIZED CRIME PROBLEM

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	 Three years ago, Mr. Yeltsin described his own country as "the biggest mafia state in the world" and "the superpower of crime." By looking the other way, and continuing to dole out the aid, the United States and its allies have only made matters worse. The time has come to heed Mr. Yavlinsky's advice -better to tell the truth.

ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE CHANGE BEFORE SOCIAL ATTITUDES ARE READY FOR IT WILL ONLY ACCELERATE THE CRIMINALIZATION OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 167 , acs-VT99 
	The main idea of the present book is that, in order to avoid "wildness" of either the "Western" or the "Eastern" type, excessively rigid or excessively "revolutionary" measures cannot be applied in the spheres where no social consensus exists regarding actions or types of activity that are permissible or impermissable. Such measures will only accelerate the criminalization of both the state and soclety.

RUSSIAN CAPITALISM BENEFITS CRIMINALS AND THE SELFISH, NOT INCREASED PRODUCTION

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 105-107 , acs-VT99 
	We begin with the views of the sociologist Tat'iana Zaslavskaia, a respected voice of reform. Her characterization of some of the "deformed features of Russian entrepreneurship," and of the business groups that have gained most from the market-oriented transformations currently under way, paint a highly critical portrait of leading sectors of the emerging business class, one that contrasts quite sharply with 4 the expectations of free market reformers. The illicit origins of most of the large-scale and medium-sized capital in the country, the mass corruption of government bodies, the predominance of commercial and financial middleman activity relative to production activity, the feeble legal control over economic activity, and the spread of racketeering, violent "showdowns" between groups of commercial operators, and terrorist actions have had the result that entrepreneurship has begun to be perceived not only as the most criminal sphere of life but also as a source of the criminalization of the entire society. 	Today the Russians who have the best chance of enriching themselves are distinguished not so much by their high level of skills, knowledge, and business energy and talent, as by their possession of advantageous connections, their impudence, and their disdain for the law and for morality. This state of affairs does not correspond to Russians' sociocultural norms and values, and hence is perceived by the majority as a violation of social justice.

PRIVATIZATION HAS CREATED A HUGE ROBBERY MENTALITY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 At recent debates at Harvard University's U.S.-Russian Investment Symposium and at the Davos World Economic Forum, Western investors sharply criticized the robber-baron mentality of many Russian business leaders and the process of privatization under former Deputy Premier Anatoly Chubais. As George Soros put it, first "the assets of the state were stolen, and then when the state itself became valuable as a source of legitimacy, it too was stolen."

GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS CANNOT CONTROL CORRUPTION -- THE BEST SOLUTION IS TO BREAK GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMY

Grigory Alexeyevich Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko faction in the State Duma, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, OCTOBER 6, 1997, HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE LEADER OF THE YABLOKO FACTION acs-VT99
	Generally, liberalism is the key instrument of the war on corruption. Not government control or some extraordinary commission -- not at all government control, about which our President has begun talking, all of a sudden. It is absolutely wrong. The picture is just the reverse: the more government control, the more corruption. This is perfectly obvious. The more controllers, the more bribes are handed out. What is there that is hard to understand? The fewer controllers, the less corruption. That is why systemically, the general policy line is economic policy as a whole rather than some individual steps to tighten order. But the war on corruption begins precisely in the way in which you would begin it in your office: 

BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER MUST BE SEPARATED IN RUSSIA IN THE INTERESTS OF PROSPERITY AND DEMOCRACY

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	A RUSSIA that works for its citizens and plays a constructive role in world politics will be a Russia that has chosen well. To achieve such an outcome, a new set of rules must be established. The most important step is to separate business from political power in order to fight corruption. There must be a decisive break with the legacy of the past, when administrative power stood above the law. Individual businesses should be regulated by legislation, not by government officials or local barons who are often not easily distinguishable from gang leaders. The power of oil and gas tycoons, who generate huge profits using the country's natural resources, must be curtailed. They should be made accountable to parliament, and their activities should be made transparent and subject to public control.

SWEEPING THE PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN MAFIA UNDER THE RUG ONLY MAKES IT WORSE

Reuben Johnson, The Moscow Times, December 3, 1997, HEADLINE: U.S. Shirks 'Tough Love' acs-VT99
	However, the study very clearly warns of succumbing to this generous impulse and the serious danger of the United States being seen as ignoring or denying the existence of the menace, stressing that "the United States must avoid the appearance of unqualified support for what is routinely seen as a kleptocratic establishment. Such linkage reinforces the growing popular perception that democratic political and market economic systems are merely code words for rapacious criminality."

IMPACTS OF A CORPORATIST CRIMINAL STATE

THE GREATEST THREAT TO RUSSIA IS BEING CONTROLLED BY ORGANIZED CRIME

Viktor Bondarev, January 31, 1998 [Russian Press Digest. HEADLINE: Threat To Russia Comes Not From Communists ... \\ jan]VT99 
	The main threat to Russia comes neither from communists nor from fascists, but from a rise oligarchy, from a possible movement of the country along the Latin American way, writes KURANTY. The weakening of political parties and public movements in a weak civic society may give rise to the growth of bureauc racy, to a political power of capitalists and criminals. Therefore, Russia's slide down not only to "wild capitalism" but also to primitive, savage democracy, when power is concentrated in the hands of those who have money and command people, must be stopped.

WE MUST AVOID A CORPORATE CRIMINAL TAKE OVER OF RUSSIA AND ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 There are many reasons why a country with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons should not be allowed to slip into the chaos of rule by semi-criminal, corporate, oligarchic robber barons. Unfortunately, those who believe that the capitalism of the robber barons will eventually give way to a market economy that benefits all in society, as occurred in the United States at the turn of the century, are mistaken. America had an established middle class with a work ethic and a government that remained largely free of robber-baron infiltration. The American tycoons were still investing in their own country. Russia's robber barons are stifling their homeland's economic growth by stealing from Russia and investing abroad. In the late 1990s, Russia has no emerging middle class, and the oligarchy, which is deeply involved in the government, can alter policy for its private benefit.

GROWTH OF GRAY ZONES LEADS TO SUPERMAN CONCEPT OF SOCIAL TITANISM

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 159 , acs-VT99 
	The outburst of crime, in addition to the social and institutional factors comprising the numerous "gray zones" already mentioned, have psychological and, however strange it may be, aesthetical dimensions -- something like a Nietzschean thirst for the advent of a "superman." In Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, the ideas of the "superman," elaborated by such intellectuals as Friedrich Nietzsche and Gottfried Benn, were implemented by former marginals. In today's Russia, similar ideas are being developed and implemented by those who suffered a hopeless, half-hungry existence in branch research institutes or remote military units.

RUSSIAN ORGANIZXED CRIME CAN DOOM ITS ECONOMY

Arnaud de Borchgrave; The Washington Times, July 25, 1997, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Ignoring Russia's crisis of crime , acs-VT99
	This "false political picture of what is going on in Russia is creating the climate for business failure," Mr. Yavlinsky [Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the liberal reform party Yabloko ] wrote. He and his close friend Boris Nemtsov, the first deputy prime minister in charge of reform, know that the greatest single threat to a nascent democracy is institutionalized corruption and organized crime, and the political and economic distortions they have already generated.

EVEN A STABLE CORPORATE CRIMINAL STATE CAN STILL COLLAPSE, MUCH AS INDONESIA DID

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 A corporatist Russian government would be more challenging and less stable. Realists may argue that a corporatist Russian government would value stability above all and therefore cooperate with the West to ensure the status quo. But such a system, although stable on the surface, would be built on false foundations, much like today's Indonesia, where any change of leadership could undermine the entire order. Nor would it necessarily be a status quo power. Another scenario has such a government becoming contentious and suspicious of Western actions and goals. Cooperation on important global issues would be less forthcoming, and rules and laws would change to fit personalities, hindering economic development.

RUSH TO REFORM

THESIS: Russia is undergoing a transition from an authoritarian society to a completely different sort of society. The most important changes are the changes in attitudes among the people at all levels of Russian society. If changes come too fast, before attitudes have changed to accomodate and use those changes, then Russia will be thrown back into its dark, authoritarian past. The best policy is NOT to try and introduce new reforms in Russia, because left to its own pace of reform all will work out fine, but if it is pushed to reform too quickly the entire process will backfire.

A. IT IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES INTO A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE WHICH WILL DETERMINE IF AUTHORITARIANISM TRIUMPHS

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 21-22 , acs-VT99
	As already noted, the political development of any post communist country is strongly influenced by the attitudes and strategies of elites and the character of the parties and other institutions through which they vie for power. Equally important to long-term post communist outcomes are the initial condition and subsequent evolution of the country's political culture and political society. Broadly speaking, a country's political culture reflects the inhabitants' basic attitudes toward such matters as the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens, the legitimacy of others citizens' rights and interests, the fashion in which conflicting interests ought to be reconciled, the ability of citizens to influence government policies, and the legitimacy of existing political institutions. A civic political culture embodies high levels of interpersonal trust, a readiness to deal with political conflict through compromise rather than coercion or violence, and acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic institutions." It stands to reason that political culture affects whether citizens choose to support moderate or extreme political movements and parties, and whether they choose to engage in democratic or antidemocratic forms of political participation.

B. AFFIRMATIVE ATTEMPTS TO ACCELERATE THE PACE OF REFORM AND CHANGE IN RUSSIA

C. IF THE RATE OF CHANGE IS TOO FAST SOCIAL STABILITY IS UNDERMINED -- CHANGE IN RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE SLOW

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 6 , acs-VT99 
	To reduce the pain of change, consideration needs to be given to the relationship between the rate of change and the time it will take to adjust to change. As Karl Polanyi noted in his classic study of the first transition to a market system, common sense should suggest that if the pace of change is too fast, it should be slowed down, if possible, to safeguard the welfare of the community. He might also have added that the more privileged are always in a much better strategic position to accommodate to changing circumstances than less fortunate and vulnerable groups. Most Russians, regardless of their economic status, when asked about the pace of marketization, have repeatedly expressed the view that reforms should proceed more slowly. 

D. IMPACT: IF CHANGE IS TOO RAPID IT LEADS TO ETHNIC SCAPEGOATING AND DANGEROUS NATIONALISM 

Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 237 , acs-VT99 
	Politically, such a process is leading, among many people, to a craving for order and protection, and for some new certainties. Many of the excluded begin to search for scapegoats for their own problems and anti-Semitism and ethnic conflicts rise. This is fertile ground for populist forms of politics, even fascism. This is true of many post communist countries, and emphatically true of Russia, since as well as appealing to the economically insecure and the psychologically alienated, the demagogic leader can manipulate a nostalgia for the days of empire, a lost feeling of pride in superpower status and in Russia's control over the destinies of many subordinate peoples, and a sense that Russia was somehow special and unique

PUBLIC ATTITUDES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, AND DETERMIME WHETHER RUSSIA’S TRANSITION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL

BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION, POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES FACE A VERY DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. I I , acs-VT99
	By comparison with many democratizing countries that were never communist, the post communist countries have little prior democratic experience on which to draw, as Valerie Bunce has forcefully argued. This disadvantage is clearest with respect to human capital. Measured against Latin America and Southern Europe, where authoritarian and democratic rule frequently alternated with one another in the past, "Eastern Europe has no such democratic tradition. The so-called democratic experiments of the interwar period lasted less than a decade and are best understood, in any case, as authoritarian politics in democratic guise." Lacking "the 'feel' for democracy that Latin America and Southern Europe enjoyed," post communist states face special political obstacles.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE LAG BEHIND EVENTS, BUT ARE THE MOST POWERFUL FORCE

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East EuropeanStudies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 22 , acs-VT99 
Empirical evidence suggests that a country's political culture is neither fixed once and for all, nor completely malleable. It changes in response to new historical events and personal experiences, but with a considerable lag, and primarily through the generational turnover of citizens.' This makes political culture an important determinant of the way that political institutions evolve and operate. Over time political institutions and major sociopolitical events exert a reciprocal influence on the content of the country's political culture. But in any given period, the content of the political culture shapes the perceptions and actions of the political elite and the mass public.

RESPONSIBLE NEW SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE FORMING IN RUSSIA, BUT SLOWLY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 163 , acs-VT99 
	New social institutions in Russia are forming, but extremely slowly. They are emerging from chaos and fragments of older social structures, and the contribution of "New Russians" to this process is small. "Authorized" structures supported by continuing corporate solidarity, especially among the older elite who decided to learn to work in new conditions, is much more positive in this respect.

WITHOUT A BROAD TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES IN RUSSIA, NO LEGAL SYSTEM CAN SUCCEED

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 166 , acs-VT99 
	If a country lacks a smoothly functioning industry, which is an institution of modem society ensured by the standard moral practices of honest labor (without theft and idleness) and honest management (without delays in payment and the illegal "revolving" of money), then all speculations about competition and monopolies are nothing more than attempts to discuss the basically noneconomic problems of violence, power, and deception in economic terms, which is hardly productive. If the government of a country ensures neither the security of its citizens nor acceptable social conditions for elderly persons and children, it makes no sense to speak about a normal tax system: Who is going to pay for nonexisting services? Again, it would be better to speak about power and subjugation, that is, about tributes, not taxes. 

PROMOTING QUICK CHANGE IN RUSSIA, BEFORE ATTITUDES ARE READY, WILL CREATE A DANGEROUS POLITICAL RETROGRESSION

TRYING TO PROMOTE QUICK CHANGE IN RUSSIA SPARKS A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH

Carl Linden, Prof. Intl. Affairs George Washington Univ., 1997; RUSSIA AND CHINA ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM, p. 120, acs-VT99 
 What is clear in theory may be muddy and beset with complexities in practice. Crossing the zone of anarchy between an old and a new contract is not only perilous but full of paradox. It is a change revolutionary in implication and almost always precipitates an agonizing conflict of human loyalties. However strong popular pressure for change, the change provokes a counterrevolutionary resistance, especially from the old elite. All this has been especially true in the labor of Russia's rebirth. 

TRYING TO IMPOSE NEW ATTITUDES ON RUSSIA WILL LEAD TO DISASTER

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 168 , acs-VT99 
	Any attempt to regulate a particular situation or moral practice by law has certain social consequences. When moral evaluations of practices are not stable and universally shared, the consequences are highly unpredictable. Many historical figures who used violence to introduce new political relations might hardly be accused of extraordinary bloodthirstiness: bloodshed by them was just a miscalculated consequence of their social and legal innovations. The executed residents of Paris in 1793 and Petrograd in 1918, as well as the victims of Grozny or Sarajevo in 1995, were smashed by a social machine put into action without proper account of possible "excesses of execution." One should hardly ascribe a desire to "criminalize the country" to the architects of "radical economic reform" in Russia since 1991. The birth of the "Wild East" in a country that twenty or thirty years ago looked rather civilized resulted from the overlapping of several factors: the prolonged, unnatural, and forcibly imposed restriction of social activity; the political myopia and conservatism of the older elite; and the perhaps even worse myopia, as well as the ill-conceived and incompetent radicalism, of the new elite. It hardly makes sense to speak about individual faults. This is a matter of collective and historical responsibility. And it may be that the mindless application of the maxim "There is no other way" (perhaps the most alien to politics of all possible maxims) will deprive another generation (or even generations) of Russians from enjoying well-being, security, and freedom.

TRYING TO MOVE TO A "CIVIL SOCIETY" TOO QUICKLY, OLDER FORMS OF DOMINATION WILL RETURN

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 161 , acs-VT99 
	Does the individual's escape from the "Renaissance-type" atomization of society favor the development of a civil society and the establishment of citizens' control over the state? At first glance, yes; the state's power is undermined because of the mass disobedience of citizens and the loss of its image as something sacred and inviolable.
	But if a disintegrating or atomized society is unable to provide an elementary order that would ensure the human right to life and the basic needs of the private citizen, a return to the domination of the state over its citizens becomes unavoidable. If the "liberated" part of society cannot organize properly, or has no idea how to do so, the other part, which retains the previous, statist political culture, will ensure a return to tradition sooner or later. 

REFORM MUST NOT BE FASTER THAN THE CHANGE IN SOCIAL ATTITUDES OR ELSE CATASTROPHE RESULTS

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p.61 , acs-VT99 
	The principal lesson from this analysis is that reformers must leave enough time for the creation of new moral practices within a parallel (and initially not heavily loaded) sector of the private economy, which can later usurp basic economic responsibilities in the competition with the older sector in decline. And this development follows the course of a "pink revolution"--progress without catastrophes .

TRANSITION TO A FREE AND OPEN SOCIETY MIGHT COLLAPSE AND RUSSIA COULD RETURN TO AUTHORITARIANISM AND CONFLICT

TRANSITION OUT OF COMMUNISM DOES NOT HAVE TO BE INTO DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIANISM LOOMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 5 , acs-VT99 
However, when thinking about the evolution of the post communist states it is important to maintain the distinction between transitions from communism and transitions to democracy. It may be true that liberal democracy has become the prevailing model of modem politics in much of the world." But both historical experience and a priori reasoning suggest that a spectrum of possible post communist outcomes still exists. This spectrum includes variants of democracy, variants of authoritarianism, and some hybrids in between.

RUSSIA'S FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS ARE NOT CERTAIN

REPRESENTATIVE FLOYD D. SPENCE (R-SC), FEBRUARY 12,1998 [Federal News Service. HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE. SUBJECT: THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY jan]VT99 
Nor has the end of the Cold War brought an end to great power- competition. China, economically backed with -- (inaudible) -- poorly armed throughout most of the Cold War is using its robust economy to modernize both its conventional and nuclear forces. China currently has more strategic missiles under development than any other nation. Beijing and Moscow claim to have buried their Cold War hostilities and formed a strategic partnership. Unfortunately this partnership entails significant transfers of advanced weapons and military technology from Russia to China. And Chinese support of 	 Russian political goals, such as opposition to NATO enlargement and to possible US, United States military action against Iraq. Russia's future is far from certain as well as democracy is not yet firmly established. Indeed, according to a study last year headed by William Webster, former director of the CIA and the FBI, Russia's fast becoming an unstable kleptocracy, armed with nuclear weapons.

LINK: TRYING TO FORCE DEMOCRACY TOO SOON LEADS TO A DANGEROUS RETROGRESSION

REAL PROGRESS FOR DEMOCRACY MUST WAIT UNTIL A CRITICAL MASS OF DEMOCRATS EMERGES IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 358 , acs-VT99
Sergei Kovalyov, a biologist who spent many years in prison under Brezhnev and then helped lead the human rights movement:
	"The quality of democracy depends heavily on the quality of the democrats," Kovalyov told me after the elections. "We have to wait for a critical mass to accumulate of people with democratic principles. It's like a nuclear explosion: the critical mass has to accrue. Without this, everything will be like it is now, always in fits and starts. Our era of romantic democracy is long over. We have finally fallen to earth."

FORCING NATIONS TO HAVE ELECTIONS WHEN THEY ARE NOT YET READY CAUSES ETHNIC VIOLENCE, AS IN BOSNIA

Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY, December 30, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Ballots don't always stop the world's bullets Democracy as strategy is hit or miss acs-VT99
	Zakaria argues that elections actually can have a negative effect. In Bosnia, he says, "it has been a disaster," solidifying ethnic hatreds that produced the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II.
He criticized Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for urging elections during a recent visit to the Congo, where leader Laurent Kabila gained power by force. "So Kabila will hold relatively free and fair elections and they will mean nothing," Zakaria says.

WHEN DEMOCRACY IS ADOPTED TOO EARLY IT MERELY INSTITUTIONALIZES ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS IN A SOCIETY, RENDERING IT UNGOVERNABLE

Matthew Miller; U.S. News & World Report, The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 30, 1997, Pg. B-7, HEADLINE: Is democracy right for every nation? acs-VT99
	 When these conditions aren't present, democracy instead institutionalizes tribal, ethnic, religious or regional tensions, rendering nations ungovernable. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example, democracy brought nationalists to power and paved the path to war. Only a coup in Azerbaijan has brought the stability that now promises to bring economic development.

DEMOCRACY EXPOSES THE WEAKNESSES OF ANY SOCIETY, AND THUS SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN SITUATIONS OF SOCIAL STRENGTH

Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99
	HITLER and Mussolini each came to power through democracy. Democracies do not always make societies more civil-but they do always mercilessly expose the health of the societies in which they operate.

THE SOCIETY NEEDS TO HAVE DEVELOPED SOME COHESION BEFORE DEMOCRACY IS INTRODUCED FOR IT TO BE SUCCESSFUL

Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99
	 The lesson to draw is not that dictatorship is good and democracy bad but that democracy emerges successfully only as a capstone to other social and economic achievements. In his "Author's Introduction" to Democracy in America, Tocqueville showed how democracy evolved in the West not through the kind of moral fiat we are trying to impose throughout the world but as an organic outgrowth of development. European society had reached a level of complexity and sophistication at which the aristocracy, so as not to overburden itself, had to confer a measure of equality upon other citizens and allocate some responsibility to them: a structured division of the population into peacefully competing interest groups was necessary if both tyranny and anarchy were to be averted.

RUSSIA IS FALLING APART BECAUSE IT TRIED TO GO DEMOCRATIC TOO SOON

Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99
	 Because both a middle class and civil institutions are required for successful democracy, democratic Russia, which inherited neither from the Soviet regime, remains violent, unstable, and miserably poor despite its 99 percent literacy rate. Under its authoritarian system China has dramatically improved the quality of life for hundreds of millions of its people. My point, hard as it may be for Americans to accept, is that Russia may be failing in part because it is a democracy and China may be succeeding in part because it is not.

LINK: TRYING TO FORCE FREE MARKET TOO SOON LEADS TO A DANGEROUS RETROGRESSION

SEVERE HARDSHIPS INFLICTED BY REFORM TEND TO DISCOURAGE PEOPLE ABOUT DEMOCRACY

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 25 , acs-VT99 
	On the other hand, the severe hardships inflicted on many persons by economic reform may ultimately sharpen disillusionment with democracy - especially if these hardships are accompanied by rapidly increasing disparities of income and extensive corruption.

RUSSIAN PEOPLE SUPPORT A FREE ECONOMY, BUT DISAGREE ABOUT THE SPEED OF THE TRANSITION

Matthew Wyman, Prof. of Politics at Keele University [UK], 1997, PUBLIC OPINION IN POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA, p. 233 , acs-VT99
	Attitudes to the development of a market economy could be discussed with a great deal more confidence. It was shown that , from the time at which it became a political issue, a consistent majority supported the idea of creating a market economy, while a smaller number, around one in four, consistently opposed it. Among the supporters of markets, however, there were great differences about the desirable pace of reform, with a relatively small social constituency in favour of rapid transition to a market economy.

A MINORITY OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS SUPPORT A FREE MARKET

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 129 , acs-VT99 
	As reform unfolded and social distress increased, Russians became increasingly disaffected and alienated from the reform process and the pain that it inflicted on the population. VTslOM, the highly respected public polling research center, has monitored this dramatic shift in the population's support for capitalism. Of those surveyed in 1993, 81 percent favored a system based on private property and market relationships. Only 7 percent thought that an economy regulated by state planning was better. By May 1995 Russians were no longer certain. Only 22 percent said they favored a capitalist economy, while the remainder were evenly divided between those who thought state planning was better (39 percent) and those who were uncertain (39 percent).

FEAR OF IMPENDING SOCIAL DISORDER CRIPPLES THE PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

Bertram Silverman & Murray Yanowitch, Profs. of Economics Hofstra Univ., 1997; NEW RICH, NEW POOR, NEW RUSSIA: Winners and losers on the Russian road to capitalism, p. 132 , acs-VT99 
	The declining effectiveness of government and the erosion of confidence in it has another consequence. It contributes to fears of impending social disorder and moves people to be more cautious about changing the course of reform. Anxiety about looming disaster partly helps explain the surprising passivity of the intelligentsia in the face of hardships imposed by radical reform, and is another important reason for the weakness of social democracy in Russia.

LINK: BOTH UTOPIAN AND CONSERVATIVE ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE MORALITY LEAD TO CATASTROPHE FOR RUSSIA

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 167 , acs-VT99 
	Utopian efforts to create and legitimize social institutions not supported by moral practices may, contrary to reformers' intentions, produce an apocalyptic reality of the collapse of power. And conservatives' tough-minded and persistent reluctance to institutionalize the operative moral practices may turn the whole of society into a hierarchy of mafia-like organizations.

IMPACT: RUSHING REFORM LEADS TO AUTHORITARIANISM

RUSSIAN AUTHORITARIANISM MAY TAKE THE FORMS OF DICTATORSHIP, ONE PARTY STATE, OR MILITARY REGIME

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 7 , acs-VT99 
	The main potential forms Of post communist authoritarianism are personal dictatorships, one-party states, and military regimes. The socioeconomic turmoil following the collapse of communism may make it hard to build stable versions of any of these types of authoritarianism, but oscillations among them may still preclude successful democratization. In countries where a substantial part of the population has already undergone sociopolitical mobilization, the lack of a well developed party structure makes a personal dictatorship vulnerable to sharp shifts in the public mood and to unbridled powerstruggles when the dictator is incapacitated or dies . Nonetheless, a few post communist countries are likely to come under the sway of such dictatorships. Contemporary Belarus fits this model, and Turkmenistan bears a significant resemblance to it.

SOCIAL TITANISM IS A DISASTER FOR ANY SOCIETY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 160 , acs-VT99 
Generally speaking, social titanism, the aesthetization of war, and the immoralism of crimes, prisons, and concentration camps are corollaries of the opening of the valves of social mobility, be it during the "Great Revolutions," Napoleonic wars, or Nazism.

WHILE ONE PARTY STATES ARE MORE STABLE, DICTATORSHIP IS AN EASIER AUTHORITARIAN ALTERNATIVE

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 7 , acs-VT99 
	Generally speaking, authoritarian states built around a single ruling party are more stable than personal dictatorships. A ramified party organization helps harness mass political participation to the leaders' objectives, reduces elite conflict, and smooths the process of succession. For post communist leaders set on following this path, the challenge is to create a part), mechanism that can actually control mass participation and the behavior of any quasi-democratic governmental institutions that already have been set up. This stratagem is often more difficult to apply than it might seem. Once the old communist mechanisms of control have been weakened, building a stable new ruling party is a problematic undertaking, as developments in Kazakstan indicate. Success depends both on the top leader's willingness to assign high priority to building such a party and on the party's capacity to contain new socioeconomic forces within its structure. Absent these two conditions, leaders with a dictatorial bent may move toward a system of personal rule, eliminating quasi -democratic institutions and processes, such as elections, that they cannot effectively control.

AT ITS OWN PACE, RUSSIA WILL DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL SOCIETY

IN THE LONG RUN, RUSSIA WILL DEVELOP INTO A DEMOCRATIC PLURAL STATE

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 117, acs-VT99 
	Therefore a gradual increase in political order through democratic pluralism is possible over the long run. Institutional change can be a powerful impetus to a self-sustaining democratic equilibrium. Where once it was assumed that social modernization tended to drive the development of political regimes, now scholars are inclined to believe that well-constructed institutions can provide elites with sufficient incentives to resolve their differences and achieve their goals by democratic mean.

SMALL CIVIC SUCCESSES WILL GROW, THROUGH A VIRTUOUS CYCLE, INTO A CIVIC SOCIETY

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 118, acs-VT99
 But where people begin to reinforce one another's expectations that they are able to cooperate in common endeavors without relying upon a harsh, dictatorial central authority, a "virtuous cycle" results in which more complex and effective organizational forms evolve."' What would set such a developmental sequence into motion in Russia? The preceding discussion has suggested that Russia stands poised between two alternative paths. The disintegrating forces of repressiveness, crime, corruption, and popular alienation may take the upper hand and lead to a new form of authoritarianism, or the integrating forces of a pluralistic and lawregulated order may gradually grow stronger. In this delicate state of equipoise, the behavior of central political elites could tip the balance: in particular, their behavior during and after the 1996 presidential election. Recall Samuel Huntington's "two-turnovers" rule in judging the degree to which democracy is consolidated in a post -authoritarian regime. "' If following the collapse of an authoritarian regime, the incumbents lose the first election and give up power peacefully, and then, following the second election, their successors do the same, we may say that democracy is well established. Although Russia's parliamentary election of 1995 was the first in which a free election was held on schedule since the October Revolution, the most important test of a peaceful transfer of state power is the presidential election: 1996 will be the first; 2000 would be the second. If incumbents lose twice and exit willingly, their behavior will be crucial in setting examples for other political leaders at all levels of government.

PRESSURES BY DEVELOPING STRUCTURES WILL MOVE RUSSIA TOWARDS BEING A CIVIL SOCIETY

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, P. 163-164 , acs-VT99 
	Of course, some may say that the very existence of "authorized" commercial structures is a form of corruption and, therefore, contributes to the criminalization of society. But the pressure exerted by the "authorized" structures has a civilizing impact on the state. A good example of this fact is an address in the spring of 1996 by a number of outstanding businessmen (closely connected to the state) to the principal political forces of the country. On the eve of the presidential elections, the businessmen suggested elaborating an agreement on the basic rules of the game in politics and economics that must not be violated irrespective of the outcome of the elections. This address is an episode in the prolonged, tormented birth of civil society, which, contrary to the opinion of politicians like Anatoly Chubais, could hardly be hastened by the unjustified enrichment of a handful of citizens who instantly "turned intoproprietors.

BEST POLICY IS STRATEGIC PATIENCE -- DON’T TRY TO RUSH THINGS IN RUSSIA

BEST CHOICE IS TO WAIT AND LET THE IRRATIONAL HOPES OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE TRANSFORM THE SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 161-162 , acsVT99 
 	Does all this mean that the present situation in Russia is absolutely hopeless and that the creation of a modem society is precluded? I do not think so. To my mind, it is exactly the irrational nature of human behavior that may save the situation now. When rational behavior induces people to revel in chaos (this is what the "social utility function" has turned out to be in Russia), irrational behavior (which is in essence collective rationality; see Chapter 3) must lead to the emergence of new and stable social institutions of modem society. They probably cannot develop quickly. But having seen so much bloodshed since the beginning of this century, the Russian people must have learned something very important that was previously lacking 'in Russian political culture, This is the insight that social institutions are indispensable for supporting contracts and must be carefully constructed. The spontaneous order, that is, norms of collective rationality, must be fixed or crystallized in legitimate social institutions transferred "from shadow into light." One can discern some evidence that this understanding is emerging in present-day Russia. Our fear is that it may once again, as at the beginning of the century, be destroyed in yet another social cataclysm.

THE BEST POLICY IS STRATEGIC PATIENCE -- LET RUSSIA DEVELOP

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 In other words, we need to make sure we have a policy toward Russia that contains an indispensable feature: strategic patience. That means a policy not just for coping with the issue or the crisis of the moment or the week or even of the season, or for getting through the next summit meeting; rather, it means a policy for the next century -- which, by the way, begins in 2 years, 3 months, 11 days, and 4 hours.

RUSSIA IS SLOWLY EVOLVING, AND MUST BE GIVEN TIME TO DO SO, IN ORDER TO BECOME COMPLETELY BENIGN

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 This must not take Americans by surprise. Seven years ago, an enormous evil empire that had poisoned everything and everyone it touched broke to pieces. Its harmful emanations, like light from a long-dead star, will continue to reach us for years to come. Russia's leaders came of age and rose under the empire. They cannot be counted on to fashion a world of which they know little. At best, in domestic politics, economics, and international relations, they will forge a hybrid. If we are lucky -- as we have been with Yeltsin -- the Russia they make will be more than half benign. It will be up to the next generation to turn the hybrid into something new and free of the malignant past.

OUR ERROR IS IN DEMANDING THAT RUSSIA MOVE TO STABLE MARKET DEMOCRACY TOO QUICKLY THEY JUST NEED SOME TIME

David Remnick, Pulitzer Prize winning author on Russia, 1997; RESURRECTION: The Struggle for a New Russia, p. 367 , acs-VT99 
	Perhaps it is a legacy of the Cold War that so man), American analysts demand so much so soon from Russia. Russia is no longer an enemy or anything resembling one, and yet we demand to know why, for example, there are no developed political parties in Russia; somehow we fail to remember that it took the United States (with all its historical advantages, including its founders) more than sixty years after independence to develop its two-party system, that in France nearly all the parties have been vehicles for the likes of Mitterrand or Chirac. The drama of 1991 so accelerated our notion of Russian history that expectations became outlandish; and now that many of those expectations have been disappointed, deferred, and even betrayed, it seems as if we have gone back to expecting I only the worst from Russia.

THE BEST POLICY IS TO LET SOCIAL ATTITUDES CATCH UP TO THE CHANGES WHICH ALREADY EXIST

THE BEST WAY TO FIGHT "CORRUPTION" AND "MAFIAS" IN RUSSIA IS TO LET SOCIAL ATTITUDES CATCH UP WITH NEW REALITIES, NOT TO TRY AND FORCE CHANGE

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, P. 119 , acs-VT99 
	I believe that the problem of corruption in Russia cannot be solved without settling a more profound problem, that of the reduction and ultimate extermination of "gray zones" in social behavior. When law happens to be in contradiction with universal and habitual practices, no action against corruption has any real prospects of success. It is not possible to arrest all corrupt people if the practice of corruption is commonplace. Attempts to combat corruption in Uzbekistan between 1983 and 1986, when tens of thousands were arrested for what was a norm of life there (to wit, paying a "share" of income for being appointed to this or that profitable position), and the failure of that campaign proved the impossibility of combating corruption by force and terror; the scale of repressions in this instance would have been close to that of the Stalin era.

ALLOWING ATTITUDES TO CATCH UP WITH INSTITUTIONS ALLOWS A CIVIL SOCIETY TO EMERGE, AVOIDING SOCIAL TITANISM

Victor Sergeyev, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 1998; THE WILD EAST: Crime and lawlessness in post-communist Russia, p. 160 , acs-VT99 
	And this leads to a significant question, perhaps the central one for societies in transition: How is it possible to avoid social titanism with all its dark sides? The traditional response is the creation of civil society, that is, a system of independent institutions elaborated by citizens themselves and used by them to promote their own interests. The state in relation to civil society is merely an instrument for the creation of an infrastructure that makes the functioning of civil society possible; the state is a kind of hired worker. Civil society and a society in which the state acts as an independent actor (with its own goals and interests different from the interests of the citizens it dominates) differ basically in that civil society reduces the number of "gray zones" that are permanently emerging where the state bureaucracy has no desire to take the ideas and interests of the private citizen into account.

THE PROBLEM IN RUSSIA IS THAT NEW DEMOCRATIC MARKET VALUES HAVE NOT YET REPLACED OLD SOVIET VALUES

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	In the end the Russians dismantled their own empire with barely a shot fired. Now Russia is sick with self-doubt and has become an international loner. Nor do Russia's current "democracy" and Western-style consumerism, divorced from the Protestant ethic that sustains them in the West, constitute a value system that can unify and inspire. The problem is not that Soviet values have been jettisoned but that there is nothing to replace them.

IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME FOR RUSSIAN IMPERIALIST MOTIVATIONS TO DIE DOWN

EDWIN G. DOLAN, president of the American Institute of Business and Economics in Moscow, International Herald Tribune, April 15, 1998, Pg. 9, Russia Today , acs-VT99
	One [thing I have learned] is that changing Russia into a normal, democratic country ready to live quietly within its own borders is an agenda for a century, not for a decade. American foreign policy today must deal with Russia as it is and as it will be for a long time, not with a dream- Russia that may exist several generations from now. The Russia that now exists still views itself as a big power only temporarily down on its luck. All of the former Soviet Union and much of the rest of the former Soviet empire are regions still seen as a legitimate sphere of influence.

RUSSIA NEEDS TO DEVELOP A MIDDLE CLASS BEFORE IT TRIES FULL DEMOCRACY

IT IS BETTER FOR NATIONS TO WAIT FOR DEMOCRACY UNTIL A MIDDLE CLASS HAS DEVELOPED

Matthew Miller; U.S. News & World Report, The San Diego Union-Tribune, December 30, 1997, Pg. B-7, HEADLINE: Is democracy right for every nation? acs-VT99
	For nations not ready for democracy, Kaplan argues, something closer to benevolent dictatorship is the best hope, until a middle class emerges to demand broader political rights -- in effect, biting the hand that fed it.

THE BEST PATH TO DEMOCRACY IS TO DEVELOP A MIDDLE CLASS AND THEN HAVE THAT CLASS PRESSURE FOR THE MOVE TO DEMOCRACY

Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1997; Pg. 55; HEADLINE: Was democracy just a moment? acs-VT99
	 Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class. Not democracies but authoritarian systems, including monarchies, create middle classes-which, having achieved a certain size and self-confidence, revolt against the very dictators who generated their prosperity. This is the pattern today in the Pacific Rim and the southern cone of South America, but not in other parts of Latin America, southern Asia, or sub-Saharan Africa. A place like the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), where the per capita gross national productis less than $ 200 a year and the average person is either a rural peasant or an urban peasant; where there is little infrastructure of roads, sewers, and so on; and where reliable bureaucratic institutions are lacking, needs a leader like Bismarck or Jerry Rawlings-the Ghanaian ruler who stabilized his country through dictatorship and then had himself elected democratically-in place for years before he is safe from an undisciplined soldiery.

HISTORY SHOWS THIS IS HOW STABLE CIVIL SOCIETIES ARE FORMED

RUSSIA IS FOLLOWING THE HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF PAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

NIKOLAI BIRYUKOV & VICTOR SERGEYEV, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1997; RUSSIAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: Institutional conflict in a nascent democracy, p. 287 , acsVT99 
“This world is extremely obscure and extremely important - the danger is out of proportion to the reactions it causes; it is the reactions that are really dangerous.” -P. Valery
 The above analysis of political developments in Russia in the post perestroika period is a good occasion to formulate a number of questions that appear to be of general interest to historical sociology, viz. about the ways in which regimes of representative rule come to supplant those of authoritarian power. Comparison of the great European revolutions of the last four centuries reveals a repeated pattern of development, at least in the institutional domain.

FRANCE AND GERMANY SHOW THAT IT TAKES TIME TO BUILD A DEMOCRACY

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	However, no such miracles have been observed in History over the past couple of thousands of years. France needed almost a century for the principles of liberty solemnly proclaimed by the revolutionaries of 1789 to reveal themselves as firmly anchored in 1871. Between these two dates, the country was aching under the burden of a military dictatorship and two empires which rose above the bones of two crushed revolutions and which massacred whole generations of young Frenchmen in pointless wars of conquest. Germany first proclaimed itself a democratic republic in 1848. A century later, in 1948, it was still building its democracy

ELECTION 2000

THESIS: The Russian presidential election is coming up in the year 2000. It is shaping up as a confrontation between Nemtsov for the Yeltsin reformers vs. Zyoganov for the Communists. The Communists will use the affirmative’s foreign policy changes to win the close election. And, of course, a new Communist government would soon find itself engaged in wars and conflicts to reconquer the former Soviet Union.

A. IN RUSSIA THE POLITICAL FUTURE IS BETWEEN REFORMISTS AND COMMUNISTS

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	The situation in today's Russia is highly volatile. There are really two Russias. One is led by the younger, better-educated, mostly urban population that is eager to break with the past and take the Western route; the new deputy prime minister, Boris Nemtsov, is a representative spokesman for this constituency. The other Russia is made up of older, often unskilled, preponderantly rural or small-town citizens, suspicious of the West and Western ways and nostalgic for the more secure Soviet past; their principal mouthpiece is the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadi Zyuganov. At present the pro-Western contingent runs the country, but it is by no means firmly in the saddle. In the first round of the June 1996 presidential election, incumbent Boris Yeltsin received the most votes (35 percent), but had the anti-liberal opposition combined forces it would have decisively defeated him: Zyuganov won 32 percent of the vote, the extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky nearly 6 percent, and the authoritarian Aleksandr Lebed over 14 percent, to produce a theoretically absolute majority of 52 percent. 

B. COMMUNISTS WILL USE ANY CHANGES IN US FOREIGN POLICY TO CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. CURRENT POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA IS JUST ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO CRUSH IT

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 14 acs-VT99 
	We have only begun to understand how the West, while talking about Russia's "admission to civilization," has actually been trying to remove or weaken its chief geopolitical competitor. The West has always considered historical Russia--whether the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union-to be its number one geopolitical rival. Our territory has been subjected to so many intrusions and invasions because of Russia's unique proximity to all the power centers of America, Asia, and Europe.

C. WE MUST ACT NOW TO MAKE SURE THAT THE RUSSIAN ELECTION OF THE YEAR 2000 DOESN’T LEAD TO A WORLDWIDE DISASTER

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	 Of course, the next elections are still a long way away. Long enough to lay back? It is clear that, if we do not want to repeat in the year 2000 the same "Russian roulette with the revolver placed against the temple of Mankind," then we must immediately roll back the influence of revanchism with the influence of common sense and political sobriety. But to all appearances the liberal majority of the Russian political class is not even preparing for such a counter-attack

THE ELECTION OF 2000 IS THE CRITICAL TURNING POINT FOR RUSSIA

BRINK: RUSSIA CAN NOW TURN EITHER TO DEMOCRACY OR AUTHORITARIANISM

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 119, acsVT99 
	These are strong conditions, but less so than the commonly offered theory that democracy in Russia can succeed only if a congruent cultural, social, civic and economic foundation is created first. The behavior of political elites, interacting and monitoring one another's willingness to comply with democratic rules of procedure, can itself launch Russia onto either the democratic or the autocratic path. While it is still too early to tell whether Russia in its post-Soviet, postcommunist phase will succumb to a lengthy phase of self-reinforcing demands for authoritarian rule, or whether the culture and institutions of pluralist democracy will ultimately triumph, it is fair to say that democracy remains a possible outcome.

THE NEXT ELECTION IS CRITICAL -- IF IT GOES WELL THEN THE FUTURE WILL BE MUCH SAFER

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 118 , acs-VT99 
	Finally, if the opposition wins the election, assumes power peacefully, and then uses presidential power in such a way as to reinforce rather than overturn the democratic institutional fabric of Russia's postcommunist political order, this will contribute powerfully to the odds that the next, and the next, electoral turnover will also proceed by the rules.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES VERY FRAGILE ABOUT DEMOCRACY

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IS RUSSIA IS VERY BRITTLE, MANY PEOPLE LONG FOR THE COMMUNIST PAST -- THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE QUICKLY

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	Three years ago, when asked what they thought of communism, 51 percent of Russians polled said they had a positive image of it and 36 percent a negative one. (It is, however, indicative of the prevailing confused mood that fewer than half those who expressed a positive attitude toward communism wanted to see it restored.) The popular base of democracy in the country is thus thin and brittle; the political climate can change overnight. Countries like Russia, lacking in strong party organizations and loyalties, are capable of swinging wildly from one extreme to another, often in response to a demagogue who promises quick and easy solutions.

COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST FORCES ARE DEEPLY ENTRENCHED IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	 YET SELF-INTEREST has to contend with a political culture based in traditions of empire-building and reliance on military power for stature rather than security. For, unfortunately, Russia has not made a clean break with its Soviet past.
The bloodless revolution of 1991 that outlawed the Communist Party, oversaw the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, and installed democracy is in many respects incomplete. The new coexists with the old in an uneasy symbiosis. No fresh elites have emerged: the country's political, economic, military, and cultural institutions are run by ex-communists who cannot shed old mental habits. The Duma, the lower house of parliament, is dominated by communists and nationalists equally suspicious of the West and equally determined to reclaim for Russia superpower status. n1 Unlike the Bolsheviks, who on coming to power promptly obliterated all the symbols of the overthrown czarist regime, Russia's democrats have left in place the myriad memorials glorifying their predecessors without substituting pervasive symbols of their own.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY MIGHT WIN THE ELECTION IN 2000

COMMUNISTS ARE RALLYING FOR THE 2000 ELECTIONS

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
 Another danger: Yeltsin is increasingly dependent on a small circle of top aides, including his daughter Tatiana Dyachenko, chief of staff Valentin Yumashev and spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky, keeping other advisers and views away.
"The president is isolated," says Andrannik Migranyan, a foreign policy adviser. Meanwhile opposition presidential candidates, including communist leader Gennady Zuganov and former general Alexander Lebed, a nationalist, will openly campaign for the presidential election set for the 2000, with no agreed-on reform candidate yet in place to succeed Yeltsin.

COMMUNIST ZYUGANOV IS A STRONG CHALLENGER

ARIEL COHEN, PH.D., AND EVGUENII VOLK, Heritage Foundation,, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: YELTSIN'S GAMBIT: POLITICAL CRISIS IN MOSCOW acs-VT99
	Presidential politics also played a role in Yeltsin's decision. According to persistent media reports, and despite his public denials, Yeltsin is seriously considering running in 2000 for a third term. If the Constitutional Court -- and his health -- do not permit this, Yeltsin must consider possible successors. He is not ready to anoint one yet, however. Chernomyrdin officially announced on March 28 that he intends to run for the presidency in 2000. With only about 6 percent of popular support according to recent polls, however, Chernomyrdin remains a distant sixth in the field of contenders. Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov leads the pack, followed by First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, retired general Aleksandr Lebed, and Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky.

ON THE ISSUES MOST IMPORTANT TO VOTERS, THE COMMUNISTS CAN CAPTURE THEIR ALLEGIANCE

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 113-114 , acs-VT99 
			Popular alienation. The pathologies of the soft state described here have affected public opinion and electoral behavior in Russia. The popular wave of enthusiasm for democratic and market reform that propelled a new generation of political elites into power in 1989-91 has been spent. It has been followed by a wave of disillusionment with the initial results of change, and expressed by voter support for the communist and nationalist opposition.
 Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party and Gennadii Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation have been highly successful in appealing to popular discontent with their radical opposition platforms. The issues that helped to bring democrats into power in 1989-91 radical anti-establishment egalitarianism, political freedom, economic opportunity - no longer move voters. Instead, in 1995, on a number of issues voters cared about most, including the economy and crime, it was the communists who were best able to capture the support of Russian voters.

IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGE IS TAKING PLACE IN RUSSIA ALONG THE LINES OF MARKET VS. COMMUNISM

Thomas Remington, Prof. Political Science at Emory, 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 115 , acs-VT99 
Analyses of Russian electoral behavior suggest that cleavage lines are beginning to form and that party development will be strongly influenced by the social divisions, for example between those favoring and opposing Market reforms, and those favoring and opposing communist principles.'

THE OPPOSITION FACTIONS IN RUSSIA ARE UNITING,

Interfax news agency, February 19, 1998 [Moscow, 19 Feb 98. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. HEADLINE: Communists, army support movement sign cooperation pact \\ jan]VT99
	Moscow, 19th February: The People's Patriotic Union, led by Gennadiy Zyuganov, and the movement for the support of the army, led by Lev Rokhlin, have signed an agreement aimed at coordinating their activity. Zyuganov, who also leads the Communist Party [of the Russian Federation], and Rokhlin, chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, signed an agreement to this effect at a meeting of the union's presidium held at the State Duma. 
	"Only joint action by all patriotic forces can save the country from catastrophe," the agreement reads. The two movements will coordinate their actions both in Moscow and in the regions. They will stage joint actions and extend each other support during "events aimed at confronting the antipopular policy pursued in the country" 

YELTSIN WON’T CHANGE POLICIES NOW AS HE PREPARES FOR 2000

YELTSIN WILL NOT CHANGE POLICIES FROM NOW UNTIL THE ELECTION IN 2000 -- THE ISSUE IS WHAT HAPPENS THEN!

Georgi Shakhnazarov, the Soviet Academy of Political Science, The Daily Yomiuri, August 18, 1997, SECTION: Pg. 6, HEADLINE: INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD/Boris Nemtsov: Yeltsin's heir apparent? acs-VT99
	It is true that Yeltsin still has three years to go until the end of his presidency and much could happen in the meantime. Yet he himself is unlikely to initiate any dramatic changes. He did what he did, and today the question is how viable his policies are going to be and whether his legacy will be preserved--or whether it will be rejected as totally wrong. This question, however, has to be answered by his successors.

YELTSIN WILL BE JUDGED ON HOW HE PREPARES HIS COUNTRY FOR THE 2000 ELECTION

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	In three years' time, Russia will be facing an even harsher test - the elections of 2000. There will be no Yeltsin in them who could be blamed for our common mistake. But the antagonism between the profanated democracy and the party of confrontation will remain. And in the end History will judge Yeltsin by the way he prepares his country for this exam, and the liberals by how well they learned the lessons of the 1996 elections.

EVEN IF YELTSIN STAYS HEALTH, THE FOCUS WILL BE ON THE SUCCESSION ISSUE

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. X , acs-VT99 
Moreover, even with a relatively healthy Yeltsin, Russian politicsand policy-will he increasingly influenced by the succession issue. Russian politicians and bureaucrats are already looking beyond the Yeltsin era and beginning to shape their policies and behavior accordingly. The longer Yeltsin is in office, the more the succession issue will begin to intrude on Russian politics-and the more Yeltsin's power and ability to shape Russian policies will decline. 

YELTSIN IS WEAK, ON HIS LAST LEGS, AND SERIOUSLY ILL -- THE STRUGGLE TO REPLACE HIM HAS BEGUN

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
President Boris Yeltsin's health has declined to the point where some of his aides no longer pretend he is effectively leading Russia. 
Although the exact cause of Yeltsin's condition remains secret, it has become increasingly clear at home and abroad that the Russian leader is seriously ill, that the campaign to succeed him has begun and that other governments must start adjusting for the post-Yeltsin era. For the United States, that means the potential for influencing Russia in a positive direction has just gotten more difficult.

YELTSIN CAN RUN FOR A THIRD TERM BUT PROBABLY WILL NOT

Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY, March 24, 1998, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: Yeltsin housecleaning shows 'personal pattern' Experts don't see big impact on U.S.-Russian relations acs-VT99
	Yeltsin acted this time after business tycoon Boris Berezovsky voiced doubt on television that Yeltsin, whose second presidential term ends in the year 2000, could be elected to a third term. Technically, Yeltsin, 67, can run again, but his health problems would make that difficult.

NEMTSOV IS THE CANDIDATE REFORMERS WILL SUPPORT TO REPLACE YELTSIN

NEMTSOV IS A POPULAR AND SUCCESSFUL GOVERNOR YELTSIN HAS CHOSEN AS HIS SUCCESSOR

Georgi Shakhnazarov, the Soviet Academy of Political Science, The Daily Yomiuri, August 18, 1997, SECTION: Pg. 6, HEADLINE: INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD/Boris Nemtsov: Yeltsin's heir apparent? acs-VT99
	It seems, however, that this time the president himself, with no prompting from his family, decided that it was important to bring in someone to whom he could entrust his legacy. Enter the latest heir apparent, the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov, whom Yeltsin had liked since he first visited that Volga city. As is his custom, the president acted quickly, creating for his protege another post of first deputy premier to whom crucial tasks are assigned. In a particularly meaningful gesture, the president had an unusual televised talk with Nemtsov in which he enthusiastically and even sentimentally lavished praise on the governor, leaving no doubt in anyone's mind that he regarded him as his successor.

RUSSIAN MEDIA IS NOW PAVING THE WAY FOR NEMTSOV TO REPLACE YELTSIN IN 2000

Georgi Shakhnazarov, the Soviet Academy of Political Science, The Daily Yomiuri, August 18, 1997, SECTION: Pg. 6, HEADLINE: INSIGHTS INTO THE WORLD/Boris Nemtsov: Yeltsin's heir apparent? acs-VT99
	 If any proof was needed, it was provided by the electronic media and the progovernment press. With the apparent blessing of the president, they started to build up Nemtsov as Russia's next president. Although he has spent barely a few weeks in Moscow and has not accomplished anything significant, leading commentators have said that opinion surveys indicate a surge in Nemtsov's popularity, and that he enjoys the trust of almost half of those polled. It is true that the elections are still a long way off--but the party of power has a point man and Yeltsin has an heir apparent.

THE PRESIDENT RUNS THE SHOW - RUSSIAN ELECTIONS ARE DEMOCRATIC, BUT DEMOCRACY STOPS THERE

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	 Russia's democratic institutions have not developed as fully as its elections. As the recent cabinet firings show, the system of checks and balances is underdeveloped, leaving the country prone to the whims of a mercurial chief executive. The rule of law is often not respected. The judicial branch of government remains overly influenced by the executive branch. The lower house of parliament has made some headway in becoming more than a mere talking chamber in which the occasional fistfight breaks out, and the executive branch now has to lobby the Duma to pass the budget, the START II treaty, and other crucial matters. But Yeltsin and his team still reserve the option of bypassing the Duma altogether -- thereby ignoring the constitution -- if the Duma disagrees with an executive initiative or is unwilling to be co-opted by promises of some new monthly leadership meeting with the president and prime minister. This strategy is routinely applied to the budget, where compromises are made to ensure passage and are then ignored throughout the year. Another example is the persistent rumor that Yeltsin will seek an unconstitutional third term as president.

LINKS: THINGS THE AFFIRMATIVE MIGHT DO WHICH WOULD HELP THE COMMUNISTS GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER

NEW USA SUPERPOWER INITIATIVES INCREASE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN RUSSIA

ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IS INCREASING IN RUSSIA BECAUSE THE US IS TRYING TO ACT AS THE GLOBAL BOSS

GENNADY ZYUGANOV, FEBRUARY 4,1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CPRF LEADER \\ jan]VT99 
Zyuganov: I believe that the third world war in qualitatively new forms, financial, economic, information-psychological forms, is already raging on the expanses of Russia. And we arc witnessing a redivision of the world. The Potsdam post-war epoch is over. The balance of forces that was achieved by the USSR and the United States has been finally disrupted. And against this background we see a redivision of spheres of influence by qualitatively new means. For instance, NATO is expanding, there is a new division of spheres of influence in the Balkans. A similar attempt is now being made in the Middle East. They want to become established masters of the planet capable of dictating their terms to everybody. As to a hot war, we recently had one in the south, in Chechnya. This war never stopped in the Middle East, And massive strikes will result, will bring about massive acts of terrorism and subversion and may develop into a large-scale conflict. I mean the possibility of sophisticated systems being taken from under the appropriate control. This will lead to a broader confrontation as well. Anti-American sentiments are growing on all continents and in all countries. Anyone I talked with, even the Europeans, do not like the position of the "boss", not a brother, but the boss who tries to dictate his terms. This is fraught with dire consequences.

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES WILL DOMINATE THE NEXT RUSSIAN ELECTION

Dmitry Trenin, deputy director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, The Moscow Times, April 14, 1998, HEADLINE: Words to Deeds in Riga , acs-VT99
	It is clear that foreign-policy problems are becoming more significant for voters. The potential here for populism practically guarantees that, unlike elections in 1995 and 1996, the next parliamentary and especially presidential elections will have a clearly expressed foreign-policy dimension. The United States, NATO, Iraq and the Balkans are far away; the majority of Russians are rather indifferent to them. But the former Soviet republics and their Russian -speaking populations are another matter.

WIDENING INCOME GAP MERELY FUELS THE NEO COMMUNIST AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	In real terms, government pensions and wages were cut to 40 percent or less of their original value, and the government still cannot collect enough taxes to cover these expenses. Tax receipts have fallen to less than 20 percent of the country's GDP. Meanwhile, external debt has skyrocketed, and domestic debt, which was next to nothing just a decade ago, has reached almost 15 percent of GDP. Servicing these debts, paid out to local bankers and foreign speculators at exorbitant interest rates, will take no less than 25 percent of total government expenditure in 1998. The current Russian market economy has created a handful of super-wealthy individuals while leaving the rest behind to struggle. It is no wonder that these economic policies resulted in some 250 communists and 50 ultranationalist Zhirinovskyites being elected to the 450-seat State Duma in 1995.

INSULTS TO RUSSIA ADVERSELY EFFECT RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND INFLUENCE THE ELECTIONS

Vladimir Mikheyev, Russian Press Digest, May 26, 1998, HEADLINE: U.S. Congress Introduces Sanctions Against Russia: IZVESTIA, p. 1 acs-VT99
	The apparent aim behind the congressional resolution is to demonstratively punish Moscow which is still officially designated as "a partner for peace" but it ignores serious implications for Russia's internal situation in the run-up to the presidential election in the year 2000. The unfriendly act confirms the impression that Russia has been slighted in the past and will continue to be slighted in the future. A Russian public opinion poll taken on the eve of the G8 summit in Birmingham revealed that 64% of respondents with a university education were of the opinion that Yeltsin and Russia were regarded by world leaders as playing a role of secondary importance in world affairs. Now more Russians will subscribe to that view.

ACTION AGAINST THE EXISTING RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ONLY HELPS THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Vladimir Mikheyev, Russian Press Digest, May 26, 1998, HEADLINE: U.S. Congress Introduces Sanctions Against Russia: IZVESTIA, p. 1 acs-VT99
	 The congressional slap in Russia's face will be welcomed by Zyuganov's Communists in so far as it has supplied them with ideological ammunition to argue their case on behalf of their opposition to Russia's disarmament and NATO's eastward expansion.
By its act the U.S. Congress has made a major contribution to the formulation of Moscow's new foreign-policy objectives aimed at overcoming the costly illusions of the Kozyrev era (the Duma has indefinitely postponed the ratification of the START-2 Treaty). There is also the prospect of "a national idea" emerging from Russia's "humiliation," which will be exploited by a strongman dangling it as a method of wooing the electorate.

IMPACT: END OF THE YELTSIN ERA IS THE MOST DANGEROUS PART OF THE RUSSIAN TRANSITION

THERE IS WIDESPREAD CONCERN ABOUT THE DANGERS OF THE END OF THE YELTSIN ERA

Fred Coleman, USA TODAY, April 6, 1998, Pg. 1A, HEADLINE: Who's running Russia? Even aides say he works few hours, lacks focus acs-VT99 
The opposition asks if Yeltsin, 67, is fit enough to stay in office. "There is only one important question," says liberal Grigory Yavlinsky. "How is the president making his decisions and what condition is he in to be making those decisions?"
Communist opposition is shriller. "In a fit of unpredictable action, the president could, after all, unexpectedly press the nuclear button," the pro-communist newspaper Sovietskaya Rossiya warned. It said Yeltsin should resign or be impeached. Thoughtful Russians, with no partisan political agenda are increasingly worried.

AS LONG AS YELTSIN REMAINS IN CHARGE THERE WILL BE NO BIG WAR -- THE ISSUE IS WHAT COMES AFTER HE LEAVES

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	 It could be replied that the imperial "patriots" lost the 1996 elections. And as long as Yeltsin remains in charge, there will neither be a big war with the "near abroad," nor a military confrontation with the West. Duma deputy Albert Makashov may call upon Russia to reply to NATO's expansion with a "military-strategic partnership with Iraq and Cuba" as much as he pleases, or ask it to provide Libya and Iran with "everything that is necessary to lead a modern war" (i.e. nuclear weapons) - his call will remain hot air. That is so, but only as long as Yeltsin remains in charge. The question is, what comes after Yeltsin.

COMMUNIST REGIME WILL ATTEMPT TO RECONQUER THE FORMER SOVIET STATES

ALL OF YELTSIN’S POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS WANT TO RECONSTITUTE THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER

Alexander Yanov, Moscow News, August 21, 1997, HEADLINE: Boris Yeltsin: Victor or Vanquished acs-VT99
	If we go through the list of his potential successors, a startling picture is suddenly revealed: Three of the five (Luzhkov, Lebed and Zyuganov) are convinced that Sevastopol is part of Russia. (That is, they are precisely following Dugin's scenario described in the chapter called "The Geo-Political De-Stabilization of the Ukraine," in a book which they probably haven't even read, which makes it even more ominous.) The fourth, Chernomyrdin, publicly declares that " Russia is not a country but a continent." (That is, without noticing it, he starts using Dugin's language.) And the fifth, Nemtsov, takes as advisor one of the former leaders of the "party of the big war," Viktor Aksyuchits. Such, then, is the state of affairs.

THE COMMUNISTS AND NATIONALISTS WILL ATTEMPT MILITARY REINTEGRATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET STATES

Gennady I. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders; Russian Academy of Sciences and the Kettering Foundation, The Washington Quarterly, 1997 Autumn; Pg. 35, HEADLINE: The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and the Near Abroad acs-VT99
	 Finally, a wide range of public groups, movements, and political parties, ranging from Communists to nationalists, strongly supports early and comprehensive reintegration. The Communist Party probably takes the most radical stand on this issue. The Communists and their allies became the largest single bloc in the new parliament elected in December 1995. They passed a resolution renouncing the December 1991 agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union. Communists have voiced the intent to approach the governments, parliaments, and peoples of all former Soviet republics with a proposal for a voluntary restoration of a single state. They justify their stand not only by results of public opinion polls on this issue held periodically in Russia but also by the results of similar polls conducted in other former Soviet republics, like one in Belarus in December 1995.

COMMUNIST PARTY CONSIDERS LATVIA A DANGEROUS FASCIST STATE

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	 Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov hinted last month at what Baltic states could expect if he rose to power. "A fascist regime has been reviving in Latvia, and it's the most loathsome one can imagine," he growled.

COMMUNISTS WILL RAPIDLY REMILITARIZE

COMMUNIST RUSSIA PERCEIVES THAT THE US IS USING ITS MILITARY TO DANGEROUSLY PROMOTE ITS SELF INTEREST. THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY NEED TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY TO ACHIEVE A BALANCE OF POWER

GENNADY ZYUGANOV, FEBRUARY 4,1998 [Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast. HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH CPRF LEADER \\ jan]VT99 
Zyuganov: Yesterday's intensive discussion showed once again that a balance of interests can exist only on the basis of a balance of force. The disintegration of our army, of our military industrial complex and military science undermines the balance of forces not only in Europe, but on the planet as a whole. Americans speak a great deal about humanism and civilization, about democratic principles, but they act like a drunk and disorderly cowboy ignoring the Security Council, the United Nations and its NATO allies, and the public opinion. In the Council of Europe, the Europarliament where 30 parliaments are represented, I asked the question, who is in favor of using military force? Let us exert our efforts to prevent this conflict. Not a single deputy spoke in favor of a military solution. The same happened at a meeting with Arab ambassadors. During the negotiations with the leaders of major Arab countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, it was the same. So, who wants a military solution? The Americans who today have gained an unchallengeable supremacy and are prepared to promote their dominance and their ambitions.

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE DICTATED BY WHOEVER REPLACES YELTSIN

JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: Clinton's Call-Boris Policy Still Vital but Has Its Limits acs-VT99
	Was Russia's recent campaign with France and China to limit American action against Saddam Hussein a harbinger of new foreign-policy alignments?
 How will Russia react in the years after NATO expands its membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic? And what will happen if and when NATO tries to bring in other new countries besides these three?
 The answers may well depend on who will lead Russia after the departure of Yeltsin, who is 67 and whose term expires in 2000.

DIPLOMATIC PARTNERSHIP

THESIS: Russia is an incredibly important dioplomatic partner for the United States all over the world. Russia is able to act as an intermiediary and neutral partner while at the same time pursuing the foreign policy goals of peace and stability. The Russians are concerned that America appreciates their role, and is angered when the USA does not take their direct interests and desires into account. The affirmative plan angers Russia’s leadership, so they do not act constructivelky in diplomatic partnerships which are needed in many of the world’s hot spots.

A. US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE NOT CEMENTED, AND RUSSIA HATES BEING TREATED AS A JUNIOR PLAYER

CRAIG R. WHITNEY, March 15, 1998 [The New York Times. SECTION: Section 4; Page 4; Column 1; HEADLINE: The World; The Not- SO Superpower Society \\ jan an]VT99
	As frustrated former superpowers, they both hate to be reminded that they are no longer what they used to be -- in France's case the Napoleonic Empire that dominated the continent almost two centuries ago, and in Russia's, the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991.
	Every time the French hear the words "the world's only superpower" emanating from Washington, they wince, and as for the Russians, the phrase practically rubs their noses in their own loss of power and global influence, even though Russia does still have enough nuclear missiles to blow the world to smithereens.
	Still, the French are American NATO allies, and the Russians, for all the Bill-and-Boris camaraderie at summit meetings, are still somewhere between friends and former adversaries.

B. IN THE POST NATO EXPANSION WORLD RUSSIA IS LOOKING FOR REASONS TO ASSERT ITSELF AGAINST US ACTION

JAMES MEEK, March 10, 1998 [The Guardian (London). SECTION: The Guardian Foreign Page; Pg. 13. HEADLINE: Moscow sees world through eastern eyes \\ jan]VT99
	Russia's emergent foreign policy is a kind of crooked homage to the United States. The buzz words of Moscow's armchair geopoliticians - national interest, vital economic interests, spheres of influence - are all lifted from US policyspeak.
	That makes it no easier for diplomats trying to keep any one of the many points of tension with Russia from leading to the first serious breakdown in relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Satisfaction at Mr Primakov's endorsement of limited Nato expansion and the cooling of the Iraqi crisis is already fading as Kosovo and the Baltic states' desire to join Nato loom.
	Russia's determination not to be done out of a profitable deal is spawning numerous other disagreements with Washington, from its supply of anti-aircraft missiles to the Greek Cypriots to the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran.

C. ON EVERY FOREIGN POLICY FRONT, GOALS WILL BE BETTER MET WITH RUSSIAN COOPERATION

EDITORIAL, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 29, 1998, Pg. B6, HEADLINE: FREEZING OUT THE BEAR , acs-VT99
	The Clinton administration errs when it tries to paper over that fact. The United States needs Russian cooperation to control and dismantle Soviet nuclear arms, to keep the peace in Bosnia and to get Iraq to comply with U.N. resolutions. That's just the start. The United States will get further fighting terrorism, organized crime and drugs with Russian cooperation than without.
Ultimately, Russia can be more destabilizing and destructive of European and U.S. security interests than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic combined and multiplied.

LINKS TO ANGERING RUSSIA’S LEADERS

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY HAS SHIFTED FROM BEING LARGELY IDEOLOGICAL TO BEING LARGELY PRACTICAL

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 193 , acs-VT99
	A third identifiable trend, one already alluded to above, is the shift from an ideologically to a pragmatically based foreign policy. Based on this trend, Russian policy is driven less by the desire to spread its ideas to the far comers of the earth than by desires to ensure territorial integrity and economic growth. In short, more decisions are now made according to a cost-benefit analysis that emphasizes concrete benefits to be gained by Russia in pursuing a particular line of policy.

DIRECT USA INFLUENCE IN COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO RUSSIA

Xinhua News Agency, MAY 22, 1998, HEADLINE: russia opposes u.s. attempt to broaden sphere of influence; ITEM NO: 0522083 acs-VT99
	russia is firmly opposed to the united states' attempt to spread its sphere of influence to countries of the former soviet union, deputy foreign minister georgy mamedov said friday. speaking at the state duma, or the lower house of the parliament, about a report submitted by a u.s. senior official to a u.s. senate committee on u.s. foreign policy in outer caucasus, the caspian sea and central asia, mamedov said the u.s. action "was unacceptable," the itar tass news agency reported. mamedov said that one of the priorities in russia's foreign policy was to develop relations with outer caucasus and central asian countries, adding it was its main task to further strengthen ties with these countries. " russia will not seek confrontation in the region, but will protect its own interests there because the region concerns russia's security and territorial integrity," he said.

ATTEMPTS TO BUILD UP RUSSIA RESULT IN EMBARRASSING IT

GEORGIE ANNE GEYER, The Times-Picayune, August 16, 1997; Pg. B7, HEADLINE: BE HONEST -- 'POTEMKIN RUSSIA' NOT GREAT POWER acs-VT99
	We thought we had learned from the disastrous Versailles Treaty in 1919, which ended the World War I. Germany's punishment was so cruelly punitive that it led to World War II. Following that war, the Allies rebuilt Germany and Japan, leading to one of the greatest periods of history. Once Soviet Russia was collapsing of its own internal weight between 1985 and 1991, the Western foreign ministries opted not to humiliate Russia. But American efforts to build up Russia have broadcast to the world its failings. 

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS SUCCESSFUL AND SKILLFUL

RUSSIA IS EXTREMELY ACTIVE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND IS NOT ISOLATIONIST

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	The initial signs are auspicious. The new Russia has already gone a long way toward repudiating the old Soviet Union's delusions that autarky and self-isolation are even options for a modern state. Russia today plays an active role in organizations of which it was a founding member, such as the UN and the OSCE. It is also knocking at the door of those from which it has been excluded. Over the past two years, it has become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Council of Europe, agreed to join the Paris Club, and it has strengthened its ties to the European Union.

AN EFFECTIVE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ORGANIZATION HAS NOW EMERGED

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. ix-x , acs-VT99
	ln short, after a number of fits and false starts, there are signs that a more disciplined and effective national decisionmaking process is beginning to emerge. The creation of the Defense Council in particular has been a major improvement and has given Yeltsin a powerful tool for pushing military reform, which is likely to be one of the top issues on the Kremlin's agenda in the coming years.

RUSSIA HAS BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE ITS MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

Peter Shearman, Prof. Political Science Univ. Melbourne, 1997, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 25, acs-VT99 
	Third, Russia has been remarkably successful in achieving many of its stated foreign policy goals. Although the initial policy focus on the West did not bring the expected economic gains, Russia has been successful in maintaining the integrity of the state, reclaiming its influence (without military occupation) in the 'near abroad', and gaining access to important global and Western institutions without having compromised its sovereignty. 

RUSSIAN COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR AVOIDING CONFLICTS AND WARS

RUSSIAN COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR SOLUTIONS IN THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Tony Barber, Business Day (South Africa), April 21, 1998; Pg. 13, HEADLINE: MOSCOW STILL REGARDS THE US WITH PRICKLY RESENTMENT , acs-VT99
	 It is harder to see what Russia might gain by standing up for Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav president, in his disputes with the US over Bosnia and Kosovo. "We have grown used to the logic that says an enemy of Washington is our friend," said Konstantin Eggert, a foreign affairs expert at the Izvestia newspaper.
In February, Yeltsin boasted: "Today it is clear to all that without Russia it is impossible to reach productive decisions on thorny international issues, be it the Bosnian problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict or the middle Eastern situation." Liberal critics of the Yeltsin administration's foreign policy would argue that Russia is picking the wrong quarrel when it defends Iraq and Serbia against the US.

BAD USA-RUSSIA RELATIONS NOW TRANSLATE INTO GEO-POLITICAL UPHEAVALS IN THE FUTURE

Sergei Rogov, US and Canada Studies Institute Director, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, DECEMBER 9, 1997, HEADLINE: INTERVIEW REGARDING RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	The growing alienation between Russia and the United States is giving cause for worry. It bodes ill for international security and stability. It's unlikely that the United States will remain the only super power. Hopefully, Russia will not always be in an enfeebled state and will sooner or later be able to play the role of a power center in the world. So, growing contradictions between us spell future geo-political upheavals.

AS THE USA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP DECLINES, NUCLEAR POWER RIVALRY BECOMES MORE POSSIBLE

Pavel Felgenhauer, Segodnya's defense and national security affairs editor, The Moscow Times, December 4, 1997, HEADLINE: DEFENSE DOSSIER: Yeltsin Rhetoric Old Tactic acs-VT99
	As hopes of a real U.S.- Russia "partnership" fade away, however, some of the former nuclear power rivalry is slowly creeping back into relations. Nuclear disarmament agreements were once the cornerstone of U.S.-Russian detente, but today they are source of irritation and deadlock.

CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID WAR

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY SAVED THE USA FROM A DISASTER IN IRAQ

CAROL J. WILLIAMS and JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG; The Buffalo News, November 21, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: RUSSIA RETURNS AS DIPLOMATIC PLAYER TO REASSERT INFLUENCE; IN ARAB WORLD acs-VT99
	Having pulled the United States and Iraq back from the brink of another armed confrontation, Russia's leadership has scored its first major diplomatic victory of the post-Cold War era and demonstrated that it takes more than one superpower to keep the world at peace.
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov's success in persuading Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to lift his ouster of U.N. weapons inspectors also testifies to Moscow's resurgent clout in parts of the Arab world and confirms that the Kremlin is as defensive of its interests abroad as are Western leaders. Most significant, according to officials and analysts, is that Russia's resolution of the tense standoff between Baghdad and the international community enhances the solidarity and authority of the U.N. Security Council by showing that its often-squabbling permanent members can also be allies.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY SUCCESSFULLY DEALT WITH THE IRAQI CRISIS AND BOLSTERED THE UN IN THE PROCESS

CAROL J. WILLIAMS and JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG; The Buffalo News, November 21, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: RUSSIA RETURNS AS DIPLOMATIC PLAYER TO REASSERT INFLUENCE; IN ARAB WORLD acs-VT99
	Having engineered a defusing of the crisis and at the same time drawn the five permanent Security Council members into a unanimous position, Russia has been credited not only with a serious peacemaking contribution in the troubled Persian Gulf region, but also to the often-fractured United Nations.
In a message to Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, French President Jacques Chirac said the success of the Geneva meeting marked the return of Moscow's influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf "in a very spectacular manner."
Chirac also saluted Franco-Russian coordination, which he said "functioned remarkably during this crisis." France and China stood beside Russia in arguing against military measures to force Iraq into submission -- a threat raised by the United States and its stalwart ally, Britain.
 Foreign policy analysts deemed the Russian-brokered deal a milestone in Moscow's recovery of international clout and a clever rescue of the United States from a crisis partly of its own making.

RUSSIA IS VERY INFLUENTIAL IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND SAVED THE USA FROM A NEW GULF WAR

CAROL J. WILLIAMS and JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG; The Buffalo News, November 21, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: RUSSIA RETURNS AS DIPLOMATIC PLAYER TO REASSERT INFLUENCE; IN ARAB WORLD acs-VT99
	 "The meeting in Geneva has demonstrated that after a protracted period of being weakened and bled white by domestic turmoil and dwindling prestige on the world stage, Russia is slowly but surely regaining its status as a world power," said Viktor A. Kremenyuk, a senior analyst at the USA-Canada Institute in Moscow.
 He implied that the United States had to swallow its pride and rely on Russia to save it from what would have been a foreign policy disaster -renewed combat with Iraq.

RUSSIAN MEDIATION IN THE IRAQ CRISIS SHOWS THAT IT CAN BALANCE ITSELF BETWEEN OPPOSING AND COOPERATING WITH THE USA

Daniel Williams; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1997, Pg. 7, HEADLINE: Russia's Balancing Act; How to Stand Up to U.S. but Avoid Conflict acs-VT99
	Russia's successful mediation in the Iraq arms-inspection crisis vividly demonstrated the balancing act that is central to Moscow's foreign policy: a keen desire to show independence in world affairs balanced against a necessity to avoid conflict with the United States. 

IRAQ WILL NOT HURT US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS BECAUSE RUSSIA IS HAVING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN RESOLVING THE DISPUTE

Linda Wertheimer, February 19,1998 [ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR), HEADLINE: Angry Russians. \\ jan]VT99 
LINDA WERTHEIMER, HOST: In Moscow today, a Kremlin spokesman said President Boris Yeltsin deserves credit for helping to persuade Kofi Annan to go to Baghdad. Russia has led the efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, and also led the opposition to Washington's threat of force. Both U.S. and Russian officials insist their disagreement over Iraq does not threaten their relations. But some observers see the present rift as a sign that Russia intends to challenge America's current dominance in world affairs. 

WHETHER THE US USES AIR STRIKES OR NOT, RUSSIA'S INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE WILL INCREASE BECAUSE OF THEIR ACTIONS

Askold Krushelnycky, February 8, 1997 [Scotland on Sunday. SECTION: Pg. 16 HEADLINE: Russia no longer able to play with the big guns \\ jan]VT99 
	But Russia, which depends on US-controlled financial institutions and investors to rebuild its shattered economy, is not in a position to pressure Washington. Kremenyuk said: "Moscow risks nothing even if its diplomacy achieves nothing. If the US decides not to strike, the credit will go to Russia. If it does strike, Russia will be remembered in the region for trying to stop the attack.

RUSSIA’S ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS EXTREMELY VALUABLE AND SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THEY ARE A CRITICAL FRIEND OF THE USA AND CAN OPERATE AS AN INTERMEDIARY

Daniel Williams; Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1997, Pg. 7, HEADLINE: Russia's Balancing Act; How to Stand Up to U.S. but Avoid Conflict acs-VT99
	 Viktor Kremenyuk, deputy director of the USA-Canada Institute, said: ''The period of romantic love for America is over, but this doesn't mean we fight with America. It would be pointless. We want, however, to underscore the independence of Russia as an international player.''
Russia's role with Iraq is almost a textbook case of the two faces of its foreign policy, deftly put into play by Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov. On the one hand, Mr. Primakov expressed Russia's opposition to U.S. threats to use force against Iraq. He also pledged to take Baghdad's case for easing the United Nations' trade embargo on it to the UN Security Council. At the same time, Mr. Primakov held firm on the central demand of the United States: Iraq would have to let Americans be part of UN arms inspection teams. In a stroke, Mr. Primakov demonstrated that Russia can stand up to Washington and still be a responsible power.
 In remarks made on Russian television Thursday, he stressed both aspects. ''It is natural that we insist that Iraq carry out all UN resolutions,'' he said. '' Russia achieved this without the use of force, without the use of weapons.''

RUSSIAN COOPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL IN STOPPING THE LAST GULF WAR THREAT 

Stephen Sestanovich; Ambassador at, U.S. Department of State, Heritage Foundation , April 6, 1998; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: THE STATE OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA; OPENING STATEMENT acs-VT99
	 In October, after much intensive consultation between us and in the U.N. Security Council, the Russians played a role in bringing Saddam back into compliance. Iraq's attempt on Tuesday to exclude American and British inspection team members is the latest step in a long-standing Iraqi campaign to ignore, frustrate, and deceive the international community about Iraq's enormous programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. What I have said about other issues applies here: The test of whether our interests converge or clash lies in whether we can find common ground on the big problems, one at a time.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY IN IRAQ GOT THEM TO COOPERATE WITH UN INSPECTORS

CAROL J. WILLIAMS and JOHN-THOR DAHLBURG; The Buffalo News, November 21, 1997, Pg. 8A, HEADLINE: RUSSIA RETURNS AS DIPLOMATIC PLAYER TO REASSERT INFLUENCE; IN ARAB WORLD acs-VT99
	 It was the intervention of Russia, which has long enjoyed symbiotic relations with Iraq, that compelled Baghdad to allow unhindered access to its weapons facilities by a U.N. Special Commission seeking to assess Baghdad's compliance with Security Council resolutions ordering elimination of its weapons.
 Russian officials insist that no promises or concessions were made to Iraq. But Primakov did vow to press for accelerated, more efficient inspections in hopes that a positive judgment on compliance will be the outcome, opening the way for easing harsh economic sanctions imposed to punish Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE IN THE BALKANS: RUSSIAN COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL

TENSIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE USA THREATEN PEACE IN THE BALKANS AND SPECIFICALLY KOSOVO

Martin Sieff; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 4, 1998, Pg. A1, HEADLINE: Russia raises stakes against NATO; Tensions increase as Moscow balks at alliance's growth // acs-VT99
	Tensions also are growing between Russia and the United States in the violence-wracked Balkans.
 In March, Yugoslavia's Russian-backed president, Slobodan Milosevic, launched a crackdown on ethnic Albanian dissidents in the Albanian-majority province of Kosovo. At least 80 people were killed by Serbian military and police forces.
 Since then, there have been persistent skirmishes between Kosovan guerrillas and Serbian forces. Western diplomats have been ineffective in trying to force Mr. Milosevic to negotiate with the rebels, and there are fears of an all-out war.
 If that happens, diplomats fear the conflict could spread to mainly Muslim Albania and multiracial Macedonia.
 In such a confrontation, Russia could start by supporting Serbia and find itself swept along by the dynamics of the situation, said Paul Goble, deputy director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and former chief State Department analyst on Soviet nationalities. He spoke in a private capacity.
"The Russians have played the Serbian card on several occasions" by approving aggressive Serbian actions in the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Goble said. But "Moscow has often found it far easier to turn the Serbs on than to turn them off. Sometimes, they have become the prisoners of their own client, Milosevic."

USA CAN USE ITS POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA TO INFLUENCE SERBIA TO MOLLIFY ITS ETHNIC SLAUGHTER IN KOSOVO

EDITORIAL Newsday (New York, NY), June 3, 1998, Page A40, HEADLINE: / IS KOSOVO THE NEXT BOSNIA? RUSSIA COULD STOP IT, acs-VT99
	The one player with the influence to curb Serbia is its close Slav ally, Russia. But Moscow is not much inclined to cooperate with NATO, not after the alliance's ill-considered expansion. Russia, however, needs western help to bail it out of its currency crisis. Perhaps President Bill Clinton can persuade the Kremlin that, as a goodwill gesture, a sharp Russian twist of Milosevic's arm over Kosovo would be greatly appreciated. It's worth a try.

ATTEMPTS TO SEVER KOSOVO FROM SERBIA COULD CREATE A WAR FAR BIGGER THAN IN BOSNIA

Dmitry Gornostayev, Russian Press Digest, April 29, 1998, HEADLINE: Primakov Follows Ideas Of Gorchakov , acs-VT99
	This problem, Primakov pointed out, is still a timely one today. He warned that attempts to amputate the province of Kosovo from Serbia could lead to a war "even bigger than the one in Bosnia." Moscow, he declared, has all grounds to believe that there are forces that want to resolve the situation around Kosovo by creating a third republic in Yugoslavia. Russia is against this, Foreign Minister Primakov emphasized.

SERBIAN ACTIONS IN KOSOVO RISK A NEW ROUND OF ETHNIC SLAUGHTER

EDITORIAL Newsday (New York, NY), June 3, 1998, Page A40, HEADLINE: / IS KOSOVO THE NEXT BOSNIA? RUSSIA COULD STOP IT, acs-VT99
	Kosovo is not yet the sort of household word for ethnic slaughter that its Balkan neighbor, Bosnia, has become. But Kosovo could join the lexicon of political horrors if the Serbian army doesn't stop its campaign of massacres and artillery barrages, which are driving thousands of ethnic Albanians out of the Serbian province of Kosovo into refugee camps beyond its borders

SERBIAN OPPRESSION IN KOSOVO HAS INCREASED

EDITORIAL Newsday (New York, NY), June 3, 1998, Page A40, HEADLINE: / IS KOSOVO THE NEXT BOSNIA? RUSSIA COULD STOP IT, acs-VT99
	Albania, after receiving more than 1,000 refugees fleeing the fighting between Serb troops and Kosovar separatists, is now leveling charges of "ethnic cleansing" against Milosevic. That may be an overstatement, but it is undeniable that Serbia's suppression of Kosovar rebels has risen dramatically.

MIDDLE EAST: RUSSIAN COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL

WITHOUT RUSSIAN HELP IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THERE WOULD BE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND WAR

Michael O'Hanlon & Julien Hartley, Brookings Institution, The Washington Post, December 16, 1997, Pg. A27, HEADLINE: Why Not Let Russia Play a Role? acs-VT99
	Jim Hoagland is wrong to claim that Russia's role in the Iraq crisis works against American interests [op-ed, Nov. 21], just as Henry Kissinger is wrong in his Dec. 7 op-ed to criticize Russia for allegedly acting "as the lawyer of Saddam." There is no better way for Russia to exert influence on the world stage than by serving the causes of nonproliferation and international stability.
Without Russia's role in this crisis, we could be facing further arms proliferation or even war in the Middle East.

RUSSIA WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Christophe Beaudufe, Agence France Presse, November 19, 1997 HEADLINE: Russia gains prestige as mediator in Iraq-UN crisis acs-VT99
	"For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia can play an important diplomatic role in an international crisis because for the first time it is needed by the opposing sides," commented Andrei Piontkovsky, head of the Moscow Centre for Strategic Studies.
 Despite its role as co-sponsor of the Middle East peace process, Russia has had less diplomatic clout in the region than the United States, but the latest crisis could help restore the balance, analysts said.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF IRAN, RUSSIAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY HAS ASSISTED AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Robert Friedman, Prof. Political Science Baltimore Hebrew Univ., 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 153-154, acs-VT99 
	A final conclusion to be drawn is that, with the exception of arms sales to Iran, Moscow has, despite occasional rhetorical outbursts to the contrary, cooperated with key American policies in the Middle East. This is particularly evident in the case of Russian policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, but, on balance it has also been evident in Russian policy towards Iraq. Thus Moscow has supported the US effort to bring about an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, in the main has supported US punitive bombing of Iraq, and has not unilaterally broken the US-led embargo against Iraq. Both areas are high on the American priority list, and Moscow has not chosen to jeopardize the Russian-American relationship over them. Even in the three areas where there have been US-Russian disputes (Bosnia, arms to Iran, and the conditional lifting of the Iraqi embargo), Moscow has not acted alone but with the support of America's NATO allies (Britain and France in the case of Bosnia, France and Turkey in the case of conditionally lifting the Iraqi embargo, and Britain, France, Germany and Japan in the case of Iran, since all four of these countries sell 'dual use' equipment to Tehran).

CENTRAL ASIA: RUSSIA CAN WORK WITH IRAN TO STOP ETHNIC FIGHTING

RUSSIA AND IRAN COOPERATE TO BRING PEACE TO FLASHPOINTS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHWEST ASIA

Robert O. Freedman, president of the Baltimore Hebrew University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 16, HEADLINE: PRIMAKOV AND THE MIDDLE EAST acs-VT99
	 Finally, a greatly weakened Russia has found Iran a useful ally in dealing with a number of very sensitive Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Transcaucasian, and Central and Southwest Asian political hot spots. These include Chechnya, where Iran kept a very low profile despite the use by the Chechen rebels of Islamic themes in their conflict with Russia; Tajikistan, where Iran helped Russia achieve a political settlement, albeit a shaky one; Afghanistan, where both Russia and Iran have stood together against Taliban efforts to seize control of the country; and Azerbaijan, which neither Iran, with a sizable Azeri population of its own, nor Russia wishes to see emerge as a significant economic and military power.

INDIA: RUSSIA HAS CRITICAL LINES OF INFLUENCE OPEN TO INDIA

RUSSIA WILL NOT IMPOSE NUCLEAR SANCTIONS ON INDIA

MICHAEL R. GORDON, The New York Times, May 14, 1998, Section A; Page 13; HEADLINE: NUCLEAR ANXIETY: IN RUSSIA; Kremlin Soft-Pedals Its Rebuke to India, and Opposes Sanctions // acs-VT99
	Russia today reaffirmed its refusal to join other countries in punishing India for resuming nuclear tests, and has so far failed to register an especially strong diplomatic protest. President Boris N. Yeltsin still plans to visit India later this year. And some top officials at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy want to go ahead with plans to sell India two nuclear power plants.
"Sanctions are an extreme measure, which is not always productive," Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov said. "Therefore, I don't think we shall support any sanctions against India."

RUSSIA WILL NOT INVOKE SANCTIONS ON INDIA FOR ITS NUCLEAR TESTS

Maxim Yusin, Russian Press Digest, May 14, 1998, HEADLINE: Moscow Will Not Quarrel With Its Ally // acs-VT99
	Moscow is calm about India's nuclear blasts and will hardly resort to any sanctions to punish Delhi, says observer.
In contrast to the outrage sparked off throughout the world by India's latest nuclear blasts, Moscow's reaction is calm, writes IZVESTIA. In the Russian corridors of power no one even thinks about economic sanctions or any other moves to punish Delhi. So far, the Kremlin has confined itself just to mild condemnation in word.

RUSSIA VALUES ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA

MICHAEL R. GORDON, The New York Times, May 14, 1998, Section A; Page 13; HEADLINE: NUCLEAR ANXIETY: IN RUSSIA; Kremlin Soft-Pedals Its Rebuke to India, and Opposes Sanctions // acs-VT99
	"Frankly, India is a very good friend of ours and we have very good relations," Mr. Yeltsin said on Tuesday. "During my visit to India this year I shall make every effort to somehow overcome the problem."
India's tests have confronted Russia with a difficult decision: whether to sell nuclear power plants to India in a deal that is worth $1.5 billion to $2 billion. The contract was to be made final this year.
Moscow has argued that the nuclear plants are intended for civilian use and would be subject to international monitoring to prevent them from contributing to India's military potential.

RUSSIA AND INDIA ARE DETERMINED TO REMAIN CLOSE FRIENDS FOR STRATEGIC INTERESTS

MICHAEL R. GORDON, The New York Times, May 14, 1998, Section A; Page 13; HEADLINE: NUCLEAR ANXIETY: IN RUSSIA; Kremlin Soft-Pedals Its Rebuke to India, and Opposes Sanctions // acs-VT99
	The muffled criticism is also a matter of foreign policy. India's rivalry with China makes it a potential counterweight to Beijing in the Russian strategic calculus -- just as it was in Soviet times.
India's strained relations with Washington also make New Delhi a sympathetic partner for the Russian Foreign Ministry, whose influence has shrunk since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
"In Russia's corridors of power they don't allow for the possibility of economic sanctions or the recalling of ambassadors," the newspaper Izvestia observed today. "Moscow seems ready to close its eyes to the violations of international norms."

RUSSIA HAS INFLUENCE IN INDONESIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

RUSSIA IS ACTIVELY WORKING TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY TIES WITH INDONESIA

Igor Shchegolev, February 13, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: Yeltsin to visit Indonesia in first half of 1998 \\ jan]VT99 
	The two presidents are also expected to discuss the military- technical cooperation. "The interest of Indonesia to Russia in that sphere is not limited to warplanes," the diplomat said. "We are disappointed by the cancellation of the deal because of the financial crisis in South East Asia, but we take into account the fact Jakarta has not revised a political decision to develop the military-technical cooperation with Russia. The sides may also discuss the cooperation in nuclear power engineering including the supplies of vessel-based floating nuclear power plants to Jakarta, Losyukov said. Indonesia is interested in the cooperation in the space exploration, including the launch of its satellites by Russian rocket-boosters and a flight of its cosmonaut on a Russian spacecraft. Russia is actively increasing its ties with Indonesia. 

A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT THIS SPRING WILL CEMENT A NUMBER OF POLITICAL DECLARATIONS AND ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS

Igor Shchegolev, February 13, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: Yeltsin to visit Indonesia in first half of 1998 \\ jan]VT99 
	President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Indonesia is scheduled for the first half of this year, presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky told Itar-Tass on Friday. The Foreign Ministry and other departments are actively getting ready for the trip. 
	Moscow expects to sign a political declaration and a number of economic agreements as a result of the visit to Jakarta, a high-ranking staffer of the Russian Foreign Ministry official told Itar-Tass earlier. "Russia is closely watching the development of the internal political life in Indonesia, which is expected to have presidential elections in spring, and builds its policy in accordance to that," the diplomat said, adding that the exact date of the visit has not been specified.

RUSSIA IS ACTIVELY INCREASING ITS SECURITY RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM

Igor Zhukov, January 22, 1998 [TASS. HEADLINE: Russia's Duma to discuss Russian-Vietnamese cooperation \\ jan]VT99 
	Russia's State Duma, or the lower house of parliament, will hold on Thursday a roundtable discussion on Russian-Vietnamese cooperation. 
	The roundtable organizers consider the development of relations between the two countries to be among the high priorities of Russia's foreign policy in Southeast Asia. 
	Participants in the round table are scheduled to discuss a package of issues related to the economic, military and technical cooperation between Russia and Vietnam. They are to come up with recommendations for the Russian government to expand partnership between the two countries in the economic, scientific, technological and cultural spheres.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IS UNRELIABLE AND WEAK

UNIQUE PROBLEMS IN RUSSIA MAKE FOREIGN POLICY PROGRESS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 3 , acs-VT99 
Bureaucratic rivalry and policy incoherence, of course, are not unique to Russia. The same problems can be found in many other countries-including the United states. But the problems have been more acute in Russia for three reasons: 
*Russian politics and society are in a state of acute flux.
*The new decisionmaking structures are weak and do not have
deep institutional roots.
*There is no clear consensus on Russia's national interests.

QUESTIONS ABOUT YELTSIN'S HEALTH DOOM RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. X, acs-VT99 
The uncertain state of Yeltsin's health, however, casts a dark shadow over Russian politics and U.S.-Russian relations. Yeltsin's continued illness or incapacitation could accentuate the behind- the -scenes jockeying and struggle for power, making it even more difficult for Russia to pursue a coherent and consistent foreign policy. But even if Yeltsin's health holds, he is unlikely to be able to exert the type of strong dynamic leadership that characterized his first several years in office. 

RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS STOP IT FROM PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 12 , acs-VT99 
	Russia's political and economic problems have tended to restrict both its ability to implement its foreign policy and its role on the international stage. This situation has created a gap between Russia's policy objectives and their actual implementation, or -Lines the shift in the between rhetoric and real policy.

DECREASED RUSSIAN CAPACITIES HAVE REDUCED RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY ROLE AROUND THE WORLD

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 192-193 , acs-VT99 
	First, domestic politics and other internal factors have limited the cope of policy options available to Russian policy makers. Efforts to restructure the Russian economy have reduced the resources available to the government to conduct foreign policy. This, in turn, has forced Russian policy-makers to reduce commitments and involvement in certain areas of the world where the Soviet Union was once very actively involved, such as the developing countries. The de-ideologization of Russian foreign policy has acted as an impetus for the ways in which these cutbacks have occurred. In other words, a convincing reason no longer exists for Russia to maintain a relatively active relationship with a substantial number of developing states. Many of these relationships were built and sustained merely for ideological reasons, such as to counter US interests in a particular geographic region.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS 	CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT EFFECTIVELY

F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore Karasik, National Defense Research Institute, 1997; FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DECISIONMAKING UNDER YELTSIN, p. 2-3 , acs-VT99 
However, it is one thing to have legal authority over foreign and security policy and quite another to exercise that authority effectively. It is on the latter score that Yeltsin has failed most dramatically. Despite several attempts, Yeltsin failed to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and security policy decisionmaking. 

RUSSIA IS INCAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTING ITS FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY DESPITE THE RHETORIC

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 34, acs-VT99 
Combining Interests, Constraints and Players 
Russia's current political, economic and military difficulties have curtailed its state power, prevented the full implementation of its foreign and security policy, and obscured its international role. Furthermore, the proliferation of decision-makers and political players, coupled with a lack of coherent policy coordination, has made it difficult for both Russians and external analysts to identify the precise direction of the country's economic and foreign policies." Political rhetoric must be carefully analysed and distinguished from real policy, and policy objectives must be differentiated from their actual implementation.

RUSSIAN DI0PLOMACY IS DICTATED BY THEIR OWN DOMESTIC NEEDS

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS, MORE AND MORE, CONTROLLED BY ECONOMIC AND PRIVATE CONSIDERATIONS

Angela Stent, professor of government at Georgetown University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE NEW PRAGMATISM acs-VT99
	Economic, and not political, considerations are increasingly influencing the direction of Russian foreign policy. Moreover, Russian foreign policy is also becoming increasingly "privatized"; that is, energy companies and industrial -- financial groups are pursuing their own commercial interests, which do not always coincide with the agendas of the Russian Foreign or Defense Ministry -- or even the Kremlin.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS DICTATED BY DOMESTIC PRIORITIES, NOT GEOPOLITICAL ONES

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 3 101 p. 14, acs-VT99 
 Since 1991, Russians have perceived their country's foreign policy as an extension of its pressing domestic priorities, and have tended to view the external environment through the prism of internal economic and political crises. Russia's domestic politics have thus had a major influence on its foreign policy course

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY IN INEFFECTIVE IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE GLOBE

RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESS MAKES IT UNABLE TO ASSIST THE PEACE PROCESS IN KOREA

Chikahito Harada, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, July, 1997; RUSSIA AND NORTH-EAST ASIA, Adelphi Paper 310, p. 69, acs-VT99 
	The fundamental reason for Russia's disengagement from the Korean Peninsula is not a lack of balanced relations with the two Koreas. The US, China and Japan, for example, have no such balanced relations. Should Moscow achieve such a balance, to what extent could it influence both Koreas to guarantee Russia an influential role on the Peninsula? The real reason for Russia's marginalisation is its weakened political, military and economic power. This same reason underlies Russia's current peripheral role in the Asia-Pacific as a whole. The US and South Korea have both been cautious about involving Russia in the talks on the future of the Peninsula. North Korea, for its part, sees no merit in including Russia, which Pyongyang fears may increase external pressure on it. Russia, in turn, may expect China to support its involvement on the Peninsula, but, as analysed in Chapter 2, China is not an active supporter. On the Korean Peninsula, a discrepancy between Russia's policy objectives and their implementation, and a distinction between real Russian influence and illusory Soviet influence - for which the Russian elite remains nostalgic - will therefore remain.

RUSSIA WANTS IRAQ BACK IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY BECAUSE IRAQ OWES THEM $7 BILLION

Robert O. Freedman, president of the Baltimore Hebrew University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 16, HEADLINE: PRIMAKOV AND THE MIDDLE EAST acs-VT99
	 The second interest Yeltsin's Russia has in Iraq is in regaining the $ 7 billion which Iraq owes to Russia, something that cannot be achieved until sanctions against Iraq are lifted. The third interest in Iraq is in acquiring contracts for Russian factories, oil and gas companies, although the actual activities of these companies also cannot begin until sanctions are lifted.

RUSSIA HAS STALLED ACTIONS AGAINST GENOCIDE BY SERBIA

Mark Gage, Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 30, HEADLINE: THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES -- RUSSIAN RELATIONS acs-VT99
	 With regard to European security, time and again Russia has supported Slobodan Milosevic and the ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, despite the allegations of war crimes and ethnic cleansing tied to them, and had to be dragged into agreeing to a more forceful approach to ending the violence in Bosnia while being given a role in the NATO-led force as a bow to Russia's claimed interests in the Balkan region.

RUSSIA WILL REMAIN LARGELY UNINVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Roger Kanet, Prof. Political Science Univ. of Illinois, 1997; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, p. 184 , acs-VT99 
	Political involvement of the Russian Federation in the developing world is likely to remain limited, however, because of the mismatch between the expanding objectives of the Russian leadership in the foreign policy realm and the restricted resource base from which it is operating. Preoccupied with numerous security problems in the 'near abroad' and socio-economic misfortunes at home, Russia, at least in the near future, will not be able to claim the role of the major player in African, Asian and Latin American politics. Nevertheless, if successful, Russia's increasing economic activities on both continents, in particular in the area of the arms trade, will eventually form a basis on which Moscow can potentially reassert its political power. 

CIVIL WAR

THESIS: The Russian economy is in fairly bad shape. People have taken about all they can take, and the next economic shock will bring warfare in the streets all over Russia. Any plan that risks harming the Russian economy also risks setting off a civil war.

A. RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE TAKEN ALL THEY CAN AND ARE ON THE BRINK OF A SOCIAL EXPLOSION

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	It may also be, however, that today's opposition, like the Kremlin, fears the people, who by all counts and nearly every criterion now live worse than before 1991. Widespread analogies with 1917 and Albania may be for political effect, but there is a palpable anxiety across the political spectrum that the fabled patience of the Russian people has limits, and when they are reached the result could be beyond anyone's control. Indeed, it is surely indicative that while all the Moscow-based leaders and parties are already preparing for the next parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled respectively for 1999 and 2000, no one is certain when or even whether they will actually take place.

B. ECONOMIC CRISIS WILL LEAD TO A BLOODY RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 62 acs-VT99
 Collisions of economic interests cause political confrontations even bloodshed. This is the bottom line of all revolutions, as well as counterrevolutions. However speedy and triumphant a political revolution, its ultimate success or defeat is determined by the outcome of the struggle of political-economic interests, a struggle that is accelerated by the momentum of the revolution or counterrevolution. The 1917 October Revolution was followed by a civil war, which we now perceive as a national tragedy. Since August 1991 and the subsequent actions of the Yeltsin political regime, a new national tragedy is looming on our horizon

C. RUSSIA IS ON THE BRINK OF INTERNAL COLLAPSE WHICH WOULD DRAW OUTSIDE POWERS INTO A NUMBER OF FLASHPOINTS

Valery V. Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, March, 1998 /April, 1998 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 107. HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia \\ jan]VT99 
	But abetting the continuing destabilization of Eurasia is not in the West's interests. NATO enlargement has not consolidated anti-Western forces in the region, as some Western experts had feared, but it has encouraged the division of Eurasia and the shattering of the Russian Federation. There will likely be further attempts at secession, although not necessarily according to the bloody model of Chechnya. Central Asia and the Caucasus are rife with flash points that could ignite several nations and draw in outside powers. And with regional destabilization and the slackening of central control, the nuclear threat is perhaps greater now than during the Cold War.

BRINK: RUSSIA IS ON THE BRINK OF A CIVIL WAR

RUSSIA IS ON THE VERGE OF A SOCIAL EXPLOSION -- A NATIONAL CATASTROPHE

Gennady Zyuganov, chairman Communist Party of Russia, member of parliament, 1997; MY RUSSIA: a political autobiography, p. 141 , acs-VT99 
	Our country is on the verge of social explosion. By all significant indexes, Russia has been pushed back by many years. The promises of the authorities are no longer believed by anyone, and their inability and incapacity to manage Russia's national economy effectively and professionally is obvious to everyone. The choice today is either a change in economic policy or national catastrophe.

RUSSIA IS ON THE BRINK OF INTERNAL COLLAPSE

Valery V. Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, March, 1998 /April, 1998 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia \\ jan]VT99 
	As Russia broke up the Soviet Union, it soured its relations with the union's former republics and stopped treating many non-Russian peoples in its territory with dignity. Thus the central government incessantly duels with Tatarstan over tax revenues. Ingushetia and the Primorsky (Far Eastern) regions have demanded greater autonomy. North Caucasia, the Volga Basin, and the Siberian republics speak of secession. Tatarstan wants to sell oil independently on world markets and is building, with German help, its own tanker fleet, Talk of a Rus Republic that would include only predominantly ethnic Russian areas is fashionable. The Russian parliament held two hearings last year at which self-determination for ethnic Russian and Muslim Turkic populations was discussed, raising the possibility of the secession of ethnic Russian areas from the Russian Federation, a process that would break up Russia itself in the same manner as the Soviet Union. The very mention of such a scenario proves that the Russian elite has forgotten how to coexist with other peoples and ethnic groups,

POST-COMMUNIST STATES ARE RIPE FOR ETHNIC REVOLUTION AND VIOLENCE

Bruce Parrott, Prof. Russian & East European Studies at Johns Hopkins Univ., 1997; DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA, p. 9-10 , acs-VT99 
	Due to the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, twenty-two of the twenty-seven postcommunist states are new sovereign entities. This is one of the main features that distinguishes postcommunist efforts to build democracy from comparable processes in Latin America and Southern Europe." 
	The break-up of states severely complicates efforts to achieve democratization. The process frequently triggers incendiary controversies over the national identity of the new states, contested borders, and rival groups' competing claims to be the only indigenous inhabitants of their new country. In cases as diverse as Croatia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia, national declarations of independence from a larger communist regime have coincided with simultaneous attempts by local minorities to declare their own independence from the newly established states. Such centrifugal processes, which cannot be resolved by appealing to the principle of national self-determination, increase the probability of violent communal conflict and the emergence of ultranationalist sentiments harmful to democratization . 

POLITICAL STABILITY IN RUSSIA IS VERY, VERY FRAGILE

Ariel Cohen; Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP? WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA? acs-VT99
	 Political stability in Russia is as deep as the surgeon's stitches on Yeltsin's coronary blood vessels. Several candidates with unsavory business associates -- and large and questionable business holdings -- are jockeying for the best position to run for the presidency in the year 2000. The lines between federal and local politics, big business, and criminal activities are blurred. Former presidential adviser and bodyguard General Alexander Korzhakov uses criminal jargon in a press conference, while former Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Boris Berezovsky was a target of a gangland-style explosion.

RUSSIA’S ECONOMY IS ABOUT TO MELT DOWN LIKE MEXICO AND SOUTH KOREA’S

Daniil Osmolovsky. Kommersant-Daily, April 25, 1998, pp. 1, 3. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, May 27, 1998; Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Kiriyenko Wins Confirmation on Third Try acs-VT99
	The globalization of financial markets has put Russia in an extremely vulnerable position, as last year's crisis clearly demonstrated. Undercollection of taxes, uncertain prospects for industrial growth, a stagnating banking sector, a substantial percentage of nonresidents holding state treasury obligations -- all these things are factors that, given a rapid increase in budgetary debt, are bringing us closer to the prospect of devaluation of the ruble and even financial collapse of the kind that occurred in Mexico or South Korea.

 DEPRESSED REGIONS WILL REVOLT AGAINST MOSCOW

MOSCOW IS DOING WELL, BUT THE REST OF RUSSIA IS A DISASTER IN THE PROCESS OF HAPPENING

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	 Whatever the full explanation, Moscow is an island of relative prosperity -- a "fiefdom of thieves," as it has been called -- in a decaying country. Most of the privatized wealth accumulated since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union has been concentrated in the capital through a semi-criminal and oligarchical banking system, along with nearly 80 percent of all the country's new investment. The rest of Russia remains in the throes of the twentieth century's greatest depression -- even according to the government's own statistics. The fall in production, down nearly 50 percent since 1991, continues, and unemployment is expected to exceed at least 10 percent by next year. Capital investment dropped 18 percent last year and 8 percent in the first quarter of this year.
 In conversations with Russians from the provinces, we found none who could report any signs of improvement. On the contrary, several spoke despairingly of a "dying nation" -- idle factories, decaying farms, polluted rivers, malnourished children and collapsing professions, education and health care. According to official statistics, 25 to 30 percent of Russians now live in poverty, but even those astonishing figures give little indication that a large twentieth-century middle class is being transformed into nineteenth-century subsistence farmers, who must grow on tiny garden plots what they need to survive but can no longer afford to buy.

DEPRESSED REGIONS ARE ON THE VERGE OF A SOCIAL EXPLOSION

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	 By all accounts, there is no stability in these provincial wastelands. Tens of millions of citizens, among them workers, teachers, doctors and soldiers, still have not received months of salaries. In some of the most stricken areas, there is a growing pattern of direct citizen action and violent protest so dramatic (though still episodic) as to remind observers of the recent uprising in Albania. In the Kuzbass region, miners protesting unpaid wages threatened to take up arms. In the Far East, workers and pensioners blocked railways lines and bridges while wives of unpaid officers closed a military airbase by lying down on runways. Workers at a nuclear submarine facility sealed off the yard and took the managing director hostage until wages were flown in from Moscow. Teachers and doctors in the city of Kimry occupied the city hall, blockading administrators inside until adequate supplies and back salaries were promised.

LINK: THE NEXT ECONOMIC SHOCK WILL TRIGGER A RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR

ECONOMIC STAGNATION MEANS THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY

Lisa Hoffman, Scripps Howard News Service, The Patriot Ledger , March 24, 1998; Pg. 01, HEADLINE: Cleaning Russia's house ; Russian upheaval may be dramatic gesture acs-VT99
	 The most dangerous threat to democracy is continued economic stagnation, which has led some in Russia to lament the passing of the good ol' days of communism, when pensioners didn't have to scrape for bread money and crime was hidden and rare.
But if Yeltsin's economic shin-kick works, or if Russians simply perceive better chances for prosperity ahead, democracy's roots will only grow deeper.

THE NEXT MOVE TO SHOCK THE ECONOMY INTO CAPITALISM WILL CAUSE A SOCIAL EXPLOSION

Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Nation, August 11, 1997; Pg. 24; HEADLINE: The other Russia: Moscow glitters, the economy collapses, the army rumbles. acs-VT99
	 In light of all this, can Yeltsin's reconstituted "young reformer" government, headed by Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, really be serious about imposing a new round of economic "shock therapy" -- this one by abolishing longstanding state subsidies for housing and utilities? "Another dose of this "therapy,'" warned former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev during a conversation at his foundation offices, "is likely to generate a social explosion. People don't receive their wages and now the government is going to raise their rents! What is it thinking"

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED

BOB PACKWOOD, March 2,1998 [Journal of Commerce. SECTION: EDITORIAL/OPINION; Pg. 7A. HEADLINE: Time is ripe for US-Russia free trade \\ jan]VT99 
	After nearly a decade of continuous economic decline, the Russian economy managed to grow 0.4 percent in 1997. Before Asia's financial meltdown, most economists mistakenly saw Russia on the verge of an economic revival. The Asian crisis unnerved international investors, particularly those in emerging markets. In the last two months of 1997 alone, foreign investors withdrew $4 billion from Russia. To defend the ruble and stem the foreign capital outflow, Russia's central bank raised the country's key lending rate to 42 percent from 28 percent and then back down to 39 percent. But now high interest rates threaten to forestall Russia's economic recovery. 
	Meanwhile, the government's continued reliance on high-yield, short-term debt could eventually lead Russia into a financial crisis of its own, prompting many economists to predict continued stagnation. 
	Russia's fiscal, economic and political problems are intimately connected. With Communists in control of Russia's lower house of Parliament, Mr. Yeltsin's tax, budget and free-market reform efforts have stalled.

IMPACT: CIVIL WAR COLLAPSE OF RUSSIA WILL COLLAPSE THE WORLD ECONOMY

IF RUSSIA’S ECONOMY GOERS, THE WORLD SYSTEM, ALREADY WEAKENED BY SOUTHEAST ASIA’S COLLAPSE, MIGHT COLLAPSE

DAVID E. SANGER, The New York Times, June 3, 1998, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: Central Europe May Catch Russia's Cold, U.S. Warns, acs-VT99
	Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin warned today that unless Russia's financial crisis is resolved, its economic troubles "could spread to Central Europe," placing two major regions -- Asia and Europe -- in simultaneous downturns.
In his first statement since President Clinton said on Sunday that the United States would support an international bailout of Russia, Mr. Rubin chose his comments carefully to avoid worsening the flight from Russian and Asian currencies.
"I think it would be fair to say that the situation facing the world today with respect to financial stability is unprecedented," Mr. Rubin told a group of executives on a Presidential export council. " Russia's a difficult situation. We have an obvious national security interest. There is also the risk, once again, of contagion that could spread to Central Europe."

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN RUSSIA WILL QUICKLY SPREAD TO CENTRAL EUROPE

DAVID E. SANGER, The New York Times, June 3, 1998, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: Central Europe May Catch Russia's Cold, U.S. Warns, acs-VT99
	 And Central Europe is still so closely tied to Russia that Moscow's troubles could quickly spread.
 In Russia's case, the alarm bells are ringing in Washington, but not with enormous urgency. Deputy finance ministers from the world's largest industrial countries meet in Paris next week to discuss their next moves. Officials say it will probably take several weeks to put together a package of loans or emergency credits through the I.M.F., the World Bank and other international institutions. And the aid they are considering -- about $10 billion -- is about a quarter of what was promised to Indonesia, and a fifth of what was promised to South Korea. At least that is the plan for now. In both South Korea and Indonesia, the problems increased dramatically while the fund and its members negotiated over what to do. The same could easily happen with Russia. 

A SLOW GROWTH WORLD SITUATION WILL SHATTER WORLD PEACE

Walter Russell Mead, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1998; Part M; Page 2; HEADLINE: THE WORLD / DIPLOMACY; SO NOW WHO'S IN CHARGE? // acs-VT99
	 Unfortunately, our Cold War allies share a negative, slow-growth agenda. Neither Western Europe nor Japan wants to make troublesome, difficult reforms. Europe (Britain excepted) doesn't want to break up its cozy welfare states and Japan doesn't want to dismantle its centrally planned and cartel-based economy. If that means slow global growth, Western Europe and Japan don't care. With slow or negative population growth, Western Europe and Japan don't need to build their economies to make room for future generations. In practice, rapid economic growth would require Europe and Japan to be more receptive to immigrants: a big taboo in both places. Finally, as creditor societies increasingly dominated by retirees, they prefer low inflation and high interest rates even if the price is slower growth around the world.
That is bad for the United States, bad for world peace and, ultimately, bad for Western Europe and Japan. If Europe and Japan don't do their part in stimulating world growth, social and political tensions in the Third World will ultimately undermine world peace with terrible consequences for all.

IMPACT: A RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR WILL BECOME A NATIONAL ETHNIC CONFLICT

A CIVIL WAR WOULD LEAD TO THE BREAK-UP OF RUSSIA INTO INDEPENDENT STATES. THIS WOULD DRAMATICALLY INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NATIONS THAT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND RUSSIAN CENTRAL AUTHORITY WILL FIGHT A NUCLEAR CIVIL WAR

Victor Irsraelyan, 1998 [For almost 50 years, Victor Israelyan was a Soviet ambassador, diplomat, arms control negotiator, and leading political scientist. The Washington Quarterly. Winter, 1998. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 47. HEADLINE: Russia at the Crossroads: Don't Tease a Wounded Bear \\ jan]VT99
	These pressures could well exacerbate the trend toward fragmentation that has already been evident in the Russian Federation. Other autonomous formations (there are currently 20 of them within Russia) might follow the example of the breakaway republic of Chechnya, a process that could continue until Russia is reduced to the dimensions of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. In this event the world will have to deal with a conglomerate of small independent states rather than a united Russia, which is a permanent member of the United Nations (LYN) Security Council. 
	One cannot exclude such a possibility. In the wake of another imperial collapse, more than 10 states emerged from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which had existed for several centuries. Almost 100 states, now essential players in the world arena have been established as a result of the collapse of the French and British empires. The multinational Russian Federation might follow the same path. But in the case of Russia, national fragmentation will pose an entirely new threat - nuclear weapons proliferation. The small countries of the former Russian empire may claim ownership of parts of the Russian nuclear arsenal, arguing that the weapons were either produced or deployed on their territories. Under such conditions, Russia will feel an urgent need to take all possible measures to prevent the further disintegration of the country.

RUSSIA HAS FORGOTTEN HOW TO DEAL WITH ITS MANY ETHNIC GROUPS, AND RISKS SHATTERING APART AS A RESULT

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 As Russia broke up the Soviet Union, it soured its relations with the union's former republics and stopped treating many non-Russian peoples in its territory with dignity. Thus the central government incessantly duels with Tatarstan over tax revenues. Ingushetia and the Primorsky (Far Eastern) regions have demanded greater autonomy. North Caucasia, the Volga Basin, and the Siberian republics speak of secession. Tatarstan wants to sell oil independently on world markets and is building, with German help, its own tanker fleet. Talk of a Rus Republic that would include only predominantly ethnic Russian areas is fashionable. The Russian parliament held two hearings last year at which self-determination for ethnic Russian and Muslim Turkic populations was discussed, raising the possibility of the secession of ethnic Russian areas from the Russian Federation, a process that would break up Russia itself in the same manner as the Soviet Union. The very mention of such a scenario proves that the Russian elite has forgotten how to coexist with other peoples and ethnic groups. 

CHINA DISADVANTAGE

THESIS:
	This disad is has a generic link to any case that may increase, or stabilize US relations with Russia. The argument is that when we better our relations with Russia this hardens our relations with China because Russia and China are embarking on a very shaky bilateral cooperation on many issues in opposition to the United States. China will be angry at Both Russia and the United States for a couple of reasons. First, they see Asia as their sphere of influence, as Russia is no longer the Asian superpower and China is slowly taking over that role. Also, China is very wary of US actions within their sphere because they view it as a threat to their sovereignty. Secondly, many authors argue that better relations between the US and Russia make it easier for the US to actively contain China. The story is that China will perceive US actions with Russia as containment.
	There are many scenarios that can be run off of this. First of all the internal link is twofold. First the plan will negatively affect US-Sino relations. then there is the Impact which could be one of 3 things. First, good relations between the US and China are key to solving the crisis on the Korean Peninsula which is described by the cards included as the most likely flash point for a nuclear war in the world. Secondly, a hampering of relations could spark China to be adventurous and take Taiwan, or attempt to. The United States has agreed to back Taiwan in such an event which would mean some sort of conflict between the US and China. Thirdly this adventurous spirit could also lead China to take the Spratly's which are Islands in the South China Sea that many claim contain vast amounts of oil. These Islands however are under dispute and have been claimed by many Asian/Southeast Asian nations. Sino-territorial grabs in the South China Seas would most likely erupt in a regional conflict that would be pretty ugly. Also, there is a likelihood of the US getting involved with such a conflict.
	Included is enough evidence to give you a good idea of the disad, but it should be expanded upon with more specific links. As well, there is a lot of literature available about the impact scenarios and the internal links.

AFFIRMATIVE DAMAGES US-CHINA RELATIONS

A. US RUSSIAN ALLIANCE WILL BE USED TO CONTAIN CHINA

Amos Perlmutter, professor of political science and sociology at American University and editor of the journal of Strategic Studies,The Washington Times,April 9, 1998, Thursday, Final Edition HEAD LINE: Illusion of unending NATO expansion
 In the post-Cold War international system, when the greatest challenge to the United States comes from China, and when we badly need Russia as an ally to contain China, we are creating a Russian-Chinese alliance and a Russian-Iranian alliance. 

B. IF CHINA PERCEIVES THAT THE US IS INCREASING ITS EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THEM, OUR RELATIONS WILL DETERIORATE

Dr. Richard N. Haas, director of foreign policy study programs at Brookings Institution, 1997 [HEADLINE: DEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD CHINA. SEPTEMBER 17,1997. Federal News Service\\jan]VT99 
Thirdly, I worry over the large political signal this legislation will send. There's a widespread sentiment throughout China that the United States stands in its way, that somehow it's US policy to deny China its rightful place in the world. I do not believe this to be the case. We couldn't prevent China's rise even if we so desired, but legislation such as this will work to reinforce the impression in China and therefore make it more likely that the US-Chinese relationship will become adversarial.

C. BREAKDOWN IN US/SINO RELATIONS EQUALS NEW COLD WAR, ASIAN ARMS RACE, AND BREAK-DOWN IN KOREAN COOPERATION.

MICHAEL ZIELENZIGER, KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWS SERVICE, June 29,1997 HEADLINE: A TEST FOR CHINA-,WHAT DOES BEIJ LNG INTEND FOR HONG KONG'S FUTURE, FREEDOM OR TIGHT CONTROL? Pittsburgh POST-GazETTE//pk VT99 
Increased tension with China WOULD mean the U.S. State Department could no longer rely on Beijing's help to finally and officially end the war on the Korean Peninsula, where tensions remain high. And it would mean South Korea, Japan and the "tiger" economics of Southeast Asia might someday find themselves caught in a vise between China's grow ing ambitions and the United States' growing fears. Such insecurity could trigger a new arms race across Asia, meaning billions more U.S. taxpayer dollars would be spent on the military while the pentagon would be forced to delay any plans to reduce U.S. troop strength in the region. "The U.S. could stumble into a new cold war" said Kenneth Lieberthal, a China scholar at the University of Michigan.

LINKS AND LINK HELPERS

CHINA PERCEIVES US EXERCISE OF SOFT POWER AS A CRITICAL THREAT.

Denny Roy, Strategic and Defense studies Center, Australia, 1996 Security Dialogue. "China's Threat Environment" VT99
	Throughout the various threatening scenarios Beijing envisions, the prominence of the United St a tes is rernarkable. The United States clearly represents the single greatest source of danger to China not only because of its military strength, but also through its various forms of 'sofy' power that have the potential to enlarge and intensify China's indigenous political and social problems. 
	Policy-makers dealing with Beijing must account for what might be termed Sino-centric paranoia: a belief that the other major powers have a long-term commitment to dividing and otherwise weakening China to prevent it from rising from the legacy of the 'century of shame' and returning to its former and rightful place as the center of world civilization. This deep-seated. fear forces nearly every aspect of Sino-US contact, including cultural and economic relations, into the context of a lifeand-death political power.

CHINA VIEWS ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS AS ENEMIES. THIS CAUSES THEM TO DISTRUST AN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ANY ARRANGEMENTS

Fei-Ling Wang; assistant professor of international affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 1998 [The Washington Quarterly. Winter. SECTION: Vol. 21, No. 1; Pg. 67 HEADLINE: To Incorporate China: A New Policy for a New Era\\jan]VT99
	CCP insecurity has colored the country's "national interests" to the extent that some analysts in Beijing view nearly all its neighbors as potential "troublemakers": Japan "is transforming from a potential threat to a real threat", Russia is "our long term potential rival"; and India "is the potential source of instability in our southwestern regions. Moreover, Beijing sees the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the "direct party of struggle over our sovereignty of the Nansha (Spratly) islands," so that the development of "a larger ASEAN" would be a serious and unfavorable challenge to China. Such perceptions of insecurity in a rising power hardly lead it to feel at peace with the world or to trust collective security arrangements.

CHINA SEES GLOBALIZATION OF ALLIANCE SYSTEMS, LIKE NATO, AS A THREAT OF CONTAINMENT.

Yoichi Funabashi (Bureau Chief of Asahi Shimbun American Gen. Bureau 1996-97 Survival vol 38 no 4, winter "bridging Asias Economics Security Gap)//jm VT99 
	 Balance between these three regional powers, at as core. means coping with the rise or China. Some argue that 'the emergence or China as a global power ... could be dealt with within the framework or a traditional alliance like NATO only if NATO were fundamentally overvalued." I However, Beijing will view tiny such new alliance system. or 'globalisation or NATO', as an expansion or Western influence and an attempt to contain China. The global strategy will not work, as wcurity implication-, will he felt and pronounced in regional terms.

CHINA PERCEIVES US LEADERSHIP AS THREATENING IN NEW WORLD ORDER 

Pendley, William T., Prof of International relations and Asian Studies at The Air War College in Alabama, 1997 Heritage Foundation Reports, "China as International Actor", excerpt from Between Diplomacy and Deterrence Heritage Foundation Reports, June 2, 1997 / sjs-VT99 
Because it shares a 2,700-mile border with China, Russia has been a concern to Chinese dynasties throughout history. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, a new bond has emerged to replace the ties Of shared ideology: Both China and Russia are powers in transition and deeply dissatisfied with their Current status in the international system. Russia as a declining power and China as an emerging great power both view the current domination of the international system by the United States as threatening.

CHINA WANTS US OUT OF ASIA

Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, RB-book critic New York Times and RMDirector of the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research institute in Philadephia, 1997-.The Coming Conflict with China \\js VT99
 	As we will see below, China's self-conception and its vision of the American role in Asia have changed markedly over the past decade. Internal policy documents have been circulating within the Chinese leadership since 1992. portraying the United States as China's real enemy. In 1995, China's foreign minister Qian Qichcn sent a chill through the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations by declaring it was time for the United States to stop regarding itself as the savior of the East.' Qian said: "We do not recognize the United States as a power which claims to maintain the peace and stability of Asia."'The statement signaled that China's strategic thinking had changed. Befpre, it welcomed the American military presence in Asia as a stabilizing force and a balance to the Soviet Union. Now its assumption is that an American withdrawal would leave China the dominant power, and that is what it wants to be.

BETTER RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA THREATEN RUSSIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

CHINA AND RUSSIA SHARE AN ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT

Stephen J. Blank, 1997 [of the U.S. Army War College College Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 19, 1997. HEADLINE: Sino-Russian Ties: Implication for for the West? Following are excerpts from a recent analysis by Blank, "The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China." A national security analyst at the college's Strategic Studies Institute and a fluent speaker of Russian, Blank specializes in Russian military affairs.\\jan]VT99 
	Russian policymakers also appear utterly oblivious to threats based on transferring weapons to China. Apparently, they believe that Russia is immune to such threats , or that its peaceful interests give it a standing as a power that "does not deserve to be hurt." Others assume that, by practicing such policies, Russia will either gain leverage over China and a constant and friendly market; or [they] think that Russia's technological superiority will enable Russia to offset and repel threats. China now has many points of leverage throughout the Russian economy, with federal and local governments, among civilian and military bureaucracies and with the defense industry. China also gains a market for some of its lower quality goods and a source of cheap consumer goods. It shares with Moscow (and New Delhi) a common desire to restrict Muslim nationalism in Xinjiang and Central Asia. And of course, it gains a stable, cheap supply of quality weaponry. WHILE THIS LAST BENEFIT may be the most tangible geopolitical fruit of this new relationship, it also cements an anti-American orientation, which can only grow more truculent and intense if China collides with U.S. interests in East Asia.

CHINA, JAPAN, AND RUSSIA ARE FORMING TRIPARTITE TO INCREASE STABILITY IN REGION 

The Canberra Times. November 18, 1997. HEADLINE: LOVING THY NEIGHBOUR PAYS IN ASIA-PACIFIC. The Federal Capital Press of Australia///sdg VT99 
	China, Russia and Japan have been working at the highest levels to create a tripartite relationship that, in the words of the Chinese official spokesman, would contribute to peace and stability throughout the region. In the course of the past fortnight the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, met the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, and the Japanese Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto; and the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Pen-, began a six-day visit to Japan.

YELTSIN AND ZEMIN HAVE RESOLVED HISTORIC BORDER DISPUTES

The Canberra Times. November 18, 1997. HEADLINE: LOVING THY NEIGHBOUR PAYS IN ASIA-PACIFIC. The Federal Capital Press of Australia///sdg VT99 
	Yeltsin's visit to Beijing was perhaps of most immediate importance. The 40OOkm border between China and Russia has never been precisely defined, and for centuries has caused friction between the two countries. 
	After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demarcation talks which had been stalled for many years were resumed. Until recently, little progress had been made, but last week Yeltsin and Jiang signed a declaration proclaiming the end of present disputes.

 SINO/RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF A MILITARIZED BORDER

Gennady Chufrin October 10, 1997 [Professor Gennady Chufrin is Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Science, Moscow, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES. HEADLINE: China and Russia: Just ties, no alliance\\jan]VT99 
The second part of the problem (demilitarisation of the border) was resolved when the Moscow Declaration was supplemented by an agreement between Russia and China, also signed in April this year. According to this agreement, Russia assumed an obligation to reduce, within two years, the size of its armed forces in a 100-km border zone with China by 15 per cent, while Kazakhstan, TaJikistan and Kirgizia, who joined this agreement, declared a complete withdrawal of troops from their borders with China. As a result, Russia, China and the former Soviet Central Asian republics had .a unique opportunity to divert substantial resources so far spent on keeping an oversized military potential on their mutual borders for more productive purposes. These border agreements undoubtedly helped to resolve many sensitive and delicate issues in SinoRussian relations, including long-standing, and potentially explosive territorial disputes.

THE NEW RUSSIA/SINO RELATIONSHIP HAS RESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES ALONG THEIR MUTUAL BORDER

Gennady Chufrin, October 10, 1997 [Professor Gennady Chufrin is Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Science, Moscow. SINGAPORE STRAITS TINES. HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance\\jan]VT99 
Second, by signing the above declaration, both sides wanted to minimise contradictions still remaining in their own relations. Among such major outstanding issues of a bilateral nature was, of course, the problem of demarcation and demilitarisation of the Sino-Russian border. The first part of this problem had already been resolved after the signing of the agreements between Moscow and Beijing on the eastern portion of the border in May 1991 and on its western portion in December 1994. These agreements held even when Mr Yevgeni Nazdratenko, governor of the maritime province, disagreed with the way the Sino-Russian border was demarcated in some areas and tried to start an ultra-nationalistic obstructionist cam paign on this issue. This unfortunate incident was resolved, however, in a very amicable fashion by the Russian and the Chinese governments who, acting in the larger interests of mutual cooperation, compromised their positions on the disputed border area.

RUSSIA WANTS CHINA INVOLVED IN REGIONAL DIALOGUE ABOUT SECURITY ISSUES

Gennady Chufrin, October 10, 1997 [Professor Gennady Chufrin is Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Science, Moscow. SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES. HEADLINE: China and Russia: Just ties, no alliance\\j an]VT99 
	One cannot ignore, however, a growing concern in some of the neighbouring countries in the AsiaPacific as to how this trade in advanced weaponry may influence the regional power balance. 
	It is therefore in the basic national interests of Russia to have China participating actively in a dialogue process on regional security while continuing to assist China in its legitimate plans to modernise its conventional defence.

CHINA AND RUSSIA HAVE REVIVED CLOSE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES

Gennady Chufrin, October 10, 1997 [Professor Gennady Chufrin is Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Science, Moscow. SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES. HEADLINE: China and Russia : Just ties, no alliance\\jan]VT99 
	A REVIVAL of close political and economic ties between Russia and China, a phenomenon unthinkable only a decade ago, has become one of the most remarkable events in international relations. Indeed, after almost three decades of fierce ideological, political and even military confrontation, Moscow and Beijing regard each other now, if not as friends-in-arms as they were in the late 1940s and early 1950s, then certainly as good partners. Numerous and re gular exchanges of official delegations, coupled with a growing number of joint political statements and major business deals, may be seen as clear proof of such a development.

THE NEW CHINA/RUSSIAN AGREEMENT IS NOT A REVIVAL OF A MILITARY ALLIANCE

Gennady Chufrin, October 10, 1997 [Professor Gennady Chufrin is Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Academy of Science, Moscow. SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES. HEADLINE: China and Russia: Just ties, no alliance\\jan]VT99 
First of all, it must be made very clear that a new Sino-Russian partnership does not in any way represent a resurrection of the former Sino-Soviet political and military alliance. It is well known that staying out of such alliances is one of the cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy. Entering into such alliances also goes against Russian national interests.

ACTING TO MARGINALIZE AND CONTAIN CHINA INSULTS ITS GLOBAL AMBITIONS

CONTAINMENT OF CHINA IS THE WORST POSSIBLE POLICY OPTION

Dr. Richard N. Haas, director of foreign policy study programs at Brookings Institution, 1997 [HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD CHINA. SEPTEMBER 17,1997. Federal News Service\\jan]VT99 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The United States has a clear interest in seeing the emergence of a China that is prepared to act with restraint, both beyond its borders and toward its own citizens. Moreover, history suggests that the emergence of such a China is anything but automatic . It's possible that one day we might find ourselves in the position of facing a China that is expansionist and hostile. If this happens, so be it. But containing China would surely be costly, and dangerous and vastly interior to a China that was more responsible and a US-China relationship that was more cooperative. Obviously, this should be our goal.

GOOD SINO-US RELATIONS ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT EACH IS TREATED LIKE AN EQUAL

Yu Haisheng, DECEMBER 21, 1997 [Xinhua News Agency HEADLINE: yearender: major progress in sino-us, sino-russian ties in 1997\\jan]VT99 
progress in sino-us and sino-russian ties was a conspicuous part of this year's international relations, with frequent contacts between big powers' leaders. since the end of the cold war, sino-us ties were stymied by issues like taiwan, human rights, and weapons proliferation and made slow progress. the stalemate was not in the two peoples' interest, nor was it in keeping with world trends in peace and development. a major problem for china and the united states remained how to transcend these differences, expand co-operation, avoid confrontation, and establish a stable and healthy relationship. on the other hand, sino-us political, economic, and military exchanges have clearly increased this year. major us political figures like vice-president al gore, secretary of state madeleine albright, and speaker of the house newt gingrich have visited china, paving the way for the sino-us summit. president jiang zemin's visit to the us in october was a new stage in sino-us ties. during the visit, the two countries issued the china-us joint statement, an important document for ties after the three previous joint communiques. the joint statement dealt with major common interests and their commitment to establish a constructive strategic partnership, and the basic status of the three joint communiques in developing ties. it says that china and the us handle bilateral ties in a global and strategic way and their problems in a spirit of equality and seeking common ground while reserving differences. 

CURRENT US-SINO RELATIONS ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY

ASIA PULSE, December 17,1997 [HEADLINE: USIS - TALKS WITH CHINA TO IMPROVE PORT ACCESS (The following is a release by the US Information Service\\jan]VT99 
	Maritime discussions between the United States and the People's Republic of China have set the stage for improved access by each nation's shipping, lines to the other's ports and cargoes, according to the U.S. Maritime Administration. "Our maritime discussions with China will further enable our world-class U.S. intermodal carriers to improve their operations in China," Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater said in a press release issued December 12. "We have reinvigorated our productive working relationship with China, based firmly on the principle of reciprocity."

CHINA IS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

Sir Leon BRITTAN, Vice-President of the European Commission, February 2, 1998 "ID Engaging China EU China Academic Network Annual Conference London\\jan]VT99 
	It is often the case that dramatic internal economic or political change can lead to an equally dramatic realignment of a country's external relationship with the outside world. I can think of no clearer example of this than the way in which the momentous internal changes taking place today in China are being reflected in a significant shift in China's relationship with the rest of the world. China the Middle Kingdom is breaking out of its traditional insularity and embarking on an unprecedented process of engagement in international affairs. I am firmly of the view that this process represents one of the greatest strategic challenges for foreign policy makers in Europe, the United States. Asia and elsewhere and that the way it unfolds will be one of the determining factors shaping the international order of the 21st Century.

CHINA'S GOAL IS TO MAKE ASIA IT'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, RELEGATING THE US TO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE ONLY

DR. MICHAEL PILLSBURY, ASSOCIATE FELLOW NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, SEPTEMBER 18,1997 [BEFORE THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE SUBJECT CHINESE VIEWS OF FUTURE WARFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. Federal News Service\\jan]VT99 
The second aspect of PLA views of future warfare is the requirement to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs so that China can even more rapidly and effectively "defeat the superior with the inferior. " One statement never found in PLA open source writing is any declaration that China will one day be the world's leading military power. Rather, the eventual end state of the current Post Cold War transitional period is always proclaimed to be "multipolarity" among five "equal" powers each of which will have its own sphere of influence. One bold author explains that by mid-21st century, even the declining United States will still be left its own sphere of influence, namely Latin American and Canada. Several PLA articles and a book published by the Academy of Military Science provide equations with which to calculate the future trends in "comprehensive national power" that will lead to this world of five equal powers.

MAINTAINING US-SINO RELATIONS REQUIRES THAT BOTH SIDES ACT WITH A SPIRIT OF TRUST

Xinhua news agency, October 5, 1997 [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts October 8, 1997. HEADLINE: Minister urges USA to abandon trade status reviews\\ an]VT99 
	The strong growth of the Asia-Pacific economies provide a good chance for cooperation between China and the United States, both of which are on the Pacific rim. The recent 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party provided a blueprint for future development in China, which will open even wider to the rest of the world, creating new opportunities for expanded economic cooperation and trade with all other countries. As Iona as both China and the United States cherish the hardwon progress and act positively and in a spirit of trust, eliminate prejudice, reduce differences and create the future together, they will push Sino-US economic and trade relations to a new level.

CHINA IS ULTRA SENSITIVE TO PERCEIVED THREATS TO ITS POWER

William T. Pendley, 1997; [retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, is a Professor of International Relations at the Air War College in Alabama and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the East Asia/Pacific Region. Edited by Kim R. Holmes and James J. Przystup. Heritage Foundation Reports. June 2, 1997 SECTION: BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND DETERRENCE; Strategies For U.S. Relations With China; Pg. HEADLINE: CHAPTER 2; China as International Actor\\jan]VT99 
	Many factors underscore the fact that China has yet to attain great power status. The reality of its day-to-day relations with foreign countries rules out any immediate appearance that it has been restored to its "rightful place" on the international stage as a leading power or primary actor. At best, China has achieved status as a major regional power, holding limited roles in the global political, economic, and security spheres. This disconnect between the vision of China's role in the international system and the reality of its position adds to Beijing's hypersensitivity to pressures and perceived slights from the international community -- especially any perceived interference in its internal affairs.

INTERNAL LINKS TO KOREA SCENARIO

CHINA AND US CAN MANAGE KOREA

Tat Yan Kong & Dae Hwan Kim, Prof. Oriental & African Studies at Univ. of London- Prof. Economics at Inha University in Incheon South Korea, 1997 The Korean Peninsula in Transition, "Introduction Aspects of the Transition and Theoretical Considerations" // JAD-VT99 
American relations with the other major Asian power, China, structures the room for manoevre available to North Korea. The decline of China’s strategic importance to the US since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have reactivated latent differences between the Chinese and the Americans over social order and individualism. This has reinforced the political interdependence between China and the surviving communist systems, Vietnam and North Korea. Relations between them have improved accordingly. 

US CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA COOPERATION KEY TO SOLVING TENSIONS IN KOREA

Ralph Cossa and Jane Khanna, Directors of the Pacific Forum, 1997 International Affairs, "East Asia: Economic Interdependence and Regional Security", April// JC-VT99 
While tensions have yet fully to subside on the Korean Peninsula, the immediate nuclear crisis has at least temporarily been defused. Pyongyang seems willing if not eager to improve relations with Washington and Tokyo, even as it remains ins reluctant to renew its once-promising dialogue with Seoul. Cooperation between the United States, South Korea and China in offering to engage North Korea in four-party talks aimed at replacing the current armistice With a permanent peace treaty also holds out promise for future progress, now that the dust caused by last autimn's North Korean submarine incident has begun to settle.

US-SINO COOPERATION CRITICAL TO SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF NORTH KOREA

James Lilley, Dir. Asian Policy Studies, former Ambassador to China, Much 20, 1996 Congressional Hcarings, Security Challenges posed by China\\MB-VT99 
 It seems to me also that China and the United States must work very closely - I have just come back from South Korea - to solve that terrible problem in North Korea. It is very dangerous, as General Luc has pointed out. You face a situation where you could have implosion in terms or the regime collapsing violently or turn ing to external means to desperately strike out at their neighbor. China and the United States are both very important in containing North Korea, and we have to work together on this. We have got to have high-level talks soon on military transparency. We have to discuss candidly our perception of Chinese military buildup and power projection and the so-called United States containment policy. 

US-CHINA COOPERATION EQUALS KOREAN STABILITY.

Chai-Jin Lee, Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1996 China and Korea: Dynamic Relations//PK-VT99 
	Needless to say, it is ultimately incumbent on the leaders of both Koreas to learn from the tragic history of international victimization of Korea and to shape their own destinies toward each other and toward China and other major powers. The must desirable ways for both North and South Korea to bring about a bright future for the Korean people are to engage in bona fide dialogue and cooperation a nd to establish a viable system of checks and balances among the four major powers concerned with Korea. In view of the asymmetry of national interests and historical experiences of these powers in regard to Korea and the changing nature of policy priorities that they demonstrate toward their Korean partners, both North and South Korea should be able to use the competing external forces to build 2 mutually beneficial relationship that would eventually 211%. culminate in peaceful national reintegration. In this Context China, along with the United States, seems to have both the intention and the Capacity to provide a stable and supportive external environment for the Korean Peninsula . 

KOREA IMPACTS

TENSE RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA CREATE A VOLATILE WAR SITUATION

Daryl M. Plunk, Senior Fellow at the Heritage Asian Studies Center, 1997 direction on Asian Studies Center Backgrounder," After broken promises, time to change North Korea", No. 149, May 15, MB-VT99 
Instead, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang are as strained as ever, the North's economy is in free-fall, and many of North Korea's citizens are starving. The Administration's policies, which purport to seek North-South reconciliation and North Korean economic reform and political openness, arc having the opposite impact on both counts. Concerns are mounting that the North's desperation could explode into war, or that political instability there could lead to a chaotic and violent collapse of the regime.

LACK OF KOREAN UNIFICATION INCREASES RISK OF WAR NOT ONLY WITHIN BUT AMONG. THE US AND CHINA.

Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, Research Fellows for SSAAR 1995 A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi Papers 299 \\ JW-VT99 
Deterring war on the Korean peninsula is the most critical short-term US security interest in the region. Until unification of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south is accomplished, the risk of conflict on the peninsula is likely to increase as North Korea's communist regime struggles to maintain its ideological legitimacy and overcome a deteriorating economy. A new Korean conflict would cause substantial casualties among both South Korean and US forces, increase the risk of direct Sino-American military confrontation in North-cast Asia, and pose a direct threat to Japan.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JAPAN, US, AND RUSSIA CREATE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

Stephen Kirby, Dean of Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences at Manchester Metropolitan University 1996 North Korea in the New World Order "Regional Power Factors and the Nuclear Issues' jad-VT99 15 
All four powers have a strategic interest in the Korean peninsula, and the nuclear issue has sharpened these interests and the importance of being involved at the centre. Differences thrown up by the nuclear problem, and by other matters external to the Korean peninsula, especially America's perceived arrogance and aspirations as the lone superpower, have given new vigour to cold war tics. But the security order in the area is still in the process or being shaped, with much depending on how the nuclear issue develops. This is primarily because of the responses or other actors in the region if it continues unabated, and the implications or these for regional security. For instance, Japan, the ROK and Taiwan could all go nuclear 

NORTH KOREAN PROLIFERATION WOULD LEAD TO A MILITARY CRISIS.

Gerald Segal, Senior Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1997 Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia//JC-VT99 
One of the few things that does Seem clear about the Korean problem is that North Korea is motivated primarily by worries about the survival Of its regime. It finds itself increasingly falling behind the South in all forms of competition and, most Important, in economic competition. Whether North Korea is actually acquiring nuclear weapons or not, it apparently feels that the threat of doing so seems to get American and Japanese attention. The danger is that by engaging in such a high-risk strategy of survival, it may bring about a major political and military crisis that will engulf the region. 

INTERNAL LINKS TO TAIWAN SCENARIO

US-SINO RELATIONS WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TAIWAN IS WILLING TO OPEN UP TALKS WITH CHINA

'Lien Ho Pao', Taipei, in Chinese 24 Jan 98, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 31, 1998 [SECTION: Part 3 Asia-Pacific; CHINA RELATIONS; HEADLINE: Policy meeting decides now is not the time to resume cross-strait Talks. SOURCE: Source: p2\\jan]VT99 
	In its evaluation of the situation, Taiwan also takes into consideration the development of relations between the United States and communist China. The "Clinton-Chiang [Jiang Zemin] talks" are likely be put off until around November. The timing of both the cross-strait talks and the "Clinton-Chiang talks" also have an impact on the overall strategy. Therefore, the public's expectations for the timing of the resumption of talks may be proved wrong.

CHINA WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES SO THAT WE WILL STAY OUT OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE

Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, January 30, 1998 [HEADLINE: JAPAN IMPROVING DEFENSE TIES WITH CHINA (JAN 3 O/DY)\\j an]VT99 
	According to Western military sources in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a resolution in that month to seek improved relations with Japan, after the party hailed President Jiang Zemin's U.S. visit the previous month as an epochal event. Beijing has felt compelled to seek better relations with Japan and the United States after missile drills it carried out in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 drew two U.S. aircraft carriers and heightened tensions. Western diplomats in Beijing say China's diplomatic efforts are aimed at preventing Japan and the United States from interfering in the Taiwan issue.

TAIWAN IMPACTS

TENSIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN CAN ARISE QUICKLY

James F. Hoge, Jr., Editor of Foreign Affairs, Winter 1997 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: Pg. V HEADLINE: Editor's Note; A Test of Wills Over Taiwan. November, 1997 /December, 1997\\ an]VT99 
	How quickly tensions surrounding the island's future can escalate became clear in 1995 and 1996 when China mounted a campaign of intimidation that included bellicose warnings, military invasion exercises, and missile tests in the waters off Taiwan. The coordinated show of hostility was prompted by China's perception that the "renegade province" to which Chiang Kai-shek's defeated Nationalist forces retreated in 1949 was sliding into independence with U.S. acquiescence. Since 1949, the ruling Nationalists have adhered to the idea that Taiwan is part of China, but they insist reunification can be accomplished only after China becomes a democracy and a market economy. Independence as an alternative has grown significantly only in recent years. 

A SINO-TAIWAN WAR WOULD AFFECT THE ENTIRE WORLD

Takashi Kawachi, September 24,1997 [Mainichi Daily HEADLINE: China still wary of Japan-US defense ties\\jan]VT99 
	If China, a military superpower, and one of only a handful of nations which possesses nuclear weapons, engages in an all-out war with Taiwan, an economic superpower which is frantically trying to build up its defense capabilities, this would have dire consequences not only for Japan, but also for Asia and the rest of the world.

THE US WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN A CHINA/TAIWAN CONFLICT

RAMON MYERS, September 12, 1997 [Journal of Commerce. HEADLINE: Building a Pacific alliance\\jan]VT99 
	The United States has maintained a policy of ambiguity toward the dividedChina problem ever since breaking diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1978 and recognizing Beijing (and acknowledging, that Taiwan is part of China). 
	The United States has advocated the two Chinese sides settle their differences peacefully, warning that the use of armed force would threaten U. S. interests and elicit an American response.

TAIWAN COULD TRIGGER A US-SINO WAR

Robert A. Manning, September 28, 1997 [senior fellow at the Progressive Policy, Institute, was a State Department policy advisor from 1989-93 . Los Angeles Times. HEADLINE: THE WORLD; U.S., JAPAN DEEPEN DEFENSE TIES--AND CHINA GETS NERVOUS\\jan]VT99 
But such rhetoric may have other purposes, like keeping Japan from enlarging its military horizons, wringing more economic concessions from Tokyo and constraining the expansion of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not ending it. Whatever the truth of the matter, China's real concern is Taiwan, which could trigger a direct U.S.-China military confrontation.

CHINA IS WILLING TO USE FORCE TO RECLAIM TAIWAN

ASIA PULSE, December 02,1997 [HEADLINE: BEIJING STEPS UP PRESSURE ON TAIWAN AFTER ELECTIONS\\j an]VT99 
The strong showing of a pro-independence party in elections in Taiwan last weekend prompted Beijing today to issue one of its strongest warnings that it was prepared to use force to reclaim Taiwan. Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang, Guoqiang stepped up China's rhetoric on what it regards as its "renegade province", after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 12 of 23 seats decided in city and county elections on Saturday. He repeated that the threat of force was intended against "foreign forces" seeking to achieve Taiwanese independence, but added the clear message that it would also target pro-independence forces within Taiwan. We will work hard for the peaceful reunification of the motherland but we will not renounce the use of force," Tang told a regular press briefing when asked about the election results.

CHINA IS WILLING TO USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN EVEN IT MEANS A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

Fei-Ling Wang; assistant professor of international affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, 1998 [The Washington Quarterly. Winter. SECTION: Vol. 2 1, No. I ; Pg. 67 HEADLINE: To Incorporate China: A New Policy for a New Era\\jan]VT99 
Of course, China does not completely lack real and even ambitious demands, the most pressing of which relate to Taiwan. Developments since 1995, when Taiwan president Lee Tung-Hui visited the United States, and especially since 1996 when the Chinese military conducted massive exercises in the Taiwan Strait and Washington sent two carriers to the scene, highlighted the explosive nature of this issue. Unifying the motherland and eliminating domestic political rivalries in Taiwan would ensure the CCP	political legitimacy, and they therefore constitute vital national and political interests. In fact, the CCP leadership has said it will use force to prevent Taiwanese independence even at the risk of openly opposing the U. S. military. 

CHINA HAS REITERATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE TAIWAN BY FORCE

Agence France Presse, December 02, 1997 [HEADLINE: China warns force is still an option over Taiwan\\jan]VT99 
China's Foreign Ministry warned Tuesday that force was still an option to recover Taiwan if the island made moves toward official independence. "We will work hard for peaceful reunification of the motherland, but we cannot renounce the use of force," spokesman Tang Guoqiang said when asked about the surprise win in local elections of Taiwan's pro-independence par-ties. He said such force would be targeted against "international and foreign forces as well as Taiwan forces advocating independence." Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which supports official independence for the island, won 12 of the 23 local administrative posts, doubling its previous share. The ruling Kuomintang party (KMT) garnered just eight constituencies, losing half its previous seats, while the remaining three were taken by independent candidates. "Whatever the outcome of the elections held in Taiwan these cannot change the fact that Taiwan is a part of China," Tang said. "Reunification is the common aspiration of people on both sides of the Strait and any attempt to create one China and one Taiwan or two Chinas is against the interests of all Chinese people and is doomed to failure," he added.

CHINA WILL NOT RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE IN THE DISCUSSION OF REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 13, 1997 [HEADLINE: Chinese president offers negotiations on Taiwan. SOURCE: Source: Xinhua news agency, Beijing, in English 0259 gmt 12 Sep 97\\jan]VT99 
"All opinions and proposals can be put forward as long as they are in the interest of the reunification. The question of the reunification of the motherland should be solved by us Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait," he added. "We shall adhere to the basic principles of 'peaceful reunification' and 'one country, two systems' and the eight-point proposal on developing relations between the two sides and promoting 'or the peaceful reunification of the motherland. We shall stick to the principle of' one China' and oppose splitting, the 'independence of Taiwan', the attempt to create 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' and any interference by foreign forces. We shall not allow any forces whatsoever to change Taiwan's status as part of China in any way," Jiang said. "We shall work for peaceful reunification, but we shall not undertake to renounce the use of force, " Jiang said, adding that this is not directed against the compatriots in Taiwan, but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China's reunification and to bring about the "independence of Taiwan" .

CONSULTATION DISADVANTAGE

THESIS: Before adopting the affirmative plan we should consult with Russia and ask their opinion. The consultation counterplan does that. When using that counterplan, also use this disadvantage to create a net benefit for competition.

A. AFFIRMATIVE ACTS WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH RUSSIA

B. THIS UNILATERAL ATTEMPT TO IGNORE RUSSIA IS AN EXTREMELY UNWISE POLICY

ALL POTENTIAL SITUATIONS WHERE RUSSIA IS HUMILIATED MUST BE AVOIDED

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	At the same time, Western leaders should consider ways of avoiding actions that, without any real bearing on their countries' security, humiliate Russians by making them keenly aware how impotent they have become under democracy. 

CUTTING OFF CONTACTS WITH RUSSIA IS THE WORST POLICY -- WE NEED CONSISTENT COOPERATION

Fred Hiatt, editorial page staff of The Washington Post, The Moscow Times, April 11, 1998, HEADLINE: Perils of Disengagement , acs-VT99
	 It's just as wrongheaded, though, to cut off contacts and aid, or threaten to do so, whenever Russia displeases U.S. policy-makers or congressmen, whether in its policy toward Iraq, Iran or Latvia. The West must keep engaging with Russia - opening markets to its new businesses, for example - to show that a nonbullying foreign policy can have rewards.

C. IF RUSSIA IS NOT INTEGRATED INTO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM, IT WILL IMPLEMENT A HARD-LINE POLICY OF LAND COLLECTION

Valery V. Tsepkalo, Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, March, 1998 /Apnil, 1998 [Foreign Affairs. SECTION: ESSAYS; Pg. 107. HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia \\ jan]VT99 
If the West does not support integration, Russia will implement a hard-line policy of "land collection" on its southern and western flanks. It will also adopt a confrontational attitude toward Western nations and probably China; Moscow will again begin supporting any state that opposes U.S. interests. It will likely start with Muslim nations like Iran, Iraq, and Libya and groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as Cuba and North Korea. The weakness of Russia's conventional forces will probably lead it to rely on veiled threats of nuclear blackmail, using the above countries and groups, among others. Such a policy will allow Moscow back into the negotiation process in the Middle East and on the Korean peninsula, marking its return to serious international policymaking. It would also mobilize and unite Islamic elements in Russia and the CIS, cutting the ground out from under Muslim separatists by casting Russia as the ally and friend of Islam. At one stroke, it would counter both the West and China, which is dealing with Muslim unrest of its own in Xinjiang province and elsewhere.

D. THE CONSULTATION COUNTERPLAN AVOIDS THIS DISADVANTAGE, MAKING IT NET BENEFITS COMPETITIVE

USA FOREIGN POLICY GOALS TOWARDS RUSSIA

WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT RUSSIA HIDES A DANGEROUS SITUATION OF VOLCANIC PROPORTIONS

JOHN STEINBRUNER and CLIFFORD GADDY, Brookings Institution's foreign policy studies program, Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1998, Part M; Page 5; HEADLINE: THE BEAR HAS LOST ITS ROAR // acs-VT99
	 These American views of both Russia's security situation and its economic prospects reflect a brand of wishful thinking that could be exceedingly dangerous. Beneath the surface of the Russian political system, the combination of an economy far weaker than most people recognize and security concerns much greater is leading to pressures of volcanic proportions. In the end, it will be our problem as well as Russia's. 

OUR BEST POLICY IS TO DO WHATEVER HELPS RUSSIA DEVELOP IN A PRODUCTIVE AND POSITIVE WAY

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 Our purpose in working with Russia should be to fashion the right political arrangements; in other words, to weave beneficial relationships and devise incentives that will encourage Russia to continue its democratic progress and that will yield material benefits to the Russian people.

USA FOREIGN POLICY AMBITIONS FAR OUTDISTANCE ITS CAPABILITIES -- THE USA WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN ADVICE TO RUSSIA

Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1998, p. 3., Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 25, 1998; Pg. 8,HEADLINE: Iraq Accord Reached: How Big Was Russia's Role? acs-VT99
	 In getting involved in the present conflict, the US has failed to reckon with this fundamental distinction between 1998 and 1991. Now it will have to walk the same painful road that Russia walked before it. In recent years, American politicians and analysts have been telling the Russian elite to bring its foreign-policy ambitions into line with the real potential that Russia possesses. They have urged Russia to renounce any claims to retain its status as a superpower and instead to find a new place for Russia in a new world. This has been very difficult.
Now it is time for the Americans to listen to others' lectures calling on the US to bring its foreign-policy ambitions into line with its possibilities. The Iraqi crisis of 1998 has demonstrated that the United States cannot in fact maintain its status as the only superpower, dictating its will in world politics. For the American foreign-policy elite, giving up that status is extremely difficult psychologically. It is this, not minor errors, that has led American foreign policy into an impasse over Iraq.

USA SHOULD APPLY THE SAME STANDARDS AND ADVICE TO RUSSIA IT APPLIES TO ITSELF

Grigory Yavlinsky; Russian economist and the leader of Yabloko, a democratic, reformist political party, Foreign Affairs, May, 1998 / June, 1998; Pg. 67, HEADLINE: Russia's Phony Capitalism acs-VT99
	For its part, the West should hold those in power in Russia accountable for undemocratic deeds, in much the same way as it is willing to criticize its allies. Western leaders should apply to Russia the same criteria for evaluating the health of its democracy and the strength of its market economy that they apply to themselves. The West should not give Russia advice it is not willing to take itself. This is especially important because, in the 21st century, competition will occur between civilizations and not countries. Although Russia and the West have different histories, they belong to the same civilization. The old rivalries need not endure -- if Russia chooses wisely.

USA WORLD LEADERSHIP WILL BE THE HALLMARK OF THE 21ST CENTURY IN FOREIGN POLICY

CLINTON’S FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES SET THE STAGE FOR USA LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Morton M. Kondracke, Roll Call, JULY 7, 1997, HEADLINE: Surprise! Clinton Is a Good Foreign Policy President acs-VT99
	It's too much to say that Clinton has been a great foreign policy president - luckily, he's had no wars or grave crises to face - but his strategy and execution so far have been very good, setting up the structure for continued US global leadership in the 21st century. Clinton's success in this arena is a surprising development in view of the disasters he endured early in his first term, such as the death of US troops in Somalia, being intimidated by thugs in Haiti, and having diplomatic initiatives bluntly rebuffed in China and Bosnia.

USA LIKES BEING #1 AND WILL DO WHAT IT TAKES TO STAY #1

Stephen M. Walt, professor of political science University of Chicago, Foreign Policy, March 22, 1998; Pg. 29; HEADLINE: International relations: one world, many theories; acs-VT99
	 As for the United States, the past decade has shown how much it likes being "number one" and how determined it is to remain in a predominant position. The United States has taken advantage of its current superiority to impose its preferences wherever possible, even at the risk of irritating many of its long-standing allies.

USA #1 IS FIRMLY ENTRENCHED IN AMERICAN POLICY AND WILL NOT BE CHECKED 

Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, In These Times, March 22, 1998; Pg. 10, HEADLINE: The Sole Superpower Syndrome acs-VT99
	The U.S. rush to judgment in Iraq--one could say the frenzy to bomb--is the product of a deeper psychosis in American foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. leaders have been possessed by what can be described as the "sole superpower syndrome"--a sense of nearly godlike power derived from the absence of any balancing forces in the international system. With no curbs on American adventurism, U.S. leaders are undeterred from engaging in impetuous and ill-conceived actions like the impending attack on Iraq.

US MILITARY DOMINANCE WILL REMAIN AND ACTUALLY INCREASE IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION WARFARE

Lawrence Freedman, Foreign Policy, March 22, 1998; Pg. 48; HEADLINE: International security: changing targets; acs-VT99
	The discretionary aspect of the West's military operations comes at a time when its conventional military superiority is beyond dispute. The United States, with or without its major allies, can take on all corners. There are reasons to suppose that this gap in capability will grow. The efficient application of conventional force is increasingly influenced by the ability to collect, transmit, and interpret information, and this is an area in which the United States excels. Hence, the proclamation of a "revolution in military affairs" that promises the elegant delivery of weapons (with just the right amount of lethality) against immaculately chosen targets, without the constraints of distance, climate, or terrain. In some quarters, there is excitement over the idea that information technology could lead to new forms of warfare that disrupt vital economic and social, as well as military, functions by attacking information flows. A vision of a victimless, virtual war is developing, suitable for a postheroic age, in which casualties on all sides, but especially our own, are kept to a minimum.

THE USA WILL DOMINATE THE WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY

JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; A Delusional View of U.S. Dominance , acs-VT99
	In an article titled "A Second American Century," Zuckerman points to the recent strength of the U.S. economy, and the weaknesses in Europe and Asia, as signs of permanent change in the world.
"Ignore the Cassandras," Zuckerman tells us. "This is not a transient prosperity, but one that derives from a series of structural advantages that today only America enjoys." He rhapsodizes over America's spirit of entrepreneurialism, its management culture; he thinks the low rate of inflation is self-perpetuating.
 "If anything, American business should widen its lead over the rest of the world," he says. "France had the 17th century, Britain the 19th, and America the 20th. It will also have the 21st."

THE USA IS NOT IN ANY POSITION TO EXERCISE WORLD LEADERSHIP

USA IS NOT “ON TOP OF THE WORLD,” BUT IS JUST EXPERIENCING A GOOD PART OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE WHICH WILL SOON TURN DOWN

JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; A Delusional View of U.S. Dominance , acs-VT99
	 On the economic front, the response to Zuckerman's euphoria is laid out brilliantly by Paul Krugman in the same issue of Foreign Affairs. He demonstrates that America's rapid growth over the last year reflects mostly a favorable turn of the business cycle, rather than any revolutionary change in the structure of the U.S. economy.
"The current sense that the United States is on top of the world is based on a huge exaggeration of the implications of a few good years here and a few bad years elsewhere," writes Krugman, an economics professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

USA MUST EITHER ACCEPT ITS DIMINISHED ROLE IN THE WORLD OR FIND A NEW GLOBAL ENEMY

Sergei Markov, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1998, p. 3., Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, March 25, 1998; Pg. 8,HEADLINE: Iraq Accord Reached: How Big Was Russia's Role? acs-VT99
	Either the US will have to find a new global enemy to prove the need for its status as world leader, or it will have to find a new foreign-policy strategy predicated on a de facto acknowledgment that the unipolar world is a thing of the past. . . . The world has no place for a sole superpower.
The quicker the US grasps this fact, the quicker it will be able to find itself a new place. The difficult path that Russia traveled will now have to be traversed by the American foreign-policy elite. Of course, the place of the US in world politics will be much more prestigious than Russia's, but it will not be the place of sole superpower. The Iraqi crisis of 1998 has shown that the unipolar world is receding into the past.

BLIND OPTIMISM ABOUT AMERICAN POWER AND ECONOMY IS ONLY SETTING IT UP FOR A HUGE FALL

JIM MANN, Los Angeles Times, April 29, 1998, Part A; Page 5; HEADLINE: INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE; A Delusional View of U.S. Dominance , acs-VT99
	America now stands at a moment of truly remarkable self-delusion. The current prosperity, pleasing as it is, seems to have caused some of us to lose a sense of proportion.
 "This is like the boosterism of the 1920s," says historian Warren B. Cohen. "Back then, people were saying that America's prosperity was going to go on forever, that it was the result of new technology and other lasting changes. Zuckerman's article is the sort of thing Calvin Coolidge or Herbert Hoover would have written in September of 1929."

THE NEW CENTURY IS NOT DESTINED TO BE ANOTHER AMERICAN CENTURY

Tad Szulc, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1998, Part M; Page 1; HEADLINE: FOREIGN POLICY; THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY acs-VT99
	This, in sum, is the challenge to the United States in the new century that is not necessarily destined to be another American century.

THE AMERICAN DECADE OF LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE IS OVER

Walter Russell Meadsenior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Los Angeles Times, May 10, 1998; Part M; Page 2; HEADLINE: THE WORLD / DIPLOMACY; SO NOW WHO'S IN CHARGE? // acs-VT99
	As Europe wrestled with monetary union last week and Japan writhed in the toils of its gathering recession, most observers missed the real story: The "American Decade" is over.
In fact, U.S. policy is coming unglued around the world. In the Middle East, Israel's Likud government has stalled and may yet completely derail a peace process that U.S. presidents have been working on since the time of Richard M. Nixon. Cuba just won another vote at the United Nations, this time blocking the reappointment of a special rapporteur to monitor its human-rights violations. Neither the threats nor the promises of U.S. diplomats can do much about the escalating violence in Kosovo. Failure to pass "fast track" leaves the United States without a Latin America policy, even as Brazil works to consolidate its own trading zone in South America. Even the tiny Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has thumbed its nose at the latest U.S. attempt to mediate its long-running quarrel with its Greek neighbor.

USA LEADERSHIP ATTEMPTS ARE INADEQUATE AND TROUBLESOME

Tad Szulc, Los Angeles Times, May 24, 1998, Part M; Page 1; HEADLINE: FOREIGN POLICY; THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY acs-VT99
	The United States, to be sure, plays a leadership role in the endless succession of international crises, but this is chiefly because there is nobody else to do it. In any case, . it is only a role, not true leadership. A patchwork of improvisations, the Clinton administration's foreign policy is, at best, inconsistent from issue to issue and from country to country. The result is that friends, foes and fence-sitters are often utterly confused both by what the United States proposes and how it may respond to specific emergencies.

THE PROBLEM WITH US LEADERSHIP AND ITS EXERCISE IS THAT IT CRUSHES OTHER PEOPLE IN THE PROCESS

R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99
	The fact is that everything the United States does in the world, however absentmindedly, lands with a terrific thud on somebody else's country. Other nations view the U.S. as a benign hegemon--a friendly elephant, nice but awfully big, stumbling through the global china shop, and they're getting tired of repairing the damage that this well-meaning giant can do.

USA LEADERS USE SHOWS OF FORCE FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, DISRUPTING PRACTICAL RELATIONS GLOBALLY

Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, In These Times, March 22, 1998; Pg. 10, HEADLINE: The Sole Superpower Syndrome acs-VT99
	 This being the case, it is apparent that U.S. leaders are being driven by other, less obvious considerations. In my view, the main objective here is a show of force for its own sake--to remind the world, and potential adversaries like Saddam Hussein, that the United States has the power to destroy any military challenger (or combination of challengers), and will do so when aroused. This would explain the president's evident determination to proceed with the attacks despite a stunning lack of support by our allies.
This is hubris, pure and simple. And history teaches us that those who are possessed by hubris often fail to see the dangerous and self-destructive consequences of their acts. In this case, we can only speculate as to what those consequences might be--but we can assume that they are likely to be serious. In one scenario, the United States could so destabilize Iraq as to unleash a whirlpool of chaos throughout the Persian Gulf; in another, U.S. action could so inflame Muslim sentiment in the region that it ignites a new wave of anti-American upheavals. An attack is also certain to scuttle any short-term hopes of reviving the Arab-Israeli peace process.

CLINTON ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE FOREIGN POLICY ARE FUTILE

THE CLINTON FOREIGN POLICY IS TO CHANGE THINGS VERY LITTLE

Michael J. Mazarr, director of the New Millennium Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 1998 Spring; Pg. 11, HEADLINE: Clinton Foreign Policy, R.I.P. , acs-VT99
	Nonetheless, it now seems very nearly certain that history's verdict on Clinton foreign policy (and by " foreign policy" I have in mind a broad combination of foreign and defense matters) will be a harsh one. The Clinton approach was -- is -- a foreign policy of standing pat, when events and trends demanded something new. It was and is a passive approach when the times offered immense benefits for activism. And its consequence is that the United States has all but abandoned a once-in-a-generation chance to build a more stable world on the rubble of the Cold War.

FOREIGN POLICY DRIVEN BY POLITICAL DEMANDS AND CONGRESSIONAL TINKERING IS A DISASTER

R.C. Longworth, Tribune senior writer, Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1998 SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 1; HEADLINE: FUMBLING GIANT; AMERICA'S AIMLESS FOREIGN POLICY , acs-VT99
	 Foreign policies dreamed up by congressmen responding to their noisiest constituents back home do more harm than good, as recent experience has shown. A constituent-driven foreign policy sounds democratic and wholesome; in fact, it is a disaster.

SUDDENLY THE PRESTIGE AND CREDABILITY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY HAS LESSENED

ERIC ALTERMAN, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), December 14, 1997; Pg. O01, HEADLINE: CLINTON AND THE END OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY acs-VT99
	Meantime, something fundamental has changed and no one seems to have noticed: Six years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and eight after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Cold War "imperial" presidency has passed into history.

PRESIDENTIAL CREDIBILITY HAS CEASED TO BE AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION

ERIC ALTERMAN, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), December 14, 1997; Pg. O01, HEADLINE: CLINTON AND THE END OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY acs-VT99
	 Was no one struck by the coincidence of Clinton failing to persuade his own party to pass the"fast track" trade legislation he insisted was so necessary to maintain America's position of global leader during his "eyeball to eyeball"confrontation with Hussein? Imagine, a U.S. president is smack in the middle of a showdown with an evil dictator, and his own party kicks him in the teeth.
No one appeared to give a moment's consideration to the old war-horses of the need for national unity or the protection of the president's credibility.

RUSSIA AND THE NEAR ABROAD

The Near Abroad is composed of all those nations, many previously part of the Soviet Union, which are located around Russia itself.

RUSSIA HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE NEAR ABROAD
page 259

RUSSIA WILL NOT ACT MILITARILY AGAINST THE NEAR ABROAD
page 262

RUSSIA WILL INTERVENE INTO THE NEAR ABROAD
page 264

CAUCASUS AND BELARUS
page 265

UKRAINE
page 266

GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS
page 267

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES WILL REMAIN STABLE
page 268

KAZAKHSTAN
page 268

ARMENIA
page 269

CASPIAN BASIN OIL EXPLOITATION
page 270

RUSSIA HAS AN EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AROUND IT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE SURROUNDING NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES HAS BEEN DEVELOPING POSITIVELY

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 That brings me to the most salient issue of Russian foreign policy for Russians and the rest of the world alike, which is how Russia relates to those new independent states that were until only 6 years ago part of the Soviet Union and, as such, subject to Russia's domination. In this regard, too, there have recently been some developments that are favorable and encouraging -- though by no means conclusive.

RUSSIA HAS A HIGH PRIORITY ON GOOD RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN AND TRANSCAUCASUS STATES

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1998, HEADLINE: Russia seeks to consolidate relations with Caucasus, Central Asia acs-VT99
	Transcaucasian and Central Asian sovereign states are an important, priority guideline in Russia's foreign policy, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov. Speaking in the State Duma during the "government hour" on Friday [22nd May], Mamedov noted that the main objective was consolidating ties with those states.

RUSSIA HAS ESTABLISHED A NETWORK OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 55-56 , acs-VT99 
	Moscow has exploited this uncertainty to bolster its position as the region's security umbrella, and to ensure that the Central Asian states do not pursue policies that may prompt an assertive Chinese response. In September 1992, Russia signed an accord with Central Asia to adopt a common approach to China, including continued adherence to Soviet treaties and negotiations and a common CIS position on talks with Beijing." Despite bilateral meetings and agreements, border and demilitarisation deals have been negotiated in the 'four-plus-one' framework, with Russia heading the CIS states. Moscow has also tied Central Asia into its security agenda. On 15 May 1992, a collective-security treaty was signed in Tashkent by Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia, giving the Russian High Command 'effective control over military activities in these states' and discouraging them from  LOOKING elsewhere for strategic support-" Bilateral treaties were also concluded with  KAZAKSTAN and Kyrgyzs tan in May and June 1993. 

DECREASED RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR ABROAD LEADS TO WAR

RUSSIA BORDERS ON A NEW GEOPOLITICAL FAULTLINE RUNNING THROUGH EURASIA

Richard Pipes; Professor of History, Emeritus, at Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, September, 1997 /October, 1997; Pg. 65, HEADLINE: Is Russia Still an Enemy? acs-VT99
	Even in its present reduced state, Russia still has the world's longest frontier, bordering Europe and East Asia, neighboring on the Middle East, and even touching North America. Its capacity for exploiting instabilities along its borders is therefore undiminished. Historically, whenever it has suffered setbacks in one sector of its frontier, Russia has shifted attention to the others. The pattern seems to be repeating itself: feeling rebuffed by Europe, Moscow is turning to the Middle East and East Asia. Yeltsin declared in May that to counter the "Western alliance's expansion plans" his administration has designated the integration of the CIS and the strengthening of ties with China its principal foreign policy goals. Moscow is also cultivating Iran and the other fundamentalist Muslim states. Given the interest of Western powers in Caspian oil and the desire of former Soviet republics in that region to escape Russian pressures for dissolution in the CIS by drawing closer to Turkey, a new political alignment appears to be emerging along Russia's southern frontier. With it, a new East-West geopolitical fault line, running somewhere across Central Asia and the Caucasus, seems to be opening up.

RUSSIA HAS RESOLVED THE MAJOR CONFLICTS WITH NEIGHBOR STATES AND IS PROCEEDING WITHOUT USING MILITARY THREATS

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 Third, in relations between Moscow and the regions, the bellwether event was the pact signed May 12 that ended the war in Chechnya. For all the ambiguity in the terms of that agreement and for all the suspense over its implementation, it represented a recognition, however belated, that the federation cannot and should not be held together by brute force; a recognition that tanks, artillery, and bombers are not legitimate or, in the final analysis, efficacious instruments of governance.

LACK OF RUSSIAN STRENGTH IN CENTRAL ASIA CREATES A DANGEROUS SCRAMBLE FOR CENTRAL ASIA

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 The scramble for the spoils of the Soviet heritage could cause serious conflict between major geopolitical players and threaten the very foundations of established security systems. When a tenant in a building falls ill or dies, if the tenants in the other apartments begin knocking down walls to expand their own space, they could end up destroying the entire building. Any "world order" is stable only when everyone knows his place in it and there is sufficient collective and individual power, and the willingness to use it, to maintain the whole. The challenge for Europe and the world in the post-Soviet space is averting further disintegration and keeping disorder and conflict from spilling out of the region and setting the globe ablaze.

RUSSIA HAS BEEN CRITICAL IN NEGOTIATING PEACE IN A NUMBER OF LOCAL CONFLICTS ALONG ITS BORDER

Strobe Talbott; Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State Dispatch, August 18, 1997; Pg. 22; HEADLINE: The end of the beginning: the emergence of a new Russia; acs-VT99
	 One was President Yeltsin's landmark visit to Kiev in May, which put Russia's relations with Ukraine on a more equitable and predictable footing. Another is the way that Russia is now attempting to end the decade-old war in Nagorno-Karabakh. This year, Russia has joined diplomatic forces with the United States and France under the aegis of the OSCE. This willingness on Russia's part to internationalize rather than attempting to monopolize the management of security along its periphery augurs well for the chances of equitable settlements to other conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.

LOSS OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA WILL LEAD TO A POWER VACUUM AND CONFLICT

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	If current trends continue, Russia's clout in Eurasia will further dwindle and that of Western powers and Western-dominated international organizations will grow. The United States, however, will be unable to maintain control of the process. Western allies like Germany, Japan, and Turkey will adopt independent policies in the region. The jockeying of Western interests will exacerbate tensions between and within countries. And the West will confront the increasing power of China and, to a lesser extent, Iran, which will make extending Western influence beyond the Urals impossible. Eurasia will rapidly become a less predictable and more dangerous place.

DECREASING RUSSIAN POWER IN ASIA WILL TRIGGER A SERIES OF CONFLICTS AND WARS

Valery V. Tsepkalo; Belarus' Ambassador to the United States, Foreign Affairs, March, 1998 /April, 1998; Pg. 107, HEADLINE: The Remaking of Eurasia acs-VT99
	 THE PERILS of the post-Soviet vacuum are starkly visible in Central Asia. The region enjoyed a long period of stability under Soviet rule, but the demise of the U.S.S.R. has left an agglomeration of territories in which the various peoples' overriding ethnic attachments make the five new countries vulnerable to both internal conflict and meddling by outsiders. Resurgent religion has also become a divisive force. Attempts by Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, theUnited States, and China to influence events only upset the balance between clans and increase the chances of conflict. Conversely, intrastate conflict and ethnic wars have the potential to drag in outside states.

UNLESS RUSSIA ACTS TO QUIET DISPUTES WITH BORDERING STATES, THOSE CONFLICTS WILL SPREAD TO RUSSIA AND TEAR IT APART

Abram Chayes, Prof. Law Harvard, 1997; MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: Russian and American Perspectives, p. 533 , acs-VT99 
	As Alexei Arbatov points out in- this volume, no responsible Russian government can ignore civil wars and internal clashes on its periphery. Crises are sure to develop in the future. Elementary considerations of security preclude any Russian government from ignoring conditions in which potentially hostile outside powers Could gain a foothold in the region. Moreover, stability on the frontiers is closely linked to stability at home. The treatment of Russian minorities in the near abroad is a central issue feeding reactionary nationalist forces. If violence should become widespread in neighboring states, refugee flows would be enormously disruptive and costly. The Russian Federation itself is a fragile political entity, wracked by ongoing struggles against the weak center waged by regional authorities and autonomous republics.

THERE IS LITTLE RISK OF A RADIAL ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN FORMER SOVIET STATES

Robert O. Freedman, president of the Baltimore Hebrew University, Heritage Foundation Reports, April 6, 1998; Pg. 16, HEADLINE: PRIMAKOV AND THE MIDDLE EAST acs-VT99
	 This was due in part to the fact that, after more than 70 years of Soviet rule, Islam was in a weak state in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The leaders of the Muslim successor states were all secular Muslims, and the chances for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution were very low. Indeed, some skeptics argued that Iran was simply waiting for mosques to be built and Islam to mature before trying to bring about Islamic revolutions.

RUSSIA HAS NO INTENTION OF ACTING MILITARILY AGAINST THE NATIONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

RECENT EVENTS PROVE THE RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO DEMILITARIZE ITS POST-COLONIAL POLICY TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBORS

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 The demilitarization of conflicts in the near abroad is a central tenet of the postcolonial creed, and for this, 1997 was by far the most productive year to date. With Yeltsin's near-miraculous resurgence after heart-bypass surgery, Moscow moved to settle all the hostilities in the region. Only in Nagorny Karabakh, over which Armenia and Azerbaijan had fought to a standstill, did Russia fail to make progress. On May 12, Russia signed an accord with Chechnya, granting it all but official recognition of independence. Within days, the leader of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic (a secessionist Russo-Ukrainian enclave on Moldova's border with Ukraine) signed a memorandum in the Kremlin that effectively affirmed Moldova's sovereignty over the area.  In June, the regime in Tajikistan and the Islamic opposition ended five years of bloody civil war. The same month, the Abkhaz president spent two weeks in Moscow with top-level mediators discussing an "interim protocol" for settlement of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict; and in August, he traveled to Tbilisi for his first face-to-face meeting with Shevardnadze since the war began. On September 4, in the presence of Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, the presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia (autonomous republics inside Russia) signed an agreement settling a conflict over North Ossetia's Prigorodny district, where fighting had broken out in November 1992. During the next two days in Vilnius, capital of Lithuania, Chernomyrdin held meetings with the presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who all announced they would "soon" sign border agreements with Moscow.

RUSSIA USE ECONOMICS, NOT THE MILITARY, TO INFLUENCE FORMER SOVIET STATES

Dmitry Trenin, deputy director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, The Moscow Times, April 14, 1998, HEADLINE: Words to Deeds in Riga , acs-VT99
	Russia has had to reduce its military presence in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and has abandoned military threats. Economic levers have become Russia's principal means of exerting influence and pressure on its neighbors. The ruble, rather than the rifle, will be the message from now on.

RUSSIA UPHOLDS ITS INTERESTS IN CASPIAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONS WITHOUT SLIDING INTO CONFRONTATION

ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 25, 1998, HEADLINE: Russia seeks to consolidate relations with Caucasus, Central Asia acs-VT99
	 Mamedov spoke about Russia's reaction to a report by the assistant US secretary of state for political issues on "the strategic course of the United States in Transcaucasian, Caspian and Central Asian countries" , submitted to the Senate committee for international relations. Mamedov noted that Russia acted independently in the regions, upholding its interests without sliding to confrontation. Russia's security and territorial integrity depend on it, he said.

THERE WILL BE NO GENOCIDE IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

'Respublika Armenia', Radio, Yerevan, in Russian 25 Oct 97, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 29, 1997, HEADLINE: Baku takes cautious step towards direct talks with Karabakh acs-VT99
	 [Q] But when Karabakh does not agree to be part of Azerbaijan, because, in addition to many other serious reasons you could again start a genocide...
[A] I believe that genocide is an old bugbear which should not be used to scare anybody. There will be no genocide. You should think about how to restore relations and bring communications into operation so that the oil can flow across Armenian territory, too. Then this will always link us to each other and we will never think about war.

RUSSIA MAY MEDDLE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ITS NEIGHBORS, BUT IT ACCEPTS REALITY AND WILL NOT TRY TO SUBJUGATE THEM

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Most important, Russia has chosen to accept the independence and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics -- which Russians designate, tellingly, as the "near abroad." This is the critical distinction between the imperial and postcolonial modes of behavior in the region, and the region's leaders understand it well. While they quickly learned to overwhelm some American columnists with complaints about Moscow's arm-twisting, they see clearly the difference between meddling and subjugation.

RUSSIA WILL TRY TO INFLUENCE OTHER FORMER SOVIET STATES, BUT IT WILL NOT ENGAGE IN EXPANSIVE COMMITMENTS TOWARDS THEM

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 Postcolonial Russia can be expected to probe relentlessly for weakness and to exploit its neighbors' troubles in furthering its regional dominance. Nevertheless, Moscow will be constrained by a cost-benefit calculus and wary of open-ended, long-term, and expensive commitments in the former Soviet lands.

RUSSIA WILL BE ABLE TO STABILIZE CENTRAL ASIA WITHOUT RESORTING TO OVERT MILITARY MEANS

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	As for maintaining its regional dominance, however, there should be no illusions: Russia will behave much as great land powers have for millennia in asserting control over their self-declared spheres of influence. Moscow will dispense economic and military assistance to friendly regimes and withhold it from neighbors deemed insufficiently accommodating. In the case of especially recalcitrant neighbors, support for internal rebellions is always an option. Given the economic and political fragility of most of the post-Soviet states, which depend on Russian resources (especially energy) and remain susceptible to ethnic and civil strife, Moscow will sometimes be able to determine the fate of regimes.

RUSSIA WANTS TO ASSERT ITSELF INTO THE AFFAIRS OF THE NATIONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, MOSTLY TO PROTECT ETHNIC RUSSIANS & COMBAT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

RUSSIA IS NOW PREPARING TO ASSERT ITSELF IN THE AFFIRS OF ITS UNSTABLE NEIGHBORS

The Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1998, Pg. 2A, HEADLINE: Moscow's into tough love again, acs-VT99
	Small countries that border Russia have never been in an enviable position, and when Moscow starts to throw its weight around it means just one thing: trouble.
Trouble came to Georgia in February, and to Latvia and Norway in March. A new assertiveness is stirring in Russia, and the neighbors better watch out.
" Russia was disoriented for several years, and it had very little respect for itself," says Dmitri Trenin, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center. "That can't go on forever."
And it hasn't. Self-confidence is blooming in Russia's political elite, and, fractious as it may be on domestic issues, there is very little dissent when Russia is seen to be standing up for itself abroad.

MILLIONS OF RUSSIAN LIVING OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA IN EX-SOVIET STATES ARE OPPRESSED AND MARGINALIZED

Holger Jensen, international editor of the Rocky Mountain News, The Fresno Bee, September 29, 1997, Pg. B7, HEADLINE: U.S still searching for Russian doctrine in post-Cold War era acs-VT99
	Spanning 11 times zones, Russia has never been a nation-state in the European sense. It is a Eurasian land mass, multiethnic and multireligious. Ethnic Russians accounted for only 50 percent of the population in the old Soviet empire and now that it has disintegrated, 25 percent of them live outside Russia, in other countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
 These expatriates, who number 30 million, were privileged standard-bearers of both the czars and the Communists. Now they are looked upon with hostility. The Baltic states are trying to push them out. In Central Asia they suffer open discrimination. Back home the situation is reversed, with Muslims, Tatars and other minorities suffering discrimination at Russian hands.

COOPERATION BY RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIAN STATES AGAINST ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM LEADS TO CIVIL WAR

SANOBAR SHERMATOVA, Moscow News, May 14, 1998, SECTION: POLITICS; No. 18, HEADLINE: A DEAL WITH ISLAM ? // acs-VT99
	The setting up of the "triumvirate" may have a dramatic impact on the Tajik opposition. Moscow and Tashkent once joined hands against the "threat of Islamic fundamentalism" in 1992. The military assistance Russia and Uzbekistan provided to one of the parties in the conflict that led to a full-scale civil war in which Tajikistan lost nearly one million of its citizens. As for the "Islamic factor," it is still here - leaders of the opposition are in the current Tajik government on legitimate terms. Can the new stage in combating Islamic extremism trigger a new wave of civil strife in Tajikistan?

RUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN, AND TAJIKISTAN HAVE CREATED A COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT TO OPPOSE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

SANOBAR SHERMATOVA, Moscow News, May 14, 1998, SECTION: POLITICS; No. 18, HEADLINE: A DEAL WITH ISLAM ? // acs-VT99
	This subject, along with prospects of cooperation, took up the greater part of the talks between the presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan. Boris Yeltsin talked on the phone with the head of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmonov. What followed was an announcement that a "triumvirate" was created - an alliance between Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan aimed at opposing Islamic fundamentalism. Islam Karimov gave journalists detailed reasons for the setting up of the alliance. Uzbekistan's president said he thought the spread of Wahhabism - the extremist wing of Islamic fundamentalism - both in Central Asia and in the Caucasus was "dangerous."
According to him, Wahhabites aim to come to power and set up Islamic states whenever possible, Karimov pointed to the threat that the spread of Wahhabism poses both in Uzbekistan and on Russia's territory - in Dagestan and Chechnya. 

RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CAUCUSUS IS GOOD

CURRENT POLICY IN THE CAUCASUS AND CASPIAN REGIONS IS THE BEST FOR PROMOTING INDEPENDENCEIN THE REGIONS AND RUSSIAN STABILITY AT THE SAME TIME

Fred Hiatt; International Herald Tribune, August 5, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: Don't Try to Shoulder Russia Out of the Caucasus Oil Game acs-VT99
	In fact, nothing would be simpler than to stop ''appeasing'' Moscow. The United States could cram NATO expansion down Russia's throat, and it could seek to shut Russia out of the Caucasus. It takes neither courage nor cunning to kick someone when he is down.
But the strategy of trying to integrate Russia while bolstering its neighbors is more coherent than what critics from either end can propose. The stronger Azerbaijan and Armenia grow, and Estonia and Poland, the less opportunity they present to would-be Russian adventurers and nationalists.
 And the more Russians find legitimate opportunity in Azerbaijan, the greater the chances of peace throughout the region.

RUSSIA IS LIMITING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE CAUCASUS TO SATISFY THE USA

Boris Mkrtchyan, Russian Press Digest, September 4, 1997, HEADLINE: Trailing Along At The Back Of The U.S. Partner, SOURCE: PRAVDA-5, p. 3 acs-VT99
	Today, Russia gives up her role in the Caucasian policy, having assumed the positions that suit the U.S., Stupishin says in conclusion.

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RUSSIA & BELARUS

RUSSIA AND BELARUS ARE NOT GOING TO UNITE

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 The second model, which might be called post-colonial, was far less ambitious. Reintegration was conceived as incremental, something that would occur naturally, through the functioning of a privatized Russian economy and a stabilized Russian democracy. Its time frame stretched over decades.
Haltingly and inconsistently, Russia opted for the latter approach. Even the April 1997 "union" with Belarus, which some American observers hastened to declare the beginning of Russia's inexorable westward march, has been quietly diluted. Within months, Russian first deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov declared that Russia could no more unite with Belarus, a dictatorship with a Soviet-style economy, than South Korea could unite with North Korea. A week later, ostensibly in retaliation for the jailing of a Russian journalist in Belarus, Yeltsin refused permission for the Belarussian president's plane to enter Russian air space.

BELARUS IS FORMING A CLOSE MILITARY ASSOCIATION WITH IRAN, SO RUSSIAN WEAPONS ARE NOT NEEDED

Sergei Karelin. Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 11, 1998, p. 5. , Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, April 8, 1998, SOURCE: WILL AN ANTI-AMERICAN ALLIANCE BE FORMED? acs-VT99
	 Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Aleksandr Lukashenko were able to find a common language quickly because they do indeed have a mutual interest in cooperation, the importance of which hard to overestimate. On the one hand, Iran, suffering from the effects of the international community's US-initiated sanctions, needs Russian arms supplies. It may be recalled that Belarus ranks ninth in the world in weapons exports. Most of these exports are Russian-made weapons that the Belarussians resell as middlemen. Direct cooperation between Russia and Iran in the military sphere is impossible, since it would draw a negative (and probably very sharp) reaction from the world community, especially the US. But agreements between Belarus and Iran can indeed serve as a corridor through which weapons can flow.

BELARUS-POLAND TENSIONS RISK A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE USA AND RUSSIA

Martin Sieff; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 4, 1998, Pg. A1, HEADLINE: Russia raises stakes against NATO; Tensions increase as Moscow balks at alliance's growth // acs-VT99
	The growing tensions between Belarus and Poland in particular raise the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Moscow and Washington reminiscent of the most dangerous days of the Cold War, Mr. Carpenter said.
 Some experts say an insecure Russia, reduced by the collapse of the Soviet Union to its most limited boundaries in 350 years, feels it must assert itself against any further erosion of its power and influence.

RUSSIA & UKRAINE

UKRAINE WILL REMAIN FRIENDS WITH BOTH RUSSIA AND THE USA

Viktor Voronin, Tatiana Ivzhenko, Russian Press Digest, July 8, 1997, HEADLINE: Viktor Voronin: "We Are For Multi-vector Foreign Policy" SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, p. 3 acs-VT99
	"Ukraine will never choose between Russia and the United States. Of this I am sure." A statement to this effect has been made by Viktor Voronin, foreign policy adviser to President Leonid Kuchma, in an exclusive NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview.
 Voronin said that Ukraine was fully aware of the "significance" of the United States in the modern world. It was equally aware of Russia's role in the present day world. Ukraine, the foreign policy adviser explained, was trying to find a certain equilibrium in cooperation both with Russia and with the United States. However, in his opinion, to counterpoise one direction to another would be "incorrect."

RUSSIAN APPROACH TO ITS NEIGHBORS IS EMBODIED BY ITS TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE

Leon Aron, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, The Weekly Standard, April 20, 1998: Pg. 23, HEADLINE: THE REMARKABLE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA , acs-VT99
	 But by far the most impressive diplomatic coup of that busy year was the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine, which Yeltsin and Kuchma signed in Kiev on May 31. Russia is Europe's largest country, Ukraine its sixth most populous, and their peaceful relations are as essential to post-Cold War European stability as French- German rapprochement was after World War II. The two nations undertook to " respect each other's territorial integrity, [confirmed] the inviolability of the existing borders," and pledged "mutual respect, sovereign equality, a peaceful settlement of disputes, and non-use of force or its threat."

UKRAINE WILL REMAIN CLOSELY ALLIED WITH RUSSIA

Nickolai Kralev; The Washington Times, March 23, 1998, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Ukraine won't apply to NATO, reaffirms Russia ties acs-VT99
	Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko has dampened any expectations of a policy tilt to the West by excluding the possibility that his former Soviet republic will apply for NATO membership anytime soon.
While welcoming improving relations with NATO and the United States, Mr. Udovenko said in an interview: "For the time being, Ukraine is not going to apply for NATO membership because we pursue non-bloc policy."
The minister also said that Ukraine "won't build its relations with the West at the expense of its relationship with Russia. "
Ukraine considers its relations with Moscow "very important" and tries to improve them, because in spite of old feuds " Russia remains Ukraine's biggest market," Mr. Udovenko said.

UKRAINE HAS BEEN VERY FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE WEST

Nickolai Kralev; The Washington Times, March 23, 1998, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Ukraine won't apply to NATO, reaffirms Russia ties acs-VT99
	 Since it gained independence in 1991, Ukraine has moved aggressively to break with its Soviet past and improve relations with the West.
In 1994, it was one of the first East European countries to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program, created by the military alliance as a tool to prepare former Warsaw Pact members for future integration.
Last summer, Kiev agreed to let NATO exercises to be held on the Crimean peninsula, a Ukrainian area where the population is predominantly Russian. Moscow denounced the exercises saying they worked against international stability.

RUSSIAN MISSILE SALES TO GREEK CYPRIOTS WAS STABILIZING

RUSSIAN MISSILES TO GREEK CYPRIOTS ARE PURELY DEFENSIVE

Michael R. Gordon; New York Times Service, International Herald Tribune, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Russia to Press Ahead on Cyprus Missiles , acs-VT99
	 The S-300 is actually a complex of systems, consisting of missiles, missile launchers and several radars.
 Cyprus justified its decision to buy the S-300 by arguing that it was a purely defensive weapon that would enable the island to defend its skies against Turkish aircraft.

THREAT OF RUSSIAN MISSILES TO GREEK CYPRIOTS IS MERELY A WAY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN

New York Times News , The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN), April 29, 1998, Pg. A4, HEADLINE: RUSSIA TO SELL MISSILES TO CYPRUS, RILING U.S. , acs-VT99
	 Greek Cypriot officials have hinted that they might defer or cancel the purchase if serious negotiations get under way. But American officials say the sale is needlessly provocative.

RUSSIAN MISSILES TO CYPRUS HELPED PROMOTE THE PEACE

Alexander Shumilin, Russian Press Digest, April 2, 1998, HEADLINE: Greece Missile Diplomacy, SOURCE: KOMMERSANT-DAILY, p. 5 acs-VT99
	Russian missiles have proved to be an effective foreign policy instrument, the daily [KOMMERSANT-DAILY ] remarks. It shall be recalled that after Cyprus concluded one year ago a contract for the supply of Russian C-300 missiles, long-time and serious competitors for the similar U.S. missiles, Patriots, Western diplomats markedly stepped up their activities in connection with the almost forgotten Cyprus problem. As a result, U.S. and West European mediators began an active search for ways to settle the Cyprus problem and official talks started on March 31 on Cyprus admission to the E.U. (Cyprus said that if its major problems were settled and the island was demilitarized, it would give up the Russian missile contract.) By all indications, Greece has decided to follow the Cyprus example. The Russian and Greek Defense Ministers announced yesterday that before April 15 Russia and the United States would submit tenders for their missile systems, following which Greece would consider them and sign contracts with the winner.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES WILL NOT ACT TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES EMPHASIZE SECURITY AND STABILITY AND WILL AVOID DESTABILIZING REFORMS

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 58 , acs-VT99
 	 The Central Asian states have demonstrated a marked preference for stability over democracy, cracking down on domestic dissent and discouraging pan-Turkic or Islamic sentiment. Outside competitors seeking influence have found far less fertile ground than originally expected. The reality of Central Asian life and the Soviet Union's secular state have left little taste for Islamic ideology, while Shi'a-Muslim Iran's failure to bridge the divide with mostly Sunni Central Asia further limits Tehran's appeal. US opposition has   also thwarted Iranian attempts to play an independent .

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES HAVE SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH BOTH RUSSIA AND CHINA

Jennifer Anderson, Intl. Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1997; THE LIMITS OF SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, Adelphi Paper 315; p. 59 , acs-VT99 
 In Mongolia and Central Asia, however, shared concerns have  allowed relations to progress more smoothly. Behind the talk of I new' security arrangements, and Russian hopes of more active cooperation with China, both countries have individually played to the region's long-standing fears of their larger neighbours. Under  the guise of multilateralism in the 'four-plus-one' framework, a series of essentially bilateral agreements has been made under which Moscow and Beijing have pledged to respect Central Asian sovereignty. In return, the Central Asian states have in effect declared their support for Russia and China's internal security agendas.

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RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

KAZAKHSTAN WILL NOT FALL INTO ANYONE’S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Russian Press Digest, September 18, 1997, HEADLINE: Kazakhstan Does Not Want Be Part Of Someone's Sphere Of Influence, SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, p. 3 acs-VT99
	President Nazarbayev's multi-vectorial foreign policy makes sure that Kazakhstan is not part of somebody's sphere of influence, asserts Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev.

KAZAKHSTAN AVOIDS BECOMING ANYONE’S SATELLITE NATION

Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Russian Press Digest, September 18, 1997, HEADLINE: Kazakhstan Does Not Want Be Part Of Someone's Sphere Of Influence, SOURCE: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, p. 3 acs-VT99
	Commenting in a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA interview on Strobe Talbott's proclaiming Central Asia a "zone of U.S. strategic interests," Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev has said his country thinks that "being a great power, America has the right to choose the zones of her interests." However, he added, "Kazakhstan does not want to be part of somebody's sphere of influence, and carries out its own foreign policy within the limit of its possibilities.

KAZAKHSTAN WILL NOT BE A RUSSIAN SATELLITE NATION

Anatoly Ladin, Russian Press Digest, December 11, 1997, HEADLINE: In Kazakhstan, Russia Is Regarded As Main And Long-term Strategic Partner, But Has No Intentions Of Following In Russia's Wake, SOURCE: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, p. 3 acs-VT99
	From Nazarbayev's explanation, the author comments, it is possible to draw the conclusion that Kazakhstan does not intend to follow in the wake of Russia, and will independently choose its own strategic partners.

KAZAKHSTAN HAS CONFIDENCE THAT RUSSIA WILL RIGHT ITSELF

Anatoly Ladin, Russian Press Digest, December 11, 1997, HEADLINE: In Kazakhstan, Russia Is Regarded As Main And Long-term Strategic Partner, But Has No Intentions Of Following In Russia's Wake, SOURCE: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, p. 3 acs-VT99
	 Russia, he declared, is Kazakhstan's long-term, strategic partner, our main partner. We understand that today Russia is living through a difficult period of "wild" capitalism and "wild" democracy. But Russia has in the past experienced all kinds of shocks. And this time too, Nazarbayev emphasized, I am sure Russia will rise to her full stature.

RUSSIA AND ARMENIA

ARMENIA WILL GO WITH RUSSIA AS AN ALLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE WITH THEM NOW

Ara Tatevosyan, MN Yerevan Bureau, Moscow News, July 17, 1997, HEADLINE: Armenia to Join Union ? acs-VT99
	 But Democratic Party leader Aram Sarkisyan said that "today we have to choose between the Russian-Belarusian coalition and the Caucasian house headed by Shevardnadze." He thinks that for the first time in its history Armenia has received a trump card that will allow it to dictate its conditions to Moscow. If Armenia changes its orientation, the Kremlin could lose the Caucuses for good.

ARMENIA IS SHIFTING TOWARDS RUSSIA AND AWAY FROM THE USA

ARA TATEVOSYAN, Moscow News, October 2, 1997, HEADLINE: ARMENIA: A CHANGE OF BEARINGS acs-VT99
	Zhirair Liparityan's resignation as chief adviser to the president of Armenia for "family reasons" may signal changes in Armenian foreign policy as Armenia is beginning to shift its foreign policy focus away from the West and toward its neighbors.

USA PRESSURE ON ARMENIA IS CAUSING THEM TO MOVE TOWARDS REINTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA

Ara Tatevosyan, MN Yerevan Bureau, Moscow News, July 17, 1997, HEADLINE: Armenia to Join Union ? acs-VT99
	 The recent statements of Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ara Saakyan also deserve special attention. He said that the question of Armenia joining the Union is "a reaction to the policy of twisting arms, which the United States administration is using on the Armenian leadership."

POPULAR MOVEMENT IN ARMENIA IS PUSHING REINTEGRATION WITH RUSSIA

Ara Tatevosyan, MN Yerevan Bureau, Moscow News, July 17, 1997, HEADLINE: Armenia to Join Union ? acs-VT99
	Armenian leftists collected about half a million signatures in support of Armenia joining the Union of Russia and Belarus.
Everything began when a group of intellectuals appealed to the leadership and people of Armenia to join the Russian-Belarusian Union as soon as possible. At a conference in Yerevan, the participants created the Armenian National Initiative and declared the vital necessity of Armenia's joining the Union in order to "rebuild a unified economic, defense, and scientific-cultural realm."
 A group of State Duma deputies - Ryzhkov, Kuptsov, Gdlyan, Surkov, and others - asked parliament to consider a statement on supporting the Armenian National Initiative. On that very day, the Duma supported the statement with an absolute majority and called on the "fraternal peoples of Armenia, Russia and Belarus to unite in a new Union."
 Gennadiy Zyuganov was soon to react as well, expressing his certainty that the "mutual noble goal will be achieved."

CASPIAN OIL IS PLENTIFUL AND THE USA WANTS IT

CASPIAN OIL RESERVES WILL BECOME CRUCIAL TO INTERNATIONAL OIL SUPPLY

John H. Lichtblau, The Oil and Gas Journal, August 11, 1997; Pg. 19; HEADLINE: U.S. Caspian area foreign policy in conflict with resource plans; acs-VT99
	The Caspian Sea is an excellent target for this policy. A recent U.S. Administration report to Congress states, "With potential (recoverable) reserves of as much as 200 billion bbl of oil the Caspian region could become the most important new player in world oil markets over the next decade."

CASPIAN OIL OUTPUT WILL CONTINUE RISING WELL INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

John H. Lichtblau, The Oil and Gas Journal, August 11, 1997; Pg. 19; HEADLINE: U.S. Caspian area foreign policy in conflict with resource plans; acs-VT99
	 The U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration estimates that by 2015 Caspian region oil exports will be in the 2-4 million b/d range. Given the region's reserve potential, this level is likely to keep rising beyond that period.

AMERICANS ARE INVOLVED IN A SCRAMBLE FOR CASPIAN OIL

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	After Saddam Hussein's dramatization of his attitude problem raised the possibility of another conflict in the Persian Gulf, recent flutters about vast oil reserves in the Caspian Sea come more sharply into focus. Whether at a White House reception for Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev on Monday or a celebration of "first oil" on a rig about 115 miles off Azerbaijan's coast last week, Washington has clearly joined international oil executives and regional political leaders in pinning high hopes on vast reserves of Central Asian oil.

USA POLICY IS RAPID OIL DEVELOPMENT IN CASPIAN REGION

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	 "It is the Clinton administration's policy to promote rapid development of Caspian energy resources to reinforce Western energy security," Stuart E. Eizenstat, undersecretary of state for economic affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on international economic policy at hearings last month. In light of the insatiable American thirst for petroleum, members of Congress and other policy-makers have joined the administration in looking to Central Asia to offset the importance of oil imports from the politically volatile Persian Gulf.

USA WANTS TO LIFT SANCTIONS ON AZERBAIJAN FOR MANY REASONS, INCLUDING OIL

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	Mr. Brownback, who has introduced legislation to lift U.S. sanctions against Azerbaijan, testified alongside Mr. Eizenstat, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Charles Pitman, Amoco Eurasia chairman and president. They mentioned ancillary considerations: containing the northward spread of extremism, stemming the southward flow of nuclear weapons, instilling nearby market economies as examples to Russia and China - and, last but not least, pursuing the region's "vast reserves" of untapped oil.

CASPIAN OIL BOOM IS A MIRAGE WE SHOULD IGNORE

CASPIAN OIL RESERVES ARE HUGELY EXAGGERATED

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	 Press accounts and U.S. government documents put Caspian oil reserves at 100 billion to 200 billion barrels. This would rival the total ever extracted in the United States - a major find.
However, British Petroleum's annual Statistical Review of World Energy, regarded as the industry's most reliable listing, paints a starkly different picture.
The BP guide rates proven oil reserves of the Caspian's big players - Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan - at 7 billion barrels and 8 billion barrels respectively - just 1.4 percent of global proven reserves.
 Though all parties to this disagreement expect continuing discoveries of small new fields in the region, the discrepancy between estimates is profound.

OIL LOBBYISTS ARE EXAGGERATED THE POTENTIAL OF CASPIAN OIL

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	Mr. Ivanhoe [L.F. Ivanhoe, 77, a geologist, geophysicist, engineer and oceanographer] says the goals of the oil industry and the country as a whole are mistakenly equated.
"Americans often have difficulties discerning between lobbyists and scientists," he said. "If you're trying to sell your project, you've got the biggest thing since ice cream was invented," he said of the hoopla over Central Asia. "When an [industry] representative says there are between 100 [billion] and 200 billion barrels, he is lobbying. They just want to go there, and they don't want any obstacles in their way," Mr. Ivanhoe went on. "If there turns out to be oil there, great! If not, they move on."

CASPIAN OIL WILL NOT CHANGE THE FACT OF AMERICAN OIL DEPENDENCY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	 Adds Mr. Campbell [geologist Colin Campbell]: "With respect to Caspian reserves, insofar as the United States will continue to be an importer, I'm quite sure it is not a solution and will have no major impact on the overall situation at all. "Saudi Arabia claims to have reserves of 259 billion barrels, which is miles away from anything you can reasonably say about the Caspian," he said.

CASPIAN OIL IS POTENTIAL RESERVES NOT ACTUAL RESERVES

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	 While no one doubts the presence of oil beneath the freshwater Caspian, industry experts call into question the magnitude of undiscovered reserves and their ultimate significance to the United States. Their skepticism is based on what one expert called "the reality of the finite resource." "The question is not whether, but when, world crude productivity will start to decline, ushering in an era of permanant oil shock," said L.F. Ivanhoe, 77, a geologist, geophysicist, engineer and oceanographer with about 50 years of experience in evaluating potential petroleum basins for private interests and governments.
 "The Caspian Sea has been known for a century to be a significant petroleum province, but right now, they're still talking about what they hope is there, not what they know is there," Mr. Ivanhoe said.
 "But whatever they find, it's not going to make or break the fact that the world is consuming far more oil than we're finding," he added. "And one thing Americans forget is that the whole world is after this oil."

CASPIAN OIL WON’T REPLACE DEPENDENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST --- EVEN WITH CASPIAN PRODUCTION, MIDDLE EAST SHARE OF OIL OUTPUT WILL CONTINUE TO RISE

John H. Lichtblau, The Oil and Gas Journal, August 11, 1997; Pg. 19; HEADLINE: U.S. Caspian area foreign policy in conflict with resource plans; acs-VT99
	 The Caspian Sea and other new developments may prevent the Middle East's share from rising to "more than 70% of world oil exports by 2010," as Sec. Pena predicted. But the Middle East's share will still be significantly higher in 2010 than its current level of about 50%.
Thus, the growth in Caspian or any other regional exports will not dislodge the Middle East from its unique position as the world's prime oil exporter.

CASPIAN BASIN IS NOT THE ACE IN THE HOLE FOR WORLD ENERGY SUPPLY

HILLARY DURGIN, The Houston Chronicle, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Caspian study challenges oil industry's thinking , acs-VT99
	 Construction of a wide array of pipelines has been a major foreign policy goal for the United States, which views Caspian crude as a strategic alternative to Persian Gulf crude.
"We're trying to put the Caspian Basin in the right perspective," said Edward Djerejian, director of the Baker Institute, at a press briefing Tuesday.
"The Caspian Basin is not the 'ace in the hole' for global energy supply," he said.

EVEN BY THE MOST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATES, CASPIAN OIL WILL BE ONLY A TINY PART OF WORLD SUPPLY

HILLARY DURGIN, The Houston Chronicle, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Caspian study challenges oil industry's thinking , acs-VT99
	The study said that even under the most optimistic assessments, by 2010 Caspian oil production likely will reach little more than 3.5 million barrels per day and cover only 3 to 4 percent of expected worldwide use.
By contrast, Venezuelan oil is expected to account for as much as 7 to 8 percent, while Middle East oil still will dominate with a 25 to 35 percent share, the study said.

MULTIPLE BARRIERS WILL PREVENT CASPIAN OIL FROM EVER BEING USED

MULTIPLE BARRIERS WILL PREVENT ANY SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN OIL POTENTIAL

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	Among the factors threatening deals are Russia's apparent goal of hegemony over the Newly Independent States, chronic ethnic tensions throughout the region, and the fact that the likeliest routes for getting the prize to market traverse such volatile lands as Chechnya, Georgia, southern Russia, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan - depending on where new pipelines are put.
 "Under such untenable and uncertain conditions, it is difficult to foresee oil going anywhere in significant quantities any time soon," said M.G. Melconian, a longtime industry consultant and president of Princeton, N.J.-based PetroTechnologies. "Sure, studies, proposals, press releases, and even well-intentioned agreements will proliferate, but no major production seems likely or secure until a regional export system is developed," Mr. Melconian added.

A HOST OF BARRIERS PREVENT EXTENSIVE CASPIAN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENTS

HILLARY DURGIN, The Houston Chronicle, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Caspian study challenges oil industry's thinking , acs-VT99
	A host of geological, logistical and political challenges are likely to prevent the development of significant oil and gas production from Central Asia in the next few years, according to the study by researchers at Rice University's James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy in Houston.
As a result, export routes must be developed that make the best political and economic sense, the study proposes. Specifically, the study suggests there should be one main export pipeline.

POLITICAL AND LOGISTICAL BARRIERS PREVENT CASPIAN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT

HILLARY DURGIN, The Houston Chronicle, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Caspian study challenges oil industry's thinking , acs-VT99
	 The Caspian's potential reserves of between 60 billion and 140 billion barrels of oil are comparable to reserve estimates for the North Sea. But the political and logistical barriers to exploration and development in Central Asia and the Caucasus contrast with the stability that allowed oil and gas companies to move swiftly in the North Sea, the study said.
 Indeed, while oil and gas executives have come to refer to the Caspian Basin as "the new North Sea," the study's findings challenge that perception.

BECAUSE THE CASPIAN BASIN IS A CENTER FOR FUTURE FLASPOINTS, IT WILL NOT BE DEVELOPED

HILLARY DURGIN, The Houston Chronicle, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Caspian study challenges oil industry's thinking , acs-VT99
	 In addition, the Caspian Basin's location between Russia, China, Iran and Turkey make it "a magnet for foreign powers and a flash point for potential conflict between them," the study points out. The high risk of geopolitical competition could cause instability both there and in neighboring countries, particularly Russia, the study notes.

CASPIAN OIL EXPLOITATION MAY SPARK WAR

CENTRAL ASIA IS A VERY DANGEROUS PLACE TO GO LOOKING FOR NEW OIL SUPPLIES

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	"The United States hates to be dependent on the Middle East, and I think there's a bit of wishful thinking going on here," said exploration geologist Colin Campbell, an associate of the Geneva-based advisory firm Petroconsultants and author of a new book, "The Coming Oil Crisis." "The oil industry has been trying to make deals with the FSU [former Soviet Union] since the collapse of communism, and it's been a nightmare. I don't think one could imagine a more sensitive region in which to do business. And the fact that the Western countries are willing to take such risks says there aren't many other places left."

THE CASPIAN REGION IS RIPE FOR INSTABILITY, AND OIL ONLY COMPLICATES THE SITUATION

Michael Eric Bronner; The Washington Times, November 22, 1997, Pg. A8, HEADLINE: U.S. pins high hopes on Caspian oil reserves; Experts caution that estimates may not pan out acs-VT99
	 "If economic and political reform in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia does not succeed - if cross-border conflicts simmer and flare - the region could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political extremism, and a battleground for outright war," said Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in a recent address to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.
"It would matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen in an area that sits on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil," he added.

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NO WAR THREAT IN CASPIAN OIL ZONE

CONFLICTS OVER RUSSIAN AND CASPIAN OIL WILL NOT LEAD TO A NEW COLD WAR

Steven Merritt Miner, professor of Russian history at Ohio University, Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1997, Part M; Page 2; HEADLINE: THE WORLD; RUSSIA; AMERICA'S EMERGING NEMESIS acs-VT99
	Sharp Russian oil politics provide headaches for Washington, but they do not amount to a renewal of the Cold War. Russian power is much too weak for that, and the largely privatized Russian economy is far too intertwined with the rest of the capitalist world to return to the old days of Soviet-style isolation. Above all else, there is no real ideological impulse dictating an all-out Russian-American face-down. Rather, what we are seeing is the reemergence of an independent Russian foreign policy. It is inevitable that a nation covering more than one-seventh of the world's land mass would have interests that sometimes collide with our own.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES IN OIL AND GAS COULD HELP STABILIZE THE CASPIAN REGION

John H. Lichtblau, The Oil and Gas Journal, August 11, 1997; Pg. 19; HEADLINE: U.S. Caspian area foreign policy in conflict with resource plans; acs-VT99
	There are also geopolitical reasons for the U.S.'s support of the Caspian Sea region's oil and gas developments.
The U.S. wants the region's newly independent states (NIS) to survive as sovereign political units. This requires a viable economic base and that other nations have an economic stake in the continuing independence of the Caspian NISs. Oil and gas production and exports provide such a base and such a stake.

USA CASPIAN OIL EXPLOITATION DAMAGES RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND LEADS TO CONFLICT

US OIL VENTURES IN THE FORMER SOVIET STATES ARE DESIGNED TO DETACH THEM FROM RELIANCE ON RUSSIA

Charles Clover, Financial Times (London), August 8, 1997; Pg. 04, HEADLINE: Superpowers circle Caspian
The commercial objective of ensuring access to oil supplies camouflages a more aggressive posture in Russia's former sphere of influence, as the US pursues a quiet policy of detaching Russia's former satellites, one by one. "The political objective of making the CIS independent is largely an economic problem, and involves the creation of infrastructure," said an economist with a development bank in London.

RUSSIA NEEDS TO BE INVOLVED IN THE CASPIAN REGION TO DEMONSTRATE THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION OVER MILITARY ACTION

Fred Hiatt; International Herald Tribune, August 5, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: Don't Try to Shoulder Russia Out of the Caucasus Oil Game acs-VT99
	It is in everyone's interest for these Russians to be included, not excluded - for Russians to see that they, too, can benefit in a nonimperial world.
 The competition for influence does not have to be a zero-sum game, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said recently. ''We want to see all responsible players in the Caucasus and Central Asia be winners.''

RUSSIAN MILITARY THREAT TO THE OIL PIPELINES IS UNREALISTIC

Fred Hiatt; International Herald Tribune, August 5, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: Don't Try to Shoulder Russia Out of the Caucasus Oil Game acs-VT99
	While the Heritage Foundation warns of a possible ''new Russian empire'' that might seek ''exclusive control over the region's pipelines,'' the real Russia's army is disintegrating, and its efforts to form a closer commonwealth of former Soviet republics have been rebuffed.

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CASPIAN OIL IS IN AZERBAIJAN AND KAZAKHSTAN

AZERBAIJAN HAS RICH OIL RESERVES AND AN OIL RUSH IS IN PROGRESS

Fred Hiatt; International Herald Tribune, August 5, 1997, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: Don't Try to Shoulder Russia Out of the Caucasus Oil Game acs-VT99
	Azerbaijan claims title to a good-sized patch of the Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves. Along with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on the Caspian's facing shore, Azerbaijan has become the object of an oil rush as nations and companies jockey for access to that $4 trillion prize.

80% OF CASPIAN OIL RESERVES ARE IN KAZAKHSTAN

HILLARY DURGIN, The Houston Chronicle, April 29, 1998, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Caspian study challenges oil industry's thinking , acs-VT99
	 Not only do potential reserves in the Caspian fall far shy of proven reserves in the Persian Gulf, but 80 percent of the reserves are concentrated in one country, Kazakhstan, the study points out. In the Gulf, reserves are spread across five major oil powers.

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CASPIAN OIL EXPLOITATION ANGERS NATIONALISTS

RUSSIAN NATIONALISTS STRONGLY OPPOSE WESTERN DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN OIL

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 18, 1997, HEADLINE: Nationalist leader Zhirinovskiy urges support for anti-American groups in Iraq, SOURCE: Source: Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1032 gmt 17 Nov 97 acs-VT99
	Zhirinovskiy said. The development of oil fields in Azerbaijan by the West is very dangerous, he said. " When they pump out all oil from there, the Caspian Sea will sink and that will be the end of Azerbaijan," Zhirinovskiy said.