CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND ABOUT CHINA
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Edited by: Alfred C. Snider

A. CND InfoBase China 1-1
B. Voice of America Human Rights Report (partial) 1-2
C. Thumbnail sketch of PRC 1-3
D. Regions of the PRC 1-4
E. Goals of PRC foreign policy 1-5
F. The 10 "points of view" of current PRC government 1-6
G. Different models of US foreign policy 1-7
H. Goals of current US foreign policy towards PRC 1-8
I. US concerns about situation in Asia 1-9
J. Background on China News Digest 1-10
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1-1 / China News Digest
InfoBase China 
Introduction
 June 6, 1993
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The CND InfoBase Project collects, among other China-related information, introductory material about China's history and the Chinese society. CND does not necessarily agree with the views expressed or implied in the contents of this InfoBase package.
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Source: The CIA Factbook Forwarded by: Deming
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China Geography
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Total area: 9,596,960 km2 Land area: 9,326,410 km2 Comparative area: slightly larger than the US 
Land boundaries: 22,143.34 km; Afghanistan 76 km, Bhutan 470 km, Burma 2,185 km, Hong Kong 30 km, India 3,380 km, Kazakhstan 1,533 km, North Korea 1,416 km, Kyrgyzstan 858 km, Laos 423 km, Macau 0.34 km, Mongolia 4,673 km, Nepal 1,236 km, Pakistan 523 km, Russia (northeast) 3,605 km, Russia (northwest) 40 km, Tajikistan 414 km, Vietnam 1,281 km 
Coastline: 14,500 km Maritime claims: Continental shelf: claim to shallow areas of East China Sea and Yellow Sea 
Territorial sea: 12 nm 
Disputes: boundary with India; bilateral negotiations are under way to resolve disputed sections of the boundary with Russia; boundary with Tajikistan under dispute: a short section of the boundary with North Korea is indefinite; involved in a complex dispute over the Spratly Islands with Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei; maritime boundary dispute with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin; Paracel Islands occupied by China, but claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan; claims Japanese-administered Senkaku-shoto, as does Taiwan, (Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai) 
Climate: extremely diverse; tropical in south to subarctic in north Terrain: mostly mountains, high plateaus, deserts in west; plains, deltas, and hills in east 
Natural resources: coal, iron ore, crude oil, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, uranium, world's largest hydropower potential 
Land use: arable land 10%; permanent crops NEGL%; meadows and pastures 31%; forest and woodland 14%; other 45%; includes irrigated 5% 
Environment: frequent typhoons (about five times per year along southern and eastern coasts), damaging floods, tsunamis, earthquakes; deforestation; soil erosion; industrial pollution; water pollution; air pollution; desertification 
Note: world's third-largest country (after Russia and Canada)
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China People
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Population: 1,169,619,601 (July 1992), growth rate 1.6% (1992) Birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1992) Death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1992) Net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1992) Infant mortality rate: 32 deaths/1,000 live births (1992) Life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 72 years female (1992) Total fertility rate: 2.3 children born/woman (1992) 
Nationality: noun - Chinese (singular and plural); adjective - Chinese Ethnic divisions: Han Chinese 93.3%; Zhuang, Uygur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, Buyi, Korean, and other nationalities 6.7% 
Religions: officially atheist, but traditionally pragmatic and eclectic; most important elements of religion are Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism; Muslim 2-3%, Christian 1% (est.) 
Languages: Standard Chinese (Putonghua) or Mandarin (based on the Beijing dialect); also Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, and minority languages (see ethnic divisions) 
Literacy: 73% (male 84%, female 62%) age 15 and over can read and write (1990 est.) 
Labor force: 567,400,000; agriculture and forestry 60%, industry and commerce 25%, construction and mining 5%, social services 5%, other 5% (1990 est.) Organized labor: All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) follows the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; membership over 80 million or about 65% of the urban work force (1985)
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China Government
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Long-form name: People's Republic of China; abbreviated PRC Type: Communist Party - led state Capital: Beijing Administrative divisions: 23 provinces (sheng, singular and plural), 5 autonomous regions* (zizhiqu, singular and plural), and 3 municipalities** (shi, singular and plural); Anhui, Beijing Shi**, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi*, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Nei Mongol*, Ningxia*, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai Shi**, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin Shi**, Xinjiang*, Xizang*, Yunnan, Zhejiang; note - China considers Taiwan its 23rd province 
Independence: unification under the Qin (Ch'in) Dynasty 221 BC, Qing (Ch'ing) Dynasty replaced by the Republic on 12 February 1912, People's Republic established 1 October 1949 
Constitution: most recent promulgated 4 December 1982 Legal system: a complex amalgam of custom and statute, largely criminal law; rudimentary civil code in effect since 1 January 1987; new legal codes in effect since 1 January 1980; continuing efforts are being made to improve civil, administrative, criminal, and commercial law 
National holiday: National Day, 1 October (1949) 
Executive branch: president, vice president, premier, five vice premiers, State Council Legislative branch: unicameral National People's Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui) Judicial branch: Supreme People's Court Leaders: Chief of State: President YANG Shangkun (since 8 April 1988); Vice President WANG Zhen (since 8 April 1988) Chief of State and Head of Government (de facto): DENG Xiaoping (since mid-1977) Head of Government: Premier LI Peng (Acting Premier since 24 November 1987, Premier since 9 April 1988); Vice Premier YAO Yilin (since 2 July 1979); Vice Premier TIAN Jiyun (since 20 June 1983); Vice Premier WU Xueqian (since 12 April 1988); Vice Premier ZOU Jiahua (since 8 April 1991); Vice Premier ZHU Rongji (since 8 April 1991) 
Political parties and leaders: - Chinese Communist Party (CCP), JIANG Zemin, general secretary of the Central Committee (since 24 June 1989); also, eight registered small parties controlled by CCP Suffrage: universal at age 18 Elections: National People's Congress: last held March 1988 (next to be held March 1993); results - CCP is the only party but there are also independents; seats - (2,976 total) CCP and independents 2,976 (indirectly elected at county or xian level) President: last held 8 April 1988 (next to be held March 1993); results - YANG Shangkun was nominally elected by the Seventh National People's Congress
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China Government
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Communists: 49,000,000 party members (1990 est.) Other political or pressure groups: such meaningful opposition as exists consists of loose coalitions, usually within the party and government organization, that vary by issue Member of: AfDB, APEC, AsDB, CCC, ESCAP, FAO, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFAD, IFC, ILO, IMF, IMO, INMARSAT, INTELSAT, INTERPOL, IOC, ISO, ITU, LORCS, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UN Security Council, UNTSO, UN Trusteeship Council, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO 
Diplomatic representation: Ambassador ZHU Qizhen; Chancery at 2300 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008; telephone (202) 328-2500 through 2502; there are Chinese Consulates General in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco 
US: Ambassador J. Stapleton ROY; Embassy at Xiu Shui Bei Jie 3, Beijing (mailing address is 100600, PSC 461, Box 50, Beijing or FPO AP 96521-0002); telephone [86] (1) 532-3831; FAX [86] (1) 532-3178; there are US Consulates General in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenyang 
Flag: red with a large yellow five-pointed star and four smaller yellow five-pointed stars (arranged in a vertical arc toward the middle of the flag) in the upper hoist-side corner
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China Economy
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Overview: Beginning in late 1978 the Chinese leadership has been trying to move the economy from the sluggish Soviet-style centrally planned economy to a more productive and flexible economy with market elements, but still within the framework of monolithic Communist control. To this end the authorities have switched to a system of household responsibility in agriculture in place of the old collectivization, increased the authority of local officials and plant managers in industry, permitted a wide variety of small-scale enterprise in services and light manufacturing, and opened the foreign economic sector to increased trade and joint ventures. The most gratifying result has been a strong spurt in production, particularly in agriculture in the early 1980s. Industry also has posted major gains, especially in coastal areas near Hong Kong and opposite Taiwan, where foreign investment and modern production methods have helped spur production of both domestic and export goods. Aggregate output has more than doubled since 1978. On the darker side, the leadership has often experienced in its hybrid system the worst results of socialism (bureaucracy, lassitude, corruption) and of capitalism (windfall gains and stepped-up inflation). Beijing thus has periodically backtracked, retightening central controls at intervals and thereby lessening the credibility of the reform process. In 1991 output rose substantially, particularly in the favored coastal areas. Popular resistance, changes in central policy, and loss of authority by rural cadres have weakened China's population control program, which is essential to the nation's long-term economic viability. 
GNP: $NA, per capita $NA; real growth rate 6% (1991) Inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.1% (1991) Unemployment rate: 4.0% in urban areas (1991) Budget: deficit $9.5 billion (1990) Exports: $71.9 billion (f.o.b., 1991) commodities: textiles, garments, telecommunications and recording equipment, petroleum, minerals partners: Hong Kong, Japan, US, USSR, Singapore (1990) Imports: $63.8 billion (c.i.f., 1991) commodities: specialized industrial machinery, chemicals, manufactured goods, steel, textile yarn, fertilizer partners: Hong Kong, Japan, US, Germany, Taiwan (1990) External debt: $51 billion (1990 est.) Industrial production: growth rate 14.0% (1991); accounts for 45% of GNP Electricity: 138,000,000 kW capacity (1990); 670,000 million kWh produced (1991), 582 kWh per capita (1991) Industries: iron, steel, coal, machine building, armaments, textiles, petroleum, cement, chemical fertilizers, consumer durables, food processing
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China Economy
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Agriculture: accounts for 26% of GNP; among the world's largest producers of rice, potatoes, sorghum, peanuts, tea, millet, barley, and pork; commercial crops include cotton, other fibers, and oilseeds; produces variety of livestock products; basically self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 8 million metric tons in 1986 Illicit drugs: transshipment point for heroin produced in the Golden Triangle Economic aid: donor - to less developed countries (1970-89) $7.0 billion; US commitments, including Ex-Im (FY70-87), $220.7 million; Western (non-US) countries, ODA and OOF bilateral commitments (1970-87), $13.5 billion Currency: yuan (plural - yuan); 1 yuan (Y) = 10 jiao Exchange rates: yuan (Y) per US$1 - 5.4481 (January 1992), 5.3234 (1991), 4.7832 (1990), 3.7651 (1989), 3.7221 (1988), 3.7221 (1987) Fiscal year: calendar year
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China Communications
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Railroads: total about 54,000 km common carrier lines; 53,400 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 600 km 1.000-meter gauge; of these 11,200 km are double track standard-gauge lines; 6,900 km electrified (1990); 10,000 km dedicated industrial lines (gauges range from 0.762 to 1.067 meters) 
Highways: about 1,029,000 km (1990) all types roads; 170,000 km (est.) paved roads, 648,000 km (est.) gravel/improved earth roads, 211,000 km (est.) unimproved earth roads and tracks 
Inland waterways: 138,600 km; about 109,800 km navigable Pipelines: crude oil 9,700 km (1990); petroleum products 1,100 km; natural gas 6,200 km 
Ports: Dalian, Guangzhou, Huangpu, Qingdao, Qinhuangdao, Shanghai, Xingang, Zhanjiang, Ningbo, Xiamen, Tanggu, Shantou 
Merchant marine: 1,454 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 13,887,312 GRT/20,916,127 DWT; includes 25 passenger, 42 short-sea passenger, 18 passenger-cargo, 6 cargo/training, 801 cargo, 10 refrigerated cargo, 77 container, 19 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 multifunction/barge carrier, 177 petroleum tanker, 10 chemical tanker, 254 bulk, 3 liquefied gas, 1 vehicle carrier, 9 combination bulk, 1 barge carrier; note - China beneficially owns an additional 194 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling approximately 7,077,089 DWT that operate under Panamanian, British, Hong Kong, Maltese, Liberian, Vanuatu, Cyprus, and Saint Vincent registry 
Civil air: 284 major transport aircraft (1988 est.) 
Airports: 330 total, 330 usable; 260 with permanent-surface runways; fewer than 10 with runways over 3,500 m; 90 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 200 with runways 1,220-2,439 m 
Telecommunications: domestic and international services are increasingly available for private use; unevenly distributed internal system serves principal cities, industrial centers, and most townships; 11,000,000 telephones (December 1989); broadcast stations - 274 AM, unknown FM, 202 (2,050 repeaters) TV; more than 215 million radio receivers; 75 million TVs; satellite earth stations - 4 Pacific Ocean INTELSAT, 1 Indian Ocean INTELSAT, 1 INMARSAT, and 55 domestic
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China Defense Forces
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Branches: People's Liberation Army (PLA), PLA Navy (including Marines), PLA Air Force, People's Armed Police Manpower availability: males 15-49, 339,554,712; 188,995,620 fit for military service; 11,691,967 reach military age (18) annually Defense expenditures: exchange rate conversion - $12-15 billion, NA of GNP (1991 est.)
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1-2 / >From: ILC@china.uc.edu (I Love China) Newsgroups: soc.culture.china Subject: Human Rights Report '94 Date: 16 Apr 1994 05:54:42 GMT Organization: University of Cincinnati Lines: 1518 Sender: whuang@quest.ece.uc.edu (Weiqing Huang) Distribution: world Message-ID: <2onuj2$7if@babbage.ece.uc.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: quest.ece.uc.edu Status: R
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 Human Rights Report of 1994, (Voice of America)
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 CHINA
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 The People's Republic of China (PRC) remains a one-party state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party through a 21-member Polit- buro and a small circle of officially retired but still powerful senior leaders. Almost all top civilian, police, and military positions at the national and regional levels are held by party members. Despite official adherence to Marxism-Leninism, in re- cent years economic decisionmaking has become less ideological, more decentralized, and increasingly market oriented. Fundamen- tal human rights provided for in the Constitution are frequently ignored in practice, and challenges to the Communist Party's pol- itical authority are often dealt with harshly and arbitrarily.
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Security forces, comprised of a nationwide network which includes the People's Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Armed Police, and the state judicial, procuratorial, and penal systems, are poorly mon- itored due to the absence of adequate legal safeguards or ade- quate enforcement of existing safeguards for those detained, ac- cused, or imprisoned. They are responsible for widespread and well-documented human rights abuses, including torture, forced confessions, and arbitrary detentions.
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A decade of rapid economic growth, spurred by market incentives and foreign investment, has reduced party and government control over the economy and permitted ever larger numbers of Chinese to have more control over their lives and livelihood. Despite sig- nificant income disparities between coastal regions and the inte- rior, there is now a growing "middle class" in the cities and rural areas as well as a sharp decline in the number of Chinese at the subsistence level. These economic changes have led to a de facto end to the role of ideology in the economy and an in- crease in cultural diversity. An example of this is the media, which remains tightly controlled with regard to political ques- tions, although it now is free to report on a wider variety of other issues.
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The Government took some positive steps on human rights issues during 1993. It released some prominent political prisoners ear- ly or on medical parole; many had served long terms in prison. The Government still has not provided a full or public accounting of the thousands of persons detained during the suppression of the 1989 democracy movement, when millions of students, workers, and intellectuals defied the Government and participated in pub- lic demonstrations. Most of these detainees appear to have been released, however, some after serving periods of detention without charges having been brought and some after having com- pleted their prison sentences. The Government says it has released the remaining imprisoned or detained Vatican loyalists among the Catholic clergy. Although it continues to restrict the movements and activities of some elderly priests and bishops, the Government announced in November that two priests, whose move- ments had been restricted, were free to return to their homes. The authorities also allowed a number of prominent political dis- sidents to leave China in 1993. In November the Government an- nounced it would give positive consideration to a request from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit Chi- na.
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Nevertheless, the Government's overall human rights record in 1993 fell far short of internationally accepted norms as it con- tinued to repress domestic critics and failed to control abuses by its own security forces. The Government detained, sentenced to prison, or sent to labor camps, and in a few cases expelled from the country, persons who sought to exercise their rights of freedom of assembly and speech. The number of persons in Chinese penal institutions considered political prisoners by internation- al standards is impossible to estimate accurately. In 1993 hun- dreds, perhaps thousands, of political prisoners remained under detention or in prison. Physical abuse, including torture by police and prison officials persisted, especially in politically restive regions with minority populations like Tibet. Criminal defendants continue to be denied legal safeguards such as due process or adequate defense. In many localities, government au- thorities continued to harass and occasionally detain Christians who practiced their religion outside the officially sponsored re- ligious organizations.
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1-3 / Andrew Nathan, expert on China Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 64; THR VT96
	China is a great, continental economy, essentially self-sufficient. Foreign trade occupies a relatively small portion of the GNP. The country is rich in raw materials and has a complete, well-rounded industrial establishment that can produce its own equipment for self-sustaining growth. The present leadership believes that the country can modernize more quickly by using foreign trade, investment, and technology. But this does not mean that such foreign connections are seen as essential at all costs. On the contrary, China has shown in the past that economics alone cannot constrain it from breaking with foreign suppliers of capital and technology -- first with the split with the Soviet Union in 1960 and again during the autarkic interlude of the Cultural Revolution. A highly self-reliant development policy has always been and continues to be a real possibility for China. And a strong tradition of anti-foreign feeling, sometimes verging on xenophobia, continues to make self-reliance an attractive possibility to some.
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1-4 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Second, because there is (increasingly) no single "China," to speak of China's opening is to generalize about different openings of different parts of China to different parts of the outside world." Coastal China is opening to the global economy, especially to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan, as well as to China's interior; Xinjiang and the Northwest are opening to panCentral Asian influences; Yunnan and the Southwest are opening to Southeast Asia, including Thailand and Myanmar. 
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1-5 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Given projected failure of domestic supply to meet overall oil demand, on-going modernization needs and marketization interests in the PLA, issues of sovereign pride and privilege, and a sophisticated negotiating approach that seeks to maximize every possible asset, Beijing can be expected to take a firm posture regarding its various international interests. These include territorial claims (whether the Spratly Islands or various disputed borders); transfers or sales of weapons or weapons technology; and an expansive international diplomacy (including current ties in East Asia, expanding ties in the Middle East with countries as diverse as Iran and Israel, as well as developing ties in Europe, Latin America, and Africa). 
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1-6 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 In Bogor and Jakarta, Indonesia [when attending the APEC summit], and in other Southeast Asian countries, Jiang Zemin successively put forward 10 points of view which were of great interest to many. These 10 points of view were:
 1. China's top hierarchy has completed its transition from the second generation.
 2. "Economic development is the most important of all matters."
 3. "The ship of history must move forward, and stability is the most important prerequisite."
 4. "In the face of diversity, it is impractical to seek uniformity. Only by incorporating things of diverse nature and learning from one another can we promote common development and common progress."
 5. The five principles for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region are: Mutual respect and reaching unanimity through consultation; proceeding in an orderly and systematic way in achieving steady development; opening the doors to one another and refraining from forming exclusive blocs; extensive cooperation based on mutual interests and mutual benefit; and narrowing the gaps
 6. The five principles for [Chinese] relations with the United States are: Focus on the global situation and the 21st century; show mutual respect; shake off the influence of differences in system; promote the all-round development of economic cooperation; and strengthen international cooperation and high-level visits.
 7. On relations with Southeast Asia, " China's commitment to developing good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation with its neighbouring countries is not a measure of contingency, but something which conforms to the needs of the time. It is an inevitable choice made with the long-term interests of the Chinese people and the people of all countries in this region in mind."
 8. The Taiwan question is one which "has a bearing on China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the great cause of the reunification of China. " "Any change on this question has a direct bearing on the feelings of the 1.2 billion Chinese people."
 9. On relations with Vietnam, stress will be laid on friendship and the overall situation of peace and stability and efforts will be made to enlarge consensus, seek common ground while reserving differences 
 10. Publicize a basic foreign policy which stresses good-neighbourliness and friendship in order to offset the undesirable influence of "the theory of the China threat" .
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1-7 / RANDAL ASHLEY, COX NEWS SERVICE, The State Journal-Register (Springfield, IL), March 21, 1995, Pg. 4; HEADLINE: U.S. foreign policy: What direction should it take? ACS VT96
	 FIRST, THERE'S the Woodrow Wilson crowd, reflecting "a desire to see other countries adopt a form of democratic governance and civil society that our own experience suggests is best for both the individual and the community. "
	 Then there's the economic approach, "a sense that other traditional interests (especially those derived from strategic concerns) have receded and that we have more important economic concerns.
	 Then, realism, emphasizing "balance-of-power considerations and matters of national interest."
	 Then, humanitarianism, described as seeing "the world less in terms of nation-states per se than as peoples."
	 THEN, MINIMALISM, "the favored view of those who see only modest U.S. interests in the world . . . and who take a narrow view of U.S. responsibility and obligation to meet other challenges."
DIFFERENT MEANS TO OBTAIN ENDS:
 Unilateralism is a fancy word for America going it alone -- being "uncomfortable with the compromises necessary for the smooth functioning of alliances and opposed to any transfer of sovereign authority to international organizations." 
 NEO-INTERNATIONALISM is identified with Clinton administration policy. It "reflects a sense that the potential for international cooperation is great and that the United States can and should work with and through formal alliances and international organizations in almost all instances."
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1-8 / Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Dir. Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture Univ., May/June, 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei scholar's view of Clinton Administration's policy toward China," p. 20; CJJ VT96
	In 1980's, American policy toward China was laced with the so-called idealistic realism or neo-realism. They would support the reform and opening in mainland China, rather than see a return to the line of the Mao Tse-tung era. As long as China continues to reform and open up it will be in American national interest, so they determined. American interest in Asia encompasses the following: 1) The expectation that, instead of becoming a revolutionary regime, Communist China should remain stable so as to function as a stabilizing and balancing factor in the whole if Asia; 2) A state of peace should reign in Asia, the United States would not want to see any war in that part of the world.
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1-9 / Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Winter; Pg. 123, HEADLINE: The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific; ACS VT96
	Notwithstanding the currently benign security environment, there are a number of reasons for concern:
* unresolved territorial and sovereignty conflicts, most obviously China and Taiwan and the two Koreas, but also many lesser disputes of which that over the Spratly Islands is simply the most visible;
* uncertainty about the long-term commitment of the United States to the region -- and concern that if there is a major reduction in U.S. presence, aspiring regional hegemons will seek to fill the vacuum. China and Japan are the states most frequently mentioned in this context;
* rapid, but uneven, rates of economic growth throughout the region that risk generating political instabilities that could spill over into the security realm;
* lack of any "habit of dialogue" in Northeast Asia to help mediate the hostilities between North and South Korea and the mutual suspicions that still exist between Japan and South Korea, Japan and Russia, and, to a lesser degree, Japan and China.
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1-10 / GRANT PECK, Associated Press, 4-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Internet a Weapon in asia's Battles for Freedom; ACS VT96
	 ``The Chinese and others want Internet because it is such a valuable business tool,'' Strider said. ``But if they open up to business, they cannot keep out news.'' The news is ready and waiting. During the Tiananmen Square democracy movement in 1989, overseas Chinese students and scholars established what is now possibly the world's largest electronic mailing list, China News Digest. Fifty volunteers turn out 14 on-line publications under its aegis, which last year were sent out to more than 34,000 e-mail addresses in 43 countries. They provide news of China, as well as academic, social and practical information for overseas Chinese.'
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CHAPTER TWO
TOPICALITY
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Editor: Andrea Looby
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This is one of the broadest topics in recent memory. As such, we would encourage you to focus on substantive arguments. However, we do offer two considerations for topicality. First, the nature of foreign policy as the topic focus does rule some things out, but not very much. Second, the nature of the term "policy" indicates general principles or directions as opposed to specific government programs, which most affirmative plans are.
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A. Definitions of Foreign Policy.
1.	Interaction of one nation with another. (1-2)
2.	One nation interacting with another for its own interests. (3-4)
3.	The government is the actor of foreign policy. (5-7)
B. Definitions of Policy.
1.	Definitive actions made by a government. (8-10)
2.	Plan of action. (11-15)
3.	It can be action or inaction. (16)
4.	Thoughts, beliefs and reason are used to make a policy. (17-18)
C. A program and a policy are different. 
1.	Foreign policy is a general plan for dealing with other nations. (19)
2.	Policy does not have to imply any specific actions. (20-21)
3.	A program has a very specific course of action. (22)
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2-1/RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY PROJECT. 1991, p.524; AGL VT96 foreign policy: n. The diplomatic policy of a nation in its interactions with other nations.
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2-2/AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 1982, p. 497; AGL VT96 foreign policy: n. The diplomatic policy of a nation in its interactions with other nations.
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2-3/THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, 1983, p. 521; AGL VT96
foreign policy: n. a policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations, designed to achieve national objectives.
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2-4/THE HARPER COLLINS DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1992, p. 238-9; AGL VT96
 foreign policy The totality of a states relations with and policies toward other states. A nation's foreign policy, even though it may be largely the prerogative of an executive branch, is always grounded in its domestic policy. There seems to be bipartisan support for this notion. For example, two-time Democratic presidential nominee (1952 and 1956) Adlai Stevenson wrote in What I Think (1956): "We cannot be any stronger in our foreign policv--for all the bombs and guns we may heap up in our arsenalsthan we are in the spirit which rules inside the country. Foreign policy, like a river, cannot rise above its source.' Secretary of State (under Republican Presidents Nixon and Ford) Henry Kissinger has said essentialIv the same thing: 'No foreign policy--no matter how ingenious--has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none" (Washington Post, August 4, 1973). The other major tenet of foreign policy on which there is general agreement is political theorist Hans J. Morgenthau's assertion from Politics Among Nations (Sth ed., 1978) that: "The objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest.' Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, as United States
 Ambassador to the United Nations, elaborated: "the central goal of our foreign policy should be not the moral elevation of other nations, but the preservation of a civilized conception of our own national selfinterest" (U.S News and World Report, March 2, 1981).
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2-5/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 84; THR VT96
  Second, there is fhe confusion introduced into U.S. foreign policy by the separation of powers. Under the American system, Congress has the constitutional right to oversee foreign policy. But in the past, under the doctrine of bipartisanship, both parties in Congress generally supported the administration in its conduct of foreign policy. The Vietnam War, however, caused a breakdown in Congressional trust in the Administration's conduct of foreign policy. In recent years Congress has involved itself more and more frequently in the details of foreign policy, a trend some scholars refer to as micro-management. In the human rights field, Congress has enacted legal restrictions on the Administration's ability to give aid or to sell military equipment to regimes that do not meet certain rights standards.
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2-6/WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW DICTIONARY, 1987, p. 483; AGL VT96
foreign policy: n. the policy of a sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states.
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2-7/THE WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY, 1994, p.836; AGL VT96
foreign policy: the policy followed by a nation or its government in conducting its relations with one or more foreign nations.
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2-8 / WILLIAMSON V. CITY OF HIGH POINT, WORDS AND PHRASES, VOL. 32 A, 1956, p. 486 "Policy" is settled or definite course or method adopted or followed by government..
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2-9 /BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4TH ED, 1988, p. 1317
 POLICY. The general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures. The term, as applied to a law, ordinance, or rule of law, denotes its general purpose or tendency considered as directed to the welfare or prosperity of the state or community.
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2-10/CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, 1985, CUMULATIVE ANNUAL POCKET PART, VOL. 72, p. 21
 "Public policy" of the state is that declared by the legislature or by the courts and not that adopted by any private group.
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2-11 /WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY, VOL. 2, 1983, p. 1613 POLICY. (1) A plan of action; way of management.
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2-12 /THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 1960, p. 938
 POLICY. (1) A definite course of action adopted as expedient or from other considerations.
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2-13 /LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION V. SUPERIOR COURT, IN WORDS & PHRASES, VOL. 32A, 1956, p. 484
 A "policy" is a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, institution, body or individual.
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2-14 /WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 1981, p. 882
 A definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions.
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2-15 /Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 84; THR VT96
 American foreign policy, however, is perhaps more complex and multi-stranded than that of any other major power. There is often a gap between declared policy and specific policy actions. This gap has several sources. One is the independence of various sectors of the bureaucracy in carrying out their missions. A good example of this is the annual report on human rights compiled every year for Congress by the State Department Bureau of Human Rights. Despite the Administration's stress on friendship with China, the report on China has been tough and fair every year since it was first issued in 1980.
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2-16 /THOMAS DYE, PROF GOVERNMENT, FLORIDA STATE UNIV., UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY, 1981, p. 2-3
 Public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Note that we are focusing not only on government action, but also on government inaction, that is, what government chooses not to do. We contend that government inaction can have just as great an impact on society as government action (emphasis in original)
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 2-17 /HAROLD HALCROW, PROF AG. ECON. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, 1984, AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS, p. 4
 Policy is defined as a deliberate course of action, as contrasted with a haphazard or capricious type of activity followed by a public body, private firm, family, or individual. Policy generally implies wisdom or prudence in managing affairs, based on a definitive plan or program created through a process of thought and reason.
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 2-18 /HAROLD HALCROW, PROF AG ECON U. ILLINOIS, 1984, AGRICULTURAL POLICY ANALYSIS, p. 3 All recommendations of policy involve judgements of value concerning what shall or shall not be done, and why. Values depend on beliefs that people hold about what is good, and on the strengths of their beliefs. Beliefs and values provide the foundation on which the goals of policy are built.
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2-19/LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND CULTURE, 1992, p. 505; AGL VT96
foreign policy: n. the general plan of or, country concerning its relations with other countries.
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2-20 / THOMAS DYE, PROF GOVERNMENT, FLORIDA STATE UNIV., UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC
 POLICY, 1981, p. 2
 According to political scientist Hugh Mecio: "A policy may usefully be considered as a course of action or inaction
 rather than specific decisions or actions.
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2-21 /MARSHALL CARTER, 1981 IN THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY IMPACTS, EDS, GRUMM & WASBY,
 1981, p. 3
 Policy is a rather vague term referring to a prudent or advantageous course of action, guiding principle, or procedure.
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2-22 /FUNK AND WAGNALL'S STANDARD DESK DICTIONARY, 1977, p. 528 program. n. 1. A performance or show, esp. one given at a scheduled time on television or radio. 2. A printed announcement or schedule of events, esp. one for a theaffical perbrmance. 3. Any prearranged, proposed, or desired plan or course of proceedings.
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CHAPTER THREE
CHINESE SECURITY ISSUES
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Editor: Alfred C. Snider
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STATUS OF PRC MILITARY
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A. PRC military is growing
	1. Huge already 1-2
	2. Massively increasing 3-7
	3. Increase underestimated 8-11
	4. Uses independent funding 12-13
B. PRC military is improving
	1. Navy
		a. Huge modernization 14-18
		b. Aircraft carriers 19-21
		c. Submarine fleet 22-26
	2. High tech weaponry 27-31
	3. Air Force 32-33
	4. Acquisitions from Russia 34-37
	5. Increased professionalism 38
C. PRC military trends are not disturbing
	1. Spending moderate in comparison 39-40
	2. Spending level still low 41-42
	3. Current spending makes up for past cuts only 43
	4. Current spending is justified 44
	5. Army size cut by one million 45
	6. Army shifting to reserves 46
	7. Most expenditures on personnel 47
	8. Air Force is weak 48
	9. Cooperating with other nations 49
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WILLINGNESS OF PRC TO GO TO WAR
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A. PRC is willing to fight a war
	1. All of Asia-Pacific is their security focus 50-52
	2. If there is no change, there will be a war 53
	3. PRC military strength leads to power projection 54-59
	4. PRC will use its military to gain its goals 60-61
	5. Increased nationalism will lead to military action 62
	6. Improved economy will lead to military action 63
	7. Reformist regime will lead to military action 64
	8. Will utilize low intensity conflicts in SEAsia 65-66
	9. PRC fears encirclement by uncooperative powers 67-68
	10. PRC wants military control of the seas 69-70
	11. PRC is a military threat to the USA 71-74
B. PRC is NOT willing to fight a war
	1. Does not want to use military force 75-76
	2. Will not use military force because it could upset economic development 77-79
	3. PRC military threat is a paranoid invention of military theorists 80-82
	4. PRC will NOT be the first nation to use nuclear weapons 83
	5. PRC has pledged not to invade its neighbors 84-85
	6. PRC military is a minimal deterrent for local and defensive use 86-88
	7. PRC offensive military capability is far in the future 89-92
	8. Increased PRC military spending does not mean an increased risk of conflict 93-99
	9. PRC thinks its military is weak, not strong 100
	10. PRC is not a threat to the USA 100-102
	11. Confidence building measures (CBMs) will reduce the need to fight 103-104
C. Potential types of conflicts
	1. PRC military build up sparks an arms race 105-110
	2. PRC military expansion will lead to an anti-PRC coalition 111-113
	3. PRC military buildup threatens Japan 114-116
	4. PRC expansion into Indian Ocean through Burma
		a. PRC military moving into Burma 117-124
		b. This threatens India 125
		c. PRC wants Indian Ocean zone of peace 126-127
	5. Accidental incidents at sea -- like USS Kitty Hawk 128-138
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THE BIG CONFLICT -- SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS), SPRATLYS, & PARACELS
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A. Conflicting claims exist for SCS islands and oceanic zones
	1. Many have claims 139-142
	2. Law of the Sea and Exclusive Economic Zones are grounds for claims 143-145
	3. SCS islands are already occupied by some nations 146-147
	4. PRC claims all of SCS, Spratly, and Paracels 148-153
	5. Vietnam has SCS claims 154-155
	6. Brunei has SCS claims 156
	7. Malaysia has SCS claims 157
	8. Taiwan has SCS claims 158
B. SCS is a very important area
	1. Vast resources there 159-162
	2. Vast oil & gas reserves 163-165
	3. Fishing grounds 166
	4. Vital sea lanes 167-169
	5. PRC actively threatens control of vital sea lanes 170-171
	6. Sea lane threats mean USA involvement in 		conflict 172-174
	7. PRC position in SCS threatens all in and around SCS 175-176
	8. PRC SCS actions threatens Japan 177-181
C. Conflict in SCS risks a wider war
	1. SCS is a dangerous flashpoint for war 182-187
	2. War in SCS is a possibility 188-189
	3. SCS conflict would destabilize Asia 190-191
	4. SCS conflict would escalate 192
	5. SCS conflict would become a major 		confrontation 193-194
	6. SCS conflict would create an anti-PRC 		coalition 195
D. PRC is willing to fight in the SCS
	1. PRC goal is to dominate the SCS 196-204
	2. PRC military capability was created to use in the SCS 205-213
	3. Oil exploration can trigger PRC military action
		a. PRC attracted to SCS by oil 214-215
		b. Oil is key to military moves in the 			SCS
		c. Japan involved in oil exploration
		d. PRC may use military to block SCS 			oil development 220-221
		e. Oil can create an explosive dispute 			222-224
E. PRC will NOT fight in the SCS
	1. PRC is not a military threat in the SCS 225-227
	2. PRC will not use military in SCS because it has too much to lose, especially in alienating Japan 228-230
	3. PRC policy is a slow economic development of the SCS -- a peaceful take over 231-235
	4. PRC will negotiate international cooperation in the SCS 236-239
	5. PRC will use Hainan basing strategy 240
	6. PRC is encouraging piracy so it can bring in 		police 241
	7. PRC has a two sided policy on SCS: 		cooperation and unilateral non-violent 		moves 242-244
F. SCS conflict presents only limited risks
	1. Chance of peace outweighs chance of war in SCS 245
	2. SCS conflict will stay small 246-247, 270
	3. SCS dispute will not threaten navigation rights 248-250
G. Multilateral moves can/cannot solve the problem in the SCS
	1. Will fail unless all agree 251
	2. PRC wants USA OUT of any multilateral 		approach 252-257
	3. ASEAN 258-265
	4. Law of the Sea will not solve 266-267
	5. Confidence building measures (CBMs) at work now 268-269
H. Specific conflicts: the PRC versus....
	1. Vietnam
		a. Conflicting SCS claims 271-274
		b. Two nations cannot come to a compromise 275-276
		c. Have conflicting oil field developments 277-280
		d. They can negotiate a meaningful settlement 281-284
		e. Vietnam will not risk conflict with the PRC 285-286
		f. PRC-Vietnam land border dispute being solved 287-288
	2. Philippines (PH)
		a. Tensions and risks of conflict high 289-293
		b. PH building on disputed islands 294-295
		c. PRC building on disputed islands 296
		d. No negotiated settlement 297
		e. PH engaged in anti-PRC incidents 298-299
		f. PH military
			1. Committed to fight in SCS 300-301
			2. PH is increasing its military capability 302-306
			3. PRC will crush PH military 307
		g. PRC-PH negotiations going on 308-311
		h. PRC-PH cooperation will work 312-315
		i. PRC will not attack PH in Pacific 316
	3. Indonesia (IND)
		a. PRC and IND claims 317-318
		b. IND threatened by PRC actions 319-320
		c. IND-PRC oil field dispute 321-322
		d. IND increasing air force in response 323
		e. IND initiates CBMs to reduce conflict risks 324-325
	4. USA policies 326-327
	5. Malaysia 328
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3-1/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has been a nuclear power since detonating its first atomic device more than thirty years ago, and the International Monetary Fund, calculating in "ppp" or purchasing-power-parity terms, figures that China has the third largest economy in the world, one that is growing at more than twice the rate of the two leading economies (the US and Japan). China is modernising the People's Liberation Army, and has apparently decided either to build or to buy a blue-water navy. Compared with its Asian neighbours (with the exception of Russia), China is a military giant.
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3-2 / McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 It is correct but not very comforting to other claimants to note that China's military remains under-developed, even in comparison with many Southeast Asian militaries. China doesn't need aircraft carriers to assert authority in the South China Sea; it has proximity and island bases. It doesn't need sophisticated tanks to worry the Russians; it has relative mass. China's 1979 invasion of northern Vietnam may have been a tactical debacle, but it was strategically successful, when combined with China's support to Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, in squeezing Vietnam between threats in two directions. 
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3-3/ The Economist, June 11, 1994, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: China's new model army//MDS-VT96
	 Official military spending, which declined during the 1980s, has grown sharply in the past three years. This year it rose by 25%, to 52 billion yuan ($ 6 billion). Actual military spending may be up to five times as high: the Chinese leave huge areas such as research and development and pensions out of their official figures. 
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3-4 / JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 The American unease about China is based on several factors. * The steady increase in China's spending for its armed forces. By official Pentagon estimates, China's official defense budget, adjusted for inflation, has increased by about 40% over the past five years during a period when American, Russian and Japanese defense spending have either stayed flat or [declined.]
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3-5\/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 Meanwhile, China yesterday announced a 21 percent increase in its annual military budget, to about $7.5 billion. Military spending will be the fastest-growing major area of the $75.7 billion national draft budget announced by Finance Minister Liu Zhongli on the second day of the annual meeting of China's legislature.
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3-6/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 267 ;SEG VT96
	 The steady growth in the PLA's budgets since 1989 have also increased international anxiety about Beijing's military intentions. The expansion has been substantial, and seems all the more so in light of the austerity budgets Deng had granted the military since his accession to power (the one exception being 1979, to cover the costs of the military expedition into Vietnam that year).
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3-7/Nigel Holloway, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "U.S., China try to avert the hostile kind," p. 30 ; MDS VT96
	 The Yellow Sea incident presages a change in the balance of power in East Asia. U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry said in February that America was committed to maintaining "a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable future." No increase in the U.S. military presence was envisaged. By contrast, China shows every intention of rapidly expanding its military capabilities on land, sea and in the air. 3
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3-8/Nigel Holloway, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "U.S., China try to avert the hostile kind," p. 30 ; MDS VT96
	 Others say U.S. analysts have consistently underestimated China's military capabilities. Lin Chong-pin of the American Enterprise Institute says this “bias" arises from the fact that China's military strength is continually compared with that of the U.S., whose annual defence spending is several times greater. But Lin con- is a cedes that there "growing minority of U.S. scholars/who are highlighting the rapid modernization of China's forces.
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 3-9/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 268 ;SEG VT96
	 Chinese sources have tried to allay concerns by pointing out that there has been substantial inflation during this period--sometimes exceeding 20 percent in major cities--and saying that increases have done little more than compensate the military for losses in buying power. However, it is difficult to adjust defense budget figures to account for inflation, since official inflation rates tend to be several points lower than. estimates by foreign analysts. Moreover, they do not necessarily affect the military and other sectors of the economy equally. Since 1989 the increases in the defense budget have outstripped the increases in other sectors, such as education and agriculture, that one would expect to have higher priority when the threat of external attack is minimal. And although officials point out that military expenditures are a modest 8.6 percent of the state budget and 1 percent of China's gross domestic product, foreign analysts note that China does not follow standard accounting procedures; actual defense expenditures are estimated to be two to three times the published numbers.
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3-10/Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "Gentle giant" P. 16 , SEG VT96
	 Chinese defence-spending figures are seriously questioned by foreign specialists, however. Paul Godwin, a Chinese military affairs expert at the National Defence University in Washington, says that given the size of the 3-million-strong Chinese army -- backed by nuclear weapons and 5,000 aircraft -- "the budget simply does not add up." The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that China's actual 1994 defence budget is Rmb 100 billion. Using currency-conversion formulas that take into account purchasing- power parity, that translates to US $28.5-45 billion.
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3-11/David Shambaugh, Prof., Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, .1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. ;SEG VT96
	 The rising budget deficit did not, however, preclude another hefty increase in the military budget for 1994. For the sixth consecutive year, official military spending increased sharply (a 21 percent increase over 1993). Off-budget revenue and expenditures could total as much as five times the official figure of 52.4 billion yuan (approximately $6 billion). 
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3-12/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 The PLA earns as much as $20 billion from non-military activities like launching civilian satellites, building cargo ships and nuclear power plants, pharmaceuticals, hiring out air force pilots to civilian airlines and operating luxury hotels and discos, according to Jane's Information Group.
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 3-13/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 268 ;SEG VT96
	 The military budgets of the early 1980s did not indicate a low regard for the armed forces on Deng's part; rather, the paramount leader, who considered military service an important part of his own career, was convinced that a strong military could not be grafted onto a weak economy; economic modernization was thus his first priority. The PLA was enjoined to do its utmost in the effort to modernize, including turning some of its production lines over to civilian production and marketing both consumer goods and weapons. Between 25 and 30 percent of the military's expenses are now met through its industries and businesses.
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3-14/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 357; THR VT96
	 This is not the simple cynicism of a civilian observer. These indeed have been the trends in the two countries able to decide such basic aspects of their defense policy--China and the Soviet Union. Chinese reforms, including the removal of 1 million men from the rolls of the PLA, have been specifically achieved by hitting the ground forces hardest. The navy has actually improved its position and seems to be the leading benefactor of the reform program.46 The expansion to a more blue-water naval strategy has been matched by a reduction of tension along the frontier with the Soviet Union. Although all services have received new equipment in the past decade, the most striking improvements have been in the navy. When matched by a stress on more rapid economic development of the coastal regions, China becomes more of a complete maritime power and less obsessed about traditional threats from neighbors on land. As China also looks at the global and regional East Asian economy, the maritime orientation takes on greater importance and Central Asia becomes less important.
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3-15/ Rajiv Chandra Inter Press Service, December 26, 1994, HEADLINE: CHINA-BURMA: BLOOMING FRIENDSHIP WORRIES NEIGHBORS//MDS-VT96
	 Regional experts note that Beijing has made the development of a blue-water navy a top military priority as part of what they say is China's plan to become a major economic and military player in Asia and eventually a future world power. 
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3-16/ John F. Harris, Thomas W. Lippman, Staff Writers The Washington Post, December 15, 1994, A42, HEADLINE: Chinese Watched as U.S. Navy Tracked Sub; No Protest Has Been Lodged; Beijing Has Withdrawn Invitation for Visit by Pena//MDS-VT96
	 The Chinese traditionally have had a narrowly focused coastal navy, but lately have been producing a "more versatile, more capable and continuously improving blue-water navy, " with ambitions for projecting force on the high seas, said Chong-Pin Lin, a China national security scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. 
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3-17/ Al Santoli The Washington Times, August 5, 1994, Pg. A19, HEADLINE: Asia policy vacuum//MDS-VT96
	 And as the U.S. Navy is being radically downsized, China is using its $24 billion annual trade surplus with the United States to build an aggressive blue water navy. 
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3-18/ New China news agency domestic service in Chinese BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 12, 1993, SECTION: Part 3 The Far East; 2. CHINA; FE/1584/B2;HEADLINE: NAVAL MODERNIZATION; NAVY TO ACHIEVE "EVEN MORE FIRSTS" IN ITS MODERNIZATION//MDS-VT96
	s A leading navy official said that, because of these 14 firsts, the navy has made one big step forward in improving its overall combat effectiveness and also laid a strong foundation for building a powerful and modern people's navy. As the state's economic power continues to become stronger during the course of reform and opening up, the People's navy will certainly achieve even more firsts in its modernization and also greater successes in carrying out its sacred mission of safeguarding the motherland's territorial waters and maritime rights and interests in the future. 
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3-19/ Beaver, 1993 (Paul, editor of the south China Sea regional security assessment, Jane's Defence Weekly, September 25, 1993, Vol. 20; No. 13; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Carriers key to Chinese air power)//MDS-VT96
	 For several months, the Chinese official press has hinted at a new generation of naval aircraft and the building of aircraft carriers. Radio Beijing said in May that the navy is optimistic about china's ability to build aircraft carriers. The broadcaster said the country's "annual steel output has reached 50 million tonnes and Dalien Shipyard has acquired the successful experience in building a 120 000 tonnes tanker for Norway; all these are favourable conditions for developing aircraft carriers." 
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3-20/ Beaver, 1993 (Paul, editor of the south China Sea regional security assessment, Jane's Defence Weekly, September 25, 1993, Vol. 20; No. 13; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Carriers key to Chinese air power)//MDS-VT96
	 A report presented to the National People's Congress (NPC) earlier this year indicates that two 48 000 tonnes vessels, similar to the Russian 'Kiev' class, will be built to lead two task fleets by 2005. A budget of 10 billion yuan ($1.7 billion) has been allocated. According to the report, the plans call for up to 28 fixed-wing aircraft to be accommodated in the hanger deck and for two steam catapults to launch them from the 70m long flight deck. 
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3-21/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-30-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 On the other hand, according to Japan Economic Newswire citing a Chinese leading naval magazine, a Chinese naval officer has called for quickly building a nuclear aircraft carrier as a symbol of China's national strength and increasing economic wealth. In an article appearing in the January edition of the "Modern Ships" magazine, Cao Xuegui, captain of a battlewarship, further insisted that China needs an aircraft carrier if the disputed Spratly Islands and Taiwan independence movement issues are to be solved. "If China had an aircraft carrier, Taiwan wouldn't be so arrogant over its independence movement. Besides Taiwan is quickly stepping up construction of its naval and air forces," he said in the article entitled "China's Aircraft Carrier Dream."
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3-22/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 11, 1995; ACS VT96
	China Purchased Russian Attack Submarines [TAIPEI, 01/04/95] China has made a 750 million US dollar deal with Russia to purchase three Kilo-class attack submarines, the United Daily News reported Wednesday. According to nationalist naval officials, the deal would also be processed in barter trade, the same way China bought 26 Su-27 fighters from Russia. Nationalists worried that the move, along with China's other efforts to modernize the PLA, could seriously affect the security in the west Pacific. (Zhiping YU, Daluo JIA) 
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3-23/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 China recently approved a 15 percent increase in its defense budget and is scheduled to receive the first of four Russian kilo-class attack submarines.
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3-24/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 China intends to buy 22 diesel-powered submarines from Russia over the next five years in a move that could dramatically alter the balance of naval power in Southeast Asia, Senate sources said yesterday. The submarines will enable China to pursue its claims to a vast swath of the South China Sea China's claim to the area is based on its claim to the Spratly Islands, a barren cluster of rocks and reefs believed to be near offshore petroleum deposits.
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3-25 / Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 " China and Russia have agreed to the sale of 10 submarines and have begun talks for six more," said a source on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Negotiations could also expand to include another six subs, the source said. "The total over five years would be 22 submarines," he said.
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3-26/ Robert Karniol Jane's Defence Weekly, November 19, 1994, Vol. 22; No. 20; Pg. 1, HEADLINE: China to buy Russian 'Kilo' submarines//MDS-VT96
	 China will acquire at least four 'Kilo' class diesel-electric patrol submarines (right) from Russia under an agreement finalized early this month, according to reports from several Asian capitals, confirmed by US officials. 
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3-27 The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 The military will adopt a doctrine to fight high-tech local wars. U.S. high-tech military performance in Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War has been taken as the new model for Chinese military modernization. "Chinese military officials believe the present gap in their capabilities is temporary and the long-term goal is to be a global military peer of the United States, " the report said. [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] 
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3-28/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 The American unease about China is based on several factors. From Israel, China has purchased tank-armor, missile and jet-fighter technology. And from Iran, Beijing has obtained air-refueling technology that will enable its jet fighters to operate at greater distances from Chinese territory.
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3-29/ Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 The success of Western military technology in the Persian Gulf War, however, has raised concerns in the PRC about the need to further modernize its armed forces. Recent weapons acquisitions, including advanced MiG and Sukhoi aircraft from Russia, are one indication of this. China is likely to purchase additional weaponry from Russia, not only to further its modernization efforts, but also to take advantage of Moscow's eagerness to sell arms at bargain -- even barter -- prices in order to gain hard currency and to keep its defense industrial base operational. 
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3-30/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 The success of Western military technology in the Persian Gulf War, however, has raised concerns in the PRC about the need to further modernize its armed forces. Recent weapons acquisitions, including advanced MiG and Sukhoi aircraft from Russia, are one indication of this. China is likely to purchase additional weaponry from Russia, not only to further its modernization efforts, but also to take advantage of Moscow's eagerness to sell arms at bargain -- even barter -- prices in order to gain hard currency and to keep its defense industrial base operational. 
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3-31CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 5, 1995; ACS VT96
	[CND, 05/03/95] LONDON - "Norinco of China has begun openly to solicit sales inquiries for a device that it designates the ZM-87 portable laser `disturber'", Reuter reported quoting Jane's International Defense Review Tuesday. This weapon damages the eyes of enemies with laser beams. ZM-87 could injure eyes at up to two miles, or three miles with a magnifying optic. It may result in "flaring blindness" of the human eye at 6.2 miles. It consists of an energy converter supplied by a battery, an optical transmitter, a tripod with a sighting regulator and a cable connector. The international Red Cross wants to have such weapons banned. France, Russian, Britain, and the U.S. have developed similar weapons since 1980s, but no country has ever offered them for export yet. (Tien ZHANG, Jian LIU) 
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3-32/ Denis Warner, Business Times, February 2, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: Building a force for stability//MDS-VT96
	 China plans to acquire a total of 72 Su-27 fighters, to manufacture some hundreds of Mig-31s under licence, and it has not abandoned its plans ultimately to acquire an aircraft carrier as an essential part of its blue water navy. Recent additions to the navy have raised the submarine fleet to a total of 47, including one armed with ballistic missiles. 
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3-33/ Beaver, 1993 (Paul, editor of the south China Sea regional security assessment, Jane's Defence Weekly, September 25, 1993, Vol. 20; No. 13; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Carriers key to Chinese air power)//MDS-VT96
	 According to a documentary broadcast on Radio Beijing in May, the PLA Navy will also fly the J-7 III, the Chinese equivalent of the MiG-21MF, for interception and ground attack. 
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3-34/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics of Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 265 ;SEG VT96
	 The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has continued to reach out to foreign militaries, receiving visiting groups from more than 40 countries last year and sending its own abroad. By far the most newsworthy of these contacts has been the relationship with Russia. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was first among many high-ranking military officials to journey to Beijing, signing a five-year cooperation agreement with his Chinese counterpart. A few months before, ships from Russia's Pacific Fleet had visited Qingdao for the first time in 37 years. President Boris Yeltsin placed the value of military sales to China in 1992, before the agreement was signed, at $1.8 billion; this included at least 26 su-27 fighter planes and 100 s-300 surface-to-air missiles. Talks were held on the purchase of the ss-25, Russia's most, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile; Kilo class diesel-electric submarines; aircraft carriers; and late-model T-80 tanks. More than a thousand Russian scientists visited China in the last two years to help with the Chinese military effort, and an estimated 300 to 400 Chinese defense specialists were sent to Russia for training. Weapons designs were reportedly being faxed to China, amid Western fears that Russia's system to keep track of its weapons specialists had broken down."
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3-35/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 The American unease about China is based on several factors. * China's continuing purchases of advanced military equipment from Russia and other countries. China has just obtained four new Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Over the past five years, the Russians have also sold China advanced jet fighters, helicopters, tanks, transport planes, surface-to-air missiles, rocket engines, missile-guidance technology and uranium-enrichment technology.
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3-36/ JIM MANN and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITERS Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1994, A; Page 1; HEADLINE: FACEOFF BETWEEN U.S. SHIP, CHINESE SUB IS REVEALED; MILITARY: OCTOBER INCIDENT IN YELLOW SEA HIGHLIGHTS GROWING CHANCE OF NAVAL CONFLICT. BEIJING SOUNDS WARNING.//MDS-VT96
	 Pentagon officials have been watching as China has rapidly increased its naval strength, with the aid of some purchases from what was once the Soviet Union's navy. U.S. officials said this week that the Chinese navy recently ordered four conventional submarines from Russia and that one of those left St. Petersburg recently for refitting in another port. 
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3-37 / Catherine Field in Hong Kong The Times, August 5, 1994, HEADLINE: China to spend Pounds 3bn more on Russian arms//MDS-VT96
	 CHINA is to buy an additional $5 billion (Pounds 3.35 billion) of armaments from Russia in its drive to upgrade the technology of its three-million-strong armed forces. The purchase of tanks, Su35 and Su30 MK fighters, mid-air refuelling equipment and the means to build tanks and other hardware is part of an overall campaign by military chiefs to make the People's Liberation Army a superior force in Asia. Military experts say China is keen to exploit the security vacuum in Asia created by the Cold War's end. 
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3-38/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.358; THR VT96
	 Professionalism in this new doctrine also means more stress on military education in academies and on training fields. More foreign contact is encouraged in order to get a better measure of China's ranking and learn about new ideas and technologies. Some foreign weapons are purchased as short-cuts to modernization. Arms are sold abroad in order to get money to pay for new hardware at home and in some cases even to obtain evidence on the performance of weapons. Less money is now spent on soldiers and more on research and development since 1 million men were cut from the Chinese armed forces. Thus, demilitarization in defense policy as a whole means enhanced military professionalism in the armed services themselves. China's armed forces have become leaner and fitter than ever before, and at a time when defense policy reform has made China more secure than at any point in the past several hundred years.
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3-39/ Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 84-94; "Gentle giant" p. 16 ;SEG VT96
	 Qian said he could understand how smaller countries could be concerned " about a Chinese military build-up, but he said it was necessary to compare China's defence budget with that of other countries to get a proper perspective. India, which is slightly smaller and less populous than China, has an annual defence budget of more or less the same size, Qian said. Much -smaller Japan, mean- while, whose constitution forbids the deployment of troops abroad, has a defence budget of US $30 billion, he added. The U.S. has only a quarter of China's population, but its defence budget is US$200 billion. "If you make such comparisons, you come to the conclusion that China's military .forces are defensive in nature," Qian said.
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3-40/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 China says it spends only about $6 per capita on defense, compared with over $1,000 in the United States, and that Chinese military expenditures are one-fortieth those of the United States, and one-fifth those of Japan.
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3-41/ Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 84-94; "Gentle giant-p. 15 ;SEG VT96
	 If you're worried about a Chinese military build-up, relax. China spends less on its armed forces than the United States, and not much more than pacifist Japan. That's the message Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen wants to give his Asian neighbours.
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3-42/ CHEN GUOQING; press counselor of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Defense News, May 17, 1993 / May 23, 1993, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: 'China Threat' Rings Hollow; Nation Strives To Become Modern Pillar in Asia//MDS-VT96
	 Let me first cite some statistics to examine whether this assertion is tenable. China's annual military expenditure remains the smallest among big nations and relatively low among developing countries as well. Its aggregate military spending over the past 40 years only amounted to that of the United States in 1992 alone. China's military budget in 1985 accounted for 2.2 percent of its gross national product, 1.6 percent in 1992 and 1.5 percent in 1993. 
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3-43/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 The sharp increases in the defense budget over the past five years follow a decade in which China's military spending was held flat and at relatively low levels. Likewise, experts say, the recent purchases of advanced weaponry come against a backdrop of years in which the Chinese armed forces operated with very low levels of technology.
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3-44/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 25; MDS VT96
	 Some western analysts believe expenditures are justified. They are so far behind in technology, so far behind in terms of weapons, that they need to do this just to keep up with the rest," says Paul Godwin, professor of international relations at the National Defence University in Washington.
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3-45/ CHEN GUOQING; press counselor of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Defense News, May 17, 1993 / May 23, 1993, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: 'China Threat' Rings Hollow; Nation Strives To Become Modern Pillar in Asia//MDS-VT96
	 China has unilaterally cut its military forces by 1 million troops over the past few years while shifting some military industrial facilities to civilian production and converting some military installations to civilian or military-civilian use. 
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3-46/ ED OFFLEY, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-25-95; PACIFIC RIM MILITARY LEADERS MEET IN CANADA; ACS VT96
	Senior Col. Xu Xizhong of the Chinese People's Liberation Army has a big problem.
As part of his army's general staff, Xu must create a part-time reserve organization in a country boasting the world's largest land force -- estimated at nearly 3.5 million soldiers in 1991.
While the U.S. Army and many allied military organizations have relied on part-time reservists for most of this century, the idea of the citizen-soldier is new to Beijing, Xu said Monday at an international military seminar here.
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3-47/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-6-95, SAN KOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan's 'future-oriented' ties with China still unclear; ACS VT96
	 ''China is not trying to buy an aircraft carrier from Russia...I doubt if it is really necessary to express concern only because of an increase in overall military spending,'' said former Japanese Finance Minister Yoshiro Hayashi, noting that the fast rise in China's military outlays is largely a reflection of a swelling amount of personnel expenses.
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3-48/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 "Right now, China can't even establish air superiority over China itself," says one U.S. government specialist on the Chinese military. "India has a better air force than China. For now, China also remains weak in the sort of high technology the United States used in the Persian Gulf War.
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3-49/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-27-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 PLA Expands Exchange and Cooperation with Overseas Military [CND, 01/22/95] In the past year, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has greatly expanded its exchanges and cooperation with overseas military units in the world, AFP reported form Hong Kong. In 1994 the PLA sent out 50 military delegations to 62 countries and received 225 foreign ones, according to Xinhua. Most Asian countries and some Western nations including U.S.A. were among those visited by PLA. (Ming ZHANG, Daluo JIA)
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3-50 /Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 268; MDS VT96
	 The Asia-Pacific forms the main parameters of China's defence policy. Perceived threats are more difficult to define but suspicions of Japanese motives in the region, growing Indian military potential, and territorial disputes, for example, over the Spratly Islands, claimed by China and a number of other countries, may be cited. China's increasing dependence on international trade makes her more vulnerable to naval blockade; hence the establishment of coastal bases with facilities for a fleet capable of ocean-going operations.
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3-51/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific century," p. 423 THR VT96
	 While war does not trouble the Asia Pacific at present, instability in several places throughout the region could trigger hostilities. Yet recognizing the potential for conflict is not to overlook the positive contributions intraregional detente has made to regional security in recent years. The Asia Pacific is demonstrably less conflict prone than it was even three years ago. Yet tensions simmer. Short-term potentialities (1 to 5 years) must be distinguished from medium term possibilities (5 to 15 years).
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3-524/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 Mr. McCain warned that China's rapid military growth was a danger to the U.S. goal that "no nation dominate Asia." And even though Mr. McCain spent years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, he called for a policy to back Vietnam as a counterweight to China.
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3-53/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," P. 33; CJJ VT96
	 At the start of this essay, I pointed out that China's current polices,/f projected without change, will lead to conflicts within a few years--if rapid improvements in military capacity continue, and if solemnly declared policies are enforced in the South China Sea against Taiwan and in other areas. Optimistic Western assumptions about the future are premised on political change that will make China more flexible; this fact should underline the critical importance of domestic developments in China for the peace and security of Asia.'
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3-54/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.69; THR VT96
	 For decades, Sinologists of all political stripes argued persuasively that Communist China, no matter how radical its domestic policies, was a status quo power on the international stage, dispatching troops beyond its borders rarely, reluctantly, and then only defensively. But in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, China is rapidly demonstrating in word and deed that it now views its East Asian neighborhood in expansionist terms. With its armed forces no longer tied down by a Soviet military threat to the north, China's military power relative to its neighbors has suddenly increased. Yet China has increased its officially acknowledged military spending by 52 percent since 1989. Some of that money is being spent on making the military better able to suppress domestic uprisings, particularly in border areas peopled by non-Han Chinese minorities. But much of the increase is committed to a military buildup aimed at giving China its first capability to project naval and air power well beyond its Shores.
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 3-55/Nigel Holloway, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "U.S., China try to avert the hostile kind," p. 30 ; MDS VT96
	 But at a social gathering in Beijing some time later, a official told a U.S. officer that the next time such an incident occurred so close to Chinese territory, China would send up its latest Su27 fighters and shoot down the American aircraft. Officials in Washington have confirmed the military and social encounters -- and have played down their significance. But now that China is sending its vessels far beyond its shores '-- into waters the U.S. is accustomed to roaming freely -- "there's inevitably going to be more and more of this kind of thing," says Michael Swaine, co-director of the Rand Center for Asia Pacific Policy in California.
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3-56 Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 All of this is occurring against the backdrop of China's growing military modernization, which includes trying to build a blue water navy. China recently backed away from plans to purchase an aircraft carrier from Ukraine because of cost and capability constraints, but it continues to conduct feasibility studies about such an acquisition. Purchases of strike aircraft and modern diesel submarines from Russia illustrate that Beijing is stepping up a systematic program of military modernization aimed at increasing its ability to project power by land and by sea. Why China needs such a force projection capability is both a mystery and a source of concern to Beijing's neighbors. So, too, is the PRC's continued effort to modernize and enlarge its ballistic missile forces at the same time the rest of the world is steadily downsizing nuclear arsenals.
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3-57/ Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China has also enhanced its military power projection capacity, including its ability to refuel aircraft in flight, leading some to fear that China may well be willing to use military pressure to enforce its various claims. Its neighbors have particularly noted its reported efforts to purchase an aircraft carrier from Ukraine. 
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3-58/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-30-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 China Demonstrates Supergun, May Build Nuclear Flattop .Reported By: Shuping LU, Daluo JIA, 01/29/95 The Chinese army this week unveiled a 70-foot-long supergun capable of firing large artillery shells into South Korea and Taiwan, according to Chicago Tribune. The Chinese supergun is much shorter than the 160-foot monster designed by Canadian ballistics expert Gerald Bull and shipped clandestinely to Iraq in the late 1980s. Bull was assassinated in 1990 in Belgium, allegedly by Israeli intelligence operatives.
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3-59/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-30-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 China's navy has long expressed hope for an aircraft carrier to transform its mainly coastal defense forces into a blue water fleet capable of defending territorial claims, but has refused to detail the process of acquisition.
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3-60/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 69; THR VT96
	 Having hollowed out the leftist rationale for one-party rule, China's Communist elite is increasingly flirting with nationalist, expansionist, and anti-Western themes. These themes strike a resonant chord among many Chinese, who want their nation to be a military power that commands the world's respect. For them, expansionism would expunge the humiliation of the 19th and early 20th centuries, when Western nations and Japan carved China into spheres of influence. But China's new drive for military power may prove to be an even greater problem for the United States than its mercantilist trade policies."
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3-61/ Catherine Field in Hong Kong The Times, August 5, 1994, HEADLINE: China to spend Pounds 3bn more on Russian arms//MDS-VT96
	 The decision to grant additional funds to the military at a time of government belt-tightening is also an indication of the efforts being made by factions within the government to gain the military's support. President Jiang Zemin is desperate to consolidate his position; the military's support is vital if he is to take over when Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader, dies. 
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3-62/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Although there is little sense of immediate danger for either Japan or Southeast Asia, the level of anxiety in Southeast Asian capitals has clearly increased recently, and for the first time since the 1970s the notion of China as a threat to the region is gaining currency. China has long looked upon Southeast Asia as an integral part of its security environment and therefore as a region where it is entitled to exercise preeminent influence. Although the countries of Southeast Asia do not feel under any imminent physical threat of invasion, they are acutely aware of the enormous size of the counter on their doorstep. The rise of nationalism in China can only heighten these perceptions and increase concern. 
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3-63/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.429; THR VT96
	 Growing economies contribute to increased military power. The rapidly developing capacities of regional militaries are about to trigger an expensive and explosive regional arms race. Asia is a region where governments have shown a propensity to use force to solve political problems; with modern militaries the temptations will increase.
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3-64/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. 374; THR VT96
	 In contrast to. these examples of reformed defense policy is the vexing problem of China. China invaded Vietnam in a punitive war lasting a few weeks. It apparently never had any intention of staying longer, even if it did hope to be more successful and devastating in its attack. But the real problem is that this war, and the more successful seizure of islands in the Spratly group in March 1988, was launched by a reforming leadership. For China at least, a reformed foreign policy left room for the use of force to settle territorial claims. Whether ruled by reformers or radicals, China will try and satisfy' its territorial claims, as it has done ever since the communists came to power. The Chinese action suggests that, at least in its case, there are distinct limits to the demilitarization of defense policy. Indeed, professionalism, which we have defined as a part of general demilitarization, can be turned into an offensive force that militarizes international relations. As in the case of the Soviet military reforms of the early 1960s, or of the 1970s in the era of detente, there is no necessary link between all aspects of demilitarization of defense policy, let alone between reform of defense policy and foreign economic policy'. Especially' in the realm of defense policy, some aspects of common security can be sought, while some elements of nationally defined national security are pursued.
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 3-65/David Shambaugh, Prof., Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. 45 ;SEG VT96
	 This does not mean, on the other hand, that China is not seen as a potential threat to Asian security. Changes in Chinese military doctrine that now emphasize low intensity conflict scenarios around China's periphery, combined with China's assertive stance on territorial claims in the region, have many of its neighbors worried. The dramatic increases in China's official defense budget and the extensive amount of off budget revenue that accrues to the military compound the concerns. The lack of transparency in China's military spending and force structure, and the military's reluctance to participate in multilateral security initiatives, increase the perception that China will be the principal threat to regional security in the years to come. 
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 3-66/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p.378; THR VT96
	 Yet again China stands out as. a relatively old thinker when it comes to interdependent security. While the Soviet Union helped shove Vietnam and Cambodia to a more moderate position on the Indochina conflict, China did far less to push the Khmer Rouge to serious talks. China has shown in the past that it is prepared to turn off the taps of support to revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia in order to improve relations in the region. But Beijing still retains its support for the Khmer Rouge as a way to press Vietnam into a more submissive position and even to get a more favorable regime in Cambodia. There is some evidence that China does see the need for a settlement, especially in the wake of western criticism after the events of June 1989, but Beijing is far less willing to demilitarize the Indochinese conflicts.
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3-67/ JIM MANN and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITERS Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1994, A; Page 1; HEADLINE: FACEOFF BETWEEN U.S. SHIP, CHINESE SUB IS REVEALED; MILITARY: OCTOBER INCIDENT IN YELLOW SEA HIGHLIGHTS GROWING CHANCE OF NAVAL CONFLICT. BEIJING SOUNDS WARNING.//MDS-VT96
	 Harlan W. Jencks, a UC Berkeley expert on the Chinese People's Liberation Army, wrote in a recent article that leaders in Beijing now view the American military presence in the Pacific as being "at least implicitly" in opposition to China. "Recent U.S. Navy exercises with Southeast Asian navies casting China as the potential troublemaker have reinforced this perception," he explained.
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3-68/ Maria Teresa Villanueva-Cerojano, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Report says Manila must take low profile on Myanmar" ACS VT96
	Manila should cool its efforts to bring Myanmar and other Southeast Asian nations into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order not to further strain ties with China, according to documents shown to Kyodo News Service.
A Defense Department report said Beijing may have misconstrued the Philippines' active bid to pursue an expanded ASEAN as a strategy to ''contain and encircle China and to block its strategic regional ambitions.''
The document said efforts to wean Myanmar off China and into the ambit of ASEAN ''runs counter to China's aims of gaining strategic reach into the Indian Ocean through establishment of bases in Burma (Myanmar) proper and the Coco Islands in the Andaman Sea.''
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3-69/ Graham Hutchings, China Correspondent The Daily Telegraph, July 29, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: China claim to the sea alarms its neighbours//MDS-VT96
	 CHINA is using the 100th anniversary of a crushing naval defeat by Japan to demand "control of the sea", a move that will alarm neighbouring countries, many of whom are locked in bitter maritime disputes with Peking. The call for an expansion in sea power was made in an article marking Japan's destruction of the Chinese navy in August 1894, which appeared in yesterday's official Guangming Daily. During the battle, much of China's fleet was sent to the bottom in a struggle over control in Korea that marked the start of Japan's rise to Asian dominance. The paper quoted Li Wanrong, identified as "commander of a certain maritime region", as saying: "The bitter lesson left by the war is that China needs control of the sea. If China is to get back its position on the international stage, it is necessary to seek control of the sea." 
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3-70/ Graham Hutchings, China Correspondent The Daily Telegraph, July 29, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: China claim to the sea alarms its neighbours//MDS-VT96
	 Space was also given to the views of Zhao Shuyi, another senior naval commander, who said the oceans were China's "second space for existence". He said: "There are rich natural resources in the sea which can support life for thousands of years. We have the right to exploit them and use them. "China is a big power with the biggest population in the world, but natural resources on land are quite limited. It is therefore important to maintain and expand our second space. "In the past, China ignored the importance of the oceans and regarded them as a natural defence. It is time to get rid of that conception." 
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3-71/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 Leon Hadar finds two Pentagon reports painting a picture of China as a likely post-Cold War ogre, even as Clinton administration officials use soothing tones. In the accompanying piece, Kevin Sullivan examines Asia's love-hate relationship with American forces
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3-72/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 At a foreign-policy meeting last week sponsored by the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican, was one of several speakers who warned that China was the real threat for the 21st century
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3-73/ Eugene J. Carroll Jr. USA TODAY, June 21, 1994, Pg. 10A, HEADLINE: China, Korea: Two-faced nuclear policy//MDS-VT96
	 A nation in Northeast Asia has developed the ability to threaten U.S. allies and perhaps even the United States itself with nuclear weapons. This developing nation's communist government continues to repress its people politically, though it is trying to improve their economic well-being through forays into the capitalist system. It has pursued exports of controversial weapons. Its aging leadership continues to follow hard-line policies in spite of the collapse of communism elsewhere. It fought the bloody 1950-53 Korean War against the United States and its allies. As a Cold War battleground, the country was divided into communist and capitalist states after World War II. The communist state remains in a hostile military confrontation with the capitalist state, to which the United States sells arms. Japan, invader and brutal occupier of the country before and during World War II, is wary of its nuclear force. What country is this? North Korea, right? Wrong. North Korea has not yet developed an effective military nuclear force. China is the country that best fits this description. As recently as June 10, China actually exploded a nuclear weapon, an accomplishment never achieved by North Korea. 
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3-74/ Triplett, september 12, 1994 ( William C., chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, International Herald Tribune, September 12, 1994, HEADLINE: Why Cooperate With China's Unrepentant Military?//MDS-VT96
	 The Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment was probably equally surprised. It is conducting computerized war games to see how America would fareagainst a resurgent Chinese military 25 years hence. (It loses.) 
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3-75/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 26; MDS VT96
	 Yet, most analysts believe that China would be very circumspect in. the use of force -- for military, political and economic-reasons. The Rand Corp.'s Pollack says the Chinese "don't want to run the risk of an overt military failure." Second, they run the risk of mobilizing opposition from a united Asean or the U.S. Third, Beijing is aware that an armed confrontation would be bad for business.
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 3-76/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 374; THR VT96
	 This is not to suggest that China is prepared to use its military power whenever possible. As in the Soviet Union in the 1960s, defense modernization in China has involved a reassessment of the role of nuclear weapons and of the "inevitability of war:' As early as 1980, China was arguing that war was no longer inevitable. Therefore, China could find the breathing space in which to modernize and reform. Cynics will note that this change in doctrine came despite the recent of on spate wars China's periphery and suggested a change of heart rather than the emergence of a new reality. China wanted a breathing space so it was determined to see one.
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3-77/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 35; CJJ VT96
	 China has a great deal to lose economically in any confrontation in Asia. Not only would one serious shock bring an anti-Chinese coalition of powers into being, it would also choke off the investment on which China's economic development depends. Were that to happen, a domestic financial crisis might follow from an international confrontation, but whether that would escalate or control the problem is difficult to say.
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 3-78/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics of Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 265 ;SEG VT96
	 A curious dichotomy has emerged between how the outside world views the Chinese military and how the People's Liberation Army is seen at home. Other countries have become concerned with the possibility of aggression by an increasingly militarily capable China as well as the effects of Beijing arms sales on the global balance of power. At the same time, the leadership in China is becoming more concerned about the armed forces' loyalty, and worries that the military's growing business empire may affect its combat capabilities. Although evidence can be marshaled for both sides' contentions, the interaction between the military's foreign and domestic roles makes it unlikely that the Chinese military will embark on a course of territorial aggrandizement, or that the military will prove to be the sole determinant in the struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping.
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3-79/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asia Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 262; MDS VT96
	 In summary, the Chinese claim that their military forces are for defence purposes only, foreign views to the contrary notwithstanding, while economic prosperity and diplomatic outreach are also seen as keys to China's national security. The main thrust of China's diplomacy is thus directed towards creating a peaceful Asian environment conducive to Chinese economic growth.
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3-80/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-28-95, SAN KOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan, China urged to play pivotal role in Asia; ACS VT96
	 Hayashi (former Finance Minister Yoshiro Hayashi) said he does not subscribe to the notion that China has been increasing its military spending in recent years in an attempt to seek hegemony in Asia and in the world.
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3-81/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 All these developments have attracted the attention of U.S. strategists in places like the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment, an internal Pentagon think tank responsible for examining future threats to America's national security. "There's a natural basis for the U.S. to be looking out at China and asking, 'What is the future of this country, what will be the military capability and how will it be used?' " notes Banning Garrett, an independent specialist on the Chinese military. "People who do threat analysis are looking for threats wherever they can find them. That's their job."
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3-82/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 24; MDS VT96
	 Beijing insists that there is no cause for alarm. "The rumour of a so-called 'China threat' as spread by some foreigners is a complete fabrication," Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, recently told a foreign military visitor. Gen. Liu's vigorous denunciation highlights the enormous perception gap. between China and the rest of Asia.
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3-83CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 17, 1995; ACS VT96
	China also repeatedly promises that it will not use nuclear force first in any conflicts.
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3-84/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 19, 1995; ACS VT96
	China Not a Threat, Pledged QIAN
[CND, 05/18/95] BEIJING -- Foreign Minister QIAN Qichen pledged that China would not threaten to invade her neighbors. He assured the audience in a conference on China's regional relations that China would solve disputes through consultation. His speech was in response to an earlier speech by Singapore Premier Goh Chok Tong, who urged the Chinese government to be more open on military modernization and foreign trade practices. With the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea, China's neighbors, especially in Southeast Asia, are concerned with her rapid economic development and military buildup. (Yiping GENG, Hong TANG, Daluo JIA) 
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 3-85/ Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "Gentle giant" p. 16 ;SEG VT96
	 "In history China never invaded any foreign country," Qian said, apparently for- getting the army's February 1979 cross- border thrust into Vietnam, launched in re- taliation for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. "And at present," he continued, "China has not stationed even one single soldier outside its border, nor doe it have any military bases on foreign soil.
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3-86/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p.375; THR VT96
	 Chinese doctrine evolved in the 1980s. Although large wars did not appear likely, small ones were. Indeed, China was likely to be involved in limited conflicts. Chinese defense modernization stressed air power and especially naval power, not the massed ranks of ground troops that would be useful in a general war. Although China did modernize its nuclear arsenal in this period, the most striking change was the shift to a more SLBM-based deterrent. Despite a greater capacity to deploy large numbers of weapons in each category of a nuclear arsenal, China kept to its strategy of minimum deterrence across a range of weapons.
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3-87/ Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 84-94; "Gentle giant" p. 16 ;SEG VT96
	 Qian refused to answer directly when asked about ways to provide transparency about China's defence preparations, such as allowing observers at exercises or conducting joint exercises. He also brushed aside questions about whether China had created a rapid-deployment force or was acquiring other means to project its power. 'There is no change whatsoever in Chinese strategy. China does not have aircraft carrier nor does it have overseas military bases. How can it be possible for the Chinese armed forces to be in the offensive posture?" he asked.
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3-88/ Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 He [Lt. Gen. James Clapper, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency] said China was primarily "developing military capabilities to enable it to more effectively protect its interests close to its own borders," posing little threat to the United States even though it causes consternation elsewhere in the region. Included among the weapons China has recently acquired or is trying to build itself are sophisticated fighter aircraft, submarines, and an aircraft carrier.
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3-89/Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 China, however, is decades away from becoming a serious global rival either by itself or in coalition with others, and its internal political development is likely to influence the type of foreign policy it pursues. In particular, its degree of democratization is likely to determine how much money and effort China is willing to devote to improving its international standing in the light of its immense development tasks at home. This provides the United States with ample strategic warning. For the near term, economic considerations are likely to be dominant in Chinese calculations. 
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 3-90/David Shambaugh, Prof., Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. 45 ;SEG VT96
	 Fortunately, the armed forces' current weapons inventory should not be a cause for concern. Despite the military's desire to build rapid-deployment forces and a blue water navy, and to generally improve its power-projection capacity, it will be a long time before it is able to do so. The current quality of weaponry remains 20 to 30 years behind the state of the art, and substantially behind the inventories of Russia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and many Southeast Asian countries. Yet China's booming economy, its desire to become the predominant regional power, and recent trends in its military establishment suggest that a concerted buildup has begun.
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 3-91/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests" p. 2 67 ;SEG VT96
	 These concerns may be exaggerated, or at least premature. China has indeed been developing and purchasing new weapons, but it will be many years before they can be perfected and integrated into combat plans. And increased capabilities do not necessarily indicate an intention to use them. Confronted with its neighbors' anxieties, Chinese officials have been careful to stress that the military/buildup is for defensive purposes only. Still, there is evidence to support the argument that at least the upper echelons of the armed forces favor a more assertive international role for China. Elderly generals have complained that party General Secretary Jiang Zemin has been far too accommodating toward the United States, and a group of them supposedly advised him in wanting at least twice to take a harder line. The precipitating causes were the Yinhe incident and the rejection of Beijing's bid to host the Olympics in the year 2000, in favor of Sydney, Australia.
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3-92/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 25; MDS VT96
	 Other analysts say ,that fears about' China's military are overstated, and that it will take at least another 15 years of steady growth before the country emerges as a true power.
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3-93/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-28-95, SAN KOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan, China urged to play pivotal role in Asia; ACS VT96
	 He (former Finance Minister Yoshiro Hayashi) defended the fast-paced rise in China's military outlays, noting the increase is largely a reflection of a swelling amount of personnel expenses. ''China is not trying to buy an aircraft carrier from Russia...I doubt if it is really necessary to express concern only because of an increase in overall military spending,'' the lawmaker said.
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3-94/ Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 But other U.S. officials maintain that China remains unwilling to confront the U.S. military or challenge Washington for paramount power in Asia. Lt. Gen. James Clapper, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, for example that China's continuing military modernization "is not necessarily threatening; some force modernization is to be expected."
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3-95/ Xinhua News Agency, JANUARY 31, 1995, HEADLINE: china not threat to neighbors, nor to world: perry; ITEM NO: 0131074; ACS VT96
	China is posting no threat to its neighbors, neither to the world, u.S. Secretary of defense william perry said here today. He made the statement at a press conference following a luncheon address at the new york waldorf-astoria hotel. " china has a strong military, but i believe it's not a threat to its neighbors, nor a global threat," he told reporters while answering a question on the so-called " china military threat". 
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3-96/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 For its part, China has over the past two years repeatedly denied that it poses a threat to anyone, arguing that it is still a developing country with peaceful intentions and a far smaller defense budget than the United States. Defense Minister Chi Haotian called the idea of a Chinese threat "ridiculous tales of the Arabian nights."
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3-97/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 "Beijing leaders are well aware that Chinese forces continue to have much more in common with those of (Iraqi President) Saddam Hussein than with the West," Robert Sutter, a Library of Congress China specialist, wrote last year. Moreover, some experts point out that in acquiring new weapons, China is trying to keep up with military modernization programs of nearby governments like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore.
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3-98/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 Because of these limitations, some U.S. defense officials have concluded that the current worries about the Chinese military are overblown. China "is a middle-ranking state very much constrained by the distribution of power within the Asia-Pacific region," wrote Karl W. Eikenberry, a Defense Department official and former U.S. military attache in Beijing[.] "While on an upward growth path, it is still far from the point at which it might seek to rewrite the rules, in the fashion of, say, Germany or Japan in the 1930s."
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3-99/ The Economist, June 11, 1994, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: China's new model army//MDS-VT96
	 Yet China's rising military spending does not mean an overall rise in local tension. Since China has become better friends with Russia, India and Vietnam, the region is a less dangerous place than it was a few years ago; and, for the moment, China's armed forces are probably too absorbed with their own concerns -- money-making and modernisation -- to interest themselves in foreign adventures. But in a decade or so, when the army's cupboards have been restocked with new toys, things may look different. 
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 3-100/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 269 ;SEG VT96
	 While the outside world worries about the expansionist motives of a modernizing PLA, the Chinese leadership frets about deficiencies in its military technology and the quality of the troops being recruited. Leaders are concerned as well about the military's loyalty to the regime, and wonder whether the commitment of individual military men to self-enrichment might not outweigh their institutional commitment to defend the country. They warn that "the Great Steel Wall," as the PLA is often called, "may self-destruct. Both fears appear to be exaggerated. But the military's domestic political role is substantial, and it would be difficult for any government to change this easily or quickly. Given the tenuous ties Deng's chosen successor, Jiang Zemin, has with the military, and, his need for its backing if he is to maintain his position after Deng's death, it will be' particularly difficult for him to carry out this change. Meanwhile, to the extent the PLA continues to play a major part in market enterprise, the enhancement of its military capabilities will be inhibited.
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3-100a/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 American defense officials insist they do not now consider China a threat to American interests. But even the denials underscore the intensity of the current debate about China and raise questions about the future.
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3-101/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 During the 1970s and '80s, the United States saw China as its strategic partner in counteracting Soviet military power. At times during this period, American officials griped to their Chinese counterparts that they were not spending enough money or devoting enough attention to modernizing the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military.
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3-102/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 Still, Garrett and many other experts on the Chinese military caution that it would be a mistake to exaggerate China's current capabilities or to think of it as a current threat to the United States.
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3-103/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 The Defense Department is hoping to persuade China to increase its "transparency," and open its books to allow the world to see how much it is truly spending on the military, a Pentagon spokesman said yesterday. A mission led by a senior Pentagon official visited China in December and "did a display of transparency of our forces and intentions," the spokesman said. By the end of the month, the Chinese "are to reciprocate" with a mission to display their own forces and intentions, he said.
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3-104/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p. 428; THR VT96
	 Three issues will be of key importance in such dialogues in the years to come. First, there is a need to improve military transparency concerning defense budgets and military expenditures; force structures and order-of-battle; defense doctrines; arsenals; and deployments. This especially applies to China, whose military establishment is extremely opaque. China's intentions and capabilities require clarification. Second, there is a need to discuss national arms procurement policies, force modernization programs, and foreign weapons purchases. Regional militaries may indeed require modernization, but the process has set the stage for an arms race. If a classic action-reaction spiral is to be avoided, force procurements must be discussed multilaterally and external suppliers must show restraint. Third, territorial disputes must be opened to multilateral discussion and resolution.
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 3-105/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 24; MDS VT96
	 It wouldn't be so worrisome if China lay still. But instead, the country is on the move, building up its army and asserting its claim to distant comers of neighboring seas. Making matters worse, China has cloaked its military build-up and territorial claims behind a wall of secrecy and obfuscation, letting the fears of some outsiders run unchecked.
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 3-106/Harlan W. Jencks, Research associate with the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 76 ;ANA VT96
	 The early 1990s are witnessing the most spectacular buyer's market in arms since 1945. There is a global glut of state-of-the-art weapons. Worldwide, sellers of military equipment are cutting prices and offering unprecedented bargains. Large percentages of sale prices are routinely covered by offsets and counter-trade; many deals include coproduction arrangements and transfers of sophisticated technology to buyer countries. The latter are spawning still more competition, as new armament industries emerge in India, Egypt, Iran, and Taiwan. The situation has created unique opportunities for the states of East Asia, especially the PRC, the ROC, and the ASEAN states. These states deferred military equipment modernization during the 1980s because of other budgetary priorities. Beginning about 1989, however, they began to take advantage of the emerging buyer's market to modernize forces that had been allowed to deteriorate over the previous decade. Thus, it is misleading to say there is an "arms race" in Southeast Asia. Military buildups are taking place--not in response to each other, but in response to market opportunities.
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3-107/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 The report [Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs] warns: "Although China's leaders insist that their military build-up is defensive and commensurate with China's overall growth, others in the region cannot be certain of China's intentions, particularly in this period of leadership transition.
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3-108/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 " China's military modernisation effort is in an early stage, and its long-term goals are unclear" and Beijing has "territorial disputes with several neighboring states", notes the [Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs] report. Hence, "absent a better understanding of China's plans, capabilities and intentions, other Asian nations may feel a need to respond to China's military power". This will be particularly true as China "modernises its strategic forces, naval assets and other forces capable of power projection".
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3-109/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 No domino theory anymore, but still daunting: the new Pentagon report suggests that China has the potential to disturb the balance of power in the region and become a military threat to its neighbours and the United States
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3-110 / The Economist, June 11, 1994, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: China's new model army//MDS-VT96
	 The extra money is therefore going on faster-moving troops and on naval equipment. The Chinese navy is being transformed from a "brown-water" navy, of the sort that potters around coastlines, to a longer-range "blue-water" navy. Concern about his development is reflected in the corresponding increase in spending among CHina's neighbours. 
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3-111/ Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
	 On the other hand, should China succeed in its coastal development and decide to use Hong Kong, soon to revert to Chinese sovereignty, as a base for military advance to the South China Sea and then to the Pacific and indian Oceans, tensions would inevitably emerge between China and maritime Asian nations.
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3-112/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.429; THR VT96
	 Rapidly growing economies and military establishments will inevitably shift the regional balance of power. The main catalyst for a reconfigured balance will be China's growing power. Japan does not seek to be a dominant regional power, but China does. China's growing strength will likely stimulate an informal alignment of offshore nations to contain continental Chinese power.
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3-113/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-71; THR VT96
	 Beijing's claim that the entire South China Sea is Chinese territory is legally and historically flimsy. But the realities of China's size and military power make Chinese domination of the South China Sea virtually certain. As the Sea becomes a Chinese lake and the nations of Southeast Asia adjust to a Chinese military presence that in some cases will be just offshore, the balance of power in Asia is going to shift. The United States can live with this historical shift if it succeeds in convincing China not to overplay its hand. Clearly there is little standing in the way of China's routing Vietnam from its island bases, even though this would cause alarm in the region. But if Chinese forces were to attack and wipe out a Malaysian or Philippine island garrison, for example, all of Southeast Asia would be compelled to treat China as a hostile power. Japan also would feel threatened and vulnerable, since Japan views Southeast Asia as a vital market and source of raw materials and has huge investments there. These U.S. friends wouldn't expect us to go to war to wrest back the islands, but they would ask us to forge closer military ties and to join them in diplomatic and economic actions aimed at punishing China. If we did any less, we would have little choice but to give up our military access agreements with countries like Singapore and limp back across the Pacific to Hawaii. "
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3-114/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-29-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan to reaffirm 'future-oriented' ties with China; ACS VT96
	 The Japanese premier is also expected to express misgivings about China's fast-paced increases in military spending in recent years and call for more transparency in the outlays. Beijing's military expenditure rises are widely seen as a threat to the security in Southeast Asia.
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3-115/ Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia-Pacific countries to make defense policies public; ACS VT96
	 Anxiety over China's increasing defense spending and its continuation of nuclear testing is particularly strong in the region, it [Nihon Keizai Shimbun] said. The paper [Nihon Keizai Shimbun] quoted a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official as saying it is essential to increase the transparency of military strength to build a new security framework in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War period.
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3-116/ Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Japan, too, is moderately concerned that revived Chinese nationalism could lead to territorial disputes with the PRC over the Senkaku Islands. Although there is little sense of immediate danger for either Japan or Southeast Asia, the level of anxiety in Southeast Asian capitals has clearly increased recently, and for the first time since the 1970s the notion of China as a threat to the region is gaining currency. China has long looked upon Southeast Asia as an integral part of its security environment and therefore as a region where it is entitled to exercise preeminent influence. 
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3-117/ GEBE MARTINEZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1995, SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; HEADLINE: ROHRABACHER WANTS TO SEND CHINA A MESSAGE; ACS VT96
	 In addition to "bullying their neighbors to grab the oil-rich Spratly Islands," Rohrabacher said, China is "in a slow-motion takeover of Burma."
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3-118/ Aung Hla Tun, Reuters World Service, December 28, 1994, HEADLINE: Li says Burma trip success, denies military aims//MDS-VT96
	 A key fear is that China's growing blue-water navy will gain access to Burma's Indian Ocean naval ports, expanding Beijing's military influence near major international shipping lanes. 
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3-119/ Aung Hla Tun, Reuters World Service, December 28, 1994, HEADLINE: Li says Burma trip success, denies military aims//MDS-VT96
	 But some Rangoon-based diplomats said they felt it was unlikely the independent-minded Burmese -- themselves wary of over-reliance on China -- would grant such access. 
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3-120/ Sheila Tefft, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1994, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Beijing Attempts To Gain a Toehold In Southern Asia//MDS-VT96
	 AS their neighbors watch uneasily, China and Burma are building a trade and military nexus that is expected to strengthen during a visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng this week. 
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3-121/ Sheila Tefft, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1994, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Beijing Attempts To Gain a Toehold In Southern Asia//MDS-VT96
	 In exchange, Beijing has won valuable access to sensitive military installations along the Bay of Bengal. In this quest to establish a blue-water navy, China is reportedly building a naval base along Burma's southern coast, while a Chinese-supplied radar post in the Coco Islands allows monitoring of maritime traffic in the area's heavily traveled sea lanes. China also has proposed expanding a port at Kyaukpyu on Ramree Island. 
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3-122/ Rajiv Chandra Inter Press Service, December 26, 1994, HEADLINE: CHINA-BURMA: BLOOMING FRIENDSHIP WORRIES NEIGHBORS//MDS-VT96
	 Some regional analysts point out that the Chinese headway in Burma has given its southern landlocked province of Yunnan access to Indian Ocean routes to vital markets in the Middle East.
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3-123/ Rajiv Chandra Inter Press Service, December 26, 1994, HEADLINE: CHINA-BURMA: BLOOMING FRIENDSHIP WORRIES NEIGHBORS//MDS-VT96
	 China is already reported to be building a naval base along Burma's southern coast while a Chinese-supplied radar post in the Coco Islands allows monitoring of maritime traffic in the area's heavily travelled sea-lanes. 
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 3-124/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 266 ;SEG VT96
	 China is also the military mainstay of yet another international outcast, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council in Myanmar (Burma). Arms deliveries to the junta have topped $1 billion, and include tanks, armored personnel carriers, and multiple rocket launcher systems, presumably for use in counterinsurgency operations. A joint venture factory was constructed in Myanmar for the manufacture of machine guns and ammunition. China also assisted in the building of three highways from the border of Yunnan province into Myanmar; Burmese dissidents worry that Beijing could use these as invasion routes in a takeover of their country. The Chinese military has supplied Myanmar's air force with A5-M ground attack planes suitable for counterinsurgency activities, and F-7 fighters. But its neighbor’s navy most interests the PLA: the regime in Myanmar can provide China with an outlet to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Hainan-class fast attack craft and support personnel began arriving in Myanmar in 1991, and several existing naval bases in the country are being improved, including those in Mergui and the Cocos Islands. New Chinese-made radars have been installed in the Cocos base, which will allow China's intelligence personnel to better monitor the area.
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 3-125/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 266 ;SEG VT96
	 These activities have caused concern in many countries. China's presence in the Cocos Islands is particularly troublesome to India, which has a naval base of its own in nearby Port Blair and considers the Indian Ocean part of its preserve. India's invitation to Indonesia to take part in joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean this year may be an attempt to create cooperation to counter what is perceived as a growing common threat; Indonesia has long been wary of Chinese expansionism at its expense. The increasing capabilities of China's navy have also aroused apprehension among the many countries that contest the ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea with China. 71
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3-126/ Xinhua News Agency, JULY 11, 1994, HEADLINE: china supports making indian ocean peace zone//MDS-VT96
	 china hopes that the goal of the indian ocean region as a zone of peace can be achieved at an early date, chinese representative li zhaoxing told the u.n. ad hoc committee on the indian ocean today. 
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3-127/ Xinhua News Agency, JULY 11, 1994, HEADLINE: china supports making indian ocean peace zone//MDS-VT96
	 ambassador li, china's permanent representative to the u.n., today briefed the committee on china's stand on the issue. " china has consistently supported the efforts of the states of the indian ocean region to safeguard their national independence, sovereignty and regional peace, security and stability," he said. " china has supported these states in their common desire and active efforts concerning the establishment of the indian ocean as a zone of peace, hoping that this goal can be achieved at an early date in order to contribute to the peace, security and stability of the region and the world," he went on. 
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 3-128/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 268 ;SEG VT96
	 Naval vessels have even stopped foreign ships in international waters, forced them into military ports, and off-loaded their cargoes for resale. After 16 Russian vessels were attacked in the East China Sea early last year, Moscow began deploying warships in the area, which ended the problem for its ships. For vessels from other countries--particularly those flying flags of convenience like Panama's or Liberia's, which could not expect protection from those nations' navies--problems continued. After a representative of the International Maritime Organization visited Beijing, China announced new regulations for registering its own vessels and for boarding and inspecting ships. But given the many ways in which units can evade these, it would be naive to assume the piracy problem has been resolved.
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3-129/ Rocky Mountain News, December 18, 1994, B; Pg. 28A, HEADLINE: Faceoff with China reported American officials acknowledge serious confrontation at sea, BYLINE: Reuter//MDS-VT96
	 The U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and a Chinese nuclear submarine squared off this fall in an encounter that demonstrated the growing potential for naval conflict between the United States and China, the Los Angeles Times reported. 
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3-130/ Rocky Mountain News, December 18, 1994, B; Pg. 28A, HEADLINE: Faceoff with China reported American officials acknowledge serious confrontation at sea, BYLINE: Reuter//MDS-VT96
	 Shortly after the incident, which occurred in the Yellow Sea in international waters off China Oct. 27-29, China served notice that the next time such a situation arises, its orders will be to shoot to kill, the newspaper said, citing unnamed Pentagon officials. 
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3-131/ Rocky Mountain News, December 18, 1994, B; Pg. 28A, HEADLINE: Faceoff with China reported American officials acknowledge serious confrontation at sea, BYLINE: Reuter//MDS-VT96
	 The encounter underscored the growing maritime tensions between the U.S. Pacific Fleet and China's growing blue-water navy, the Times said. U.S. officials were cited as saying the Kitty Hawk found the nuclear sub in open waters where they have rarely spotted Chinese vessels. Another U.S. Navy ship encountered a Chinese sub in September but that incident ended more quietly. 
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3-132/ PATRICK COCKBURN The Independent, December 16, 1994, Page 14, HEADLINE: China and US in sub clash//MDS-VT96
	 A Chinese nuclear submarine and an American aircraft carrier came close to a clash in October, underlining the growing naval tension between China and the US. Chinese planes were scrambled during the confrontation and China has told the US that if such an incident occurs again their orders will be to shoot to kill. 
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3-133/ PATRICK COCKBURN The Independent, December 16, 1994, Page 14, HEADLINE: China and US in sub clash//MDS-VT96
	 The nuclear submarine is one of five operated by China and is based at the main Chinese naval base at Qingdao. China is expanding its naval strength: it recently bought four conventional submarines from Russia. The Kitty Hawk was at the centre of a US battle group - including three cruisers, a frigate, and two logistic ships - manned by some 10,000 personel. 
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3-134/ John F. Harris, Thomas W. Lippman, Staff Writers The Washington Post, December 15, 1994, A42, HEADLINE: Chinese Watched as U.S. Navy Tracked Sub; No Protest Has Been Lodged; Beijing Has Withdrawn Invitation for Visit by Pena//MDS-VT96
	 Only later, officials said, was a U.S. defense official told informally at a social occasion in Beijing that Chinese officials were angry about the encounter and that U.S. forces were operating so close to their shores. The Chinese official said the next time such an incident occurred, the Chinese plan to shoot the planes down, the defense official reported through intelligence channels. 
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3-135/ John F. Harris, Thomas W. Lippman, Staff Writers The Washington Post, December 15, 1994, A42, HEADLINE: Chinese Watched as U.S. Navy Tracked Sub; No Protest Has Been Lodged; Beijing Has Withdrawn Invitation for Visit by Pena//MDS-VT96
	 The Chinese have not lodged a formal diplomatic protest, State Department spokesman Michael McCurry said. Other U.S. officials said they have no reason to believe military tension with China is on the rise. 
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3-136/ JIM MANN and ART PINE, TIMES STAFF WRITERS Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1994, A; Page 1; HEADLINE: Faceoff Between U.S. Ship, Chinese Sub Is Revealed; Military: October Incident In Yellow Sea Highlights Growing Chance Of Naval Conflict. Beijing Sounds Warning.//MDS-VT96
	 Shortly after the incident, which occurred in the Yellow Sea on Oct. 27-29, China served notice through a U.S. military official in Beijing that the next time such a situation arises, China's orders will be to shoot to kill, Pentagon officials confirmed this week. 
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3-137/ Omaha World Herald, December 20, 1994 , Pg. 18 HEADLINE: Tension in Eastern Asia//MDS-VT96
	 The incident with China involved the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, which discovered and tracked a Chinese submarine in the Yellow Sea. Before it was over, Chinese fighter planes had scrambled near U.S. planes. China said the next time such a situation occurred, its forces would shoot to kill.
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3-138/ Omaha World Herald, December 20, 1994 , Pg. 18 HEADLINE: Tension in Eastern Asia//MDS-VT96
	 Moscow, however, was never the only potential threat to the United States. China has for some time been working to build its navy into a force in the Pacific. Before the incident involving the Kitty Hawk, however, American forces had rarely encountered such Chinese warships in open waters. 
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3-139/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Philippines to take new measures to deal with conflicts; ACS VT96
	 China claims the whole South China Sea, while the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam claim parts of the mineral-rich Spratlys.
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3-140/ The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 Parts or all of the Spratlys are claimed by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, while the Paracel Islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam.
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3-141/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 A potentially much more serious dispute involves Outer Mongolia, independent now but part of China two centuries ago. At times in this century Chinese leaders as diverse as Sun Yat-Sen, Mao Tse-Tung, and Chang Kai-Shek all referred to Outer Mongolia as part of "greater China," and in 1921 China tried to back its claim by force, but was repelled by Soviet troops. Today Beijing recognizes the Republic of Mongolia, but Outer Mongolians, shorn not only of occupying Soviet forces but of a strong Russia to play off against a growing China, still worry. 
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3-142/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Indonesia expresses concern over Spratlys; ACS VT96
	 He [Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas] said all countries bordering the South China Sea, including Indonesia, have interests in seeing that the region does not become a center of tension. The Philippines, China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei hold partial or full claim to the Spratlys, which are believed rich in oil and other mineral desposits.
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3-143/ BRUCE CLARK, Diplomatic Correspondent Financial Times, November 16, 1994, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Law of the Sea promises many disputes//MDS-VT96
	 Apart from a standoff in the Aegean - where Turkey has threatened war if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 miles - one of the most grave maritime disputes involves China and Vietnam, locked in a war of words over oil rights in the South China Sea. Both China and Vietnam claim to be acting in accordance with the Law of the Sea but their interpretations of the document are miles apart. Over the last month, China has accused Vietnam of infringing its interests in international waters by inviting US and European companies to explore for oil in the Tonkin Gulf. Vietnam has retorted that it is exercising its legitimate rights in the economic zone to which it is entitled by the UN convention. It said that under the terms of that treaty, there were no international waters in the Gulf.
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3-144/ BRUCE CLARK, Diplomatic Correspondent Financial Times, November 16, 1994, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Law of the Sea promises many disputes//MDS-VT96
	 Sovereignty over the Spratlys - and hence control of the surrounding economic zone - is crucial to each side's claim to energy rights, and the salience of this issue is expected to grow as the UN convention enters force. 
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3-145/ Ramon Isberto, Inter Press Service, May 31, 1993, HEADLINE: ASIA: SPRATLYS CLAIMANTS DISCUSS JOINT SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS//MDS-VT96
	 All the coastal countries in South-East Asia have unilaterally extended their national jurisdiction over ocean resources out to 200 nautical miles or more from shore, creating a situation where many of these "exclusive economic zones" (EEZs) overlap, says Mark Valencia, a marine resources specialist at the East-West Center in Honolulu.
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3-146/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan may be drawn into S. China Sea dispute; ACS VT96
	 The Spratlys, a group of islets and atolls straddling major sea lanes in the South China Sea, are claimed in whole or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. All but Brunei have stationed troops in the area, which is believed to contain minerals and oil deposits. Security analysts have tagged the area as a potential flash point of conflict in Southeast Asia.
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3-147/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim the whole of the Spratlys. The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim bits closest to their own shores. Vietnam has occupied 22 atolls and reefs in the Spratlys, the Philippines eight, Malaysia four and Taiwan one. Many of these outposts are manned by troopsand some are close to each other, adding to the potential for conflict.
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3-148/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 Contravening international law, China claims virtually the entire Sea as its territorial waters. Beijing's new pushiness in the Spratlys coincides with a defense and naval buildup in China and the political limbo created by the failing health of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.
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3-149/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 Indonesian officials said that Jakarta had sent a diplomatic note to Beijing requesting ''clarification'' of a Chinese map that shows the Natuna field falling well within a zone of control claimed by China. The map also shows the large Jintan gas field, awarded by Malaysia to Occidental Pertroleum Corp. of the United States, Nippon Oil Co. of Japan and the Malaysian state oil company, Petronas, as coming under Chinese control.
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3-150/ 'Lien Ho Pao', Hong Kong, in Chinese, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 21, 1994, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2106/G ; HEADLINE: the military; "Largest-scale" military naval exercises held off Zhejiang//MDS-VT96
	 The mainland navy has always stressed the defensive nature of its naval strategy; that is, undertaking the defence of its coastal waters and not a global offensive. However, military generals, including former navy commander Liu Huaqing, have said that coastal waters are a strategic concept and include waters under China's jurisdiction as acknowledged by the International Marine Law, such as the Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha [Spratly] Islands. 
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3-151/ Reuters News Service, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos rejects China's Spratly protest; ACS VT96
	 China claims the whole of the Spratlys, a widely scattered group of islands and reefs that are mostly submerged at high tide.
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3-152/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 110 ; CJJ VT96
	 Yet the PRC's intentions remain ambiguous. For despite these declarations, it maintains that its ownership of the islands is uncontestable and that history demonstrates its right to them. This claim was supported by the PRC's Territorial Sea Law (February 1992); further, the award of a three-year contract to the American oil company Crestone Energy Corporation, permitting it to operate only 160 km from the Vietnamese coast within what the Vietnamese describe as Vietnam's Tu Chinh Bank, gives a practical edge to this claim. In fact, recent evidence of the potential for danger has been raised by the statement of the Vietnamese government in April 1994 that the PRC's contract with Crestone represents a 'serious escalation' in the dispute.
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3-153/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p.110 ; CJJ VT96
	 The People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC uses mainly historical arguments to support its claim to all the islands in the South China Sea. In October 1993 the PRC claimed that it advocates peaceful negotiations and wants stability in the disputed territories, favouring joint exploration and a solution to the current negotiations concerning the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
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3-154/ The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 However Muoi (Do Muoi, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) also reiterated Vietnam's claim that it has sovereignty over sea lanes around the two groups of islands in the South China Sea.
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3-155/ The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 "The Spratly and Paracel islands historically and legally belong to Vietnam," Muoi (Do Muoi, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) said, claiming the islands were controlled by the former South Vietnamese government until 1974 when China captured the Paracel Islands.
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3-156/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p.111 ; CJJ VT96
	 Brunei. Brunei claims the Louisa Reef, where the 200-mile exclusive economic zone would reach to the Southern Spratly islands. Brunei's claim is based on the UN International Law of the Sea Convention.
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3-157/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," P-111 ; CJJ VT96
	 Malaysia. Malaysia claims seven land forms in the Spratlys group. Its claim is based on the UN International Law of the Sea Convention. It has a military presence on Swallow Reef, Mariveles Reef and Ardasier Bank.
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3-158/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 Taiwan. Taiwan occupies Taiping island and in 1966 erected boundary tablets on some islands. The British Foreign Office reports that Taiwan is in the process of drafting a Territorial Sea Law. Taiwan has given Hainan Special Administrative District jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands - a somewhat theoretical position as it cannot enforce it. However, it serves to emphasize 'Chinese' ownership of the islands.
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3-159/ Maria Teresa Villanueva Cerojano, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; MANILA PLANS TO BUILD LIGHTHOUSES IN SPRATLYS; ACS VT96
	The Spratly Islands, believed to straddle rich oil and other mineral resources, are being claimed in whole or in part by China, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan.
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3-160/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-10-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. urges diplomatic solution to Spratly disputes; ACS VT96
	 The Spratlys are a chain of islets, reefs, atolls and cays which are believed to straddle rich deposits of oil and other natural resources.
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3-161/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 The South China Sea is significant for three strategic reasons. First, the South China Sea has abundant natural resources - biological resources, mineral resources and oil and natural gas. Several observers have attributed the PRC claim to the whole South China Sea to China's need for natural resources to support its economic growth and feed its growing population (estimated at 1.5 billion in 2025).
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3-162/ JOHN LEICESTER, Associated Press Writer, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Chinese Official Promises All Will Be Well for Hong Kong; ACS VT96
	 Lu [Lu Ping, Beijing's top official for Hong Kong affairs] said foreign judges could sit on the court -- an important encouragement for people who fear Chinese judges may be biased.
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3-163/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-3-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama reiterates Japan's remorse for wartime actions; ACS VT96
	 The Spratlys are a chain of potentially oil-rich islands, reefs and atolls in the South China Sea that are claimed wholly or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.
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3-164/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 The increasing pace of oil and natural gas production in waters of the South China Sea that are claimed by China and a number of countries in Southeast Asia has raised the stakes in a major struggle to control key resources. 
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3-165/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 When Hanoi awarded the block to the Mobil-led consortium last year, Beijing condemned it as illegal. In a recent assessment, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London said that the ''prime attraction'' of the Spratlys for claimant states was the prospect of controlling rich reserves of oil and gas.
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3-166/ The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 The Spratlys are rich fishing grounds for Vietnamese watermen, he (Do Muoi, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) said.
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3-167/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 The South China Sea is a major waterway for ships working the world's most economically dynamic region. It's also the site for several companies exploring for underwater oil and gas.
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3-168/ Graham Hutchings, China Correspondent The Daily Telegraph, July 29, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: China claim to the sea alarms its neighbours//MDS-VT96
	 But a much more serious contest is unfolding in the South China Sea where sovereignty over the archipelago known as the Spratly Islands is disputed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines, as well as China and Taiwan. Whoever controls the Spratlys could control the sea lanes leading to Japan and south China. 
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3-169/ Philip Bowring, International Herald Tribune, May 06, 1994, HEADLINE: China Is Getting Help In a Grab at the Sea//MDS-VT96
	 This is not a marginal boundary issue. Nor is it, as it is often presented, part of an argument about which country owns all or some of the Spratly Islands,the scattered group of islets, rocks and reefs that dot the southern part of theSouth China Sea. Given that none of the Spratlys can support permanent habitation, even rightful possession of all of them would not give China the right to the seabed of the Crestone contract area. Nor can China claim continental shelf rights. China is separated by waters 1,800 meters (6,000 feet)deep from the Crestone block, which is in the shallow water of the shelf joiningVietnam and eastern Malaysia. In other words, the Crestone award is symbolic of China's claim to the whole sea, which in effect would turn it into inland Chinese waters. 
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3-170/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 Third, a crescent of new wealth has been created under the geoeconomic constellation of the South China Sea. The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan and Hong Kong, which are situated around the South China Sea, are rapidly growing economies where ethnic Chinese play a central role. If the PRC controls the South China Sea, it will be able to control the immense wealth of the ethnic Chinese.
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3-171/ Reuters World Service, December 13, 1994, HEADLINE: China seen as key to peace in Asia-Pacific//MDS-VT96
	 Southeast Asian nations fear China will try to flex its growing political influence and military might in the Spratlys, to which six countries -- China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan -- lay claim. 
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3-172/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 The American unease about China is based on several factors. * China's territorial claims and recent behavior in the South China Sea. China long has claimed sovereignty over huge tracts of ocean and over the Spratly Islands, where five other governments also have claims. 
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3-173/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 The institute (International Institute for Strategic Studies in London) warned that the risk of military confrontation with China would arise if it directly threatened freedom of navigation or the interests of major U.S. corporations operating in the region. 
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3-174/ Associated Press, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. Asks China to Cool Rhetoric on Territorial Dispute; ACS VT96
	 Spokesman Nicholas Burns said the United States takes no position on the various claims to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands chain but has an important national interest in ensuring continued freedom of navigation.
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3-175/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Across the Asia-Pacific region, China's many disputes with other countries over the South China Sea have resulted in the fear that Beijing wants to play the role of regional power broker. It raised tensions in early February by occupying territory in the Spratly Islands claimed by the Philippines. Moreover, the anxieties of China's neighbors are heightened by uncertainty over its intentions towards Taiwan. Beijing continues to threaten Taipei with military force.
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3-176/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 Second, the South China Sea is a very strategic sea channel which connects the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean. Domination over the South China Sea will drastically increase the PRC's political leverage. Other countries in the region are aware of this. The recent firm US statement emphasized its concern over the freedom of navigation in the sea. The South China Sea serves as a very important trade lifeline for Japan. Even India, in an annual report of the Ministry of National Defence, expressed its concern about tension in Southeast Asian waters. 
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3-177/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), April 26, 1995; ACS VT96
	Japan Likely to be Drawn into South China Sea Dispute
[CND, 04/21/93] MANILA -- Southeast Asian security experts warned that an armed Japan might be drawn into the Nansha (Spratly) Island dispute in the South China Sea, according to Japan Economic Newswire. The Nansha islands are claimed in whole or in part by China, Taiwan,Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The concerns of Japan's involvement were based on its vast investment and trading interests in Southeast Asia and its past record of militarism and aggression. 
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3-178/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 But it is China's claim that the Spratlys and much of the rest of the South China Sea are part of its territorial waters that causes most concern to Japan. About 75 percent of Japan's oil imports pass through the South China Sea, as does much intra-Asian trade. ''We are concerned about China's creeping irredentism or expansionism,'' said Masashi Nishhara, director of research at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. ''This is a very important trade route for us, not only with Southeast Asia but with the Middle East and Europe. Our economic security is at stake.''
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3-179/ Clare Hollingworth International Herald Tribune, January 15, 1994, HEADLINE: The Uncertainty in China Leaves Japanese on Edge//MDS-VT96
	 Japan is deeply worried about the future of the Spratly Islands, which are believed to be rich in oil and natural gas. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei claim some or all of the island chain. The archipelago lies across the direct shipping line between Tokyo and the Indian Ocean. Disturbances there could disrupt vital supplies of oil from the Gulf. 
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3-180/ Agence France Presse, January 24, 1995, HEADLINE: Japan to pursue "more proactive foreign policy" : official; ACS VT96
	 He [Hisashi Owada, Japan's permanent representative to the United Nations] added that Japan would also continue to support efforts for a peaceful resolution to the issue of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which are claimed in whole or in part by six countries, including China and Vietnam. While Japan and its neighbors may be unable to change internal decisions made by China, it "certainly can influence the environment in which China is going to evolve," he said.
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3-181/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 15; MDS VT96
	 "China does not pose an immediate threat to Japan except for its nuclear weapons. But the trend is there," says Masashi Nishihnar of the National Institute for Defence Studies in Tokyo. "The way they have behaved in South China Sea may one day be applied to the Senkaku Islands. It's a creeping expansionism."
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3-182/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 Yet clearly the Spratlys dispute could threaten U.S. interests in a stable, open, and peaceful East Asia. The worst case, as recently described by Mark Valencia of the East-West Center, would be more frequent and violent clashes that could endanger shipping and eventually involve the United States or Japan. More likely but only slightly less worrisome would be continued stalemate, increasing tension, and the gradual emergence of an arms race around the South China Sea. 
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3-183/ Shi Junbao Inter Press Service, July 15, 1994, HEADLINE: EAST ASIA: OIL RUSH MAY IGNITE REGIONAL FLASHPOINT//MDS-VT96
	 The Spratlys and Paracels are regarded as East Asia's next flashpoint, and experts say the rush for oil has made the situation much more volatile. The strategically located Spratly Islands, believed to be rich in oil and minerals, are claimed wholly or in part by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Vietnam and China both claim the Paracel Islands. 
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3-184/ Marilyn Greene, USA TODAY, February 10, 1995, Pg. 5A, HEADLINE: U.S. calls Asia 'most hopeful' region; ACS VT96
	 Disputes over the Spratly Islands, involving a half-dozen countries, represent "one of the potential hot spots in Asia," he says. Although Vietnam and China have agreed to work toward a peaceful agreement, "potentially, there's a lot of problems."
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3-185/ The Daily Yomiuri, September 30, 1994, Pg. 15 HEADLINE: 2:Yomiuri Shimbun//MDS-VT96
	 China is strengthening its presence in the South China Sea, an area of potential international conflict, through expansion of its economic activities there and restructuring of its administration of disputed islands. The sea is called Asia's "powder house," because it includes the Spratly and Paracel islands. Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is claimed by six countries and regions, including China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Sovereignty over the Paracel Islands is disputed by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan. 
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3-186/ Reuters News Service, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos rejects China's Spratly protest; ACS VT96
	 Security experts in the region have warned that the Spratlys may provide the next flashpoint in the region. Three Vietnamese soldiers died in a 1988 clash with Chinese troops in the Spratlys.
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3-187 / Kyodo News Service, 5-25-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Manila proposes measures to build trust with China; ACS VT96
	 The Spratlys, a group of islets and atolls straddling major sea lanes in the South China Sea, are claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. All but Brunei have stationed troops in the area, which is believed to be rich in minerals and oil deposits. The area is regarded as a potential flash point of conflict in Southeast Asia.
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3-188/ Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 China and the region (The Jakarta Post, Jakarta): While no official comments have as yet been heard from countries within the region which should logically be the most concerned about the incident, it is easy to imagine that China's latest move is being observed with considerable dismay in capitals such as Manila and Hanoi, to whom the possibility of at least some kind of military confrontation with China is more than just imagination.
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3-189/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan may be drawn into S. China Sea dispute; ACS VT96
	 Asian defense experts and academics also warned during the conference that a low intensity conflict marked by skirmishes could erupt in a ''worst case scenario'' over the disputed Spratly Islands.
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3-190/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 At the same time, the continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula over Pyongyang's alleged nuclear military threat and growing Chinese assertiveness on regional issues as the Spratly Islands are seen by Japan and other pro-Western countries in Asia as a threat to the regional balance of power.
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3-191/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 The PRC claim to the whole South China Sea is unacceptable and indicates its intentions which will jeopardize the stability of Southeast Asia in the future. Indonesia is in a position to lead other Southeast Asian countries and countries outside the region, like Australia, in facing the threat. Diplomatic and military means should be gradually based on the principles of a balance of power.
 The principles of the balance of power are not designed to create an arms race or widen the dispute. The principles of the balance of power are instead designed to create real and sustainable peace and stability in the region [.]
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3-192 / Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 The security and prosperity of the entire East Asia would be put at risk, with countries in the region sucked into the clash, whether or not they sided with the more developed world or acquiesced in Chinese dominance of the region, they argue. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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3-193/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 109 ; CJJ VT96
	 The ownership of the Spratly Islands which includes the group, Paracel Islands, is disputed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The PRC is the most geopolitically significant nation in the dispute. The ownership of the Paracels, currently occupied by the PRC, is disputed by Vietnam. The islands are of considerable strategic and economic importance, being excellent sites for military bases and reportedly possessing vast sea-bed resources, primarily oil. The disputes are potential flashpoints and present a threat to the stability and development of countries in this important region.
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3-194/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 110 ; CJJ VT96
	 The islands remain a potential flashpoint. A conflict in such an important traffic convergence zone would have international repercussions. The disputes present an opportunity to test the disputants' capacity for preventative diplomacy and peaceful management. A peaceful settlement would set a precedent for future cooperation and may contribute to limiting the arms race in the region.
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3-195/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 Analysts said that if China continued its assertive policy in the South China Sea, it would drive virtually all Southeast Asian nations to form a common frontto resist Beijing's claims. Indonesia, by far the largest country in the region,would be the center of gravity of any such coalition.
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3-196/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 110 ; CJJ VT96
	 Central to the dispute are the conflicting nationalistic claims to territory. According to the theoretical department of the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth News): 'In terms of resources the South China Sea holds reserves worth $1 trillion. Once Xinjiang [region] has been developed, this [the South China Sea area] will be the sole area for the replacement of resources, and it is a main fallback position for Lebensraum for the Chinese people in the coming century." 
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3-197/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," P. 110 ; CJJ VT96
	 Security considerations are also important, particularly with regard to China. The high economic and military growth rate of South-East Asian states indicates a shift of global power towards the region, particularly in the light of the ending of the Cold War. These rapidly developing countries have been both modernising and expanding their armed forces to reflect their new wealth and power. The disputed islands present excellent sites for military power-projection in the region. The various navies hope to use the islands to enhance their capabilities and China reportedly hopes to improve its blue-sea navy capability.
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3-198/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 The threat of force is most likely to be realised in the South China Sea. Given powerful voices in China arguing that there are good geo-economic reasons for China to pursue a maritime strategy, it is likely that China will continue to push for greater control of maritime resources and control of sea lanes.
 "So long as China's neighbours scurry for cover each time the Chinese elephant plants its foot one step further, Chinese leaders will see little reason to halt their lumbering advance," say the authors. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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3-199/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 The country farthest from the Spratlys -- China -- has also been the most aggressive in asserting its claims. Aside from taking control of the Philippine-claimed reef, in 1988 Chinese troops took a collection of reefs and islands held by Vietnam. Fourteen years earlier, during the endgame of the Vietnam war, China forcibly seized a group of islands called the Paracels, then controlled by South Vietnam.
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3-200/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 China will stay tough on or even crack down on democrats in Hong Kong after its reversion in 1997. It will avoid sanctions against North Korea and oppose preemptive military action against it. China is likely to clash with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, which are wholly or partly claimed by the two nations, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, and may seize some of the islands. The leaders, who have a strong nationalistic pride, will be dissatisfied with China's international posture and will want to be regarded as a great power.
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3-201/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 As China becomes a stronger economic and military power with a growing need for fuel and food imports, Beijing is steadily extending its physical presence in the South China Sea, to which it has long laid claim. Chinese forces seized control of the Paracel Islands, in the northern part of the sea, from Vietnam in 1974. Since 1988, China has occupied at least nine parts of the Spratly Islands, in the southern sector of the South China Sea, including Mischief Reef, which it took in February.
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3-202/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 The tension in the South China Sea has showed trends in the post-Cold War era. The PRC, as the largest and strongest country in the region after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the US withdrawal from the Philippines, is the most dissatisfied party with the status quo due to its very illogical demands in the region.
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3-203/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Of immediate concern to the nations of Southeast Asia is the new tough line China is taking on the South China Sea, which has long been the source of territorial disputes among China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Despite a series of private meetings in recent years with representatives of all concerned parties, including China, to address these issues, China has laid claim to the entire South China Sea and has signed a contract with a U.S. oil company to undertake exploratory offshore drilling around the Spratly Islands. The possibility, of vast oil fields in the South China Sea (as yet unproven) is of course tantalizing to Beijing in light of the PRC's energy needs. 
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3-204/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China has also enhanced its military power projection capacity, including its ability to refuel aircraft in flight, leading some to fear that China may well be willing to use military pressure to enforce its various claims. Its neighbors have particularly noted its reported efforts to purchase an aircraft carrier from Ukraine. 
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3-205/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF , VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.771; THR VT96
	 China is clearly rushing to establish an overwhelming military presence in the South China Sea area that can't be challenged by any combination of Southeast Asian military forces. It has built an airbase on one island that could be used as a staging area for military operations against the islands still occupied by rival claimants. There are credible reports that a brigade-sized, rapid deployment force with amphibious capabilities--clearly meant for operations in the South China Sea--has been deployed in South China. China also has acquired inflight refueling technology so that it can keep its warplanes over the Sea's southernmost islands for extended periods. And there are persistent reports that indicate China will soon purchase an aircraft carrier recently built in Ukraine, primarily for use in the South China Sea area.
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3-206/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Beijing eyes South China Sea with sub purchase; ACS VT96
	 Prime Minister Li Peng said Sunday the People's Liberation Army (PLA) should "make further efforts to become a revolutionary, modern and regular army with increased combat effectiveness and defense capabilities." In a guarded reference to China's territorial claims to areas in the disputed South China Sea, Mr. Li called on the PLA to strengthen border and coastal defenses and "safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the motherland and our maritime rights and interests."
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3-207/ Ian Johnson, Beijing Bureau of The Sun The Sun (Baltimore), October 16, 1994, Pg. 6A, HEADLINE: Perry's China visit full of symbolism, not substance//MDS-VT96
	 Buoyed by strong financial support, the oft-neglected navy of the People's Liberation Army has been one of the biggest beneficiaries, methodically building a presence on the Parcel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The actions are making good on China's old claim to control all the waters from Hong Kong in the north to Brunei in the south and from Vietnam in the west to the Philippine coastline in the east -- an area that includes vast mineral deposits, oil and gas reserves, as well as vital shipping lanes. 
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3-208/ The Straits Times (Singapore), August 13, 1994, Pg. 16, HEADLINE: China "will use' its navy to protect sea resources//MDS-VT96
	 NEW YORK - China will not hesitate to make strategic use of its navy to protect sea resources needed for economic development, according to a military commentator here. Mr Ping Kefu said that the growth of the Chinese navy would give China a chance to become a true maritime state. 
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3-209/ Catherine Field in Hong Kong The Times, August 5, 1994, HEADLINE: China to spend Pounds 3bn more on Russian arms//MDS-VT96
	 Regional analysts fear that China, locked in a dispute with Vietnam over control of the Paracel Islands and the oil and gas-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is gearing up to enforce its sovereignty. The two have clashed over the Spratlys, a chain of barren outcroppings spread across the southern South China Sea. They are also contested by Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Malaysia. China and Vietnam have been the most aggressive in pursuing their claims. 
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3-210/ The Economist, June 11, 1994, Pg. 29, HEADLINE: China's new model army//MDS-VT96
	 Since the threat from the Soviet Union disappeared, Chinese defence planners have been redesigning the armed forces to deal with a different world. They are concerned not so much with the threat of ground attack from the north, but with securing access to sea routes and resources -- the oil in the South China Sea in particular. 
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3-211/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 Beijing has promised not to use force to settle the dispute and has declared itself willing to co-develop the area's resources with other claimants, but its actions undermine its rhetoric. For 20 years China has slowly extended its occupation of various islands southward. It used force in 1974 and again in 1988 to wrest key islands from Vietnam. And it has continued developing military bases in the area. in February 1992 China's People's Congress claimed the Spratlys more forcefully than ever before, authorizing military action to defend those claims. 
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3-212/ Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
	 China could also, of course, revert to unilateralism and build a blue-water naval capability. In the latter case, maritime nations' resistance to China would surface. Those nations may also contemplate plans for joint development at, say, the Makassar Strait off Indonesia, as an alternative to the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Sumatra. 
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3-213/ Beaver, 1993 (Paul, editor of the south China Sea regional security assessment, Jane's Defence Weekly, September 25, 1993, Vol. 20; No. 13; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Carriers key to Chinese air power)//MDS-VT96
	 Last year's declaration of ocean sovereignty by China's Central Military Commission confirmed the country's territorial claims to the South China Sea, including the disputed Spratly Islands. To engorce its new territorial boundaries, the People's Liberation Army's Navy (PLA Navy) has embarked on an ambitious expansion programme which places maritime aviaation and aircraft carrier construction at its centre. This decision has challenged the aerospace industry as well as the country's shipbuilders, leading to a new race for technology. 
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3-214/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 How China reacts to drilling and production by American, Japanese, European, Australian and Asian oil companies will do much to determine Beijing's future relations with countries in Southeast Asia that are becoming increasingly suspicious about long-term Chinese intentions.
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3-215/ Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Of immediate concern to the nations of Southeast Asia is the new tough line China is taking on the South China Sea, which has long been the source of territorial disputes among China, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Despite a series of private meetings in recent years with representatives of all concerned parties, including China, to address these issues, China has laid claim to the entire South China Sea and has signed a contract with a U.S. oil company to undertake exploratory offshore drilling around the Spratly Islands. The possibility, of vast oil fields in the South China Sea (as yet unproven) is of course tantalizing to Beijing in light of the PRC's energy needs. 
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3-216/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 Regional diplomats and analysts are questioning how quickly the dispute could erupt into a military clash as Chinese control over the Spratlys continues to spread. ''At present, it appears to be pretty safe if there is no oil discovery. Oil still remains a remote prospect,'' says Sheng Lijun, a Spratlys expert from China now based in Singapore. 
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3-217/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 According to Vietnamese officials, China recently warned Japanese, American, Australian and other foreign oil companies not to get involved in Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
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3-218/ Philip Bowring, International Herald Tribune, May 06, 1994, HEADLINE: China Is Getting Help In a Grab at the Sea//MDS-VT96
	 China has not yet directly threatened any companies drilling in the waters offVietnam, but exploration vessels reportedly have been shadowed. Worries are growing about China's openly aggressive posture, which may curtail activity in areas already awarded by Vietnam. 
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3-219/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 However, Japan is likely to ignore such warnings and intensify its search for oil in waters off Vietnam in an effort to reduce dependence on more distant Middle East supplies, said Fereidun Fesharaki, director of the program on resources at the East-West Center in Hawaii. He said Japanese companies already have major stakes in three promising oil concessions in the South China Sea. Several Japanese oil companies, including the state-owned Japan National Oil Co., have financial stakes in the Blue Dragon field being drilled by Mobil Oil Corp. of the United States. The field is claimed by China as well as Vietnam.
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3-220/ Graham Hutchings, China Correspondent The Daily Telegraph, July 29, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: China claim to the sea alarms its neighbours//MDS-VT96
	 Peking is also at odds with Hanoi over the Paracel Islands, which are closer to Chinese territory but are no further away from Vietnam than are the Spratlys. Maps produced in Peking and Taipei claim a vast dog-leg of ocean as Chinese, even though it clearly laps the shores of Vietnam and the Philippines. That the area is believed to contain valuable energy sources has made the question of sovereignty much more sensitive. China and Vietnam have both approved exploration projects in the area in conjunction with Western oil companies. There have already been reports of Chinese naval vessels refusing to allow an oil rig operated by Vietnam from being provisioned, and observers fear that the dispute may escalate. 
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3-221/ Inter Press Service, November 16, 1994, HEADLINE: OCEANS/SEAS: WHERE LAWYERS, NOT SAILORS, RULE THE WAVES, BYLINE: by IPS Correspondents//MDS-VT96
	 Five states claim the Spratly Islands, 600 kilometers northwest of Borneo. In 1992 China -- citing its claim to the Spratlys, or the Nansha, as it calls them -- signed a deal with a U.S. firm for oil exploration in the region, over 1,000 kilometers from China's Hainan Island but only 450 kilometers from the Vietnamese coast. Both countries threatened to use their navies to enforce their claims. Gunships have exchanged fire and wandering boats have been forced out of the area. Only last August a Vietnamese gunship chased away a Chinese oil survey vessel. 
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3-222/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 Advances in drilling technology and the rising interest of foreign companies in searching for petroleum reserves in the South China Sea are intensifying the potentially explosive territorial disputes between China and Southeast Asian nations.
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3-223/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 If China were to use force to obstruct offshore oil and gas work by Western or Japanese companies in any disputed zones in the South China Sea, it would setalarm bells ringing in the military and foreign policy establishments of virtually every country in the region, as well as inject unwelcome new tensions into Beijing's relations with the United States and Japan.
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3-224/ Johanna Son Inter Press Service, September 1, 1994, HEADLINE: ASIA: HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE CHINA?//MDS-VT96
	 The intensified exploration activity increases chances for a flare-up. But Eirenberg believes the entry into force on Nov. 16 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives claimants a fresh chance to try forging a joint development scheme. 
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3-225/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), April 26, 1995; ACS VT96
	Use of Force Not Intended for Nansha (Spratly) Island Dispute
[CND 04/19/95] WASHINGTON - In a meeting in New York on Monday, Chinese Foreign Minister QIAN Qichen assured U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that China did not intend to settle the Nansha (Spratly) Islands dispute by military means, Reuter reported Wednesday. The Nansha Islands (Spratlys), part of an oil-rich chain of reefs and atolls in the South China Sea, has six claimants- China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The U.S. has particular interest in the Philippines because of its long-time defense and security relationship with it. China's recent activities have raised new concerns in the area. The U.S. said it is not trying to act as a mediator in the dispute, but it has strong interest that the dispute be resolved peacefully. (Shiji SHEN, Daluo Jia) ___ ___
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3-226/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-3-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama reiterates Japan's remorse for wartime actions; ACS VT96
	 While Murayama urged a peaceful settlement to the dispute over the Spratly Islands, Li was quoted as saying that although China believes they are Chinese territory, it is endeavoring to resolve the row in a peaceful manner.
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 3-227/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p.25; MDS VT96
	 It is high time for us to stop seeing China through the lenses of threat and to fully view China as the enormous opportunity that it is.
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3-228/Koichi Sato, Lecturer in Chinese foreign policy at the Open University of Japan in Tokyo, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "The Japan Card," p. 32, MDS VT96
	 Fear of economic sanctions would have to rank high in Chinese calculations, if only because Japan is China's biggest source of official loans and foreign investment. Official and private Japanese loans to China amounted to $4.9 billion in 1993(actual use). These Japanese loans, more-over, are seen by other investors as an insurance policy because they suggest stability. Were China to clash with some other claimant in the Spratlys or provoke Japan in the Senkaku Islands, official loans-- some 72.3% of the Japanese total loans to China -- could easily be canceled. And if Japan withdrew its official loans, both foreign and Japanese private investment"' would likely follow suit.
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3-229/Koichi Sato, Lecturer in Chinese foreign policy at the Open University of Japan in Tokyo, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "The Japan Card," MDS VT96
	 p. 32 Yet while Japan is not directly involved in the Spratlys affair, its indirect influence is strong. Primarily it acts as an import- ant check on Chinese ambitions. China knows that any naval adventurism in the region might bring about economic sanctions from Tokyo. It might provoke the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force; Japan well remembers the Chinese naval menace to the Senkaku Islands in 1978, which are claimed by Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei. And the participation of Japanese oil companies in the Spratlys further complicates the equation for anyone seeking to resolve the issue through force. For all these reasons Japan has an interest in the Spratlys. And because this is accompanied by no territorial claim, Japanese involvement may suggest a resolution.
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3-230/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," P. 110 ; CJJ VT96
	 The Spratlys dispute is more complex as the islands are occupied and claimed by different nations. The Spratly Islands group itself is made up of more than 230 land forms, covering an area of approximately 250,000 square kilometres. All the claimants are in the process of rapid transition, particularly in the field of economic modernisation. It is widely thought that a major restraining influence is that the PRC has too much to lose economically to become involved in any large-scale military action, which could jeopardise its relations with other countries.
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3-231/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 By contrast, rising powers, especially one with China's proud past, recent growth rates, and enormous potential, have every reason to resist agreements that reflect current power relationships in hopes of negotiating from a stronger position down the road. This seems to be Beijing's approach to the Spratlys. 
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3-232/ Philip Bowring, International Herald Tribune, May 06, 1994, HEADLINE: China Is Getting Help In a Grab at the Sea//MDS-VT96
	 The claim has incalculable strategic implications, quite apart from seabed resources. This is one of the world's busiest thoroughfares, linking Japan to Singapore and hence to the Middle East and Europe. If China can establish a right to the Crestone block's undersea resources, it is at least halfway to establishing its claim, spelled out under its Law on Territorial Waters, to the whole sea and thus to rights of passage through it. 
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3-233/ The Daily Yomiuri, September 30, 1994, Pg. 15 HEADLINE: 2:Yomiuri Shimbun//MDS-VT96
	 The main aim of restructuring the organization is "to turn potential marine resources of the sea into actual economic strength," according to a high-ranking official of the bureau. The sea's oil deposits are estimated at around 30 billion tons, and the sea is believed to possess huge fishery and tourism potential. China is probably hoping that economic control of the sea will help establish its sovereignty there. With the establishment of the ocean agency, the province will gain control over marine resources in the sea. 
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3-234/ 'Ming Pao', Hong Kong, in Chinese BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 8, 1994, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; FOREIGN RELATIONS; FE/2042/G ;HEADLINE: [2]; Hainan Province given greater powers to develop South China Sea and Spratlys//MDS-VT96
	 China's current basic policy towards the South China Sea is to defend its sovereignty there by strengthening management over the area and stepping up development efforts there. Officials from the State Ocean Administration Bureau believe that the approval for setting up a marine office in Hainan Province - which will oversee dual central and local leadership with an emphasis on local initiative - will greatly benefit the development of the marine industry in the South China Sea. The power to handle disputes with neighbouring countries will remain with the central authorities. 
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3-235/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 26 ; MDS VT96
	 The congressional specialist suggests than by setting up garrison posts and sovereignty markers, the Chinese are testing to see what they can get away with, "The Chinese may be probing for points of weakness," he says.-"In a way, its up to China's neighbours to define what kind of power China is going to be.
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3-236/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. I00 ; THR VT96
	 China should promote political as well as military coordination and co- operation. Political and military relations are more complex than economic ones. It is important to set up an interregional coordination mechanism for solving disputes, reducing tensions, and controlling the buildup of armaments. So far, China has given special attention to improving bilateral relations with countries in the region. But it begins to pay more and more attention to multilateral arrangements. The principle of laying aside the issue of sovereignty, cooperating in development, and making use of resources pro- posed by the Chinese government is meant to ease tensions and to set up bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for coordination and cooperation in the region. The South China Sea is considered to be an area of potential conflicts, since there are territorial disputes concerning the Nansha Islands (also known as the Spratley Islands). Some worry that violent conflict might break out if China adopts a power-oriented policy. However, it is highly unlikely that China will risk disturbing the balance of power to the brink of going to war with other countries, possibly with the involvement of other big powers, because this would put the ambitious modernization program in jeopardy.
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3-237/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 Betting that it can push its Spratly claims against less powerful nations without triggering a military conflict, China is concurrently urging a compromise of joint development among the claimants, an idea rejected by Vietnam.
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3-238 Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 '' China can be flexible and could make some concessions on the historical waters,'' says Mr. Sheng, the Chinese foreign-policy researcher. ''But China won't give up its claim to the Spratly Islands.''
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3-239/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "China willing to enter multilateral venture in Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	The three-page report dated May 22 said China is willing to participate in scientific surveying in the Reed Bank, which is believed to sit on rich oil deposits.
''We can always have a good discussion (on international cooperation) as long as there is good intention,'' Yuchengco quoted Wang as saying.
''This is new,'' Yuchengco said in his report. ''China never in the past agreed to international cooperation and international capital participation.''
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3-240/ 'Ming Pao', Hong Kong, in Chinese BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 8, 1994, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; FOREIGN RELATIONS; FE/2042/G ;HEADLINE: [2]; Hainan Province given greater powers to develop South China Sea and Spratlys//MDS-VT96
	 An official with the State Ocean Administration Bureau who preferred to remain anonymous said in an interview with a 'Ming Pao' correspondent that the South China Sea lies within the jurisdiction of Hainan Province and setting up a marine office will give Hainan, China's "large maritime province" , more power to develop its resources and strengthen management, which in turn will help defend China's sovereignty over this area... 
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 3-241/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, 3-24-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 16 ,"Don't tread on us;" PMS VT96
	 Pirates have been given a free rein along China's southern coast. The London-based International Maritime Bureau counts at least 20 attacks so far this year, many by suspected Chinese naval vessels. Analysts wonder if the episodes add up to de facto enforcement of Beijing's claim to vast tracts of the South China Sea between Hainan, Vietnam and Borneo.
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3-242/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 110 ; CJJ VT96
	 Negotiations have been characterised by contradictions, particularly in the case of the PRC. The PRC stresses its desire that the dispute be settled peacefully and approves of joint economic development of the area; but at the same time it argues that its possession of the islands is uncontestable and has passed a law which implies sole PRC ownership of the islands."
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3-243/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 The PRC's strategy itself is inconsistent. On the one hand, diplomatic statements have said that the PRC intends to settle the matter by peaceful means and is ready to cooperate with other countries in exploiting the resources of the South China Sea while awaiting a settlement. On the other hand, the PRC has gradually and systematically increased its military presence and occupied islands in Southeast Asian waters - its recent occupation of Mischief Reef being the latest case.
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3-244/ Sheila Tefft, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1994, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Beijing Attempts To Gain a Toehold In Southern Asia//MDS-VT96
	 With the end of the cold war and collapse of communism in Europe, China has pursued a dual course in relations with Southeast Asia. It has sought closer economic and smoother diplomatic links as a regional front in Beijing's sensitive rivalry with Washington. Concurrently, it has asserted territorial claims through the region and built up its Navy to be the major economic and military power in Asia and as a future world power. 
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3-245/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 A peaceful settlement is more likely than conflict, but agreement on cooperation has limited plausibility and the disputes are undoubtedly a challenge to regional security. The key nation in the region is the PRC. The PRC would seem to be tom between improving relations with its South-East Asian neighbours and asserting its sovereignty. The IISS-Brassey's Strategic Survey 1992-93 argues that '...regional order will almost certainly be based on an accommodation to Chinese interests. The PRC's statements and actions indicate that it is not yet ready to come to a negotiated settlement but do not, at this stage, indicate a desire for a settlement by force. "
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3-246/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 112 ; CJJ VT96
	 At worst the disputes may develop into limited, violent conflict, probably restricted to the disputed territory. At best a useful precedent would be set for settling such disputes. The disputes are in many ways artificial, as there is no indigenous population and there are, therefore, no deep-rooted historical hatreds between inhabitants, such as in former Yugoslavia. It would be tragic if a war should occur over virtually uninhabited islands. A historical precedent for a solution to the disputes might exist in the negotiated resolution of the question of the ownership of North Sea oil in Western Europe, which was also essentially a question of the substantial sea-bed resources.
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3-247/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan may be drawn into S. China Sea dispute; ACS VT96
	 Carolina Hernandez, a political analyst, likened the situation to the brief but bloody skirmishes between China and Vietnam over the Spratlys in 1988.
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3-248/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China says Spratlys issue won't effect sea lanes; ACS VT96
	 China said Thursday the ongoing dispute over the Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea will not interfere with the freedom and safety of international sea lanes in the region. ''China's action to safeguard its sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and the relevant maritime rights and interests there does not affect the freedom and safety of movement of foreign aircraft and vessels through the international sea lanes in the South China Sea,'' a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. Spokesman Shen Guofang told a weekly briefing, ''We hope that the ordinary sailing of foreign vessels through the South China Sea should not be adversely affected by the existing dispute.''
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3-249/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China says Spratlys won't hurt sea lanes, Indonesia upset; ACS VT96
	 China says the ongoing dispute over the Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea will not interfere with the freedom and safety of international sea lanes in the region. But Indonesia has expressed reservations as the dispute, particularly between China and the Philippines, heats up.
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3-250/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China says Spratlys won't hurt sea lanes, Indonesia upset; ACS VT96
	 ''China's action to safeguard its sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and the relevant maritime rights and interests there does not affect the freedom and safety of movement of foreign aircraft and vessels through the international sea lanes in the South China Sea,'' a [China] Foreign Ministry spokesman said. Spokesman Shen Guofang told a weekly briefing, ''We hope that the ordinary sailing of foreign vessels through the South China Sea should not be adversely affected by the existing dispute.''
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3-251/ Johanna Son Inter Press Service, September 1, 1994, HEADLINE: ASIA: HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE CHINA?//MDS-VT96
	 But using UNCLOS or getting U.N. intervention will only work if "all parties are willing to abide by it," Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr. told IPS. He says that while U.N. instruments offer legal remedies, the Spratlys issue "is not susceptible to neat solutions or neat proposals." 
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3-252/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 Thus far the United States has demurred, rejecting Ramos's treaty interpretation and warning U.S. firms that they explore disputed areas at their own risk. U.S. diplomats repeat endlessly that "no one should use force" to resolve these issues. With North Korea's nuclear program, Japan's security debate, and a host of trade issues crowding their East Asian agenda, U.S. policymakers understandably want to stay clear of a local dispute over tiny, desolate, and often submerged atolls. 
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3-253/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "China willing to enter multilateral venture in Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	A separate report also obtained by Kyodo News Service quoted a member of China's National Security Board, Wang Lu Guang, as telling a Filipino official that China would be willing to enter into multilateral development ventures in the Spratlys but would like to calibrate it in order to leave out the United States.
The security official told Brig. Gen. Ismael Villareal, commandant of the Joint Service Command and Staff College who headed a 76-man delegation to China earlier this month, that China would rather approach the Spratlys development issue initially on a bilateral basis with Manila, then later involve other countries excluding the U.S.
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3-254/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "China willing to enter multilateral venture in Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	''As the security environment improves and as the initial Philippine-Chinese development project is already going, China may suggest to the Philippines to invite another country, say Malaysia, to participate in another economic venture, this time with a Philippine-Malaysian-Chinese one,'' Villareal said in his report to Ramos dated May 17.
''The entry of other Asian countries into this development program shall follow this procedure with the Philippines as the prime mover,'' Villareal said. He added the procedure, in China's view, would keep the Americans out of the picture.
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3-255/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "China willing to enter multilateral venture in Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	If U.S. participation is sought, it could be controlled by Asian countries concerned, Villareal quoted the Chinese official as saying.
Last year, Manila allowed U.S. oil giant Alcorn to conduct preliminary studies on possible oil exploration in the Reed Bank, which is within the Philippine-claimed portion of the Spratlys that it refers to as the Kalayaan Island group.
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3-256/ Maria Teresa Villanueva-Cerojano, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Report says Manila must take low profile on Myanmar" ACS VT96
	As a result, China has apparently decided to give Philippine diplomats the cold shoulder and to continue this stance to pressure the Philippines and other ASEAN countries to consider the Spratlys conflict as Asian, another document obtained by Kyodo quoted Chinese security officials as saying.
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3-257 / Maria Teresa Villanueva-Cerojano, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Report says Manila must take low profile on Myanmar" ACS VT96
	China is very much against involving the U.S. in the Spratlys dispute because it sees the U.S. as a serious challenge to its aspirations, the Defense Department paper said.
It added any further effort to get closer politically and militarily to Vietnam must also be reassessed because it may be viewed as deliberately provocative by China, which has deep-seated historical differences with Hanoi.
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3-258/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 In the meantime, some countries, such as Indonesia, which has pushed for a multilateral solution, would like to see the US, Japan, and other international powers intervene diplomatically to check China. ''With the help of the international community, ASEAN will gradually be able to resolve this problem with China over time,'' says a senior Indonesian diplomat in the region.
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3-259/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	 But other Asian analysts say the regional alliance is powerless and divided over the need to either take a stand or ease Chinese aggressiveness by forging closer economic ties. ''Currently, there is no other claimant or ASEAN country supporting the Philippines, except Vietnam,'' says a Southeast Asian policy analyst in Singapore. ''Both Singapore and Malaysia both want to get economic benefits from China, the US, and Japan. So they don't want to see a flare-up in the Spratlys.''
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3-260/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 The position was manifested in the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea which emphasized the need to "settle all problems pertaining to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the South China Sea by peaceful means, not the use of force."
 The declaration was reaffirmed by a 18th March 1995 statement issued by the ASEAN ministers of foreign affairs on the latest developments in South China Sea in the wake of the PRC-Philippine tension. The ministerial meeting of the Nonaligned Movement Coordinating Bureau, which was attended by 98 members in Bandung recently, clearly supported the ASEAN position.
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3-261/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 The PRC expressed support for the proposed ASEAN Regional Forum. The two leaders agreed to communicate frequently to facilitate the implementation of various agreements reached during the President's state visit to the PRC from 25 April to 1 May 1993. Both leaders expressed confidence that the bilateral relationship between the PRC and the Philippines would gain strength. President Ramos and Chairman Qiao agreed to hold more dialogues.
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3-262/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 ASEAN offers perhaps the best regional forum for settling the disputes, although China and Taiwan are not members and Vietnam has only observer status. The ASEAN states base their claims on the International Law of the Sea. The ASEAN-EC Post Ministerial Conference in May 1993 was arranged to prepare the way for a future forum for discussing security issues in the Asia Pacific region. The meeting was attended by the six ASEAN members and ASEAN'S seven dialogue partners. ASEAN has successfully taken steps to create a consultation and dialogue framework (ASEAN Regional Forum).
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3-263/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 112 ; CJJ VT96
	 The development of frameworks for negotiation and the achievement of a peaceful solution would set a vital precedent in this region of rapidly growing economic and military importance. ASEAN in partnership with the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Vietnam would seem to present the best means to achieve this aim. The Spratly and Paracel disputes continue to be a matter of concern to the global community. A non-Asian entity such as the EU has an interest to contribute, in however small a way, to the achievement of a peaceful solution.
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3-264/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," P- 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 In Manila on 22 July 1992 the ASEAN declaration on the South China Sea made by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN called for restraint, cooperation and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Cooperation would include ensuring the safety of maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search-and-rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs.
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3-266/ Inter Press Service, November 16, 1994, HEADLINE: OCEANS/SEAS: WHERE LAWYERS, NOT SAILORS, RULE THE WAVES, BYLINE: by IPS Correspondents//MDS-VT96
	 Although today marks an end to the many years of wrangling with the formal introduction of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), this document will not automatically settle the long-running disputes persist between nations over sea rights. These disputes range from the aggressive exchanges between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea routes to the complex row over the Spratly Isles in the South China Sea that embroils five nations and where shots have already been fired in anger. T
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3-267/ Inter Press Service, November 16, 1994, HEADLINE: OCEANS/SEAS: WHERE LAWYERS, NOT SAILORS, RULE THE WAVES, BYLINE: by IPS Correspondents//MDS-VT96
	 However the new convention merely creates the framework for the exploitation of maritime natural resources by establishing a regime of maritime zones and defining the rights of states within them. It does not set a formula to be applied where states dispute the extent of their territorial waters, and where the nearest land itself is disputed, territory matters become more complex still. 
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3-268/ Ramon Isberto, Inter Press Service, May 31, 1993, HEADLINE: ASIA: SPRATLYS CLAIMANTS DISCUSS JOINT SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS//MDS-VT96
	 Six Asian countries contesting ownership of potentially oil-rich islands in the South China Sea are discussing possible joint scientific research projects in the area, including an oceanographic expedition. This effort to promote scientific cooperation has a diplomatic purpose: to defuse tensions arising from the conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands. 
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3-269/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 In addition to ASEAN, other organisations have been set up, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) initiated by Malaysia which has invited China to join. Indonesia has made particular efforts to encourage cooperation by initiating workshops on 'managing potential conflict in the South China Sea'. Statements calling for cooperation were made by China during Premier Li Peng's visit to Singapore in 1990; by Vietnam towards the Philippines in a 1988 joint declaration; and by Vietnam towards Malaysia in April 1992.
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3-270/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 Japan. Japan occupied some of the islands from 1937 until the end of the Second World War, but renounced all claims at the San Francisco peace conference of 1952. As a regional superpower, Japan could potentially play a mediating role in the dispute. However, its involvement would be unlikely and Japan may well be reluctant to be drawn in.
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3-271/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p.262; MDS VT96
	 Moreover, in Southeast Asia itself there are territorial disputes and contention over maritime rights and interests between Vietnam and China. Additionally, members of ASEAN are accused of attempting, even though in vain, to encroach on the Spratly Islands, claimed by China.
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3-272/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," P- 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 Vietnam. Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands (Hong Sa in Vietnamese) which are fully occupied by the PRC. During the summer of 1993 there was a high-level official meeting of Vietnamese and PRC vice-ministers on inland borders and Tonkin. The Spratlys (Truong Sa in Vietnamese) and Paracels were not discussed in depth, largely because of the sensitivity of the issue. Both sides along with ASEAN agreed that they would do their utmost to ensure a peaceful outcome to the situation. However, Vietnam reaffirms its sovereignty but is open for discussions with all parties. It asks all parties to refrain from the use of force.
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3-273/ Shi Junbao Inter Press Service, July 15, 1994, HEADLINE: EAST ASIA: OIL RUSH MAY IGNITE REGIONAL FLASHPOINT//MDS-VT96
	 "As China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha and Xisha islands and their adjacent waters, the Chinese government finds the above territorial claims made by the Vietnamese side entirely unacceptable," said Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Guofang, using the Chinese names for the two disputed areas. 
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3-274/ Agence France Presse, October 17, 1994 1HEADLINE: Vietnam accuses China of violations in Gulf of Tonkin //MDS-VT96
	 Vietnam on Monday accused China of "systematic and unacceptable" violations in the Gulf of Tonkin, in response to official protests from Beijing over the disputed waters. Vietnam's foreign ministry categorically rejected China's territorial claims in the gulf, charging they were a violation of the UN Maritime Convention and "the sovereignty of Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and its continental shelf." 
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3-275/ The Daily Yomiuri, September 30, 1994, Pg. 15 HEADLINE: 2:Yomiuri Shimbun//MDS-VT96
	 Vietnam and other countries are also pushing development projects. Chinese President Jiang Zemin is to visit Vietnam this autumn, but there is no indication that the two sides will be able to compromise on the issue, according to the observers. 
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3-276/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-27-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Vietnam Not to Budge from Chinese Warning on Spratlys [HANOI, 01/26/95] Vietnam dismissed a warning from China on the disputed Spratlys islands where Vietnamese, with Russian collaboration, are conducting a geological survey, reported Japan Economic Newswire on Wednsday. The archipelago, a complex of over 700 islands situated 400 kilimeters from Vietnam and 1,500 kilometers from the Chinese Hanan province, has been claimed by China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. Vietnamese and Chinese navies briefly clashed over Spratlys six years ago. (Jingping XU, Daluo JIA)
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 3-277/ Roberto Tiglao, staff writer, 6-30-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 20 ,"Troubled waters;" PMS VT96
	 Hanoi has repeatedly disputed China's claim to most of the South China Sea, but the Crestone deal has provoked some of the most furious protests. The Crestone area lies just east of several Vietnamese exploration blocks, notably one called Blue Dragon which was recently awarded to a consortium led by Mobil. 
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 3-278/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, 3-24-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 16 ,"Don't tread on us;" PMS VT96
	 The drilling activity off the Spratly Islands is seen as another bid to stake out the South China Sea. The New York-based Petroleum Intelligence Weekly reports that China has just acquired a Canadian drilling. ship to explore the Blue Dragon offshore oil-field, claimed by Vietnam -- a major escalation beyond the seismic surveys to which rival claimants had previously limited themselves.
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3-279/ Agence France Presse, December 13, 1994 HEADLINE: China warns ASEAN over supporting Vietnam in Spratly dispute//MDS-VT96
	 China on Tuesday warned the six members of ASEAN against backing Hanoi in its dispute with Beijing over the Spratly Islands. The warning was made by the Chinese representative, Ji Guoxing, at an international forum here on sea law, the Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law (SEAPOL). 
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3-280/ Reuters World Service, October 18, 1994, HEADLINE: Hanoi says it will drill for oil despite protests//MDS-VT96
	 Vietnam said on Tuesday it would continue to prospect for oil in areas of the South China Sea it regards as its own and rejected China's protests over its activities there. 
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3-281/ The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 Three specialist groups are working on how to solve territorial issues with China regarding inland borders, the Gulf of Tonkin and the Spratly and Paracel islands. (Do Muoi, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) 
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3-282/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China, Vietnam back negotiated solution to Spratlys; ACS VT96
	 China and Vietnam have agreed in principle on the need to settle territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea involving six claimants through negotiations, according to Xinhua News Agency. The accord was reached Wednesday during a meeting in Beijing between Chinese and Vietnamese Foreign Ministers Qian Qichen and Nguyen Manh Cam, Xinhua said. ''We do not want to see a tense situation produced by distorted facts, international exaggerations and making a fuss over a trifling matter,'' Qian was quoted as telling Cam.
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3-283/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China, Vietnam back negotiated solution to Spratlys; ACS VT96
	 Qian called for ''constructive'' efforts for solution to the Spratly issue, Xinhua said. Cam agreed with Qian on the need for peaceful settlement of the disputes and urged restraint by the claimants, including China and Vietnam, the state-run news agency said. The other claimants are Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan, which claim all or parts of the Spratlys, a chain of reefs, atolls and cays believed to straddle rich oil and other natural deposits.
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3-284/ Kyodo News Service, 5-29-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Vietnam, China to discuss dispute over Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	Vietnam and China have agreed to set up a panel to discuss their territorial dispute over two island chains, a local daily reported Monday.
The dispute concerns the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, both in the South China Sea, the English-language Vietnamese News said.
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3-285/ The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 "It is very important not to destroy Asia's peace and stability," he (Do Muoi, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) said, adding that Vietnam respects the status quo regarding the two groups of islands and will try not to make the issue more complicated.
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3-286 / The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), April 21, 1995, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: Muoi says dialogue crucial to solve dispute over Spratly, Paracel islands; ACS VT96
	 Of its relation with China, Muoi (Do Muoi, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party) said: "It is true that unsolved territorial and border problems exist between the two nations. However, we are determined to solve them peacefully through patient negotiations. 
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3-287/ Associated Press, 5-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Vietnam, China Open Fifth Round of Land Border Talks; ACS VT96
	 Vietnam and China began talks Tuesday over their disputed border, the fifth round in a series of meetings that began in 1994. At issue is demarcation of the 800-mile-long border, with the two sides disagreeing by feet or miles at dozens of points. After years of cross-border sniping and incursions, both sides regard the negotiations as important, although concrete progress has yet to be reported. China attacked Vietnam in 1979 to retaliate for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, causing a freeze in relations that lasted until 1991.
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3-288/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-26-95, (News Global); ACS VT96 Sino-Vietnamese Land Boarder Talks Reopened [CND, 05/24/95] HANOI - The fifth talk began here to settle the dispute over the 1,130 kilometer China-Vietnam common border, AFP reported quoting official sources. The two countries fought a brief but bloody war along this line in February 1979. They also have maritime differences in the Beibuwan Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin) and fierce dispute on the Nansha islands, but this talk concentrates on the land border. (Tien ZHANG, Daluo JIA)
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3-289/ Kyodo News Service, 5-16-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China warns Philippines over Spratlys; ACS VT96
	 China strongly protested Tuesday a move made by the Philippine government in the South China Sea and warned of its growing intolerance toward Manila's actions over the disputed Spratlys Islands. In a statement read by China Central Television, the Foreign Ministry slammed the Philippine military for planning and organizing a visit by foreign journalists to Mischief Reef, which lies among the disputed islands.
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3-290/ Kyodo News Service, 5-16-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China warns Philippines over Spratlys; ACS VT96
	 ''We would like to advise the Philippine side not to misunderstand the tolerance of the Chinese side and return to the correct way of solving the relevant dispute through peaceful negotiations,'' the statement said. ''If the Philippine side continues to insist on its own way and continue to make reckless actions, the responsibility for all consequences resulting from these actions will rest with the Philippine side,'' it said.
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3-291/ Reuters News Service, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos rejects China's Spratly protest; ACS VT96
	 Two Chinese vessels harassed the slow-moving Philippine navy ship carrying the journalists in a dramatic confrontation on Saturday between Asia's mightiest military power and one of its weakest. The standoff marked the first time Chinese and Filipino warships physically confronted each other in the Spratlys. Beijing warned Manila on Tuesday it faced ``serious consequences'' if the trip was repeated.
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3-292 / Associated Press, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. Asks China to Cool Rhetoric on Territorial Dispute; ACS VT96
	 A confrontation between Chinese and Filipino vessels over the weekend was followed by a Chinese warning to the Philippines. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang accused the Philippines of encroaching on Chinese sovereignty. He was quoted as saying, ``If the other side clings obstinately to its course and willfully takes dangerous actions, it must bear full responsibility for any serious consequences.'' Burns called the statement quite strong and said China should refrain from making such declarations. ``We certainly would call upon all governments in the area to refrain from the threat of force or the use of force to resolve the international dispute in the Spratlys,'' he said.
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3-293/ Maria Teresa Villanueva-Cerojano, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Report says Manila must take low profile on Myanmar" ACS VT96
	Ties between Beijing and Manila have been strained since February, when President Fidel Ramos accused Beijing of setting up military structures and sending warships to Mischief Reef, about 200 kilometers west of the mainland Philippines' westernmost island of Palawan.
Beijing also bristled over a press tour arranged by Philippine officials to the area earlier this month and has accused Manila of being the main force behind the internationalization of the Spratlys issue.
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3-294/ Maria Teresa Villanueva Cerojano, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; MANILA PLANS TO BUILD LIGHTHOUSES IN SPRATLYS; ACS VT96
	Manila plans to build lighthouses in the disputed Spratly Islands to strengthen its claim in the region, officials said Friday.
Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino told Kyodo News Service that a budget of 178 million pesos has already been earmarked for the construction in the Philippine-claimed Kalayaan Island group.
A defense official also confirmed that the funds are earmarked in the 1994 budget for the Department of Energy.
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3-295/ Maria Teresa Villanueva Cerojano, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; MANILA PLANS TO BUILD LIGHTHOUSES IN SPRATLYS; ACS VT96
	But defense officials said the structures, allowed by the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China issued at a ministerial meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), will also help the Philippines establish presence and strengthen claim on the islands.
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3-296/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "China willing to enter multilateral venture in Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	Philippine military analysts believe China's construction of what appear to be military installations is a strategy to strengthen its position in the Spratlys and gain a foothold in the Reed Bank. China insists the structures are shelters for fishermen.
China, Vietnam and Taiwan claim all of the Spratly Islands while the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei claim portions of it. All but Brunei have troops stationed in the area.
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3-297/SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-25-95; RAMOS ASKS CHINA TO OPEN UP FACILITIES IN SPRATLYS; ACS VT96
	The Philippines and China remain firmly opposed over their rival claims to the Spratly chain after the three-day talks last month.
Philippine officials who attended that meeting said the bilateral talks failed to produce any movement on the territorial dispute in the South China Sea.
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3-298/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 17, 1995; ACS VT96
	Philippine Leader Defends Nansha (Spratlys) Tour
[CND, 05/16/95] MANILA -- Philippine President Fidel Ramos defended a recent trip by a group of journalists to part of the controversial Nansha Islands, Reuter reported. The tour by the 38 Philippino and foreign journalist was protested by Beijing but went ahead nevertheless. "This is not at all a provocation. It is a civilian operation," explained Ramos to China's new ambassador Guang Dengmin, who expressed regret over the event during his visit to the presidential palace. (Jim YU, Jian LIU)
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3-299/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 That occupation prompted a strong protest from the Philippines, which has since arrested Chinese fishermen and removed Chinese markers and other structures from surrounding reefs. Mischief Reef is only 220 kilometers (135 miles) from the Philippines and well within its Exclusive Economic Zone.
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3-300/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Philippines to take new measures to deal with conflicts; ACS VT96
	 A defense official told Kyodo News Service that among the matters discussed at the closed-door meeting was a strategic assessment paper by security officials which stresses the need to acquire deterrent capabilities in the South China Sea and to clearly define the application of criminal laws in the country's exclusive economic zone.
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3-301/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Philippines to take new measures to deal with conflicts; ACS VT96
	 The Philippine) assessment paper, the defense official said, notes the need to protect the country's Exclusive Economic Zone and to interdict if necessary by means of boats, aircraft and even missiles. Defense and military officials are also calling for immediate release of funds to beef up the military's deterrent capabilities, the defense official said. Next to tiny Brunei, the Philippines has the weakest armed forces among the claimants to the Spratlys.
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3-302/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Philippines to take new measures to deal with conflicts; ACS VT96
	 Philippine leaders agreed Friday to put into effect new policies and measures to deal with such problems as the conflict with China in the South China Sea, the threat from international terrorists and the row with Singapore over the execution of a Filipina maid, a palace statement said.
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3-303/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Philippines to take new measures to deal with conflicts; ACS VT96
	 The National Security Council, meeting for the sixth time since 1992 under the administration of President Fidel Ramos, reached the consensus after Ramos called for ''expeditious remedies'' to correct ''our economic, political and military weakness'' from which he said the problems arise, the statement said. The policy statement could signal readiness to acquire deterrent capabilities to check China's incursions into Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea. A palace official quoted Ramos as saying China's intrusion in Philippine-claimed islands in the Spratlys chain is just part of a ''deliberate and studied effort '' to firm up its sovereignty claim to the disputed territory.
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3-304/ Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Philippine military plans upgrade of missile systems" ACS VT96
	The Philippine military plans to acquire around six to 18 naval missile systems in the next 15 years in a bid to upgrade its obsolete naval fleet, a senior defense official said Thursday.
The official, who requested anonymity, said the Defense Department is carefully studying offers from France and the United States. But the number and type of missiles to be acquired will depend on the price, he said.
The official also said discussions are under way to relocate U.S.-made F-16 fighter planes to the Philippines. He did not elaborate.
The revealment followed a conflict between the Philippines and China in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
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3-305/ Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Philippine military plans upgrade of missile systems" ACS VT96
	The armed forces Thursday activated 10 V-300 armored vehicles and 11 units of 70-footer patrol craft fast (PFCs). The vehicles, which are equipped with 90 MM gun turrets, and the PFCs will supplement the aging naval fleet of World War II warships.
President Fidel Ramos said the vehicles and gunboats were part of a compensation package in the Military Bases Agreement forged between the Philippines and the U.S. in 1990.
The military last week acquired three F-5A fighter planes and five 33-meter patrol boats from South Korea to upgrade the air force and navy through a joint defense cooperation agreement between Manila and Seoul.
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3-306/ Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Philippine military plans upgrade of missile systems" ACS VT96
	Ramos signed into law in February a bill enabling the military to carry out a 15-year, 300 billion pesos modernization program.
The armed forces, said to be the most backward fighting force in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, is burdened with unreliable equipment.
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3-307/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-22-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Journalists Depict Nansha (Spratlys) Tour as "Hair-raising" . Reported by: Tien ZHANG, Hong TANG, Jian LIU [CND, 05/18/95] In spite of China's protest, the Philippines conducted its Nansha tour last weekend. Benguet, an Philippine Navy ship built in the U.S. in 1943, launched helicopter trips from its dock to fly journalists over the Chinese-held Mischief Reef, according to a Reuter report. Reuter called the trip "a hair-raising operation," which was conducted at midnight. The journalists were scared by half-foot-long rats in the ship's kitchen and frightened when its potrol escort hit the ship's bow. Two Chinese frigates armed with missiles were seen at the horizon, with top speed more than three times that of Benguet, which were apparently dispatched to deter the Filipino ships. Benguet turned around to avoid confrontation, and due to an engine failure it was towed to port the next day. A senior officer said that a military showdown with China would be "unqualified suicide." China considers the media trips as intrusions to its territory.
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3-308SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-25-95; RAMOS ASKS CHINA TO OPEN UP FACILITIES IN SPRATLYS; ACS VT96
	Manila urged Beijing during a bilateral meeting in China last month to agree on ''nonmilitary confidence-building mechanisms'' in the Spratlys such as the setting of lighthouses and other navigational aids.
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3-309/ Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos sends envoy to China over Spratlys dispute; ACS VT96
	 President Fidel Ramos has sent a special envoy to China to explore ''positive ways'' to address a territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, his office said Saturday. Retired Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco left for China on Thursday carrying a letter from Ramos to Chinese President Jiang Zemin, a statement from the presidential palace said.
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3-310/ Kyodo News Service, 5-25-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Manila proposes measures to build trust with China; ACS VT96
	 The Philippines has proposed a set of confidence-building measures to China to ease growing tension over their territorial claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, a senior government official said Thursday. The proposals include fostering relations among local governments and expanding trade between the southern Chinese island province of Hainan and the central Philippine island of Cebu to an annual volume of 1 billion dollars, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
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3-311/ Kyodo News Service, 5-25-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Manila proposes measures to build trust with China; ACS VT96
	 President Fidel Ramos' special envoy, retired Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco, submitted the scheme to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during a mission to China last week aimed at exploring positive ways to address the territorial dispute. Bilateral relations were strained earlier this year as the Philippines accused China of having illegally set up structures on Mischief Reef which is within the Philippine-claimed Kalayaan Island group.
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3-312 / Reuters News Service, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos rejects China's Spratly protest; ACS VT96
	 Philippine President Fidel Ramos today brushed aside China's denunciation of a media tour to the disputed Spratly Islands and called on Beijing to peacefully settle the dispute with all countries in the area. Ramos told his weekly news conference the May 11 to 16 trip by 39 Filipino and foreign journalists to Mischief Reef, occupied by China and claimed by Manila, was not meant to provoke Beijing. ``This was non-provocative, non-confrontational, entirely peaceful,'' he told reporters. ``This is an exercise of our freedom of expression,'' Ramos said of the tour, arranged by the Philippine Defence Department.
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3-313/ Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos sends envoy to China over Spratlys dispute; ACS VT96
	 In his letter dated April 14, Jiang proposed that China and the Philippines jointly develop the disputed area. Ramos, however, made it clear to Guan that any development of the area must involve other claimants and other countries concerned.
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3-314/ Kyodo News Service, 5-25-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Manila proposes measures to build trust with China; ACS VT96
	 Political analysts said Manila decided on a policy of trust-building after realizing that other claimant nations do not support escalating the island row.
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3-315/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "China willing to enter multilateral venture in Spratlys"; ACS VT96
	China wants to be involved in development of the oil-rich Reed Bank within the Philippine claim in the Spratly Islands, and is willing to consider international cooperation and capital participation in the project, according to a report obtained by Kyodo News Service.
Special envoy to China Alfonso Yuchengco, in a report to President Fidel Ramos, said Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan informed him in a meeting in Beijing on May 19 that China has already nominated China National Off Shore Oil Corp. to enter into a joint venture with Filipino partners.
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3-316/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. 111 ; CJJ VT96
	 The Philippines have a military presence in the Spratlys, including an airstrip. The PRC has reportedly agreed not to attack Philippine troops based in the Spratlys. President Ramos was informed by Chairman Qiao Shi of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress at a meeting in Malacanang in the summer of 1993 that the PRC is determined to contribute to maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Chairman Qiao remarked that the PRC is 'ready to get involved in cooperation on the basis of policies which are viewed as the common programme of all ASEAN countries.'
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 3-317/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 Beijing's claim against Indonesia, which has not been precisely delimited, is evidently linked to its assertion of sovereignty over the Spratlys several hundred kilometers northeast of the Natuna Islands.
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3-318 / Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 Indonesia has no claim to the Spratlys but has been sponsoring talks between the countries that do in an effort to promote a settlement.
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3-319/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 Writing in the Jakarta Post, Dino Patti Djalal, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry official, said that China's intentions towards Southeast Asia were ''now increasingly measured'' in terms of its actions in the South China Sea. Mr. Djalal said that when combined with China's ''intimidating size,'' population of over 1.2 billion people, economic resources, political clout and potential military might, this created a factor that ''no long-term strategic planners in this region could ignore.''
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3-320/ Kyodo News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Indonesia expresses concern over Spratlys; ACS VT96
	 Indonesia expressed concern Thursday over recent developments in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, urging claimants to meet to avoid military means to resolve the dispute. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas told reporters that this is not the era in which to strengthen military power in the reach for certain aims.
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3-321/ Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune, April 24, 1995, HEADLINE: A Struggle For Region's Resources; Neighbors See Dispute Over South China Sea And Its Oil as Key Test; ACS VT96
	 In the most recent reaction to the sweeping Chinese claim to control in the region, Indonesia has served notice that it will strongly resist any attempt by Beijing to claim ownership of a giant natural gas field being developed with Exxon Corp. in the South China Sea. Indonesia said that it would increase air patrols around the Natuna Islands, its northernmost territory, to protect the gas field being developed by Exxon and Pertamina, the Indonesian state petroleum company, in a $35 billion project The field, about 230 kilometers northeast of Natuna, is estimated to contain 45 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas, making it one of the world's largest offshore gas fields.
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3-322/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 Indonesia has taken strategic steps to face instability in the South China Sea. Indonesia plans to turn Greater Natuna Island into the largest resettlement location. The government will cooperate with the private sector in opening palm oil and rubber plantations and raising prawns and fish to feed the resettlers. A palm oil plantation covering an area of 15,000 ha will reportedly be opened to support 10,000 resettler families. The efforts will reaffirm Indonesia's sovereignty and the islands will serve as an outer defence line.
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3-323/ Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 Meanwhile, air patrols in the Natuna Islands and their surrounding waters will be further increased. The air force can use F-5 and F-16 fighters based in Medan, A-4 fighters in Pakanbaru, and Boeing-737 and Nomad surveillance aircraft stationed in Ujungpandang. Greater Natuna Island itself has a runway on which F-5 fighters can land. Next year, Indonesia will receive 18 Hawk fighters from Britain and there have been plans to increase the number of Hawk aircraft. The purchase of former East German warships is also a strategic measure. 
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3-324 / Arto Suryodipuro, 'Kompas RADIO', Jakarta, in Indonesian 22 May 95 pp 4,5, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 24, 1995, Wednesday, HEADLINE: FOREIGN RELATIONS; Indonesian strategy in dispute with China over Natuna islands outlined; ACS VT96
	 Indonesia also adopts a preventive diplomacy and takes confidence-building measures to face the unending dispute (in the South China Sea). Indonesia has held a series of workshops on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea. The workshops were held in Bali (1990), Bandung (1991), Yogyakarta (1992), Surabaya (1993) and Bukittinggi (1994) respectively.
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3-325 / Reuters News Service, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ramos rejects China's Spratly protest; ACS VT96
	 He (Ramos) said China should heed the calls by the United States and the European Union for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that the waters in the area should be open for use by all nations. Beijing should also take a more constructive role in a series of workshops aimed at bridging differences over the Spratlys that have been initiated by Indonesia, a Filipino diplomat said.
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3-326/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-10-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. urges diplomatic solution to Spratly disputes; ACS VT96
	 It voiced strong opposition to the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims to the islands, disputed wholly or in part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei.
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3-327/ Cameron W. Barr and Sheila Tefft, Staff writers of The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 1995, Pg. 6; HEADLINE: Uneasy Silence Hangs Over China's Grab; ACS VT96
	Some Asians worry about lack of US reaction to Chinese taking of a reef In late January, a new instance of Chinese territorial expansion was discovered. A Filipino fisherman reported being detained by Chinese sailors on a South China Sea reef claimed by the Philippines. A Chinese spokesman acknowledged that '' China's local fishing authorities have set up facilities at Meijijiao (Mischief Shoal, as it is called by the Philippines) to provide shelter for their fishing vessels.'' Hanoi officials were concerned immediately, since China had forcibly taken Vietnamese territory in the region before. ''We consider this a grave action,'' says a Vietnamese foreign ministry official. And he called the reaction of the US and Japan, the only two countries with the military might to oppose China, ''very weak.''
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3-328/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 27-28, 1995; ACS VT96
	Malaysian Navy Opens Fire on Chinese Fishing Boat
[CND, 03/26/95] KUALA LUMPUR - Last Thursday, Malasian Navy patrol boats opened fire on a Chinese trawler Swee Yee off Malaysia's southern Sarawak state, AFP reported. A senior police official Ramli Yusof said: "We had to stop them. They were trying to run into regional waters". Four of the 16 crew members aboard the fishing boat were "slightly injured". Ramly said they found five AK-47 rifles, a machine gun and some ammunition aboard the trawler. These weapons were licensed by the Chinese government for protection against pirates. Sources said these fishermen would be fined up to 10,000 ringgit (4,000 dollars) each. (Tien ZHANG, Daluo JIA) 
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CHAPTER FOUR
 HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
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Editor: Steve Woods
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STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRC
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A. Human Rights not being met
	1. In General 1-2
	2. Crackdown on dissidents is occurring 3-8
	3. Organ harvesting occurring 9-14
	4. Religion is oppressed 15-19
	5. Farmers 20-21
	6. Laborers 22-24
	7. Miscellaneous 25-28
B. PRC reforms are a sham
	1. Progress slow 29-31
	2. Not real reform 32-38
	3. Government not apt to change 39-43
C. PRC Has made advances
	1. In general 44-50
	2. Prison Labor
	3. Societal reforms 54-55
D. No Human Rights crisis in PRC 56-59
E. Dissidents active in PRC 60-62
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THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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A. Human Rights are a constant, no unique "Asian" perspective 63-68
B. There is no Constant concept of Human Rights 69-74
C. US application of Human Rights is Ethnocentric 74a-75
D. PRC focuses on Collective versus Individual Rights
	1. PRC concept provides for Human Rights 76-78
	2. PRC stresses different rights than US 79-82
	3. PRC focus alleviates mass suffering 83-88
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POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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A. US concern for Human Rights in PRC not genuine
	1. Overtly ideological and unrealistic 89-92
	2. Is domestic political issue 93-97
	3. Is economically motivated 98-99
B. PRC characterizes Human Rights as an internal affair 100-102
C. PRC believes US hypocritical on Human Rights 103-105
D. United Nations Declaration on Human Rights is Flawed 106-107
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HUMAN RIGHTS AND STABILITY
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A. Democracy equals peace 108-111
B. Human Rights abuses make PRC unstable 112-116
C. Democracy does not equal peace 117-120
D. Western Democracy and Human Rights would destabilize PRC
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ECONOMICS, TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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A. Need Human Rights to get better economy in PRC
	1. In general 126-131
	2. For sustainable development 132
B. Human Rights will be ignored if not linked to trade 133-136
C. Linkage of Human Rights to Most Favored Nation status valuable 137-138
D. Deciding policy on economics inappropriate 139-142
E. Need Economic development first to get Human Rights in PRC
	1. Economy is the critical factor 143-147
	2. Human Rights progress in relation to economic improvement 148-151
	3. Laborer abuse economic not Human Rights problem
F. Human Rights stance hurts US economy 154-159
G. Should not connect trade and Human Rights
	1. Concept is flawed 160-164
	2. Best for economic progress 165-168
	3. Public in PRC supports current advances
	4. De-Linking allows room for international approaches 172-173
	5. Should be concerned with impact to succession 174-175
	6. Should not disrupt relations with Japan 176
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US ACTIONS AND ACTORS
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A. US is active on Human Rights issues
	1. US focuses on individuals 177-180
	2. Anti-PRC pressure exists in US 181-183
	3. Human Rights part of US policy toward PRC 184-188
B. Clinton
	1. Clinton policy is good 189-192
	2. Clinton policy is bad 193-197
C. Congressional actions 198-202
D. US Human Rights focus fails toward PRC 203-208
E. US pressure not change PRC 209-211
F. Uniqueness: Some US policies currently pressuring PRC 212-216
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 4-1 / PATRICK E. TYLER, The New York Times, May 23, 1995, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: The U.S.- China Slide; A Relationship Strained by Trade Tension Could Worsen Further Over Taiwan Flap; ACS VT96
	 Instead there seems to be an increase in macabre human rights allegations, the most recent involving the illicit trade in organs of executed convicts and the sale of human fetuses as food products. There are rumors of disclosures to come about the deliberate starvation of orphans.
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4-2 /James Adams, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; Sunday Times (of London), "US-China row threatens crisis for Hong Kong", SECTION: Overseas news; PMS VT96
	 Despite American pressure, human rights monitors say China still persecutes Buddhist and Christian religious leaders; couples with genetic defects are banned from having children; and there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political prisoners, among the more than 10m people in Chinese jails. Many are employed making cheap goods for export to America. China also continues to be one of the world's worst arms proliferators.
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4-3 / JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 A trial in China - if one is held at all - is usually unfair (many leading dissidents having been sentenced to "reeducation through labor" without benefit of trial). Defendants have little opportunity to defend themselves and are almost never acquitted, especially in political cases. We do not know how many prisoners of conscience there are in China, but the number cannot be small. Earlier this year Human Rights Watch published a book, Detained in China and Tibet: A Directory of Political and Religious Prisoners, which details some 1,700 cases. But for every known political prisoner there must be many unknown . Conditions under which prisoners (both political and criminal) are held are egregious.
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4-4 / CHARLENE L. FU, Associated Press Writer, 5-16-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Intellectuals Petition Government to Release Political Prisoners; ACS VT96
	 International human rights groups estimate that China has thousands of political prisoners.
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4-5/ ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 This time, Jiang is taking no chances. Dissidents who submitted petitions this spring demanding more freedom and tolerance have been rounded up. Security in the Chinese capital has been reinforced.
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4-6/ Associated Press News Service, 5-28-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Detentions, Interrogations of Chinese Activists Continue"; ACS VT96
	 Trying to muzzle dissent, Chinese authorities interrogated more dissidents and cut telephone lines to the homes of two activist scientists, a human rights group said Sunday. Some three dozen dissidents have been detained this month to squelch activism as the anniversary of the June 4, 1989, military suppression of pro-democracy protests approaches. Many detainees have been questioned and released, but others remain in custody, the New York-based Human Rights in China reported Sunday.
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4-7 / Robert J. Saiget, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "After political dissidents, who will be next?" ACS VT96
	 The timing and manner in which the regulations were enacted make it clear that Li, who by signing the Beijing martial law order of May 20, 1989 allowed the military into the city, remains unimpeded in attempts to strengthen his political position through the state security apparatus, analysts said. Since the regulations went into effect last July 14, the Chinese government has run rough shod in its detention, arrests and convictions of a wealth of political dissidents, including Nobel Prize nominee Wei Jingsheng, who disappeared without explanation, and the Beijing 15, who were convicted last December for ''counter-revolutionary'' crimes.
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4-8/Nick Driver, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; The United Press Intenational, "China sentences top dissident to two years in labor camp", SECTION: International; PMS VT96
	 Wuhan Public Security Bureau officials handed down the administrative sentence last week and informed Qin's wife in Beijing by telegram Monday, one friend said, adding that Qin was probably being punished for his role in founding the Peace Charter in November. Police told Qin's wife that her husband, 40, now incarcerated in Wuhan's No. 2 Detention Center, will be sent to a labor camp in the Wuhan area later this week, another source said. Other activists immediately denounced the ruling, saying it shows police vindictiveness and the arbitrary nature of the Chinese judicial process. Police can sentence prisoners to labor reform without going through the court system. Fellow veteran activist Yang Zhou, incarcerated for seven weeks for co-founding the non-violent group, called the sentence ''ludicrous'' and challenged authorities to explain the reason for Qin's harsh punishment. "They have to have a real reason -- if this sentence was handed down merely because of the November (Peace Charter) meeting, then the whole thing is preposterous," he said by telephone from his home in Shanghai.
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4-9/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network; ACS VT96
	 [V.O.A. 5/3] Washington. D.C. -- A U.S. Senate Committee thursday heard details of what human rights experts say is a growing business in China of heavesting human organs from the bodies of executed prisoners for medical transplants. Among those testifying at Thursday's hearing was a former Chinese police officer who oversaw dozens of executions. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms says China is the beneficiary of a booming transplant market for kidneys, corneas and other orgnas used to help patients from Hong Kong, Japan, the U.S.A. and elsewhere.
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4-10/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 8, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Chinese Prisoners Allegedly Executed for Body Parts [CND, 05/07/95] WASHINGTON - The Chinese government is carrying on a trade in the unauthorized sale of aborted fetuses and organs from political prisoners and criminals, two dissidents claimed in an address to the U.S. Senate, Reuter and AP reported. Pei Qi Gao, formerly of China's public security agency, and Harry Wu, a former political prisoner, said the govern- ment receives $30,000 for the organs; prisoners are allegedly executed on demand, and organs are sometimes removed from living prisoners. Opponents of Most Favoured Nation Status for China urged the US to consider these allegations. (Heather FERGUSON, Jian LIU) 
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4-11/ ASSOCIATED PRESS, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; CONGRESSMAN CALLS FOR INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED CHINESE ATROCITIES; ACS VT96
	 Wolf cited what he said are credible reports from China about the sale of human body parts taken from Chinese prisoners as transplant organs. And he distributed copies of a report in the April 12 issue of the Hong Kong newspaper ``Express Extra'' on the sale of human fetuses to people who believe eating them provides some health benefit.
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4-12/ DONALD M. ROTHBERG, AP Diplomatic Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA INVOLVED IN SALE OF PRISONERS' ORGANS, SENATE PANEL TOLD; ACS VT96
	 Allegations that Chinese officials are involved in a lucrative trade selling the kidneys and other organs of executed prisoners emerged Thursday as an issue in the annual debate over granting U.S. trade preferences. ``It has become clear that any person in the world needing an organ transplant can catch a plane to China, present $30,000 in cash and receive a new organ within hours,'' said Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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4-13/ NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, 5-5-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China accused of marketing organs from executed prisoners; ACS VT96
	 Two Chinese refugees -- one a former political prisoner and one a former police official -- testified in Senate hearings Thursday that the Chinese government removes organs from executed prisoners and sells them for use in medical transplants in state-owned hospitals. The recipients of the organs, they said, are usually top Chinese officials or foreigners from Hong Kong, Japan, Britain and the United States who need either kidney or cornea transplants and can afford to pay for the operations in foreign currency.
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4-14/ NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, 5-5-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China accused of marketing organs from executed prisoners; ACS VT96
	 ``Basically, they look at the prisoner's body as whatever they want it to be,'' said Gao Pei Qi, a former member of China's Public Security Bureau who lives in exile in London. ``They would take the prisoner's skin, if necessary.'' Gao described a prison system so entwined with China's hospitals that executions are scheduled and sometimes ordered in concert with transplant demands.
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4-15/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 7, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Buddhism in Tibet Restricted [Beijing, 1/3/95] China has decided to halt the expansion of Buddhism in Tibet by circumscribing the number of monks and nuns in the monasteries, Tibet Information Network (TIN) reported Tuesday. A directive, published in the Tibet Daily on November 23, said that there were enough monks and nuns in the monasteries to meet Tibetan's daily needs and that the religion spread should always be controlled. The directive came out at the time when a top UN officer visited Lhasa for estimating religious intolerance. (Reported by Zhiping Yu, Daluo Jia) 
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4-16/Franz Schurmann, Staff Writer, March 27, 1994; Oakland Post, "Religion Behind US-China Rift", Volume & Number: V.30; N.84, Page: p. 1; PMS VT96
	 China is liberalizing much faster than most outsiders realize. Not only is the economy being marketized, but the government is also moving towards introducing some forms of democracy. But in one domain it refuses to relax its tight control: religion. There is no freedom of worship in China. Few temples, mosques and churches are seen in Chinese cities. All organized religion is government controlled. Worship in private homes is prohibited.
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 4-17/CHAN KIM-KWONG, Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, Feb., 1995; p.21 ; ISSUES & STUDIES, "New light on religious policy in the PRC;" MDS VT96
	 As a part of the general reform and opening-up policy, the CCP issued Document 1/19 (1982} which outlines its policy on religion. Presupposing the gradual wane of religion, religion can exist only if it is under the control of the state. Contrary to the predictions of CCP theoreticians, religion has experienced rapid growth during the past ten years. The issue became a major concern of the Party because some of its members were drawn to religion. The Tiananmen incident of June 1989 heightened the concern of the Party leadership over religion; they suspected that foreign anti-China forces might utilize religion as a means to challenge governmental authority, just as had occurred in Eastern Europe.
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 4-18/CHAN KIM-KWONG, Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong, Feb., 1995; p.24 ; ISSUES & STUDIES, "New light on religious policy in the PRC;" MDS VT96
	 Fourth, religious organizations might strengthen demands for autonomy among non-Han Chinese. For example, in Xinjiang or Tibet where national minorities are mostly religious believers, religion could easily be used as a pretext to rally for more regional autonomy. The continuous unrest, even bloody riots, of the Hui (Muslim) peoples in northwestern China vividly illustrates such a scenario.
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4-19/ Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 3-24-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 16 ,"Don't tread on us;" PMS VT96
	 Chinese Christians and foreign missionaries have been arrested under a tough new anti-religion law that bans churches from "destructive, independent, unauthorised or overseas-funded" activities.
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4-20/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 Though it is probable few Chinese farmers have heard of the UN's International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, their grievances spring from the fact that the authorities have denied them many of the rights asserted in that document. In recent years farmers have become increasingly outspoken about problems such as the "three irregularities" (fines, levies, and charges). They have complained to officials, brought lawsuits against them, and even stormed government offices. The most notable incident occurred last year in Renshou, in Sichuan province, where rioting lasted three weeks, at one point involving nearly 10,000 farmers.
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4-21/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 Although the immediate grievance is economic, the underlying issue is the denial of political rights; farmers are hopelessly underrepresented in both government and party circles. It is perhaps partly for this reason that the center seems to be losing control of the countryside, with local party organizations and rural committees paralyzed or able to act only with difficulty. 
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4-22/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 Although the revolution was conducted in their name, these classes are becoming increasingly aware that their fights are being trampled on. In the 1989 crackdown sparked by the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, leaders of the incipient trade union movement were treated far more harshly than were students, which only exacerbated worker alienation. Last year there were reportedly 6,320 strikes and slowdowns (both illegal but often successful). 
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4-25/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 In September 1994, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention announced decisions on a number of cases from China and Tibet submitted to it over the last few years. The vast majority of these were Tibetan protesters and religious prisoners sent to serve Reeducation terms, all of whose de- tentions were found to be arbitrary. Recently Reeducation has become the Chinese governmentUs principal weapon against human rights and labor activists around the country; those sent to labor camps in this way in the last few months include Yang Zhou from Shanghai, Zhang Lin in Anhui, Qin Yongmin in Wuhan and L Honglai from Tianjin.
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4-23/ Hugh Williamson, staffwriter, 7-28-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 20 ,"Mixed feelings;" PMS VT96
	 Although they may have differences on how to deal with China, most ICFTU members have few illusions about the state of workers' rights in the country. A new ICFTU briefing points to low wages and bad workplace conditions, widespread child and prison labour, and a spate of fatal industrial accidents. All independent organising remains banned, and many worker activists are in prison.
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4-24/ Hugh Williamson, staffwriter, 7-28-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 20 ,"Mixed feelings;" PMS VT96
	 The AFL-CIO'S Hutchison says that al- most no one in Brussels thought the Chinese labour body could actually "be induced to change its ways." Lee Cheuk Yan, chief executive of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, agrees. "You can't reform the ACFTU through dialogue; they will only change when the Chinese Government changes." Lee, who was in Brussels with Han, is keenly aware of China's attitude towards free unions. This was illustrated last December, when the Hong Kong media highlighted an internal Communist .Party document that suggests that China plans, even before 1997, to press London to ban Hong Kong unions from forming international links. 
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4-26/ ASSOCIATED PRESS, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; CONGRESSMAN CALLS FOR INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED CHINESE ATROCITIES; ACS VT96
	 A congressman called Wednesday for a U.S. investigation of a Hong Kong newspaper report that government-run Chinese hospitals are selling human fetuses as food. ``If the Chinese government is involved with selling fetuses for profit, this is something the world should know,'' Rep. Frank R. Wolf, R-Va., said in letters to President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
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4-27 / NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, 5-5-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China accused of marketing organs from executed prisoners; ACS VT96
	 Senate committee that as many as 65 offenses now qualify prisoners for death sentences. Among them, said Schulz, are crimes that range from bicycle theft to embezzlement, political dissent and more serious violent crimes.
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4-28/Robert Pear of The New York Times, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Judge supports those fleeing sterilisation in China; Asylum ruling on child policy", SECTION: Sunday Edition; Pg. 8; PMS VT96
	 Involuntary sterilisation as practised in China, was "an egregious infringement on the fundamental right to procreate", the judge said. Accordingly, Guo's opposition to China's population control policies "constitutes political opinion" and thus he was eligible for asylum, the judge ruled. Guo's wife remains in China.
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4-29/Carol Giacomo, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; Reuters World Service, "CHRISTOPHER SAYS CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVES INSUFFICIENT"; PMS VT96
	 The human rights group Chinese House of Democracy, set up by French and Chinese students in Paris after the Tiananmen Square protests, said Beijing was still dragging its feet on human rights. ''Qian said himself two months ago that there are 3,600 political prisoners in China,'' said spokeswoman Nancy Li. ''Two or three are being released every four years. At that rate, the last political prisoner can count on being released in the 27th century. And Qian's figure excludes people in labour camps.'' 
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4-30/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 129 ; ANA VT96
	 Family planning is not the only area of human rights abuses in China. It is illegal to form or join political parties, and in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, thousands of political dissidents were jailed. There are believed to be thou- sands of political prisoners in China, many of them forced to work in labor' camps. Minorities who push for local au- tonomy often land in prison as well.
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 4-31/ Lincoln Koye, staffwriter, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 127-94; "Learning to bow" p. 13 ;SEG VT96
	 Meanwhile, a leaked draft of the department's annual human-rights review on China, due for February release, credited China with "little progress" on civil liberties. A bemused Western diplomat wondered whether these contradictory pronouncements "reflect deep discord within the US. State Department on China policy or an overly clever 'good cop/bad cop' ploy to pry more concessions out of the Chinese." The best of good cops, from Beijing's standpoint, must be ex-president Bush, who sparked widespread speculation by suddenly turning up here in mid-January for his first visit since 1989. Bush stayed in a government guest house, breakfasted with Roy, avoided the press and met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng. The State Department briefed him before his departure and debriefed him after his five-day visit, but denied that he carried and special message from his presidential successor, Bill Clinton.
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4-32/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 Still, in recent years China's approach has not been entirely negative. Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping came to the decision that China had to become more engaged in the subject of human rights to prevent the issue from being preempted by the international bourgeoisie. As of 1990 the pendulum appeared to be swinging back; indeed, rather than continue stonewalling, Beijing went on the offensive. 
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4-33 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-29-95, (News Global); ACS VT96
	 Reported by: Hong TANG [CND, 05/28/95] In an interview with BBC yesterday, a spokesman of the New York-based Human Rights in China said at least 22 people have been arrested in Beijing and other cities for their advocating tolerance of dissent. He noted that even though the living standards of ordinary people have improved significantly over the past ten years, people still do not have the basic human rights of freedom of expression. Another signatory of the May 16 petition, LIN Mu, who is a former aide of the late HU Yaobang, was among the arrested.
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4-34 / Robert J. Saiget, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "After Political Dissidents, Who will be Next?" ACS VT96
	 The implementation of the regulations has been fearlessly mocked by Chinese political dissidents as proof that the CPC is intent on establishing a "rule of law" which can be easily manipulated, while carefully noting that the regulations were enacted only after the U.S. government unlinked humand rights conditions from China's trade status in May 1994. The regulations "have given the authorities legal justification for repressive actions, making the suppression of dissent appear to be legitimate in policy and law," wrote Wang Dan in an article written soon after the regulations went into effect.
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4-35 /Reuters World Service, January 15, 1994; Reuters World Service, "DALAI LAMA'S OFFICE PLAYS DOWN CHINA RELEASES"; PMS VT96
	 The office of Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, has described China's reported release of two prisoners in the Himalayan region as a ploy to improve its human rights image. ''The reported release of Gendun Rinchen and Lobsang Yonten...by the Chinese authorities has ulterior motives,'' said a statement issued by the Dalai Lama's office in India and faxed to Beijing-based news organisations on Saturday. ''It is merely a public relations exercise to reduce mounting international pressure to improve conditions in Tibet,'' it said, adding that the reported Chinese action ''does not signify any basic change in Chinese policy towards Tibetans.''
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4-36 /Margaret Warner, Staff Reporter, and Special Correspondent Robert Oxnam, a former president of the Asia Society, now with Columbia University and the Bessemer Group, a New York investment firm, January 31, 1994; The MacNeil /Lehrer NewsHour, "State of Health; Any Progress; Raising Objections; Eureka"; PMS VT96
	 MR. OXNAM: Robin Munro of Asia Watch, a human rights advocacy group, rejects China's emphasis on economic growth as the highest priority. ROBIN MUNRO, Human Rights Activist: The argument that economic rights take priority over human rights in the developing country I think is, is really a red herring. It is not relevant. I mean, I don't see why a country should feel that it has to arrest dissidents and torture them in order to guarantee economic progress. I think the argument that the Chinese government puts in the U.N. and other bodies that human rights are an internal affair, China has its own standard of human rights, has culturally different ones, these are all excuses that are made by tyrants, I'm afraid. They do not hold water. The Chinese government can perfectly well continue economic reform and at the same time stop arresting political dissidents and stop torturing detainees in Chinese prisons.
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4-37/South China Morning Post, January 14, 1994; South China Morning Post, "US sends a message", SECTION: News; PMS VT96
	 Progress on these fronts has been patchy. But on the highest profile matter of releasing and accounting for political prisoners it has been particularly poor. Those prisoners who have been let out early have tended to have only a short period left to serve and to have been released in small numbers just before crucial deadlines, such as the decision on which city should host the 2000 Olympics. Few in the West were impressed by such tactics. Indeed, the release of political prisoners at critical times only serves as a reminder that China imprisons those who hold dissenting views. The draft report also finds other serious faults, including arbitrary arrest, torture and ill-treatment of political and religious prisoners and continued repression.
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4-38/Warren Strobel, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; The Washington Times, "China told progress on rights is 'test' for favored trade status", SECTION: Part A; Pg. A1; PMS VT96
	 In the last week, China has moved on several fronts, giving Mr. Clinton some of the political cover he will require with Congress to renew its most-favored-nation status, or MFN. As a senior U.S. official acknowledged yesterday, the United States is loathe to revoke that status because it would wreck ties with an increasingly important nation and likely curb U.S. businesses' access to the world's fastest-growing market. There have been widespread hints that the Clinton administration is seeking to divorce human rights considerations from the issue of MFN, which allowed more than $30 billion in Chinese goods into the United States last year with low tariffs.
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4-39 / Robert J. Saiget, Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "After political dissidents, who will be next?" ACS VT96
	 When Chinese Premier Li Peng passed the ''Detailed Implementation Regulations of the State Security Law,'' on June 4, 1994, it sounded a defiant warning to opposers of the 1989 crushing of democracy protests on Tiananmen Square. The regulations, which give the government wide-ranging interpretations over what constitutes ''activities harmful to state security,'' or ''endangering state security,'' have been seen as both a reaffirmation by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) that the military crackdown was justified and that any reassessment of that event is not unlikely in the near term.
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4-40/Ann Kent, Associate of the Contemporary Chins Centre, Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Human Rights: The Changing Balance Sheet," Edited by David S.G. Goodran and George Segal, p65; THR VT96
	 Applying this model of human rights to China, it is not suggested that the realization of 'human rights' has been an explicit goal of the post-1949 Chinese government. On the contrary, despite the inclusion in each of China's four post-1949 constitutions of a section on the rights and duties of the Chinese citizen, encapsulating civil, political, social, and economic rights, China's leaders have not normally referred to 'human rights' as part of their political agenda.
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 4-41/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 27 ; MDS VT96
	 China's government agrees to this proposition, at least in the paper promises of its constitution, which provide freedoms of speech, press, and opposition. Anyone seeking to make use of these freedoms, however, quickly realizes how hollow they are. Wu Shishen, a Chinese editor, is serving a life sentence for leaking an advance copy of a speech by President Jiang Zemin to the Hong Kong press. The charge was "selling state secrets overseas," even though Jiang delivered the speech the following week to a nationwide television audience.
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4-42/Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 37 ; MDS VT96
	 This caution is not surprising. China has recent memories of internal chaos, civil war and warlord-ism. Stability is highly valued, not only by the leadership but also by the vast majority of the population, which is mainly rural. (Out of a total population of 1.2bn, 800m are peasants.) China has also observed developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and has concluded that the reform process undertaken in those countries has resulted in much political instability and little economic payoff. Determined to modernise while retaining power, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow economic progress to be undermined by demands for political reform.
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4-43/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p. 85; THR VT96
	 Serious work will be necessary to reverse the negative impact of the post-Tiananmen crackdown on the progress that had been made in human rights under the Deng reforms. Until a free press 'is instituted, Chinese people will be forced to rely on outside pressures, such as strong public criticism, formal diplomatic protests, and even some economic sanctions, as well as their own internal public opinion, passed up through various channels to state leaders, to improve the human rights climate in China. Therefore, while Congress's political activism in support of Chinese human rights- such as their rejection of MFN and efforts to pry Tibet free from Chinese control (which will trigger recalcitrance) -- is likely to be counterproductive, the increased salience of human rights in Sino-American relations should help improve China's domestic human rights environment.
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4-44/ PATRICK E. TYLER, The New York Times, May 23, 1995, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: The U.S.- China Slide; A Relationship Strained by Trade Tension Could Worsen Further Over Taiwan Flap; ACS VT96
	 Longtime China hands in the American foreign policy establishment argue that a stable working relationship with China is too important to allow every issue of human rights and trade "Do we want a view of China that is centered on organ transplants and infanticide or do we want a view of China in which we can recognize positive trends that have been under way here for two decades and build on those so that we have a relationship with China that represents an insurance policy and is not a liability?" a Western diplomat asked.
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4-45/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. misperceptions lead to disputes: Asia Society head" ACS VT96
	 The U.S. constantly demonizes China, making it out to be a rampaging, authoritarian military power when in fact China is mostly preoccupied with domestic concerns, Levin [Burton Levin, director of the Asia Society in Hong Kong] said, adding its human rights situation is much better than it was two decades ago.
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4-46/Patrick E. Tyler, Staff Writer, January 29, 1994; The New York Times, "Crossroads for China; With Democratic Stirrings Among Chinese, U.S. Is Pressing Beijing on Crucial Choices", SECTION: Section 1; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk; PMS VT96
	 But over the last several months, Chinese leaders seem to be paving the way for some major new decisions on human rights. For the first time in 45 years, they have entered detailed discussions with the International Committee of the Red Cross about opening Chinese prisons. Such a decision would allow Red Cross workers to visit any political prisoner and determine if he or she was being tortured or mistreated.
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4-47 /Patrick E. Tyler, Staff Writer, January 29, 1994; The New York Times, "Crossroads for China; With Democratic Stirrings Among Chinese, U.S. Is Pressing Beijing on Crucial Choices", SECTION: Section 1; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk; PMS VT96
	 Earlier this month, Qiao Shi, the head of China's Parliament and a former chief of the country's security services, toured several European capitals, where he said China needed to learn from Western countries how to establish a rule of law to protect its citizens. The Justice Minister, Xiao Yang, has been talking about the need for China to train tens of thousands of lawyers in this decade to represent companies and citizens in court.
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4-48 /Warren Strobel, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; The Washington Times, "China told progress on rights is 'test' for favored trade status", SECTION: Part A; Pg. A1; PMS VT96
	 Last week, China agreed to U.S. inspections of factories suspected of using prison labor to make goods exported to the United States. It also has begun talks with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross on visits to Chinese prisons. In early January, Beijing released two Tibetan dissidents. The Clinton administration has publicly welcomed the moves, which address some of the conditions in the president's executive order.
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4-49/Robin Wright, Times Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; Los Angeles Times, "China's trade status in doubt, U.S. says; human rights: Secretary of State Christopher declares Beijing's recent gestures and possible prisoner release still fall short.", SECTION: Part A; Page 10; Column 4; Foreign Desk; PMS VT96
	 China has taken small steps in recent weeks. Tibetan political prisoners were released earlier this month in the capital of Lhasa, an area of particularly ruthless control. Talks are now underway with the Red Cross about visits to Chinese prisons. And during the visit last week of Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, Beijing announced that it will allow U.S. Customs officials to inspect five prisons suspected of producing goods for export to the United States, in violation of U.S. law.
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4-50/Carol Giacomo, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; Reuters World Service, "CHRISTOPHER SAYS CHINESE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVES INSUFFICIENT"; PMS VT96
	 China, apparently beginning to take seriously U.S. threats to withdraw MFN, recently announced the release of two Tibetan dissidents and is discussing possible access to jails by the International Red Cross. Beijing has also struck a deal barring the export to America of goods made with prison labour.
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4-51/St. Petersburg Times, January 23, 1994; St. Petersburg Times, "China's new diplomacy", SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; EDITORIALS; Pg. 2D; PMS VT96
	 The most recent breakthrough came on the issue of China's use of prison labor in the manufacture of products exported to the United States. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen went to Beijing last week and secured an inspection agreement that goes a long way toward assuring that no goods produced by prison labor will make their way to our shores. Progress on this issue was one of the criteria the president established last year.
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4-52/Margaret Warner, Staff Reporter, and Special Correspondent Robert Oxnam, a former president of the Asia Society, now with Columbia University and the Bessemer Group, a New York investment firm, January 31, 1994; The MacNeil /Lehrer NewsHour, "State of Health; Any Progress; Raising Objections; Eureka"; PMS VT96
	 MR. OXNAM: The U.S.-China Business Council claims the amount of prison-made exports to this country is negligible. DON ANDERSON, U.S.-China Business Council: Even given most -- the highest volume of exports from prison labor, it couldn't possibly exceed a fraction of 1 percent.
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4-53/Margaret Warner, Staff Reporter, and Special Correspondent Robert Oxnam, a former president of the Asia Society, now with Columbia University and the Bessemer Group, a New York investment firm, January 31, 1994; The MacNeil /Lehrer NewsHour, "State of Health; Any Progress; Raising Objections; Eureka"; PMS VT96
	 MR. OXNAM: On his recent visit, Treasury Sec. Bentsen spoke of continuing progress on this issue. LLOYD BENTSEN, Secretary of the Treasury: [January 20] Our governments have agreed on measures to ensure more effective prevention of the export of goods made with prison labor. China has also agreed to permit inspections of five prisons allegedly producing goods for export.
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4-54/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 7, 1995; ACS VT96
	 First Case of Spouse Rape Reported [BEIJING, 1/2/95] In one of the first reported cases of spousal rape in China, Jing Zhiping a resident of Heilongjiang province has been sentenced to six years in prison for raping his wife, Reuter reported Monday. Jin was accused of abducting and then raping his former wife during a court recess of their divorce trial, with the help from his relatives. In a similar pending case, a man from Gansu province was also charged for sexually assaulting his wife with the help of his relatives (He Du, Chuck LIN). 
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4-55/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-31-95, (News Global), ACS VT96
	 Infant Health Law Implemented [CND, 06/01/95] BEIJING - The Maternal and Infantile Health Care Law became effective Thursday, Reuter reported. Under the new law, doctors will do pre-natal checks for pregnant women to insure the babies born are normal and healthy. The law also bans gender identification before birth unless medically necessary, in an effort to fight sex discrimination in a society that traditionally prefer sons. (Tien ZHANG, Jian LIU)
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 4-56/Yongnian Zheng, Prof. Beijing Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, V109 #2, "Development & democracy: are they compatible in China?" p. 240 ;SEG VT96
	 China's political system is changing institutionally bit by bit if not systematically. For example, China has carried out a local direct election system: delegates to middle-level people's congresses are selected by direct election. Meanwhile, the National People's Congress (NPC) has extended its functions in China's politics. Today it has established a number of functional standing committees to consider and discuss state matters regularly. In addition, other consultative mechanisms such as "democratic parties," the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, and some professional academic associations and research institutions are also encouraged to participate in politics through discussing political agendas, initiating or considering state policy, and providing information for the state's decision making.
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4-57/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and US. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.175; THR VT96
	 This begs two fundamental questions. First, rather than focus upon a nation's civil and political conditions, why not also judge a state by how well it eases human suffering? Easing human suffering would presumably be a way to create social harmony and political stability, especially if it is accomplished within the cultural context of each nation. The promotion of social harmony and political stability are clearly in the geopolitical interests of the United States and are also consistent with the national values it espouses. However, many nations in [the Population Crisis Committee report] do a comparatively worse job of providing civil and political rights, and economic and social rights, than does China. Second, why is the United States rewarding nations who are more abusive than the PRC, given their human suffering scores? What message does this send, not only to abusive nations, but to those struggling to maintain a modicum of civil and political liberties and economic and social ones? In some cases, one might be inclined to suggest that the United States' policy of rewards and sanctions ignores both the civil and political conditions of a nation as well as its economic and social ones. This is clearly not consistent with American national values.
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4-58/Fang Li Zhi, Exiled Chinese Astrophysicist and Richard Dicker, Lawyer, Sept./Oct. 1992; THE SCIENCES, "Portraits of Oppression," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 185; THR VT 96 It is important to remember that, in spite of the government's efforts to suppress it, the pro-democracy movement in China is not dead. Rather it survives, at great risk, in a number of under- ground organizations throughout the country. Meanwhile a host of groups supporting the activists have arisen among Chinese living in the U.S., notably the Independent Federation of Chinese Scholars and Students, Human Rights in China, and the Commit- tee of 100. Those groups and others have maintained constant contact with people inside China, through telephone calls, letters and occasional visits. Outside the American-Chinese community several human-rights organizations are working in behalf of the dissidents. The Committee to End the Chinese Gulag, in which we are both active, has labored to publicize the mistreatment of political prisoners and other abuses in China and Tibet. Closely affiliated with Asia Watch (a division of Human Rights Watch), the committee has informed and advised the scientific community about prisoner cases and helped organize appeals and responses. Asia Watch has issued reports with unprecedented documentation on the crushing of the democracy movement in Hunan Province, prison conditions there, the suppression of dissent in Inner Mongolia, and the use of prison labor for the production of goods exported to the U.S.
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4-59/ DONALD M. ROTHBERG, AP Diplomatic Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA INVOLVED IN SALE OF PRISONERS' ORGANS, SENATE PANEL TOLD; ACS VT96
	 Helms said the State Department also informed the committee that ``the practice of removing organs from executed prisoners without consent -- if true -- would be one of the grossest of violations of human rights.'' A State Department official, speaking only on condition of anonymity, said the United States has not come up with any evidence the allegations are accurate.
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4-60 / CHARLENE L. FU, Associated Press Writer, 5-16-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Intellectuals Petition Government to Release Political Prisoners; ACS VT96
	 In the most prominent act of dissidence since Tiananmen Square, 45 intellectuals have urged the government to stop labeling people with opposing views as ``hostile elements'' and subjecting them to persecution. The letter sent Monday to China's president and the head of its legislature also demanded that the government ``release all those who have been imprisoned because of their thoughts, religious beliefs or acts of speech.'' The petition, following about a half-dozen others to the legislature earlier this spring, is the boldest sign of dissent since the spring of 1989, when intellectuals' demands to grant amnesty to prisoners of conscience preceded seven weeks of huge street protests for political change.
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4-61/ CHARLENE L. FU, Associated Press Writer, 5-16-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Intellectuals Petition Government to Release Political Prisoners; ACS VT96
	 There have been signs that some Chinese leaders may believe the official verdict on the 1989 protests should be reversed. Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin recently made an unpublicized visit to the grave of his liberal predecessor, Hu Yaobang, whose death in 1989 set off the demonstrations. Wan Li, a senior leader who did not support the military crackdown, reportedly has suggested that a laudatory headstone be erected at Hu's gravesite.
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4-62/ CHARLENE L. FU, Associated Press Writer, 5-16-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Intellectuals Petition Government to Release Political Prisoners; ACS VT96
	 Chinese activists and intellectuals have grown bolder in recent months, in contrast to the silence following the brutal military crackdown in 1989. Most dissidents who have tried in recent years to agitate for democracy and human rights have been imprisoned. But this spring, intellectuals and families of political prisoners have petitioned the government and legislature on at least a half-dozen occasions. Police have increased their surveillance of some of them, but no one has been arrested.
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4-63 / George Weigel, Commentary, February, 1995; Pg. 41; HEADLINE: Are human rights still universal? ACS VT96
	 On the other hand, deploying this strategy of "emergent understanding" in the defense of universal human rights against charges of "Western cultural imperialism" does not preclude the possibility--indeed, I would say, the certainty--that some moral claims first adumbrated in the West do indeed have a universal validity.
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4-64 / DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 Is there an Asian view of human rights? There is no such thing as the Asian view of human rights, there are human rights, Razali Ismail, Ambassador of Malaysia to the United Nations. When the United States and other Western countries started criticizing Asian governments for violating rights, this notion of an Asian view was the response. Both the criticism and the response have a rhetorical, or political dimension, they are not predominantly philosophical, Andrew Nathan, professor of political science at Columbia University.
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4-65/ DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 No... Most Asian countries have an interesting mixture of nationalism and globalism with virtually no sense of regional identity to speak of,Samuel Kim,senior research scholar at Columbia UniversityUs East Asian Institute. I don' t believe there is an Asian consensus (on rights)... There' s cer- tainly a collective resentment against pressure from the West, but it would be equally resented if it were coming from Japan, or others in the region, Sidney Jones, executive director of Human Rights Watch/Asia.
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4-66 / DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 However, the idea does represent a reality: a number of Asian countries have joined together to mount an aggressive campaign against Western cri- ticism of their human rights records, to introduce cultural relativism into human rights documents at the United Nations and to discredit human rights conditions on trade, aid, World Bank loans and so on. There was no Asian view until some Asians were forced to articulate it, in response to Western challenges, because of the proposed linkage between human rights and trade and aid, said Linda Lim.
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4-67/ DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 The most vocal and successful counter-attack to Western criticism has come from what Samuel Kim calls, the Asian Gang of Four, Singapore,Malay- sia, Indonesia and China. Initially articulated by Malaysia and Singapore within the context of ASEAN, when China joined the club, new impetus was given to the fight. After the Chinese government realized the potency of this particular argument on an Asian view, says Sidney Jones, [Beijing] became one of its strongest defenders. The rise of the idea of an Asian perspective, says Gerald Segal, comes at the same time as much discussion in Asia about the clash of civilizations, and suggests the extent to whi- ch this issue has taken on a real political dynamic. However, it does not represent a coordinated position, Segal argues, but a transitory marriage of convenience emerging from the various domestic agendas of the coun- tries involved. The political dimension of this alliance has found expre- ssion in a number of global fora. 
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4-68/ DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 Japan and South Korea, say Kim and Segal, found the articulation of such an Asian perspective an embarrassment, but did not feel able to swim against the tide. They spoke out for the universality of human rights,but would not stand up to China. China wants to project the image that all Asian countries are united against Western hegemony on human rights, says Kim, So even democratic governments like Japan and South Korea are very cautious on human rights questions. Rhetorically Japan has accepted the notion that there should be linkage, but does not apply this to China, only to easy targets like Burma.
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 4-69/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 Num. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.173; THR VT96
	 Yet McCamant's invective to find a new analytical concept, though timely, is flawed as well. In fact, it suffers from the same fundamental problems as all the rest of the measures discussed above--they are all culturally biased. Inherent in their respective premises are traditional Western, Judeo-Christian values. This begs a basic question: Can Western, Judeo-Christian values be fairly applied to assess "human rights" conditions in non- Western, non-Judeo-Christian states? I think not. Applying Western values to those in the Orient is as wrong as applying Oriental values to the West. Nonetheless, American policy with all nations is based upon its conception of human rights. Not only will some states never pass muster, those that eventually do will likely have to make some profound cultural transformations. Such transformations are likely to be disruptive and might well lead to a popular backlash--such as Iran felt in the 1970s when fundamentalists resisted the Shah's attempts to Westernize. Moreover, such backlashes might produce human rights conditions that are even worse than those the U.S. policy was attempting to affect.
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 4-70/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 95; THR VT96
	 And cultural diversity,like democracy, is, I believe, also morally desirable, as important for Homo sapiens as genetic diversity is for all species sharing this planet. Cultures are circumscribed at least in part by language, and the linguist Kenneth Hale has argued eloquently and at length for maintaining and enhancing linguistic diversity: . . . I will assume without further discussion that the purpose of humanity is to exercise to the greatest possible degree the intellectual powers which define its distinctive biological heritage, through the mental and material creation of the widest possible range of cultural products. And I will assume further, al things being equal, that anything that enhances this purpose is moral, and anything that obstructs it is immoral. A number of things follow immediately from this. Thus, for example, the oppression of human groups and individuals violates the human purpose. And assuming that both the breadth and depth are necessary to achieving the human purpose, its enabling condition is linguistic and cultural diversity. Only with human diversity can it be guaranteed that all avenues of human intellectual process will be traveled. From this it follows that local languages and cultures must be permitted to develop in accordance with the directions of progress which the communities involved define for themselves.
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 4-71/ James D. Seymour,Sr. Research scholar at Columbia Univ. East Asian Inst. Jan 1995, CURRENT. "Repression or Reform? Human Rights in China." P. 28; CJJ VT96
	 In these matters China's leaders take a cultural relativist approach, claiming that in the application of international standards, account must be taken of the diversity of values, and each government is entitled to make allowances for its nation's historical, social, cultural, and even political realities.
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4-72 / George Weigel, Commentary, February, 1995; Pg. 41; HEADLINE: Are human rights still universal? ACS VT96
	 To be sure, this notion of universality rests on the idea that we can speak meaningfully of a "human nature" in which a certain moral logic is hard-wired--a wholly unfashionable notion regarded as vaguely medieval and definitely "unenlightened" in many Western academic and political-intellectual circles today. But that only suggests the need to carry the debate to Cambridge, Chicago, and Berkeley as well as to the seminaries of Teheran and Qom and the Foreign Ministry of Singapore.
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4-73/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 On some human rights issues the "first world" is itself divided. One example is birth control and the question of when (if ever) abortions are to be performed. During the 1980s there were many reports of obligatory abortions in China. This generated much more concern outside China than the question of voluntary abortion, the latter being an issue primarily for the United States and Catholic countries. The death penalty is another area on which developed countries differ. Executions are common in China for even relatively minor crimes, and on occasion for no crime at all. Perfunctory trials and a meaningless appeals process result in many wrongful executions. Some governments and nongovernmental organizations take the position that capital punishment is incompatible with human rights, and the consensus in the UN seems to be moving in that direction (though the United States is not part of that consensus). China exploits such differences of opinion in the international community.
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4-74/ DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 Stung by the criticism and the world's ostracism, China slowly began to fight back. Study of human rights was promoted as a way of advancing counter-arguments to those being made by China's critics, culminating in the issuance in 1991 and 1992 of a series of White Papers on human rights. The Chinese media also began to assess developments in the West, such as the Los Angeles riots and homelessness in American cities,in human rights terms. And in a major coup at the United Nations, Kim points out,in Dece- mber 1991 China succeeded in attaching a provision for regional prepara- tory conferences to the General Assembly resolution authorizing the first UN world conference on human rights in 25 years. This was opposed by Western countries, which argued that since human rights were universal, there were no particular regional perspectives.
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4-74a/ The Economist, April 22, 1995; Pg. 34; HEADLINE: Asian values; The scourge of the West; ACS VT96
	 Mr Mahbubani (top civil servant at the Singaporean foreign ministry) is something of an Asian Toynbee, preoccupied with the rise and fall of civilisations. India and China were once humbled by the West, he argues, because they were closed societies impervious to fresh ideas. Today, while Asia is absorbing the best of the West, the West clings blindly to outmoded ideas. Americans "worship the notion of freedom as religiously as Hindus worship their sacred cows. Both must be kept absolutely unfettered, even when they cause great social discomfort." Western journalists are unable to learn from Asia because they "see themselves as representatives of a superior civilisation." 
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4-75/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 34; CJJ VT96
	 Furthermore, many East Asian governments-and many Asian voices outside government -- have openly challenged U.S. human rights initiatives as arrogant efforts to impose Western values on proud, ancient societies that are doing quite well economically and socially, thank you. Similar resentments are widely expressed in the Arab world and other Islamic countries. 
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 4-76/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 77; THR VT96
	 I submit that this ancient Confucian view of what it is to be a human being much more closely resembles the views of three-quarters of the world's peoples than does the Enlightenment model, and it is real and robust enough to allow for a full condemnation of government repression, hostage taking, acts of torture, terrorism, and much more that is evil, without ever invoking the concept of human rights.
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 4-77/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 195; THR VT96
	 Social scientists have identified no absolute threshold of development required to qualify a people for democracy, but China is now clearly above the minimum level in simple economic terms and far above it in social development and communication facilities. In addition, despite increasing polarization of wealth in recent years, China still has a relatively equitable distribution, which is generally considered a helpful condition for democracy. It has strong police and military institutions, which are as necessary in a democracy as in a dictatorship to keep the peace.
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4-78/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 174; THR VT96
	 China's preference for providing social and economic rights at the expense of civil and political rights cannot be criticized too harshly by those in the West. Every government must make choices for itself and its nation and these choices tend to be based upon cultural evolution and national experience. Over two thousand years of Chinese culture and experience have reinforced the notion of collective rights rather than individual ones. Providing adequate and wholesome nutrition, clean water, health care, housing, and education are the most important tasks of any government. These are the human rights that are most fundamental, the rights that China does a reasonable job of providing for its 1.1 billion citizens.
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 4-79/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bi lateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p. 61;THR VT96
	 American and Chinese views differ as well on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and basic international norms of human rights. While the United States stresses political and individual rights and since 1980 has downplayed social and economic rights, the Chinese Communist party stresses the latter.) Although its various constitutions pay lip service to political and individual rights, government policy always subordinates these rights to socialist economic development and the social stability necessary in their eyes for economic development. Thus the Chinese constantly rebut their critics in the United States Congress, arguing that without economic development there can be no human rights in China and that this development can occur only with social stability. If individual pursuit of political rights threatens that order, the state has the legal and moral obligation to the collective interest to suppress that individual and limit his actions.
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 4-80/James D. Seymour, Senior research scholar at Columbia University's East Asian Institute, Jan 1995; CURRENT, "Repression or Reform? Human Rights in China," p. 29; CJJ VT96
	 In general the Chinese government's concerns with human fights have largely ignored individual fights; rather, the emphasis has been on group fights. In 1986 the UN General Assembly voted to approve a declaration on the fight to economic, social, and cultural "development." This step had strong backing from China, which praised it as a "breakthrough" that brought human fights concepts more in line with the needs of less affluent countries. Although the right to development is usually viewed as having both individual and collective components, Beijing sees the latter as taking precedence.
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 4-81/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p. 60; THR VT96
	 In traditional China, "the individual was not central and no conception of individual rights existed in the sense known to the United States." Individual participation in society was not on a voluntary basis and was subsumed in a variety of relations in a "familial, paternal hierarchy." According to Louis Henkin, "the ideal was not individual liberty or equality but order and harmony, not individual independence but selflessness and cooperation, not the freedom of individual conscience but conformity to orthodox truth. The legitimacy of the government did not depend on the consent of the individual or the people, and while morality was a far more constraining force on government behavior for Confucianists as compared to Legalists, "neither Confucianism nor Legalism saw moral laws or individual rights as limiting the power of the state.
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4-82/David Kelly, Research Fellow of the Contemporary China Centre Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Chinese Marxism since Tiananmen: Between Evaporation and Dismemberment," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 29; THR VT96
	 Contrary to the Chinese government's critics, He Xin maintains that 'the banner of democracy has become a powerful leverage in international strategic contention'. The US in particular promotes its dreams of world empire in this way. Democracy, he concedes, is a valuable modern political culture. But transplanted to China the result would be a politically weak, lax, and extremely pro-US 'molluscan' government unable to unite the nation. China has its own 'substantive democratic tradition, notably manifested in the Spring and Autumn, and Warring States periods. It is this tradition that should be built on, rather than a blind emulation of Western models. Democracy is essentially a matter of allowing the people to enjoy sovereignty over the administration of the state. Indeed, democracy is a means, not a purpose, as Mao once said. As it is expanded, the way in which political leadership is exercised will improve.
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4-83/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 Although the Chinese government strongly resists international pressure to improve its human rights performance, it has accepted the principle that there are at least some universal human fights, and on rare occasions even individual rights. For example, in 1988 China ratified the UN's Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (even though this has had little or no impact on Chinese realities). China's leaders have resisted considerable foreign pressure to abide by international human rights standards. Much of their negative reaction to the calls for improvement is simply self-serving and power-related. However, the authorities can reasonably argue that some of the criticism misses the point of China's situation. For example, complaints about birth control policy, lack of property rights, and restrictions against changing jobs or residence tend to demonstrate obliviousness to the monumental problems involved in feeding and housing China's people and getting the economy to grow. Even some strong foreign proponents of truman rights argue that insisting on unrestricted rights for the Chinese in these matters is so unrealistic that it undermines the general cause of human rights. But even if these points were conceded, it would still leave the main case for human rights in China unanswered.
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4-84/Margaret Warner, Staff Reporter, and Special Correspondent Robert Oxnam, a former president of the Asia Society, now with Columbia University and the Bessemer Group, a New York investment firm, January 31, 1994; The MacNeil /Lehrer NewsHour, "State of Health; Any Progress; Raising Objections; Eureka"; PMS VT96
	 MR. OXNAM: Same images, different interpretations. That can also be said to the term "human rights." When Mr. Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin met last November in Seattle at the Asian Pacific Economic Summit, the American President received a 15- minute lecture on the Chinese definition of human rights. The Chinese President also conveyed the same notion for American television correspondents. PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN, People's Republic of China: [speaking through interpreter] The difference between China and the United States with regard to the question of human rights is not whether there should be human rights. The difference lies in how we should view the question of human rights. For me, the most important thing is to ensure the right to subsistence of the 1.17 billion of the Chinese people. You have to ensure that they have adequate food and clothing and their livelihood will be constantly improved.
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4-85/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Penn State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 174; THR VT96
	 [B]ecause of traditional Chinese and Leninist-socialist policies toward human rights, China's post-1949 Communist leadership has not granted high levels of civil and political rights such as freedoms of speech, press, religion, association, and dissent. Instead, following socialist principles adopted in 1921, Chinese Communist leaders have supported health care, education, housing, food, and employment pro. grams designed to provide at least a minimum level of social and economic rights. As a result of this commitment, China since 1949 has achieved one of the most impressive social and economic rights records in the Third World and attained a relatively high level of economic growth. In this light, it seems somewhat unrealistic that U.S. policy makers should expect dramatic shifts in human rights conditions any time soon: American policy is bucking 2,100 years of Chinese tradition. Further, the above passage suggests that certain kinds of social and economic rights are at least as important and compelling as the civil and political rights the United States ascribes to. In fact, in a certain sense, it could be argued that social and economic rights are more fundamental and practical than political and civil rights. If this is the case, perhaps the United States should reward the Beijing regime, not punish it, for, as I will show in the next section, the Chinese government has done a fairly respectable job of promoting the kinds of rights that enhance social, economic, and physical well-being.
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4-86/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Penn State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, Chins, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 175 THR VT96
	 It would seem that reducing human suffering is essentially more important than granting political enfranchisement and individual rights. If one accepts the premise that the hungry would rather eat than vote, then one cannot fault too greatly any government that provides these essentials for its citizens. China does a comparatively good job of providing those basic needs that ease human suffering, [according to a Population Crisis Committee report in which] sixty nations have human suffering conditions worse than the PRC's. Many of these nations are still recipients of large amounts of official U.S. economic and military assistance and enjoy a MFN status. Further, by Western standards, most of these nations have civil and political human rights conditions that are as "bad" as the PRC's.
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 4-87/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 26 ; MDS VT96
	 China insists, and its supporters agree, that the Communists have provided for a billion plus people the most basic human right of all, freedom from need. "Where are our homeless? Where are our starving children?" a Chinese diplomat at the United Nations asked, contrasting his nation to other Third World countries. "How do you measure these achievements against an unfortunate incident in Tiananmen Square? A growing economy is the best guarantee for the Chinese people that these conditions will remain."
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4-88/Ann Kent, Associate of the Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Human Rights: The Changing Balance Sheet," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p . 65; THR VT96
	 Nevertheless, Marxist theory has encompassed within itself the basic content of social and economic rights in the form of the more equal distribution of resources, and the guarantees of the right to work and the rights of access to social welfare and social security, 'as well as the right to education. In other words, Chinese leadership, however authoritarian, has been obliged to legitimize its rule by reference to some content of 'human rights', even if its policies have not been defined in those precise terms.
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 4-89/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 2O; CJJ VT96
	 Speaking from another angle, the United States since the very beginning has always been unable to cast off the color of idealism in the political arena, notwithstanding the external criticism of American hegemonism or its double standard on human rights. In spite of this, the United States is undeniably doing its utmost to preserve the spirit of idealism upon which their nation was founded.
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 4-90/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 23; CJJ VI96
	 Hence in my view the so-called human rights diplomacy of America worked in line with certain principles only before 1860 when the United States was still a long way off to becoming a strong power. As it moved steadily toward industrialization and modernization and engaging in international affairs, particularly after holding sway over Central and South America then extending its influence to Asia- Pacific region, opening the door to Japan, occupying the Philippines, interceding in China, sending troops into Vietnam ... When America turned a world superpower, its foreign policy cannot be steered merely with pure idealism.
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4-91/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 32; CJJ VT96
	 Of course, as left-of-center human rights advocates argued, Washington's Cold War alliances with anticommunist dictators sometimes backfired. Of course, as right-of-center human rights advocates argued, American leaders episodically kept quiet about communist oppression whenever they pursued détente-like policies. And, of course, there was much heartfelt concern at the grassroots level about the moral tone and impact of American foreign policy. But the high-profile politicians and activists across the political spectrum who created and debated official human rights policies were, at bottom, simply venting frustrations over the compromises with evil that no foreign policy in an imperfect, anarchic world can avoid, and using human rights debates to push broader, more questionable agendas. 
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4-92/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 33; CJJ VT96
	 The political Rights used the human rights issue to attack détente with the Soviet Union and the larger belief that peaceful coexistence with other nuclear superpowers not only was necessary, but also could improve national security by reducing tensions and even produce mutually beneficial agreements.
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 4-93/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 32; CJJ VT96
	 Since the Cold War spawned U.S. human rights policy, its post-Cold War collapse should come as no surprise. American leaders have spoken out against oppression abroad throughout U.S. history, and the American people fought two global hot wars as well as a cold war against imperialist adversaries. But a systematic, dedicated policy to promote greater respect worldwide for human rights dates back only to the 1970s. Unfortunately, the policy was never rooted in a rigorous critique of prevailing American approaches to world affairs, or in a careful search for alternatives, but in a politically inspired temper tantrum by foreign policy professionals of the Left and Right.
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4-94/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 35; CJJ VT96
	 Moreover, strong domestic support for an active human rights policy has been difficult to detect. Although Americans often endorse vigorous human rights policies when talking with pollsters, they have not recently acted or voted as if they cared much about them.
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4-95/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT "Power and Human Nights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 33; CJJ VT96
	 More surprisingly, prominent human rights advocates rarely sounded troubled when their policies failed to significantly improve human rights practices worldwide. Did U.S. policy simply help replace a friendly autocrat with an equally ruthless and hostile successor, as in Iran and Nicaragua? Did American initiatives lead a target regime to crack down on dissenters or aspiring emigrants, as in the Soviet Union? Was America aiming at countries where it had no influence at all, as in Vietnam or Ethiopia? When advocates did try to answer such questions, their responses spoke volumes about their real priorities. Symbolism was critical. Consistency was essential--never mind that the objects of human rights policy were countries that differed completely in their level of social and economic development, their significance to the United States, and their political relations with America. The United States had to go on record. Americans had to do "what they could"--implying, of course, that salving. American consciences was the main point.
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4-96/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 33; CJJ VT96
	 For those reasons, moderate critics of the policies were missing the point entirely when they labored mightily to reconcile human rights positions with American strategic and economic interests. U.S. efforts did score limited successes-securing the release of numerous political prisoners during the 1970s (especially in Latin America) and joining in rare global economic sanctions that did advance the cause of reform in South Africa--although how those successes made the United States appreciably more secure or more prosperous was never explained. But human rights activism was never primarily about enhancing national security and welfare, or even alleviating suffering abroad. It was an exercise in therapy. The bottom line, as Jimmy Carter made clear, was to give Americans a foreign policy they could feel good about.
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 4-97/ ROBERT A. KAPP, The China Business Review, January, 1995 ; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: New year, old story; US-Chinese relations; ACS VT96
	 So, look for some flamboyant and even inflammatory talk on China from certain stars in the new congressional firmament, but bank on more balanced and sophisticated views from other influential figures in both parties. The congressional freshmen present a different challenge; there is always the chance that China might once again become the sound bite of choice for political novices looking for a high-profile international issue. 
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4-98/ DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 This is part of an explicit battle for the soul of the modernization of the East Asian states, the question is whether these states will emerge with a totally new political culture, or will accept the Western one, Gerald Segal, senior fellow at International Institute for Strategic Studies.
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4-99/ Hugh Williamson, staffwriter, 7-28-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 20 ,"Mixed feelings;" PMS VT96
	 In the isolate-or-engage debate, the anti- contact lobby asserts that establishing ties with China would legitimise Beijing's human-rights record. Those in favour of engagement, on the other hand, believe it enables international unions to exert pres- sure for change within China. Complicating the issue is the fact that pious expressions of concern for Chinese workers often mask a less-than-generous desire to exclude cheaper Chinese products from home markets.
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4-100/Margaret Warner, Staff Reporter, and Special Correspondent Robert Oxnam, a former president of the Asia Society, now with Columbia University and the Bessemer Group, a New York investment firm, January 31, 1994; The MacNeil /Lehrer NewsHour, "State of Health; Any Progress; Raising Objections; Eureka"; PMS VT96
	 MR. OXNAM: Some in the U.S. business community argue that economic development advances human rights. Virginia Kamsky is a consultant to American companies who do business in China. VIRGINIA KAMSKY, Kamsky and Associates,Inc.: Trade is allowing China to develop. The economy is booming. As the economy booms, there is more money. When there's more money, there's more education. Does education promote human rights? Of course it does.
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4-101/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THR 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China," edited by Will iam T. Tow, p.240; THR VT96
	 Western human rights pressure on China also came in for slashing attacks as "wanton interference" in China's internal affairs. Since China has signed seven international conventions on human rights, rejection of the concept as bourgeois was not possible. But human rights, in the Chinese view, could not be treated in the abstract. During the counterrevolutionary rebellion, "a very tiny number of persons" preached absolute, abstract human rights in disregard of the Chinese constitution and laws. The United States posed as a defender of human rights so as to interfere in the affairs of other states, citing, inter alia, a congressional resolution for the "establishment of a free and open political system in China which protects basic human rights." The real American purpose was subversion. In order to mobilize a democratic upsurge in communist states, Americans sought contact with "democratic elements" and supported independent publications, trade unions, and enterprises seeking to "break through" the monopoly of the ruling party and government. The goal of such American "interference" in China's affairs, using human rights as a pretext, was to force China to recognize illegal organizations, such as the College Students' Autonomous Federation and the Workers' Autonomous Federation, all in pursuit of the "sinister aim" of overthrowing the party and socialism.
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4-102/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p. 66 ; THR VT96
	 China confronts a serious dilemma in dealing with the United States and other democratic countries on the issue of human rights. As mentioned above, cultural and political differences created very different views on human rights in China and the United States. Because foreign powers infringed on China's territorial integrity for a century before 1949, China's leaders are extremely sensitive about national sovereignty. China supports United Nations positions opposing interference in other countries' domestic affairs -- hence China's strong embrace of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and its emphasis on noninterference in another country's internal affairs. 
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4-103/ RANDOLPH RYAN, Boston Globe, 4-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, McNamara Urges Foreign Policy Based On Cooperation; ACS VT96
	 McNamara said US attitudes toward China are a current example of dangerous misunderstandings by policymakers. ``I infuriate my friends on China,'' he said. ``I don't think that as a people we understand human rights,'' he said. ``We define human rights as civil rights, but ... we kill more people per thousand each year in Washington, capital of the richest country in the world, because of infant mortality ... than the Chinese killed in all their Tiananmen Squares. ``They've got people that shouldn't be imprisoned,'' he said. ``But we've got people dying because of infant mortality. I think that's a goddamn disgrace.''
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4-104/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 26 ; CJJ VT96
	 Besides economic problems, American society is also in serious trouble. The United States had better clean up its own messes at home, rather than finding fault with human rights in other countries, Peking said in rebuttal. Racial riots in Los Angeles, civil rights movement before 1964, these and other upheavals in America have been made ammunition for Indonesia, Iran and other third world countries to deride Washington.
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4-105/Takashi Inoguchi, Prof. political science at the Institute of Oriental Culture, Univ. of Tokyo, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "Dialectics of World Order: A View from Pacific Asia, edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and George Sorenson, p. 131 ; THR VT96
	 The human rights and market liberalization issues are central to these important policies. Pacific Asia is peculiarly vulnerable to human rights issues because of its tenacious belief in putting the collective interest first and the individual interest second and putting economic development first and social redistribution second. The United States is a society where the human rights issue is also important domestically. It is only natural that many Americans stress human rights internationally also. They disclose severe violations of human rights in Pacific Asia. Yet many Pacific Asians are weary of U.S. preachings on human rights, recalling what Pacific Asians see as the U.S. government's gross infringements on human rights in such cases as Rodney King in Los Angeles and David Koresh in Waco, Texas. Possibly more important, the enormity of the poverty and crime problems in the United States does not encourage Pacific Asians to place too much trust in U.S. preachings. Here is an irony: While Americans preach human rights both at home and abroad, Pacific Asians tend to take American criticisms of their violations of human rights as politically motivated and possibly even racist statements that aim to undermine their political and social stability.
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 4-106/ George Weigel, Commentary, February, 1995; Pg. 41; HEADLINE: Are human rights still universal? ACS VT96
	 ALSO coming home to roost today are the intellectual and political errors of the 1948 Declaration, and the gross overreaching of the human-rights establishment within the UN system in the years since. By listing vast numbers of social goods as "human rights," the Universal Declaration helped set the foundation on which many of the new critiques now rest. Or, to get down to cases: when the Universal Declaration put the "right" to "periodic holidays with pay" on a legal plane with the fundamental human right of religious freedom, it blunted the moral cutting edge that the assertion of inalienability has had since the days of Thomas Jefferson.
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4-107/ George Weigel, Commentary, February, 1995; Pg. 41; HEADLINE: Are human rights still universal? ACS VT96
	 Moreover, the endless piling-up of lists of "rights" that followed the Universal Declaration--in instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (not to mention such tracts for the times as the sundry international "conventions" on racial discrimination, discrimination against women, and the rights of children)--invited the suspicion that, if everything was a "human right," then nothing was, in fact, a human right in any serious sense.
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4-108/ George Weigel, Commentary, February, 1995; Pg. 41; HEADLINE: Are human rights still universal? ACS VT96
	 The most spectacular successes are in East Central Europe, where a morally-inspired human-rights movement brought down the Berlin Wall and put paid to Stalin's empire through nonviolent action
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4-109/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, US Secretary of State: - Promoting democracy and human rights "to advance our interests and our ideals. Democratic nations are far less likely to go to war with each other and far more likely to respect international law. They are more likely to promote open markets and free trade and to pursue policies that lead to sustained economic development. 
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 4-110/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 17 ; MDS VT96
	 Eating McDonald's hamburgers does not make the Chinese any more American than eating Chinese food transforms Americans into Chinese. But other American ideas have more power to affect the people of China. Freedom is the main one, whether the Chinese think of it as personal or political. China has no such strong idea to export; the days when communes and egalitarian living caught the West's fancy are over, and, in any case, those ideas have been rejected by most of the Chinese themselves.
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4-111/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.124; THR VT96
	 Let us start with the tough ones, human rights and democratization. Many constituencies in the United States, including the president, liberal and conservative members of Congress, human rights groups, Chinese students, and perhaps many average American citizens, are particularly exercised by the human rights abuses, mistreatment of prisoners, repression in Tibet, and arrests of political activists that continue to occur in China. But why do Americans care whether China turns democratic and throws off its Communist mantle? First, a democratic China would ensure the same high standard of human rights for its citizens that Americans have. It is a fundamental belief among Americans that the Chinese should have the right to speak their minds on political issues without fear of incarceration. Second, because democracies have internal restraints on military expansion, it is assumed that a democratic China would be a peaceful China, which would help guarantee the security of China's neighbors and the United States. Third, it is assumed that a democratic China would be more stable politically, easier to negotiate with, and more likely to fulfill its global commitments on issues such as arms control and nonproliferation, environmental degradation, and population control.
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4-112/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 In the meantime, the human rights abuses take a heavy toll. Aside from the suffering of the individuals directly affected, the whole system is held back by the restricted flow of ideas and information. Government is essentially the private property of officials; citizens are not allowed to know what their leaders are up to. The result is endemic corruption, and a modernization process that benefits some but punishes most.
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4-113/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.126; THR VT96
	 But the 1980s also shows that without stable, reliable institutions through which people can express their concerns about official corruption, unequal development, and fears of inflation, the Chinese people, especially students, will take to the streets and subvert political stability. It is therefore in everyone's interests to press the Chinese government to gradually create real institutions for the democratic expression of popular concerns.
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4-114/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "'Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.136; THR VT96
	 Moreover, prodding China to release political prisoners and build democratic institutions is far short of making human rights the pillar of United States policy toward China. In the current context, where American popular opinion, presidential views, and congressional concerns so strongly favor democratization in China, support for a "peaceful evolution" of the Chinese political system seems the most appropriate public policy. According to a recent suggestion from the Atlantic Council and the National Committee on United States-China Relations, a bilateral human rights commission may be one useful forum for a "quiet dialogue on human rights at senior levels." The United States government should also press China in many multilateral forums, such as the UN Human Rights Commission, to improve its human rights record. It should use the Voice of America as a tool to help Chinese understand the outside world. It must engage government officials and Chinese research scholars in a debate about the benefits of democratization, and the opportunities that exist for peaceful transitions that leave ruling parties in power--noting that this has been the outcome in Taiwan and South Korea. But Americans must also make it clear that they call for liberalization in order to avoid the breakdown of political authority in China, not to trigger it. Given China's experience of the past 90 years, few Chinese, outside a sector of intellectuals and working class activists, support foreign efforts to destabilize their country. A gentler, less corrupt and more equitable system, with rising incomes would satisfy most Chinese today.
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 4-115/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 211;THR VT96
	 Although many countries fear a strong China, a weak China is even more threatening because of the damage it can do to itself and to the world. From now on, it is doubtful that an undemocratic China can be stable and strong. A more democratic system may give China more real stability than the cycles of repression and popular outrage that have shaken the country throughout the twentieth century. To be sure, clashes of interest and personality that had been hidden would be visible, and no one would be in full control. But democratic institutions might provide peaceful and legitimate channels for resolving issues of power and policy, ways of forming a national consensus on important issues and of changing policies to serve it, a political environment that fosters economic growth, protection for dissent, and means for the political system to continue to evolve without mass violence.,
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4-116/Ann Kent, Associate of the Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Human Rights: The Changing Balance Sheet," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p86; THR VT96
	 The expansion of social and economic rights in China in the 1990s is thus likely to become a more gradual one, paralleling a limited increase in political rights. Until a radical change in China's leadership occurs, however, the exercise of those political rights will continue to be modified in the sense that expressions of political pluralism will be incorporated into, and to a large extent neutralized by, existing political institutions. Moreover, any expansion of political rights will not be accompanied by an amelioration of civil rights. And here lies the essential dilemma for China's leadership in the 1990s as it grapples with its human rights crisis. On the one hand, it will be unable to shoulder the crippling burden of expanding social and economic rights to a degree sufficient to meet popular needs and expectations. On the other, any attempt to give real content to the pledges of political reform will continue to be thwarted by its simultaneous concern to shackle, through the medium of legislation and the legal system, the freedoms of thought, speech, press, association, and assembly of China's citizens. This I inherently unstable condition of rights threatens to further under- mine the Chinese political system in the years to come.
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4-117/ Stephen Chapman, Chicago Tribune, January 8, 1995; Pg. 3; HEADLINE: WILL A DEMOCRATIC WORLD REALLY BE A PEACEFUL WORLD? ACS VT96
	 It has been, particularly in recent years. This belief has justified the Gulf War, pressure on China to liberalize, efforts to expand NATO to include the new Eastern European democracies, and U.S. aid to Boris Yeltsin. It is deployed by interventionists and foreign-aid advocates at every turn, and it is never disputed.
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 4-118/ DEMOCRATIC WORLD REALLY BE A PEACEFUL WORLD? ACS VT96
	 But is it correct? The best that can be said for the theory that democracy promotes peace is that it is unproven. And there is considerable evidence to suggest it is wrong. The answer matters, because it will determine whether the sacrifices Americans make to foster self-government abroad are worthwhile-and whether the world of the future will be turbulent or serene.
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4-119/ Stephen Chapman, Chicago Tribune, January 8, 1995; Pg. 3; HEADLINE: WILL A DEMOCRATIC WORLD REALLY BE A PEACEFUL WORLD? ACS VT96
	 Layne argues that if a link exists between democracy and peace, the "democratic peace" theory gets it backward. Countries that enjoy great security-the U.S. today, Britain a century ago-can afford to be liberal. Those that face many threats may turn to dictators to make it easier to mobilize for national survival.
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4-120/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 35; CJJ VT96
	 In the wake of the Cold War, both liberal and conservative human fights advocates (including the president) have argued that democracies rarely fight each other--hence the more there are, the merrier and safer America will be. Yet the jury is still out: Significant numbers of democracies have existed together only in the last 50 years. Furthermore, U.S. leaders obviously have never bought the argument themselves-otherwise, they would not continue to be terrified by the prospect of democratic Germany and Japan carrying out independent foreign policies or going nuclear.
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4-121/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.418; THR VT96
	 When the U.S. State Department's annual human rights report on China came out in early 1994, it found that China's record "fell far short of internationally accepted norms as it continued to repress domestic critics and failed to control abuses by its own security forces." The Beijing government's fear that dissent or even pluralism would lead to instability was expressed by one of China's delegates to the U.N., Wang Guangya: "A tumultuous China would not only mean disaster to the Chinese people but would also have grave repercussions for Asia's stability, as well as for the whole world.
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4-122/Charles Homer, Executive Vice-President of the Madison Center in Washington D.C., Fall 1991; COMMENTARY, "Sinology in Crisis," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.43; THR VT96
	 The democracy movement in China was also convoluted. According to Nathan, many of the activists had a quite limited agenda, and were not interested in challenging the basic validity of "socialism." Others wanted a more modern regime, better suited to managing the rapid economic growth initiated by Deng's "four modernizations" of 1979. Inside the government itself, many of the reformers wanted a transition from totalitarianism, but only to a "new authoritarianism." They cited South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan as the kind of polity best suited to China's condition as a developing country. But at the same time, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent some of the others, were undergoing democratic revolutions of their own. 
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 4-122/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 191; THR VT 96 These problems suggest the need for a democratic system, but there are other reasons to deny' the necessity of the system. First, there is difficulty in reconciling the dilemma between democracy' and the monopoly by' the party'. Second, if there is enough freedom to produce a market economy, a full-fledged democracy is not always necessary'. One example is Hong Kong. Third, democracy is a luxury for many developing states. Many of the Asian societies that have shown rapid economic development were not and are not democratic. Under authoritarian rule, economic development has been possible. The problem here is whether the feudal-Stalinist regime can move into developmental authoritarianism.
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 4-124/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 83 ; THR VT96
	 No such urgent practical motives exist for the U.S. to make an issue of human rights in China. China is not perceived as an expansionist threat. Nor is the stability of the Chinese regime a major worry for American policy-makers. True, the evolution of China in a more democratic direction would be in the long-term American interest for several reasons. It might help lead to a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem. And it would help assure the permanence of the cooperative economic and strategic ties between the U.S. and China.
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4-125/Anita Chan, Associate Contemporary China Centre Australian National University, 1991; CHINA ]N THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "The Social Origins and Consequences of the Tiananmen Crisis," Edited by David S .G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 125 THR VT96
	 The second demand that brought the workers and the rest of the urban populace out into the streets in support of the students was that call for 'democracy'. By 'democracy' the students did not mean what the term normally implies in the West. It was not a call for elections based on universal suffrage. Very few intellectuals- not even the most famous of China's dissident political liberals, Liu Binyan and Fang Lizhi-wanted to see China's leaders selected by the 70 per cent of the population who are peasants. 'Democracy' instead holds several other potent meanings for the Chinese. To the students and intellectuals, it means the institutionalization of a more pluralist decision-making system, in which professional associations and independent commissions and forums comprised of intellectuals and specialists should help determine government policies. It means also the right to be safely at odds with the political leadership: an institutionalized right to speak up, a right to demonstrate, an independent press, the recognition of student associations independent from government control, and an independent judicial system safeguarded from the party leaders' commands.
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4-126/ William P. Alford.; professor of law at Harvard University, Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1995; Pg. 23; HEADLINE: U.S. TAKES THE WRONG ROAD IN CHINA; ACS VT96
	 American business can not expect to secure meaningful and regular protection for intellectual property or any other property rights in China until China accords greater protection for its citizens' basic rights. Courts and governments that fail to accord their own people fundamental procedural regularity can hardly be expected to serve as sound guarantors of complex property interests of distant and resented foreign parties.
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4-127/ William P. Alford.; professor of law at Harvard University, Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1995; Pg. 23; HEADLINE: U.S. TAKES THE WRONG ROAD IN CHINA; ACS VT96
	 Restoring to American foreign policy a genuine concern with human rights in China and a commitment to help that nation develop effective legal institutions will not transform China, but it will do far more over time toward creating the conditions that will enhance our business interests and uphold our national ideals than the present policy.
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4-128/ DOUG BEREUTER , CONGRESSMAN , Congressional Press Releases, March 16, 1995, HEADLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN ASIA; ACS VT96
	 Experience has shown that not only do democracies embrace human rights, but they are also traditionally the most stable and reliable trading partners and friends. Almost invariably, democracies don't make war on other democracies, don't practice terrorism or generate refugees. Therefore, we need to recognize the strengths and successes of democratization, not just criticize human rights failures.
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4-129/ Amelia A. Newcomb; Yomiuri Shimbun Washington Bureau, The Daily Yomiuri, May 25, 1995, Pg. 3, HEADLINE: U.S. lawmakers debate China's trading status ACS VT96
	 But Rep. Gerald B. Solomon, R-N. Y., chairman of the House Rules Committee, vowed to introduce a resolution of disapproval during the first week of June. A staunch opponent of delinking MFN with trade status, Solomon blasted what he said was a neglect of human rights concerns in favor of business deals. Referring to the $29.5 billion trade deficit with China, as well as the fact that the U.S. absorbs about 37 percent of China's exports, Solomon questioned whether the U.S. had gotten much in return for its delinking measure last year. As far as human right s were concerned, he said, "things have gone from horrible to worse, if that was even possible."
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4-130/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 195; THR VT 96 In this situation political reform, or at least administrative reform, is necessary. Simply put, the administrative system established during the age of the command economy cannot be efficient in the age of the commodity' economy. Allocating, commanding, and bargaining are very different from market-building. Besides, there has appeared no system for achieving compromise among the diverse interests produced by the reform policy. No political channel to articulate interests exists. This often results in quarrels and fights between peasants and cadres, or, in more sophisticated ways, in bargaining and corruption using connections.
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4131/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 191 ; THR VT 96 Political reform is a prerequisite for economic reform for the following reasons. First, to make enterprises relatively' independent entities, administrative constraints of the command economy' have to be restructured. Second, to make the market economy' work, communications and information must offer open access to a wide range of markets; knowledge about matters previously monopolized by the party' and the government must be shared. Third, the pluralized interests of the society' will emerge, and they cannot be represented by a single-party leadership.
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4-132/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 129; ANA VT96
	 Despite continuing denial of civil liberties, some kinds of freedom appear to be emerging with a market economy, including personal freedoms, such as giving people choices of where to work, when to marry and have a child, and where to live. As people gain access to foreign broadcasts and a higher standard of living, they are beginning to want more say in their system of governance. Most outside experts expect more liberalization in the future, but this may take time. Unless the government provides people with a more direct say in their future, the road to sustainable development will be obstructed by a lack of public participation and the risk of political explosions.
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4-133/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-19-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Amnesty International Urges US to Press Human Rights in China In the statement issued on Saturday, Amnesty International urged the US administration to be tougher to meet its own goals for pressing human rights in China. The organization said that Washington had not pursued "an invigorated human rights policy" toward China despite a pledge by President Bill Clinton when he decided to delink trade and human rights last year. "The US-China human-rights dialogue to date has hardly intensified, US has bowed to a country in the name of business interests," said Amnesty International USA executive director William Schulz. "We're telling the US to hold the Chinese to international rule of law in human rights, just as President Clinton has been doing in international trade." (Xiangmin TANG, ZHAO Hua)
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4-134/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.26 ; MDS VT96
	 Another argument for keeping the issue of human rights alive-although not necessarily in the public spotlight--is that China has made progress, if not the "overall significant progress" the Americans wanted. Political prisoners have been freed, plans are under way to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to monitor prisons, and Chinese officials say they have banned the export of prison-made goods and are looking into ceasing the jamming of foreign broadcasts.
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4-135/ Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 83; THR VT96
	 But these concerns are less urgent than the ones that motivate human rights policy toward the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Korea. Thus, human rights considerations easily receive a lower priority in the total foreign policy mix when other practical concerns appear more urgent.
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4-136/ Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Inst. March April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma." p. 32; CJJ VT96
	 President Bill Clinton's team-up with the Haitian military and his acknowledgment last summer that trade sanctions would not hasten democracy's development in China are only the latest signs that America's human rights policy has collapsed. The signs of America's failure to achieve the policy's objectives appear everywhere: from the halls of power in defiant Beijing to the streets of Port-au-Prince, from the mountains of Bosnia to the tenant farms of rebellious Chiapas in southern Mexico. At least as important, the policy has antagonized or simply turned off numerous democratic countries, as well as endangered a broad range of US strategic and economic interests in key regions around the world.
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4-137/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-3-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 But senior State Department officials denied that last May's decision by President Clinton to de-link most-favored nation (MFN) status from Beijing's human rights record had been a mistake and said it could succeed in the long run.
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4-138/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 83; THR VT96
	 The human rights strand in American foreign policy is often misunderstood, even by Americans, as growing out of a missionary impulse introduced into American politics by our first Christian fundamentalist president, Jimmy Carter. But the human rights policy was not the creation of the Carter administration. The U.S. has been promoting democracy in the rest of the world since at least the late nineteenth century. American policy-makers' have long perceived the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad as a hard strategic interest leading to a safer world for America. 
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4-139/ Howard Kleinberg, a former editor of the Miami News, The Tampa Tribune, January 8, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Will the U.S. ever stand up to China? ACS VT96
	 When Clinton was reconsidering his campaign pledge to cut off favored-nation status with China because of that country's miserable human rights record, he found himself being deluged by lobbyists from big U.S. corporations who saw the prospects of doing business in China, in taking advantage of cheap labor and of a hungry, unsophisticated market that would snap up Western products. The corporations won and America lost.
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4-140/Stephen Chapman, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; Chicago Tribune, "THE SUDDEN RISE OF A NEW GIANT COULD REMAKE THE WORLD", SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 3; ZONE: C; PMS VT96
	 Americans treat relations with China almost entirely as a matter of promoting human rights, as on Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen's visit there last week. That emphasis has been a luxury made possible by China's relative weakness. In the future, disputes over Beijing's treatment of dissidents will take a back seat to the geopolitical tensions caused by the emergence of a new superpower.
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4-141/ Susumu Awanohara, staffwriter, 6-30-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC. REVIEW, p. 21 ,"Never say die;" PMS VT96
	 Congressional critics are not going to let Clinton off so easily. "I would love to know from [Clinton's] economic people why they're so persuaded that more trade and more investment inherently will lead to less oppression and more openpness," Congressman Howard Berman said in mid-June. He added: "People who want to make a profit in dealing with these despotic regimes are bending over backwards to try to give the best possible interpretation of all of the actions of those regimes.
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 4-142/ Susumu Amanohara & Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 6-9-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 15 ,"Full circle;" PMS VT96
	 }Justifying his decision, Clinton said "it "offers us the best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human rights and for the advancement of our other interests with China." Clinton did not mention the intense pressure he felt from busi- nessmen and even from his economic officials. He simply stated: "China is also the world's fastest growing economy. Over US$8 billion of U.S. exports to China last year supported over 150,000 American jobs.
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4-143/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 215; CJJ VT96
	 Precisely because ideas and capital and technology-and, to a somewhat lesser extent, people-can cross borders so easily, official rhetoric and even sanctions get lost in the shuffle. Government words and deeds form merely one small breeze in the gales of commerce and culture blowing around the world today. Western and American values will not be the only seeds dropped by those winds. But if we consider their spread and growth to be essential, then we are better advised to lead from strength--to energetically add to America's already vast commercial, cultural, and ideological influence around the world, rather than seek to replace it with legislation or executive orders or official oratory. 
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 4-144/RAMON MYERS, Sr. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 15 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Meanwhile, the United States should press the PRC to improve human rights on an issue-by-issue basis. Americans have good reasons to be unhappy with the way the PRC government has treated its political prisoners and managed a huge penal system producing commodities that often find their way into the U.S. market. But some of these issues already have been negotiated on an issue-by-issue basis between Beijing and Washington, with progress achieved. As mentioned at the outset, the Red Cross soon will inspect PRC prisons. To be stare, the progress never seems rapid or substantial enough t<> satisfy those groups greatly concerned about those problems. But U.S. promises of loans or economic aid and moral suasion will encourage Beijing's leaders to give those problems attention. In fact, by intensifying economic contacts with the PRC, the United States can still strongly insist on human rights improvement, a policy the Clinton administration appeared to be enacting in late January 1994. a4 This is the non-linkage approach argued above, and I hope that the Clinton administration will stay the course.
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 4-145/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 14, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 The PRC already is a key economic player in APEC, and stable prosperous foreign trade is as important for the PRC as it is for other APEC members. Enhancing trade between the PRC and other APEC members, particularly the United States, should be one of America's top priorities in its foreign affairs with the PRC. Linking PRC trade sanctions to non-trade objectives is a bad idea for the United States and other APEC members.
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4-146/ Asiaweek, February 24, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Sweet and Sour; The Taiwan Question May Poison Sino-American Ties; ACS VT96
	 Unfortunately, many U.S. politicians seem not to care how things might play in Beijing these days. Washington is in a truculent mood, as the State Department's critical human-rights report demonstrates. The Americans may be peeved that China did not do enough to "repay" President Bill Clinton after he unconditionally extended MFN at considerable political cost to himself and his administration. Few stop to ask if the freeing of a few high-profile dissidents really would have advanced the cause of civil liberties in China more than the economic opportunities MFN helps provide. The report may have contributed to a growing feeling in Washington that Beijing has broken its word and is therefore an unreliable partner.
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4-147/Crossborder Monitor (formerly Business International), January 26, 1994; Crossborder Monitor (formerly Business International), "China Opens Chute: Economy Bucking into Westernization"; PMS VT96
	 Recent steps to avert a trade war over illegal textile exports to the USA and to meet Clinton administration concerns about human rights signal China's desire to maintain its trade status, and may also reflect an attempt to counter-balance competition from the GATT and NAFTA trade accord. Robert Larney, treasury operations manager at Ingersoll-Rand, (I-R) says the moves reflect the Chinese desire for rapid Westernization. Earlier, China eliminated the two-tier currency exchange rate and instituted tax reform. The switch from a dual to a single rate will ease forex transactions. Tax changes, meanwhile, range from cuts in corporate rates to implementation of a VAT and other new indirect taxes.
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4-148/ Amelia A. Newcomb; Yomiuri Shimbun Washington Bureau, The Daily Yomiuri, May 25, 1995, Pg. 3, HEADLINE: U.S. lawmakers debate China's trading status ACS VT96
	 Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky argued against withdrawing MFN, saying that "it is clear that greater engagement on all fronts...will help encourage the emergence of a more open society." Barshefsky conceded that the administration continued to seek progress in such areas as adherence to rules-based trade regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, respect for individual rights, and full cooperation on nonproliferation issues. Nevertheless, she added, the MFN decision last year set a long-term foundation for a more productive bilateral relationship with China. 
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4-149/Patrick E. Tyler, Staff Writer, January 29, 1994; The New York Times, "Crossroads for China; With Democratic Stirrings Among Chinese, U.S. Is Pressing Beijing on Crucial Choices", SECTION: Section 1; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk; PMS VT96
	 Last week, China agreed to tighten an agreement to prevent products made by prison labor from being exported to the United States. And China made major concessions to the United States this month to strike a new textile agreement, which for the first time permits United States customs inspections on Chinese soil. These steps have done nothing to dismantle the security apparatus that suppresses free expression and keeps the Communist Party in power, but they show that China's leaders are capable of acting.
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 4-150/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.410; THR VT96
	 The impression that the increasingly relaxed atmosphere being enjoyed in the economy might migrate into politics was reinforced when a series of high-visibility political prisoners were also released. By the end of 1993 the list included such well-known 1989 protest-movement activists as Bao Zunxin, a former researcher from the Institute of History at the Academy of Social Sciences and a member of Zhao Ziyang's brain trust sentenced to five years; Wang Dan, the Beijing University student leader who led the list of "most wanted" protesters and had been sentenced to four years; and Han Dongfang, leader of the Beijing Autonomous Workers'. Federation, held for almost two years without trial. Several prominent members of an earlier generation of prodemocracy-movement activists were also released, including Wang Xizhe, Xu WenIi, and even Wei Jingsheng, who had all received long sentences for their participation in the Democracy Wall Movement. In early 1994 the government released Xiao Bin, who had been arrested for giving an interview to ABC-TV after the June 4 bloodshed and Wang Juntao, who had been given thirteen years as a "black hand" behind the movement.
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4-151/Ann Kent, Associate of the Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Human Rights: The Changing Balance Sheet," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p83; THR VT96
	 In the final analysis, the content of these renewed calls for political reform will depend on whether the current controls on the exercise of citizens' civil rights are loosened. That is, the question remains whether the current purpose of political reform, focused as it is on 'improving socialist democracy and the socialist legal system' is, in fact, as Jiang Zemin now claims, 'to ensure effectively that the people enjoy status and rights as citizens of the country'. Since the lifting of martial law in Beijing on 11 January 1990, 881 political prisoners have been released from custody. Such actions, however, appear to have been more closely related to achieving the removal of international economic sanctions than to any liberalization of domestic policy.
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4-152/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 36; CJJ VT96
	 Nor can labor rights controversies be successfully resolved by acting out the stylized morality plays that make up human fights policy today-by issuing the same threats and voluminous reports, by trotting out the same dissidents in front of the press, by fasting, or by any other attempts to dictate the social and economic priorities of other countries. Instead, labor rights problems require a raft of new trade, technology, foreign investment, and other policies designed to increase America's economic power. 
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 4-153/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 36; CJJ VT96
	 The China issue, however, along with last year's controversy over the North American Free Trade Agreement, does bring up one bona fide human fights issue where more effective U.S. government action is needed: the question of how most of America's work force can benefit from trade with countries that repress labor fights. American workers are already exposed to strong competition from hundreds of millions of workers in developing countries who are highly educated, highly productive, and organized by the world's leading multinational corporations, but who are paid a fraction of what their U.S. counterparts earn and who are systematically denied the fight to form independent unions and bargain collectively for wages that bear some relationship to productivity increases, for decent workplaces, and for nonwage benefits--fights and conditions until recently taken for granted in North America and Western Europe. Many more such workers will soon be coming into the world economy from China's interior (as opposed to its already booming coastal regions), from South and Southeast Asia, and, farther down the road, from Russia and Eastern Europe. Even if all of them work for politically and socially progressive American companies, which they will not, the capacity of those workers to export will exceed by orders of magnitude their capacity to consume. Lack of labor fights is hardly the only reason, but it can create major competitive advantages. As Labor Secretary Robert Reich noted in an April 1994 speech, the problem is part and parcel of the inherent difficulties of commerce between countries at greatly differing levels of economic and social development in. an age of highly mobile capital and technology. 
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4-155/Financial Times, January 31, 1994; Financial Times, "China and the Gatt", SECTION: Leading Article; Pg. 17; PMS VT96
	 There are good reasons, however, for the US to modify its approach. Withdrawal of MFN treatment would be economically damaging to the US itself. It would also harm the economic dialogue begun by President Clinton at the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in Seattle last November. Bilateral pressures designed to corner Beijing and force concessions have been shown not to be the most effective way to secure political change in China. Gatt, by contrast, offers a less tense but still powerful multilateral framework for improving China's economic policies in a more market-oriented direction.
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4-156/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 34; CJJ VT96
	 Even more disturbing has been the global reaction to U.S. human rights policies, especially their unilateral elements. Not a single major power, for example, emulated Washington's linkage of trade relations with human fights progress in China. Some of America's staunchest regional allies, such as Japan and Australia, openly criticized that strategy from the start. Other allies, principally the West Europeans, quietly worked overtime to cut deals with a booming economy that is already the world's third largest. 
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4-157/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 35; CJJ VT96
	 To a depressing degree, however, U.S. human rights policy grinds on along the same well-worn tracks. Despite the China trade decision, another China-like struggle over linking trade relations with human fights practices may be unfolding with Indonesia, and yet another looms with Vietnam. Both controversies have scary implications for America's economic position in rapidly growing Asia (where establishing long-term relationships and, consequently, a reputation for reliability are keys to business success) and other emerging markets. 
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 4-158/ RAMON MEYERS, Sr. Fellow Hoover Inst:., Stanford, 1994; p. 4, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays on Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Insisting that human rights be improved or favorable trade status will be withdrawn defeats our goal of encouraging greater marketization and economic development in the PRC and might delay the improvement of human rights. Moreover, such linkage is not appropriate at a time when the leaders of the PRC face three formidable challenges: First, they must respond to severe economic challenges and create a new socialist market system. Second, there are four decades of pent-up consumer demand from nearly 1.3 billion people who want to live like the people in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, or the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. To meet this new consumer demand, the economy must perform efficiently with social peace and political stability. Third, Deng Xiaoping and many other top leaders are in their nineties. As no legal institutional means for a leadership transfer has ever been established in this regime, a fierce power struggle might erupt after Deng is gone.
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4-159/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 124; THR VT96
	 Second, few in the United States business community support lining trade policies and human rights. This community believes that expanding business is a liberating force in itself. Moreover, the examples of Taiwan and South Korea suggest that economic development and the creation of free markets help generate support for democratic transitions. One potential fallacy in this argument, however, is the assumption that economic development inevitably leads to the creation of an autonomous middle class, which then presses the state for political liberalization. In China, where private property rights are still unclear, much of the economic growth is due to local government industrialization, which may weaken the central state's control over the localities, but need not generate a middle class, as it has in South Korea and Taiwan.
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4-160/ Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 11, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Baker cites ruddeless foreign policy ; Rejects isolationism; says middle ground exists in dealing with China; ACS VT96
	 Mr. Baker [Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III ] rejected "a false choice betwen idealism and realism" in dealing with China. "A good policy is flexible and can address both of those concerns," he said. "Human rights is important but not the be all and end all." 
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4-161/Chris Carney, Penn State University-Scranton, Fall, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF, VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.175; THR VT96
	 As I suggested earlier in this article, basing U.S. policy with China on human rights is naive at best and just plain stupid at worst. It limits options, paralyzes new initiatives, and makes America seem very hypocritical. The United States can no longer afford to punish China for Tiananmen Square for two thousand years of cultural inertia.
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4-162/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 177; THR VT96
	 Given these reasons, America must seek to improve relations with the PRC, not punish it for its human rights record. As I have shown, basing U.S. policy on a concept such as human rights not only displays the inconsistency and hypocrisy within decision making circles, it demonstrates a narrow perspective of the world and its peoples. Though clearly very important, the emphasis on civil and political human rights tends to cloud the American view of how well nations provide the even more fundamental economc and social rights to their people. U.S. policy with the PRC can promote Western conceptions of human rights, but it must also be sensitive to Chinese values. More importantly, U.S. policy needs to be far more consistent and pragmatic than. in the past. Otherwise, America will continue to miss opportunities, until there are no more.
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 4-163/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 37; CJJ VT96
	 In the process, critics have periodically aired stronger objections, calling human rights policy arrogant, naive, inconsistent--a juvenile protest against life's built-in imperfections. They are largely correct.
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4-164/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 169, THR VT96
	 Defining relations with states based on their human rights records is flawed for at least three reasons. First, as stated above, the United States fails to evenly apply the same standards to every state. Some nations are arbitrarily punished for not meeting U.S. standards whereas other abusive states face no sanctions whatsoever. Second, the measures used to determine human rights conditions are inconsistent and subject to debate. Moreover, they tend to be value laden with Western ideals and pay little attention to a nation's unique cultural experience. Various groups, using different subjective criteria, create the scales and reports which policymakers use to judge human rights conditions in each nation. The discrepancies in these measures create a confusion and disagreement that is eventually reflected in policy. Finally, it might be reasonably argued that U.S. focuses upon the wrong kind of human rights. Rather than concentrate solely on a state's civil and political freedom, U.S. policy should also consider how well a nation provides the more fundamental human necessities-wholesome nutrition, pure water, adequate housing, proper health care, education. United States policy might be more effective and less contradictory if it were grounded in universally accepted ideas of human suffering and actual physical well-being rather than some theoretical notion of civil and political "correctness." The inherent flaws in U.S. human rights policy create situations that needlessly constrain policy options. Moreover, tensions with so-called "abusive" nations often arise, further limiting U.S choices instead of providing opportunities for constructive changes.
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4-165/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 36; CJJ VT96
	 As Americans will discover in many foreign policy fields, crusades to bring about utopian change around the world will rarely achieve their goals. The best bets lie in measures that enable the country to survive, flourish, and bargain successfully in the deeply flawed world that we will remain stuck with for many decades. Americans wishing their government to act in moral ways might consider focusing on their own country-which suffers its share of problems and moral outrages, but is also blessed with the institutions and social cohesion to make serious reform more than a pipe dream. 
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 4-166/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia" p. 17 ;SEG VT96
	 Fourthly, we should continue to promote American values in Asia, but with a sense of realism and proportion. China is too massive and too old to be changed by sermons from Washington. Time, trade, and social modernization can be abetted by a strong declarative human-rights policy that stops short of trying to coerce those who are too big, too powerful, and too proud to be moved by empty threats.
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 4-167/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p.1, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 First, the PRC is at a critical stage of economic reform, and trade expansion greatly helps these reforms as well as the U.S. economy; thus, linking trade policy to human rights is bad foreign policy.
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 4-168/RAMON MYERS, Sr. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 4, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 A better way would be for the United States to encourage the PRC to promote marketization and trade liberalization while negotiating separately with the PRC's leaders to improve human rights and reduce weapons proliferation. By negotiating these issues separately, the United States could achieve its goals and allow the PRC's leaders sufficient time to deal with their three major challenges. Can we justify this nonlinkage foreign policy by the United States toward the PRC? 1 believe the answer is yes; the PRC is already evolving in new directions that hold great promise for the long-term improvement of human rights and welfare, issues that have a profound bearing on the PRC and its Asian neighbors.
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 4-169/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. East Asian Studies, Boston Univ., Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "America and China: back from the brink" p.252; SEG VT96
	 Nevertheless, in suppressing dissidents and in openly risking American reprisals, Jiang certainly put in a bid for the support of China's military and other nationalistic elements that believe China has yielded to excessive United States demands in recent years.
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 4-170/Yongnian Zheng, Prof. Beijing Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, V189 #2, "Development & democracy: ore they compatible in China?" p. 255 ;SEG VT96
	 V--In terms of their political values, most individuals show their strong , need for the state (see Table 5 for details). Most individuals have high identification with the state. While many people are no longer proud of or are indifferent to the socialist state (as already demonstrated), most people still have high loyalty to the Chinese state. Fully 75 percent of individuals contend that one should love the state even if he or she is disappointed with it. Also 86 percent believe that there is no reason for one to betray the state, even though it cannot satisfy one's needs and expectations. Most individuals think that they should hold high accountability to the state. The government's authority is unquestioned and viewed as beneficial. Also 74 percent believe that they should trust in and obey the government, because the ultimate goal of the government is to serve them. Half believe what they have is given by the government, and 69 percent still indicate they had confidence in the central government.
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 4-171/Shigeki Hakamada, Prof in the International Politics and Economics Dept. at Aoyama Gakuin Univ., Tokyo, and GiIbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, II " "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity, edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 171; THR VT 96 Some of the national surveys of the political views of youth (aged up to 25 and 26 to 35) focused on attitudes toward reform, often showing that most respondents favored reform of the political system, but cautious reform. About one-fifth in each age group urged an immediate comprehensive reform and another one-sixth went further by favoring China's absorption of a broad range of thought in order to create an environment for reforming the political system. But, at the other extreme, one-fifth of respondents insisted that reform is of no use or temporarily it is best not to act. The most common response was intermediate between immediate comprehensive reform and temporary' delay. Of the group aged 26-35 31.4 percent and of the younger group 24.5 percent preferred, through careful experimentation, to move forward in adjustments and reforms. This was the mainstream response. Likewise, 55 percent chose the cautious answer that China now already has some democracy and needs to advance a step in perfecting it, a far larger number than the one-fifth who chose the response that China most lacks democratic freedoms necessary for the Four Modernizations. Balancing the respondents impatient for democracy were nearly as many' on the opposite side who chose one of three answers: 1) China does not need new democratic freedoms--first economic freedoms should proceed and then we can consider then; 2) China already' has advanced socialist democracy': and 3) the Four Modernizations demand the united will of the whole people--to incite democratic freedoms now is not to be careful.
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4-172 /Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. z 7; CJJ VT96
	 More recently, at a meeting sponsored by Council on Foreign Relations, many heavy weights specialized in China issue like Kissinger, Oksenberg and Vance as well as several former secretaries of state in chorus recommended separating human right from trade issues. There are two reasons for doing so: 1) China cannot be expected to improve its human rights record in any short period of time due to certain specific conditions in that country. A developing country must be assessed in the perspectives of its culture and history, rather than by the modern criteria of western nations. 2) It is not necessary for the United States to singly oversee China's human rights situation. The matter should be handed over to the United Nations or for more countries to execute jointly. And China should not be the only country targeted for censure, other countries violating human rights should be dealt with altogether.
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4-173/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 75; THR VT96
	 At the same time, it must be recognized that much of the struggle for human rights and democracy is best waged outside government. Human rights organizations as well as private media must continue to expose and embarrass China's persecution political dissidents. Religious organizations should continue their quiet, good, and subversive work. Washington should make better use of our special relationship with democratic and capitalist Taiwan. U.S. off]dais should remind officials of the Republic of China that they have a unique responsibility for promoting greater political and economic freedom on the mainland. Taiwan should have a plan for pumping not just its exports and investment dollars into the mainland, but information as well. Taiwan, not America, has the unique resources to run successfully the proposed new radio service to the mainland.
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 4-174/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 As China is going full steam toward market economy, there exists a force of reformists internally. Should the United States continue to make a fuss about human rights, both Washington and Peking would end up suffering from loss in trade. It could also result in the reformists losing out to the military and the conservatives in China.
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4-175/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 154; THR V196 On human rights, the United States should not shrink from criticism for fear of offending the current Chinese leaders. They will act in their own interest whether or not Washington is nice to them. In any case, American policy makers should be more concerned with how the successors to this government will judge U.S. words and actions during this period of transition. Nor should the United States be deterred by those who charge that criticism of the ways in which the Chinese leadership crushes the spirit of its people is a naive attempt to impose "American values" on the Chinese. The United States needs to be clear that it is pressing for China's adherence to human values, not for its adoption of American political or economic structures. And the U.S. response to China's standard line, that the "people of a country should be free to choose the social system... ideology and morality" they deem appropriate, should be that the only obstacle preventing the Chinese people from making their choice is the Chinese Communist party and its leadership.
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 4-176/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia" p. 17; SEG VT96
	 Thirdly, after protecting and defending the United States and stabilizing the structure of peace in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy should aim to ensure the prosperity of the United States. Trade and human rights, while important national interests, are less critical than buttressing the structure of peace on which everything depends. That is why neither trade nor human rights should be allowed to jeopardize either the U.S.-Japan security agreement or a friendly relationship with China. The United States should seek to open markets, but a balanced and coherent foreign policy would integrate trade interests with overall national-security goals. Japan should be pushed to open its markets and deregulate its society, but these ends are best accomplished through quiet, not noisy, diplomacy. Talk of trade war is fool's gold, all bluff and few positive consequences outside of ephemeral domestic political advantages. By emphasizing the importance of the U.S.-Japan security agreement, an American president gives his Japanese counterpart the political cover at home behind which he can craft reforms that will improve trade. Trade hawks advise diminishing the emphasis given to the security relationship, as a means of putting pressure on Japan, but this tactic is counterproductive because it weakens the ability of Japanese prime ministers to deliver meaningful concessions. 
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4-177/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 86 ;THR VT96
	 By its nature, it is difficult to get complete information about this sort of quiet diplomacy. But my impression is that in recent years the State Department has been increasingly willing not only to raise individual human rights cases with the Chinese government, but also to state publicly that it is doing so: J. Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified recently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "through official channels, we have raised a number of human rights concerns, both on questions of general principle and individual cases." Making this kind of public statement about its inquiries in China represents a subtle shift of emphasis in State Department policy, but it may prove to be a significant and long-lasting one. American public opinion is now somewhat more critical of China than it was in the early 1980s; American relations with China are now virtually free of major problems or crises, leaving more room for dialogue on human rights issues; and the improved relations of the Soviet Union with both the U.S. and China have reduced the bargaining power of China in the strategic triangle. So long as these conditions persist, the State Department will probably continue to find it relatively easy to make inquiries and expressions of concern to the Chinese government about cases that American citizens and residents are interested in.
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4-178/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 85 ;THR VT96
	 It is relatively easy for American citizens and even for foreigners living in America to get appointments to see State Department staff members, Congressional staff, and even members of Congress. The State Department is required to answer all inquiries from members of Congress and almost always answers direct inquiries from the general public as well. By directing an inquiry to the State Department through any of these channels an American can usually get the U.S. Embassy in Beijing or one of the U.S. consulates to request information from the Chinese government about a political or religious prisoner. Depending on the amount of public and Congressional concern and the nature of the case, the State Department will sometimes inform the Chinese government of the seriousness of public concern or ask for an early release of a prisoner on humanitarian grounds.
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4-179/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 85; THR VT96
	 Third, not only Congress, but also the White House and the State Department are often responsive to public opinion. When Yi Xigong, the fiancé of American graduate student Lisa Wichser, was arrested in China, the U.S. government pressed inquiries about his case and he was quickly released. Hanson Huang (Huang Xian), an American lawyer of Chinese descent, was sentenced for espionage but given early parole after American expressions of concern. The State Department has been inquiring regularly about the status of Yang Wei, who had been a student in America before returning to Shanghai last winter, and whose wife, a Chinese citizen, is still in the U.S.
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4-180/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 86; THR VT96
	 This kind of diplomatic intervention is most likely to occur and tends to be most vigorous when the American side has some clear excuse for taking an interest, such as the involvement of an American citizen, the relative of an American citizen, or the employee of an American firm. Thus the State Department was especially active in pressing the Chinese for the release of New York Times reporter John P. Burns, who is a Canadian citizen but the employee of an American newspaper, when he was detained for traveling in forbidden areas. But a strong American connection is not required so long as there is an American constituency to pressure the U.S. government about the case. The government has made inquiries to the Chinese about Wei Jingsheng because several groups in the U.S., including Amnesty International. have asked about him. Also, the Catholic Church in the U.S. is active through an organization called "Free the Fathers" in pressing the State Department to inquire about priests imprisoned in China because of their loyalty to the Vatican.
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4-181/ John Maggs and John Zarocostas, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Presents Another Piece to WTO Puzzle; ACS VT96
	 At the same time, critics of China's human rights policy in the United States have continued to push for tougher conditions on its ability to export to the United States. The new letter from Beijing could stir opposition to any change in Jackson-Vanik, and even undermine the Clinton administration's resolve to negotiate China's accession to the WTO.
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4-182/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p.71; THR VT96
	 The Tiananmen incident let some leaders reintroduce "class analysis" into foreign policy, which painted a conspiratorial picture of the Western critique of China's human rights behavior. Western criticism of Chinese human rights abuses was not simply "interference" but was seen as one tactic in the long-term strategy of "peaceful evolution" by' which American politicians and diplomats had for the past forty' years sought to overthrow the party and undermine China's global status. In the United States, China's leaders witnessed the ascension of actors who had for years resisted Sino-American ties, such as the human rights lobby, the anti-family-planning forces, anticommunists and pro-Taiwan forces, and those who opposed China's growing challenge to American economic interests. As the shift of emphasis allowed for these people to take center stage in Congress, it made it appear in China as if long-term American opponents of the PRC were now in a position to challenge it on all fronts.
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 4-183/Andrew J. Nathan, We l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 88; THR VT96
	 Based on the model of American Jewish leadership in publicizing human rights problems in the Soviet Union and black leadership in lobbying to change American policies on South Africa, one might expect Chinese-Americans and Chinese citizens in the United States to lead the way in forming bigger, more comprehensive lobbies on China. But so far, except for the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (China Spring), which has had some success lobbying with Congress, few in the Chinese community have been active in bringing human rights issues to the attention of the U.S. government. The reasons for this are no doubt complicated--perhaps a tradition of abstention from politics, lack of organization, patriotic pride in recent progress in the mainland, or a greater identification with Taiwan than with the mainland. Whatever the reasons, the open nature of the American political system offers the prospect that when Chinese-Americans begin to express their concerns about human rights issues in China, the U.S. government is likely to respond.
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4-184/ Evelyn Tan Powers, USA TODAY, March 3, 1995, Pg. 5A, HEADLINE: Human rights to stay part of U.S. policy; ACS VT96
	 Human rights continue to be a key part of U.S. policy in China, said Winston Lord, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific. "We do not believe that people who are discussing their views peacefully should be rounded up," he said. Lord held talks with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and other officials on issues including security and economic matters, and relations with Taiwan. 
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 4-185/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 87;THR VT96
	 This analysis leads to two conclusions. First, because the human rights impulse in American foreign policy is ultimately rounded on a perception of national self-interest, it is not likely to disappear as an element of American China policy even though it is sometimes de-emphasized in favor of other concerns that appear of more immediate urgency. Second, even now the American government would probably take a greater interest than it does in Chinese human rights problems if there were stronger public lobbies calling attention to them. Free the Fathers, the Office of Tibet, and the U.S. section of Amnesty International are relatively small organizations, and each deals with only a portion of the total Chinese human rights picture.
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4-186/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, ',Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 33; CJJ VT96
	 And so far--again, leaving economics aside-human rights issues have dominated Clinton's intermittent foreign policy making as president. His inaugural address promised to use American power if necessary whenever "the will and conscience of the international community is defied." His national security adviser Anthony Lake has made the "enlargement" of the world's roster of democratic countries one Of America's top foreign policy priorities. And human rights considerations permeate the U.S. foreign policy agenda from Russia to China to Somalia to Bosnia to Haiti.
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4-187/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 214; THR VT96
	 Moreover, the human rights issue showed no signs of disappearing. The Americans continued to denounce Chinese human rights abuses, with the Chinese reacting with some of their own accusations. For instance, the People's Daily of 26 November 1991 declared that, in the United States, 'there are millions of people who do not have enough food or clothing or personal security'. This was a contravention of the most basic of all human rights, which the Chinese government repeatedly stressed to be that of subsistence. When serious ethnic rioting and looting broke out in Los Angeles at the end of April 1992, killing over 50 people, the Chinese media carried out 'a paroxysm of America-bashing' focused on accusations of human rights abuses and racial discrimination, including the claim that China was actually superior to the United States in many forms of human rights.
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4-188/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China," edited by William T. Tow, p.243; THR VT96
	 Principled Chinese prose aside, the fact is that China continued to bargain with the United States. When Chinese interests were at stake, as in the case of the renewal of MFN, China proved quite willing to negotiate over the departure of the dissident Fang Lizhi, who had been blamed for the 1989 demonstrations and who had taken refuge in the United States embassy. Similarly, the Chinese did not simply reject the Western approach to human rights but engaged in a dialogue, seeking to defend the Chinese record.
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4-189/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Clinton opposes linking China's MFN, human rights; ACS VT96
	 U.S. President Bill Clinton on Friday slammed the opposition in the Congress over his China policy of splitting trade ties with human rights issues. ''I believe that we should continue to press China on human rights issues, but I don't believe that singling China out for MFN is necessarily the best way to do it,'' Clinton told reporters at the White House.
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4-190/St. Petersburg Times, January 23, 1994; St. Petersburg Times, "China's new diplomacy", SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; EDITORIALS; Pg. 2D; PMS VT96
	 The Clinton administration's policy of respectful but insistent pressure already has brought more progress on China's human-rights record than four years of President Bush's coddling. If Chinese officials follow through on their recent promises, President Clinton will have ample justification for extending China's most-favored-nation trading status later this year. The president also would be justified in claiming a significant foreign policy achievement. China became accustomed during the Bush years to winning repeated extensions of its privileged trading status without having to make even the slightest effort to improve its shameful human rights record. President Clinton got their attention, though, by setting several precise criteria for China to meet and by publicly monitoring their record of compliance.
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 4-191/ Susumu Amanohara & Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 6-9-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 15 ,"Full circle;" PMS VT96
	 But however the MFN decision is perceived, for the U.S. it marks the end of its post-Tiananmen trauma. Asia specialist Robert Manning, who served in the State Department during Bush's tenure, concedes that "just as it took a conservative Republican president to open relations with China, maybe it takes a liberal Democratic president to delink trade from human rights.
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4-192/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 Seen in these lights and under both internal and external pressures, Washington will most likely adopt a more realistic approach in the execution of its China policy. Human rights and trade will not be tied together, the most favored nations treatment will no longer be subject for yearly deliberation. Instead, a course of action beneficial to both sides will be sought after.
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4-193/ DONALD M. ROTHBERG, AP Diplomatic Writer, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Administration Stung by China, Russia Rebuffs; ACS VT96
	 A year ago he went to China and publicly said he would tell the government in Beijing that if its human rights record didn't improve, there was little chance the administration would renew its trade preferences. The Chinese responded by arresting dissidents and when the June deadline arrived, President Clinton renewed China's most-favored-nation status and said it was time to separate trade and human rights.
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4-194/ NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, 5-5-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China accused of marketing organs from executed prisoners; ACS VT96
	 William Schulz, executive director of Amnesty International USA, chastised the Clinton administration for not making human rights abuses in China a more important part of its foreign policy. A year ago, President Clinton severed the relationship between China's trade status with the United States and its human rights record.
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4-195/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 34; CJJ VT96
	 But the best evidence of failure is the administration's zig-zag record on numerous human rights fronts. Human rights issues are a large part of the president's most embarrassing retreats from campaign promises. Clinton has decided to follow the Bush administration's approach to China, finally agreeing that continued economic engagement is the best way to advance America's human rights and broader agendas with the world's most populous country.
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 4-196/ Susumu Amanohara & Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 6-9-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. l4 ,"Full circle;" PMS VT96
	 In recent weeks, human-rights groups and their supporters in Congress had warned that Clinton was about to succumb . to business pressure at the expense of Chi- nese human rights. Following the decision, Human Rights Watch-Asia's executive director, Sidney Jones, said the president had "effectively removed all pressure on China to improve its human-rights practices." The administration, he added, looked "vacllating and hypocritical," wlule the Chinese leadership had emerged as "hard-nosed uncompromising and victorious.
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4-197/ Susumu Amanohara & Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 6-9-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 15,"Full circle;" PMS VT96
	 But the MFN game is not over yet. Angry members of Congress can still agitate for sanctions against China. Some key Democrats in the House are angry withClinton, too. As a resuIt the executive-legislative consensus on China policy, which Clinton claimed to have restored through his executive order, may once again break down, Capitol Hill staffers say. Senate Majority Leader George MitcHell said Clinton's decision would "confirm for the [Chinese] regime the success of its policy of repression on human rights and manipulation on trade." 
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4-198/ Susumu Awanohara, staffwriter, 6-30-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 21, ,"Never say die;" PMS VT96
	 Clinton extended China's MFN status even though Beijing had failed to meet human-rights conditions he had set a year earlier. Moreover, the president delinked trade and human rights issues. By most counts, Congress won't be able to muster the votes to override Clinton's decision. But the sanctions bill will provide new opportunities for China-bashing. This can intensify if attention is focused on Beijing's "bad behaviour" -- such as its lack of cooperation on the North Korean issue.
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4-199/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 25"; CJJ VT96
	 In April, Clinton at the White House met with Dalai Lama and Hongkong governor Chris Patten. To the latter he expressed unreserved support of the political reform formula for Hongkong, much to the ire of China. In May, the House objected to Peking's sponsoring the 2000 Olympics, citing human rights abuses in China. In June, Clinton approved the establishment of the Asia Democracy Broadcasting Station targeted specially on human rights in mainland China. In July, the House passed the resolution against holding 2000 Olympics in China and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee removed the limitation of arms sales to Taiwan. In the Congress there exists a dominant feeling that the Taiwan Relation Act should take precedence over the August 17 Communiqué. In August, 60 senators in the U.S. Senate signed their names opposing China's sponsorship of the Olympics. The White House imposed a small-scale sanction on Peking for its sale of M 11 missiles to Pakistan. In September, it announced the lease of Hawk Eye prewarning aircraft and Yorks frigates to Taiwan. Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. representative to the United Nations, stated: "The United States will examine the proposal for Taiwan to return to the United Nations"... Communist China was extremely unhappy about all these events.
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 4-200/ Susumu Awanohara, staffwriter, 6-30-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 21 ,"Never say die;" PMS VT96
	 Congressman Tom Lantos said at the same hearing that the new sanctions bill "will at least recapture a small portion of the lost integrity and credibility on this issue." Lantos said that while some administration officials "couldn't care less about human rights if it hit them in the face." But "there are plenty of us in this Congress... who feel deeply and passionately about that issue." How passionately will become clearer soon. The expectation is that the House will vote on the bill and possibly pass it in July. The Senate, where support for the bill should be weaker, will wait until after the House acts. A prominent Capitol Hill starlet says that 'lf they expect the Senate will kill the bill anyway and they will not be held responsible for the consequences of trade disruption, there could be considerable support for the bill in the House." 
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4-201/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 85; THR VT96
	 Congressional committees often use their hearings not only to gather information, but also as forums to force the State Department publicly to evaluate human rights practices in certain countries and to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on foreign governments. Congressmen traveling to foreign countries often inquire about human rights cases of concern to their constituents. Perhaps most confusing of all to foreign governments--who wonder which branch of government in the U.S. is really running foreign policy--Congress sometimes passes "sense of the Congress resolutions" or legislative amendments which lack specific provisions but simply express Congressional disapproval of the activities of foreign governments. The most recent example was a Senate resolution criticizing Chinese policy in Tibet.
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4-202/ Susumu Awanohara, staffwriter, 6-30-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 21 ,"Never say die;" PMS VT96
	 Pelosi's bill says MFN should be revoked for all products manufactured or exported by the People's Liberation Army and Chinese "defence-industrial trading companies." It would also close the door to certain products of state-owned enterprises (including plastics, wood articles, apparel footwear and iron and steel articles). 
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4-203/Paul J.C. Yang, Staff Writer, March 26, 1994; Northwest Asian Week, "China has a right to self determination", Volume & Number: V.13; N.12, Page: p. 2; PMS VT96
	 Imagine the foreign minister of China on a visit to Washington D.C. He sends an advance team which meets with Louis Farrakhan, the controversial Muslim leader. Then the Chinese official arrives with a stern lecture from Beijing: racism in America is a hideous violation of human rights. Eradicate it by June 1 or we'll cut off our trade with you. Sound preposterous? That's exactly what Warren Christopher has done this month in Beijing. And Beijing's in-your-face, mind-your-own-business response is both understandable and reasonable.
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4-204/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 33; CJJ VT96
	 Not surprisingly, given such political and polemical origins, human rights policy rarely advanced U.S. national interests in the 1970s. Relations with both allies and adversaries worsened (including West European countries that criticized the policy's heavy-handed treatment of the former Soviet Union), dictatorial friends were often weakened without generating better replacements (as in Iran and Nicaragua), and equally dictatorial foes remained securely in power (throughout the communist bloc and much of the developing world).
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4-205/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 34; CJJ VT96
	 Yet none of the countries that the president or the world community has focused on have become significantly freer or more democratic places since Clinton's inauguration or since the Soviet Union's demise. In other areas of American concern, notably Russia and its "Near Abroad," the situation has arguably worsened in recent months. Bleaker still is the human rights outlook in those regions that have so far eluded either the administration's or the media's focus-from sub-Saharan Africa to suddenly shaky Mexico to the Arab world. 
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4-206/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 168; THR VT96
	 One of the most perplexing questions in the development of U.S. foreign policy is the importance of human rights. By making human rights an issue of high salience, U.S. policy makers have placed themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, promoting global human rights is seen as the morally and politically correct approach. On the other hand, geopolitical and geostrategic realities have, at times, caused the United States to turn a blind eye to certain chronic abusers of human rights. The irony of the Gulf War is an obvious example: the United States was perfectly willing, for political expediency, to join in an alliance with an old enemy and human-rights abuser, Syria, in order to liberate the personal kingdom of the Al-Sabah family. As another example, states such as Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, the Philippines, Kenya, and Guatemala receive or have received tens of millions of dollars in aid from the United States--and their human rights conditions are as bad or worse than those in Syria. Such inconsistency between stated policy and actual practice seriously erodes America's credibility and simultaneously sends the message that the United States is not really serious about human rights.
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 4-207/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 24; CJJ VT96
	 The so-called most favored nations privilege is a product left over from the era of cold war. The United States use it to demand communist nations to improve their human rights record to a certain extent in order to qualify for MFN trading status. These countries depend on American market for their manufactured goods.
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 4-208/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 32; CJJ VT96
	 Rather than blame Secretary of State Warren Christopher's alleged incompetence and Clinton's allegedly naive campaign promises, or struggle to better "balance" human fights concerns with other major U.S. interests, Americans might instead begin asking a fundamental question: Does any government-centered human rights policy make sense in the post-Cold War era? All the evidence indicates that such policies, however morally compelling, are obsolete-swamped, ironically, by the very forces that only yesterday inspired such bipartisan optimism in a new age of human fights progress. The immense tides of information, technology, goods, and capital that now flow so effortlessly across border have turned Washington's efforts into Cold War relics, as antiquated as fallout shelters--and, in their own way, as falsely comforting.
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4-209/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the Chins Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.149; THR VT96
	 How can the United States expect to influence a regime that says at as prepared to discuss human rights only to educate foreigners on the meaning of "socialist human rights"? As long as China is ruled by a clique whose overriding concern is survival, which sees peaceful demonstrations as "counterrevolutionary rebellion" aided by "anti-China forces in the United States," and which dismisses even such a moderate summary of human rights abuses as the State Department's 1990 human rights report on China as slander, flagrant interference in China's internal affairs, and "expressions of out-and-out hegemonism and power politics," foreign government attempts to 'talk to Beijing about human rights will prove fruitless and perhaps even counterproductive.
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4-210/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 73; THR VT96
	 The debate about how best to promote human rights and democracy in China is the latest manifestation of the old "We-can change-China" myth that has warped U.S. thinking about China for a century. At best, any U.S. administration can bring about only a tiny, marginal improvement in Chinese political conditions. Conversely, U.S. China policy can have a huge impact for good or ill on America's economic and strategic interests. This will never be truer than in future years, when the United States comes to grips with China's growing economic and military power.
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 4-212/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p.25; CJJ VT96
	 China-U.S. tension had stemmed from January's American human rights report which took Peking to task. China was also irritated by the appointment of Winston Lord to take charge of Far East affairs, who has been known to sympathize with the democracy movement activists at the June 4 Tiananmen incident. Although more recently Lord no longer let his personal feelings interfere with his handling of China affairs, he and James Liley were blacklisted at that time by Peking as persons most unfriendly to China.
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4-213/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p.25; CJJ VT96
	 In March, the United States submitted a report On human rights in China to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in an attempt to internationalize the issue. Even though the case was killed, China inevitably held a grudge against the United States for manipulating behind the scene. The move also involved Lord and Liley for their links to the organization and operation of democracy activists.
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4-214/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERlCAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p. 26 ; THR VT96
	 But even inpursuing these important issues, human rights should not be ignored. Indeed, there is little likelihood that China's human rights policy will soon cease to be a problem in American politics. Even should Beijing restore the full reform program planned before June 1989, this would not be sufficient to win praise from American human rights activists. The fundamental changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989 have raised American expectations of political reform in socialist countries. Chinese reform policies that earned lavish praise in the 1980s will be widely scorned as inadequate in the 1990s. Moreover, various groups in the United States will work to keep China's human rights violations on the public agenda. Activists, pleased. with the expansion of democracy in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, have turned their professional focus toward China and will devote their energies to calling attention to Beijing's ongoing repression. Chinese students in this country will play a similar role. Although the direct political clout of Chinese students in United States policymaking will likely be negligible, their criticism of Chinese government policy will receive widespread attention in the United States, ensuring that China's human rights abuses remain in the public view.
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4-215/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p. 84; THR VT96
 Without a strong lobby in Congress to protect China policy, ties between the United States and the PRC remain vulnerable to single-issue constituents who either oppose China's human rights policy or use it to advance their own particular causes. And while China policy was relatively immune to impact from the human rights issue for most of the past ten years, in the post-June 4 era Sino-American ties will remain highly vulnerable for several reasons. A new coalition of opponents to China has evolved composed of right-to-life advocates, liberal human rights activists, trade protectionists, and anticommunists, who for different reasons share a common interest and act in ways that can further weaken Sino-American relations. Moreover, the shift in the strategic global environment and the declining Soviet threat has reduced China's strategic importance to the United States. The disillusionment of American business with China and the current economic retrenchment and go-slow approach to economic reform in China also undermine some of the economic rationales for the relationship. Finally, the ballooning trade deficit with China -- in 1990 it was $12 billion -- will give ample ammunition to those who question why the American government continues its double standard on human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and China. All these factors will be counterposed to Chinese and administration efforts to downplay the human rights component in Sino-American ties.
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 4-216/ Susumu Amanohara & Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 6-9-94; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 15 ,"Full circle;" PMS VT96
	 A diplomat in Beijing, however, warns China against becoming too cocky because of its MFN success. "If Beijing thinks it is home free on human rights, it may have another think coming. This just removes the question from the realm of trade to the realm of 'face,' where it belongs. Suppose Clinton started inviting the Dalai Lama to prayer breakfasts. Suppose he puts up Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in the White House." A Beijing intellectual proffers another warning. "The thing to watch is how the government conducts itself after the June 4 anniversary of the Tiananmen uprising. Will there be extensive prisoner releases? Will people like dissident Chen Ziming be able to come back to Beijing and speak their minds? That will be the first proof of how much can be accomplished on the human-rights front with 'constructive engagement.' Don't expect China to pass with flying marks.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COERCING CHINA
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Editors: Annalei McGreevy & Gordie Miller
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I. Current Situation
	A. US foreign Policy toward China
		1. US must get tough with China 1-7
		2. US China relationship is getting tense 8-11
		3. US policy is wavering 12-13
		4. US should try to end current regime 14-16
		5. US should push for market reform 17-19
		6. US needs a consistent foreign policy 20-21
		7. US policy must remain flexible 22-23
		8. Should have high level meetings 24
		9. US policy must effect professional class 25
		10. US should pressure China on nuke testing 26
		11. Giving in on rights issues is moral cowardliness 27
	B. Communist China is Bad
		1. Fear of China is self-fulfilling prophesy 28-30
		2. China wants regional dominance 31-34
		3. Nationalism is increasing in China 35-38
		4. China is US' number one enemy 39-41
		5. China will respond to aggressive policies 42-43
		6. China is testing US resolve 44-46
		7. China wants to be international power 47-48
		8. US administration is anti-China 49-50
		9. IS power struggle occurring in Communist China 51-53
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II. US coercion of China is good policy
	A. US should apply military pressure on China
		1. US must continue its presence in Asia 54-57
		2. US presence needed in Northeast Asia 58-61
		3. US presence needed in Southeast Asia 62-64
		4. US military presence needed to control China 65-75
		5. US and China view each other as threats 76-77
		6. US should increase its military strength 78-83
		7. US and Russia must cooperate to balance China 84-85
		8. US pullout would lead to Japanese Rearmament 86
		9. US and Japan must cooperate to balance China 87-88
		10. US military presence has controlled other crises 89-90
		11. US must be leader of the world 91-92
		12. US should not withdraw its nuclear umbrella 93-94
		13. US is decreasing its presence in Asia 95-99
		14. Clinton's policy has decreased American credibility 100-103
		15. US is increasing its military presence 104-106
		16. Asian nations want US to maintain presence 107-111
	B. US should get tough in trade policies
		1. Us should threaten and use sanctions on China 112-119
		2. America should use its economic power as a lever 120-123
		3. US needs strong trade agreement with China 124-127
		4. US should guide China's admission into GATT 128-133
		5. US should use WTO as a trade lever on China 134-135
		6. MFN status
			a. US use of MFN strengthens its position 136-140
			b. US must apply more pressure than just MFN 141-142
			c. Should not link MFN status to human rights 143-146
			d. should not grant China MFN status 147-148
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III. US coercion of China is bad
	A. China will retaliate to US pressure
		1. China will retaliate with trade sanctions 149-156
		2. US pressure on Nuke testing will cause a backlash 157
		3. China's response should not be taken lightly 158-159
	B. China won't listen to the US
		1. China will ignore US influence 160-163
		2. China knows US can't project military power 164-166
		3. China opposes interference in internal affairs 167-171
	C. Sanctions don't work
		1. China will not respond to economic pressure 172-177
		2. US sanctions would hurt Hong Kong and Taiwan 178-179
	D. China views US as hegemonic beast
		1. China views US as hegemonic power 180-184
		2. China opposes US policy of containment 185-187
		3. US policy creates unstable China 188-191
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5-1/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p 126; THR VT96
	 Yet, if the United States does not press the Chinese to adopt democratic institutions for China's own benefit, China will continue its cycle of liberalizations and crackdowns, which alienate the population and undermine economic growth. Without strong popular institutions, China's leaders increase the possibility of chaos when the political system does weaken further, which it eventually will. No doubt, rapid economic growth and expanding income inequality are placing great pressures on the Chinese system. But what type of system can best handle these strains? While Westerners believe democratic institutions are the solution, the examples of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea lead many Chinese to believe in the utility of a "new authoritarianism" that would maintain stability as the country goes through its rapid growing pains. (In fact, one more decade of political authoritarianism and rapid economic growth may be the perfect formula for the emergence of a moderately wealthy, politically modern Chi- nese state).
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5-2/ Patrick J. Buchanan, Presidential candidate, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Enough is enough; ACS VT96
	 Toward free traders like Canada and Europe, our policy should remain free trade. But toward predators like Japan and China, it is time for hardball.
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5-3/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 Unless the outside world shows greater firmness and coherence with China than it had done during the Deng era, it is likely that Chinese leaders will opt for more nationalism and less cooperation, the authors say. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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5-4/ THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, The Houston Chronicle, February 15, 1995, SECTION: A; Opinion; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: If China is ripping off Mickey Mouse today, it will be autos tomorrow; ACS VT96
	 The trick for the United States is to find a way to put enough pressure on China to make it conform to international trade norms, without putting so much pressure on it at once that the United States and Beijing get into a Cold War on a broad front. It's one thing to fight a Cold War with a hollow Soviet economy that produced television sets that blew up and tractors that were more valuable as scrap metal. It's another to fight a Cold War with 1.2 billion people, whose economy grows at 10 percent a year.
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5-5/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 This means laying out clearly what these rules are and telling the Chinese that the level of U.S. cooperation or opposition depends on how well Beijing adheres to them. The message can be conveyed in a series of high-level official meetings that focus on specific issues and do not become bogged down in theoretical and never-ending discussions of the general U.S.- China relationship. High-level visits could be used to persuade the Chinese to be more open about their armed forces and their military intentions in the South China Sea. They also could serve to convey displeasure with Beijing's recent moves to silence dissidents asking for political liberalization and its unwillingness to renounce the use of force to solve its differences with Taiwan. The Chinese must understand that breaking the rules of the road will come at a price.
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5-6/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 The best way for the U.S. to encourage China to adhere to international norms and standards is to describe clearly what these norms and standards are and then to tell the Chinese that the degree to which they comply with these rules and standards will determine the costs and benefits of their relationship with the United States.
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 5-8/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 33; CJJ VT96
	 Were China not such an important power, the linkage between its search for a new domestic political order and its foreign relations would not be a matter of such concern for the rest of the world. However, China is very important, not just by virtue of its size and power, but also because of the position it has been given by other powers in the Asian order. Both the pragmatic laissez-faire approach of the first part of this century, and the positive assessment of China's revolution in the second, have fed the attitude by which the rest of Asia waits on China, defers to China, and generally expects China to contribute to the solution of problems. Only slowly is the realization dawning that, not least because of its internal political situation, China may itself become a problem.
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 5-9/William T. Tow, Senior lecturer of international relations, Dept. of Govt., Univ. of Queensland, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Introduction," p. 1 ;THR VT96
	 From the American perspective, the means China adopts to pursue modernization and reform is the key criterion for judging how Washington's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) should evolve. To many in the United States, the current Chinese regime's behavior since mid-1989 cannot be justified either in terms of the PRC's national security or as exclusively an internal Chinese affair. It is instead to be viewed as a blatant disregard for fundamental human rights and political reform which cannot be ignored when considering future ties between the two countries. Despite the Bush administration's effort to disassociate American public revulsion over China's political system of state controls from "normal" state-to-state relations, American concern for the fate of China's democratic forces remains critical to future prospects for Sino-American cooperation.
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 5-10/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow,p. 1 ; THR VT96
	 Yet, satisfaction of public opinion and stable bilateral relations are precisely the requirements of a successful American China policy in the post-cold war security environment. For the foreseeable future, Sino-American relations will continue to be characterized by more limited cooperation due to the combination of the post-cold war security environment and Chinese human rights policies. Simultaneously, the relationship will experience repeated challenges to stability. Chinese domestic instability and bilateral conflicts of interest suggest that American policy makersw will repeatedly face the dilemma of protecting Washington's interests in Sino-American cooperation while pursuing a policy which attracts widespread domestic support.
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5-11 / ROBERT A. KAPP, The China Business Review, January, 1995 ; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: New year, old story; US-Chinese relations; ACS VT96
	 A Republican Congress will not mean the end of congressional pressure on US- China commercial relations
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5-12/ Ian Johnson, Beijing Bureau of The Sun The Sun (Baltimore), October 16, 1994, Pg. 6A, HEADLINE: Perry's China visit full of symbolism, not substance//MDS-VT96
	 An Asian diplomat based in Beijing complained: "The Chinese are sending ships on regular patrols into disputed waters, they just conducted a nuclear test and are simply making a lot of people nervous. So the Americans give them a reward by sending over a Cabinet minister. It's confusing."
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 5-13/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p .37; THR VT96
	 Today the United States runs the very real danger of pursuing a self-defeating policy of benign neglect or overt hostility that is rationalized by moral outrage over the character of political ' rule in China. Moreover the United States is doing so at a time when no other country in the world is pursuing such a course: America may be in more peril of being isolated than China, if the trends of the recent past continue.
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5-14/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.151; THR VT96
	 What policy makes sense in such difficult circumstances? The first requirement is that it be bipartisan. What pressure the United States has tried to exert on the Chinese government has doubtless been less effective because Chinese officials calculate that Bush understands them and will save them from their American critics. The administration, the Congress, and the public need not agree on tactics. Reasonable people can still differ about whether to renew MFN, for example, but support for or rejection of proposals should be based on the evidence of their effectiveness; proposals should not be rejected out of a concern that they might offend or annoy the octogenarians in Beijing. Finally, whatever differences of opinion there are on tactics, Congress and the administration should agree on a common strategic goal: the end of communist rule in China. 
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5-15/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P. 154; THR VT96
	 U.S. policy, then, should try to make life as uncomfortable tor the current leadership in China as it can. This does not mean the government should refuse to talk with Chinese leaders. The United States should talk when it has something to talk about, but at the lowest appropriate level and at sites outside of Washington and Beijing. That is what Bush's much-criticized ban on high- level visits after Tiananmen should mean: not a straitjacket, rob- bing the administration of its flexibility to act in the national interest, but a statement that Americans regard the current re-grime as a pariah. The administration ought to state clearly that it has no intention of returning to the high-level visits that charac- terized the pre-Tiananmen period, with all their hype and sym- bolism.
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5-16/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.152; THR VT96
	 A second requirement is to abandon the pre-Tiananmen as- sumption that the Chinese government is somehow permanent or that the United States must act as if it were because there are so many important problems that can only be resolved by dealing with the current regime. That turns reality on its head. The Bei- jing government is not here to stay, and it cannot help resolve anything. China's communists are preoccupied with staying in. control and enhancing their own power. Out of touch with the world and discredited in the eyes of their own people, they will in all likelihood remain in office through the rest of Bush's current term in office, though probably not beyond another three to five years. This is not to say that the death of Deng Xiaoping will prompt a rapid return to reform and progress toward a more open society. The process will be long and difficult, though less so than in the more ethnically diverse former Soviet Union; the assumption of power by a new generation committed to greater openness, respect for human dignity, and a free-market economy may well take the rest of this decade. But it will begin relatively soon. Americans must do What they can to encourage this process.
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 5-17/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow,p. 30; THR VT96
	 On the absence of a strategic imperative and in the context of Beijing's ongoing political reforms, the Sino-American relationship will be more limited and more subject to recurring challenges. Moreover, the future of this relationship will be primarily determined by developments in China. Should China return to the path of political stability and reform, there is little question that American politics will enable policy responses promoting closer Sino-American ties. But for the foreseeable future, the likely prospects are that China will continue to stagnate in the mire of succession politics and Sino-American relations will continue to reflect American apprehension over dealing with an unstable and retrograde Chinese leadership. There is little the United States can do to change this situation.
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5-18/ Wisconsin State Journal, February 15, 1995, SECTION: Opinion, Pg. 7A, HEADLINE: U.S. SHOULD FOCUS ON CHINA; ACS VT96
	 The conditions call for the United States to be circumspect. But circumspection should not lead to passivity. The U.S. goal must be to apply economic and political influence to give post-Deng China incentive to continue Deng's freer market economic policies and to abandon his autocratic political control in favor of democratic reforms.
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5-19/ David Friedman is a visiting fellow at the MIT Japan program.November 21, 1993, Los Angeles Times p. m1 HEADLINE: TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC BULLIES THAT AMERICA REFUSES TO FACE UP TO; COMMERCE: WHILE JAPAN -- AND NOW CHINA -- RUN UP HUGE SURPLUSES, THE U.S. FRETS OVER GEOPOLITICS AND MOUTHS FREE-TRADE PRINCIPLES. //MDS-VT96
	 China and Japan are also viewed by many in Washington as strategic "assets" that must be maintained at any cost. For years, America's geopolitical tacticians urged toleration of virtually any economic inequity to preserve U.S. influence in Asia -- a position that justified America's now intractable trade and technology imbalances with Japan and, more recently, the granting of "most favored nation" trade status to China. 
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5-20/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 The best strategy for the U.S. is to engage Beijing selectively, formulating and communicating the rules of the road and informing the Chinese that the degree of cooperation or opposition from the U.S. depends on how well they adhere to these rules. By doing this, the U.S. can help China in ways that advance liberalization and democratization. At the same time, this "carrot and stick" approach informs the Chinese that they will pay a price for breaking their international obligations. 
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5-21/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 The possibility that the United States will be pulled into regional disputes involving China suggests a compelling need to collect the fragments of U.S. China policy--the concern for trade one day, arms transfers the next, help with North Korea the next--into a more coherent whole. The difficulty of predicting China's future is no excuse for ignoring the implications of China's continued growth. 
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5-22/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow,p.33; THR VT96
	 The era of American fixation on friendship with China must be replaced by a pragmatic American policy that recognizes the merit of a "mixed" (conflictual and cooperative) stance toward the PRC. Both cooperation and confrontation can be appropriate postures, each to be applied toward a different situation. Such an American policy will produce a less congenial relationship, but it will be a relationship free from misleading expectations and one that more accurately reflects the important issues in Sino-American ties, thus enabling American policy makers to maximize opportunities for cooperation in the future.
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 5-23/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof..Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.84; THR VT96
	 On market access, USTR threatened in 1992 to impose punitive tariffs of up to 100 percent on $4 billion worth of Chinese goods if an agreement on removing trade restrictions was not reached. By mounting pressure on some of the same issues over which it has negotiated with Japan, USTR has been able to obtain significant concessions on making trade laws transparent, dismantling import licensing requirements and quotas, and removing technical barriers. Here, too, the central government's ability to ensure implementation has been problematic, and USTR has threatened retaliation if the agreement is not rapidly fulfilled. There is general acknowledgment, moreover, that efforts to increase the market orientation of China's economy will necessarily be the subject of negotiations well into the future.
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5-24/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 The U.S. should stick to specific issues at these high-level meetings and not digress into theoretical discussions that enable the Chinese to avoid concrete commitments. The focus should be on issues that, though beneficial to both countries, primarily represent an advancement of U.S. interests in the region. Thus, the U.S. should:
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5-25/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 The United States should take advantage of this pressure. A growing avenue of influence for the U.S. is the emerging commercial and professional classes. Entrepreneurs up and down China's "gold coast" are exercising new freedoms, and it is these freedoms which are fueling the economic boom. To avoid being overwhelmed by a flood of unemployed and migrant workers, the prosperous coastal regions will require continuing access to foreign capital and markets. This will allow the economic boom to spread to the interior, creating jobs and improving the living standards of China's inland population. At the same time, factory managers in money-losing state enterprises are eager to reform but will need greater access to American management and technology to succeed.
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5-26/Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 Yet certain geopolitical realities must be accepted - namely, that pressuring China on matters of nuclear security exacerbates Sino-US relations and is counterproductive. For better or worse, President Clinton has established himself as moderately ''friendly'' to Beijing with the sale of a supercomputer following China's October 1993 nuclear test. Severely pressuring China will appear inconsistent and belligerent. On the other hand, securing Beijing's inclusion in a CTBT, even at the cost of allowing a current test series, not only will ensure that the modernization dangers resulting from near-term testing don't accrue but also will offer unique long-term benefits to regional and international security. 
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5-27/ Philip Ritter, The San Francisco Examiner, January 31, 1995, Pg. A-16, HEADLINE: Tibet's history of independence overlooked in U.S. policy; ACS VT96
	 We say a few words when the continuing repression and executions of Tibetans gets too much out of hand, and then we back off when the Chinese complain about our interference in their internal affairs. This may not be arrogance, but it is at least hypocrisy and moral cowardliness.
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5-28/ David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
	 * Second, how each state will behave toward the other in the future is not foreordained. Instead, future behavior will be shaped by the environment they create now. If Washington and Beijing each assume the other is a threat, they will take actions that create the belligerent foe they fear.
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5-29/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 Equally dangerous would be the advice of the academic "realists" who are constantly on the lookout for America's "new enemy". Searching for new enemies through the mists of the post-Cold War world can easily turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy; if we look hard enough for some inevitable enemy, we surely will find it. How tragic it would be if we let the "realists" convince us to make a "new enemy" of China (or any other country for that matter) simply because that is the only kind of world that they can understand.
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5-30/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 "If you treat China as an enemy, China will become an enemy," said Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye Jr. in a recent interview. "It will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. "If you have a policy of containment toward China now, you've written off the chance (that China won't ). It may be a 50-50 chance, so why write off the 50%? If you do, you're going to have a 100% possibility of becoming an enemy. (Should not be taken as exact figures.)
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5-31/Reuters World Service, January 20, 1994; Reuters World Service, "TAIWAN SEES CHINA TIES REMAINING TENSE IN 1994"; PMS VT96
	 Kao, whose council sets Taiwan's policy towards China, said Beijing was also expected to seek more diplomatic influence throughout Asia. ''It is evident that Communist China will actively intervene in Asian Pacific affairs this year, striving to play the lead role,'' he said.
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5-32 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 How will China define its role as its power grows beyond its territorial interests? China appears to be seeking eventual regional predominance, a prospect opposed by Japan, Russia, and several other rising regional powers such as Indonesia and India.
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5-33/ Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 Nuclear hopes are blasted by China (The Australian, Sydney): Monday's nuclear weapons test at Lop Nor was the latest manifestation of China's propensity for thumbing its nose at world opinion. The test itself was deplorable. Its timing, days after China joined the other declared nuclear weapons powers in agreeing to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the end of next year, was grossly insensitive. It was as if it had been calculated to give the maximum offence to a region growing more concerned about the bullying attitude of its biggest neighbor.
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5-34/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China, like many nations, is clearly struggling to define its role in the new international environment. One guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy appears to be a desire to ensure that its own national interests remain preeminent, particularly in Northeast Asia. Just as the PRC sought to maintain an equilibrium between the United States and the former Soviet Union in the past, China today would be loath to see a regional hegemon emerge. In Northeast Asia, therefore, China is likely to play Japan, Russia, and the United States, as well as the two Koreas, off against each other in order to preclude dominance by any one state or group of nations. To the extent that the forward-deployed forces of the United States contribute to that goal, the U.S. presence is likely to receive tacit support from Beijing. 
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5-35/Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 38 ; MDS VT96
	 Increasingly, the Chinese leadership seems to be turning to nationalism as a new source of legitimacy. Calls are heard to resist 'polluting' external (i.e., Western) influences and to work to make China strong and independent. The appeal of nationalism is great in China, as it is in many other countries, and resonates particu- larly within the circle of conservative Party hardliners. It can also be an effective weapon in the battle to modernise the economy; China, to be strong, must be economically prosperous and therefore requires economic reform. Finally, we should not underestimate the quite legitimate pride the Chinese people, including young, urban intellectuals, have in the tremendous achievements their country has made over the last 15 years.
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 5-36/David Shambough, Prof, Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY J0URNAL, FALL, "Chino's fragile future" p. 43 ; S E G VT96
	 Corruption is rampant inside and outside the party and is a major source of resentment among the citizenry. As economic growth has accelerated, the number of privileges the party can provide its members has declined markedly. Membership has been declining steadily in recent years, and the party has few ideological adherents. It bases its legitimacy today almost entirely on economic growth, nationalism, and the remaining instruments of Leninist rule: the nomenklatura personnel system; control of paramilitary forces and the armed forces; and the internal security apparatus. It sur- vives through its monopoly of political power; the suppression of dissent and lack of any organized political rival; by pushing economic growth; and by playing the nationalism card.
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5-37/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Externally, the recourse to nationalism is reverberating in Chinese foreign policy. On a general level, this is manifesting itself in an ever-hardening stance on maintaining China's territorial integrity, with direct implications for Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
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5-38 / Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Increasingly, the Chinese leadership seems to be turning to nationalism as a new source of legitimacy. Calls are heard to resist polluting external (i.e., Western) influences and to work to make China strong and independent. The appeal of nationalism is great in China, as it is in many countries, and resonates particularly within the circle of conservative party hardliners. It can also be an effective weapon in the battle to modernize the economy; China, to be strong, must be economically prosperous and therefore requires economic reform. Nationalism can also be used, of course, to counter the rise of regionalism. 
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5-39/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Even without regional domination, China might become interested in becoming the leader of an anti-U.S. coalition based on a rejection of U.S. leadership generally or as it is expressed in such policies as nonproliferation and human rights. This is evident in its assistance to Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs. It is also clear that China is not as opposed to the North Korean nuclear program as the United States is. Some Chinese writing on strategy and international security expresses hostility to U.S. preponderance [.]
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5-40/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 Merely talking about containment of China or the possibility of a future Chinese threat represents an extraordinary change in American strategic thinking.
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5-41/ Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 In the very long run, China may be the greatest threat to our interests. A China with only a quarter of America's per capita income would surpass us as the world's largest economy and, perhaps, as the pre-eminent military power. It has already replaced the Soviet Union as the major military supplier for anti-American regimes, and is insisting on great-power hegemony over the South China Sea.
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5-42/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.301; THR VT VT96
	 Second, one sees in the America Watchers' interpretations of U.S. foreign policy--particularly Sino-American relations--a strong prejudice toward viewing the United States as a hegemonic power driven by the desire for world conquest. This is certainly not the way most Americans-leaders and public alike---view their nation's international behavior, but it does coincide with the views of many in other parts of the world. To view the United States as an aggressive and arrogant power that throws its economic and military might around the globe is hardly unique to the Chinese. This view, when juxtaposed in the context of modern Chinese history, leads one to the conclusion that no matter how well Chinese leaders understand the internal workings of the United States, its external behavior worldwide (and particularly toward China) will always be viewed with a great deal of suspicion. Given their historical experience and this perception of American hegemony, Chinese leaders simply do not trust American motives. They fear American manipulation of China in international strategic terms, exploitation in economic terms, and subversion in political and ideological terms. From the Chinese official perspective, therefore, cooperation between the two countries must be tactical since essential shared interests are relatively few, the two nations' political systems are fundamentally different and the United States is perceived as harboring aggressive designs on China.
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5-43/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.81; THR VT 96 While some made explicit China's history of being subjected to hegemonist aggression, all would agree with that viewpoint. The "century of humiliation" is indelibly etched on the psyches of most Chinese and, importantly, serves as the most fundamental of all reference points in modern China's worldview. Therefore, the reason Chinese analysts of international affairs use hegemony as a key element in their analyses is directly linked to modern China's own historical experience. Not being able to rule their own country after centuries of relative insulation had a traumatic effect on generations of modern Chinese. It is no accident that when Chairman Mao proclaimed the rounding of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, his first words were, "The Chinese people have stood up[" There certainly exists a potentially large propaganda windfall to be gained from other developing countries who have similarly been subjected to outside aggression, colonialism, and neocolonialism, but the importance of this element in the Chinese worldview is genuine and not to be underestimated.
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5-44/ ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 At the same time, China has adopted a more assertive stance on key foreign policy issues -- one likely to bolster nationalism and win Jiang favor with powerful factions inside the military. In many areas -- trade, Taiwan, Tibet, nuclear testing -- this has put Beijing and Washington at odds, and disturbed China's neighbors. ``They are looking for ways of fostering unity, and nationalism is a glue. So they respond to challenges from abroad in a tough way,'' says Platt, the Asian affairs expert.
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5-45/ David Schlesinger, The Reuter Business Report, February 6, 1995, HEADLINE: Sino-U.S. ties pushed to the brink once again; ACS VT96
	 Beijing has over the years honed brinkmanship to a fine art. "They are going to push it to the very end to see where our bottom line really is," said Kenneth Lieberthal, professor of political science at the University of Michigan. "That is a legitimate if nerve-racking negotiating tactic."
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5-46/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads:Reform after Tiananmen, p. 67; THR VT96
	 The evolution of a benign worldview was suddenly ar- rested. China's world had not seemed as threatening since the early 1970s--although the nature of the threat had sig- nificantly changed. The earlier military threat had been re- placed by an intensified ideological threat from the West. And, like Mao before them, many Chinese leaders warned that a global class struggle against bourgeois ideology was necessary to protect the integrity of Chinese communism. This was, as one authoritative journal put it, the "new cold war."
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5-47/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Assuming these difficulties can be avoided, the world will have to deal with the fact that China is not a "satisfied" power. Among the major powers, China appears more dissatisfied with the status quo than the others. Beyond Hong Kong and Macau, which will be ceded to China by the end of the century, it claims sovereignty over substantial territories that it does not now control, such as Taiwan, the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea generally, and the Senkaku Islands between China and Japan. Although China has abandoned communism as a global ideology and seems to have accepted the economic imperative of the global economy, it is still seeking its "rightful" place in the world geopolitically. 
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5-48/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 China's recent behavior includes defying international norms of behavior and breaking international agreements. For example, Beijing dispatched a naval task force to the South China Sea in February and built a makeshift base on Mischief Reef to strengthen its territorial claim to the Spratly Islands. Occupying this atoll, which lies well within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, puts Beijing at odds with the Law of the Sea Convention signed in 1982. In addition, China allegedly has violated the guidelines of the Missile Technology and Control Regime, an arms control agreement to limit the spread of ballistic missiles, by exporting M-9 missile technology to Pakistan. Finally, the PRC has been trying to write its own rules with respect to joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the new global trade institution that replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on January 1, 1995.
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5-49/ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
	 At the same time, the Jiang leadership is convinced that Washington wants to exploit the temporary vacuum left by Mr Deng's death to bully China. Chinese think-tanks have painted an apocalyptic picture of a broad-based anti -Beijing coalition in such major American institutions as the Congress and the media. According to a much-circulated viewpoint, the Congress has not been so anti- China since the McCarthy era of the 1950s. "There is a union between liberals who oppose China on issues such as human rights, and right-wing 'friends of Taiwan' who want to promote American hegemonism," an America -watcher in Shanghai said.
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5-50/ Nnyan Chnndn, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 12-1-94; "Storm warning" p. 14 ;SEG VT96
	 When President Bill Clinton of the United States United States sat down with his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, in Jakarta recently, the atmosphere wasn't as tense as it was during their last encounter. The issue of China's preferential trading status, which hung like a dark cloud over their 1993 meeting in Seattle, had been resolved. But the meeting wasn't all sweetness and light, either. New clouds were gathering on the diplomatic horizon as a result of the Republican victory in U.S. congressional elections. "The new line-up on Capitol Hill is a nightmare for Zhongnanhai," says a Republican analyst, referring to the ex- clusive Beijing enclave that houses the Chinese leadership. Sen. Jesse Helms, who is staunchly anti-communist and proTaiwan, will take charge of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His counterpart in the House Foreign Affairs Committee probably will be Benjamin Gilman. An old friend of Tibet's exiled leader, the Dalai Lama, Gilman was the sponsor of a bill declaring Tibet an occupied country. With several other key leadership' positions also to be taken over by strong critics of Beijing, Sino-American relations appear headed for some very stormy weather indeed. The complete line-up of the new congressional leadership will not be confirmed until the Republican caucus meets in the last week of November. But there are sufficient pointers to the emergence of what one specialist calls the "most pro-democracy, pro-Taiwan, proTibet, anti-Chinese Communist Party and anti-People's Liberation Army" Congress in recent memory.
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5-51/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 85; THR VT96
	 The violence might be massive, and sustained, because as already noted, the government, while weakened considerably, is by no means impotent. It could remain in power by inaugurating a reign of terror akin to Stalin's. This would be a morally loathsome state of affairs, even if it did not have disastrous economic consequences, which it almost surely would.
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5-52/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China, edited by W@IIiam T. Tow, p.235, THR VT96
	 Specifically, control over the army had to be strengthened. When Romania exploded, Chinese leaders concluded that military/rebellion had to led Ceausescu's overthrow. Hence, ideological-political work in the People's Liberation Army had to be intensified so as to teach resistance to bourgeois liberalization. Those who had advocated that the army ought to be separate from the party and become a politically neutral organ of the state had to be silenced. The party had to continue to exercise absolute leadership over the PLA.
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5-53/Marlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.154; THR VT96
	 There is a widespread perception among informed Chinese, and surely too in the officer corps, that the party leadership is in disarray, preoccupied with infighting. Whether by design or owing to confusion, the 'gang of elders' seemed to overreact to events in the streets of Beijing, and then to events in Romania. Such overreaction implies a sense of insecurity. So do the shake-up in the CMC, the purge of the People's Armed Police, the strengthened internal repression, and the Maoist-style indoctrination campaigns.
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5-54/ GEBE MARTINEZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1995, SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; HEADLINE: ROHRABACHER WANTS TO SEND CHINA A MESSAGE; ACS VT96
	 "We don't need to have bases there, but we do need to have the capability to demonstrate our power and influence in the area," Rohrabacher added, suggesting that the Navy cruise the Spratly Islands "and pay a courtesy call to the Philippines."
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5-55 / Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 28, 1995, , HEADLINE: U.S. military readiness in Asia questioned; ACS VT96
	 Republican Representative James M. Talent, of Missouri, accused the Clinton administration of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" by using funds earmarked for support functions in order to maintain short-term readiness while neglecting long-term force modernization. Talent said a U.S. failure to maintain a strong military presence in East Asia would invite China to undertake an expansionary foreign policy to fill power vacuums.
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 5-56/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-1-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Tamazawa discusses Asian security with presidential aide; ACS VT96
	 (Japan's Defense Agency head) Tamazawa told Lake that the role of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has changed in the post-Cold War era, and refers its contribution to the stability of the world through its helping to establish stability in Asia, the officials said.
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5-57/ Agence France Presse, January 24, 1995, HEADLINE: Japan to pursue "more proactive foreign policy" : official; ACS VT96
	 The continued presence of US forces in the region was "essential to regional peace and prosperity," since it provided "a framework in which countries within the region can pursue nation building efforts with a sense of reassurance," he [Hisashi Owada, Japan's permanent representative to the United Nations] said.
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 5-58/Takashi Inoguchi, Prof. political science at the Institute of Oriental Culture, Univ. of Tokyo, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, II m "Dialectics of World Order: A View from Pacific Asia, edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 135; THR VT96
	 More important, communism is alive in China, North Korea, and Vietnam, and the U.S. armed forces are not planning as drastic a reduction of forces in Pacific Asia as we have seen in Europe. Even if one can argue that peaceful evolution is taking place in all three communist countries due to globalization and liberalization of economic activities, the end of communist dictatorship has yet to come. Furthermore, even if one may argue that the U.S. armed forces are bound to leave in the longer term, their regional security role has been enhanced in the short term due to the prospect of increasing competition and growing uncertainty.
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5-59 Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 The Nye report [Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs] seems to be responding to these and other concerns, by emphasising that "a continuing United States security commitment is viewed by almost every country in the region as a stabilising force" and that America's role as "a force for regional stability remains central and has not diminished. "The United States' role as a force for regional stability (in Asia) remains central and has not diminished," states the report. "To support our commitments in East Asia, we will maintain a force structure that requires approximately 100,000 personnel." Most of these forces are based in Japan and South Korea. If anything, the report notes that "post-Cold War reductions in the United States forces in the Asia-Pacific have essentially levelled off" and that "within this stable force level, capabilities will continue to improve
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5-60/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 But what is more important over the longer term, and vital to the stability of East Asia, is a US strategic commitment to counter PRC inclinations to use its overwhelming military power either to intimidate, to threaten the use of force, or to use force in order to have its way in contested areas like the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea or in relations with Taiwan.
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5-61/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 A global rival could emerge if a hostile power or coalition gained hegemony over a critical region, defined as one that contains economic, technical, and human resources such that a power that controlled it would possess a military potential roughly equal to, or greater than, that of the United States. It is, therefore, a vital U.S. interest (i.e., one that the United States should be willing to use force to protect) to avoid such a development. Although this could change in the future, two regions now meet this criterion: East Asia and Europe. The Persian Gulf is critically important for a different reason -- its oil resources are vital for the world economy.
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 5-62/Michael Hindley and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p. ; CJJ VT96
	 The ending of the Cold War altered the balance of power in the South China Sea. The United States has withdrawn from Subic Bay in the Philippines and the former Soviet Union withdrew from Camran Bay, Vietnam. The PRC is in the best position to take advantage of the resulting power vacuum. It claims most of the area of the sea, and argues that approximately 800,000 square kilometres of its territory have been encroached upon by other regional powers. The PRC fully occupies the Pardeels, having ousted the South Vietnamese presence in 1974. The subsequently unit..ed Vietnamese maintain their claim to the Paracels
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5-63/ GEBE MARTINEZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1995, SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; HEADLINE: ROHRABACHER WANTS TO SEND CHINA A MESSAGE; ACS VT96
	 Convinced that China is "becoming an aggressive and threatening force in South Asia," the Orange County congressman met this week with Philippine President Fidel V. Ramos and suggested a strong U.S. presence in the South China Sea "to make sure China will not be a problem."
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5-64/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 "If Washington fails to provide a clear definition of its interest in the region, including in the South China Sea, to develop a cohesive strategy, and to project its commitments there, it basically sends a message to the Asean countries that they will be better off cutting a separate deal with Beijing," notes Larry Niksch, a specialist in Asia affairs in the Congressional Research Service.
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 5-65/ Bruce Cummings, Prof. Intl History at Northwestern, Dec., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "What is a Pacific Century?" p. 406 ;SEG VT96
	 Samuel Huntington characteristically tops Betts in claiming that continued American hegemony is not merely in America's interests but also the world's: "no other country can make comparable contributions to international order and stability." Japan, however, is not to be trusted, because it unremittingly pursues "economic warfare" against the rest of the globe and is already dangerously close to hegemonic predominance.4 Yet Huntington's argument is looking like yesterday's porridge. If in the recent past most American pundits focused on Japan as the rising power-even on "the coming war with Japan"--many now regard China as more threatening. Betts again: "The state most likely over time to disturb equilibrium in the region--and the world--is China." Betts seems to think that if current projections hold up, China will not only soon be rich but will be "the clear hegemonic power in the region .'
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5-66/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FAI ,T, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHE[ ,F VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 176 THR VT96
	 Moreover, one should not forget that China will be able to exert more regional influence as the United States gradually removes its military bases from the Western Pacific. Given its reduced military presence in the region, it becomes vital to United States regional interests that relations with Beijing remain cordial. One would hope that the same sorts of geopolitical dynamics that led to the events in the 1930s and 1940s will not reappear in the face of a diminished United States presence.
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5-67/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Thus, the U.S. should: Discourage Chinese military adventurism and unilateralism. The U.S. should warn the Chinese that the recent occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands is unacceptable. It is a direct violation of China's pledge in the 1992 declaration of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to settle disputes in the South China Sea peacefully. The U.S. also should inform the Chinese of its concerns about the transfer of missile technology to Pakistan and nuclear technology to Iran and Algeria. To signal its displeasure, the U.S. should postpone further reciprocal port calls by naval warships until China participates substantively in regional security dialogues and accepts a greater international responsibility to curb the proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction. 
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5-68/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 The report issued by the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs, headed by former Harvard professor Joseph Nye, suggests that China has the potential to become a military threat to its neighbours and the United States. It stresses that, contrary to earlier concerns in Asian capitals about possible US military withdrawal from Asia, The 32-page report implies that now that the Soviet threat in Asia has disappeared, Washington's top strategic goal in the Asia-Pacific region is to provide the countries there with a security guarantee against potential threats, such as China.
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5-69/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 While the United States continues to cooperate with China, it should be cautious in transferring to it technologies that have important military implications. It should also ensure that China's neighbors, such as Taiwan and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, have the means to defend themselves. Working with other powers, especially Japan, Korea after unification, and Indonesia, the United States should preclude Chinese regional hegemony by maintaining adequate forces in the region. Without a U.S. presence in the region, as Chinese power grows, some states in the region are likely to appease China and move closer to it, while others such as Indonesia, Japan, and Vietnam would seek to balance it.
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5-70/ Hidenaka Kato, reprinted from The Nikkei Weekly, Jan 9, 1995 , World Press Review, April, 1995; Pg. 52; HEADLINE: Can Japan learn to lead? Japanese foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 The complication, of course, is that the U.S. may come to the point where it pulls back, or withdraws completely, its military presence in Asia, leaving an increasingly powerful--and possibly domineering-- China to fill the void.
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5-71/Stephen Chapman, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; Chicago Tribune, "THE SUDDEN RISE OF A NEW GIANT COULD REMAKE THE WORLD", SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 3; ZONE: C; PMS VT96
	 Since World War II, the United States has had two major rivals, the Soviet Union and Japan. Imagine a combination of the two-a military superpower that is also an export machine, a nasty authoritarian regime with a perpetually robust economy, a communist country that has found a way to make communism work spectacularly well. It sounds like America's most formidable challenge, if not its worst nightmare. It sounds like China. Russia and Japan continue to dominate American thinking and American strategy, but the world's center of gravity is moving rapidly toward Beijing. With the biggest population on earth-twice the size of the U.S., Russia and Japan combined- China has long been a sleeping giant. It is now awakening, with consequences that could transform the world.
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5-72/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Many in Asia also believe that outside powers, especially the United States, must continue to stay politically and militarily, as well as economically, engaged in the region. A strong U.S. presence can, they hope, provide a buffer to growing Chinese influence, deterrence in time of crisis and assistance should a conflict erupt. 
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5-73/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S.-Japan alliance called 'irrelevant'; ACS VT96
	 In asserting that the U.S. must focus on Asia in the next century, Lind (Harper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind) said Asia ''contains most of the world's population and much of its industry, and Japan and China are the only powers with the potential to be formidable rivals.''
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5-74/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 THE US has provided the balance of power in Asia, especially after the end of the Cold War. Yet, it has shown a reluctance since the Gulf War, to become militarily engaged in East Asia or anywhere else. Such a retreat from East Asia, by and large, suits China: An Asia left to Asians means an Asia more subject to Chinese influence. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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5-75/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 A global rival to the United States could emerge for several reasons. Because the main deterrent to the rise of another global rival is the military power of the United States, an inadequate level of U.S. military capability could facilitate such an event. The United States has made this error on several occasions by downsizing excessively. It faces the same danger again for the longer term.
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5-76/ David Schlesinger, The Reuter Business Report, February 6, 1995, HEADLINE: Sino-U.S. ties pushed to the brink once again; ACS VT96
	 "It is typical of U.S.- China bilateral negotiations that they go to the 11th hour," said Thomas Gorman, a long-time China hand who is chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong. "There are those who are critical of this and those who think it is the only way to get results." The endlessly repeated pattern the two sides appear to be locked into "is a result of a chemistry of sorts," he said on Monday in a telephone interview. "They know each other's flashpoints and boiling points," he said. "Both sides are playing to a very emotive domestic audience."
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5-77 David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
	 Unless Washington and Beijing are careful, each may overestimate its own capabilities, underestimate those of the other, and act on a misguided assumption that each is necessarily a long-term threat to the other.
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5-78/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 BOB DOLE: - Rebuild U.S. military power. While we don't need today what we needed during the Cold War, U.S. defense spending has been cut too far, too fast, damaging our industrial base, research and development of new weapons systems and training for new missions. For example, effective ballistic missile defenses would do more to enhance U.S. and allied security than would nonproliferation [policies]
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5-79/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Second, the United States needs improved capability for decisive impact in lesser regional crises (LRCs) -- internal conflicts, small wars, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, punitive strikes, restoration of civil order, evacuation of noncombatant Americans, safeguarding of security zones, and monitoring and enforcement of sanctions. Given the end of the Cold War, the United States can be more selective in deciding when to become involved militarily. It has not been selective enough during the past three years. Getting involved in LRCs can erode U.S. capabilities for dealing with bigger and more important conflicts. Nevertheless, some crises may occur in areas of vital importance to the United States -- e.g., in Mexico, Cuba, South Africa, or Saudi Arabia -- and others might so challenge American values as to produce U.S. military involvement. 
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5-80/ FRANK GAFFNEY; director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, Defense News, April 3, 1995 / April 9, 1995; Pg. 19. HEADLINE: U.S. Leadership Must Awaken To Onrushing Tide of Crises; ACS VT96
	 It can only be hoped the new congressional leadership and growing field of presidential candidates will respond to this recognition of the need to provide a modern, competent defense. This is not to suggest that a U.S. military perceived as potent is the full answer to all of the above problems. However, a United States so equipped probably will be able to deter at least some of these potential threats; at the very least, it will be better prepared to deal with them in the event that deterrence fails.
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5-81/ GEBE MARTINEZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1995, SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; HEADLINE: ROHRABACHER WANTS TO SEND CHINA A MESSAGE; ACS VT96
	 The United States should dispatch a naval carrier battle group "on a leisurely cruise" to the Philippines as a warning to the Chinese that they "will not be permitted to reign supreme over their neighbors," Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
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5-82/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Third, it is essential to retain a mobilization base to reconstitute additional military capability in a timely fashion if things go badly in any major region. Without such a capability the United States is unlikely to be able to take prompt action, 
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5-83/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 To discourage the rise of another global rival or to be in a strong position to deal with the problem should one arise, focusing U.S. military planning for the future on Korea and the Persian Gulf, plus increased ability for LRC operations, is inadequate. Over time, although the threat from North Korea will probably disappear, other larger threats could emerge. As an alternative, the United States should consider moving toward sizing its forces largely by adopting the requirement that they be capable of simultaneously defeating the most plausible military challenges to critical U.S. interests that might be created by the two next most powerful military forces in the world that are not allied with the United States. Such a force should allow the United States to protect its interests in Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. Such a force-sizing principle does not mean that U.S. forces have to be numerically as large as the combined forces of these two powers. It means that they should be capable of defeating them given relatively specific nearsimultaneous scenarios of great importance to the United States -- a Gulf and Asia scenario; a Europe and Asia scenario; or Asian and Gulf scenarios nearly simultaneously. Such an approach would give the United States a flexible global capability for substantial operations.
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5-84/ Ian Johnson, Beijing Bureau of The Sun The Sun (Baltimore), October 16, 1994, Pg. 6A, HEADLINE: Perry's China visit full of symbolism, not substance//MDS-VT96
	 An internal Chinese military document obtained by The Sun, for example, painted a picture of a new world order in which China will fill at least a regional military vacuum created by the fall of the Soviet Union and U.S. defense cutbacks. "The future holds great potential for the People's Liberation Army if it develops into a modern fighting force," the document stated. "Unlike in previous years, the pullback of the two former superpowers and the economic strength resulting from reforms give China a unique opportunity." 
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5-85/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S.-Japan alliance called 'irrelevant'; ACS VT96
	 Other aspects of the ''Asia first'' foreign policy proposed by Lind included increased cooperation with Russia on Asian affairs and the dismantling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He proposed that NATO be replaced with a pan-European security organization that includes Russia and the U.S. A ''moderately strong Russia'' would also act as a military counterweight in Asia to Japan and China, Lind (Harper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind) said.
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5-86/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan may be drawn into S. China Sea dispute; ACS VT96
	 ''Further U.S. military disengagement from the West Pacific coupled with the global nature of Japan's political, economic and security interests will intensify Japanese rearmament efforts,'' she (Malaysian defense undersecretary Siti Azizah Abod) said.
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5-87/ Clare Hollingworth International Herald Tribune, January 15, 1994, HEADLINE: The Uncertainty in China Leaves Japanese on Edge//MDS-VT96
	 The region now owes its stability largely to the U.S.-Japan security treaty signed shortly after World War II. The presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet as well as American ground forces in Japan and South Korea gives the area a sense of protection, as does the American nuclear umbrella. But Japan considers the situation in East Asia to be as tense and insecure as it was during the Cold War, a senior Defense Agency official said. Not only is there concern about the North Korean nuclear issue, but China and some Southeast Asian countries are building their military capabilities, and Russia retains sufficient force to launch a nuclear strike. 
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5-88/Lauren Fredman, Staff Writer, January 31, 1994; The Nikkei Weekly, "Global realities dictate closer ties among China, Japan and the U.S. Power Balance Vital To Stability, Expert Says", SECTION: EDITORIAL & COMMENTARY; Pg. 7; PMS VT96
	 Q:What is the key political or security issue facing Asia? A:China is obviously the major problem for the 21st century. The overwhelming power of China needs to be balanced by other powers. The U.S. and Japan are going to have to play that role, and I don't mean in an adversarial way. Everything in Asia is going to depend on what kind of China emerges. Deng Xiaoping is now 89 and his health is questionable. China has never solved the problem of passing political power from one to another without bloodshed. (Other problems include) the return of Hong Kong, the growing independence movement in Taiwan and the growth of China's defense budget. The U.S. and Japan have to work together to bring China into the community of nations.
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5-89/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 At present, the risks of regional hegemony in Europe and East Asia are very small. This is due in large part to the alliance of the key states of these regions with the United States, which endorses the presence of U.S. forces and the credibility of U.S. commitments. It is thus vital that U.S. alliances in Europe and East Asia be maintained but adapted to meet the challenges of the new era. During the Cold War, the U.S. role in these two regions not only deterred threats from the Soviet Union but also contained rivalries. In Europe, it is not in the U.S. interest for the EU either to become a superstate or to disintegrate. The former could ultimately pose a global challenge -- Western Europe's economy is bigger than the U.S. economy. The latter could encourage mutual suspicion and contribute to renationalization and a possible repeat of the first half of the twentieth century.
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5-90/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 At this point, the United States is the preponderant outside power in the Persian Gulf. Its position there helps to discourage the rise of a rival and will put it in a strong position to compete should one arise. U.S. preponderance serves the interests of the members of the zone of peace because it helps diminish the threat of interruption of oil supplies from the region.
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5-91/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 BOB DOLE: - As the only global power, the United States must lead, not simply pose questions for international debate as Dole says the administration did in discussing the lifting of the Bosnian arms embargo with NATO allies.
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5-92/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 Only one thing is for sure: Even though the Soviet Union has collapsed and the overriding threats of the Cold War are history, it has become increasingly apparent that the United States, almost half a decade into this next era, has yet to figure out its changed role as the single most powerful nation on the globe. Everyone in the debate says we have to remain involved as a leader - probably as the leader - and cannot withdraw from the field. 
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5-93/ Robert J. White; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 16, 1995, Pg. 21A, HEADLINE: Why a zero-nukes goal is dangerous; ACS VT96
	 Allies, notably Germany and Japan, have relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to forgo development of their own weapons. The umbrella's collapse to the size of Britain's or China's would probably lead to the emergence of Germany and Japan as nuclear powers. Others would follow. Some strategists see advantages in such a dispersal of nuclear authority. To nonstrategists like this writer, the idea is nutty. Besides, nonnuclear allies like Germany and Japan would let the rest of us know if they wanted to join the nuclear club. They don't. The way to reassure them is obvious: Keep the umbrella open. That does not mean keeping weapons inventories at their current Cold War levels. It does not mean that when the number of U.S. strategic weapons drops to 3,500 eight years from now - the level required by the 1991 strategic arms treaty - no further reductions are possible. An open U.S. umbrella does mean an inventory large enough to make the United States a credible protector.
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5-94 / The Tampa Tribune, March 13, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: How U.S. might send a message to itchy nations with nuclear arms; ACS VT96
	 Without American nuclear guarantees, many nations would join the rush to recalculate their security requirements, Mandelbaum warns.
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5-95/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia" p. 16 ;SEG VT96
	 For the United States to return to the position of dominance it occupied in Asia at the end of the cold war is probably impossible. The world has changed, and trying to resurrect the past would be frustrating and., futile. The current free fall in American credibility can, however, be halted.
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5-96/Karl Jackson, Hudson .inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's status in Asia" p. 14 ;SEG VT96
	 The shortfall in force capabilities is exacerbated by the Clinton admini- stration's inclination towards universalistic goals such as the "enlargement" of democracy and western-style civil liberties and rights around the globe, and the use of American military force in humanitarian relief roles in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and wherever television cameras intrude next. Lives will be saved, but military capabilities will erode &specially when multi-billion dollar expenditures are subtracted from operations, maintenance, and training budgets. For Asia and the Pacific, this will mean a defacto decline in U.S. presence as - carriers, aircraft, and troops decrease their operating tempo to make up for funds expended on non-military missions.
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5-97/ The Tampa Tribune, March 13, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: How U.S. might send a message to itchy nations with nuclear arms; ACS VT96
	 Whether the United States can maintain its expensive nuclear umbrella is uncertain. Mandelbaum says, "The American public may be unwilling to support the deployment of major military forces to reassure prosperous democratic allies that they do not need nuclear weapons. The American people were willing, for four decades, to spend trillions for defense and deterrence; what they will be willing to spend for reassurance, and for how long, remains to be seen."
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5-98/ FRANK GAFFNEY; director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, Defense News, April 3, 1995 / April 9, 1995; Pg. 19. HEADLINE: U.S. Leadership Must Awaken To Onrushing Tide of Crises; ACS VT96
	 Yet among the political elite in Washington, the conventional wisdom remains that with the passing of the Cold War there are no serious threats to the United States or its vital interests; reducing the federal budget is the first priority for the U.S. government; and significant reductions in defense spending can be safely executed.
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5-99/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 The issue is not only what levels of resources are spent on defense but also on what, for what, and how they are spent. For the United States to maintain its military preeminence, in addition to meeting possible major regional contingencies (MRCs), it needs specific capability in three areas.
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5-100/Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 BOB DOLE: Since Clinton became president, he says, "In the minds of many, U.S. foreign policy has been marked by inconsistency, incoherence, lack of purpose and a reluctance to lead. American lives have been risked, and lost, in places with little or no connection to American interests. From Bosnia to China, from North Korea to Poland, our allies and our adversaries doubt our resolve and question our commitments."
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5-101/ GEBE MARTINEZ, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1995, SECTION: Metro; Part B; Page 7; HEADLINE: ROHRABACHER WANTS TO SEND CHINA A MESSAGE; ACS VT96
	 Rohrabacher also criticized U.S. foreign policy strategy toward China as indecisive. The Clinton Administration does not "know whether to try to kiss the dragon on the cheek or put it in a cage," Rohrabacher said. "Our State Department has been hoping that if we kiss the dragon on the cheek, it's going to turn into a democratic princess, and now they are surprised to learn that it's still a dragon trying to devour its neighbors.
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5-102/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 BOB DOLE: - Use all tools of statecraft, diplomatic, military and covert. Diplomacy without force is empty, and force without diplomacy is irresponsible. The administration fails to understand the fundamental relationship between diplomacy and force and has displayed a "basic discomfort with American military power unless exercised pursuant to U.N. authorization."
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 5-103/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter,. "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia" p. 13 ;SEG VT96
	 IntemationaI credibility is derived from a combination of realistic goals, proportionate capabilities, a coherent alliance system, and the ability to execute policies under crisis conditions. The United States has suffered from a precipitous decline in credibility around the globe because it has simultaneously expanded its goals while shrinking capabilities, weakening vital alliances, and displaying disturbing indecisiveness in situations of crisis.
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5-104/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital and for which of them it should be ready to use force and put American lives at risk. It is a good prism for identifying threats, setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, and assessing needs for military capabilities and modernization.
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5-105/ Stephen Wrage, National University of Singapore, The Straits Times (Singapore), January 15, 1995; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: Little change likely in US foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 It will be clear that there was no change in the underlying commitment to a strategy of American predominance, and that in fact increases in spending on the military will have confirmed that commitment. Nor will there have been any deviation from the traditional orientation towards free trade, nor any backing away from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) or the new World Trade Organisation.
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5-106/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia" p. 17 ;SEG VT96
	 Fifthly, the United States must fund fully a military establishment commensurate with its geopolitical goals. Credibility will be restored if Congress and the president fully fund the shortfalls in the military budget while continuing to reshape the military to make it more mobile.
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5-107/ Vikram Khanna in HONGKONGBusiness Times October 16, 1993, Pg. 2 HEADLINE: US- Japan-China ties key to Asia-Pacific security: Kan Seng //MDS-VT96
	 Calling for a "predictable and constructive pattern of relationships", Mr Wong [Singapore Foreign Minister] pointed out that the continued US engagement in the Asia-Pacific is crucial; most Asian countries want it to continue. 
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5-108/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 But many Asians have expressed their worries that "multilateralism" and "cooperative arrangements" may be a cover for American disengagement from the region.
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 5-109/ Bruce Cummings, Prof. Intl History at Northwestern, Dec., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "What is a Pacific century -- and how will we know when it begins?" p. 405 ;SEG VT96
	 The Pacific Century is not here yet, and the Pacific Rim is neither a self-contained region nor a community but just a rim--peripheral and semiperipheral societies oriented toward Tokyo and the American market. Consumer purchasing power is still lower than in Western Europe or the United States (though rising rapidly in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), and its lower labor costs still orient the region toward assembly and finishing work using Japanese, American, or Korean technology. It is still a region under dual economic hegemony, held together by a unilateral American security network. 
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 5-110/ Bruce Cummings, Prof. IntI History at Northwestern, Dec., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "What is a Pacific Century? " p. 406 ;SEG VT96
	 Apart from the momentum of economic development, it is the United States that drives the countries of the region together (or keeps them apart, as with North and South Korea). We may say it is still the United States that drives the region itself. The ultimate logic of Washington's position resides in Japan being for the United States today what the United States was for Britain in the 1920s: the emergent financial and technological center, but a long way yet from assuming hegemonic responsibilities. As the Persian Gulf War demonstrated in 1991 and other crises have demonstrated since, Japan (and Germany) will be content for some time to let Washington shoulder these responsibilities why take on an expensive security role when the United States is willing to, and in the absence of major threats from Russia or anywhere else?
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5-111/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FAT ,I, 1992; POLICY review, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-63; THR VT96
	 Nor is Washington coming' to grips with the implications of China's growing military strength. The sudden spurt in China's relative and absolute military power inevitably affects security relations with our best friends in Asia. Japan, Taiwan, and capitalist Southeast Asia are all unnerved by China's new assertiveness in the region, now that Beijing no longer has the Soviet Union to worry about. All of them are anxiously looking to the United States to maintain its military presence in the region and, some, how to protect them from China.
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5-112/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 153 THR VT96
	 None of these sanctions will bring down the Chinese Communist party, but they will ensure that the United States does not, by act or omission, undercut those in China who will bring about the change Americans hope for. As has become clear after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, it is shortsighted to minimize the importance of standing with oppressed peoples.
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 5-113/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994;p.15 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 If the PRC refuses to liberalize its markets, the United States can apply the same pressures and trade sanctions it used successfully between 1985 and 1992 on South Korea to open its markets.
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5-114/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.155; THR VT96
	 Foreign trade and investment do not in fact prop up the current Chinese leadership, as some in Congress fear. Americans should be more concerned that the regime will succeed in tightening controls over trade and investment in order to minimize their subversive effects, while still satisfying the state's essential needs for technology, capital, and markets. To counter this effort by Beijing, U.S. policy makers should consider selective economic sanctions that target the central government and its state enterprises, not shotgun sanctions that hit all Chinese and will bankrupt the entrepreneurial south. Appropriate measures include restricting technology transfer, reducing China's textile quotas, selectively raising tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act on those Chinese exports manufactured in state enterprises, and actively opposing (not just abstaining from with a wink) any World Bank or Asian Development Bank loan that would strengthen state enterprises or the central planning system. The administration has already moved on some of this agenda, but not as elements of a considered new policy. Instead, the administration has remained reactive, doing the minimum necessary to preserve Bush's blocking third on Senate MFN votes.
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 5-115/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship," edited by William T. Tow, p. 85; THR VT96
	 In part this shift may already be under way, for something has changed in the way the Deng regime deals with its internal political enemies while it still executes some of its working class foes and deals harshly with those whose organizational skills really challenge communist power, most of the Chinese intellectuals who were arrested in June-July 1989 were released within a year. Had this been 1957, the time of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, or the Cultural Revolution, almost all of these political prisoners would have stayed in jail for ten to twenty years. While China argued that it would not yield to external pressure, greater economic interdependence has decreased China's ability to withstand economic sanctions and international opprobrium. Fang Lizhi's release is • the proof.
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5-116/ THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, The Houston Chronicle, February 15, 1995, SECTION: A; Opinion; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: If China is ripping off Mickey Mouse today, it will be autos tomorrow; ACS VT96
	 The key to such a nuanced strategy is the U.S.business community. China's leaders understand that their power depends on their ability to keep expanding their economy. They will only go after the pirates when we make it clear that their economy won't attract investment if they don't. 
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5-117/ Associated Press, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "Some Notable Failures, Successes in Employing Sanctions"; ACS VT96
	 Draws: --Sanctions on South Africa, particularly those imposed in mid-1980s, played a modest role in dismantling apartheid. --U.N. sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 have led to dismantling of much of Iraq's ability to build weapons of mass destruction, but failed to topple Saddam Hussein.
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5-118/ Associated Press, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "Some Notable Failures, Successes in Employing Sanctions"; ACS VT96
	 Successes: --India imposed sanctions on Nepal in 1989 to reverse Nepal's shift toward China. Sanctions contributed to political reform, including naming a pro-Indian prime minister.
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5-119/ The Plain Dealer, March 1, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS & FORUM; Pg. 10B, HEADLINE: A FAIR DEAL WITH CHINA; ACS VT96
	 The Clinton administration was right to threaten trade sanctions unless China agreed to corrective action. That threat, delivered with the sort of conviction too often lacking from the administration's foreign policy, succeeded in eliciting two key promises from China. The Chinese government has agreed to open its market to American film, music and computer software companies, and also to intensify its enforcement of anti-piracy laws.
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5-120/ P.T. Bangsberg, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-14-95, Software Industry Monitor Reports Drop in Asia Piracy But Increased Losses, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ACS VT96
	 Acting on complaints by the BSA, Chinese authorities recently arrested three people for suspected illegal software dealing in a series of raids in Beijing's popular computer area. Officers of the municipal Administration for Industry and Commerce swooped on 10 retail outlets and almost 20 hawker stalls, backed by BSA investigators who provided technical and other assistance. China is under heavy American government pressure to enforce the numerous laws it has on the books covering intellectual property rights. Officials insist they are doing as much as they can.
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5-121/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, II 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade, Edited by William A. Joseph, p.83; THR VT96
	 A newer instrument of U.S. bilateral trade relations that is sharp, appropriate, and relatively effective for pursuing U.S. trade interests falls under the rubric of Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974. Under this legislation, the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) is authorized to initiate investigations into alleged discrimina- tory trade practices by other countries and to negotiate for elimination of these practices. Barring successful negotiations, stiff retaliatory tariffs may be imposed. 
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5-122/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 130; THR VF96 Several internal factors in China require it to maintain good relations with the United States. The adoption of an export oriented industrialization strategy has made China highly vulnerable to shifts in external markets. With over 25 percent of its exports going to the United States, and with markets in Europe and Japan relatively closed, China will have to depend on United States acquiescence in order to maintain its successful growth strategy.
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5-123/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 123; THR VT96
	 The lack of a clear hierarchy is not the only problem confronting a president who must govern in an interdependent world. The tools of his trade, the weapons of statecraft, have changed as well. As he moves into the realm of economic policy, Clinton will rapidly discover that America's military power is not the key determinant of bilateral policy conflicts, especially those involving economic issues. (If it were, the United States could, for example, use its superior military might to force the Japanese to open their markets.) In the case of China, the leverage to make it respond to United States concerns is based more on the degree to which China needs access to American markets, investment, and technology. How long it would take China to find new markets and the costs of doing so greatly enhance the leverage the United States has over China.
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 5-124/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.80; THR VT96
	 More broadly, the conclusion that long-term U.S. business interests in China could be threatened by a serious decline in SinoAmerican relations was an important factor motivating a behind the scenes reevaluation of U.S. China policy by the Clinton administration in the fall of 1993. Concluding that relations needed to be put on a less hostile footing, the U.S. government prepared to step up high-level government and military contacts-most of which had been suspended after the 1989 Tiananmen events. The Chinese leadership has concurred with this goal. Thus, talks on human rights were resumed during a visit to Beijing by the U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights in October. Visits by several U.S. cabinet- and subcabinet-level officers to Beijing also occurred, as did a visit by China's vice-foreign minister Liu Huaqiu to Washington, in part for talks aimed at lifting the recent U.S. sanctions. Most important from a symbolic point of view was the meeting between U.S. president Clinton and Chinese president (and party general secretary) Jiang Zemin at the APEC conference in Seattle in. mid-November.
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5-125/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow,p. 31; THR VT96
	 The key to this approach is American willingness to confront directly Chinese human rights violations and bilateral conflicts of interests so that the relationship is neither predicated on nor explained by a false assumption of interests shared across a wide spectrum of issues. The expectation must be developed in both the United States and China that conflict is expected and inevitable and will likely occur in a number of different areas. In this way, policy can conform to American interests regarding both human rights and international security, while the Bush administration and its successors can protect themselves from domestic charges that they are displaying excessive friendliness to a repressive Chi- nese regime. Moreover, insofar as recurring conflict is the ac- cepted norm, such an approach will reduce the United States government's susceptibility to Chinese pressure to compromise in order to preserve stable relations. This was the general character of George Shultz's diplomacy in the Reagan administration, and the Bush administration should return to this policy line. 
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5-126/ The Plain Dealer, March 1, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS & FORUM; Pg. 10B, HEADLINE: A FAIR DEAL WITH CHINA; ACS VT96
	 The Clinton administration's last-minute trade agreement with China is a welcome development in a critically important relationship. The pact not only averted an imminent threat of trade hostilities, it also promises to bolster a growing sector of the U.S. economy, and offers hope for resolving other disputes dividing the United States and China.
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5-127/ South China Morning Post, January 5, 1995; Editorial; Pg. 14, HEADLINE: Bipartisan approach; ACS VT96
	 The most obvious example of recent years is Mr Clinton's tough election rhetoric against Beijing, which gave way to a more accommodating stance when he took power and then evolved into a rather more abject approach. Now, Washington is talking tough again. China and Japan can both expect more pressure to open their economies, while Beijing will not be surprised if matters such as human rights and the status of Tibet make the move from back burner to burning issues. Even Hong Kong, which has hardly been at the forefront of US politics, could make its appearance as an issue in the 1996 presidential election, if there are votes to be had from China -bashing.
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 5-128/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 75; THR VT96
	 Despite these efforts by China, key GATE nations have remained skeptical of both China's intentions and, on account of the panoply of remaining market restrictions, its eligibility for membership in the short term. The concerns of industrialized countries are intensified by domestic economic considerations, particularly worries about increased competition from Chinese imports and, in the case of the United States, about China's rapidly growing bilateral trade surplus. Hesitation over China's admission also likely reflects the understanding of GATE member nations that agreement by the central government in Beijing cannot always guarantee change at the local level. The center's signature on international property conventions and efforts to mandate access of foreign-invested enterprises to raw materials, for example, have been thwarted readily by those seeking to profit from the sale of unlicensed copies or to hinder competition from foreign enterprises--or by the central government's incapacity to police foreign patent rights or solve materials bottlenecks. In short, China's compliance with GATE rules depends on the cooperation of local actors that in the past have been all too willing to ignore Beijing's dictates. Thus, while the GATT working party on China met in early 1992 and declared support "in principle" for China's bid, neither the U.S. nor European signatories would agree to draft a protocol of accession immediately. Further negotiations on China's admission to GATT reportedly have gone very slowly. The Clinton administration has been particularly wary and has publicly played down China's chances of joining GATE soon.
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 5-129/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.85; THR VT96
	 In little more than a decade, China's reformist government has deepened and profoundly reshaped its trade and investment relations with the major industrialized powers and has furthered the prospects for Asian regional economic cooperation. This new role demands that China be taken seriously in multilateral economic forums such as GATT and APEC. These trends are unlikely to abate during the 1990s or into the next century, even given the tensions with other economic powers that integration with world markets inevitably brings. At the same time, the problems the government has faced in controlling its foreign economic policy are likely to continue into the near future: in particular, the boom mentality that has taken hold as the localities respond in unsanc- tioned ways to new foreign trade and investment opportunities, and the central government's inability to effectively enforce both its own policies and the international agreements it makes.
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 5-130/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.75; THR VT96
	 This hesitation has not been lost on the Chinese government, which began in 1993 to tone down its enthusiasm. It acknowledged that chances for accession in that year were virtually nonexistent and claimed it would now "not rush to rejoin the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade if conditions are not ripe.''38 As a result, full GATT membership for China is not likely to be realized in the immediate future.
 Two events are high on China's international agenda, and both give the United States some leverage. First, China's entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) passes through Washington, and the Chinese know it. One of the terms of last fall's MOU on market access was that the United States would work "enthusiastically" for China's entry into GATT. But the recent visit of Assistant United States Trade Representative for GATT Affairs Douglas Newkirk to Beijing, where he said that China would probably not gain access to GATT for at least another 5 to 7 years, created great consternation in the Chinese govern- ment. Linking criticism of China's restrictive trading practices and its ability to gain entrance into GATT is one way for the United States to press China to further lower its tariff barriers.
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5-132/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 Over the past two years, the Clinton Administration has been seeking to bring China into groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the World Trading Organization; to require China to obey rules on intellectual property rights, and to have China defend itself before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
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5-133/ The Plain Dealer, March 1, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS & FORUM; Pg. 10B, HEADLINE: A FAIR DEAL WITH CHINA; ACS VT96
	 But as China seeks acceptance in the global economy and entry into the World Trade Organization, its leaders should bear in mind that U.S. officials have every reason to closely monitor whether it is playing fair. Given China's size, and its already-huge trade surplus with the United States, the question will not lose its potency anytime soon. Last year, China's $29.5 billion trade surplus with the United States was second only to Japan's.
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5-134/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Thus, the U.S. should: Encourage China to end its insistence on entering the WTO as a "developing country." Given the size of its economy, as well as its position as the 11th largest trading nation in the world, China simply does not merit the benefits and protection normally afforded developing nations under the WTO. China's entrance into the WTO as a "developed country," as the U.S. and European Union demand, would not require China immediately to throw its economic system open to the world. Liberalization would be required over a period of years' ultimately supporting the very types of reforms that China needs if it is to continue its economic growth.
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 5-135/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journal ism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.25 ; MDS VT96
	 Trade, however, has not been ruled out entirely as a means of pressure for democracy in China--only the institution of MFN. Rather than the bilateral MFN bargaining, where the United States emerges as the only villain in Chinese official eyes, the administration plans to use the negotiations for China's membership in the World Trade Organization, successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to force concessions in the way China treats its workers. Freedom to organize and other workplace rights are among the main demands of Chinese human rights activists. China won its quarrel with the United States on human rights and trade but will find it hard to buck the majority of GATT members on workers' rights won decades ago in other nations.
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5-136/ C.F.A. UPDATE, 5-29-95, (A Newsletter of the Chinese Finance Association) Volume 1, No. 17, ACS VT96
	 Meanwhile, on Capital Hill, less opposition is expected against the renewal of China's MFN status, as this year's extension of MFN hasn't had the same politically charged atmosphere and Congress is having too much else on its plate to worry about. Likewise, it is not likely that Congress will consider any time soon a multi-year extension of China's MFN status. 
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 5-137/Michele Ledic, Researcher of China's foreign trade and energy Brikbeck College, University of London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES:CRISIS MANAGHFINT AND BEYOND, "Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p217; THR VT96
	 This objective was given a boost in June 1990, when President Bush decided to extend China's most-favoured nation status in the US market, against Congressional opposition. If this had not been done, Hong Kong entrepreneurs with investments in China would have seen much of their exports from China wiped out by the effect of high US tariffs. Hong Kong% shipping, property, and banking sec..tors would also have been severely affected.
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 5-138/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads:Reform after Tiananmen," p. 94;THR VT96
	 Finally, in Beijing, as in Washington, the trade issue has become linked to broader issues and has become politicized. An inner Communist party document leaked to Western reporters in late 1991 argued that the differences between President Bush and Congress were simply over means. Their ends were the same: "to make us collapse and bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist China." Although noting that the nation needed ties with other economies, the authors of this document asserted that American politicians who supported MFN status for China only did so because they saw it "as the most effective way to influence China's actions. "
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5-139/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 155; THR VT96
	 In economic relations the United States must keep its strategy clearly in mind: to make life difficult for the current Chinese leadership. Cutting off MFN status is not the way to press that aim. By continuing China's MFN treatment, the United States strengthens the market-oriented south, introduces new ideas, and undermines the communist system. This is the "peaceful evolution' that worries the leadership in Beijing so much.
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5-140/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FATfl, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMEMICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 176; THR VT96
	 First, renewing China's MFN status would continue to foster the nascent entrepreneurial spirit that already exists in the country--especially in the southern provinces. This would in- crease contacts with the West and could lead to a gradual, yet natural, softening of China's civil and political rights policy. One must not underestimate the political influence that Western capital, modes of production, and daily contact can have. Moreover, once relations are more cordial, China can provide U.S. exporters with a vast market. Japan, by pursuing a more pragmatic policy with Beijing, has already seen the benefits of the Chinese market. : These same economic benefits can.be realized by the United : States.
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5-141 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 As the past three years demonstrate, the broad mix of politics, policy, and philosophy inherent in the debate over China's MFN status demonstrates that it is too blunt an instrument to use for regulating overall U.S.-PRC relations. 
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 5-142/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, II 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade, Edited by William A. Joseph, p.83; THR VT96
	 The terms of the 1993 MFN renewal are notable for an additional reason. On the one hand, there is a certain irony in the focus of the conditions on human rights to the exclusion of trade issues. But the narrowing of conditions to the 'human fights realm has meant, on the other hand, that MFN is no longer a bucket into which a large number of diverse issues-trade, arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and hu- man rights-is dumped. There is merit to the Clinton administration's decision to address many of these diverse issues in different, and often more appropriate, forums (such as handling trade issues through Sec- tion 301 negotiations). Because MFN can only be a blunt instrument of U.S. policy, it makes sense to broaden the range and types of pressure to be put on China"
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5-143/ C.F.A. UPDATE, 5-29-95, (A Newsletter of the Chinese Finance Association) Volume 1, No. 17, ACS VT96
	 Renewal of China's MFN Status This Year Appears Set (By Hong Yang) China's MFN status, which grants it the same tariff treatment as most other nations that trade with U.S., had been a sensitive issue that was linked to China's human rights record and other practices, such as arm trade. Last year, President Clinton unconditionally extended China's MFN status, de- linking trade from human rights issues in a policy described as a "policy of engagement" aimed at active dialogue on trade and human rights matter in parallel rather than in concert. 
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 5-144/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edit ed by W i I I i am A. Joseph, p .82; THR VT96
	 In contrast to the Bush administration's anti-sanction victories, the Clinton administration has been willing to use the threat of MFN revocation to achieve U.S. policy goals. During the presidential cam- . paign, Clinton was highly critical of Bush's "softness" toward China and aligned himself more firmly with pro-sanction elements in Con- gress. Once in office and faced with the annual renewal question, however, Clinton's own stance softened, and the one-year renewal of the status came without sirings in June of 1993. Still, several conditions were set for the 1994 renewal, all of them focused on human rights and cultural issues: the fleeing of political prisoners (although the conditions do not insist on the release of all such prisoners); humane treatment of prisoners as verified by inspections by international humanitarian orga- nizations; free emigration in accordance with the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik amendment; recognition of Tibet's "religious and cultural heritage"; allowance of international radio and television broadcasts into China; and compliance with the bilateral agreement on use of prison labor. The executive order is relatively weak in that the standards it sets for meeting these conditions are not binding on either the president or Congress; rather, they merely require the secretary of state to issue a " recommendation for or against renewal based on whether he or she can show that China has made an undefined level of progress on these issues.
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5-145/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 134; THR VT96
	 Third, jeopardizing trade relations for improvements in Chinese domestic behavior is risky. By making MFN conditional, the president will be in a bind next year not to appear weak on human rights: unless China makes very significant progress, it will be hard for him to certify that it has. This fact will shift the debate to whether or not to withdraw MFN. The political stakes and pressures at that time will dwarf anything we have seen to date in the recurrent discussions on MFN. Also, given the current pace of economic growth, the problems in rural China, and growing inequalities and corruption, major protests could reemerge in the next 12 months. China will meet that challenge forcefully, and if necessary with brutality. No doubt, massive arrests of peaceful demonstrators and secret executions of labor activists, as in 1989, would and should not be tolerated; but should we condemn China for trying to maintain some semblance of social order as it undergoes this historic growth spurt? And tying MFN to China's domestic behavior, rather than to external acts such as arms sales which the central government should be able to control, puts the initiative in the hands of people who want to see MFN taken away. One might anticipate massive riots in Tibet next spring as young monks become aware that triggering a military crackdown in Tibet will force the president's hand to end MFN.
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5-146/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURREXIF HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 133; THR VT96
	 As has been noted, China's trade dependency on the United States market leaves China highly vulnerable to American trade pressures. If China lost access to the United States market, its economic boom, particularly in south China, would stumble bad- ly. No other market of similar proportions exists for its exports. Foreign investment that relies on re-exports to the United States would also decrease. But the degree of vulnerability for both the United States and China varies across policy arenas. The United States has great leverage when directly confronting China over specific economic and trade policies. And United States firms benefit from trade pressures that improve access to the Chinese market. For a president who must worry about jobs, directly chal- lenging China to open its market, using clear guidelines and indicators of compliance, may be a far more effective strategy than a broadside on the trade relationship because of a political agenda. Even Clinton has recognized that the Bush administra- tion's strategy of threatening economic sanctions to gain move- ment on economic policies, rather than using economic threats for political purposes, has led to significant agreements with Chi on na on a host of economic issues, including MOUs on prison labor, intellectual property rights, and market access.
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5-147/ Philip Bowring, International Herald Tribune, May 06, 1994, HEADLINE: China Is Getting Help In a Grab at the Sea//MDS-VT96
	 The extension of most-favored-nation trade status is debated ad nauseam on theassumption, on both sides of the argument, that the United States influences China's domestic policies. At the same time the United States is sleepwalking into active support of Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, which is even more arrogant than its invasion of Tibet and far more dangerous to international peace. ASEAN countries, too, are proving an accomplice by declining to face unpleasant reality. 
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 5-148/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTVRE,p.427; THR VT96
	 As the country's economy continued its pell-mell pace into 1994., there was so much money being made that Chinese and foreign businessmen alike found it increasingly difficult to integrate environmental, cultural, political, and moral issues into the China equation. A few isolated voices within China joined dissidents in exile to urge the United States to continue pressuring the Chinese government to halt political arrests and torture in prisons by retaining conditions on China's MFN status. "Without the annual review of most-favored-nation status, the Chinese government's behavior in the past four years would have been far worse," wrote Fang Lizhi from America, where he was now teaching physics at the University of Afizona.
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5-149 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-19-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Government to Cut Customs Duties on 255 Items [BEIJING, 01/18/95] China is to cut customs duties on 246 import and 9 export items for one year from January 1 this year, Xinhua News Agency said on Monday. Among such import items are agricultural chemicals, beef and mutton fat, coconut oil, plastics, rubber, wood pulp, newsprint, wool, man-made cotton optic fibres, airplane engines and navigation equipment. The nine export items with lower tariffs are chestnuts, phosphorous and seven kinds of non-ferrous metal products. The announcement was made by the Chinese General Administration of Customs. But it did not say by how much the duties were being reduced. (Luchen LI, ZHAO Hua)
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5-150/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-19-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Chinese Team Tracks Down Fakes [BEIJING, 01/15/95] Washington has criticized Beijing for not doing enough to protect U.S. copyrights, trademarks and patents, and threatened on December 31 to impose punitive tariffs on $2.8 billion in imports from China. U.S. firms estimate a loss of $827 million a year to Chinese pirates. Beijing vowed to inflict punishing retaliation on U. S. business should U.S. fullfill its threat, and argued that it has made laudable progress towards upholding intellectual property rights, enacting in 12 years protections that western countries developed over a century. (Feng ZHOU, ZHAO Hua)
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5-151/ Howard Kleinberg, a former editor of the Miami News, The Tampa Tribune, January 8, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Will the U.S. ever stand up to China? ACS VT96
	 The Chinese, who talk tough and stick to it, say that if the United States imposes those tariffs, they will break off negotiations with U.S. companies seeking to invest in China and ban U.S. movies, TV programs and laser discs in addition to retaliating further with 100 percent tariffs of their own. There is no doubt that the Chinese would follow through on their threats. There is considerable doubt, however, that the United States would, based on its previous timidity - and acquiescence to powerful U.S. corporations.
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5-152/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-24-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 U.S. Business Delegation Lashes Beijing over Copyright [BEIJING, 01/22/95] China has threatened to retaliate if the United States, which estimates that American firms are losing one billion dollars annually to piracy here, carries through its threat to impose sanctions on one billion dollars' worth of Chinese goods if no progress is made in IPR protection by the deadline. According to Ken Wasch, deputy director of the Software Publishing Association, the Chinese government itself uses pirated goods. "Chinese ministries run on pirated software," Wasch said, citing the fact that ministerial departments have been major buyers of foreign personal computers but have yet to purchase any legally-produced compatible software.
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5-153/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 4, 1995; ACS VT96
	 [BEIJING, 01/01/95] China will retaliate if U.S. go ahead with adding punitive tariffs to Chinese goods, Xinhua News Agency said Saturday. According to an announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, China's counter-retaliatory measures include suspending automobile joint venture projects, raising tariffs on game machines, cassette tapes, CDs, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and cosmetics, halting imports of U.S. films, TV programs, video tapes, and laser discs, and so on. (Jian-Min LI, Chuck LIN) 
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5-154/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-24-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Sino-U.S. Failed to Reach Agreement on Copyrights [BEIJING, 01/23/95] Negotiations on protecting intellectual copyrights between China and U.S. failed to reach any agreement, AP reported Saturday. If further talks, which resume on Tuesday, can't approach an agreement, U.S. will apply sanctions by imposing punitive tariffs on Chinese products worth $2.8 billion, U.S. Embassy said. U.S. wants China to imporve its law on protecting intellectual property rights, but China rejects the demand as interference of internal affairs. If sanction were imposed, China will retaliate by cutting U.S. imports and suspending negotiations with U.S. companies which want to do business in China. (Jingping Xu, Chuck LIN)
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5-155/John Frankenstein, Senior lecturer in the Dept. of Management Studies and the Hong Kong Business School at the Univ. of Hong Kong, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "American Trade Pol icy toward China," edited by William T. Tow, p.133;THR VT96
	 Risks to American interests in China. If the United States acted against China, it would be reasonable to assume that China would cut back on purchases of American goods, and of course tariffs and other restrictions on American goods would be raised substantially. Leading American exports to China can be found elsewhere, and for some items -- grain and aircraft, for instance- the market is fiercely competitive. Furthermore, American investments could be put in jeopardy. The Chinese might not appropriate them outright, but they could make their operations very difficult and could slow if not stop further American investment in the country.
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5-156/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads:Reform after Tiananmen, p. 119; THR VT96
	 However, such moderation has its limits. Over time, weighing perceived affronts to China's national rights against the economic worth of the Sino-American relation- ship may well take its toll. Deng's deep commitment to China's sovereign rights, intensified by frustration over per- ceived American use of economic leverage as well as pres- sures from more-conservative elements in the Communist party, will condition more prickly responses to issues that are perceived as holding China to a different standard or--as in the case of arms sales to Taiwan or human rights--as inter- fering in its domestic politics. For example, Beijing's deci- sion not to attend UN talks on arms control in the Middle East can be seen as one such response.
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5-157/Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 Beijing's frustration at US criticism could explode in Washington's face if the US pulls out all the stops to pressure China to cease testing. Washington's agenda with China is overflowing. The administration is already pressing Beijing on illicit missile sales, most-favored-nation status, North Korea, and human rights violations. Nuclear testing, a charged issue that goes to the heart of China's sovereignty, could cause intense backlash.
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5-158/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 Sometimes, however, Chinese press commentaries take on a belligerent tone. "Obviously, China, which is becoming mighty, is regarded as an opponent not to be taken lightly," thundered one official Chinese publication after an American aircraft carrier had a tense high-seas encounter last October with a Chinese nuclear submarine.
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5-159/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 China's leaders perceive these difficulties, whether economic or political, as fomented from "outside." From their perspective, China should be assuming a greater role in the region and in the world community. At the same time, they see the United States stepping in and demanding that China accept concessionary trade and security agreements in which it had little or no formative role. And while they recognize that Asian stability and economic growth for the past four decades have been underpinned by a strong American military presence, they also believe it is only a matter of time until China replaces the U.S. as the dominant power in the region.
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 5-160/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p.23; CJJ VT96
	 How will Chinese attempts to resolve these issues affect their foreign policy and the interests of other states? No question is more important in international relations, yet it is a question that has repeatedly caught the world by surprise, and may do so again. During the 1920s and 1930s, an anti-imperialist China, becoming stronger and more assertive than expected, began the disruption of the Asian order, and of Japan's position in particular, eventuating in the Pacific War. During the 1950s and 1960s, Asia was again disrupted by a China that had unexpectedly chosen communism and, for a decade, aligned itself with the USSR. These examples may seem like ancient history today, for in its next international incarnation a strong China was cordially aligned with the United States against the USSR. But this association was the product of specific circumstances: First , a Soviet threat that China could not credibly meet alone, hence the imperative to find a great-power ally; secondly, a strong Chinese leadership able to enforce the policy. Today both those preconditions have disappeared, and China is already demonstrating that its foreign-policy agenda does not necessarily match that of its neighbors and the United States. But in making China policy, most states continue to talk and act as if the rather smooth relationship of the late cold war period. should still be assumed, and as a result behave rather reactively and passively.' There are, of course, good reasons for that. The most important is the simple fact that because of its size and power, China is not easy to influence.
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5-161/ CHARLES WILLIAM MAYNES, editor of Foreign Policy magazine, The Houston Chronicle, April 19, 1995, SECTION: A; Outlook; Pg. 33, HEADLINE: Small wonder U.S. "gets no respect' globally; ACS VT96
	 Two factors explain the growing trend of foreign defiance to U.S. policies and whims. One is the erosion of the cement of fear that, during the Cold War, bound the fate of others to our own. The second is the progressive dulling of America's diplomatic tools -- a bipartisan achievement.
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5-162/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 Hot spots like Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Spratly Islands could also provide the spark for diplomatic flare-ups between the US and China. In light of this, says Kenneth Lieberthal, professor of political science at the Univeristy of Michigan, Ann Arbor, ''the odds favor a China that is more prickly, more easily moving to a position of standing up for China's rights and prestige against US pressures to conform to our version of appropriate international behavior.''
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5-163/ Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 U.S. relations with China on topics ranging from trade and human rights to Taiwan are worsening because Beijing is ruled by cautious and prickly officials who are less responsive to U.S. pressure than ailing longtime Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, according to U.S. officials and intelligence analysts.
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 5-164/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia" p. l3 ;SEG VT96
	 1. The Bush administration planned to cut U.S. military forces by approximately one-quarter, and the Clinton administration plans to cut more deeply. Morale in the U.S. armed forces has plummeted, and levels of readiness have suffered from budget shortfalls. American forces have been used in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda and are on call for Bosnia. Overextension and underfunding have led most knowledgeable military experts in the Pentagon to conclude privately that the present force structure could not fight and win two regional conflicts simultaneously. Both U.S. political parties agree that the defense budget is underfunded, although they disagree over whether underfunding equals $40 billion or $140 billion over the next five years. If current shortfalls remain unrectified, America's capability to fight more than one war at a time will be dramatically reduced, replaced in a few years with a none, hold.one strategy that for political reasons will become a win.one, abandon.one strategy. A single contingency defense strategy presents an open invitation to aggression by a Baghdad or a Pyongyang whenever the United States becomes committed to any other contingency. Friend and foe alike in Asia will include such considerations in these calculations of American credibility in the late 1990's.
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5-165/ Howard Kleinberg, a former editor of the Miami News, The Tampa Tribune, January 8, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Will the U.S. ever stand up to China? ACS VT96
	 China, again, sees in the United States a paper tiger, a country that talks tough but doesn't back up its words.
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5-166/ Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 The prospect of new military influence seems alarming to some U.S. experts because Chinese military leaders have long had vehement anti-Western views. Many Chinese officers "feel that China may be paying too high a price for Washington's favor," notes a report circulated by the National Defense University to senior policymakers last week.
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5-167/ Bruce Kyle, BANGOR DAILY NEWS , February 6, 1995, HEADLINE: Experts reflect on China Trade key issue with United States; ACS VT96
	 Lu [Lu Shumin, political counselor at the Chinese Embassy] said outside pressure on any issue -- trade, Taiwan, human rights -- "will never be acceptable to the Chinese people. China will always cherish its sovereignty; we will never allow othersto interfere in our internal affairs. "
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5-168/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 "Because interdependence means a degree of dependence, a China that sees itself as a non-status quo power has natural problems in accepting limits on its behaviour," they argue. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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5-169/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 Part of the problem is the way that the Beijing government sets itself apart. Just before the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, China scholar Lucian Pye wrote: "No major power in world politics is as isolated as is China today." Since June 4, China (with Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea, remnants of a once powerful Communist world) has become even more isolated. China has no traditional friends. Even when participating in the United Nations and other international bodies, despite Beijing's talk of Third World solidarity, China operates in a solitary fashion -what Samuel Kim has called "perhaps the most independent actor in global group politics, a veritable Group of 1 (G-1)".
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 5-170 /David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.81; THR VT 96
 The Chinese are among the most vocal proponents of the doctrine of state sovereignty on the world stage today and have real difficulty coming to terms with the realities of the interdependent world of the late twentieth century. One gets the sense that China wishes the world would return to the Westfalian state system of reified sovereignty found in sixteenth-century Europe. One sees the notion of immutable state sovereignty expressed in many Chinese foreign policy pronouncements, not the least of which are the hallowed "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."
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 5-171/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journal ism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 12_ ; MDS VT96
	 But in contrast to the talk of political reform we heard at every interview and briefing ten years ago, even Chinese officials who consider themselves liberal say that democracy, as the West or even Taiwan and Japan understands it, is no longer on the agenda. Their argument, buttressed by the ever-upward growth charts on office walls, is that a healthy economy that benefits all or most of the nation's millions is the Chinese version of democracy.
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5-172/ Bruce Kyle, BANGOR DAILY NEWS , February 6, 1995, HEADLINE: Experts reflect on China Trade key issue with United States; ACS VT96
	 Offering a clue as to whether U.S. protests about the piracy of computer software, compact discs and videotapes will bear any more fruit than have past protests about human-rights violations, Lu Shumin of the Chinese Embassy in Washington told attendees at the foreign-policy conference Saturday his country "never yields to pressure from foreign powers. "
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5-173/ Bruce Kyle, BANGOR DAILY NEWS , February 6, 1995, HEADLINE: Experts reflect on China Trade key issue with United States; ACS VT96
	 On the issue of intellectual property rights and copyright infringement, Lilley [James Lilley, U.S. ambassabor to China from 1989-91] said there is "no doubt the Chinese are ripping us off. This is a true clash of cultures. We can retaliate with tariffs, we can claim the right to punish China for selling a pirated CD at one-tenth our cost. The Chinese view is that this is capitalism -- free competition for technology that belongs to the masses. "
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5-174/ Associated Press, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "Some Notable Failures, Successes in Employing Sanctions"; ACS VT96
	 Experts say sanctions have been effective only about a third of the time since World War I, less so in recent years. Some cases of failures, draws and successes.
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 5-175/ William P. Alford.; professor of law at Harvard University, Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1995; Pg. 23; HEADLINE: U.S. TAKES THE WRONG ROAD IN CHINA; ACS VT96
	 Chinese factories are, indeed, engaged in the massive infringement of American and other copyrights, patents and trademarks-but trade sanctions, even of the magnitude United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor has proposed will do little to halt it.
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 5-176/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHIMA AT THE CROSSROADS: REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 146; THR VT96
	 The annual threat to withdraw MFN status has produced a few small concessions and cosmetic improvements in China. These are important because they can mean freedom for at least a few Chinese dissidents. Unfortunately, though, threats to reduce trade are not going to bring about substantial change in China. Many Americans believe that Beijing so desperately needs foreign exchange that it would have no choice but to accept conditions along with MFN treatment. This assumption is dangerously wrong. The Beijing leadership makes a convincing case that the benefits of foreign trade and investment go largely to Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors in export-oriented businesses. The leadership would probably strangle the south if it could, even if that would mean sacrificing what the central government claims is only a small percentage of the foreign exchange it earns from business enterprises in the south.
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 5-177/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow,p. 26; THR VT96
	 Moreover, continued attention to China's human rights policies will occur in the context of ongoing Chinese political instability. Although the international reaction to the Beijing" massacre may caution Chinese leaders from taking similar action in the future, China's leaders may have concluded that the eighteen months of isolation from Western countries and international financial institutions was a small price to pay for what they perceived as restoring order, and, thus, they may not be deterred from using similar tactics should domestic instability recur in the context of intensified succession politics. Indeed, the Chinese decision to place two democracy activists on trial for "counterrevolutionary acts," a capital offense,just prior to Foreign Minister Qian's visit to Washington suggests that Chinese leaders have not been deterred from pursuing their repressive domestic agenda. At the very minimum, there will continue to be instability at high levels in China, undermining the chances for renewed reform and thus sustaining international hostility toward Beijing and providing additional challenges to American policy makers.
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5-178/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Corning Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 35 THR VT96
	 Hong Kong is America's thirteenth largest trading partner. U.S. investment exceeds $7 billion there, and nearly 22,000 Americans live in the territory. Moreover, about two-thirds of China's exports to the United States pass through the colony. Hong Kong's greatest insurance policy for its post-1997 future under communist sovereignty is its economic utility to China--that means trade. If the United States adopts policies that reduce trade with China, either by design or through a general deterioration in relations with Beijing, it will correspondingly reduce the incentives for restraint in Beijing toward both Taiwan and Hong Kong.
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5-179/John Frankenstein, Senior lecturer in the Dept. of Management Studies and the Hong Kong Business School at the Univ. of Hong Kong, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "American Trade Pol icy toward China," edited by William T. Tow, p.134;THR VT96
	 Effect on Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the major source of investment for the kinds of Chinese factories supplying the American market. Almost three-quarters of American imports from China transit Hong Kong. Obviously, Hong Kong would have much to lose should tariffs on Chinese goods rise. Any negative economic effects -- and subsequent negative political and social effects- in Hong Kong would also have second-order consequences for the United States since it is the largest industrial investor in the territory.
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 5-180/David Shambaugh, Ph. D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.8O; THR VT VT96
	 What do Chinese scholars see as the sources of hegemonism? An analyst at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies noted three criteria for qualifying as a hegemonist: (1) strong military power; (2) a traditional nature of aggression toward others; (3) the big bullying the small.77 An America Watcher at the Institute of American Studies opined that "Desire for power is most important. Big powers inevitably become expansionist and hegemonist.''78 Thus, a range of definitions of hegemony is offered by Chinese international affairs specialists in a variety of research institutes. The common denominator is the strong imposing their will on the weak. Several analysts mentioned interference in internal affairs as the sine qua non of hegemony. Many noted military subjugation as the key manifestations, but several also noted nonmilitary means.
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 5-181/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.227; THR VT 96
	 The export of capital by U.S. multinational corporations has been viewed as the main manifestation of an imperialist foreign policy. Even government programs such as the Marshall Plan and Alliance for Progress are said to have been a "cloak" for multinationals to gain a foothold abroad.2 Institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank are seen as mere manifestations of state-monopoly capitalism in the foreign policy realm, and international organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD, and GATF are also viewed as "tools" (gongju) in the hands of U.S. monopoly capitalists and the multinationals.3 A book on American multinational corporations considers them to be the "invading instrument of neocolonialism.''
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5-182/David Shambaugh, Ph. D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.79; THR VT 96
	 A scholar in the international Politics Department at People's University reflected, Many people use the term hegemony, but few define it. In China when we use this term we mean big countries that try to control or interfere in smaller countries. Many scholars mix up imperialism and hegemony. We do not know if it is a system or a policy. Before the 1980s we thought it was a system, like Soviet social-imperialism- We now define hegemony as a policy. For example, in the past when we called the United States imperialist we meant the system; today we use hegemony to describe its foreign POLICY.
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5-183/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p. 44 ; THR VT 96
	 For most American Watchers in the Marxist School, the United States is the world's most noteworthy example of an imperialist and state-monopoly capitalist country, and for America Watchers of both schools the United States is the most poignant example of a nation practicing a hegemonist foreign policy.
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5-184/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.227; THR VT 96
	 The Marxists, not surprisingly, analyze U.S. foreign policy in a classic Leninist sense. Based on Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, the Marxists believe the main motive force behind U.S. foreign policy are monopoly capitalists who seek ever-higher profits and ever-expanding areas of control abroad. The primary focus of this line of analysis is economic, the principal actors are monopoly capitalists and their multinational corporations, and the main geographical targets of an "imperialist" U.S. foreign policy are the developing countries. The arms race is also attributed to the profit-hungry defense industrialists under conditions of state-monopoly capitalism.
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5-185/ PATRICK E. TYLER, The New York Times, May 23, 1995, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: The U.S.- China Slide; A Relationship Strained by Trade Tension Could Worsen Further Over Taiwan Flap; ACS VT96
	 Instead of partnership, some Chinese officials now suspect that the United States is developing a "containment" strategy against China through a military pact with Japan, weapons sales to Taiwan and the deployment of an anti-missile system in the Pacific that will neutralize China's strategic arsenal. A senior Chinese foreign policy expert told a recent visitor that when Chinese leaders get together these days, the country they express the most anger toward and dislike for is the United States.
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5-186/ David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
	 On another extreme, this line of reasoning leads a few in the Chinese leadership to conclude that ''the West remains our chief enemy'' and that America is pursuing a ''new containment [“]
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 5-187/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.233; THR VT 96
	 Analysts at the CASS's Institute of World Economics and Politics agree with this assessment. An article in the institute's journal World Economics put it this way: The United States' "aid to developing countries" is in fact an important means of effecting political control over, and economic infiltration into, the developing countries. In addition it represents an important part of the U.S. global strategy and struggle for world hegemony. Such "aid" more often than not stipulates that the receiving country fall under American military control or political sphere of rule, or that the country provide military bases for the United States .... Such "aid" thus makes the country receiving it more and more dependent on the United States in economic and political terms, even to the point of falling into heavy debt .... It is absolutely impossible that the United States will change its basic aims of providing "aid" to developing countries, in particular its aims of a very clearly aggressive and expansionist nature.
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5-188/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, .1972-1990, p.230; THR VT 96 
	 Perhaps the Marxists' sharpest condemnation of U.S. imperialism is reserved for U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. One review .summed up U.S. policy toward the region over the last century this way: "The United States has used many methods to promote its neocolonialist policy [in Latin America], such as propping up proxies, engineering military coups, establishing military and political cliques, and plundering and controlling Latin America by giving 'aid' and loans.'' The article goes on to give a laundry list of U.S. interventions in the region (overt and covert). The Monroe Doctrine, "bigstick policy," "dollar diplomacy," the "good neighbor policy," "Alliance for Progress," Carter's "human rights policy," and so forth are all denounced as imperialist attempts to control America's "backyard" (beihou). "As a result of U.S. oppression and exploitation," says another analyst at the Institute of International Studies in Beijing, "the people's struggle in Latin America has a strong nature of opposing the United States, with extensive support of the masses."
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5-189/David Shambaugh, Ph. D. political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p283; THR VT 96 But chapter 6 uncovered a significant new departure from the Marxist/non-Marxist dichotomy so evident throughout the study of domestic American affairs. Rather than seeing a variegated foreign policy (as the non-Marxists) or a profit-driven foreign policy (as the Marxists), this new strand of analysis viewed American foreign policy as the pursuit of global hegemony. For America Watchers articulating this image--and the majority duster in this camp--all American actions abroad are derivative of the U.S. quest for global hegemony. Some see this quest for hegemony as derivative from U.S. competition with the Soviet Union for such supremacy, while others see it as driven by a combination of factors in the American historical experience and national psyche--what veteran America Watcher, journalist, and pundit Peng Di referred to as the "superpower complex." The hegemonist critique of American foreign policy is very apparent in the America Watcher's perceptions of American policy and behavior toward China. The United States, in the view of many, is bent on manipulating China for its own strategic purposes, wantonly interfering in its internal 'affairs irrespective of Chinese national dignity and sovereignty, and trying to transform China in its own vision.
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5-190/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.275; THR VT 96
	 These official views of U.S. hegemonist interference were also echoed by the America Watchers in the post-Tiananmen period. Many criticized the United States for the policy of "peaceful evolution" whereby the United States attempts to subvert the socialist system in China by peaceful means. The policy of "peaceful evolution" supposedly began with John Foster Dulles, according to hardliner Huo Shiliang of the CASS's America Institute, but has accelerated since the normalization of relations. A colleague of Huo's at the America Institute went further: Before June 4 China considered the United States as a trustworthy and friendly country, but since June 4 the United States has become the main source of instability in China. Peaceful evolution is the main threat to China's stability today. The ideological struggle will be the most important factor in future Sino-American relations. The U.S. will again become the major threat to China, but not a military one. The Taiwan problem will remain important, but the ideological struggle -- particularly peaceful evolution-will be primary.
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5-190a /David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.202; THR VT 96
	These official views of U.S. hegemonist interference were also echoed by the America Watchers in the post-Tiananmen period. Many criticized the United States for the policy of "peaceful evolution" whereby the United States attempts to subvert the socialist system in China by peaceful means. The policy of "peaceful evolution" supposedly began with John Foster Dulles, according to hardliner Huo Shiliang of the CASS's America Institute, but has accelerated since the normalization of relations. A colleague of Huo's at the America Institute went further: Before June 4 China considered the United States as a trustworthy and friendly country, but since June 4 the United States has become the main source of instability in China. peaceful evolution is the main threat to China's stability today. The ideological struggle will be the most important factor in future Sino-American relations. The U.S. will again become the major threat to China, but not a military one. The Taiwan problem will remain important, but the ideological struggle-particularly peaceful evolution-will be primary .
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5-191/Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 According to recent news reports, several high-ranking Chinese generals expressed their frustration over Beijing's soft-line stance toward American ''hegemonism'' and ''power politics.'' They gave President Jiang Zemin a petition signed by 180 ranking officers insisting that China take a ''solemn and just stand'' against the US.
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CHAPTER SIX
COOPERATING WITH CHINA
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Editor: Gordie Miller
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I. Cooperative policies
	A. Failure of current policy
		1.Clinton's policies are inconsistent 1-2
		2. US has shortsighted Foreign policy 3-4
		3. Popular support is difficult to maintain 5
		4. Conciliation is the wrong approach 6-7
		5. Current policy is constructive engagement 8-10
	B. Must act now 11-13
	C. Must stay engaged with China/Asia
		1. US must stay engaged in Asia 14-15
		2. Engagement is most beneficial policy 16
		3. US must stay actively involved with China 17-23
		4. High level engagement is necessary 24-26
	D. Cooperation is best level of engagement
		1. US policy should be global cooperation 27
		2. Focusing on Asia requires Chinese engagement 28
		3. Cooperation with China is necessary 29-34
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II. Regional Security
	A. China is of great strategic importance
		1. Collapse of China is the ultimate impact 35
		2. China could become a threat 36-38
		3. China is a strategic world power 39-41
	B. China needed for regional security
		1. Best arms control is to reduce regional tensions 42
		2. US Coop with China necessary for regional security 43-45
		3. China's relations with its neighbors are key to peace 46-48
	C. US wants cooperative solution to South China Sea 49-51
	D. China wants cooperation
		1. China increasing economic ties with Asia 52
		2. China wants coop with US on most issues 53-58
	E. US Policy of Coop hurts regional security
		1. US policy antagonizes the region 59
		2. US toughening up in anticipation of Deng's death 60
		3. US focused on internal politics of China 61-62
		4. US must refocus on China 63-64
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III. Areas of Cooperation
	A. Military issues
		1. need direct US/China military cooperation 65-71
		2. Asian nations are sharing defense information 72
		3. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
			a. China opposes BMD 73-75
			b. China views BMD as a threat 76-80
			c. BMD would stop Chinese arms control 81-82
			d. BMD is flawed 83-84
			e. BMD is good for US and China 85-87
	B. The environment
		1. China's environment is threatened 88-91
		2. China threatened by global warming 92-93
		3. China's crops are threatened 94-97
		4. China working to solve environmental problems 98-101
		5. China needs International coop to clean environment 102-106
		6. China needs to restructure environmental policy 107-110
		7. China can develop alternative energy 111-114
		8. US is not helping with the 3 Gorges Dam 115
	C. Human rights
		1. Should coop, not dictate, human rights policies 116-120
		2. China is authoritarian 121-122
	D. Immigration
		1. Chinese immigration is increasing 123-125
		2. Clinton has changed coercive birth control asylum law 126-127
		3. Courts reject Clintons policy 128-131
		4. China and US cooperating on immigration issue 132-134
	E. Trade
		1. Greater China (PRC, ROC, Hong Kong) is key 135-140
		2. Chinese investment is increasing 141-143
		3. Don't need new legislation 144
		4. China key to Asian Growth 145
		5. Should include China in international organizations 146-151
		6. Need cooperation on science and technology 152-155
	F. Taiwan (ROC)
		1. US & Taiwan are economically linked 156-158
		2. Two track relationship fails 159-160
		3. US must coop with both PRC and ROC 161-164
		4. China concerned over US-ROC relationship 165-167
		5. US must be engaged with Taiwan 168-172
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6-1 / Jennifer Lin, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; PLANNED DEPORTATIONS OF CHINESE WOMEN THREATEN CLINTON WITH CONTROVERSY; ACS VT96
	 ``Is the president's alleged position just for the press and Congress or is it for real?'' asked Craig Trebilcock, an attorney who is working with Golden Venture inmates held in York, Pa. ``The reality on the ground today is completely contrary to the policy the president took last summer.''
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6-2 / Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. misperceptions lead to disputes: Asia Society head" ACS VT96
	 ''It does take a certain amount of mishandling to simultaneously antagonize the two most important nations of Asia,'' said Levin [Burton Levin, director of the Asia Society in Hong Kong] , a China scholar and former senior U.S. official retired from the foreign service, during a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong. ''I think that this is a hallmark of the inept way this administration has gone about dealing with its relationships in Asia,'' he added.
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6-3/ RICH MILLER, Reuters News Service, 4-23-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. strives to keep up in race to tap new economies; ACS VT96
	 Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin returned home from an eight-day tour of Asia vowing to avoid the mistake the United States made in China -- falling behind in the race to develop ties with the world's fastest-growing markets. ``As a nation ... we were late in foreseeing the economic changes taking place in China,'' Rubin told reporters after his return Friday night. ``As a consequence, other nations were ahead of us in establishing themselves in the new Chinese economy.''
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6-4/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Despite efforts by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, three years after the end of the Soviet Union, no grand strategy has yet jelled and there is no consensus on overarching national security objectives. It appears that the United States is still trying to get its strategic bearings.
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6-5/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Without a broadly agreed architectural framework, gaining widespread bipartisan support for policy also becomes harder, as has been evident in recent discussions of foreign and security policy. Sustaining popular support and staying the course for particular policies become harder if the costs of implementation increase but the commitment cannot be explained in terms of a national interest and a strategy on which broad agreement has been achieved.
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6-6/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 214; THR VT96
	 Quite clearly, the short-term geostrategic human rights goals that the Bush administration hoped for in adopting a conciliatory policy toward China have not been achieved. That the PRC leadership has acted in accordance with its perception of China's best interests should have surprised no one; it has been a consistent feature of the Chinese foreign policy for the past several decades. To expect that a conciliatory American policy could change this pattern is so naive that it raises doubts about the competence of those in charge of the United States' Asia policy. The administration's longer-term goals of encouraging friendly ties with individuals in the Chinese military and interactions between the defense forces of the two countries are certainly more feasible. and may yet occur. A year and a half is not very long in terms of diplomatic accomplishments, and one cannot ignore the possibility that those goals will be accomplished in the future. 
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6-7/John Frankenstein, Senior lecturer in the Dept. of Management Studies and the Hong Kong Business School at the Univ. of Hong Kong, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "American Trade Policy toward China, edited by WiIIiam T. Tow, p. 144;THR VT96
	 The challenge now is for the United States to formulate a strategy and policy that will include China -- a country with strong isolationist tendencies and a country perhaps on the edge of interesting, if not profound, domestic political changes as the makers of the old cold war environment disappear -- as a positive contributor to a new world order that will be emerging in the 1990s. Trade policy will have an important role to play here, but to be effective, it must have some cohesion and must be linked with wider United States policy. "Constructive engagement" with Beijing merely maintains the status quo; we need also to clarify our own vision of China as a significant actor in the post-cold war environment. 
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6-8/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century, " p. 426; THR VT96
	 China's military modernization program is also of increasing concern to the United States, but Washington's China agenda remains dominated by human rights, trade, and political concerns. The United States , wants to improve human rights in China, but its stance is shaped by the lingering ideological/political struggle of the cold war. China is seen by many American politicians and officials as a pariah state that should join the former communist parties of the former Soviet bloc in the annals of history. Nonetheless, President Bill Clinton has opted for the policy of "constructive engagement" with China that had been fashioned by President George Bush. By extending most favored nation trading privileges to China, the Clinton administration has recognized that China is critical to key United States international security interests, while at the same time trying to balance deep American concerns over China's human rights record and political system. 
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6-9 / Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 Indeed, US officials have dismissed the notion that they are devising an anti- China strategy. Instead, as the reports puts it, US policy towards Beijing will be one of "principled engagement".
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6-10/ Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 President Bill Clinton's foreign policy team believes the United States should be actively engaged with the world, not as a traditional great power, but as a facilitator. Sometimes this policy has worked well. The Clinton administration has had notable successes with the North American Free Trade Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the United Nations' population conference in Cairo. At other times, though, this "soft" engagement has brought embarrassment and stoked the fires of isolationism. 
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6-11/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Given the opportunity costs, the United States should no longer delay the development of a vision and a national grand strategy. The shift in the tectonics of power confronts Washington with several options. The choice that the United States makes is not only important for setting the country's global direction for this new era, but also for the major impact it will have [.]
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6-12 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 THREE YEARS AFTER the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is heading toward squandering a oncein-a-lifetime opportunity to shape the future of the world because it still does not have a broadly agreed upon vision and a grand strategy for the new era. The United States cannot succeed in shaping the post-cold war world unless it knows what shape it wants the world to take, understands what it takes to mold international relations in accordance with that vision, and has the will to see the task through. Without a strategy, the United States will tend to lose the initiative in world affairs and be placed in a reactive mode.
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6-13/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 The lack of vision endangers the completion of even modest tasks. An administration can neither evaluate specific policy decisions adequately, nor reach an effective consensus with respect to them, without first constructing a framework for guiding policy, setting priorities, and deciding what constitute vital U.S. interests. Policy on many issues will be ambivalent and uncertain and will lack staying power. Short-term and parochial interests will take priority over longerterm, national interests.
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6-14/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, US Secretary of State: - We must seek and maintain productive political and economic relations with the world's most powerful states - including Western Europe, Russia and Japan - in order to "pursue our objectives in a safer and more favorable environment. These nations could pose the greatest threat to the United States if any should stand against us, but when they work with us we can reap great benefits."
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6-15 / Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Although our foreign policy should focus on Asia, we of course cannot ignore Europe's great powers, Germany and Russia. Fortunately, neither are strong enough to be world-class threats.
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6-16/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 39; THR VT96
	 Whether the P. R. C. succeeds or fails it will present America with enormous challenges. System collapse would impose large- scale misery on the Chinese people, lead to a destabilizing foreign policy and produce a China with no authoritative center with which to deal and create migratory flows of enormous magni- tude. Economic success in the P. R. C. will have negative global ecological effects, increase Chinese competition in some econom- ic sectors (as well as provide a large market for many American industries), and enable China to project power and influence in ways the United States will not necessarily like. A China that has made rapid progress and becomes stronger will not be a pliable China. However, it is far better that America face the problems of success in China than those of failure. 
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6-18/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 The United States should continue to pursue economic relations with China and encourage its integration in global economic and security regimes.
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6-19/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 The best strategy for the U.S. is to engage Beijing selectively, formulating and communicating the rules of the road and informing the Chinese that the degree of cooperation or opposition from the U.S. depends on how well they adhere to these rules. By doing this, the U.S. can help China in ways that advance liberalization and democratization. At the same time, this "carrot and stick" approach informs the Chinese that they will pay a price for breaking their international obligations. 
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6-20/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 "China is now just starting out as a growing power, just as Japan and Germany were growing powers at the beginning of this century," Harvard University professor Ezra Vogel, who is the U.S. intelligence community's national intelligence officer for East Asia, observed recently. "It's the role of all of us to see we have a stable system that tries to encourage China and yet tries to prevent it from going too far."
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6-21/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Comm. on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-37; THR VT96
	 A policy of benign neglect or outright hostility will not only forego opportunities to build links to the most dynamic regional. economy in the world and to gain the benefits to be derived from cooperation on global problems, it also will retard the ongoing processes that over the long run will produce the kinds of social change more compatible with basic American values. The United States needs a policy of active involvement in Greater China that consists of the following elements: vigorous engagement, diversification, multilaterization and recognition of interdependence. 
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 6-22/David Zweig, Assoc. Prof. of international relations, Tufts Univ. , 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Sino-American Relations and Human Rights: June 4 and the Changing Nature of a Bilateral Relationship, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 86; THR VT96
	 Yet openness and reform have their virtues. We should anticipate a change as China recognizes the fundamental nature of its response to human rights and the need to improve its performance if it wishes to keep Western loans and technology flowing into the PRC. Ten years of Deng's reforms have had a significant impact. For a decade Deng told the Chinese intellectuals that they were part of "the people" and had the right to participate actively in China's modernization drive. Their views and China's ties to the outside will have their impact. In the words of one of the author's Chinese friends, a well-known political hard-liner, "The world has become internationalized and China cannot go on its own as in the 1950s and 1960s and ignore what the world thinks about it. We have to be concerned and try to deal with these issues. China cannot go back on its open policy. The people would not accept it, and this has led to changes in China, in people's views and people's demands. " Let us hope he is right. 
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6-23/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-36; THR VT96
	 In sum the challenges facing American policy are twofold: to encourage and participate in economic developments that promote security, prosperity, and social and political change, as has occurred in other areas of high-speed Asian growth, most notably South Korea and Taiwan; and to remain flexible and diversified in dealings with China, given that the unexpected has been the norm in the P. R. C. 
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6-24/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-Chins Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 37; THR VT96
	 Diversification of relations has two principal dimensions. At the same time that Washington remains actively engaged with Beijing's leaders at the national level, it needs to develop relations with local leaders throughout China. A new generation of capable, younger, economically oriented leaders is moving up through the system. These individuals not only have growing influence because of the decentralization that has occurred over the last 15 years, they also increasingly have the skills and motivation to make cooperation with Americans more productive. America should not deceive itself, however, that the rise of younger, more technologically oriented leaders in China will dispel disputes. On the contrary the seriousness of their commitment to economic development may increase conflict, particularly in the trade and environmental domains. But one can expect that Americans and Chinese will speak the same language to an ever larger ex- tent. "
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6-25. /Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-Chins Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 37; THR VT96
	 Vigorous engagement means involving Chinese leaders and organizations at the highest levels in a dialogue about the problems and opportunities that America and China face together. These problems include proliferation, trade, human rights, the global environment and the development of multilateral institutions. In the course of these dialogues, such as recent and successful negotiations over intellectual property and market access, the United States may have to exert considerable pressure to assure a fair outcome. Nonetheless this pressure should be applied to achieve clearly defined objectives. To apply broad sanctions in the absence of dialogue, in order to achieve ill-defined purposes, is a formula for ineffective and counterproductive policy. 
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 6-26/William T. Tow, Senior lecturer of international relations, Dept. of Govt. , Univ. of Queensland, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSTS FOR THE 1990s, "Introduction, " p. 3 ;THR VT96
	 If both Beijing's and Washington's policy behavior appear to lack the self-confidence and enthusiasm that underscored their relations during much of the late 1970s, and again in the mid- to late 1980s, it may be due to the dawning realization by both sides that they know far too little about one another's decision making systems and processes to have confidence in their dealings with each other. The critical importance of the United States and China understanding the workings of each other's political systems has become increasingly evident as both systems have come under increasing strain. The Bush administration confronted an international crisis in the Persian Gulf which tested its constitutional prerogatives and promised to undercut American fiscal stability even in the process. Deng Xiaoping's regime (or that which could soon be formed by a coalition of his immediate successors, perhaps including Yang Shankun, Li Peng, and Jiang Zemin) faces the prospect of continued challenges to its legitimacy by both regional leaders and a suppressed democratic movement. This is especially true if the PRC's efforts to strengthen its collective economic activities continue to languish, its military infrastructure remains divided, and the key elements of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) remain in their current state of disarray. Prospects are that both Washington and Beijing will have increasing difficulty in generating the needed capacity and resources to overcome their domestic challenges and face international problems in asystematic and consistent fashion. 
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6-27 / Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, US Secretary of State: - We must adapt and build lasting institutions to enhance cooperation "if the historic movement towards open societies and open markets is to endure. If we are to lock in the gains of the Cold War's demise, we must build the security, political and economic structures for the more integrated world of the twenty-first century." This includes constructing the new World Trade Organization and revising and re-energizing NATO, the United Nations at 50, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Organization of African Unity and Organization of American States to meet new challenges.
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6-28/ Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 An "Asia first" foreign policy would entail maintaining an economic and military balance between Japan and China, ending America's military agreement with Japan, increased cooperation with Russia on Asian affairs, forcing open Japan's and China's markets to U.S. goods, and dismantling NATO.
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6-29 / Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 Yet, if one thing is clear in this confusing post-Cold War world, at least in relations among the major powers, it is that there is a deep and abiding mutual benefit to be gained through military, economic, and scientific cooperation. The only reasonable strategic posture for the US in its policy towards China is to seek to co-operate -in all the different realms of post-Cold War interdependency.
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6-30/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL. 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 75; THR VT96
	 But the United States must navigate this new Asia with great caution. We must do everything possible to avoid stepping across the line that separates the role of the balanced from that of the leader of a hostile, anti-China alliance. We must also avoid applying the containment model to China. It would be tragic if the United States found itself compelled to maintain a huge naval and air presence in the western Pacific specifically aimed at restraining China. Nor should we ever be drawn into a fight over the rocky atolls and coral reefs of the South China Sea. Our vital interests will not be threatened if China consolidates its hegemony over Burma, Laos, or even Vietnam. Up to a point, it is in our interest--and Southeast Asia's to accommodate China's growing economic and military power. In reassessing the American relationship with an awakening China, we can learn something from the Chinese leaders in Beijing. They view the United States as a threat, but they never forget that it is in China's national interest to continue working with us on several levels. The United States could do worse than adopt this approach toward China. 
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 6-31/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, " p. 119; THR VT96
	 From the American point of view, there is also reason to settle existing tensions and move to the more fundamental work of exploring the bases for a new post-cold-war relationship with China. It is a permanent member of the UN, with veto power. China's status as a major arms dealer and nuclear power means that its policies should command similar attention in regard to questions of nuclear proliferation and regulation of weapons sales. Its sheer size, as well as its specific policies in regard to questions ranging from birth control to the use of bituminous coal, is relevant to recent efforts toward global cooperation on the environment, population and disease control. At a time when American policy in the Asian Pacific region is undergoing a fundamental reconceptualization, the uncertain evolution of China's politics is not only part of the problem--it is also part of the solution. Finally, of course, bilateral factors ranging from the considerable American economic stake in China to' the less finite American preoccupation with China are all factors that would seem to stimulate a reassessment. 
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6-32/John Frankenstein, Senior lecturer in the Dept. of Management Studies and the Hong Kong Business School at the Univ. of Hong Kong, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "American Trade Policy toward China, " edited by WiIIiam T. Tow, p. 127; THR VT96
	 Just the same, the late summer 1990 crisis in the Persian Gulf has created new impetus for cooperation among the three superpowers. One fruit of this new era was in fact Chinese and Soviet support of-- or at least acquiescence in -- the Western position on the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, a major arms customer for both the PRC and the USSR. Another result appears to be agreement on the Cambodian civil war. These, plus the eventuality of a power transition in China itself as its aging ruling group goes on to meet Marx and Mao, suggest that the natural inclination of the Bush administration to take the low-key communications road with China, despite the powerful emotions stirred by the Tiananmen events, is not inappropriate. But it is equally important to realize that the strategic rationale and thus the nature of the Sino-American relationship has changed, and new formulations will be required. 
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6-33/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 86; THR VT96
	 Some China-watchers, such as former Carter Administration aide Michael Oksenberg, would argue that while the nature of the strategic relationship has changed, China remains an important international actor, crucial to American objectives in Asia and the world. Despite deep differences and Chinese rhetoric, there are sufficient reasons to nurture relations and sufficient grounds for agreement between the two countries. 
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 6-34/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges, " p. 35; CJJ VT96
	 The conclusion would seem to be that the rest of the world ought to be doing now what it should have been doing in the 1980s for the Soviet Union: considering what course it wants unavoidable change there to take, and what concrete steps it ought to take to influence events. That will demand a cooperative and coordinated policy, for all the powers involved. We are far from having such cooperation today: among the major powers, China policy is fundamentally competitive, and although there is some coordination on weapons sales, economics is a free-for-all. No forum brings all the players together, from Russia to Europe to Japan, and some players (Taiwan most importantly, but also Hong Kong Chinese) are simply excluded from consultations despite their potentially crucial roles. 
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6-35/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 126 THR VT96
	 An alternative scenario would be the situation that has emerged in the former Soviet Union. When freedom suddenly explodes without the development of proper political institutions, political chaos is likely. But where will the United States be when China tries to put the pieces of a collapsed system back together? Look how slowly the United States has responded to the needs of the former Soviet republics. Unlike the Soviet Union, which was a direct military threat to the United States, China does not directly threaten American security. A collapse leading to chaos may be of less benefit to the United States than such an outcome was in the former Soviet Union. Collapse and disorder could trigger a massive flow of refugees into Hong Kong, or a new stream of boat people onto the shores of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. While Deng has raised this fear to frighten the world into not pressing China for political reform, one cannot underestimate the costs to all of East Asia if internal chaos in China demolishes the floodgates controlling more than 1 billion people. 
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6-36/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 64; THR VT96
	 Our long-term problem in Asia is China--not stable, demo- cratic, and still quasi-pacifist Japan. Despite all the speculation that Japan is destined to become our primary adversary in the world, our common interests and growing interdependence make that highly unlikely. This does not mean that China will replace the former Soviet Union as "the new enemy. " But in both the economic and strategic spheres, China will pose a growing threat to our vital interests. Precious little binds the United States and China together now that our mutual concern about Soviet expansionism, the essential glue of our relationship in the 1970s and most of the 1980s, has dissolved. For the United States, the challenge will be to prevent , m inevitably conflict-ridden relationship from deteriorating into full-blown hostility. 
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6-37/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century, " p. 423; THR VT96
	 After 150 years of war and military tension, the Asia Pacific is at peace today. The current lull in ore than a century of conflict has led some to 'assume that the Pacific Century will be pacific. This belief has been occasioned not only by the end of the cold war, but also by the assumption that the economic interdependence of the Asia Pacific nations will anchor relationships, contain competition from stimulating conflict, maintain the balance of power, and ensure regional security. Despite this optimism, the assumption of a pacific Asia is by no means a foregone conclusion. As in other pans of the world, regional conflicts repressed by the cold war now have the potential to reemerge. Lingering historical rivalries and national divisions remain, and new symmetries are taking shape that may cause a fundamental realignment in the balance of power. Mutual perceptions are also shifting, and bilateral relationships and security in the region are in great flux. 
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 6-38/Jiri Valenta, Feb. , 1995; p. 78; ISSUES & STUDIES, , "Coping with the red brown spirit in the post communist countries;" MDS VT96
	 Three years later--in the summer of 1994--the reality is much changed. The twin spirits of ex-communist red socialism and Nazi brown militant nationalist populism are haunting the post communist countries. History did not end with the fall of European communism as envisioned by Francis Fukuyama, nor did its collapse lead to the establishment of the new world order. Instead of a new world order, the world has entered a time of great disorder. Whereas before the only alternative to old-fashioned Leninism appeared to be liberal democracy, now various forms of authoritarianism and state control by the ex-communists loom on the horizon. Moreover, the dissolution over the years 1991-93 of the Warsaw Pact, on the one hand, and the federations of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia, on the other, created a dangerous power vacuum that facilitated the revival of centuries-old ethnic feuds and territorial claims. 
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6-39/John Frankenstein, Senior lecturer in the Dept. of Management Studies and the Hong Kong Business School at the Univ. of Hong Kong, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "American Trade Policy toward China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 143; THR VT96
	 The real importance of the Sino-American relationship is political and strategic. China, after all, not only contains a billion people, a large domestic economy, and large conventional armed forces, but also sports strategic, nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This political weight, plus its position as the cultural heartland of East Asia, raises the level of relations with China to the highest degree. The West may once have seen China as some kind of counterweight to an aggressive Soviet Union; that characterization is no longer viable, and some writers, such as Robert Dells, argue that China is now "less relevant on the world scene with the collapse of any threat from the Soviet bloc. '' Perhaps, rather, it is the concept of the "strategic triangle" that is no longer relevant, though certainly no one can deny China's role as a power in a region that has led the world in economic development over the past twenty years. Events in the Middle East, too, remind us that China has significant relations with that region as an arms supplier not only to Iraq but also to Saudi Arabia and other countries, plus important, if denied, ties with Israel. 
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 6-40/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 85; THR VT96
	 This is not to say that Beijing pursued policies consistently inimical to the United States or became unimportant. The very fact of China--a country of well over one billion occu- pying a large land mass in Asia--makes it an important strate- gic factor in Washington's calculations for the post-cold-war world. History has shown that American isolation or slight- ing of China has inevitably damaged U. S. strategic interests. Moreover, in the current world, China has shown its strate- gic worth in specific diplomatic circumstances. For example, the Persian Gulf war demonstrated that its cooperation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council was essen- tial. Moreover, during the fall of 1991, China played a cru- cial role as backer of the Khmer Rouge in the brokered peace in Cambodia and has been a critical intermediary in dealing with the often unpredictable, and inaccessible, re- gime in North Korea. Finally, Beijing's recognition of Israel as well as its greater involvement in the Middle East peace process also would seem to highlight its strategic importance to the United States. 
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6-41/David Zweig, Prof. . International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 129; THR VT96
	 Similarly, the United States needs Chinese support for resolving many global crises, including the war in Yugoslavia, the tenuous Cambodian peace accords, and the ongoing nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula. With its seat in the United Nations, China has a great deal of power over the UN's development into a multilateral peacekeeping force and over the Security Council's ability to become a real center for negotiating solutions to crises. On North Korea, China is seen as the only state that has direct access to top Korean leaders. While the United States may also wield great leverage over North Korea, a united strategy may be the . only way to ensure a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. 
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6-42 / Robert J. White; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 16, 1995, Pg. 21A, HEADLINE: Why a zero-nukes goal is dangerous; ACS VT96
	 The sensible alternative in such cases is diplomacy to resolve regional disputes and diminish the incentives for nuclear arms. The United States has practiced just that kind of diplomacy - energetically in the Middle East, intermittently in South Asia. As Mandelbaum points out, nonproliferation among the "orphans" depends more on the success of U.S. peacemaking than on deploring nuclear weapons.
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6-43/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Healthy bilateral ties and enhanced economic cooperation that includes China will tend to increase economic interdependence and the price of military intervention or regional instability. 
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6-44/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 128; THR VT96
	 On issues of East Asian security, the United States needs high level Chinese cooperation if any kind of regional arrangement is to be built. Unless there is international cooperation in East Asia, a new era of nationalism will emerge. And President Clinton may see a regional security arrangement as one way to decrease American military. obligations in East Asia, which are a drain on the economy. 
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6-45/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 33; THR VT96
	 Regionally American interests are both numerous and important. The two most protracted, economically distracting and politically explosive American military commitments in the post World War II era were Korea and Vietnam. In both cases China figured prominently. The lesson is that regional stability requires workable U. S. -China relations. Competition between Beijing and Washington takes the form of exploiting indigenous regional conflicts by both powers, resulting in local problems that expand to suck both countries into a self-defeating vortex. 
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6-47/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era, " edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 99 ; THR VT96
	 From China's perspective, relations with the neighboring countries are extremely important. For a long time, relations between China and its neighboring countries were troubled, but they have greatly improved in recent years. Since the late 1980s they have benefited from China's new "good neighbor policy. " From North to South, and from East to West, for the first time in a long period it seems that China may feel released from the threat and encirclement by its neighbors. 
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6-48/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era, " edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 182 ; THR VT96
	 The emergence of Chinese power together with the end of the Cold War has caused apprehension among other countries in Pacific Asia, especially in East Asia. China is increasingly looked upon as a superpower that will naturally expand and strengthen its regional influence and power. In economic terms, China is now a strong competitor, expanding its market shares and hosting large amounts of foreign investment. The fact that millions of Chinese live in other countries in the region increases anxieties concerning the creation of an "invisible Chinese kingdom. " China must take such fears seriously and avoid power-oriented policies, which will only create tensions in the region and eventually hurt China's interests in development and modernization. Therefore, China will have to resist the temptation to fill the regional vacuum left by the end of the Cold War. 
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6-49 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-10-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. urges diplomatic solution to Spratly disputes; ACS VT96
	 The U.S. ''is willing to assist in any way that claimants deem helpful,'' it said, reiterating Washington's support for a Manila declaration on the South China Sea calling for a peaceful solution. It was issued in 1992 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It cautioned that any restriction on maritime activity in the region not consistent with international law would be viewed ''with serious concern'' because freedom of navigation is a ''fundamental'' U.S. interest and essential for peace and prosperity in the entire Asia-Pacific region.
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6-50 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-10-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. urges diplomatic solution to Spratly disputes; ACS VT96
	 The U.S., which takes no position in the disputes involving six claimants, ''is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions and reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions'' in the region, the State Department said in a statement.
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6-51/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-10-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. urges diplomatic solution to Spratly disputes; ACS VT96
	 Asked about the possibility of holding an international conference to discuss the Spratlys issue, a U.S. official said Washington has no intention of proposing such a meeting, adding that it is a matter to be decided by the parties concerned and not to be discussed by outsiders. The U.S. urged all claimants ''to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions,'' the statement said, apparently referring to reports that some of them have built structures on islands they occupy to reinforce their claims to sovereignty.
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6-52/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 76; THR VT96
	 It is against this background that the new efforts to in- crease foreign investment and trade have taken place. More- over China has also actively promoted--and been part of-- regional and international multinational organizations. Not only has Beijing advocated a strengthened (but restruc- tured) UN, but it continues to seek membership in GATT and to benefit from the assistance of such bodies as the World Bank. In Asia, China is promoting cooperation on many levels, ranging from increased borrowings from the Asian Development Bank to its sponsorship of a Sino-Soviet- North Korean project in the Tumen river delta (dubbed the Rotterdam of the Far East), its active participation (along- side Taiwan) in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and its April 1992 hosting of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 
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 6-53/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ. , 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform, " edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. 200; THR VT 96 This declining mention of helping yanbian shows that China's leaders are trying to improve relations with the West, the source of needed finance and high technology. Two gestures were the lifting of martial law and the release of Fang Lizhi, who had found asylum in the American Embassy in Beijing in order to evade arrest by the Chinese authorities after the Tiananmen incident. In the United Nations China tried to cooperate during the Cambodian conflict and the Gulf War. 
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6-54/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy, " edited by William T Tow, p. 25; THR VT96
	 Within these parameters, the United States can conduct a great deal of business with Chinese leaders. There are many issues on which China has a voice, and Washington will have to work with Chinese leaders to secure American interests. These issues include resolution of regional conflicts, including the war in Cambodia and the conflict between South Korea and North Korea. In each case China is a pivotal actor, and its cooperation is essential in resolving these conflicts. Indeed, in the case of the Koreas, China's interest in closer economic relations with South Korea has contributed to Pyongyang's gradual but definite moderation of its foreign policy. In Indochina, Chinese ties to the Khmer Rouge guarantee that there cannot be peace without Chinese cooperation. Most recently, Chinese influence has affected American policy toward Iraq. Although neither Chinese flexibility nor its influence in Persian Gulf matters is as great as in Indochina, Beijing can contribute to American interests relative to Iraq; and in this context American cooperation with China is important. 
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6-55/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, " p. 117; THR VT96
	 On the Chinese side, there seems ample motivation to resolve these immediate tensions and to seek the bases of a new Sino-American relationship. The mainstream of Chinese leadership, led by Deng Xiaoping, remains committed to the policy of an economic open door and sees the United States as playing a crucial role in its success. There is also a continued appreciation of the importance of good relations with the United States in the maintenance of a benign strategic environment that will allow a focus on economic growth. Although Chinese commentaries cite the multipolar nature of the post-cold-war world, there seems to be an appreciation of the present American strategic preeminence. This is particularly the case in the Asian region. American influence is seen as crucial not only to the settlement of the Taiwan question and the resolution of tensions between north and south on the Korean peninsula, but also as a counterweight to growing Japanese economic and perhaps even military influence in the region. 
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 6-56/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 107; THR VT96
	 Where are other leaders who are more supportive of the opening to the West. Included here would be regional politi- cal figures in areas which have benefited enormously from foreign trade and investment (Shanghai and Guangdong, for example), and politicians who see a stable relationship with the United States as essential to the success of reform. Deng clearly falls in this latter camp. He is not any less concerned about the dangers of foreign subversion nor does he mini- mize the threat from the changing world order, but he is convinced of the need for China to get the wherewithal of development from abroad--particularly the United States. 
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6-57/Gerald Segal, Research Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA ]IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Foreign Policy, " Edited by David S. G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 162; THR VT96
	 After the events of June 1989, a new series of debates emerged as China questioned its own path of modernization, and the communist party states of Eastern Europe collapsed. Initial tendencies to xenophobia and to blame Westerners for the student protests and 'the ensuing massacre were soon replaced' by a more sensible attempt to return to business as usual with the West. As debates rumbled, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe made the choice more stark as there was an ever-shrinking socialist world on which to rely. Despite some hesitations, by mid-1990 Chinese leaders recognized there was no alternative to seeking close relations with the West. 
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6-58/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIFS, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, " p. 107; THR VT96
	 In December 1991, as part of a broader campaign to diminish the influence of anti reform elements and regain reform momentum, Deng is reported to have called for limiting the campaign against peaceful evolution, noting: We should not repeatedly mention the peaceful evolution plot by the West to change China's socialist system, because it goes against the United States. We need the United States to promote our reforms and openings. If we always confront the United States, we'll leave no leeway for us to maneuver. 
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 6-59/ Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. East Asian Studies, Boston Univ. , Sept. , 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "America and China: back from the brink" p. 251 ;SEG VT96
	 The cumulative effect of these misconceptions was to make the administration's China policy a central part of a policy that antagonized most of the region. It was perhaps this sense that not only was United States policy toward China misguided, but its entire approach to the region was out of kilter, setting it increasingly at odds with the very countries to which it wanted to move closer, that brought about the final collapse of America's China policy. 
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6-60 / Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
	 Partly because of the precipitous decline in the health of patriarch Deng Xiaoping last winter, the White House has toughened up its China policy. American diplomats and China specialists think it is likely that the post-Deng leadership - "a clique of technocrats and military officials" according to one formulation - will adulterate if not betray the pro-West, pro-market reforms associated with the New Helmsman.
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6-61/ ROBERT A. KAPP, The China Business Review, January, 1995 ; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: New year, old story; US-Chinese relations; ACS VT96
	 We would be kidding ourselves if we thought that what went on in one country's social and political life was of no interest to the other nation. The possibility of spillover from the two countries' domestic agendas to their international relations is still very real.
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6-62/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL, 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U. S. Foreign Policy, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 176 THR VT96
	 'Third, future generations of Chinese leaders might be more : inclined to cooperate with the United States if the current relationship improves and is deemed to be mutually beneficial. Finally, it is ridiculous to not have a normal diplomatic rela- tionship with a nation of 1. 1 billion souls. The implications for the global environment alone make friendlier relations essential. 
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6-63 / Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 The United States -Japan alliance and NATO have been rendered irrelevant by cold war success. The new slogan in Tokyo ought to be adopted in Washington as well: "Leave the West, enter Asia."
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6-64/ Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 Ambassador NICHOLAS PLATT: Well, everybody in, in, in Asia is, is looking at China and wondering how China is going to evolve. The Chinese are bending over backwards to make it clear that they are a good neighbor, but people are concerned based on, you know, past history and so forth. They see a population this big. They see an economy that's growing this fast. They see a, a military establishment that's adding to its capabilities, and they're not sure. And so, I think that the only way to make, to make the whole situation safe and secure is for us and the Japanese to work closely with the Chinese, to be closely engaged.
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6-65 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Thus, the U.S. should: Enhance U.S. contacts with the Chinese military. The possibility that China's next leader might rise from the ranks of the military makes it essential to develop the existing military-to-military ties between the U.S. and China. Enhanced ties with the PLA could offer crucial insight into both the governing process and the changing political direction of China. Therefore, the U.S. should support officer exchanges with all branches of the military. These would expose Chinese officers to the American military and civil society while facilitating the development of institutional contacts and informal networks needed to build trust and gauge mutual intentions.
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6-66/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Thus, the U.S. should: Recommend that the Chinese military be more open about its modernization program. The PLA should be encouraged to issue "white papers" describing its positions on various issues and fostering greater transparency in its defense
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6-67/ Triplett, september 12, 1994 ( William C., chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, International Herald Tribune, September 12, 1994, HEADLINE: Why Cooperate With China's Unrepentant Military?//MDS-VT96
	 Last week a group of high-ranking Chinese army officers toured American war colleges. As guests of the Pentagon, they were briefed on the state of the art of U.S. military technology and strategy. The visit was the forerunner of a potentially dangerous program of military cooperation with China that the Clinton administration has undertaken without informing Congress. The cooperation effortwas initiated last month when General Xu Huizi, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, visited Washington.
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6-68/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 137; THR VT96
	 Finally, if we are to arrest China's possible expansion Into the South China Sea, work for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue, prevent a Sino-Japanese arms race, and establish some kind of security arrangement in East Asia, the United States must be involved in direct talks with the Chinese military. The Chinese cannot dismiss American and Asian concerns about an expanding Chinese military by innocent protestations of misunderstanding. China's "peaceful" and "just" foreign policy positions (as the Chinese call them) are not apparent to all. Serious concerns are emerging about Chinese great power aspirations, and until China responds to those issues through greater openness, there should be no lifting of the sales embargo on "dual use" technology. An engaged United States policy, . which tries to enmesh the Chinese military in a stronger bilateral or preferably multilateral security arrangement, rather than one that seeks to dismantle China's Communist system, will garner strong support from America's Asian friends. 
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6-69/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century, " p. 429; THR VT96
	 Thus, while the Asia Pacific region is in an unprecedentedly peaceful state, it is by no means certain that this state is sustainable. The Asia Pacific is a dynamic region, but such dynamism can be the source of: instability. For the Pacific Century to be pacific, regional security mechanisms must be substantially strengthened and the United States must maintain its military commitments to the region. Even if these conditions do obtain, Asia is likely to experience as much conflict in 'the next century as it has in this one. 
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 6-70/Henry Rosemont, Jr. , Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 100 ; THR VT96
	 During eighteen hundred of the past twenty-two hundred years China has been more or less unified. The concept of "All under Heaven" or "All within the Four Seas" goes back to the dim past. And tens of millions of Chinese must have felt proud when Mao announced on October 1st, 1949 (at Tiananmen Square) that "China has stood up. " Yet much of the felt need for unity within stemmed from fears of invasion from without. One of the things the American peoples might do for the Chinese, therefore--and for themselves and the rest of the world as well--would be to reduce drastically the U. S. military juggernaut, so that the Cold War can truly come to an end, and armies the world over begin to shrink in size and importance. Under such conditions the Chinese fears of invasion should lessen, and be replaced by fear for their all-too-fragile-environment, and fear of continuing injustice, both economic and political; for the alleviation of which our moral hopes, it seems to me, should be for a number of smaller "Middle Kingdoms" whose citizens can struggle to achieve the good life as they collectively conceive and work for it. 
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6-71/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 27; THR VT96
	 Nevertheless, other aspects of Sino-American military relations can be and are likely to be resumed. These include bilateral exchanges between Chinese and American officers and working sessions between American and Chinese military specialists on a wide range of issues. In important respects, such exchanges are far more valuable than arms sales relations. While less controversial, they contribute to greater understanding of each country's threat perception, capabilities, and strategic planning and help to promote a significant rapport between the two militaries. During periods of tension, this relationship may prove helpful in minimizing misunderstandings and contributing to reliable communication. 
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 6-72 / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia-Pacific countries to make defense policies public; ACS VT96
	 The United States, China, Russia and other Asia-Pacific countries will agree to draft papers outlining their basic defense policies and military strength and mutually make them public as a confidence-building measure, a leading financial daily reported Sunday. The foreign ministers of 18 countries will reach the accord in the second meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) slated for August in Brunei, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun said, quoting government sources. Japan has called for such a move to increase the transparency of each country's defense policies and military strength, the daily said. Most Asia-Pacific countries, except such countries as Japan, the U.S. and Australia, have not revealed their military strength and the opacity of defense policies has been an obstacle to security dialogue and cooperation in the region, the Nihon Keizai said.
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6-73/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 Chinese reaction, however, has been overwhelmingly negative. Shortly after the release of the report, a Chinese foreign ministry official warned in Beijing that BMD could spur an arms race. ''If a country with nuclear weapons has a spear and then gets a shield, you can imagine what would happen,'' the official said. He added the US ''will increase the danger of nuclear war'' with BMD.
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6-74/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 19, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Weijun LIU, Jian-Min LI, Daluo JIA [CND, 05/18/95] The United States and Russia decided last week to continue their cooperation in developing ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems, Christian Science Monitor reported Monday. Fearing losing its nuclear threat, China has been opposed to the development of BMD. Beijing warned in February, after the Pentagon had showed its interest in building a missile defence system with Japan in East Asia, that such systems will incite a new run of arm race and "increase the danger of nuclear war."
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6-75 / Amelia A. Newcomb; Yomiuri Shimbun Washington Bureau, The Daily Yomiuri, May 9, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: China's nuclear worries are Asia's; ACS VT96
	 A dispute over the development of ballistic missile defenses is already making waves for the United States and Russia as they prepare to meet this week in Moscow. But it is also generating ripples of concern in the East, where emerging superpower China is becoming increasingly vocal about its oppotision 
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6-76/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 IT'S a scenario to catch the eye of any Chinese military planner. Sometime in the future, China gets into a dispute with an Asian neighbor, such as Japan, but finds the threat of its nuclear weapons made useless by a [ballistic-missile defense (BMD) ] China, in effect, would lose its nuclear option, a powerful ''card'' that helps ensure its influence in Asia. It would also be vulnerable to attack itself since it could not retaliate with its own nuclear arsenal. Such scenarios have driven Beijing to join a chorus of complaints against a United States drive to use ballistic-missile defenses (BMD) to defend key military and urban targets in the Pacific region.
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6-77 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 China is particularly concerned about the efficacy of its nuclear arsenal. ''This erodes their very small ballistic-missile force,'' says Paul Godwin, a professor at the National War College in Washington. China first exploded a nuclear device in 1964.
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6-78/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 Others, however, are concerned about the reaction from a country that, despite US assurances to the contrary, often expresses the view that the US is practicing ''containment'' of China in the face of its growing military clout. China's defense spending has grown 40 percent in real terms over the last five years. ''Nothing much the US military can say will reassure the Chinese that the US isn't aiming to degrade the Chinese deterrent,'' says Iain Johnston, a professor at Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass., and an expert on Chinese foreign policy. ''There is an emerging consensus among Beijing hard-liners that US policy is to keep China weak.''
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6-79 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 Mr. Johnston says that the Chinese are not mollified by those who say BMD is purely defensive and not targeted at eliminating China's nuclear deterrent. Even if the first generation of BMD technology cannot hit an incoming Chinese nuclear missile, he says, ''the Chinese view this as the thin edge of a wedge.'' And, he [Iain Johnston, a professor at Harvard University ] states, ''it encourages some in China who argue in favor of more missiles and warheads.''
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6-80/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	Johnston [Iain Johnston, a professor at Harvard University ] points to trends in China's nuclear- force development as evidence: improved accuracy, consideration of tactical nuclear weapons, and multiple warheads on missiles. While the Chinese force is minuscule -- about 300 long-range warheads -- as well as technologically behind US or Russian standards, it nevertheless has provided China with big-power status and a credible deterrent against other nuclear states. And with the US and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals by 2003 under the START II treaty, it will become propor-tionately more powerful.
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6-81 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 Most analysts say that China will have to be part of any further arms-reductions agreements -- something that could be harder to achieve with BMD. ''If China gets too alarmed by this, it will affect their willingness to scale down,'' says Spurgeon Keeney, director of the Arms Control Association. 
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 6-82/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 BMD could also reduce China's willingness to join in international nuclear accords. High on the wish list for those seeking greater Chinese participation in this arena are agreements on fissile materials production cutoffs as well as signing onto a comprehensive test-ban treaty, something China says it will do in 1996. Without China on board, says Lisbeth Gronlund, a senior arms analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Mass., there is little hope for signing up other Asian nations. ''The US has decided one of its big goals is to pull India and Pakistan into some sort of regime,'' Ms. Gronlund says. '' China is key to this.''
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6-83 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 Critics say BMD, a ''star wars'' type system for regional defense, will bring instability. A nation might prefer to strike before a defense system is in place. Proponents argue that US-designed missile defenses in Asia are needed to prevent such ''rogue'' nations as North Korea from launching a nuclear attack.
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6-84 / Robert J. White; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 26, 1995, Pg. 15A, HEADLINE: A Republican's contradictory vision of the global future; ACS VT96
	 Observers will differ about his (Dole's) conclusions. For example, the section on "rebuilding American military power" seems to me flawed by the assumption that the country's strength is inadequate. It is flawed further by statements like this: "Effective ballistic missile defenses would do more to enhance American and allied security by providing real protection against limited and accidental strikes than would nonproliferation policies, which rely on the goodwill and cooperation of others to halt the spread of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction to rogue states."
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6-85/ Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 For BMD's supporters, China's concerns are overblown. Michael Green, a Japan expert at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, says BMD is in China's interest, as it would keep the US engaged in Asia and Japan from developing its own nuclear force.
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6-86/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Deploying robust, multilayered ballistic missile defenses is vital for protecting U.S. forwarddeployed forces and extending protection to U.S. allies, thus gaining their participation and cooperation in defeating aggression in critical regions.
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6-87 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1995, Pg. 1; HEADLINE: China Vexed By US Push For a 'Shield' Against Nukes; ACS VT96
	 Some analysts argue that greater communication between the China and the US can bridge many of the difficulties posed by US support for BMD. The Institute for Defense Analyses' Mr. Green says that improvements in military-to-military dialogue are a necessary first step.
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6-88/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 143; THR VT96
	 Although changes in the physical environment are difficult to assess over a short time span, Chinese environmental data suggest that in most areas environmental quality has deteriorated since 1950. Problems of deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, water shortages, and levels of pollution are all far more serious today than they were at the time of the rounding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). These problems are partly the result of population growth, which puts an insupportable strain on China's natural resources. Recent analysis conducted under the auspices of the country's State Science and Technology Commission and the State Natural Science Foundation Commission suggests that China's current population of 1. 2 billion has already exceeded the number that the country can support at a good standard of living. Predictions are that the population could reach a point above which minimal living standards cannot be sustained (1. 5 or 1. 6 billion people) yearly as the year 2015. 
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6-89/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 144; THR VT96
	 Poverty and lack of education make it especially challenging for China to overcome its environmental problems. Half of China's counties still lack rural extension services. This, combined with high illiteracy rates, means that it is difficult to disseminate ecologically sound techniques. A formal Environmental Protection Law was finally adopted in 1989, but environmental policy decisions continue to be hampered by attempts on the part of the central government to produce a consensus among various factions. 
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6-90/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 170; THR VT96
	 Ultimately, though, China's environmental problems cannot be solved solely through price reform or regulatory policies. If the country is to provide all its people with a good standard of living in the next century, China needs strict population control, extensive environmental education, increased wealth and infrastructure, political stability, and a more open society where information can be obtained and opinions freely expressed. To what degree these goals are met in the coming decade will have far-reaching implications not only for China's environment but for the whole earth. 
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6-91/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 170; THR VT96
	 It has been suggested that industrial pollution in China could be reduced by 30 percent simply by improving technology management in enterprises. Pollution-abatement equipment is often not installed properly or regularly maintained, and pollution-related accidents are common, with more than 3, 000 serious incidents reported between 1989 and 1992. 3s The Environmental Protection Law stipulates that environmental assessments are to be part of construction projects. However, such assessments are rarely carried out for small-scale projects, and their results are often ignored in the case of large-scale projects. In addition to more funds and personnel, much more openness to assessment information will be necessary. 
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6-92/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 31-April 1, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Global Warming a Threat to China's Cities [CND, 03/29/95] BEIJING -- A recent study on the "greenhouse" effect warns that rising sea levels due to global warming could flood 48 cities, including Shanghai, and displace 76 million people by 2050, according to Reuter. The report, the work of the Chinese government and the World Bank, says "If coastal areas are not protected, a 3.3-foot increase in the sea level will flood regions lying below a 13-foot contour line in China's coastal plains when combined with tide and storm surges." Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou and the Pearl River Delta are major areas threatened by the rising sea level. Much of China's industry--from coal energy to rice paddies, produces tremendous amounts of carbon dioxide and methane--gasses which trap the sun's warmth in the atmosphere. (Adam Johnson, Jian LIU) 
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6-93/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 13, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Rising Sea Levels Threaten Booming Regions [CND, 05/09/95] BEIJING - An alarmingly rapid rise in sea levels, caused by the effects of global warming, is threatening the Pearl River Delta and Shanghai, while the latter is also sinking due to the weight of construction activity. Experts warned that failure to take effective measures to slow the rise would endanger 92,000 square kilometres of land and displace 76 million people by the year of 2050. (Ming TIAN, Daluo JIA) 
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6-94/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 27-28, 1995; ACS VT96
	 South China Sees Short Supply of Corn [CND, 03/26/95] China's southern coastal regions suffer from a serious shortage of corn, Reuter quoted trading sources as saying on Tuesday. Consequently, China stopped corn exports late last year and will likely continue to do so this year. According to Reuter, buyers are flooding Shanghai to ensure they secure stocks from ships arriving from the United States. Although in China's northeast corn is in surplus, the country's clogged and inefficient transportation networks failed to move sufficient amount to the south. (Kewen ZHANG, Jian LIU) 
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6-95/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 1, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Revival of Grain Ration Coupons Said to be Temporary [CND, 04/27/95] BEIJING -- Grain ration coupons have been reintroduced in 29 of China's 35 biggest cities to enable the poor to buy a fixed amount of grain at prices below the market level. The return of the coupons is merely a temporary means to facilitate transition to a market economy. The coupons have proved effective, but will "die naturally, just as they were born", Xinhua news agency quoted an official as saying. (Ming TIAN, Daluo JIA) 
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6-96 / SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-15-95; CHINESE POISONING CASES TOP 100,000 IN 1994; ACS VT96
	 About 100,000 people -- half of them consumers -- were poisoned by agricultural chemicals in 1994, according to an official report. The report, seen in Beijing on Saturday, did not provide figures for earlier years or say how serious the poisoning cases were. It said roughly half the people poisoned were consumers and half were involved in farm production. The report, in the official newspaper Rural Life Weekly, warned farmers to be more careful in applying herbicides and pesticides. It said about 1,000 factories now produce 940,000 tons of farm chemicals a year.
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6-97/ SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-15-95; CHINESE POISONING CASES TOP 100,000 IN 1994; ACS VT96
	 Last fall, a number of people in Hong Kong were hospitalized after eating vegetables imported from China, leading authorities to warn restaurants and consumers to take special care in cleaning and cooking imported food.
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6-98/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 12, 1995; ACS VT96
	 New Environmental Laws to Protect Forests and Wildlife [AFP, 01/06/95] China is to speed up revising or introducing laws to apply harsh punishment against those who destroy forests and kill protected wild- life, officials said Friday. Some local governments were criticized for failing to give adequate protection to forests or wildlife, while others have blindly pursued economic development at the expense of their environ- mental resources. The penalties in present laws were "much too mild for what the law-breakers deserve," officials also said. (Jim YU, Daluo JIA) 
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6-99/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 13, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Frank LING, Jian LIU Forestry Minister XU Youfang disclosed a plan to increase forest coverage of the country from the present 14 percent to 17 percent in 2010 and 20 percent in 2050, Reuter and AP reported. In 1992 Premier LI Peng promised in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that China would do its part in materializing the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, also called Agenda 21. It has been mandatory that all Chinese citizens between 11 and 55 (men 60) must volenteer to plant trees every year. In 1994, 2.4 billion trees were planted this way. XU said that the ambitious plan would bring cleaner air, more absorption of carbon dioxide, less acid rain, lower soil erosion and safer habitats for more abundant wildlife, as well as long term benefits of the recovery and exploitation of wastelands.
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6-100/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), April 28, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Chongqing Cuts Coal Use to Clean Up Air [CND, 4/27/95] BEIJING -- Relocating or shutting down polluting enterprises, combined with a campaign to encourage residents to change to gas as fuel are credited by local officials with playing a major role in efforts to change Chongqing's reputation as the acid rain capital of China, according to a Xinhua story. Chongqing accounted for five percent of all sulphur dioxide emissions in China only a decade ago. However, the local government's anti-pollution measures have enabled Chongqing to cut these emissions by 10 percent since then. The high rate of pollution, worsened by Chongqing's mountainous location, has produced a high incidence of respiratory ailments among city dwellers. Chongqing residents have the highest lung cancer death rate in China, and the city has suffered economic losses estimated at 550 million yuan ($US65 million) annually from acid rain. (Don Marion, Daluo JIA)
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6-101/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 170; THR VT96
	 In China as a whole, the most that can be hoped for is that the pace of water depletion, deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification will slow down in coming years. If efforts at reforestation and population control during the 1980s and early 1990s prove successful, we can expect to see benefits sometime after 2010. 
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6-102/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 129 ; ANA VT96
	 Although it is clear that the world cannot afford to have another billion people driving around in big cars or eating fast-food hamburgers, it is also clear that the burden of creating a sustainable society should fall on the countries that pioneered the unsustainable life-styles, not on those that are just beginning to adopt them. Nevertheless, even if China is not responsible for the problem, it is an essential part of the solution--and it can benefit by joining the transition early and avoiding investments in obsolete energy and industrial systems. In some instances, its participation is essential: just as industrial countries are phasing out production of chlorofluorocarbons in order to protect the ozone layer, for instance, China's production more than doubled between 1986 and 1992. Thus the pace at which China abandons these industrial chemicals will help determine global rates of skin cancer for decades to come. 
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6-103/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 169; THR VT96
	 The Chinese government's standpoint on international environmental cooperation can be summed up by the Chinese delegate's speeches at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. In this view, poverty is the main cause of environmental degradation in developing countries, and thus it is not reasonable to expect these countries to maintain lower emission levels or install expensive equipment to control emissions on their Own. Instead, the developed nations should transfer funds and technology to help poorer countries reduce emission levels. Rather than talk of shared responsibility for global warming, the Chinese government argues that it is up to the developed nations to acknowledge their emission of the vast majority of greenhouse gases. This viewpoint echoes the position China took at the 1991 environmental conference of developing countries hosted in Beijing. It can be seen as part of the Chinese government's attempt to make the environment a foreign policy issue and in the process assume leadership of a developing-country environmental bloc. Whether or not China can convince the developed countries to contribute large amounts of funds and technology, improvement in China's environment will require internal political stability as well as international support; even then, it is unlikely that China will be able to halt its ecological degradation within the next couple of decades. 
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6-104/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 115 ; ANA VT96
	 Ultimately, China's challenge is the world's, for the success of this huge country in forging a new development strategy will affect all others. Like most developing countries, China has until re- cently had minimal effect on global envi- ronmental trends. But as its economy grows, it will begin challenging the far less populous United States as the lead- ing contributor to many global prob- lems. As China faces its limits, many of its development plans will have to be re- considered; as other countries encoun- ter the global limits raised by China's growth, they will have to reevaluate their own unsustainable economic plans as well. 
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6-105/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 114 ; ANA VT96
	 The challenge for China, therefore, is to meet the expanding needs of its citi- zens while gradually moving onto a sus- tainable development path, one that protects the quality of its own environ- ment and does not make excessive de- mands on the world's resources. To do so, it can learn from sustainable develop- ment efforts in other parts of the world--from Costa Rica to Kerala, India. But no other society of remotely similar size has made a serious effort to pursue sustainable development. Among the major challenges are build- ing an energy system that does not rely so heavily on coal, providing a nutritious and satisfying diet that does not stretch food production limits too far, and using water and forestry products much more efficiently. 
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6-106/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 125 ; ANA VT96
	 China has three energy' paths open to it: copy the worst of the West (the nineteenth-century coal path), copy the best of the West (an oil-based system similar to the U. S. or German ones), or leap past the West, directly to an efficient, decentralized, twenty-first century system. The third path would involve a portfolio of new energy sources and technologies, including natural gas, solar energy, wind power, and improved energy efficiency. Together these options could allow China to reduce its air pollution drastically, while relying mainly on domestic resources. 
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6-107/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 120 ; ANA VT96
	 Although China's food trends are daunting, a change in policies could lessen the burden. First, it will need to increase investments in its cropland. Strategies include using high-yielding regenerative farming techniques, ensuring that plastics laid over farmland to speed the growing season are properly removed, reducing waterlogging, and so on. As part of its response to Agenda 21, the blueprint for action adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit, China has selected 10 sites for experiments that combine traditional farming techniques such as crossplanting, interplanting, and manure-based fertilizers with modern technology to try to make farming more sustainable. 
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6-108/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 121 ; ANA VT96
	 Planning to minimize the amount of land required for industrial and urban development is also key to China's agri- cultural future. If growth is planned and zoned so as to reduce the loss of prime agricultural land, it would not cut so ex- tensively into the country's food-grow- ing potential. Efforts to centralize and contain industrial and urban develop- ment also increase the land efficiency of waste and water treatment facilities. In addition, restrictions on the conversion of high-quality agricultural land conver- sion are needed. Although such laws have been passed, they have been inade- quately enforced so far. 
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6-109/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 123 ; ANA VT96
	 Because of the timber constraints China is facing, it will have to become much more efficient in its use of wood, and reduce its burning of firewood in homes and industry. Also, its booming construction and coal mining industries may have to move toward less wood-intensive techniques. (See Chapter 5. ) Already, most Chinese homes are made of earthen bricks rather than wood--and most paper is derived from crops. In the future, China has good reason to continue its leadership in developing new materials that can substitute for wood-and in using wood products more efficiently. 
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6-110/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment, " Edited by William A. Joseph, p . 168; THR VT96
	 Most Chinese environmentalists argue for improved management of nature conservation by pointing out the long term, economic value of such a policy. This is the only viewpoint that will attract the attention of a government intent upon rapid economic development. However, China's policy makers must come to understand that nature conservation is a necessity for the country's long-term survival. 
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6-112/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 126 ; ANA VT96
	 China's largest energy resources are solar and wind energy. (See Chapter 4. ) Solar power can be tapped locally throughout the country; some homes in remote areas, such as Gansu Province, are already being electrified with photo- voltaic cells. In the future, wind and solar energy can replace coal: electricity and hydrogen produced in western de- serts can be transported to the coast via long-distance transmission lines and pipelines. In fact, a World Bank study shows that such schemes will soon be economical. As in the United States, a tiny fraction of the area of the less popu- lated western provinces could meet all the country's foreseeable energy needs. This will require sizable investments, but in the long run it would be less ex- pensive than a coal-based energy path. 
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6-113/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 126; ANA VT96
	 Although official figures show little natural gas in China, foreign geologists believe the country has major resources, mostly in areas that have not yet been explored with modern technology. The government neglected gas investments in the past, but has recently opened several areas to exploration and is building long pipelines and a distribution system in Beijing. Such advances will allow the country to use gas for efficient applications such as homes, factories, and even trucks and buses. The International Energy Agency believes that China is on the verge of a gas boom. If China were able to use natural gas at the same rate that the United States does, it could meet all its current energy needs--or half the projected needs of 2010. 
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6-114/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, " edited by Lester Brown, p. 121 ; ANA VT96
	 China's fish harvest increased from 4 million tons in 1980 to more than 15 million tons by 1992. With the marine catch growing slowly despite an expanded fishing fleet, most of the gains have come from fish farming, which provided half the coun- try's fish in 1993. Production leaped 50 percent between 1988 and 1993, and China is now the world's leading fish farmer. Although it is expected to con- tinue growing, fish farming will ulti- mately be constrained by China's limited availability of fresh water and arable land. (See Chapter 2. ) This sector al- ready claims more than 4 million hect- ares, equal to all the cropland in Japan. 
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6-115/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 31-April 1, 1995; ACS VT96
	 U.S. Government Not To Aid China's Dam Project [CND, 03/30/95] New York - The U. S. government intends not to provide funds for China's controversial Three Gorges Dam, leaving U.S. private firms to compete for contracts on the project, AFP cited U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary Thursday. U.S. firms have signed six billion dollars worth of contracts during her recent visit to China. As the largest hydroelectric project in the world, the Three Gorges Dam in southern China is scheduled to be completed in 2009. It is facing criticisms from environmentalists since it would displace about one mil lion people and bring in other problems. (Ke WEI, Daluo JIA) 
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6-116 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Thus, the U.S. should: Offer assistance and cooperation in areas that promote reform. China needs America's business expertise and technology in order to grow economically. This provides an opportunity to assist the cause of reform in ways the Chinese may find it difficult to refuse. To advance reform and spur the growing entrepreneurial class in China, the U.S. should facilitate Chinese students' access to American law schools. Legal reform will require professional, well-trained lawyers' and China's schools cannot meet this tremendous demand on their own. American assistance could provide the flamework for legal reform that affords better protection for America's legal, commercial, and private interests in China. Moreover, the U.S. should encourage Chinese students studying in America to join U.S. alumni and professional associations. Since 1989 PRC students have made up the largest foreign contingent enrolled in American colleges. In the last two years these students' previously reluctant to return to their country because of its repressive system, have begun to go home. 
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6-117 / DOUG BEREUTER , CONGRESSMAN , Congressional Press Releases, March 16, 1995, HEADLINE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN ASIA; ACS VT96
	 When we address human rights issues -- issues which are always sensitive and sometimes contentious -- we must engage aggressively in every means of dialogue and negotiation to resolve outstanding issues or, at least, to narrow our differences. In my view, we must resist the impulse to isolate or demonize those countries with which we disagree, even when we have fundamental differences on a wide range of human rights issues, for example, as with the People's Republic of China. At the same time, we must not hesitate to raise human rights concerns in a candid and open way even with our friends in the region.
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6-118/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUN. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-74; THR VT96
	 Both the administration and the Congress must break from the post-Tiananmen era and stop treating trade primarily as a lever to promote human rights and democracy. Only after that is accomplished can the United States realistically fulfill its unique obligation to promote democracy and human rights in China without jeopardizing American interests. U. S. officials can and should continue to emphasize the need for political liberalization in China, without linking that stance to the threat of sanctions. We should continue to intervene on behalf of jailed and persecuted dissidents and, of course, maintain our import ban on products made by prisoners. We should step up exchanges and visits of all kinds in both directions, since they are subtly but profoundly subversive. Washington's information offensive, from the State Department's annual human rights report to the Voice of America's immensely popular broadcasts to China, should be strengthened. 
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 6-119/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ. , 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China, " edited by William T. Tow, p242-3; THR VT96
	 Judging by these indictments, the machinations of American imperialism and other "international forces" posed a clear and present danger to China's survival. But this diagnosis did not prevent China from making efforts to carry on business as usual. "It is clear to all what attitude the United States has adopted toward China. However, China has not suspended contacts with the United States. Being neither overbearing nor servile, China readily made reasonable responses to proposals conducive to relations between the two sides, but refused to make any concessions on the practices that harm China's sovereignty . . . . In the most difficult days, China still received the special envoys of the US President on two occasions, carried out dialogue. preserved its flexibility and left room for maneuver. " China complained that the United States' interference in Chinese domestic affairs was an obstacle to improved Sino-American ties. "Sooner or later, the United States will have to make a choice of pursuing US strategic interests of the state or continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. "
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6-120/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 32; THR VT96
	 Most important, this policy of acknowledging bilateral conflicts and American distaste for Beijing's domestic policy need not interfere with United States interest in developing cooperative relations in distinct areas, such as regional arms control and the resolution of regional conflicts. On the contrary, it will actually facilitate cooperation by accommodating the demands of various influential domestic constituencies regarding other issues and will place the overall bilateral relationship on a realistic footing. But for cooperation to coexist with conflict, American diplomacy must pursue American interests in discrete areas, preventing conflict or cooperation in one area from influencing the tenor of relations in other spheres. The imperative of cooperation in Indochina, for example, must not undermine the administration's commitment to seeking respect for human rights in China. The administration should pursue firmness in human rights issues as well as in trade relations and arms sales whenever our interests clash with those of China, but it should not allow differences to interfere with Washington's ability to cooperate with Beijing when American and Chinese interests can converge. 
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 6-121/ RAMON MYERS, Sr. , Fellow Hoover Inst. , Stanford, 1994; THOUGHTS ON U. S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Yet the Communist party still practices "hard authoritarianism, " relying on a vast police and security system to maintain strong control over critics and any potential opposition movements. In this respect the PRC increasingly resembles the ROC on Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s, when an economic and ideological marketplace had formed but the regime opposed the creation of a political marketplace. 
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 6-122/Henry Rosemont, Jr. , Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 95; THR VT96
	 Returning specifically to China again, I take it as non con-troversial that conceptions of the good life are widely shared in its several regions. Differing in particulars, the age-old Confucian dream, taken over by Mao, continues to be one of the things that make more than 700 million Chinese peasants Chinese (and is perhaps common to peasant farmers the world over). A strong central government, espe-cially as it insists upon a very different conception-or has no conception of the good life at all--will neither promote local democracy, nor diversity; and hence such a govern- ment cannot be our highest moral hope for China, even if its repressive measures stopped short of employing terror to secure conformity with its dictates. 
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6-123 / SLOBODAN LEKIC, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-3-95; SMUGGLING OF ILLEGAL CHINESE IMMIGRANTS PICKING UP AGAIN; ACS VT96
	 Smuggling of Chinese immigrants into the United States is on the rise again, with at least 10 vessels bearing human cargoes now approaching America's shores, a senior U.S. diplomat said Tuesday. Within the past two months, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted two ships with 212 would-be Chinese immigrants aboard. ``We are particularly concerned about the problem of the smuggling of Chinese because of the pervasive use of violence by Chinese smuggling gangs,'' said Robert Perito, director of the State Department's Office of International Criminal Justice. ``We have intelligence reports that 10 more vessels are now on their way,'' Perito told reporters. He did give details on the boats.
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6-124/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 5, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Smuggling Chinese Immigrants to the U.S. on Increase [CND, 05/02/95] WASHINGTON - Smugglers are steering at least ten boatloads of Chinese immigrants towards the United States, indicating increased smug- gling activity, AP reported Tuesday. The U.S Coast Guard has interdicted two such vessels in the past two months. Brutality, imprisonment, blackmail and extortion are the stock-in-trade of such gangland "enforcers" and the situ- ation is a real cause for concern. The U.S. is the destination of choice for Chinese immigrants. It is estimated that the U.S was home to 19,000 illegal Chinese immigrants in 1992. (Heather FERGUSON, Jian LIU) 
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6-125/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 9, 1995; ACS VT96
	 China Denies Responsibility for Boat People's Entering Australia [BEIJING, 01/08/95] China is not in favor of foreign refugees' entering other nations or regions after leaving China, but nor is China responsible for such decisions, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Friday, AP reported. In 1994, 953 "boat people", many of them ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, arrived in Australia in 18 vessels from China. China earlier said it had no obligation to accept their return, but would discuss a solution with Australia. (Jim Yu, Chuck Lin)
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6-126 /Robert Pear of The New York Times, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Judge supports those fleeing sterilisation in China; Asylum ruling on child policy", SECTION: Sunday Edition; Pg. 8; PMS VT96
	 In the Reagan and Bush administrations, three attorneys general ordered favourable treatment for people fleeing China to avoid forced sterilisation or abortion. Clinton administration officials withdrew one such directive. They now say they worry that they will encourage the smuggling of human cargo if they are too generous to Chinese refugees.
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6-127 / Jennifer Lin, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; PLANNED DEPORTATIONS OF CHINESE WOMEN THREATEN CLINTON WITH CONTROVERSY; ACS VT96
	 In recent years thousands of illegal immigrants have used fear of coercive birth control measures in China to gain admission to the United States. But President Clinton decided last August to take a tougher approach to Chinese asylum cases, officially reversing the more lenient policies of former President Bush.
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6-128/Robert Pear of The New York Times, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Judge supports those fleeing sterilisation in China; Asylum ruling on child policy", SECTION: Sunday Edition; Pg. 8; PMS VT96
	 In a legal brief submitted to Judge Ellis last month, the Justice Department argued that involuntary sterilisation was not a manifestation of communist doctrine, a punishment for Chinese dissidents or a form of persecution on the basis of political opinion. In the brief, the Clinton administration and the Board of Immigration Appeals, a unit of the Justice Department, said Guo had not been singled out for persecution; it said China's population control policies were applied equally to all citizens. But Judge Ellis, who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1987, wrote: "This argument is fallacious. Nothing in the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes asylum for aliens persecuted by a government because of political opposition to uniformly applied governmental policies." Indeed, he said, the uniform policy of most totalitarian governments was to persecute those who challenged the government's legitimacy. At a hearing on December 10, Judge Ellis scorned the Justice Department's position, saying: "How many people in Stalinist Russia could say, 'Hey, this is invidiously enforced against us?' It was enforced against everybody. If you didn't like what he did, you went to jail. He didn't play favourites."
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6-129/Robert Pear of The New York Times, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Judge supports those fleeing sterilisation in China; Asylum ruling on child policy", SECTION: Sunday Edition; Pg. 8; PMS VT96
	 A judge has ruled that victims of China's coercive population control policies are eligible for asylum in the United States, despite the Clinton administration's efforts to expel some of them. The case involved a passenger on the Golden Venture, a vessel that ran aground on a sand bar in New York harbour on June 6 last year. The 28- year-old passenger, Guo Chundi, said he had fled the mainland because he and his wife were resisting sterilisation orders. He also said they feared persecution because of their opposition to China's policy limiting them to only one child.
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6-130 / Jennifer Lin, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; PLANNED DEPORTATIONS OF CHINESE WOMEN THREATEN CLINTON WITH CONTROVERSY; ACS VT96
	 Attorneys representing the Golden Venture women argue that they should be considered for asylum under Clinton's directive. Most of them have presented credible claims that they have suffered harm for resisting forced abortions or sterilizations.
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6-131 /Robert Pear of The New York Times, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Judge supports those fleeing sterilisation in China; Asylum ruling on child policy", SECTION: Sunday Edition; Pg. 8; PMS VT96
	 Since 1989, the Board of Immigration Appeals has repeatedly denied asylum claims by people expressing a fear of persecution under China's population control policies. The Clinton administration urged Judge Ellis to defer to the board's expertise on this issue - advice the judge dismissed. Judge Ellis said Guo and his wife showed their opposition to China's population policies by refusing to comply with sterilisation orders and by fleeing from their home village in Fujian province. The local government then confiscated their property and destroyed their home, he said. "It simply defies logic to contend these governmental actions do not amount to persecution," the judge said.
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6-132/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 13, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Vietnamese Boat People Fight Deportation with Violence [CND, 05/11/95] HONG KONG - Eight Vietnamese boat people were injured when some 60 protesters threw glass, rocks, hot water and burning charcoal from roofs of Hong Kong's High Island detention center, Reuter reported Thursday. Several hundred other Vietnamese detainees showered the officers with rocks. During the portest, 47 prison and police officers also sustained injuries. The protest erupted when 38 Vietnamese were slated for deportation from Hong Kong the following week. Some 22,000 boat people remain in Hong Kong deten- tion centers, with little hope of obtaining refugee status. (Heather FERGUSON, Jian LIU)
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6-133 /Xinhua News Agency, January 25, 1994; Xinhua News Agency, "china, u.s. to combat smugglers, illegal immigrants"; PMS VT96
	 china and the united states are to take effective measures to combat smuggling and illegal immigration. this was made clear during consultations between the two countries here on monday. on the basis of mutual respect, equality and strengthening co-operation, the consultations were conducted between zhang hongxi, director of the consular affairs department of the chinese foreign ministry, and u.s. assistant secretary of state robert gelbard. during the consultations, the chinese side analysed main reasons for the emergence of smuggling and illegal immigration, reiterated china's consistent principled stand that the chinese government has all along been against smuggling and illegal immigration, and briefed on the unremitting efforts and resolute measures the chinese side had adopted in this sphere. the chinese side asked the u.s. to deal severe blows at 'snake heads' --people involved in organizing smuggling inside the territory of the u.s. the chinese side pointed out that china is resolutely against and cannot accept that 'political asylum' should be offered to smugglers who ask the u.s. for 'political protection'. such people use so-called excuses such as that 'the chinese human rights situation is not good', or claim that they are 'suffering from political persecution', or are against china's family-planning policy. the chinese view is that wrongfully granting asylum in fact encourages smuggling and provides international smuggling organizations with opportunities. while combating smuggling and stopping illegal immigration, the chinese side held that normal exchanges between people of the two sides should be actively maintained, hoping that the u.s. side can ensure convenience for chinese people who are on business or for private affairs apply for visas from the u.s. the u.s. side said that the u.s. is formulating new laws so as to crack down on increasing illegal activities by international crime-committing organizations. paying much attention to combating smuggling activities, the u.s. side is willing to strengthen co-operation with china in enhancing direct contacts between the two sides and exchanging information, and severely punish those criminals. the u.s. side also said that relevant u.s. bodies are ready to strengthen exchanges with relevant chinese departments and enhance understanding between the two sides. the two sides agreed to establish an ad hoc consultation system, further strengthen bilateral exchanges and co-operation between law-enforcing departments, exchange information in good time, and take effective measures to severely punish the 'snake-heads' and stop smuggling and illegal immigration. the two sides held that this effort is in conformity with the interests of the two countries.
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6-134/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-33; THR VT96
	 In the world today refugees also are a major concern. The dislocations created by refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam and eastern Europe are small compared to the havoc a major exodus from China would produce. Each one percent of China's population totals almost 12 million persons--about a quarter of France's population, twice the size of Hong Kong's and more than half that of Taiwan's. It is in the world's interest, not to mention that of the P. R. C. 's immediate neighbors, that a Chinese exodus not be created by political failure (of which severe political repression is one form), natural disasters or widespread economic/agricultural collapse. 
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 6-135/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 155; THR VT96
	 For the United States, a higher degree of integration among China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is on balance probably a plus, at least in the short run. It helps to diffuse the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations, it brings Taiwan's and Hong Kong's capital and managerial skills to bear on the problems of Chinese modernization, and it could be a force for moderation of Chinese politics. Integration with China also offers an alternative to Japanese economic hegemony as an organizing force for the Asian regional economy. Realizing the potential benefits of a Greater China for the United States will require that the latter -- in the governmental, commercial, and academic areas -- make adjustments in its strategies and programs for science and technology cooperation both to induce new forms of intra-Greater China cooperation and to exploit the synergies which such cooperation can produce. 
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6-136/Barber Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 35; THR VT96
	 Bilaterally the United States has/stake not only in pursuing the interests specified above, but also in creating a niche in the world's most rapidly growing major economy today--"Greater China" (the P. R. C. , Taiwan and Hong Kong). Exports have been the engine keeping the American economy going during the recent recession and exports will play an increasingly prominent role in America's future. If this emerging Chinese economic conglomerate were considered a single trading entity it already would have been America's third largest trading partner in 1989, following Canada and Japan (with Mexico ranking fourth). There is insufficient recognition among Americans that the increasing economic interdependence among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland is creating new economic opportunities, policy problems and dependencies that hold the promise of creating greater regional security. 
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 6-137/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 43; ANA VT96
	 Trade and investment between the "two Chinas" have been facilitated by the existence of Hong Kong, where PRC agents can make deals, either through Hong Kong intermediaries or directly with business people from Taiwan, some of whom set up companies in Hong Kong to conduct their trade and investment. The attraction of mainland trade and investment for Taiwan entrepreneurs has led them to pressure the ROC government to ease restrictions, which mainland officials hope will eventually result in direct and largely unrestricted trade across the Strait. Such a development, PRC officials believe, would strengthen links between the two areas and improve prospects for negotiations on unification. 
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6-138/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 38; THR VT96
	 The rise of the Chinese economic conglomerate is important not only because of the economic opportunity it presents to the United States and because it will be another force for moderation in Beijing, but also because of what it implies for the use of American leverage. To the degree that Hong Kong and Taiwan use China as a platform for the production of export products to the United States, Washington's use of economic sanctions (such as ending or placing conditions on China's MFN status) that seek to deny "P. R. C. exports" access to the American market will inadvertently create unintended victims in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The United States must not make economic cluster bombs that hit friends and opponents equally. 
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6-139/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P. 36; THR VT96
	 The gainers in this process were American consumers, who were able to purchase low-cost, high-quality goods; the P. R. C. , which gained jobs; and Taiwan and Hong Kong, which were able to shift their own production efforts to higher value-added output and reduce trade frictions with Washington. As for American workers they were not going to get these low-paying jobs in any case. The only remaining questions are to which Third World country those jobs are going to move, and how can the United States rapidly raise the capacity of the American work force to add value in new product areas. High-quality education and job training, not protectionism, are the long-term answers to America's economic problems. 
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6-140/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 135; THR VT96
	 It is continued economic engagement that keeps China trapped in its tango with the United States. Without access to the United States market, China could not grow as rapidly as it has, but without that engagement the United States would have less leverage over China's internal affairs. While threatening to withdraw MFN may appear to be the best tool, doing so will undermine the leverage the United States has over China. But because of the linkage between economic growth and the United States market, China cannot disengage from the United States, even as the United States presses China on human rights, democratization, and arms control. 
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6-141/ C.F.A. UPDATE, 5-29-95, (A Newsletter of the Chinese Finance Association) Volume 1, No. 17, ACS VT96
	 The Reuters also reported that three state-owned banks were punished for violating regulations on funds transferring and loans issuing. They are branch of the Bank of Communications in Tangshan city and branches elsewhere of the People's Construction Bank and the Agricultural Bank of China. (Wenhai Liu)
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6-142/ C.F.A. UPDATE, 5-29-95, (A Newsletter of the Chinese Finance Association) Volume 1, No. 17, ACS VT96
	 - China Closes Eighteen Private Quasi-Banks As the Reuters reported, China's central bank People's Bank closed 18 private financial institutions in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, one of the richest city in China. These stock-holding companies or private business account up to 1 billion yuan ($120 million) in assets. They offered interest rates 50 percent higher than state-owned banks. The central bank has ordered them to combine with authorized credit cooperatives, which have rights to decide their own shareholders' dividends but can only offer official interest rates. Last year, 30 similar private quasi-banks were closed.
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6-143 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-19-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Beijing Strengthening Monitoring Foreign Investment [BEIJING, 01/15/95] In response to an almost 44 percent decline, Beijing claimed its positive adjustment on managing foreign investment in 1994, AFP reported. China last year approved barely over 40,000 projects involving foreign investment, compared to 83,437 in 1993. Officials emphasized the healthier monitoring by the government, with $28.8 billion of foreign capital utilized in 1994, a $2.2 billion increase from 1993, and stricter control over the speculative sector of real estate, which alone attracted $44.5 billion from foreign investors in 1993. Incomplete statistics released by the government shows a total $69 billion foreign investment was settled with contracts last year, a sharp decrease from $122.7 billion in 1993. (ZHAO Hua)
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6-144/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 153; THR VT96
	 While legislation is inappropriate and unnecessary, American companies would need to be assured that they were not acting contrary to U. S. policy. The Bush administration could satisfy business on that point by calling together a representative group of responsible companies involved in investment in China to explore the concept and assure them that such an initiative would not be inconsistent with government policy. China would still charge that the companies were just doing their government's bidding, but there would be no denying that the initiative was voluntary. Some companies would probably elect not to participate, but if the larger ones did, and were able to persuade some non-American firms to join in, Beijing would have to deal with them. If there were legislation, the matter would simply add one more government-to-government issue to the other irritants. 
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6-145/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P-25; THR VT96
	 China is important to America's interests--the Clinton administration's policy should be premised on that fact. An economic boom is well underway on China's mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong; yet the United States is in danger of isolating itself from its benefits. Not only does this regional growth offer great potential for American investment, trade and the jobs for Americans that both can bring, it also promises a more stable East Asia and will gradually create the conditions for a more pluralistic and humanely governed society on China's mainland. How can the new administration seize these opportunities, be true to core American values, and help avoid a dangerous worsening of U. S. -China relations?
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6-146/ Kyodo News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "WTO sees no obstacle for China joining the trade body"; ACS VT96
	 The director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) expressed optimism Saturday that obstacles to China's accession to the new trade body can be resolved soon, saying China's entry ''will be a historical achievement both for China and the system.'' ''My impression is that no one has anything against the entry of China,'' said Renato Ruggiero, who arrived in Manila on Saturday for a two-day visit.
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6-147/ Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
	 Another urgent task is to bring China into the GATT and familiarize it with international rules. Failing to do so could allow the Chinese economic sphere in South China and Southeast Asia to grow into an increasingly exclusive "backyard" of the Chinese economy, a potential breeding ground for discord between Japan and China over economic interests in the region. China must not be isolated. It must be incorporated into a multilateral security framework. 
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6-148 / CYNTHIA OSTERMAN, Reuters News Service, 5-6-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Trade ministers make push for China to join WTO; ACS VT96
	 ``It is intensely in the interest of both China and the world economy that China should become a member of the WTO as quickly as possible,'' EU Trade Minister Sir Leon Brittan told a news conference after their meeting. ``I very much hope China will realize we are prepared to show understanding of the transitional nature of the Chinese economy,'' he said.
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6-149 / John Maggs and John Zarocostas, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Presents Another Piece to WTO Puzzle; ACS VT96
	 In a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Chinese Trade Minister Wu Yi has questioned whether the WTO talks can succeed unless the United States repeals a 20-year-old law that conditions China's trade status on its policy toward allowing its citizens to emigrate. The Jackson-Vanik law calls for a yearly congressional review of China's trade status that has become an annual debate on that government's human rights record, especially after Chinese troops crushed pro-democracy demonstrators in 1989 who were peacefully occupying Tiananmen Square in Beijing. China has been rankled by that yearly scrutiny, and has angrily denied that any nation has the right to judge its record on human rights.
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6-150 / CYNTHIA OSTERMAN, Reuters News Service, 5-6-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Trade ministers make push for China to join WTO; ACS VT96
	 The world's most powerful industrial economies Friday threw their weight behind a drive to bring China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and said they were prepared to show flexibility to end an impasse on the issue. After two days of talks in Canada, trade ministers from Japan, the United States, European Union (EU) and Canada -- a grouping known as the Quadrilateral -- said they were willing to respond if China makes a greater commitment to adhere to international trading rules.
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6-151/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 150; THR VT96
	 Science and technology relations with China also became closely linked with evolving United States trade policy and with concerns for the protection of intellectual property), as an important source of American foreign trade anxieties. In the face of a deteriorating trade picture, continued opportunities for S&T cooperation with the United States were made contingent, by' both executive order and legislation, on foreign nations' adopting intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes acceptable to Washington. In the Sino-American case, the Agreement for Cooperation in Science and Technology, which provided the framework for cooperation throughout the 1980s, expired in early 1989. While the Tiananmen Square events have certainly influenced the context for renewal of the agreement, substantive disagreements over IPR provisions must first be reconciled if the agreement is to be reactivated. 
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6-152/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 154; THR VT96
	 Lest the progress described above suggest that China's S&T development is on a simple upward trajectory, we should recall that Chinese society is a deeply troubled one, and there is no way to make S&T immune from the general malaise. China's ability to realize its aspirations for scientific and technological development is closely related to the deepening of its international S&T relations and to the successful implementation of economic and S&T system reforms. Progress in these two areas, however, is now slowed by conservative elements in the political elite who rightly fear that reform and internationalization threaten the Communist party's monopoly on power. Whereas the Sino-American science and technology relationship began at a time when there was considerable optimism in China about the prospects for political stability, reform, and orderly succession, the climate today is one of political gloom brought on in no small part by the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the political succession. 
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6-153/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 158; THR VT96
	 The discussion above illustrates how very changed the context for Sino-American science and technology relations has become from the heady days of a decade ago when relations were first established. Implicitly, it has also addressed the "Should we care?" question raised at the outset. Explicitly, yes, we should care about our S&T relations with China. We would like China's political succession to be resolved in ways which do not harm our interests, and S&T may be a factor in that outcome; we would like to prevent the inevitable enhancement of China's technological capabilities from being directed towards destabilizing arms exports; we would like Chinese S&T to be an accessible resource in the shifting patterns of Asian economic and technological cooperation and competition; and we would like the full cooperation of the Chinese technical community in international efforts to avert global environmental crises. 
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6-154/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. , of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 150; THR VT96
	 While the Tiananmen incident has been the proximate cause of disrupted S&T ties, we should not forget that a number of other problems in the relationship made reassessments by both sides both inevitable and desirable. On the American side, a number of considerations were on the agenda. From a commercial perspective, the problems of doing business in China remained. Technology transfer is best thought of as part of commercial transactions; disincentives for the latter thus become disincentives for the former. While both China and the United States worked seriously. throughout the 1980s to improve the business climate in China, b)' the end of the decade China's relative appeal as a destination for foreign investment, compared to many of its Asian neighbors, had not improved noticeably. 
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6-155/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 160; THR VT96
	 In the final analysis, how the United States relates to China in S&T is contingent upon how it relates to a rapidly changing Asia more generally. While Washington continues to assert its interest in and commitment to Asian security, its economic and technological position in the region increasingly seems out of phase with its military position. While not surprising, it appears that this fact is not fully recognized. It may be that the elements of a coherent new Asian strategy are inherently elusive; there is just too much change and uncertainty for the confident setting of directions. If so, the best strategy may be one of minimizing maximum regret. While the appeals of S&T cooperation with China are less compelling to man>' today than they were a decade ago, the context of the relationship today is also markedly different than it was, and markedly more uncertain. Chinese S&T has changed and Asian regional interactions have changed. It is important that the United States not be surprised by the new synergies which will result East Asian socioeconomic dynamicism, and remaining engaged with China in areas of S&T is one way to stay "ahead of the curve. " Thus, a "minimax" orientation does not imply passivity. On the contrary, it implies activism in preparing for, and seizing upon, targets of opportunity for economic, technological, scientific, and political gains as they come along while avoiding costly long-term entanglements. For the reasons given above, a minimax approach to S&T cooperation with China commends itself. 
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 6-156/Fu-mei Chang Chen, Research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and member of the National Assembly in Taiwan, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, Commentary, " edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 134; ANA VT96
	 The United States is Taiwan's most important trading partner. Under constant pressure to mitigate the large trade deficit in Taiwan's favor, the New Taiwan (NT) dollar's exchange rate with the U. S. dollar has rapidly appreciated, from 36: 1 in mid-1986 to 25: 1 in 1990. After holding steady at that rate for a couple of years, the NT dollar began to depreciate in July 1992, moving downward by 6 percent within eight months from 24. 5: 1 to 26: 1. Ordinarily, such a change would stimulate Taiwan's export industries, but the even greater depreciation of the PRC's renrninbi may have offset some of those potential gains. Now at the top of the U. S. priority watch list, set up under Section 301 of the 1988 Trade Act, Taiwan is under the pall of threatened U. S. trade retaliation. If sanctions are imposed, Taiwan's export industries, particularly electronics, will be the hardest hit. 
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6-157/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 182; ANA VT96
	 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), adopted in April 1979, provides the legal framework for continuing unofficial relations between the United States and the people of Taiwan. It also contains language designed to protect the people of Taiwan from the use of force against them. The Act declares (1) that the United States would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States; (2) that the United States would provide defensive arms to Taiwan; and ( 3 ) that the United States would maintain a capacity to resist any resort to force or other means of coercion that would jeopardize the security or social and economic system of the people on Taiwan. 
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6-158/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 181; ANA VT96
	 The United States continues to be almost the sole supplier of weapons to the ROC. It is Taiwan's principal trading partner, although its share has declined in recent years, as the ROC has increased its trade with Europe and Southeast Asia. In 1990 Taiwan's two-way trade with the United States was $34. 3 billion, 40 percent greater than U. S. trade with the PRC. Taiwan was the sixth largest trading partner of the United States. Investment by American firms totaled $3. 6 billion, more than double U. S. investment in mainland China. Six hundred American firms had offices in Taiwan, and the resident U. S. business community numbered over 11, 000. 
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6-159/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 183; ANA VT96
	 The overall objective of U. S. policy over the past 12 years has been to maintain reasonably good relations with both Beijing and Taipei. The friction that has occurred from time to time in Washington's relations with each capital has been almost entirely over bilateral issues, not the triangular relationship. A notable exception was the dispute between the United States and the PRC in 1981-1982 over U. S. arms sales to Taiwan. The August 1982 communiqué in which the United States placed limitations on its arms sales to Taiwan greatly eased the tension over the issue. For ten years the arms sales issue remained quiescent, overshadowed by bilateral disputes between Washington and Beijing over trade, over the PRC's missile sales in the Middle East, and over the Chinese government's violations of the human rights of its citizens, highlighted by the Tiananmen massacre. 
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6-160/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 176; ANA VT96
	 As indicated above, track-two diplomacy, while not yet narrowing the gap on the issue of unification, is far from having been ineffective. It has reduced hostility and improved understanding, and it may be preparing the way for eventual official negotiations on unification, as contemplated in phase three of the ROC's unification guidelines. Contrasting the state of relations between Taiwan and mainland China with that between the two parts of Korea, the other divided nation of Asia, brings out more clearly the necessity and value of track-two diplomacy for the ROC. 
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6-161/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. I87; ANA VT96
	 Taiwan, on the other hand, is an important economic partner and has been linked to the United States for many years by a diverse and growing web of interrelationships. U. S. sea and air power could readily be brought to Taiwan's defense. Yet a conflict with the PRC over Taiwan would shatter. U. S. hopes for a peaceful and stable East Asia. A peaceful resolution of the differences between Beijing and Taipei, or even the perpetuation of the status quo, would be much more in the U. S. interest than to be drawn into a conflict with the PRC because a democratically elected government of Taiwan declared the island independent. 
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6-162/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 189 ; ANA VT96
	 The mainland China-Hong Kong-Taiwan economic nexus, sometimes referred to as "the greater China, " is intricately connected with the economy of East Asia, the fastest growing region of the world. During the current decade, economic issues seem likely to supplant security issues as the most important concern for most governments of the region. The U. S. government thus has three reasons for its interest in the effectiveness of track-two economic diplomacy between Taiwan and mainland China. It hopes that "greater China" will make a positive contribution to the growth and prosperity of the East Asian region. It wants American companies operating in Taiwan to benefit from their mainland China trade and investments. Finally, and most importantly, it does not want to see a return to the hostile confrontation between Beijing and Taipei that existed in the past. 
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6-163/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 186; ANA VT96
	 To intervene as Deng requested would have been contrary to the established U. S. policy of avoiding involvement in the relations between the two sides. Once people-to-people interaction between the two sides of the Strait began, however, the United States did not hesitate to express its gratification at this development. During a visit to the PRC in March 1987, Secretary of State George P. Shultz said that the United States "welcomed developments, including indirect trade and increasing people-to-people interchange, which contributed to a relaxation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. " He added that the United States also supported a "continuing, evolutionary process toward peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question" and declared that it was U. S. policy to "foster an environment within which such developments can continue to take place. " The remarkable expansion of trade, investment, travel and other forms of people-to-people relations between the two sides of the Strait has removed any reason for intervention by the United States to encourage the process. It has acquired what appears to be irreversible momentum. Secretary of State Shultz's statements, which were noted approvingly by PRC officials, have continued to define the U. S. attitude toward the interchange. 
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6-164/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 182; ANA VT96
	 In its relations with the PRC and Taiwan since 1979, the U. S. government has maintained the position that the future of Taiwan should be worked out peacefully by the Chinese on the two sides of the Strait, stressing that the United States will not serve as a mediator or pressure either side to negotiate. Either unification or independence would be satisfactory to the United States, provided that both Taipei and Beijing agreed to that solution. The United States has also demonstrated that it can live with the continuation of the ROC's present status of de facto independence. 
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6-165/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 185; ANA VT96
	 As the debate over Taiwan independence gathered momentum in Taiwan, PRC leaders found new reason for concern over the U. S. attitude toward Taiwan. Organizations of Taiwanese based in the United States became more active in promoting Taiwan independence. World United Formosans for Independence, as discussed in Chapter 8, announced plans to move its headquarters to Taiwan. The Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), which had close associations with the DPP, stepped up its lobbying activities in the U. S. Congress. 
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6-166/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 185; ANA VT96
	 PRC leaders have never relinquished their suspicion that the long-term objective of the United States was to keep Taiwan separate from the China mainland. When the quarrel over U. S. arms sales to Taiwan was at its height in July 1982, the People's Daily published a lengthy article by a Chinese scholar quoting extensively from U. S. official documents of the 1948-1950 period to demonstrate that U. S. officials had long harbored a desire to separate Taiwan permanently from China. The adoption of the TRA, the author concluded, ' showed that the United States, under the influence of its historical "imperialist expansionist policy" was still unwilling to stop interfering in Chinese domestic affairs. Senior Chinese officials from time to time reiterated their distaste for the TRA. During his visit to the United States in 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang called for the complete repeal of the TRA, describing it as the essential obstacle to steady and sustained improvement in U. S. -PRC relations. In his interview with CBS newscaster Mike Wallace in September 1986, Deng Xiaoping referred to the TRA as "an immense obstacle in Sino-U. S. relations. " Although the PRC did not seek a showdown with the United States over the TRA, its officials continued to remind Americans that U. S. relations with Taiwan, as prescribed in the TRA, constituted interference in China's domestic affairs. 
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 6-167/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 187; ANA VT96
	 The U. S. government and the American people have welcomed the progress in Taiwan toward a more democratic system. Democratization may, however, create a dilemma for the United States if it results in growing popular support for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan that would be permanently separated from mainland China, no longer even theoretically a part of "one China. " The American people in principle favor the self-determination of peoples, but would not necessarily favor intervention by U. S. armed forces to defend the right to self-determination of any ethnic group that chose to raise the banner of independence. U. S. military intervention would be likely only in rare instances where, in addition to the defense of the principle of self-determination, vital U. S. interests were involved. 
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6-168/Lee Lai To, Lecturer Political Science National University of Singapore, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Taiwan And the Reunification Question, " Edited by David S. G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 187 ; THR VT96
	 The limited and cautious reactions of the KMT revealed that pragmatism was in command and that Taipei would like to steer the island into a safe haven for its people in a secluded position off the Chinese coast based on a cool-headed assessment of the political situation. While rhetorically reiterating its interest in having one China, it was much more interested, at least for the time being, to 'pressure' Beijing and persuade the international community to recognize a separate place for Taipei in international affairs. As a result, the Tiananmen incident was used effectively by Taipei, at a time when many countries, especially those in the West, were alienated by the use of force against unarmed citizens on the mainland, to show off its successful development experience and its worth as a member of the international community. With its skillful use of its economic diplomacy, its 'elastic' posture in estab- lishing ties with other countries, and the more favourable interna- tional environment in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, Taipei could expect to score some successes in its international relations. 
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6-169/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 112 ; ANA VT96
	 Taiwan has played a prominent role in private international business organi- zations. The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), founded in 1966 by business people from the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada and now composed of members from 16 countries, admitted the ROC in 1984. Its conference of May 1989 was held in Taipei and was attended for the first time by two Soviet observers, representing the USSR Association for Business Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Countries. The Confederation of Asia-Pacific Chambers of Commerce (CACCI), also rounded in 1966, which has 14 members, has maintained its headquarters in Taipei since 1980. It has provided valuable channels for resolving problems with countries where Taiwan lacks diplomatic ties. 
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6-170/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 111 ;ANA VT96
	 The world community needs Taiwan's cooperation in international conventions on protection of the environment. However, the ROC is excluded from signing agreements under UN sponsorship, such as the multination Montreal Protocol on usage of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which deplete the ozone layer. The ROC has agreed to cooperate with the signatories, at substantial cost to its economy, but asks in return that it be granted the status of a member country. 
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6-171/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 187; ANA VT96
	 A related problem, although less potentially serious and more manageable by the United States, is Taiwan's growing economic importance in the world and the desirability of having the ROC as a member of the most influential intergovernmental economic organizations. The question for the United States is how vigorously to promote the admission of the ROC to organizations such as GATT, the World Bank, and the IMF and what the effect would be on U. S. PRC relations of increased activity on these issues. 
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6-172/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development, edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 63; ANA VT96
	 Taiwan remains under pressure to reduce its persistent trade surplus with the United States. Accession to GATT membership would require Taiwan to liberalize trade with the United States, probably reducing its large trade surplus with the United States. Most observers doubt that Taiwan can expand its exports to Japan enough to offset its growing dependence on Japanese technology products. The potential for expanding its surplus with China, however, could provide some offset. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN
EXCHANGE WITH CHINA
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Editor: Andrea Looby
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A. INHERENCY
1. There is not a lot of information about China's culture. (1-3)
2. The U.S. has not yet built up relations with China. (4-5)
3. There hasn't been the right change in attitude for an exchange. (6-7)
4. There is not any good understanding of the U.S. by China. (8)
5. China is not open yet to U.S. culture because of the perception of U.S. imperialism. (9)
B. Harms
1. Wrong perceptions between China and U.S. lead to conflicts. (10-14)
2. Views of each other are of hate with racist views. (15-16)
3. The media has wrong perceptions about China. (17-18)
4. China feels threatened by the United States. (19)
5. China acts differently with certain perceptions of the U.S. (20-22)
C. Solvency
1. There needs to be contact with Chinese citizens for good understanding. (23-25) 
2. Chinese students want an understanding of the West to make a change. (26-29)
3. Elimination of how American's think about China now would be productive. (30)
4. There is a need for cultural and educational exchange programs between China and the United States. (31)
5. Change in attitudes could help Sino-U.S. relations. (32)
6. The U.S. wants a better understanding of China. (33)
7. China is influenced by the West. (34-38)
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D. Negative: Even without illusions, if conflict exists, a Sino-U.S. relationship will be bad.(39)
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7-1/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 416; THR VT96
 In the middle of May 1992, the Beijing office of the Washington Post was unexpectedly raided and a young journalist Bai Weiji from the Overseas Edition of the People's Daily (whom Bureau Chief Lena Sun had known years earlier as a student at Beida) was arrested, charged with "leaking state secrets, " and sentenced to ten years. Because this incident involved a large American daily, it made headlines around the world. But other incidents involving Chinese alone rarely attracted such attention, and thus the perception remained widespread that China was becoming a society of industrious merchants who cared little about anything but business. "
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7-2/Henry Rosemont, Jr. , Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 3 ; THR VT96
 With few exceptions, media coverage of China, sup- ported all too regularly by "expert" China watchers, basically reflects the concerns of large corporations and the United States government, with the mischievous consequence of rendering virtually invisible the manifold particulars of Chinese life that do not comport well with American business and foreign policy interests; which in turn renders basic moral issues equally invisible. 
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 7-3/Henry Rosemont, Jr. , Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 50 ; THR VT96
 Most of these issues, of course, are not unknown to any sensitive person who has reflected on the causes of and cures for social and economic injustice. That they are seldom considered in a Chinese context says much about the distorted pictures of China portrayed by the U. S. media and professional China watchers, making it difficult for us to understand the conditions of the Chinese peoples, and thereby making it equally difficult to appreciate the true conditions in which we ourselves live. 
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 7-4/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 152; THR VT96
 Third, the United States should build relationships with the people of China, not its government. Since Tiananmen, the Chinese central leadership has sought to expand official governmental contact and recognition while attempting to restrict private contacts. The United States should turn that around and stand with the people, encouraging as much cultural and business exchange as the government will allow. At the same time it should minimize prestige-building, high-level government contact. Such a policy will hurt the regime, encourage the people of China, and above all maintain the flow of "subversive" ideas. It is time to seriously consider providing financial support for a Radio Free China. This approach was effective in Europe; perhaps it would be in China. 
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7-5/Tom Bernstein, Prof. Columbia, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union " T. Tow, p 227-8 THR VT96
 and China, edited by WilIiam Third, China's position on one side of the global strategic triangle lost importance as reconciliation between the United States and Soviet Union proceeded apace. For two decades. China had enjoyed influence disproportionate to its actual status as a regional power because of the role it was able to play as a sought after counterweight to Soviet hegemonism. China's heyday in this role was in the 1970s and early 1980s. Its position eroded as Soviet-American relations improved from the mid-1980s on. But with the fundamental turn in relations between Washington and Moscow for the better, the United States' need for China sharply declined, and so did China's leverage outside of Asia. Journalists wrote of a sense of "helpless hurt" among China's officials and that "China's leaders are painfully discovering that the Middle Kingdom matters less on the international stage than it did not long ago. " 
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7-6/Steven GoIdstein, Prof. of government at Smith college, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, " p. 116; THR VT96
 This is where the lessons of the post-Tiananmen period become relevant. Understanding China since the late 1980s has been much like the parable of the blind men and the elephant-depending on what part is touched, a very different animal is perceived. In the past, observers have seized upon different elements of the Chinese polity and economy at different points in time in order to make broad generalizations. Yet, as the instant wisdom after the Tiananmen demonstrations (as well as most of the prognostication since) has suggested, the zigzag and checkerboard quality of the Chinese reform has defied easy generalization -- or labeling. A new attitude is necessary. 
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 7-7 / David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
 	 The would-be successors to China's aging supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, are unsure of their footing with their own people and in the international community. In Washington, we have an administration unsure of itself in many foreign-policy areas and confronting an energized Republican-controlled Congress. In both Washington and Beijing, domestic politics and exaggerated perceptions are driving policy in dangerous directions. In both capitals voices are calling for fundamental reevaluations of the relationship.
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 7-8/David Shambaugh, Ph. D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p. 41; THR VT96
 The spectrum of perceptions of the United States articulated by China's America Watchers as presented in this study leads one to the contusion that, despite considerable progress, Chinese understanding of the United States remains shallow and seriously distorted. With a few exceptions, the vast majority of America Watchers in China do not understand the United States very well. The non-Marxists are best informed about the United States, but even their analyses usually lack subtlety and sophistication. The main implication of this conclusion is that a significant perceptual gap exists on the Chinese side that will continue to contribute to the fluctuating nature of Sino-American relations in the future. 
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7-9/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, " p. 83; THR VT96
 Despite the attraction of Western values, it was not that easy for Chinese intellectuals to abandon their own heritage-and identity. More than one have shifted back and forth during their lifetimes, sometimes decrying, sometimes praising American values. The major reason for this fluctuation lay in the "imperialist" side of the United States. As Mao once wrote, those who had "fond dreams" of learning from the West were confronted with the difficult question: "Why were the teachers always committing aggression against their pupil?" At crucial junctures, even seemingly pro-American intellectuals turned against the United States when it appeared to have acted in such a way as to harm China's interests
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 7-10/David Shambaugh, Ph. D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p. 303; THR VT96
 The import of this discussion is that there continues to exist a large "perception gap" in U. S. -China relations. Both sides are imbued with severe cases of cognitive dissonance, wishful thinking, stereotypical imagery, misinformation, and misperception. Granted, since 1972 mutual understanding has improved considerably as a result of direct contact between the two countries. This study is testimony to this fact with respect to China. But much still needs to be done if real mutual understanding and respect are to become realities. Without more accurate perceptions, Sino-American relations will forever be plagued by falsely heightened and unfulfilled expectations followed by disillusionment and recriminations, potentially leading to wider conflicts. This repetitive pattern means that Sino-American relations will forever fluctuate, never finding a proper equilibrium. Given the size, strength, and importance of the United States and China in world affairs, unstable Sino-American relations are a dangerous omen for both countries and for the world . 
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7-11/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 102; THR VT96
 The Chinese reaction to American policy has been pointed and predictable. Not only were the fighter sales seen as an intervention in China's domestic politics, they were said to violate earlier Sino-American agreements on reducing arms sales to the island. Deng was reported to have approved "tough measures" in response, and one agricultural official suggested China might respond by halting American grain imports. Given their frustration with Taiwan's growing confidence, its dilatory responses to Beijing's initiatives and, most of all, the growing suspicion of American global policy, it was only natural that China's leaders would see American statements and actions as part of their problem in dealing with the island. For example, during the fall of 1991, there were suggestions in the Chinese press that Taiwanese aspirations for independence were being supported by forces in the United States that, like those practicing peaceful evolution, were seeking to return to past policies and "interfere in the affairs of the Chinese people. " Although the electoral defeat of the pro independence party eased these concerns, the Taiwan question remains a delicate issue that is once again figuring prominently in Sino-American relations. 
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7-12/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 89; THR VT96
 The Chinese leaders, however, have seemed unwilling to reach such an agreement. They have combined defiance with some willingness to engage in dialogue. Thus, even as Chinese leaders listen to foreign visitors, ranging from prime ministers to human-rights envoys, they play a curious cat-and- mouse game in response to American initiatives, whereby some dissidents are released and/or allowed to leave the country while still others are put on trial. Against the background of these few gestures of alternating concession and recalcitrance, the Chinese media have kept up a constant drumbeat of sharply worded statements--as well as a "white paper"---meant to disarm Western critics by "exposing" their record at home or by comparing the present domestic situation (particularly in Tibet) with that of the past. In regard to the former argument, the outbreak of violence in Los Angeles following the acquittal of the policemen impiicated in the March 1991 beating of Rodney King and American policy toward Haitian refugees have, not unexpectedly, provided the material for extensive Chinese discussions. 
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7-13 / Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. misperceptions lead to disputes: Asia Society head" ACS VT96
 	U.S. misperceptions of Asia have led to clashes throughout history, such as the automobile showdown with Japan and the invitation of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the United States, Burton Levin, director of the Asia Society in Hong Kong, said Wednesday.
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7-14 / David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
 	 This mixture of mutual hubris, contempt, and suspicion is combustible. Such views have caused colossal errors in US- China relations before: the ''accidental'' Sino-American conflict in Korea and arguably the Vietnam quagmire.
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7-15/Henry Rosemont, Jr. , Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 13; THR VT96
 It is plain that Deng, Yang Shangkun, and Li Peng wanted the demonstrators and their supporters in China and abroad to be taught a lesson from the violent crackdown. 
 (In the New York Review article from which these quotes were taken, Mirsky regularly provides footnotes and documentation for a number of points which are either well-known, obvious, or inconsequential. For the quoted statements, however, no evidence whatsoever is proffered, leaving readers to wonder how Mirsky was able to penetrate the minds of Politburo members so clearly). 6 Statements similar to Mirsky's can be cited ad nauseam, but the overall picture of current China as drawn by the U. S. media is clear enough. It is a mischievous picture. First, it is cynical, and it reinforces the old racist stereotype of China as an "Oriental despotism" by portraying all Chinese politics simply as power struggles, lacking genuine inter-governmental moral dimensions. It also wrongly suggests that the Tiananmen story may have ended well if only the minimal student demands had been met, and further, it provides precious little insight into the quality and quantity of problems any Chinese government must face, problems long resistant to principled solutions without moral compromises. 
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 7-16/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 103; THR VT96
 No pictures could have had a greater impact on the American people than those of Chinese tanks toppling the Goddess of Democracy or of a lone citizen standing up to a column of tanks. For millions of viewers, it was the victory of totalitarianism over democracy and individual rights. Once more American illusions about China were shattered and Isaac's pendulum of American attitudes swung again--this time toward the "hate" pole. Moreover, as developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union took their course, the image of "hard-line" China that originated at Tiananmen became even more strongly etched in the minds of the American people. The "hard-liners" in Beijing seemed to be bucking the trend of world democratization. In addition, many in the foreign policy community saw China's strategic importance significantly reduced with the demise of the U. S. S. R. as a global power. With the compelling issue of common opposition removed, the revulsion and distrust unleashed by Tiananmen seeped into all areas of the relationship. 
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7-17/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future, " Edited by David S. G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 145; THR VT96
 In June 1989, the Western press spread its own wishful thinking that parts of the PLA were 'liberal', that they favoured the demonstrators and agreed with their political views. That was simply not true. There is a vast difference between hesitating to murder people in the streets and agreeing with their political objectives. A majority of PLA officers disapproved of clearing the streets with brute force, because that would escalate the disorder and discredit the army, but they also disapproved of the demonstrations. 
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7-18/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 80; THR VT96
 Much of the dramatic deterioration in Sino-American relations can be attributed to the fact that policy makers in both Washington and Beijing have come to view each other through lenses decisively shaped by their respective images of the nature of China's post-Tiananmen reform and the evolution of the post-cold-war world. 
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7-19/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U. S. State Dept. , 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p. 258; THR VT96
 Meanwhile, although it wants and needs American markets and technology, and American investment, the PRC leadership regards the United States as the major source of infection of that insidious disease, "spiritual pollution, " and as the inventor of the strategy of "peaceful evolution. " Such Chinese apprehensions have been graphically represented in the Chinese press. The following passage is illustrative: 
 The United States uses democracy, freedom and human rights as weapons to force the West's value system onto socialist countries . . . . It propagandizes that socialism has no future, at least not within the next 100 years; it spread the notion that the third and fourth generation of the communist party is decadent, losing power, unqualified to represent the people, and even less qualified to lead; and it seeks to create trouble between the socialist populace and their leaders, and among ethnic groups by spreading rumors and sensational exaggerations to weaken people's wills and sow discord domestically and abroad. 
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7-20/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ. , 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 226; THR VT96
 In China, . three major setbacks diminished the Chinese role in the world. The first was the industrial world's reaction to the Tiananmen crackdown. Sanctions were imposed by the United States and its Western allies, with Japan tagging along Somewhat reluctantly. Sanctions reflected a fundamental decline in China's prestige. Not so long ago, China's bold reforms had aroused much excitement around the world. There was substantial confidence in China's stability, leading to international willingness to invest. After the Tiananmen Square events, China's political stability became publicly and starkly an open question. The transformation of China's international status was best symbolized by Deng Xiaoping, who as a great reformer not long before had graced the cover of Time as "Man of the Year" but who now was called the "butcher of Beijing. "
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7-21 / David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
 	 This is no time for miscalculation in Sino-American relations. And yet, there is real danger of just that. In Washington, there is increasing talk of the '' China threat,'' even though China's social and political cohesion is widely believed to be shaky. The thinking spawned by this view is, ''be tough while China is weak.'' In Beijing, there is increasing talk of America's ''hegemonism,'' domineering policies, and desire to see China weak and fragmented. At the same time, the United States is portrayed as a ''power in decline,'' paralyzed by political gridlock, weak political leadership, aimlessness, and social breakdown. This breeds a ''be tough with the Americans and they'll back down'' view.
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7-22 / David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
 	 It is disturbing to read in official and unofficial Chinese sources how an increasingly wide range of informed Chinese view America. Washington is seen as so constrained domestically by political gridlock and scarce budgetary resources that it cannot act effectively abroad. US foreign policy is simply a reflection of economic interest, with moral concerns a mere fig leaf for ''commercial diplomacy.'' Social and ethnic cohesion in America is seen as diminishing and citizen confidence in Washington as declining. The conclusion? America is in a weak position and will back down in the face of a determined Chinese leadership.
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7-23/Steven Mosher, Prof. at Claremont Institute, 1990; CHINA MISPERCEIVED: AMERICAN ILLUSIONS AND CHINESE REALITY, p. 216; THR VT96
 If we in the West understand the People's Republic better today, our clearer vision does not come from academic China-watchers, foreign policy experts, or politicians, whose past portraits often have been misleading, self-serving, even false. It comes from the Chinese people, who have begun speaking to us directly about their aspirations for democracy, economic freedom, and human rights. A Fang Lizhi proclaiming the demise of Marxism requires no explanation; and there is no way to misinterpret a student waving this banner: "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death. "
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7-24/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 38; THR VT96
 Diversification also has another dimension. With the tremendous economic, political and social change that has occurred in Taiwan, and Hong Kong's attempts to reach out in anticipation of the 1997 transition to Beijing's sovereignty, the United States needs to further develop its cultural and economic ties with these two exceedingly important areas. 
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 7-25/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 79 ; THR VT96
 A second factor is the information and opinions that Americans derive from the Chinese themselves. Our large China-watching community remains considerably dependent upon the official Chinese press and government-controlled access to China for information. The favorable attitudes of the late Mao years to some extent simply reflected American acceptance of official Chinese claims; the shift to negative attitudes in the post-Mao years was stimulated by revelations put out by the Chinese government about abuses under Mao; and the enthusiastic response to Deng's reforms reflects the great claims made for them in official Chinese statements. Although the same claims emanating from another communist country might not have achieved so much credibility, American specialists have tended to view China in isolation rather than in comparison with other communist countries, both because of China's break with the Soviet Union and because of the linguistic and other difficulties in the way of gaining expertise on both China and other communist systems at the same time. 
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 7-26/Stanley Rosen, Prof. Political Science University of Southern California, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Students and the State in China: Crisis in Ideology and Organization, Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 184; THR VT96
 In the aftermath of June 4, this intellectual tolerance has been denounced by a conservative leadership with a tight control over China's media. The former trend toward ideological "pluralism" has been condemned in the country's leading newspapers and journals, with the primary villains now seen as the "turmoil elites, " many of whom have fled China? Lenin's dichotomy of ideological systems has been resurrected and, as a Qiushi article put it, "there is no exception whatever. " Those viewing "science" and ideology as opposing forces are said to have fallen prey to a "liberalization" that serves the interests of the West, which has long advocated the "peaceful evolution" of China. According to this argument, Chinese students studying abroad are seen by Western leaders as a "strategic investment"; after imbibing Western ideology and culture, they will return home as a force that will greatly exceed that of tens of thousands of troops. "
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7-27/Lee Feigon, Chairman of the Dept. of East Asian Languages and Culture and prof. of Chinese history at Colby College, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Gender and the Chinese Student Movement, " edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 170; THR VT96
 Young argues persuasively that the "ancien regime" that both the students and the government claimed to oppose was, among other things, a combination of the supposed feudalism of the Qing and the austere communism of the Maoist era. For the students, one aspect of this "ancien regime" was the puritanical morality and isolationism associated with the first few decades of the revolution. Reacting against this order, students looked to the West, especially Western movies, pulp novels, and magazines, for an image of sensuality and liberation that they associated with democracy. After all, if, as the Deng regime has implied throughout much of the last decade, the austere poverty of the Chinese countryside has produced China's backwardness, then the apparent materialist sensuality of the West must mean modernization. In any event, it's fun, not least of all because their elders have been cautioning Chinese youth against this kind of decadence for years. 
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 7-28/Stanley Rosen, Prof. Political Science University of Southern California, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Students and the State in China: Crisis in Ideology and Organization, " Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 176 THR VT96
 This seeming orientation toward Western liberal democratic values-combined with pessimism over the future of Chinese reforms and frustration with the low standard of living of Chinese intellectuals-has begun to have a major impact on China's educational system. It has become almost a cliché to say that everyone wants to leave China to study abroad. Though clearly an exaggeration, there is ample evidence to document the dissatisfaction with opportunities in China and the desire to leave, at least until such time as conditions in China improve. 
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7-29/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. Prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, " edited by William T. Tow, p. 185; THR VT96
 American strategy toward Chinese students, the internal report goes on, singles out children of high-level officials and those most gifted academically for special cultivation. When they return to China, it is hoped that their rise to influential positions will benefit the United States. At the same time, measures are taken to introduce American democratic freedoms and material civilization in the best possible light to the overseas students, so that upon their return they can serve as a bridge to the rest of society in promoting a transition to capitalism. The role of the American FBI in encouraging talented foreign students to defect is also scored in the report. 
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7-30/Barber B. Conable, Jr. , Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power, " Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 25; THR VT96
 The first task in reexamining U. S. policy toward China is to rid American thinking of three inaccurate and harmful assertions: China's system is performing dismally and therefore its stability is tenuous; China, since the Tiananmen crackdown, has pursued a course opposed to the free market, and current developments are antithetical to political liberalization; and China is of only secondary importance to American global interests. None of these assumptions stand up to careful examination. . 
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 7-31/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. Prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p. 184; THR VT96
 In assessing the background and immediate causes of the spring 1989 demonstrations, Chinese authorities singled out the United States as pursuing a long-term policy goal to transform China from a socialist to a capitalist country through a process of "peaceful evolution. " While this charge has been leveled openly, the most detailed accounts of reputed American intentions and activities have appeared in internal publications. The material presented below, unless otherwise indicated, is drawn from the most widely circulated of these internally issued books; as of the fourth printing in August 1989, around two million copies had already been circulated in China. A key plank in the American strategy, according to this ac- count, has been the use of cultural and educational exchange programs. These programs are said to have both general and specific targets. 
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7-32/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, " p. 116; THR VT96
 As the world has watched the tumultuous events in post Communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it has become accustomed to systems of a highly ambiguous nature that defy easy categorization, as ethnic civil wars exist alongside uncertain democratization and stumbling economies. Earlier confidence that policies could be prescribed -- or the future foretold--has diminished considerably. Although events in China in the near future will probably lack much of the drama and violence of those in other nations, they will have the same quality of change and ambiguity that defies easy stereotyping. If observers of China can eschew stereotypes and be open-minded to developments there, it would constitute a major reorientation in American attitudes that in the past have been dominated by wishful thinking and the desire to reshape China to suit American preferences. 
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 7-34/Stanley Rosen, Prof. Political Science University of Southern California, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Students and the State in China: Crisis in Ideology and Organization, " Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 172; THR VT96
 In their search for a viable belief system, Chinese youth have been strongly influenced by concepts imported from the West and, in their suspicion of some of the core collectivist values of the regime, appear to have become much more individualistic in their thinking. This change in thinking has been accompanied by the growth of a moral viewpoint that stresses concern primarily with one's own behavior and the avoidance of moral judgments about others. Surveys have shown, for example, that even though students were not supportive of cheating on examinations or living together before marriage, they were also unwilling to criticize others for doing so, considering such behavior a private matter. 
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7-35/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 107; THR VT96
 In these ways, Chinese domestic politics influence the development of Sino-American relations. The direction of domestic policy in China is an important influence on how Beijing approaches the United States: a reform-minded leadership is more inclined toward the United States while less-reformist leadership leans toward confrontation. In the United States, policies and perceptions are strongly influenced not only by the approach but also by the general image projected by China. When China's reform seems to be moving smoothly, Washington is clearly more forthcoming than when it projects uncertainty and repression. 
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 7-36/David Shambaugh, Ph. D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p293; THR VT96
 Electronic visual images also have an impact on their perceptions. Many Chinese who come to the United States spend hours watching television, and the perceptions they form are strongly conditioned by this medium. Similarly, American satellite news feeds and other programs are now carried daily on Chinese television (not to mention the hundreds of millions of Voice of America listeners), and American movies increasingly play to packed houses in Chinese theaters. 
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7-37/Steven Mosher, Prof. at Claremont Institute, 1990; CHINA MISPERCEIVED: AMERICAN ILLUSIONS AND CHINESE REALITY, p. 205 THR VT96
 While the increasingly tense confrontation between the students and the authorities had all the elements of a good story, this alone would not have generated such intense coverage by the U. S. media. In part, public enthusiasm for news of the demonstrations reflected America's long-standing romance with China. More important than this, however, was the students increasingly vocal commitment to democracy, especially American-style democracy. When on 13 May, about two thousand students began a hunger strike, they announced that they were prepared to die for democracy. Students avowed during interviews that they were avid listeners of the Voice of America. Banners appeared in demonstrations bearing quotations from Patrick Henry, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Jefferson. ("Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death" was a favorite. ) As if to make the inspiration for their movement perfectly transparent, the students chose in the final days to erect a Statue of Liberty on Tiananmen Square. She went by the name of the Goddess of Democracy, to be sure, but no American who beheld that thirty-foot female figure holding high the torch of freedom could doubt her transpacific origins. 
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7-38/Stephen R. MacKinnon, Prof. of history and director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona State University, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "The Role of the Chinese and U. S. Media, " edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 213; THR VT96
 On balance U. S. influence on the Chinese press may be greater than the reverse, given the importance of the ideal of a free press to the Chinese democratic movement since the turn of the century. But it is worth remembering that the U. S. journalists covering China inevitably reflect the prejudices and concerns of their Chinese co-workers. Current features of U. S. press reporting in some ways resemble those of the 1940s: poor coverage of rural conditions, strong coverage of the urban-educated elites, and genuine empathy for political dissenters. What may be more important by the end of the century is the leading contribution of both media to the creation of a civil society in China or a political dialogue and legitimacy outside a state-dominated public sphere. In the 1980s the Chinese and U. S. press demonstrated that the struggles for press freedom in China of the 1930s and 19405 had not been an empty exercise. 
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7-39/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 124; THR VT96
 Yet this 'is not necessarily a pessimistic conclusion. A future in which the United States and China view each other as they are and not as they wish each other to be would be a significant change from the past. While a relationship with- out illusions, built out of conflict, would lack the equilibrium or even the stability of the past, it might be less volatile. As Steven I. Levine, a prominent observer of Chinese foreign policy, has argued, despite the severe traumas of the post- Tiananmen period, Sino-American relations have demonstrated the resilience that might make such a transition pos- sible. A network of economic, cultural and political ties has persisted. And more importantly, there is ample evidence that there exists on both sides of the Pacific a minimum of common interest and will to promote relations that not only have acted to control the damage of the past three years, but which, alone with the established network of ties, could sustain efforts to manage what portends to be a far more difficult relationship in the decade ahead. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CHINESE POLITICAL EVOLUTION
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Editor: Alfred C. Snider
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WILL CHINA BREAK APART? YES, AND IT WILL BE NASTY
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A. PRC is ripe for a split
	1. The most likely scenario 1-5
	2. Too many forces push towards it for it not to happen 6-7
	3. PRC will fall apart like other ex-communist nations 8-10
	4. Regionalism is historically true in China 11
	5. PRC central authority is in question 12
	6. Many provinces ignore the central government now 13-18
	7. Rural uprisings threaten 19-22
	8. PRC is full of social fault lines 23-25
	9. Localism is strong 26
	10. Border ethnic groups want to split away 27-28
B. Links to PRC split up
	1. Decreased economic growth causes split 29-33
	2. Increased market forces causes split 34-35
	3. Messy succession causes split 36-38
	4. Lessen power of Communist Party causes split 39-40
	5. Crises and an unsettled PRC cause split 41-42
	6. Increased regional income disparities causes split 43-45
	7. Increased foreign investment causes split 46
	8. Central taxation causes split 47-48
	9. Increased corruption causes split 49
	10. Imposed agricultural policies cause split 50
	11. Divisions in PLA (army) cause split 51
	12. Decreased nationalism causes split 52
C. If PRC splits up it will be very bad
	1. A very dangerous situation 53-54
	2. Increased military warlordism 55-56
	3. Conflicts will spread internationally 57-58
	4. War with USA over Taiwan 59
	5. Huge number of illegal guns now 60
	6. Muslim uprising risks 61
	7. Decreased economic development 62
	8. Lose the villages and lose the nation 63
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WILL CHINA BREAK APART? NO, AND IT WILL NOT BE NASTY
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A. PRC will not split apart
	1. Regional splits unlikely 64
	2. 50% study is wrong 65
	3. PRC will loosen, but not split apart 66
	4. Won't shatter like other ex-communist states 67-69
	5. Military will hold it together 70
	6. Ethnic cohesion will keep it together 71-72
	7. Communist Party still has grasp of rural regions 73
	8. Inland provinces are not suffering income lag 74
B. Forces which unite the PRC (delinks)
	1. Increased nationalism stops a split 75
	2. Rural Chinese are doing well 76
	3. Favoritism from Jiang keeps them happy 77
C. A split would not be bad
	1. Provinces now show that it can work 78
	2. No warlordism will occur 79-81
D. A split in the PRC would be GOOD (turns)
	1. Split would avoid wars 82-83
	2. Split would be better than staying together 84-85
	3. Split means Chinese people will be better off 86
	4. Split will increase democracy 87-88
	5. Split is good for culture 89
	6. Split is the best way for reform 90
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A NEW REGIME -- THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION
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A. Succession is a difficult time to experience and predict
	1. Critical for PRC future 90A-91
	2. Deng era is over 93
	3. Planned successions tend to fail 94
	4. Can't predict outcome of succession 95-99
	5. Succession is difficult in a dictatorship 100
	6. Longer succession is delayed, the worse it will be 101
B. Factions in the coming succession
	1. Conflict is in institutional factions, not individuals 102
	2. Must act to support the proper faction to get the right outcome 103
	3. The current ruling group (Deng and others now ruling)
		a. Deng has set stage for succession 104
		b. Deng;s preference for informal power struggles will make succession a messy process 105-107
		c. Deng's chosen one will not be the successor 108-111
		d. New group of current leaders is young 112
	4. New, collective leadership after Deng
		a. Succession will result in a ruling cooperative of top contenders 113-117
		b. Collective leadership will be effective & will continue reform 118
		c. Collective leadership will eventually result in a paramount leader, but through stability 119
		d. Collective leadership will fail to govern PRC 120-123
		e. Collective leadership will risk war 124
	5. Hard-liners
		a. Succession will pit reformers against hard-liners 125-126
		b. Hard-liners and liberals are really the same 127
		c. Hard-liners are in decline 128-130
		d. Hard-liners cannot take over the government 131-132
		e. In a messy succession, hard-liners will take over 133
		f. Succession during a weak economic period and hard-liners will take over 134-135
		g. Hard-liners will pick the next paramount leader 136-137
		h. Hard-liner takeover attempt will lead to mass rebellion 138
		i. Outline of hard-liner take over explained 139
		j. Hard-liners will decrease economic reform 140-141
		k. Hard-liners will have anti-USA policies 142
	6. Military
		a. Military will pick the winner in the coming succession 143-152
		b. Military will take over the succession process 153-156
		c. Succession crisis could cause a military break up 157-158
		d. Anti-reform succession will cause a military coup 159
		e. Military coup is unlikely 160
		f. Military will choose a civilian ally to rule PRC 161
		g. Military is concerned about a civil war 162
	7. Communist Party (CCP)
		a. CCP is strong 103-104
		b. CCP is reforming and modernizing 165-166
		c. CCP is in decline 167-170
		d. Decreased economic growth hurts the CCP 171
		e. CCP collapse means a disaster for the PRC 172-174
		f. Anti-corruption drive is used to prepare CCP for succession 175-177
	8. Liberal reformers will win in succession crisis 178
	9. Regional economic elites
		a. Regional economic elites will dominate the succession 179-181
		b. Regional economic elites want democracy 182
C. Individuals involved in the succession question
	1. The three generation theory explained 183
	2. Designated 3rd generation will not become paramount leader (PL)
	3. Jiang Zemin
		a. Jiang is the successor 189-193
		b. Jiang has many power bases 194-195
		c. Jiang is strong in the military 196-202
		d. Jiang wants stability 203-204
		e. Jiang wants economic reform 205-206
		f. Jiang controls liberal reformers 207
		h. Jiang opposed by Li is a stable scenario 208
		i. Jiang is a reformer like Deng 209-210 &210a
		j. Jiang is flexible towards the USA 211
		k. Jiang will not succeed Deng
			1. Jiang will not become PL 212-215
			2. Jiang is a transitory leader at best 216
			3. Hard-liners oppose Jiang 217
			4. Military opposes Jiang 218
			5. Jiang being Deng's pick doesn't wrap it up for him 219-220
			6. Sputtering economy will hurt Jiang's chances 221
		l. Jiang becoming PL has some problems
			1. Dangerously adventurous foreign policy 222-223
			2. Jiang opposes the USA 224
			3. Jiang triggers regional divisions 225-226
			4. Jiang seen as weak 227
		m. Non-Jiang successor will mean anti-USA policies 228
	4. Li Peng
		a. If not Jiang, then it will be Li as PL 229-232
		b. Li will not become PL 233
		c. Li and Jiang will cooperate 234-235
		d. Li supports open policies towards the West 236
		e. Li wants to decrease economic reforms 237
		f. Li is a hard-liner 238
	5. Yang Shangkun
		a. Yang has made a comeback to power 239-240
		b. Yang will support reformers 241-242
		c. Yang will be the king maker 243-245
	6. Zhu Rongji
		a. Is a reformer 246
		b. Wants to increase economic reform 247
		c. Would be the best leader 248
	7. Zhao Ziyang
		a. Will be PL 249
		b. Is a reformer like Deng 250
	8. Qiao Shi will become PL 251
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WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT OF VARIOUS SUCCESSION SCENARIOS?
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A. Succession will impact everything 
	1. New PL will make all important decisions 252
	2. Decisions of new PL will be unpredictable 253
B. Various scenarios explained and probabilities given
	1. Scenarios listed and explained 254-257
	2. Continuing status quo scenario 258
	3. Increase reform scenario 259-261
	4. Immobilism scenario 262-263
	5. Decreased internationalism scenario 264
	6. Maoist revival scenario 265
	7. New cultural revolution scenario 266-267
C. USA influence on succession can backfire
	1. Our strategy will be show of force confrontation 268
	2. Human rights moves during succession will backfire 269
	3. Factions will vie for foreign support 270
	4. US support for any faction will cause dangerous backlash 271-273
D. Succession period may not be harmful...it may be good!
	1. Succession will be smooth 274-276
	2. Succession will not change PRC's status quo policies 277-283
	3. Succession will not change economic policies 284-290
	4. Succession will lead to progressive reform 291-293
	5. Succession will lead to economic integration of Asia 294
	6. Succession will not decrease openness policies 295
	7. Succession will increase China's need for technology 296
	8. Succession will not cause PRC to split apart 297
E. Succession may cause many serious problems
	1. Succession could lead to civil war and disintegration 298-307
	2. Succession could lead to international conflict
		a. Change in internal policies will change foreign policies 308-311
		b. Succession could spark dangerous international crises 312-314
		c. Succession could cause military adventurism 315-318
		d. Succession could lead to threats to Taiwan 319-320
		e. Succession instability could threaten the USA 321
		f. Succession could bring on a nationalist strong man ruler 322
		g. Succession may bring on policies which oppose the USA 323
		h. Succession could lead to unpredictable crises 324
	3. Other harms of the succession process
		a. It will hurt democracy 325-327
		b. Succession means the real problems do not get addressed 328-330
		c. Weak economy during succession is a recipe for danger 331-336
		d. Succession could lead to a global nuclear black market 337-338
		e. Succession could lead to rapid reform and then a crackdown 339-342
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CHANGING POLICIES WILL LEAD TO PROTEST AND CLAMPDOWN
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A, Links to increasing protest
	1. Increased openness increases protest 343-346
	2. Unmet expectations leads to protest 347-350
	3. Reform increases protest 351
	4. Rapid economic changes leads to protest 352-354
	5. Difficult economic times leads to protest 355-357
	6. Privatization of industry leads to protest 358
	7. Problems in transition to market system leads to protest 359
	8. Inflation leads to protest 360
	9. Increased technology leads to protest 361
	10. Increased drought leads to protest 362
	11. Elites are on guard during reform 363
B. PRC is on the BRINK of PROTEST and CLAMPDOWN
	1. Roots of conflict lie in dual pressures: to modernize & to keep traditions 364-366
	2. On the brink of A new wave of protest now 367-376
	3. Tiananmen/democracy movement example
		a. What happened 377-378
		b. Rooted in Chinese tradition 379
		c. Stage set for next, bigger protest 380
		d. 1989 protests were national 381-383
	4. Intellectuals, students, youth will lead the way 384-387
	5. People will follow, ready to oppose the government 388-391
	6. Other methods of solving problems are nor available 392-394
	7. Slow, steady change is best, not big protest 395-396
	8. Armed party in opposition is ready 397
C. IMPACTS: Protest, clampdown, disaster
	1. Protests will grow out of control 398-399
	2. Government WILL clampdown and do it HARD 400-409
	3. Military and security forces will act and KILL
		a. Military and security forces will support the government 410-413
		b. Mass repression and death 414-417
		c. Violence will spread 418
	4. Society will be polarized even more 419-420
D. IMPACTS: Other impacts of the clampdown
	1. The clampdown will lead to foreign policy crises 421-424
	2. The clampdown will cause a hard-line policy towards the US 425-426
	3. The clampdown will cause dangerous policies towards Hong Kong and South China Seas 427-428
	4. The clampdown will stop other reforms 429-430
	5. The clampdown will cripple the economy 431-432
	6. The clampdown will cause a hard-liner take over 433
	7. The clampdown will cause a military break up and chaos 434-435
E. ANSWERS: No big protest will take place
	1. Protesters are small and insignificant 435-437
	2. Intellectuals serve the government 438-439
	3. Peasants and common people will not join in protest 440-446
	4. The people will remain moderate 447
	5. Protests will be co-opted 448
F. ANSWERS: Harms of the clampdown are exaggerated
	1. The army will not kill 449-450
	2. Only used a clampdown before in stop a committee meeting 451
	3. The last clampdown was soft 452
	4. The clampdown will not create large destabilization 453
	5. Hard-liners can't turn back the clock 454
	6. Protest will be non violent 455-460
	7. Nationalism not enough to rally to government 461
G. ANSWERS: Protest movement would WIN
	1. Student based protest will WIN next time 462-464
	2. Lead to freedom 465
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8-1 / Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 How concerned is the West? The Far Eastern Economic Review recently reported a Pentagon study, produced by a panel of China experts, in which half of the panel expected a "Soviet-style break-up" of China within seven years after Deng's death. 
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8-2/ Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 A smaller portion of the panel predicted that radical reformers would seize control, fulfilling Washington's long-held dream that China will become a fellow, nonthreatening superpower. But half the group predicted instead that China would eventually disintegrate, possibly because of economic disparities between coastal and inland regions and internal frictions provoked by the rise of a new authoritarian strongman with a belligerent foreign policy.
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8-3/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 [a group of Asia experts led by Ronald Morse, a University of Maryland professor] The experts discussed several alternative scenarios that could follow the death of Deng Xiaoping, and concluded that there is a high probability that China would experience a Soviet-style breakup.
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8-4 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 50% of study group commissioned by Pentagon believe China will break up like Soviet Union
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8-5 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 -- The "Disintegration" scenario, in which China will break up like the Soviet Union because of unresolved factionalism at the political center and loss of control over the instruments of economic, political and social control. Thirty percent of the study group believed that this scenario [Disintegration] was most likely to occur. In this scenario, the leaders will regard stability and the continuation of Communist Party control paramount. The collective leadership will try to avoid being seen as weak and carry out only limited political reforms. The authorities will continue to arrest people whom they regard as antigovernment.
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8-6/ Thomas Homer-Dixon; Director, Peace and Conflict Studies University of Toronto, Defense News, March 27, 1995 / April 2, 1995; Pg. 46; ACS VT96
	 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Director, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto: They'll have to be even smarter to meet their own needs. If they aren't, we're faced with either fragmentation or more authoritarian regimes. China is at greater risk of fragmentation. The centrifugal pressures within China are so great that even under the best circumstances we'll be left with a very loose federation of regions.
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 8-7/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.183; THR VT96
	 What has held these diverse communities together has been the power of the Chinese state and the fear of foreign domination. Now that China is not threatened externally and economic reforms have given increased autonomy to local regions, age-old internal divisions along "official" and "unofficial" ethnic lines may become one of Beijing's greatest concerns as it approaches the 21st century.
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8-8/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p.34; CJJ VT96
	 'The problems the rest of the world are likely to face with respect to China in the years ahead, then, sound broadly similar to those we now face in connection with the former communist world and the USSR: they are a matter of managing not incremental change, as was expected, but regime transition. It is true that China today has advantages that the USSR lacked a decade ago, but the challenges it faces are substantial nevertheless./n magnitude, then, if not in detail, the forthcoming shifts in China will most likely be comparable to what we have seen in the USSR. And, if so, then China's diplomatic and international role is likely to be as nerve-wracking as Russia's is today.
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8-9/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb. 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p.38-9; MDS VT96
	 The end of the Cold War destroyed the remaining barriers to the development of nationalism, which had been curbed in the past by the need to fit into a bipolar world. Conflicts less evident in the past because of the confrontation between East and West now have been thrust out in the open. This trend toward national self-determination has led to the disintegration of several old multinational states such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. In the future this may lead to the collapse of the Russian Federation, the PRC, Belgium, and Canada. The new states that have emerged from the old, multinational states all seek to become separate geopolitical agents.
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8-10/ Michael MccGwire, Cambridge Univ. (UK), Brookings Review, March 22, 1995; Pg. 36; HEADLINE: Eliminate or marginalize? Nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy; importance of striving for nuclear-free world; ACS VT96
	 New problems have also arisen. The Cold War's end eroded intra-bloc discipline and weakened the constraints that superpowers were able to impose on allies and clients. Weapons-grade material and people with nuclear skills are newly available worldwide. And if the Soviet Union can disintegrate, why not China, or India, or the new Russian state, and why should the break-up be peaceable? If Muslim political identity strengthens, could Pakistan choose to share its weapons know-how with Indonesia, Malaya, even Iran? 
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8-11/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Although it is highly unlikely that the PRC will disintegrate along the lines of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a looser system characterized by greater regionalism cannot be ruled out, nor would it be without precedent in China's political history. 
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8-12 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 Many experts agree that in the short run the Asian giant will continue economic reforms and tight political control. But many also question Beijing's long-term central authority -- and the impact this will have on everything from social problems to foreign policy.
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 8-13/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 71; THR VT96
	 As the contrasting reactions of the regional governments imply, full integration of the economy will depend upon better political accommodations between Taiwan and the PRC and the reduction of administrative restrictions in both locales. Indeed, the obstacles to integration posed by the absence of mutual recognition and the lack of solid institutional ties between Taiwan and the PRC should not be underestimated. If greater integration of the region as a whole occurs, however--something that will be made more likely by the 1997 reabsorption of Hong Kong--the region has the potential to grow into a powerful trading bloc characterized by the export-oriented and, possibly, neo-mercantilist policies that in the past have been typical of Taiwan and China. The fates of Hong Kong and Taiwan also will be tied much more closely to that of Beijing, and vice versa. At the same time, the power of the southern Chinese provinces, especially Guangdong, is likely to grow even further, perhaps increasing pressures for greater regional autonomy. Indeed, with its ability to take in revenues from abroad, Guangdong in the past decade has grown quite financially independent from Beijing and now relies on the center for only about 2 percent of its budget. Beijing is sure to counter any strong moves toward greater autonomy with its own efforts to retain ultimate control of not only Guangdong but also Greater China. The push and pull between Beijing and its prosperous southern flank will be one of the most interesting regional dynamics of the decade.
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8-14/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P. 49; THR VT96
	 Almost all observers agree that China's Southern and Southeastern borders are now porous. Smuggling is big business from Hainan Island in the Southern China Sea to Xiamen on the Taiwan Strait. A large portion of the big spenders found in these regions are smugglers whose activities make a mockery of China's import controls, tariff regulations, and rhetoric of self-reliance. 
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 8-15/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 346; THR VT96
	 As the Chinese experience makes plain, the widening of reforms in foreign economic policy helps change the regional and sectoral state of the country. There is good evidence that China can be treated as more than one country for vast parts of its foreign trade. By opening several doors to the outside world, the tendency toward regionalism in China was allowed to develop. Some provinces, most notably Guangdong, have managed to resist new orders from the center during times of retrenchment. They are able to grow their way out of inflationary problems that afflict the rest of the country. Indeed, by demonstrating their independence they encourage the outside worm to regard the province as a special part of China relatively immune to shifts evident in Beijing and other regions.
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8-16/ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
	 Analysts have pointed out while Beijing has the authority to close any IPR -violating factory in Guangdong or Zhejiang, it lacks the wherewithal to prevent another one from starting up the next week.
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8-17 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Regardless of province or outside contact, the general trend is significant: few areas of China remain entirely isolated; almost all (including interior provinces establishing representative offices in Hong Kong and the special economic zones) are seeking ways to establish windows and doors to the larger outside, even if that world is initially only a neighboring province with more current ties or connections.
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8-18 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 Reports have it that in March this year, the CCP's top leaders instructed the Organization Department, Propaganda Department and Central Policy Research Office to conduct an extensive rural survey to find out about the basic conditions of 800,000 grass-roots party organizations in the rural areas. In late April, 12 investigation teams were dispatched to 16 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, 36 counties, 42 townships and 70 villages, where they conducted investigations for two months. According to the findings, many of the grass-roots party organizations have been in a state of paralysis since the fixing of output quotas for each household. Some rural cadres are riding roughshod over the masses, and some rural areas have come under the control of forces of evil or feudal " village councils" . The picture presented is very worrying.
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 8-19/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 106; MDS VT96
	 To Beijing's central authorities, agriculture's most dangerous and disturbing problem has been the growing unrest and rebellion among the peasants toward corrupt party officials, which burst out in defiant demonstrations in many of the provinces. During x993, in Hubei, Shanxi, Anhui, Guizhou, Guangxi, even the more prosperous provinces of Shandong and Jiangsu, over 200 incidents of surly and angry peasants storming Communist Party offices and confronting officials required police intervention.
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8-20/Marc Blecher, Chair and Prof. of the Dept. of Government at Oberlin College, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "The contradictions of grass-roots participation and undemocratic statism in Maoist China and their fate," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 145; THR VT96
	 On the other hand, new forces relating to each of these three conditions for peasant radicalism are now at work. Villagers are more united than at any time since 1978 in their opposition to the state; they have been killing tax collectors, burning government buildings, and engaging in large-scale armed clashes with police over environmental and economic 66 issues. If state control is intensified to cope with the growing economic crisis - for example, to stamp out free or black-market outlets for commodities that the peasants will increasingly hold back from sale to the state at the low prices it offers, or to re institute acreage quotas - peasants may experience that in ways not so different from day-to-day supervision by exploiters. And state control is increasing in other areas as well, including campaigns around propaganda, legal issues (such as criminal justice), and social policies (such as population control, land use, and cultural expression). All of these will fuel discontent that could predispose the peasantry to participate in spontaneous or even semiorganized uprisings more than they have already. 
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8-21/Marc Blecher, Chair and Prof. of the Dept. of Government at Oberlin College, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "The contradictions of grass-roots participation and undemocratic statism in Maoist China and their fate," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 145 ;THR VT96
	 How likely are the peasants to play the role of the dynamite under the state edifice? On the one hand, the Chinese peasantry often has proved a difficult lot to mobilize politically. The active participation of "the masses" in the Chinese Revolution was brought about through the intense, protracted, and (only after many failures) ultimately adroit efforts of the Chinese Communist Party in the face of tremendous obstacles.63 Most of those - including the scholar-official-landlord class64 and the imperial state rounded upon it - are gone, but in their place there is now the agrarian structure of smallholding peasants. In it, all the conditions that Skocpol identified as conducive to peasant insurrectionists have been obliterated: In Dengism's first decade, local communities were deprived of whatever solidarity they may have had under high collectivism, the peasants were given relief from direct day-to-day supervision by exploiters, and state coercion was relaxed.
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8-22/Marc Blecher, Chair and Prof. of the Dept. of Government at Oberlin College, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "The contradictions of grass-roots participation and undemocratic statism in Maoist China and their fate," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 146 ;THR VT96
	 Once again China appears poised for deep and perhaps prolonged crisis. re is palpable, widespread, and potentially revolutionary discontent in most of its cities, including most prominently its major political and economic centers. Its armed forces are shot through with serious fissures. Most ominous of all is the prospect of rural protest that has already found expression in localized sparks. To follow Mao's metaphor, they could, by linking up with urban movements already under way, ignite a conflagration in the prairies as well as the cities nested in the interstices. But unlike the period presaged by Mao's metaphor, this time peasant discontent is unlikely to be canalized in the service of broader goals. It took a great deal of work, intense commitment, brilliant organization, dedicated leader: ship, and many setbacks to forge a local participatory politics that could turn the peasants' destructive fury to a constructive purpose. Conditions for replicating that feat are not now in view. 
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 8-23/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 191; THR VT96
	 Awareness of China's history of internal conflict and ethnic and racial differences drives a deep-seated anxiety about the possibility of China's breaking up in the future. Chinese citizens rarely take China for granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is because most are all too aware of how easily and naturally China could dissolve into its constituent parts. But what are those parts? What are the fault lines that underlie and permeate the People's Republic? While we certainly know the "official" lines of division between the minorities and the Han, we have little idea of the other, "unofficial" fault lines of cultural difference within China. There are no maps or statistics revealing how many Cantonese, Hakka, or Subei people there are in China. The state has not wished to count them, perhaps for good reasons.
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8-24/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. I]I; THR VT96
	 China is not usually thought of as a multiethnic country, but rather as one nation with a majority population, the Han, and a few inconsequential minorities on its borders. Yet China's widely dispersed population is characterized by tremendous cultural, geographic, and linguistic diversity. This chapter will argue that not only is there ethnic diversity among minority groups, but there are equally important cultural differences within China's majority population. Such differences must be considered if we are to understand the full complexity of local politics and identity in contemporary China. Furthermore, with the end of the external threat posed by the cold war, ethnic and cultural differences within China have become more salient. 
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 8-25/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 175; THR VT96
	 Yet despite growing awareness of the enormous cultural and ethnic diversity within China, most introductions to the study of China have devoted themselves primarily to the larger issues of state and society, especially economics, politics, religion, family, and the arts, with little attention to the impact of cultural diversity on any of these issues. When cultural differences have been noted, they have generally been explained as "regional" and not important for our understanding of national identity in China. When ethnic identity has been addressed, it has usually been devoted to the study of the "official" minorities, who are generally located on the geographic and sociopolitical borders of China, with little attention paid to ethnicity outside these groups. This chapter will suggest reasons for the past neglect of "unofficial groups" and introduce further aspects of ethnic identity in China. It will argue that the study of minorities must not be divorced from the understanding of ethnic and national identity in general and explore the increasing importance of the politics of difference throughout China.
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8-26 /Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p.39; THR VT96
	 Localism has, of course, been an endemic problem in China. During Mao's lifetime, county, city and provincial authorities acted like entrepreneurs, developing local industries, hampering movement of raw materials outside their jurisdiction and preventing goods produced elsewhere from entering. In the 1980s, efforts to weaken the central-planning bureaucracy only served to increase local power and, by so doing, to complicate further reform by creating redundant industrial lines which competed with the central government for everything from raw materials to energy and tax funds. A Communist party statement in November 1989 discussed reining in these local economies and creating stronger, central macroeconomic control. Yet, by late 1991 very little seemed to have been accomplished in this respect. Not only did local investment and protectionism continue unabated, but the central government was finding it more and more difficult to extract tax revenues from the localities. At a time of growing demands on its budget for infrastructural investment, subsidies, etc., the central government, from 1989 on, found itself confronted with declining revenues.
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8-27/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p.354; THR VT96
	 In the decade of Chinese reforms, decentralization of policy has in- volved the granting of relatively more autonomy on some matters to such poor areas as Tibet and Xinjiang, and such rich areas as the different parts of the coastal • While the rich regions have regions. found satisfaction in economic interdependence, the poor regions have released their anger on the occupying Chinese power. More liberal policies toward local religion and culture led some to believe that even more independence could be obtained. Greater freedom to contact the outside world led to wider knowledge about successful kin or even just other independence movements. In Tibet martial law had to be imposed by the PLA when the public security apparatus proved incapable of controlling riots in 1989. In Xinjiang in 1990, unrest flared, apparently encouraged by similar uprisings across the border in the Soviet Union.
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8-28 /Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 9 ; MDS VT96
	 Unrest and dissatisfaction also has surfaced more openly and even violently among some of China's fifty-five minorities, particularly the Muslims and Tibetans. The rise of new, independent states along the Chinese border since the breakup of the Soviet Union has aroused and fired nationalistic desires within China.
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8-29/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p. 254; THR VT96
	 Another factor with the potential for splitting China is the differing degrees of loyalty to the centre of the northern provinces and those of the south. Already Guangdong, Fujian and several other provinces enjoy considerable autonomy in economic matters. However, although ideologically driven decisions by people like Li Peng may rankle with them, it is extremely unlikely that' such autonomy could develop into attempts to secede from China. They would need not only totally independent economies, but also military power. It is just not in their interests to take such a step when their economy is doing so well within a stable China.
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8-30/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p.376; THR VT96
	 The securities and futures exchanges also accelerated the process of regionalization that had been dividing the country into economic satrapies beyond Beijing's control. This process raised questions that few people were eager to confront--at least not as long as so many of them were making so much money. What would the central government do if these regions began to translate their growing economic independence into political power, and what would happen if regional economic and political power ever merged with regional military commanders to form a network of opposition to Beijing? It was no accident that Deng was often forced to rotate, and sometimes purge, generals in each of the country's seven regional military commands to prevent them from becoming too politically or economically entrenched in any one area. With economics so dominating the agenda, it seemed very possible that, as Gao Xiqing had implied, the next major challenge to Beijing might revolve around questions of regional. economic autonomy rather than issues of freedom, democracy, or human rights. Indeed, only a week after Gao's comments, a disturbance took place that made his warning seem prophetic.
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 8-31/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 184 ; THR VT96
	 Protests by Uygurs and other Muslims in the past have covered a wide range of religious, family, and environmental issues. These problems have been exacerbated by increasing income disparities between the ' southeastern and eastern coastal regions on the one hand and the primarily Muslim areas of the north and northwest on the other. As contact increases between Central Asian Muslims on both sides of China's northwest border, moves for local autonomy and even indepen- dence may need to be balanced against the desire for economic growth. Xinjiang's Muslims are well aware of the ethnic and political conflicts in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and also that many of them are better off economically than their coreligionists across the border. The challenge to the national government is to convince northwestern Muslims that they will benefit more from cooperation. than. from resistance.
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8-32/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 China, however, faces significant political uncertainties in its domestic politics, including a possible succession crisis on the death of Deng Xiaoping and the centrifugal tendencies unleashed by differential economic growth among the provinces. 
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8-33 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 In contrast, views from the inside usually focus on China's myriad domestic dilemmas. For example, the 442.5 million metric ton grain harvest of 1992 was China's second largest in history; yet, because of excessive taxes, fees, and paper IOUs, peasant uprisings recently broke out in 11 provinces. 
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8-34/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald ARtschiller, p.59; THR VT96
	 It is in respect to such matters that China is displaying troub- ling signs of weakness. As China's market economy expands her central authority weakens. Layer by layer, sphere by sphere, Beijing is losing control over her Southern and Southeastern coastal provinces, and over her borders, customs revenues, currencies in circulation, tax collections, investment strategies, land-use allocations, environmental protection standards, and even basic law and order. No one doubts there is a boom in progress. Some areas are becoming very prosperous. But the richer they grow the more independence they show and the less they listen to national ministries, party organs, or leaders in Beijing. This is a situation made to order for multinational penetration and manipulation. A united China may be big enough and strong enough to withstand the onslaught, preserve discipline, and pursue a self-reliant strategy, but provinces, regions, and municipalities taken one by one can, be easily overwhelmed.]
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8-35 / Richard Lawrence, AirCommerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, World Trade Seen Up 50 Percent by 2000, Paced by East Asia; ACS VT96
	 But, as the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development points out, the China outlook is not without potential problems. ``Strains on national unity'' may develop as provinces seek more independence from the central government and many workers may feel increasingly threatened by economic reforms, the OECD said.
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8-36/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 Half of the study group [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] believed that China likely would break up. This scenario, they say, will occur when factions are unsuccessful in building a dominant power base, leaders pursue personal power and the central government loses control over the instruments of economic, political and social control. Mutual distrust among leaders causes gridlock in choosing the successor(s) to Deng. They will play zero-sum games in a power struggle, concentrate on domestic fights and pay little attention to foreign policy. The disintegration will be triggered by alienating provinces and splintering military control.
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8-37/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Given the increasing inability of the old ideology to perform these functions, however, China's leaders will either have to find other sources of legitimacy or face the possibility of the nation's disintegration or substantial decentralization. The specter of a fractionalized China in a state of domestic upheaval holds no more appeal for Asia than does the prospect of a strong nationalistic giant next door. A China in chaos would threaten regional stability unleash huge waves of refugees, and give birth to new centers of hegemonic ambition. 
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8-38/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.236; MDS VT96
	 Many would rather push along the process of disintegration, the third possible course. If independence movements in Tibet and Xin- jiang grow strong enough, this in itself might cause the dissension in the ranks in the and find it easier leadership capital, Beijing might to grant the dissidents their wishes for greater autonomy, or even independence.
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8-39 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 China's Communist party is being pulled into a future it cannot control; the locus of initiative and dynamism in economic and political decisions is shifting to provinces, townships, and individuals determined to chart their own destinies. 
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8-40/ Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 In his attempt to gain the moral credentials necessary for power, Jiang Zemin has pointed out in recent key speeches that if the problem of corruption cannot be solved it may lead to the collapse of the Communist Party, creating a vacuum in which narrow regional interests would surface leading to the collapse of China.
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8-41 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 Many Sinologists predict that at minimum, China's response to such challenges may include a devolution of power from the center to the provinces.
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8-42/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 192; THR VT96
	 In a recent statement to the United Nations, Russian foreign minister Andrei V. Kozyrev declared that the threat of ethnic violence today is "no less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday. ,,33 While most people would agree that this is certainly true for the troubled regions of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and much of the Americas, few would acknowledge that China is also faced with such a threat. While the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in particular are seen as fiddled with ethnic and nationalist strife, China is still regarded as a relatively intact monolith, dominated by a centralized power structure intent on maintaining its control at all costs. Although there is certainly some. truth in these perceptions, there are potential fault lines in the system, and these could grow more pronounced if China should become unsettled. As long as the center remains intact and there are no more social earthquakes, ethnic fault lines in China may continue to lie submerged beneath a relatively calm surface. If we are to detect the direction possible future rumblings may take, however, we should not ignore the new politics of cultural and ethnic difference in 1990s China.
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8-43/ Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
	 In China, the prosperity brought to coastal areas by rapid economic growth is leaving the inland provinces further and further behind. In Indonesia, economic growth has promoted a "politics of envy" as its Chinese population flourishes by building on its traditional commercial base and exploiting the indigenous pribumi people. Government attempts to use the Muslim element to counter this opposition could upset the delicate balance between religion and the state. 
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8-44 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 The Chinese population is growing at a rate of more than 15 million per year. The wealth differential between rich and poor regions in China is increasing rapidly. Tens of millions of people are migrating from the country's interior and northern regions, where water and fuel wood are desperately scarce and the land often badly damaged, to the booming coastal cities. Coastal areas must continue their rapid growth to absorb this surplus labor. But the Chinese leadership is having great difficulty maintaining control over the process. Economic liberalization helps mobilize the population by dissolving long-standing social relations, which weakens the Communist party's ability to micro-manage Chinese society. The party has also been weakened by deep internal disagreements over the rate and degree of liberalization, and by worker discontent throughout the country.
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8-45 / Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 There is simmering resentment in the countryside, for example, where more than 100 million peasants have no livelihood and have missed out so far on the immense upsurge in earning potential created by the opening of China to foreign investment since the late 1970s. This has already led to several outbreaks of peasant violence which have been admitted by the official press.
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 8-46/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 56 ; THR VT96
	 Another complaint is that the large-scale importation of advanced technology will require large commitments to support and ancillary services for the imported equipment. This will withdraw investment from less spectacular but equally necessary indigenous development projects, or from existing, relatively backward plants the upgrading of which would bring fast growth at low cost. The need to realize relatively quick profits from imported plants creates pressure to locate them in highly developed areas such as the Shanghai region, the Northeast, and Shanxi. Less developed provinces have argued that even though investments in their areas pay off less quickly, they provide better dispersion of industry, both for defense purposes and for long-term nationwide growth.
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8-47/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 Throughout history, taxation has repeatedly posed the issue of governmental legitimacy. No one would claim that the government of the People's Republic of China is truly legitimate, at least not by the standards generally applied today. It was created through a military victory a generation ago and has perpetuated itself since then through elite straggle and the laying on of hands: it has never faced any son of election. So it taxes at its peril those who are not represented. Coexistence between center and regions up to now has rested on a sort of division of property, that is, a tacit agreement about which areas of the economy each will tap for revenue. The largely extra-legal status of the vigorous market economy, moreover, has kept its profits out of state revenue streams. Clearly, something has to be done to put finances in order, but forced recentralization by a weak government carries risks. 
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8-48/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 Today's China is an immeasurably more complex society than was the one in which Zhou Enlai laid his plans; hence social and economic considerations, as well as those of elite politics, make constitutional questions inescapable. That is evident in the area of relations between the central government and the regions--the very issue that toppled the Qing dynasty. China is more prosperous now than it has ever been, but the central government’s budgets are chronically in deficit. The reason is that Beijing draws its revenues above all from state enterprises, and these are mostly in the red. Supplementary revenues come from customs receipts and taxation of major centers such as Shanghai, but nothing like a comprehensive system of taxation exists. Now the central government is attempting to install such a system, but this attempt is eliciting local resistance that has perhaps broader implications.'
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 8-49/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 18; THR VT96
	 The new wave of reform that has swept over China since Deng Xiaoping made his "southern tour" to the Shenzhen SEZ in January 1992 has been paralleled by a rising tide of social problems that not only make Chinese society more difficult to govern but could, under the right combination of conditions, undermine the unity of the nation. Although financial speculation and corruption are nothing new in China, the levels attained in the past year appear to overshadow anything seen in the past. These problems are rooted partly in the rapid expansion of stocks and other financial instruments and in the opening up of a sizable real estate market in the absence of adequate legislation and enforcement mechanisms. Well-connected cadres and their relatives have taken advantage of the new freewheeling economic atmosphere to engorge themselves on an apparently unprecedented scale. The cynicism that this activity reflects may ultimately be more harmful to China than the corruption itself.
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 8-50/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 40 ; THR VT96
	 For the rural populace, while reforms in the state procurement system for agricultural commodities will finally eliminate an onerous form of taxation, they may also bring with them a growing sense of economic insecurity. In the short run, the termination of mandatory procurement at fixed prices may produce a paradoxical decline in agricultural output, since the end to mandated procurement is accompanied by a termination of subsidies to farm inputs. Already the terms of trade are turning against agriculture, with input prices for chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and the like rising faster than output prices. If continued, this trend will harm incentives and once again cause a shift of resources from agriculture to sectors giving higher rates of return. On the other hand, should output rise but market prices decline and cause significant hardship, the rural population, already irritated by the repeated use by government agencies of "white slips" in lieu of cash payments for procurement, may well stop being quiescent. During 1992, farmers unhappy with low prices and IOUs reportedly staged more than 200 demonstrations and protests.
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8-51/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S. G. Goodman and George Segal, p.159; THR VT96
	 Nevertheless, the PLA officer corps could split up under extreme conditions. If it did, the PRC would split into regions, each dominated by a military commander. This could lead to civil war and a new version of 'warlordism'. There might be an extended period of 'one nation, many states'. As during the warlord period (191627), one government in Beijing might continue to speak for China internationally. The various military-dominated regions might coexist uneasily, with each evolving its own economic, political, and social system. Some regimes might attempt to remain centralized planned economies. Because they would be smaller and more manageable, they might be somewhat more successful than the PRC has been. Some regions might attempt to work out combinations of socialism and capitalism, while still others might adopt market economics. Some border minority areas might not only discard Marxism-Leninism, but declare independence or even join themselves to entities beyond PRC borders.
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 8-52/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 22; CJJ VT96
	 Nor is talk about Chinese nationalism. Some commentators believe that nationalism can function as the glue that will hold the People's Republic together after the last vestiges of communism wither away. This would seem to be at least part of the government’s plan as well, for, since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, it has increasingly discarded the rhetoric and symbolism of communism (which was the avowed enemy of the inherited Chinese culture) and embraced instead the idea of China's traditional greatness and its five thousand years of history, most recently even Confucianism. These expedients, however, are likely to prove inadequate. Like pure pragmatism in administration and economics, nationalism as a unifying ideology will not prove sufficient in politics. China's last hundred years are a story of creating nationalism, to be sure, but an especially conflictual form of nationalism. Far from unifying China, national pride and a shared awareness of the need. for national strength have regularly intensified internal political conflict. The political contenders of twentieth-century China have all been avowed, nationalists Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, even Wang Jingwei. But they have quarreled bitterly about the political expression of that nationalism, be it monarchy, militarism, communism, a constitutional republic, even collaboration or confrontation with the Japanese or Western imperialists. As for Confucianism, it has always served as the moral basis for a system of rule, and not that system itself.
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 8-53/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 254; THR VT96
	 A question worth asking is whether those countries which have indeed fallen apart really constitute such positive models worthy of emulation. Were the central Chinese government to collapse and various minorities or southern provinces secede, the possibility of large-scale conflict could not be ruled out. Having seen what has actually happened in the early 1990s in the Balkans and parts of what was the Soviet Union until 1991, even the most ardent secessionist would need to think carefully before risking the kind of conflict which could ensue if China fell apart. Even under its capitalist system, Russia does not appear to be doing anything like as well as China. The history of China from ancient to modern times suggests that disintegration would be most unlikely to be peaceful.
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8-54/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 86 ; THR VT96
	 A number of strong objections can be made against this position. First, there is definitely a possibility that history would fully repeat itself, and China would enter another "warlord" period, as dismal as the earlier one. Second, the several "little Chinas" would probably have unequal rises in living standards. I would guess that Guangdong, Shenzhen, the Dongbei area, Shanghai, and the coastal regions of Fujian, for example, would forge ahead, while areas like Guizhou, Shandong, Lanzhou, and the interior of Fujian would fall behind. Third, a number of the "little Chinas," even the economically stronger ones, might not be capable of withstanding the depredations of multinational corporations, and become wholly owned subsidiaries of them in everything but name. And finally, the idea of regionalism would be repugnant to most of the Chinese intelligentsia, who have been inheriting the concept of "All under Heaven" ever since the classical Book of History began to be written three thousand years ago.
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 8-55/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p.354; THR VT96
	 Especially in large countries such as China and the Soviet Union, there is always risk decentralization of decision making will lead to regionalism Since one perhaps even separatism. the major of the armed forces is to ensure the territorial integrity of the state, regionalism may well lead to an enhanced role for the military. Indeed, such tension between reform and the integrity of the state is already evident in the Soviet Union and to some extent in China.
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8-56/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 39; THR VT96
	 Thus, the local autonomy that sustained reform in Guangdong could equally serve to inhibit national reform or, even worse, to promote disintegration into what one Chinese author has called "warlord economies." The fact that this province has been able to go its own entrepreneurial, outward-looking way reflects a weakness in the authority of the central government despite the rhetoric of post Tiananmen. Without central authority, as embodied in a national tax and banking structure, any discussion of moving in the future from the old system of mandatory or direct planning to one of guidance or indirect planning is empty talk.
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 8-57/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 185; THR VT96
	 In the south, there are nearly 12 million Kam-Dai-speaking Zhuang people on the Vietnam border and over 24 separate minority groups in Yunnan Province alone, where cross-border relations with Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, and Thailand have increased dramatically in the last few years, Weekly flights connect Yunnan's capital, Kunming, with Bangkok and Chiangmai, and increased overland traffic has led to a rising problem of smuggling and drug trade across the Chinese border. The settlement of disputes in Cambodia, Vietnam, and highland Myanmar has continued to be of interest to government leaders in Beijing, perhaps because of the significant potential for ethnic wars to spill over China’s southern borders.
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8-58 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 WILL CHINA'S BUBBLE BURST? Many analysts have been distracted by the phenomenal economic expansion in China's coastal areas. They have projected these trends onto the rest of the country and have neglected the dangers posed by a weakened central government, and resource scarcities and population pressures in the countryside. The costs of misreading the Chinese situation could be very high. The effects of Chinese civil unrest, mass violence and state disintegration could spread far beyond its borders.
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8-59/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 In formulating the country's foreign policies, the leaders [under the disintegration scenario] will regard military force as useful and necessary. They will not seek fights but will not avoid them, either. China will likely oppose Taiwan's declaration of independence with force. War with the United States is possible if China tries to exert its will over Taiwan.
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8-60/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 31-April 1, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Illegal Gun Ownership Surges in China [CND, 03/30/95] BEIJING -- Chinese police seized 120,000 firearms and 300,000 pieces of ammunition in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong, during a month-long crackdown on illegal possession of weapons last year, the Beijing Youth Daily disclosed Monday in a special report. According to the report, illegal sales and smuggling of arms have worsened in recent years, particularly in the south where illegal arms markets have sprung up. (Kewen ZHANG, Daluo JIA) 
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 8-61/Dru C. Gladney, Prof. Asian Studies University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference," Edited by William A. Joseph, p . 184; THR VT96
	 Through cross-border trade and increased foreign-trade relations with the Middle East that involve significant exchanges of cheap Chinese labor, consumer goods, and weaponry, China has become tightly linked to the Muslim Middle East. In order to maintain close ties with the Muslim world, China has had to pay greater attention to the treatment of its Muslim minorities. The recognition of China by Saudi Arabia in 1990 and the increasing numbers of Muslim pilgrims from China to Mecca indicate improving relations. Yet these relations will be jeopardized if Muslim, especially Uygur, discontent continues over such issues as limitations on mosque building, restrictions on childbearing, and mineral and energy development in Muslim minority regions without regard to local concerns.
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 8-62/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 59; THR VT96
	 The Chinese bureaucracy is so large and diverse that there is always some danger of confusion or delay. Recent policy shifts and experiments have intensified the problem of coordination among overlapping and competing organs whose responsibilities are not always defined. Economic powers have been shifted among the different levels of the hierarchy--central, provincial, and local--several times in past decades. In the foreign trade/ investment sphere, some of the provincial-level (e.g., Fujian and Guangdong) and even local-level units (e.g., Shenzhen) have been granted new powers to enter into some transactions without consulting higher levels. But these powers are untried and their extent unclear. Sometimes a transaction becomes more complicated than before because more levels are involved or because several levels are locked in a struggle for authority. At a given hierarchical level, there are functional organizations whose responsibilities overlap. Within a given city, foreign firms are sometimes bewildered by a host of independent local organizations.
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 8-63/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 23; THR VT96
	 In late May and early June of 1993, Qiao Shi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and then head of China's Leading Group for Comprehensive Maintenance of Public Order, visited Sichuan Province. Although it was not reported that he went there specifically to investigate and deal with the Renshou County situation, Qiao was quoted as warning that "failure to stabilize agriculture will not only destabilize the entire economy but also hamper our efforts to achieve political stability .... We should never ignore peasants and their interests under any circumstances. Concern over the rural situation was also expressed by Politburo member Tian Jiyun, who told delegates to the NPC from Tianjin, "If there are problems in villages, no one in the present regime can hold on to power."
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8-64 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 In fact, adds Mr. Christensen, also a participant, a Soviet-style breakup was considered the least likely outcome by most of the group, even among those who believed that power would devolve significantly from the center after Deng's death.
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8-65 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 But many in the group say the report, which caused ripples among both foreign investors and China watchers, misstated their assessment. ''Contrary to the written report, there was no consensus among the group that there was a 50-50 chance of a Soviet-style breakup,'' says Iain Johnston, assistant professor of government at Harvard University and a participant. And, he points out, ''just over half the people polled thought that something other than disintegration was more likely, namely the continuation of present trends or more dramatic political and economic reform.''
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8-66/Richard L. Grant, Feb. 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 39 ; MDS VT96
	 Beijing's inability to grasp China's economic levers firmly raises the question of the adequacy of central control ,of the political apparatus. Although it is highly unlikely that China will disintegrate along the lines of the Soviet Union, the emergence of a looser system characterised by greater regionalism cannot be ruled out, nor would it be without precedent in China's political history. The strains in the economy result in part from the fact that China is still midway between establishing a fully-fledged capi- talist system with a Chinese face and a Communist command economy. Beijing has yet to gain full control of its financial system, and a large part of the economy which is fully given over to the market is beyond central government control. 
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8-67/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p.372; THR VT 96 In sum, China--more than the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Hungary, the GDR, and North Korea--has demonstrated that it is possible to have real reform of foreign economic policy. The international system can have an important impact in shaping the reforms, and yet this impact is most evident when domestic politics are moving in the same direction. What is perhaps most remarkable is the range of policies that can be pursued by a country such as China and the extent to which it can respond to pressures from the international system without complete reform at home. Certainly, in comparison to the East European cases, the Chinese determination and ability to find a solution short of total collapse of the Communist Party' state is striking.
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8-68/Shigeki Hakamada, Prof. in the International Politics and Economics Dept. at Aoyama Gakuin Univ., Tokyo, and GiIbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 170; THR VT96
	 Of course, there were sharp differences between the two countries. China's populace never experienced the psychological uplift of electoral campaign promises followed by victories of anti-establishment figures followed by hard-hitting speeches and parliamentary' deliberations. There never was a mood of euphoria. When disappointments arose in China, the blame was quickly spread in many directions. The prestige of the party was low. Yet without any electoral diversity and without glasnost, it is likely that the psychological reaction against the part>' in China among most social groups, especially the peasantry' and the workers, was less unabashedly negative. In any case few reform intellectuals were ready to concede that central power should be strengthened. As seen in the huge spring demonstrations of 1989, the urban populace had no trouble placing the blame on the party old-liners and on conservative resistance. After the June 4 reassertion of conservative power, the situation became even clearer. The responsibility of reformers for some inadequacies in economic policies paled before the guilt of the conservatives in stifling the popular will. Of course, the beneficiaries of Chinese reform were far more numerous than were those of Soviet reform. The greater number reduced the need for scapegoats. As microlevel conditions deteriorated sharply' in the Soviet Union, the central institutions bore the brunt of the attack; the vitality at the microlevel in China--an achievement of the 1980s that was not ended by the crackdown at the center--made escape from central concerns a viable outlook.
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 8-69/GiIbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Introduction," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.56 ; THR VT96
	 Despite their greater readiness to dismantle the tower of communism, the Soviets found that they had built it so high that they could not easily climb back down. Community roots and household entrepreneurship were difficult to locate. Above all, the union needed to be taken apart before suspicious nationalities could learn to work together again. The Chinese, however, had never destroyed the rural community and within it the farming household deeply embedded with Confucian traditions. Dismantling an edifice only works if at the bottom there exists a foundation on which to build. In China there seems little doubt that the foundation is there.
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8-70 /Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Amy, China's Future," Edited by David S. G. Goodman and George Segal, p158; THR VT96
	 Thanks to the reforms of the 1980s, regional breakup of the PLA is much less likely than it was during Mao's lifetime. The army is more resistant to regionalism than any other institution because of its command-control-communications, logistics, and educational systems, which are all national in scope. Moreover, the reforms of the 1980s, especially periodic officer reassignment, 'homogenized' the PLA considerably, weakening its 'independent kingdoms'. Military power is much less tied up with regional political and economic power than it was at the end of the Cultural Revolution.
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8-71 /Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.354; THR VT96
	 Of course, both China and the Soviet Union were empires, each having grabbed land and people for centuries, well before the coming of communism. Yet China remains far more ethnically coherent, with a 94 percent Han population as opposed to the 50 percent Russian pop- ulation in the Soviet Union. More than half of Chinese territory was acquired less than three hundred years ago; much of the Russian em- pire was two-thirds newer. Clearly, the Soviet Union was always likely to face a far more pressing problem of regional disintegration than China.
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 8-72/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 45; THR VT96
	 Finally, political risk analysis usually asks about potential ethnic or nationalities strife, and in China there is superficial reason to consider this a factor. China has 55 officially recognized national minorities, ranging in population from a few hundred to roughly 10 million. The largest of these groups occupy strategically crucial areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (Nei Menggu). The Chinese press now charges that much was done to alienate these minorities during the 1960s arid 1970s and has called for policies to repair the damage. But the minorities are located peripherally to most foreign economic activity; their power in the central government is almost nil; and their ability to threaten government territorial control is slight. Large-scale disorder in these regions is unlikely and if it occurs will hardly affect foreign economic policy or its implementation.
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8-73/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 197; THR VT96
	 Most people in China (a little less than 80 percent) live in rural areas and still have a kind of "subject culture;' even though they have ample political problems to be solved. Although they are changing rapidly and are much interested in the output of the political system, they have no institutionalized means to express their demands except through quarrels and violence against the cadres. These actions are closer to "peasant rebellions" of the past than to a new type of political participation. Very few urbanites pay attention to the plight of the rural areas, which have been underprivileged by the government and the party since 1949. Few Chinese democrats, either in Tiananmen in 1989 or in foreign countries before and after that incident, even mention the need for organizing the peasants as the communists have been doing since the 1920s. This is why' the party is still "stable" in its grasp on power.
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 8-74/Robert Ash, Prof. Economics, Univ. of London, Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 13-14, "Mainland China's emerging role in the world economy;" MDS VT96
	 That mainland China's growth under the impact of reform has been characterized by a strong regional bias is not contradicted by _ these findings. It is, for example, no coincidence that the five fastest- growing provinces are all situated in the eastern coastal region. But it is interesting that the other coastal provinces--Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai--experienced slower growth than some interior regions. The proposition that growth polarization has been an out- come of mainland China's open-door strategy can be accepted, but with qualification.
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8-75/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Increasingly, the Chinese leadership seems to be turning to nationalism as a new source of legitimacy. Calls are heard to resist polluting external (i.e., Western) influences and to work to make China strong and independent. The appeal of nationalism is great in China, as it is in many countries, and resonates particularly within the circle of conservative party hardliners. It can also be an effective weapon in the battle to modernize the economy; China, to be strong, must be economically prosperous and therefore requires economic reform. Nationalism can also be used, of course, to counter the rise of regionalism. 
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8-76/James L. Watson, Fairbank Prof. of Chinese Society and Prof. of anthropology at Harvard University, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "The Renegotiation of Chinese Cultural Identity in the Post-Mao Era" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 79 ; THR VT96
	 Rural people interpreted this and other pronouncements as a sign that the ideological heat was off and that performance (read production) would henceforth be rewarded, irrespective of class background or inner conviction. The much-heralded campaign to "Let a Few Lead the Many to Wealth" was also aimed primarily at rural people. In fact, it is safe to say that the post-Mao reforms have had the most economic impact in the countryside and that urbanites--save for a relatively small number of entrepreneurs and independent contractors--have been reduced to the role of disgruntled spectators. The resentment felt toward nouveau riche farmers has become a serious social problem in some regions, with urbanites freely commenting on the unfairness of economic policies. Meanwhile, the cultural gap between rural and urban may be growing wider each year. To be "Chinese" no longer implies that one shares the same sense of cultural identity. The key symbols that helped hold China together (shared rites, folkloric traditions, a common notion of proper lifestyle) no longer have the same meaning.
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 8-77/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of. Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 22; THR VT96
	 China's leadership has obviously become concerned about the problem of rural discontent. In December 1992, Jiang Zemin presided over a special rural work forum for six provinces. Jiang particularly censured the widespread practice of giving peasants IOUs for their grain, a phenomenon which, he said, roused the "strongest resentment" of the peasants. In March the CCP General Office and State Council issued an urgent circular demanding that burdens on peasants be alleviated. In late May, the Ministry of Agriculture announced the cancellation of 43 levies on peasants.
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8-78/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p.28; CJJ VT96
	 The obvious answer is a devolution of power, accompanied by general Political relegitimation. Many of the pieces are now in place for such a development. The most important is probably the vigor of China's southern and coastal regions, now more than self-sufficient economically, and also
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 increasingly autonomous administratively. Hong Kong and Taiwan, both outside the jurisdiction of the People's Republic, demonstrate, furthermore, what economic and political autonomy can do for a Chinese territory, while providing economic (and, in the case of Taiwan, potentially political and even military) resources for the coming recasting of China's political system.
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8-79/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 88; THR VT96
	 My second reason for doubting that a number of "little Chinas" might lead to a rebirth of warlordism, related to the first, is that large, well-equipped armies are simply becom- ing too expensive to establish and maintain, and they even- tually wreak economic havoc in their homelands. Mikhail Gorbachev seems to have been the first political leader to realize this, and I think it will soon be realized by Lithuani- ans, Serbians, Armenians, and other independence-minded ethnic groups as well. (And I further believe this principle is well understood by a great number of Americans, despite the jingoism of the U.S. government, broadcast by the media, during the Iraqi war.)
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8-80/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 87; THR VT96
	 The several warlords of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were different from one another in many respects, but were all appropriately designated, because they did make war. I do not think it will be possible for history to fully repeat itself in this way, for at least two reasons. First, the geopolitics are very different now. While none of the major imperialist nations had the capacity to annex the whole of China as a colony, they all wanted "spheres of influence" within which they would be economically and politically dominant John Hays's "Open Door" notes on behalf of the U.S. are not a relevant exception). The desire for such spheres led the imperial powers to seek out and support--with supplies, weapons, etc.--local strongmen, the fathers (sometimes literally) of the later warlords. But I think the world has changed too much geopolitically and technologically in the past century for a similar situation to obtain today.
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 8-81/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.71; THR VT96
	 Although presently conflicts of economic interest between the central government and the localities and among the regions are intense and the central leaders' efforts at recentralization encounter stiff resistance, there is not much chance for China gradually to evolve into various autonomous regional governments, as it did during the warlord period of the 1920s. If the military sides with civilians, as was the case in Romania, it means internal splits within the military that will certainly confound the regional rivalry, and, China may face a real danger of disintegration. The possibility of such a scenario is minimal, however, largely because of the limited ability of the provincial authorities to collaborate with one another. And it is unlikely that the PLA, with 3 million soldiers, will act as a unified group and join with democratic forces. Moreover, a long tradition of a unitary government, bitter memories of warlordism, and the inability of the military to run the economy without support from the technocrats and the population at large further reduce the likelihood for such an outcome.
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8-82 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 Regionalism [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] In this scenario, a loose federation of provinces will emerge. Leaders will negotiate redistribution of political and economic authority between regional and central powers. Leaders will have local identities and allegiances, but prefer regional [control]. The federation will forge regional ties to foreign areas and avoid conflict. It will have fragmented foreign policies and provinces will have veto power over foreign economic and security policies. The federation will be unable to prevent Taiwan's declaration of independence and will take soft and hands-off policies toward Hong Kong. It will not be involved in North Korean issues. Its southern provinces will push joint development projects in the Spratly Islands, but will not use force. Its military doctrine is to defend borders and to prevent regional breakaway. Its military spending will decline and its military strength will be weakened. While central power may be concentrated in a Beijing-Shanghai power axis, local border disputes and regional conflicts are likely to spread as local authorities take policy into their own hands.
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8-83/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 31; CJJ VT96
	 The most welcome shape for a future China would be one that was constitutional in form and commercial in ambitions. The second characteristic is already evident, particularly in the east and south, and the shift in the economic center of gravity towards the Yangzi Valley may yet draw political power there as well, as it did from the 1920s to the 1940s. Achieving domestic peace in such a China would require some compromise with Muslims and Tibetans, while peace abroad would require a genuine settlement with Taiwan (already advocated by some in the PRC) and a willingness to put aside claims to the South China Sea (this could be done by following the model of the 1959 Antarctic treaty, which simply does not discuss sovereignty). The benefits of . such changes would be enormous, and a bold reformer may try to seize them, but opposition from entrenched interests would be massive.
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8-84/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 87; THR VT96
	 .All of these are very good warrants for skepticism about the desirability of decentralization in China; I do not take them lightly. Lest the point get lost as we continue, however, let me reiterate my fear that a strong central government can only continue by becoming increasingly repressive, and that decentralization is therefore a preferred moral alternative by default, if for no other reason; those who would reject my hope for "little Chinas" must thus have some confidence that my fears are more or less groundless. (In its most recent report on China--June 4, 1991--Amnesty International stated that religious and political repression there had increased over the past two years: "It's not uncommon for people out of the spotlight, ordinary activists or those tried outside Beijing, to be jailed for 10 to 20 years, sometimes simply for making dissident speeches.")
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8-85/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 86; THR VT96
	 Throughout Chinese history, as dynastic central authority grew weaker, the periphery--the provinces--grew stronger, and perhaps it is time for history to repeat itself. To my mind, a dozen or so "little Chinas" will necessitate the making of fewer moral compromises than one big one. In the economic realm regionalism has already been growing apace for the last several years, and in my opinion this movement offers more promise to the Chinese peoples than the continuation--or worse, strengthening-of an authoritarian central government that cannot govern, but only maintain itself through fear and/or force.
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8-86/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 99; THR VT96
	 For all of these reasons I conclude that a strong central government in China is a greater evil for the Chinese peoples than a multiplicity of more or less autonomous "little Chinas." How autonomous they ought to be, what kind of federal institutions should be kept for inter-regional affairs such as railroads, mails, economic resource management, and so forth, how the poorer regions would obtain the financial wherewithal necessary for overcoming their poverty-all of these and many others are important questions I cannot answer. I must also allow the distinct possibility that the "little Chinas" might all end up with their own Deng Xiaopings, Yang Shangkuns, and Li Pengs, and concomitant bloated bureaucracies. But even if all the fears attendant on regionalism were realized, I believe they would very probably result in less misery for the Chinese peoples than they currently endure, and will continue to endure in the future.
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8-87/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 90 ; THR VT96
	 The case for more regional autonomy can be strengthened considerably when we take up what I assume is a universal moral value: the necessity of having people democratically participate actively in the making of decisions that directly affect their lives. The Chinese have long held to the principle of cooperation at the family, clan, and village level, but there is no tradition of a public in the country, no strong civic sense that begets citizens (the Chinese word gong, now translated as "public," originally denoted a clan leader, and by extension, the dwelling place of a clan leader). This suggests that if anything like genuinely democratic institutions and traditions are to develop in China-or elsewhere--they will have to develop where they have an analogue: at the local level; people assuming real control of their own lives has always been a bottom-up and not a top-down endeavor. And we can note in passing that the role of citizen is a fairly natural extension of others, like friend, fellowworker, neighbor.
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8-88/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p.153; THR VT96
	 That the ordinary populace is in fact fully capable of dramatic action is revealed not only by its revolutionary history but by its recent behavior as well. In the post-Mao era, despite major gains for agriculture under the reforms, unrest in the Chinese countryside has been remarkably prevalent. Significantly, this rural protest is accompanied by a strong resurgence of folk religion; many of the incidents have involved shamans, ancestral temples, "jade emperors descended to earth," and the like. Undoubtedly the popular religion of the contemporary countryside differs significantly from its pre 1949 forerunners; the socialist experience has left a visible imprint on the mentality of today's peasantry. But regardless of how old or new these practices may be, they suggest the fuzzy outlines of a "civil society" in the sense of a domain of public interaction not fully controlled by the state. The drive to institutionalize this domain (as seen in the privately financed rebuilding of local earth-god temples or rewriting of lineage genealogies, for example) further attests to the efforts of the rural populace to carve out a niche of independence from state authority. We are not, of course, seeing here a Chinese Solidarity or Neues Forum. Yet we are witnessing the consolidation of organizational forms that have for centuries provided a foundation for popular protest. When they join state officials in dismissing these practices as "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin), contemporary intellectuals mirror the prejudice of their Confucian forefathers as well as of the ruling regime. In failing to take seriously the peasantry's capacity for collective action, would-be democrats deny themselves a powerful and essential ally.
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8-89/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 96; THR VT96
	 These considerations strengthen further the case for greater autonomy for the several and varied regions of China. Its culture does not need further homogenization, and it would be good, even among the Han peoples, to maintain local customs, traditions, and dialects. Weddings, funerals, and religious observances in Sichuan are not the same as those in Shanghai, and are different as well from those in Hailongjiang, or Guangdong; as are the dialects spoken in all these areas. And if we may hope for the continuation of linguistic and cultural diversity among the Han peoples, then all the more should we hope for it among the Muslims of Xinjiang, the Mongols of the grasslands, the minorities in Guizhou, Yunnan, and other areas, and hope it especially for the suffering Tibetans.
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 8-90/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 120; THR VT96
	 At this moment no one knows how China will find its way from point A--the stalemate of reform--to point B--the realization of its economic potential. One possible path would be via the continued rapid growth of the small-scale private and collective enterprises which are especially vigorous in the coastal region. In the coming years such enterprises are likely to ignore the orders coming from far-away Beijing for an economic slowdown and to continue their rapid growth. If the days of reform from above are finished, the days of reform from below may be just beginning.
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 8-90A/William A. Joseph, Prof. Political Science Wellesley College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Introduction: Toward the Post-Deng Era," p.6 ; THR VT96
	 The transition to the post-Deng era is, in some ways, an even greater milestone in the history of the PRC than that marked by the death of Mao. After a brief interregnum, Mao's rule gave way to a leadership still dominated by some of the regime's original founders and architects, including Deng Xiaoping. The post-Mao leadership has brought many profound changes to China; but it has remained wedded to some of the dogmas of the past, particularly those that bolster party dictatorship. The passing of Deng and the other few remaining party elders will set the stage for the first truly generational succession of the communist period. China's course into the next century will be determined by which of these new leaders rises to the top, how they choose to deal with some of the difficult issues laid out in this volume, and how they respond to the demands of a nation and a world vastly different from that which bred and molded their predecessors.
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8-91/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 108; THR VT96
	 China is at a crossroads. In the near future, it will face what has been a most difficult and complicated period for any Leninist authoritarian regime--succession. Lacking meaningful formal constitutional procedures, such systems usually have passed through a period of intense political maneuvering--and often dramatic policy changes--before a new leader or leadership team takes power. And more often than not, the outcome of this process has defied the predictions of outside observers.
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8-93/Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "in search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p. 83 ;THR VT96
	 Deng's commitment to old values of party hegemony and to new policy content made him the perfect arbiter of the "struggle on two fronts." The flexibility of that position suited his pragmatism. He could be either conservative or reformer, depending on the circumstances. However, as the gap between the conservative and reform positions widened, his flexibility and discretion were reduced. With the ejection of Zhao Ziyang, the uniqueness and power of Deng's position as arbiter collapsed. Deng has attempted to rebuild his middle position by sponsoring as his successor Jiang Zemin, who is not tainted with the blood of Tiananmen. But the continual concern with health, retirement, and succession in the central leadership proves the transitional nature of current arrangements. Regardless of how long Deng continues to live, the era of Chinese politics that he defined is over.
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8-94/ PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 If the political succession Deng has put in place suddenly collapsed, it would not be a first. After Mao Tse-tung died in September 1976, two years passed before Deng emerged from a bloodless but intense political struggle to become first among equals in the circle of revolutionary elders. Mao selected and purged three potential heirs before he finally settled on Hua Guofeng, whom he anointed by uttering from his deathbed: ``With you in charge, I am content.'' It didn't last.
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8-95 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 Deng's health is a matter of grave concern to China and to the international community. Deng, whose immense political influence led some people to call him the last emperor of China, has been the country's top leader since 1977. His death likely will give rise to a new China, one largely unknown to the world. The question remains, however, how China --with a population of 1.2 billion and a vast geographical area--will change.
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8-96/ TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 China's 90-year-old emperor, Deng Xiaoping, is fading, and the country's leaders are approaching the millennium with uncertainty. After a 16-year transformation of the economy, the Communist Party remains in power and refuses to give an inch on political reform. But now the last of the country's revolutionary leaders appears close to death and there are all the signs that an unpredictable period of transition has begun. 
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 8-97/Andrew d. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 79 ; THR VT96
	 Four flaws in the American understanding of China weakened China specialists' grasp of these events. Unfortunately, two of them are irremediable. We knew the importance of the web of personal relationships among the Chinese party leaders, and appreciated how influential the internal politics of the Chinese military could be in political crises. Both were decisive factors in 1989. But these are the two most tightly guarded subjects in a very secretive country. Even the U.S. government's intelligence specialists seemed to know little about them.
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8-98/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p 146; THR VT96
	 'Undoubtedly, there is a major power struggle going on in the upper reaches of the party- another 'pre-mortem succession struggle' like the one during Mao's last decade. We simply do not know who, if anyone, among top PLA generals, could discuss a coup detat with another general without fear of betrayal? Presumably, Deng and the 'gang of eiders' do not know either. If and when they even suspected such a pair of generals, they would try to remove at least one of them. It is especially hard for foreign observers to guess at such things, because of the success of the 1980s reform in promoting relatively young officers into the high command. We just do not have the biographical data we had on the older revolutionaries.
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 8-99/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 191; THR VT96
	 In retrospect, Tiananmen may have served a useful function in dispelling unrealistic illusions of convergence on both sides and in placing the relationship on a sounder and more realistic footing. Since the crackdown, China has been making incremental adjustments to many of the policies that have created difficulties," and the fledgling Clinton administration has backed off somewhat from campaign promises to punish the Beijing regime by revoking most favored nation status, though it must be said that the relationship is still in search of a new raison d'etre. And it seems doubtful that China will discover one until it has resolved its leadership succession crisis. Given the continuing salience of the personal factor in Chinese politics, only after a new leadership has consolidated itself will it become fully clear what China's future developmental priorities are and what foreign policy arrangements it will choose to pursue to accommodate them.
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 8-100/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p.55 ;THR VT96
	 Both Mao and Deng were very much aware of this besetting flaw ,.of charismatic leadership-particularly at the time of approaching succession for each, when his own eminent demise made it necessary to consider how the nation's leadership could best be maintained, and if possible, improved. IL as some Existentialist thinkers contend, the true meaning of Life is revealed only in death, the ultimate test of any leadership regime is succession. At this point both took hesitant steps to alleviate the leadership uncertainty they had been wont to capitalize on earlier to enhance their influence. Thanks partly to these efforts, and partly in response to the functional requirements of the system, the routinization of charisma achieved measurable progress during this period. Routinization may be subdivided into two processes: institutionalization, entailing a shift from the magical powers ascribed to an heroic decisionmaker to the establishment of prescribed rules and procedures, and depersonalization, implying a shift from personally validated commands to organizationally prescribed roles within a formal division of labor. As we shall see, the former aspect of routinization has on the whole been relatively successful; the latter is not yet complete.
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8-101/Marc Blecher, Department of Government Oberlin College, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Sounds of Silence and Distant Thunder?: The Crisis of Economic and Political Administration," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 63; THR VT96
	 Once the present leadership is swept away, experiments will resume anew. They will doubtless produce their own admixture of success and failure. On the positive side, there are now ten years of experience of reform that can be mobilized in formulating novel policies and practices. On the negative side, the reversals beginning in 1989 may well make reformers more hesitant in the future. And they surely will make the objective economic and political problems to be resolved more daunting as the economic crisis worsens with time. The longer the present leadership remains in power and the present course of economic policy and administrative practice continues, the more thunderous will be the storm once the silence ends.
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 8-102/David Shambaugh, Prof., Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. 43 ; SEG VT96
	 The succession to Deng will actually be less concerned with personalities than with competing institutional interests, central local relations, the civil-military balance, and broader issues of socioeconomic change and stability. In each of these areas China remains fragile.
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8-103/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 34; CJJ VT96
	 The current situation puts China's neighbors and the rest of the world in a difficult double bind. For short-term stability, the easiest policy is to support the present regime; but for middle- and longer-term peace, it may be in the United States's interest to support regime change. If the post-Deng transition brings a strong liberalizing leadership to power, the difficulty may be avoided. But if that does not happen, then we face unpleasant prospects. 
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8-104/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 109; THR VT96
	 This outcome certainly must humble anyone who would be so bold as to predict China's future. It also cannot bring much consolation to Deng Xiaoping as he confronts his passing. Like Mao in his last years, Deng is attempting to set a policy course that will endure beyond his death and will assure that those who succeed him stay the course. The vision of Chinese communism he would like to leave behind him is no less ambitious than that of Mao Zedong. He seeks to accomplish the reform of essential aspects of a Soviet-style economic system by means of a ruling Communist party. His effort will undoubtedly set the tone for Chinese politics not only during his last years but also for the succession period that follows.
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8-105/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 95 ;THR VT96
	 Yet in regard to arranging his own personal succession Deng has repeated an all-too-familiar pattern. First, he has failed to retire from politics, vacillating between withdrawal and spirited comebacks designed to ensure the viability of his reform legacy. Second (and relatedly), he has failed to make an irrevocable decision in favor of an heir apparent, falling rather into Mao's love-them-and-leave-them pattern. As in Mao's case, the result has been a classic succession crisis in which policy innovation is either paralyzed or gives way to policy zigzags. The recurrence of this pattern has reinforced gerontocratic tendencies in the short run and cast a shadow on the attempt to institutionalize the uncertainties of successsion, over the longer term.
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8-108 / Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 ROSS TERRILL, Harvard University: I don't think, Charlie, any dictatorship can arrange the succession. Mao tried and picked two, and then he tired of those; he picked a third, and Deng Xiaoping removed him. Deng Xiaoping has already removed two successors he himself chose - Mr. Hu [sp?] in 1997 [sp?], then in the middle of Tiananmen, Jiao Tse Yung [sp?]. Now he has a third. The problem is that since they don't have elections as we have, the new government can't be legitimated other than by making cracks against the previous government. So, as Winston says, Jiang Zemin will carry on Deng's policy. He'll, he'll wear Deng's coat, but other people will say Deng's coat is worn out. 
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8-109 / TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 For China, the death of Mr Deng will mark a new era in which there is no emperor figure. When Mao died in 1976, a man with the necessary revolutionary credentials and political vision - Mr Deng - was already in the wings. Today, as the old revolutionaries die out, there are no candidates in the "third generation" with emperor qualities. So China's autocratic political system will have to mature into something resembling a collective leadership.
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8-110 / TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 Thus, while the Chinese government insists that a "smooth transition" has already taken place, recent events point to a less tranquil atmosphere within the Zhongnanhai walled leadership compound in central Peking. The political purge in Peking is probably the first stage of a drawn-out transitional period. 
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8-111/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," p. 16; THR VT96
	 Chinese succession arrangements have a tendency to break down, and both Secretary General Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng have limited political bases. Moreover, the cautious work style and narrow specialization of bureaucrats associated with the central ministries tend to dull political instincts. Some scholars believe China's future leaders are likely to come from the ranks of provincial and local party secretaries, whose responsibilities as political brokers provide broad contacts and hone political skills. They are also skeptical about the leadership potential of China's technocrats. First of all, technocrats are much more adept at making systems work efficiently than they are at transforming systems. Even if economic reform is a prerequisite for eventual democratic reform, fundamental political reform may be needed to make economic reform work. Furthermore, the institutionalization of a bureaucratic technocracy normally is possible only if civil service bureaucrats become politically neutral. Because Chinese bureaucrats have always regarded themselves as active participants in the political process, they may be reluctant to vacate old seats of power.
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8-112 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Yet China's leadership succession entails much more than waiting for the "old men" to pass away. The average age of China's seven-person ruling Politburo standing committee is only 64.7 years. Included in this elite group at the pinnacle of formal power are Jiang Zemin, 67 years old; Li Peng, 65; Qiao Shi, 69; Li Ruihuan, 59; Zhu Rongji, 65; Liu Huaqing, 77; and Hu Jintao, 51. 
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8-113 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 According to the report, " China in the near term," released early this year by the Pentagon, no single strong leader will emerge in the year or two following Deng's death.
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8-114 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 "Leaders coming after Deng have influence in the bureaucratic, military or economic areas, but they lack the broad support necessary to rule. At a minimum, only some combination of group leadership can hold the system together."
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8-115/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 The lack of apparent internal balance of political forces will create a political vacuum for conservatives and reformers, the report said. But those leaders are likely to seek a collective leadership because they will want to avoid chaos, avoid being seen as weak and wish to protect their personal and family benefits.
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8-116/ Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 Ambassador NICHOLAS PLATT: They will bend over backwards, particularly during the immediate post-Deng period, to present a picture of continuity and stability. 
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8-117/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 115 ;THR VT96
	 Whatever its inner structure, the post-Deng regime will most likely take the form of collective leadership. The question will be whether any post-Deng leadership will be able to create enough consensus and concentrate enough power to overcome the strongly entrenched bureaucracies and deep conflicts of interest among regions, agencies, and social classes that stymied the forward movement of reform in the latter half of 1988--and whether, while trying to do so, the leadership will be able to win at least tolerance, if not support, from an increasingly restive populace. Without Deng, both these tasks will be harder than ever.
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8-118/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 58; THR VT96
	 These political developments will surely have an impact on the future course of reform in China. To be successful, reform in Communist countries requires a united leader- ship, with effective political instruments at its disposal, pre- pared to move ahead with determination despite bureaucratic and popular resistance. In the early days of reform, the political environment came close to meeting these criteria. The environment since the Tiananmen crisis has been substantially different: a divided leadership faces consider- able popular skepticism and holds uncertain control over a national bureaucracy of even more indeterminate reach or efficiency. This domestic political configuration will have a crucial impact on the future of the third wave of reform.
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8-119/Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 38 ; MDS VT96
	 In the short term, immediately following Deng's death, there is no question that the principle of collective leadership will be enforced and China's current leadership - Jiang, Li and Zhu Rongji, the Deputy Prime Minister-will hold the levers of power. Over time, possibly within three or five years, there will be a shift in power and a single leader will emerge. Until this occurs, we will continue to see the leadership in Beijing operating cautiously and conservatively.
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8-120/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 112 ; THR VT96
	 The indispensability of Deng to the reform process raises obvious questions as to what will happen when he dies. Despite Deng's accomplishments at the 14th party congress, there was evidence of continued elite divisions. Moreover, it is impossible to predict how even his designated successors will behave when the cohesive force of his presence is gone and the succession struggle is in full swing. Very little is known about their views, and there is no assurance that in the heat of political struggle they will necessarily stand by positions taken during Deng's lifetime. The vague nature of Deng's program and the temptations of political expediency could move Deng's successors in unexpected directions, leading to a fragmentation of China's top leadership in the midst, of the delicate process of reform.
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 8-121/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94;. "Slippery succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 Jiang and his collective leadership partners might not even make it that far, though, according to senior political science lecturer Ian Wilson of the Australian National University. "I give the collective leadership about a year," Wilson says. "After that, anything could happen." If crime and corruption spin further out of control and the promised "soft landing" of the economy proves bumpier than expected, then China could turn to some of the "alsorans " who are at the party's top echelons but outside the current "troika." Most prominent in this category could be parliamentary chairman Qiao Shi, whose intelligence background gives him access to the politically explosive party personnel files. Another wild card is Hu Jintao, the 52-year-old "baby' of the Standing Committee. These two are said to be the main transmitters of Deng's Delphic dicta these days in top party conclaves.
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 8-122/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "Slippery succession" p. 23; SEG VT96
	 A faceless leadership collective could thus emerge over the short term in this toned-down 1990s political culture. But whether it has the dynamism to galvanise China for the next phase of its development is another matter. If not, then the current triumvirate could prove as temporary as the one that followed Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's 1953 demise.
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8-123/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 The outcome of the post-Deng succession is uncertain. Although the principle of collective leadership was reaffirmed at the Party Congress, past experiences have not been successful and at present no single individual stands out as the logical heir to Deng Xiaoping. 
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8-124 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 One-third of a 13-member expert panel predicted Beijing would retain a stable, collective leadership, pursuing its present course of modest reform and gradually increasing its military capability. It could intervene militarily to prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan and possibly one day go to war to defend its claim to rich oil fields beneath the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
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8-125 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 But while the Chinese agenda may not change in the short term, the longer-term picture is murkier. '' China is up for grabs once Deng passes away,'' stated a group of China specialists in a recent report sponsored by the Department of Defense. ''There is no apparent internal balance of political forces, and Deng's death will create a political vacuum for both conservatives and reformers to move in.''
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8-126 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Deng Xiaoping is ailing and the power struggle over succession is already underway in Beijing. The struggle is being waged between reformers who want to bring the People's Republic of China into the world community and hard-liners [.]
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8-127/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 35; THR VT96
	 Seen in this light, it is misguided to see a major distinction between the so-called "liberals" (Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Li Ruihuan, etc.) and the "conservatives" (Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng). At a level of analysis that goes beyond the simple-minded power struggles so beloved by China watchers and the U.S. media, the policies of both groups involved moral compromises that make them equally unattractive to anyone sympathetic to the plight of the Chinese peoples. Both groups are committed to the same kinds of economic reform, yet, as should be clear by now, the introduction of foreign, highly technological market driven economic factors into a huge and impoverished country with few traditions of self-governance beyond the family and village level will almost surely eventuate in increasing misery and injustice.
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8-128/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 45; THR VT96
	 Orthodox Leninists ("paleo-Maoists") hearken back to the "golden age' of Chinese communism before the Eighth Party Congress in g September 1956. They not only reject democratically oriented political reforms in the party or government but criticize already implemented economic reforms for leading back to "capitalism." The "opening to the outside world;' they believe, invites "spiritual pollution"; the special economic zones are neocolonialist enclaves. Among representatives of this point of view are retired party veterans such as Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, Li Xiannian, and Bo Yibo, along with an indefinite number of their colleagues on the CAC. This group, however, appears to lack recruitment prospects among younger cadres and may fade away with the passing of its current membership.
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8-129/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 30; THR VT96
	 One major change has been the declining influence of conservative party elders. Although such party veterans, many of whom have opposed radical reforms being introduced in the economy, remain influential at the highest levels, their ability to intervene in politics directly and continuously has been curtailed to some extent. In particular, as noted earlier, the 14th Party Congress abolished the conservatives' main institutional stronghold, the Central Advisory Commission. Similarly, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, while not abolished, was merged with the Ministry of Supervision, and both were placed under the leadership of Wei Jianxing, a 62-year-old former deputy director of the CCP Organization Department with a reputation as a reformer.48 In the past, the CDIC had frequently been used by conservatives to investigate alleged wrong doings by reformers. In addition, the influence of conservative eiders has declined because of the deaths in the last few years of a number of senior leaders: Li Xiannian, former president of the PRC, died in June 1992; Hu Qiaomu, a former member of the Politburo and the leading conservative ideologue, died in September 1992; and Wang Zhen, the outspoken vice-president of the PRC, died in March 1993. So far at least, the actuarial tables have been kinder to reformers than to conservatives.
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8-130/Merle Goldman, Prof. Chinese History Boston University, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "The Intellectuals in the Deng Xiaoping Era," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 217; THR VT96
	 Jiang Zemin, the party general secretary who replaced Zhao Ziyang, has a record of tough treatment of the critical intellectuals, but, like Deng, he is within the self-strengthening tradition that wants Western science, technology, and business yet rejects the Western ideas that accompany them. But as Li Honglin observed, there is no way to keep Western notions from coming in "through the cracks." As the self strengtheners were unable to stop Western ideas from undermining Confucian orthodoxy in the late nineteenth century, so, too, will China's present-day self-strengtheners be unable to prevent Western thought from subverting their Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and power in the late twentieth century. 
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8-131/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.97; THR VT96
	 As China entered the 1990s, there was some restriction in the scope of civil society in urban China, but a situation far short of the suppression that characterized the Mao era. It appeared that a substantial amount of independent social life and sharing of heterodox opinions continued at the grassroots level, providing the basis for rapid revival of autonomous activity and perhaps even new rounds of mass demonstrations if the political situation should permit it--possibly as a result of Deng Xiaoping's death or a sharpening of elite conflict at the center. Still, it is clear that civil society has not been fully institutionalized in contemporary China and faces an uncertain future. A vigorous group of conservative leaders might be able to draw on their cultural legacy and the organizational practices of the Mao era to more fully suppress the remaining elements of civil society. However, to do so they would have to be willing to abandon most elements of the economic reform program and use harsh measures 10 command a return to the penetrated and officially mobilized society of the Mao era. I doubt that the current leadership, or any coalition that might succeed it, would have the vigor or internal cohesion to carry out such a fundamental shift. Thus on balance, and in spite of the negative influence of the historical background and the crackdown policies, there is some basis for optimism that a nascent civil society will survive to provide potential for a more democratic China in the future.
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8-132/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 44; THR VT96
	 The final scenario is "A Shift to the Right." Scenario F envisions Deng and his successors, or an alternate leadership group, adopting significantly more internationalist policies than those now in force. Both the desire of a Communist Party leadership to do so and its ability to overcome opposition are doubtful. I assign this scenario a probability of only 5 percent.'
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8-133/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 84-94; "SIippery Succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 A drawn-out succession struggle at the centre could encourage regional satraps to stake out greater autonomy. Or else, to fore- stall any such divisive tendencies, military and political hardliners could play the "nationalist card" to reassert central authority.
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 8-134/ LincoIn Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "SIippery succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 Likelier than a resurgence of Zhaoist re- formers, Lake's Chinese friends warn him, would be a hardline backlash in the event of a downturn in the economy and the disintegration- in public order that might ac- company it. Hardliners could .gather momentum- in a hard-fought succession battle as factions sought to trump each other with the "nationalist card."
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8-135/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 84-94; "Slippery succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 Deng's posthumous stock remains (which in turn depends on the sustainability of his "economic miracle"), then his anointed successors could enjoy a few years' smooth sailing as a collective leader- ship. But if economic growth falters, the stage could be set for a power-grab by Politburo- heavyweights outside the Deng- designated "core." 
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 8-136 / PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 Although China's political succession is apparently complete with the elevation of Jiang Zemin as head of state, general-secretary of the Communist Party and chief of the military, the revolutionary elders who survive Deng will continue to wield enormous influence, Chinese and Western officials say. The most influential hard-liner among the elders, Chen Yun, died at the age of 89 on April 10, but he is survived by Peng Zhen, 92, Yang, Song Renqiong, 85, Bo Yibo, 86, Wan Li, 78, and Song Ping, 79. It was these leaders who elevated Jiang after Zhao Ziyang, now 76, was deposed as party boss during the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989.
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8-137 / Jonathan Mirsky in Hong Kong The Times, October 13, 1994,HEADLINE: Peking breaks a taboo to signal Deng is near death//MDS-VT96
	 Now, however, more conservative elders, one of whom is even older than Mr Deng, have resurfaced in public. At the weekend, Peng Zhen, 92, one of the veterans of the Maoist era, toured some Peking highways and was described as wholly alert, in contrast with Mr Deng. The last time Mr Peng, a former chairman of the National People's Congress, China's nominal parliament, came out of retirement was during the pro-democracy uprising in Peking's Tiananmen Square in 1989. He was one of the elders who then urged a violent crackdown against the demonstrators. 
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8-138 / Rieko Saito, Kyodo News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; FOREIGN COMPANIES REMAIN OPTIMISTIC TOWARD CHINA; ACS VT96
	 ''Imagine if Japanese were told to go back to militarism several years after the World War II,'' Goga says rhetorically. ''People would have said no because they had tasted freedom. In the same way, the Chinese will rebel if ordered to go back to the old communist way.'' ''People here know how important it is that they can now eat, dress and earn money according to their efforts. They believe that tomorrow will be better than today if they work hard.''
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8-139/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 7 ; THR VT96
	 Set more than twenty years in the future, the story foretold how a group of conservative leaders would carry out a coup shortly after Deng's death. As the year 2000 starts, the new leaders launch a purge of Deng's followers, whom they charge with having formed a "counter-revolutionary group that schemed to split the motherland." The fallen leaders, who appear drugged, admit their guilt at show trials. A reshuffled Politburo (the top organ of Party power) announces that one of the conspirators' worst crimes was to attack the sacred memory of Chairman Mao and his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Politburo enacts regulations to recentralize political and economic power, aiming to rein in enterprises given too much independence during the reforms. The government reverses its close cultural and economic ties with the West and carries the purge deeper into society, calling for "the thorough extirpation of the influence of rotten Western bourgeois capitalism."
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8-140/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 111; THR VT96
	 Bureaucrats, seeking to protect prerogatives and sobered by past reversals, can be expected to respond slowly to the latest effort. Some of the interior provinces, with less to gain from foreign trade and investment, may not rally so quickly around the promise of increased decentralization. Although Deng's onslaught seems to have quieted his elite opposition, it persists. More importantly, it is prepared to exploit any difficulties that arise from reform efforts. And such difficulties are likely. Indeed, the very factors that have contributed to the launching of a reform effort contain within them elements that render its nature and outcome uncertain.
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8-142/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 122; THR VT96
	 Looking farther ahead, after Deng's death the issue of policy toward the United States is likely to be embedded in broader differences over the future of the reform movement. The new leadership will undoubtedly come under increased political pressure from both conservatives who would like to restrict ties with the outside world as well as regional forces seeking broadened ties. Although the initial instincts of Deng's successors are likely to be inclined toward a continuation of Deng's economic policies and thus a more accommodating posture toward the United States as major economic support of China's reform effort, there are numerous factors that might move policy in a much different direction.
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 8-143 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 Many U.S. officials say they believe the interests of the Chinese military will figure prominently in China's future, no matter who takes control. This stems partly from the visible power already wielded by highly conservative officials such as Liu Huaqing, the Navy chief, or Yang Shangkun, whom Washington considers the de facto chief of the People's Liberation Army. "No one is going to assume Deng's mantle without the approval of the military," a U.S. official said.
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8-144 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Contemporary Chinese history shows that the armed forces have played a deciding role in political struggles, even those involving such skilled, charismatic leaders as Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. In the 1960s Mao called on the military to end the factional violence, begun at his behest, that threatened to plunge China into chaos. For his part, Deng parlayed his long-standing ties to the military after Mao's death in 1976 into a power base more stable than those of any of his rivals. In fact, China's recent military modernization program is partly a bow to the armed forces' consistent support for Deng's regime.
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8-145 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 In the absence of a "paramount" leader to assume Deng's mantle, the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in shaping China's future will be large. Thus, Deng's successor could rise from the ranks of the military.
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8-146 / Philippe Massonnet Agence France Presse, October 11, 1994, HEADLINE: Return of China's Old Guard excites speculation over Deng//MDS-VT96
	 The surprise appearance in public of two of China's Old Guard -- the revered generation who brought the Communists to power in 1949 -- has added to the fevered speculation surrounding their 90-year-old chief, Deng Xiaoping. Peng Zhen, 92, and Wan Li, 78, both former presidents of the Chinese parliament, popped up on state television late Monday, less than two weeks after the communist party's central committee held a plenum to strengthen the position of President Jiang Zemin. Peng, oldest survivor of the Communist revolutionary warriors known as the Immortals, seemed in good shape according to the footage, which showed him visiting Beijing last Saturday. Some analysts said Peng's impromptu sortie into the public eye could signal an offensive by the party's conservatives in the context of a succession war. 
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8-147 / Ian Johnson, Beijing Bureau of The Sun The Sun (Baltimore), October 16, 1994, Pg. 6A, HEADLINE: Perry's China visit full of symbolism, not substance//MDS-VT96
	 But Clinton administration officials believe that contacts are especially important because China's senior leader, Deng Xiaoping, is believed to be near death. The military has recently come to occupy key positions in the Communist Party hierarchy -- the sort of domestic power that the generals have not wielded since the death of Mr. Deng's predecessor, Mao Tse-tung, in 1976. "They hold the key to the near- and mid-term stability in China," said Zhang Weiguo, an author and analyst with TRI Inc. "It's in the U.S. interest to have contacts with them -- people-to-people contacts -- even if they aren't as warm contacts as they once were." 
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8-148/Andrew J. Nathan, Well l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 115; THR VT96
	 The generals have played key roles in power transitions in the past, for example in the arrest of the "Gang of Four" after the death of Mao. Deng's departure may disturb the delicate balance between military and Party elites and force a weak or unstable successor to turn to the military for support. In such an event, the facade of Party rule would probably be maintained, with the generals exercising their influence largely behind the scenes.
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8-149/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Amy, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 159 THR VT96
	 Today, the crucial party-army issue for the People's Republic of China is the degree to which civilian politicians can maintain and exercise institutional authority. Even under the best of circumstances, that capacity is now severely limited. In all probability, the PLA officer corps will act as the 'guardian' and 'kingmaker' as Deng Xiaoping and the other elders pass from the scene over the next decade. Today, the unity of the People's Liberation Army is the strongest- perhaps the only- factor holding the PRC together. If the officer corps splits, the country will split, leading to 'one nation, many states' or to civil war.
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8-150/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 131; THR VT96
	 'The calamitous events of 1989 saw senior leader Deng Xiaoping repeat many of the mistakes made by Mao Zedong in his declining years. Deng severely damaged the political arrangements with which he had hoped to assure a peaceful transition after his own death, and left the People's Liberation Army as the primary institution that will determine China's future.
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8-151/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 155; THR VT96
	 In the aftermath of Tiananmen, even the eight million or so members of the CCP nomenklatura seem to be in some disarray. By contrast, the collective cohesion and discipline of the one million or so PLA officers remains solid. The officer corps 'also has material resources, an organizational structure that does not atrophy, weapons, and unmatched technical capability for command'.77 By default, the officer corps is likely to determine China's future, because it is by far the most unified, disciplined, and authoritative national institution.
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 8-152/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the .Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.246 ;MDS VT96
	 A Chinese analyst said that the military is certain to play a role in the succession, probably not in taking power directly, but in deciding who does.
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8-153/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China' s Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p-. 156 THR VT96
	 In the absence of consensus on a civilian leader, the officer corps might put forward one of its own to lead the country. Some senior officers have substantial support among civilian officials, and could maintain the theory of party leadership.
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8-154/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Array, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 157 THR VT96
	 Under this scenario, in the absence of any viable civilian candidate or because of extreme social disorder, the officer corps would directly intervene to 'restore order'. It would probably, but not necessarily, act in the name of the communist party. Having intervened, the army could install a civilian figure-head, or a military leader who formally retired from the army, like Park Chung Hee in Korea (1961). A uniformed officer could simply take over, as General Jaruzelski did in Poland in 1981. Such a government would probably be quite authoritarian initially. However, moderate reformers might regain influence, using the now familiar argument that only by reform and opening can China gain economic and military power. 
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 8-155/ Chai Ling, Shen Tong, Gao Xin, Wang Jungtao, Tiananmen square Survivors, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Tiananmen and China's future: the view five years later" p. 249 ;SEG VT96
	 The only thing preventing military intervention is that Deng Xiaoping remains alive. Once Deng Xiaoping passes away, there really isn't anything left that's stable. There's no strong person ruling the political system, so really we cannot guarantee any kind of stability [in the future] .
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8-156 / David Friedman is a visiting fellow at the MIT Japan program.November 21, 1993, Los Angeles Times p. m1 HEADLINE: TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC BULLIES THAT AMERICA REFUSES TO FACE UP TO; COMMERCE: WHILE JAPAN -- AND NOW CHINA -- RUN UP HUGE SURPLUSES, THE U.S. FRETS OVER GEOPOLITICS AND MOUTHS FREE-TRADE PRINCIPLES. //MDS-VT96
	 Matters are considerably worse in China, where many observers believe that as Deng Xiaoping fades from the scene, a hard-line government with closer ties to the People's Liberation Army is gradually emerging. 
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8-157/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 158; THR VT96
	 This scenario would certainly involve factional conflict within the officer corps, with more and more officers demanding to participate in any consensus that purported to represent 'the military'. The 'Polish Scenario' could evolve into an irreparable PLA split. 'Frustrated modernizers' would become sufficiently restive to contemplate a coup d' etat. They might try to pressure their generals into action, or act themselves. A miscarried coup attempt could easily split the officer corps and lead to intra-PLA fighting.
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8-158/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 157; THR VT96
	 The danger of dissension with the officer corps would increase as the power-broker or 'kingmaker' role evolved towards direct intervention. As the domestic situation worsened, demanding more drastic measures, ever more heated and more widespread conflict would erupt within the officer corps over issues of policy and political power. Field-grade officers, especially the 'frustrated modernizers', would make themselves heard.
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8-159/Harlan W. Jencks,. Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 148 THR VT96
	 Many field-grade officers have been frustrated at the slow pace of modernization. The tragic events of 1989 exacerbated that frustration. These 'frustrated modernizers' have much in common with the dissatisfied officers who have taken over the governments of other unstable, corrupt, developing countries. For the first time in PLA history, it is conceivable that a few officers may actually be contemplating coups d' etat. Military coup is against PLA traditions, and is still quite unlikely, but it is now conceivable, as it never was before.
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 8-160/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 44; THR VT96
	 This analysis can be extended to address the possibility of a military coup. The party does "control the gun," in the Chinese phrase. The institutional power of the army reached a high point during the Cultural Revolution, but was whittled down by 1973 to a point at which Mao could suddenly transfer all eleven military region commanders. (Again in February, 1980, seven regional commanders were shifted on central government orders.) At the higher levels the military and party leaderships are intertwined: all top leaders in the army are believed to be party members, and the great bulk of party leaders have had long army careers. Thus, although individual military leaders are politically influential, the army leaders do not form a coherent interest group; instead, political disputes and factions cut across army-civilian lines. Each new power group in past purges has had both civilian and military members, and this would be true of any new power group in the 1980s. If a factional coup and purge (scenarios B and C) occur, they will not be distinctively "military." A junior officers' coup is also impossible. The army is penetrated at all levels both by a commissars' hierarchy loyal to the party and by a network of party cells. Moreover, the massive size of the Chinese army precludes effective horizontal organization of the middle and lower officer corps.
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8-161/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Amy, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.156 THR VT96
	 As Deng Xiaoping and the 'gang of elders' die off, the succession will be messy, if not chaotic. Led by Deng himself, the elders have destroyed the institutions Deng created to smooth the transition. Moreover, they have removed Zhao Ziyang, the only 'pure civilian' leader to have won a degree of PLA acceptance. So, what will happen when the old men die? In order of likelihood here are three plausible scenarios:
 1. The PLA as 'Guardian' and 'Kingmaker'
 Under this, the most likely scenario, civilian succession would be peaceful, as the officer corps threw its weight behind a civilian candidate for national leadership. One-party rule would continue. In its role as 'guardian', the military high command would insist that destabilizing policies be avoided. PLA commanders want to keep the army unified, and avoid direct political intervention. However, they stepped in and told Mao to stop the radical nonsense in 1967, and might step in again, in extremis.
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8-162/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 62; THR VT96
	 Yet people remained apprehensive. Deng Xiaoping's death could not fail to bring on a period of uncertainty and instability. The aged Yang Shangkun and his military colleagues retained a high degree of power. How would the army react to the deaths of the old generation leaders? Conversations held from late 1990 to late 1992 suggested that while nobody expected civil war, many realised it was a possibility. Few were quite as confident as Deng Xiaoping that Jiang Zemin would remain the third-generation leader following Mao Zedong and Deng himself. As is usual when a major political figure leaves the scene, people worried that things would get worse, but hoped and expected that a new leader would emerge who would usher in a better period. People were divided over whether the student movement would or should re-emerge, or whether, if it did, it would lead to a better result than in 1989. The really consistent feeling found among ordinary Chinese people late 1990 to late 1992 was a desire for a peaceful transition to a post-Deng leadership which would continue the policies of reform and opening to the outside world. Very few expected the post-Deng regime to be led by other than the CCP, but virtually nobody wanted a return to the radical policies which characterised the late years of Mao Zedong.
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8-163/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 251; THR VT96
	 The CCP still commanded widespread support, especially among ordinary workers and peasants, but more because it brought stability and a rise in prosperity than because of its oven adherence to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. The overthrow of the Soviet Communist Party in August 1991 and the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of the same year were signals to the CC? to try to persuade the Chinese people that only continuing Party leadership could prevent the chaos, disintegration and economic misery which had befallen the world's first socialist state. In terms of membership, the CCP grew from about 48 million in August 1989 to 51 million in October 1992, about a million per year. What ' this suggests is that, whatever their motivation, people have enough confidence in the long-term survival in power of the CCP to think it worth joining, a fact in striking contrast to the Soviet Communist Party during its last years in power. 
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 8-164/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 44; THR VT96
	 Three additional scenarios that businessmen sometimes ask about are so improbable that I exclude them from further analysis. The "Fall of the Regime" means a loss of power by the Communist Party (as opposed to a shift in power from one party faction to another). The Communist Party is an elite organization of some 38 million. Although it was paralyzed in the Cultural Revolution, it has re-emerged in the last ten years as strong as ever. Its internal discipline and control over society are being strengthened further under Deng, as I will discuss below. The party dominates all institutions of society, including the army, the government ministries, the press, and the universities. It reaches down to the communes and neighborhood committees. It has no significant organized opposition. Any political change that occurs in the 1980s will occur within and through, not against, the Party. 
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8-165/Lawrence R. Sullivan, Political Studies Adelphi University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Beijing Massacre: The Crisis in Authority," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 103; THR VT96
	 z Relying on raw military and police power, however, the CCP has survived as conservative leaders attempt to wrest control of the institution from the pro-reform groups cultivated by Zhao Ziyang. While the press obediently follows central dictates, the failure to 'ferret out' pro-democracy sympathizers and Zhao supporters has left the CCP just as divided as before 4 June. The purge of Zhao and his think-tank intellectuals has substantially reduced reform- minded leaders at the top. Yet the promotion of Li Ruihuan to the Politburo and retention of Shanghai Mayor Zhu Rongji (a close ally of Zhao) could possibly revive political reform in the ' event of a shakeup in the central leadership. In the cities and key institutions such as universities and advanced industrial installations- tins, moreover, many CCP members remain highly receptive to reform as they wait for the death of the old leaders to create an opportunity for a new leadership to emerge.
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8-166/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 93 ;THR VT96
	 Like Mao, Deng's solution to the likelihood of a succession crisis was premortem succession, but he proceeded to institutionalize such arrangements much more systematically. Particularly noteworthy in this regard have been his endeavors to stimulate the circulation of elites. The Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh CC abolished the practice of guaranteed lifelong tenure for Party cadres, and two different retirement packages (lixiu for cadres, and tuixiu for others) were introduced. With the help of Chen Yun and Hu Yaobang, Deng has vigorously encouraged veterans to retire.92 Most leading officials are now limited to two five-year terms, and there is a "normal" retirement age for officials.
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 8-167/David Shambaugh, Prof., Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. 43 ;SEG VT96
	 Communist party authority has eroded considerably in China. The party reigns but it does not rule. It is a hollow shell of an organization to which officials and citizens alike feign compliance at best and ignore in normal circumstances 
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8-168/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 6 ;THR VT96
	 The Chinese Communist Party has always enforced its control of society by placing its members throughout every institution, including those that were nominally independent. My conversation with Cao Siyuan made me realize that this process of infiltration had become mutual. Society was beginning penetrate the party. For the sake of reform the party found it useful to cultivate the fiction of an increasingly independent society. For their part independent people found it useful to join the party and to get party sponsorship for their initiatives. Each side pretended to play the other's game, and each thought it was winning. Without being challenged, Deng Xiaoping's notion of party leadership was growing hollow from within in the late 1980s.'3 [0
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8-169/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p 29, THR VT96
	 [.In short, the old structures of power and ideology no longer have the same functionality as in the past. New structures and groups have usurped functions previously monopolized by the party-state. A weakened party-state remains strong enough to prevent people from blatant violations of official policy (with the notable exception of enforcing the single-child family policy in the countryside), but it can no longer actively manage society or elicit positive compliance.
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 8-170/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 48; THR VT96
	 The major secular change in Chinese politics has been the waning of ideology, which has had profound and multiple effects on the leadership. This decline has come about for two reasons: On the one hand, the masses were generally exhausted by the rigors of ideological conformity in the absence of material payoffs in the wake of the Cultural Revolution; on the other hand, the Deng Xiaoping leadership deliberately undercut late Maoist ideology to introduce enough pragmatic flexibility to permit experimentation with various reforms (and to undermine Hua Guofeng's position). The primary drawback to this decline is that the leaders are bereft of a language through which they can appeal to the masses for the pursuit of collective goals. In the absence of such language and such goals, the masses tend to become totally absorbed in the pursuit of private material interests (wang qian kan in the Chinese pun).23 Yet operational control of the material incentives through which the masses' interests could be manipulated has been decentralized or marketized in the course of the reforms, to the extent that the leadership feels a more or less acute sense of loss of control. During crisis situations, this tends to give rise to leadership Panics.
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8-171/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 36; THR VT96
	 Chastened by his close call with oblivion in Tiananmen Square, and by the failure of hard-liners to save the situation afterward with their retrenchment program, Deng seemed to have decided that the Party could survive only if the Draconian measures taken to maintain political stability could be complemented by greater prosperity. By turning Guangdong into a model and by giving ordinary people's dreams for a better standard of living new forms of expression, he hoped to head off the kinds of resentment that in the past had built into protest-even if, as some hard-liners feared, he was actually planting the seeds of the Party's ultimate destruction. While Deng had no desire to destroy the Party, he seemed to have realized that, with its reputation in tatters, the Party's only remaining path lay in its ability to deliver consumer goods. In Deng's eyes, the Party either had to lead the way to prosperity or be swept away by history.
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 8-172/Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "In search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p.87 ;THR VT96
	 Recent events have demonstrated to my satisfaction that the future of Chinese politics is difficult to predict, but it seems to me that the old guard regime is a transitional phase to a basic question, namely: Is China heading toward a new total crisis or is it merely working out the last painful throes of the party-state vanguardism ? The new total crisis would be the end of the party-state. If repression so radicalizes the forces of reform that they reject the possibility of reform within the party-state system, then future politics will be defined by a chaotic struggle between new forces of revolutionary radicalism and establishment forces defending public order. The vanguard party will relegitimate itself as an unideological authoritarian party, and reform politics will be radicalized into antiregime activities reminiscent of opposition to the late empire. The advantage will be with the establishment, which might in time feel secure enough to tolerate a new cycle of reform efforts.
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8-173/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. l25; THR VT96
	 While some of these assumptions are questionable--could a democratic China stem the rapid growth of the country's population?--we must still ask a basic question: how fast do we want change to occur in China? And what are the risks involved in pushing for rapid change? Some members of the United States Congress believe that the collapse of the Chinese Communist party will lead to a democratic alternative. However, the most likely scenario would be a takeover by a Chinese military no longer constrained by a Communist party. This could be even more destabilizing for the region, since there would be little internal opposition to further expansion of the military budget. One of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's greatest contributions to regional stability in the 1980s was the demilitarization of Chinese society and China's foreign policy. Only in the wake of Tiananmen, when the military saved the regime, has it successfully flexed its political muscle to get a larger share of the national budget. [Author's note: It is also important to remember that the Persian Gulf War, with its display of American military technology, heightened the Chinese military's awareness of the great technical gap between it and the Western militaries. Some of the growth in defense spending must be seen as a response to these concerns for national security, rather than simply seen as reflecting Chinese expansionist tendencies.] The collapse of the party could also exacerbate human rights abuses--witness the cruelty meted out during the post-Tiananmen crackdown to those who were arrested by the martial law troops.
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8-174/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 22; CJJ VT96
	 But this hollowing out of communism cannot, as some observers seem to expect, itself create a new regime. A functional state requires institutional structures. Moreover, these are not spontaneously generated; they must be designed and built. Yet in China today, what we see is a growing gap between the codified institutional structures of government, and the needs, behavior, and realities of everyday life. Society and government are disentangling themselves and going their own ways, which is not good for either. Society cannot exist ungoverned nor can an economy grow without a legal system, nor, in the end, can a government survive without a social base. Talk of pragmatism, and the use of rhetorical resolutions, such as "one country, two systems," which are the staple both of Chinese officials and optimistic commentators, are simply not sufficient responses to the needs and challenges.
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8-175 / Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 The prospects for survival of communist rule in China can be summed up in one word -- corruption. As would-be heirs of Deng Xiaoping jostle for control by asserting their moral authority and undermining rivals, rumors are rife in Beijing as heads roll in the current official drive to root out corrupt practices which have thrived with the rapid development created by the opening up of China's economy.
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8-176 / Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 Corruption is not a new problem in China, but the current drive against it should be seen against the backdrop of a struggle for power as the contending heirs apparent seek to step into the shoes of Deng Xiaoping, now regarded as close to death.
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8-177 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-26-95, (News Global); ACS VT96
	 Officials Regulated to Report Incomes [CND, 05/24/95] BEIJING -- All officials above county level are now required to report incomes, Reuter reported on Wednesday quoting Xinhua. The regulation became effective right away, the items to be reported include regular wages, extra bonuses and subsidies, incomes from welfare, consultation, speeches and publications, and contracted projects and businesses. Income reports will be filed twice a year and will be kept in upper divisions; perjury will result in "disciplinary punishment", Xinhua said. The rule on incomes came after a series of aniticorruption measures aimed at preventing officials from being bribed into wrong doings. (Frank LING, Jian LIU)
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 8-178/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.73; THR VT96
	 There are good reasons to speculate that China may move in this direction. First, when the next major leadership change occurs--probably following serious power struggles after Deng Xiaoping's death-the winners will be more liberal bureaucratic technocrats, with a better understanding of the democratic aspirations of the Chinese population and the importance of a market economy than those leaders they replace. The probability that the victims of the post-Tiananmen purge will eventually be rehabilitated, with or without Zhao Ziyang's return to power, is high.
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8-179 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Over the longer term, many observers expect that this new leadership will be increasingly drawn from the provincial ranks and will be pragmatic, economically oriented, and without strong historical ties to the Communist party. 
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8-180/Shigeki Hakamada, Prof. in the International Politics and Economics Dept. at Aoyama Gakuin Univ., Tokyo, and Gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. 179; THR VT 96 In China after Prime Minister Li Peng's participation in the United Nations Security Council session of January 31, 1992, on a new world order, there were suggestions that, two and one-half years after Tiananmen, normalcy had been reestablished. Official spokesmen even suggested that in 1949 communism had saved China and now it was China's turn to save communism. To most observers, however, this possibility seemed scarcely conceivable. Even the strategy of a gradual neo-authoritarian reform led by the Communist Party seemed far-fetched under leaders as unpopular as Li Peng. Instead, it could be expected that rising regional elites, closely tied to business interests, would play a major role in the next stage of transition. Once Chinese glasnost and democratization resumed, the survival of communism would be put to its last major test. Since much of the communist system was already being dismantled, the Communist Party itself could not be expected to retain its power for long even though uncertainty over its future leadership complicated efforts to predict the timing and process of transition.
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8-181/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 59 ; THR VT96
	 Fifth, having 'spent most of their careers as technical staff in functionally specialized organs, they have accumulated very little experience in overall political works--which include administrative, propaganda, and mass works. Unlike the revolutionary cadres, who were urged to be good "proletarian politicians," the bureaucratic technocrats do not have backgrounds in energizing, representing, organizing, and mobilizing unorganized interests. It seems likely, therefore, that those who have reached the highest positions of the Chinese bureaucracy--for instance, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng--will act more like coordinators, conciliators, and managers than like politicians, who tend to represent the interests of various social groups, develop long-term visions, manipulate symbols, and rally the support of the people. If one takes Li Peng as an example, his behavior so far resembles the bureaucrat rather than the politician. He has been conservative, cautious, submissive, and primarily concerned with immediate problems and piecemeal solutions in dealing with such issues as inflation, corruption, fragmentation of the bureaucratic authority, and student demands for democracy.
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 8-182/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 151; THR VT96
	 One line of thought has been that there are circumstances m which relatively democratic institutions are more functional for elites than authoritarian ones. Given permissive economic, social, and international conditions, a turn toward democracy may be an attractive option for an elite facing succession problems, an economic crisis, mass unrest, international pressure, or other problems. In such conditions relatively democratic institutions offer the possibility of improving a regime's abilities to legitimate itself, to regulate social conflict, to recruit successors, to gain access to and make use of information for policy making, and so on.
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 8-183/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 94 THR VT96
	 To try to deal with the question 1n generational rather than individual terms. Thus the "first echelon" (including Mao, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, among others) referred to the revolutionary veterans; the "second echelon" (including Deng, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, and others) referred to those who had risen to leadership since 1949; and the "third echelon" (e.g., Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Qiao Shi) would carry the nation into the twenty-first century. This represents a bureaucratic systematization of Mao's search for "revolutionary successors"--while orienting the search to a quite different type of candidate. Though this policy is sometimes resented by other cadres as a vehicle for accelerated promotion of children of high cadres (the "princes' party," or taizi dang), it has resulted in a sweeping rejuvenation.
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 8-184/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "Slippery succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 Personal charisma counts for less nowadays than it used to, notes sociologist Lu Jianhua, 35, of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "I doubt if one Chinese in 20 could name you all the members of the Standing Committee," he says. The current leadership generation lacks both the mythic stature and the combat-forged loyalty net- works of Deng and his cohort.
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 8-185/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "Slippery succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 The political counsellor discounts this threat, though: "None of these three guys has the authority or the glamour for 'paramount leadership.' And they're all so thoroughly identified with the post-1989 mix of political repression and economic boom that they'd now have a hard time striking out on a new tack They're likelier to form the nucleus of a collective leadership 'troika'."
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 8-186/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, II I "Introduction, p. 9, THR VT96
	 Bureaucratic technocrats will not find it easy to become the political successors to the old generation. Careers spent as managers in specialized bureaucratic organizations rarely prepare individuals to act as "politicians" or leaders. Instead, successful bureaucrats develop a cautious work style, as job specialization narrows perspectives and limits personal connections. Even their education and training may isolate bureaucrats from the average Chinese. Because both of China's formal leaders, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, epitomize the prudent work style and limited political base of the bureaucrat, Lee and Dittmer are skeptical that either can succeed Deng as paramount leader.
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8-187/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. of Political Science at the University of California, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "From revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 201 ;THR VT96
	 The immediate future for reform and political stability in China is uncertain. It seems probable that the political lives of Li Peng and Jiang Zemin (who succeeded Zhao Ziyang as the party's general secretary) will last only as long as the corporeal lives of Deng Xiaoping and other elderly leaders. It seems likely that many of the victims of the current persecution will eventually be rehabilitated, and the leaders of the student movement, who now are condemned as counter-revolutionaries, may become heroes in the near future. If such a reversal takes place, one consolation will be that more enlightened technocrats, with a better understanding of the democratic aspirations of the Chinese population and the importance of a market economy, will replace the current hard-line technocrats.
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8-188/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 431; THR VT96
	 In March 1993 Deng's latest "heir apparent," Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, was also appointed president. Whether Jiang would be able to preside over the contradiction of socialism coexisting with capitalism as well as Deng had was far from certain. It was difficult to see how he, Zhu Rongji, or Li Peng, whom the official press now tirelessly described as "the core leadership," would be able to continue Deng's balancing act, staying in power and keeping China from tilting irrevocably into the hands of either zealous reformers or conservative hard-liners. In trying to be both an economic reformer and a political Leninist, Deng sometimes seemed like a bigamist with two wives and two separate families whom he managed to placate only by dint of his uncanny skill at knowing when to switch attentions from one to the other. The real hick, of course, was to keep them apart, a very different enterprise from resolving the underlying contradictions that kept China revolving through one epicycle of fang (loosening up) and shou (tightening down) after another.'
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8-189/Asiaweek, January 27, 1994; Asiaweek, "CHINA; The Deng Deathwatch; Everyone Is Agog -- Except the Chinese Themselves", SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 24; PMS VT96
	 What will change when Deng Xiaoping dies? Initially, not much. After pushing China's remarkable moves toward a free-market economy, Deng officially retired in 1989, though he retained a decisive say on key issues. At the helm since then, the collective leadership headed by President Jiang Zemin, 68, is expected to continue in power for some time. As Deng's personal secretary and one of three daughters who interprets the old man's mumbled wishes, Deng Rong may be more concerned with preparing outsiders for a scenario Chinese themselves know only too well.
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8-190 / Antonio Kamiya, Economic Newswire, FEBRUARY 9, 1995, HEADLINE: U.S.- China trade links growing despite patents row; ACS VT96
	 Lord, a former U.S. envoy to Beijing, suggested that political power in China has already shifted to a 'coalition' headed by President Jiang Zemin. 'The conventional wisdom is the basic team, at least for the short term, is already in place,' Lord told a private foreign policy advocacy group.
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8-191 / Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 Most think Jiang Zemin will succeed him [Deng] and that China's changeswill be gradual. [WINSTON LONG, Asst. Sec. of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs; ROSS TERRILL, Harvard University; Ambassador NICHOLAS PLATT]
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8-192 / TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 Officially, the baton of power has already been passed to the "third generation". In China's Communist lexicon, the "first-generation" leader was Chairman Mao, the "second-generation" chief was Mr Deng, while the "third-generation" represents the current crop of senior cadres who were too young to play a significant role in the 1949 revolution. The man at the "core" of the third generation is Jiang Zemin, who is not only president, but Communist Party chief and titular head of the armed forces as well.
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 8-193/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 14I; THR VT96
	 Whatever the long-term ramifications of this military shake-up, Jiang Zemin appears to be the immediate beneficiary. The ouster of Yang Baibing removed a clear rival for control over the military, and Jiang has made every effort since then to bolster his support among the military by constantly visiting military bases. Moreover, Jiang will have the opportunity to sponsor the promotion of new military leaders. Such moves do not guarantee that Jiang will remain in power following Deng's death, but they do suggest that he has become a stronger contender for power than most observers would have allowed only a short while ago.
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8-194 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 A concerted attempt to guarantee leadership stability now gives senior leaders such as Jiang Zemin concurrent positions within the party (general secretary), military (chairman of the Central Military Commission), and government (state president). In any case, leadership change will not come all at once by political fiat or sudden actuarial change, but will rather combine elements of Peking opera played out in the sometimes dark corridors of power. It is a continuous play of numberless acts. 
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8-195/ John Gittings The Guardian, October 11, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: CHINA SEES AN ERA GO DOWN TO ITS LAST FLICKER;As rumours abound that Deng's death is imminent, John Gittings asks what lies in store for Beijing when the architect of economic reforms is no more//MDS-VT96
	 This does not stop analysts from noting that Mr Jiang - promoted from Shanghai by Mr Deng to give the party a new image after the Beijing massacre - has done some reshuffling of his own. His "Shanghai faction" has been strengthened by promoting the city's mayor, Huang Ju, to the politburo and its party leader, Wu Bangguo, to the secretariat.
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8-196/ Graham Hutchings China Correspondent The Daily Telegraph, October 10, 1994, Pg. 11, HEADLINE: Jiang raises the stakes in quest to replace Deng//MDS-VT96
	 PRESIDENT Jiang Zemin has stepped up his campaign to succeed Deng Xiaoping by promoting senior officers in the Chinese Communist Party's security apparatus. In a move likely to give him more control over the million-strong People's Armed Police, Jiang promoted Zhang Shutian, the unit's political commissar, to lieutenant general and 14 others to major general. The promotions were made by the party's Central Military Commission, of which Jiang is chairman. At a ceremony in Peking, Tao Siju, Minister of Public Security, urged those promoted to "rally around the government with Jiang Zemin at its core". They were to "uphold the party's absolute leadership" of the PAP", the official New China News Agency reported. In June, Jiang promoted 19 army commanders - including the chiefs of all military regions - to general. 
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8-197/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-6-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Reported by: Bo XIONG, Daluo JIA, 02/05/94 Jiang Zemin has strengthened his grip on power by boosting control over the PLA and the Deng Xiaoping household, an article in Feb. 3rd South China Morning Post said. Sources in Beijing said since the news that Deng Xioaping had been in coma spread in December, Jiang has obtained the personal allegiance of some senior generals as well as regional commanders and commissars.
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8-198/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-6-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 In a series of PLA meetings held between December and January in the three PLA headquarters units and the seven military regions, one of the main topics was "absolute obedience to the new leadership with comrade Jiang Zemin as its core." Jiang was said to be very satisfied with the conclusions of those meetings. It is said that Jiang is now being backed up by the two key generals - CCP's Central Military Commission vice-chairmen Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen.
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8-199/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-6-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Jiang also increased his control over the PLA's General Political Department headed by headed by Jiang protege General Yu Yongbo, though it is not clear about the relationship between Jiang Zemin and the deputy head of the General Political Department, General Wang Ruilin, who is also the head of the Deng Xiaoping Office and Deng's chief military adviser. Wang has been playing a low profile over the past few months. Sources said that Jiang would continue to reshuffle the PLA leadership in 1995 to flush out remnant Yang Shangkun's followers.
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8-200/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.246; MDS VT96
	 No one in power can match the military stature of Deng Xiaoping, a veteran of the Long March and countless civil war campaigns, but Jiang Zemin has spent the last few years courting the military, visiting remote bases, and congratulating border guards, apparently to make up for his lack of military background.
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 8-201/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, 3-2-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 15 ,"The mantle slips;" XYZ VT96
	 Nor are local politicians the only ones getting the message to toe the line. Party Secretary and President Jiang Zemin, who is also chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, has spent the past couple of months actively canvassing top army brass for support. In addition to personal pledges of loyalty, he also garnered a formal pledge from the commission last month to "uphold the party's absolute leadership over the army." To enforce the pledge, Jiang's hand-picked director of the army's General Political Department has launched a year-long "psychological engineering" campaign to weed out malcontents.
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8-202/ Julian Baum, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Taipei planners debate chances of a Chinese attack," p. 21; MDS VT96
	 If anyone like Jiang Zemin succeeds Deng, the military will have many opportunities to influence policy," says Andrew Yang of Taipei's Chinese Centre for Advanced Policy Studies, which. ' specializes in research on security affairs. Even before Deng's passing, Yang adds, the military has gained power in decision making. ".Jiang has already promoted hundreds of young generals and has allowed-the military to take part in politburo meetings," he says. "In Chinese politics, power still comes from the barrel of a gun."
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8-203 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Revolutionary leader Mao Tse-tung liked nothing better than to stir things up. His successor Deng Xiaoping urged the nation to be bold as it embarked on unprecedented economic reforms. Their heir, President Jiang Zemin, is doing all he can to ensure that the times remain as uneventful as possible, maneuvering to enforce stability -- in both politics and the economy.
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8-204 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 While Mao sent the nation reeling with nationwide political campaigns, Jiang's ultimate goal is stability. Having vanquished his most prominent rival, he appears to have put a lid on investigations into allegations of bribery and kickbacks among other senior Beijing officials. Indications are that the purge has reached its limits.
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8-205 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 According to observers in Beijing, Jiang's 10 points of view reflect the four fundamental frameworks of China's foreign policy. First, China will maintain independence and take the initiative in its own hands, develop friendship with its neighbours, strengthen relations with developing countries and properly handle its relations with the West. Second, at a time when China has quietly entered the post-Deng era, concentrating on economic construction and creating a peaceful international environment to ensure stability during the period of transition has become China's basic starting point when devising its diplomatic strategies. Third, giving priority to economic considerations has become an important starting point when choosing diplomatic options. Fourth, Jiang's announcement that the leadership had "completed its transition" was as good as telling the world that China's third-and fourth-generation leaders had eased into their historical roles as main players...
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8-206/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-22-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 JIANG Zemin Calls for More Foreign Investment [CND, 05/21/95] BEIJING -- CCP top leader JIANG Zemin wrote an essay for the People's Daily, published in the paper's front page, to call for more foreign investment. He stressed that such activities must be conducted through official channels. JIANG warns about the side effects that foreign money may bring, such as being intent on profit, worship of money and worsening corruption, which he related to capitalism. Recent move to a five-day workweek has worried some foreign investors for its impact on increase of production costs, a Japan Economic Newswire report said. (Hong TANG, Jian LIU, Daluo JIA)
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8-207/ Kyodo News Service, 5-30-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Li, Jiang tighten control bid, H.K. newspaper says"; ACS VT96
	 Concurrently, President Jiang Zemin is taking steps to control the activities and influence of liberal sympathizers such as former President Yang Shangkun and disgraced Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, it said.
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8-208 / DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
	 Written by: Patrick Tyler Source: San Francisco Chonicle 5/16, 1995, & IFCSS REVIEW 5/19, 1995 The campaign has already given the uncharismatic Jiang a much needed boost with the public. "Maybe we've all been underestimating him," says one Beijing resident in an increasingly common reaction. But the newfound respect could dissolve if he does not make good on what the public at least believes he has promised them: an even more high-ranking victim, preferably Li Peng. If he failed to oust Li, says a Hong Kong-based Chinese banker, he will seem less courageous that the Chen ouster sugg- ested. On the other hand, if he dose push out Li, says the analyst, " people will say that others have worse corruption problems," and pressure will mount for more heads to roll. And in the delicate balance of power within the Politburo, Li actually poses little political threat to Jiang; if Li goes, the balance of power could shift to more dangerous rivals like National People's Congress Chairman Qiao Shi.
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8-209/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 56; THR VT96
	 The main problem facing the Fourth Plenum was who should replace Zhao as General Secretary. The man who got the job was Jiang Zemin, the Shanghai boss who had succeeded in solving the student problem in China's largest city. A suave pro-reformist, Jiang was nevertheless a surprise choice because at the time he was not a member of the Politburo, let alone its Standing Committee. Deng Xiaoping expressed his view that, whereas Mao Zedong had dominated the first generation of CCP leaders and he himself the second, Jiang Zemin had the ability to lead the third. Li Peng must certainly have been disappointed to see Jiang get the top job over his head. What this implied was that, while Li Peng got the odium of the massacre, somebody else got the main reward. Of course, Li Peng retained the job of Premier of the State Council and kept his place on the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
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 8-210/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.46; THR VT96
	 Moderate reformers represent a line of continuity to the reforms introduced under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in the early 1960s. They strictly reject any form of democratization that might deviate from a single-party proletarian dictatorship, though they are willing to give at least lip service to a clearer division of labor between party and government. Their goal is "perfection" of the existing system rather than any fundamental departure from it. With regard to economic reforms, they adhere to the notion of the market as a "bird in the cage" of the plan--any expansion of private property or market activity must be strictly limited. However, they endorse existing reforms, such as the de facto decollectivization of agriculture or China's opening to the West. Among the supporters of this point of view are Jiang Zemin, Chen Yun (with reservations), and Wan Li. Although Deng Xiaoping took a somewhat more adventurous approach to economic reform in the past, supporting price reform in the spring and early summer of 1988, since Tiananmen he seems to have cast his lot with the moderate reformers. The so-called princes' party (taize dang) (children of high cadres) also generally subscribes to this point of view, which protects its vested interests. 
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8-210a / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	The fundamental reason why the CCP calls on the nation to study the "political theories" in the works of Deng Xiaoping is to uphold and defend the "ideological line" of reform and opening and make sure that "it will not waver for 100 years" . The CCP's call to study Deng' s works is not merely a general call. 
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8-211 / Wisconsin State Journal, February 15, 1995, SECTION: Opinion, Pg. 7A, HEADLINE: U.S. SHOULD FOCUS ON CHINA; ACS VT96
	 U.S. influence is made all the more important by the character of the man likely to succeed Deng, President Jiang Zemin. Jiang is known in China as ''the weather vane'' because the political winds can so easily change his direction. The more Washington can ensure the winds blow in a pro-U.S. direction, the better.
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8-212/ Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 38 ; MDS VT96
	 Jiang Zemin, China's President, while holding all the principal titles of power (President, Secretary-General of the Party and Chairman of the Military Committee), is not believed to have sufficient influence within the Party bureaucracy and the army to hold onto power as supreme leader.
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8-213/ Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 ROSS TERRILL: He [Jiang Zemin] doesn't. He doesn't' have the authority to combine opposites. Mr. Deng Xiaoping has combined opposites. He's said to be a great pragmatist, Deng, and he is. But he isn't all that pragmatic. He threw away Marxist economics, but he didn't throw away Leninist politics. Now, Jiang Zemin doesn't have the gravitas to maintain the fiction that you can fit those things together. So I don't think it would be a smooth evolution to Jiangism. Secondly, you could have the dire scenario of the regions breaking away or drastic decentralization, especially if Deng Xiaoping holds on until the eve of Hong Kong coming back. Hong Kong coming back is a major injection into South China of the capitalist world. Still, I think China's cohesive enough to avoid that. Or you could have what happened in Moscow: simply, the Communist Party unexpected for all of us, collapses. Well, it would be a surprise to me. 
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8-214 / Patrick E. Tyler International Herald Tribune, October 04, 1994 HEADLINE: Send-Off for Deng, Once Again; But the Ailing Leader's Role Remains Crucial //MDS-VT96
	 Mr. Deng, though ailing, is still the most powerful man in China. His protegeslike Mr. Jiang, fill the ranks of the party leadership. But there is no certainty that their power will long outlive Mr. Deng, despite their official assertions that the succession in China is firmly in place. 
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8-215 / Yojana Sharma Inter Press Service, October 4, 1994, HEADLINE: CHINA: IS THERE LIFE AFTER DENG FOR JIANG ZEMIN?//MDS-VT96
	 But it seems not everyone in Beijing is happy with the thought of Chinese Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin becoming China's next leader, and analysts here say the succession may be far from assured. 
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8-216 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Although lacking the charisma of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, Jiang has managed the government and strengthened his power base by appointing his supporters to top positions in Beijing. However, he is widely regarded as a transitional figure; Deng's two previous; heirs, General Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both were casualties of factional disputes in the 1980s similar to those underway in China today.
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8-217/ PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 At the time, Deng was just another little-known figure in the West. Today, as Deng's death approaches, China's enfeebled paramount leader has uttered to a daughter that with Zemin in charge, ``I am content.'' Many Chinese believe that this prescription, too, will not endure. Jiang was always a compromise, a choice least offensive to China's hard-liners, whom Deng was forced to placate after the democratic uprising in June 1989.
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8-218 / Yojana Sharma Inter Press Service, October 4, 1994, HEADLINE: CHINA: IS THERE LIFE AFTER DENG FOR JIANG ZEMIN?//MDS-VT96
	 Yet despite all the efforts to portray Jiang as a statesman, his ability to maintain power within China will depend largely on his relations with the military. Unlike other Chinese leaders, he has never served in the army and does not have a well-developed power base in the armed forces. 
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8-219/ TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 Mr Jiang, formerly the party boss in Shanghai, is in fact the third of Mr Deng's anointed heirs; his two predecessors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, fell by the wayside in the 1980s, sacrificed to party hardliners. Mr Jiang was catapulted to the top as a compromise candidate after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. His problem is that titles maketh not the man; he lacks both the power base and charisma of his ailing patron. He is, however, a seasoned party operator. The pattern of disparate events over the past year seems to coalesce The Independent, May 26, 1995
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8-220/ Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 Whatever the truth, another part of the alleged Zhu speech certainly rang true -- his insistence that the party must win back public trust, now much dissipated. The new leadership, he argued, has to establish its own credentials and not rely on those established by the older generation.
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8-221/ John Gittings The Guardian, October 11, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: CHINA SEES AN ERA GO DOWN TO ITS LAST FLICKER;As rumours abound that Deng's death is imminent, John Gittings asks what lies in store for Beijing when the architect of economic reforms is no more//MDS-VT96
	 This is where Mr Jiang's problems really lie, because bad economic news reopens the debate about reform, which has divided the leadership ever since Mao's death. 
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8-222 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Jiang's strategy also involves an assertive foreign policy that fortifies his credentials as a nationalist leader but has spooked China's neighbors and added to friction with other nations.
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8-223 / TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 At present, the signs are that Mr Jiang is using every means to try and secure his political inheritance as primus inter pares. First, he must ensure the support of the military - an indispensable asset even for a sub-imperial Chinese leader. Since the beginning of last year, Mr Jiang has let the generals put their hardline stamp on foreign policy.
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8-224 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 The U.S. administration believes power has passed to a clique of technocrats and military officials led by president and Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin. Jiang is seen by Washington as a much weaker and stodgier politician than Deng, rendering him largely incapable of resolving major disputes through compromise. His lesser stature has allowed nationalists and conservatives to begin exerting new influence -- a development that U.S. officials fear will undermine key U.S. commercial and political interests in China.
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8-225 / Yojana Sharma, Inter Press Service, May 26, 1995, HEADLINE: CHINA: CAN SHENZHEN SURVIVE DENG? ACS VT96
	 Hong Kong-based China watchers say the rise of party chief Jiang Zemin and vice president Zhu Rongji -- both former mayors of Shanghai -- has given power to the so-called Shanghai faction which would rather see Shanghai become the business center of China than upstart Shenzhen. Shanghai is now being promoted by Beijing rather than Shenzhen. Officials outside Shenzhen dourly joke that the one thing Shenzhen residents pine for most is another "nanxun" or "imperial tour", as Deng's 1992 visit is often referred to, in order to revive the city's political fortunes.
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8-226/ Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, for example, is striving to cement his power base, having only stepped onto the national stage, from his previous obscurity in Shanghai, since the 1969 Tiananmen Square incident. There is a natural antagonism between Beijing and Shanghai, and analysts say that Chen Xitong has been a bitter opponent of Jiang since his elevation to the top post.
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8-227 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 But Deng's concentrated power has also created the potential for considerable instability after his departure. His appointed successor, President and Communist Party head Jiang Zemin, is widely viewed as politically weak and too beholden to the military. Without the restraining influence of Deng's patronage, it is unclear how long Mr. Jiang's relatively unchallenged stature as ''first among equals'' will last.
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8-228 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 Complicating Washington's effort to find some leverage during the post-Deng era is uncertainty about how long Jiang will remain in power and what type of government his successor might produce. The outcome, officials said, could determine whether China remains a peaceful power or becomes a strategic enemy of the United States.
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 8-229 / Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94;-"Slippery succession" p. 23 ; SEG VT96
	 Both of these uncharismatic men were plucked from relative obscurity in party ranks. Both lacked independent power bases of their own, especially in the military- . Despite their plethora of lofty titles, neither Jiang nor Hua could go it alone as leaders. Both had to rely on a collective leadership comprising abler technocrats and better-connected politicians. Jiang's two main supporters so far could just as easily turn into his rivals: Premier Li Peng, tribune of China's baulky bureaucrats and conservative party elders, and economics tsar Zhu Rongji, who may enjoy wider cachet abroad than at home.
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 8-230/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 103; THR VT96
	 After reemerging briefly to congratulate the storm troops and preside over the Fourth Plenum, Deng lapsed into a less salient position for much of the next two years. Having reneged on two heirs apparent, he tried for the third time to groom a successor in the person of Jiang Zemin. Jiang, however, feeling understandably insecure, became a political chameleon, trying to please every grouping within the leadership; by 1992 Deng had become so exasperated with him that he reportedly invited Liu Huaqing to take over his seat as chair of the CMC (Liu wisely declined). Meanwhile, Li Peng consolidated his hold on the economic portfolio, while chairing the Party's Leading Group on Foreign Affairs.
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8-231 / Philippe Massonnet Agence France Presse, October 11, 1994, HEADLINE: Return of China's Old Guard excites speculation over Deng//MDS-VT96
	 The party plenum -- held last month ahead of schedule -- underpinned Jiang, already president, party secretary and armed forces chief, by promoting two of his Shanghai allies to key jobs. Jiang's perceived rival for the unquestioned leadership of post-Deng China is Prime Minister Li Peng, a deep-hued conservative. 
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8-232 / Philippe Massonnet Agence France Presse, October 11, 1994, HEADLINE: Return of China's Old Guard excites speculation over Deng//MDS-VT96
	 "The conservatives are obviously irritated by the last plenum and don't want to give Jiang Zemin complete control over the succession question, which is why Peng, Li's political backer, made that appearance," another diplomat said. 
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8-233/Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 38; MDS VT96
	 Li Peng, the Prime Minister, is seen as having been too closely associated with the events June 1989 to have sufficient authority to be the pre-eminent leader. 
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8-234/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 249 ;THR VT96
	 In the early 1990s, Yang Shangkun and Li Peng were still widely hated and despised among the inhabitants of Beijing and the intelligentsia because of their role in the Beijing massacre. At the First Session of the Eighth National People's Congress held in March 1993, Yang Shangkun was replaced as PRC President by Jiang Zemin, who thus achieved the top formal positions in the Party, military and state spheres. Despite the reverses Li Peng suffered at the National People's Congress meeting of March 1992 (see Chapter 5), he succeeded in regaining influence to the extent that he was appointed to a second five-year term as Premier of the State Council at the National People's Congress meeting of March 1993. It was strongly rumoured that, as of 1992, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin enjoyed very good relations. In other words, the friction between them caused by the fact that Jiang Zemin got the top job as General Secretary of the CCP in preference to Li, who has received only hatred for his support of the massacre, appeared to have abated, as had the likelihood of a power struggle between them, such as the one between Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng which poisoned the atmosphere so severely in 1989.
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8-235/ Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 ... Before his departure from South Korea, Li Peng told the world that China's third-generation leaders are "united and capable" , that " a third-generation leadership collective with Jiang Zemin as the core has been formed" and that China has the ability to handle problems after the passing of Deng Xiaoping. 
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8-236/ Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 On the other hand, in his meeting with South Korean businessmen, Li Peng declared: " China attaches importance to the assimilation of all fruits of civilization in the world, including the fruits of civilization created by developed countries of the West and the rich experience accumulated by newly industrialized countries and regions of Asia in their economic development. This includes efforts to absorb funds, advanced science and technology, and management experience, and to learn other fruits of civilization." According to some observers, these remarks of Li Peng's watered down the "political flavour of the ideology" of China learning from foreign countries. Foreign observers believe that these acts and declarations by Li Peng were not personal comments made on the spur of the moment, but formed part of "the collective behaviour of third-generation leaders" . The self-confidence shown in these acts stems from the stability of China's political situation and self-confidence in one's own culture...
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8-237/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. of Political Science at the University of California, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "From revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 199 ;THR VT96
	 In contrast, the more conservative bureaucratic technocrats, represented by Li Peng, advocated recentralization of economic authority, a tight monetary policy, and a program to perfect the enterprise contract system. Understandably, the semi-retired senior political leaders preferred Li Peng's view, or it may have been the case that those old leaders dictated the policy to Li Peng. Regardless of who led the way, Li Peng's preference resembled Chen Yun's conceptualization: that reform means expanding the bird cage so that the bird will have more space, rather than letting the bird out of the cage to fly at will. In other words, the hard-liners believed that the state's planned economy should remain the central feature, while allowing the market mechanism to play only a supplementary role.
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8-238 / Kyodo News Service, 5-30-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Li, Jiang tighten control bid, H.K. newspaper says"; ACS VT96
	 Chinese Premier Li Peng has ordered spy units to crack down on a reemerging dissident movement, the South China Morning Post reported Tuesday. Quoting security sources in Beijing, the daily said Li has told the ministries of state security and of public security to increase antidissident operations as the movement has spread to more than 10 provinces and major cities. Li and State Council Secretary General Luo Gan have concluded that ''covert operatives from a major Western power'' have given financial and other support to dissident rings, the report said.
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8-239 / PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 Deng's sudden decision in the summer of 1992 to drop Yang and purge the military of his influence, and that of his younger, half-brother, Gen. Yang Baibing, has been one of the enduring mysteries of China's succession struggle. Now, from the accounts of former Communist Party insiders, Chinese observers, and Western diplomats, the dimensions of Yang's assault on the political status quo are becoming clearer.
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8-240/ PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 For a man who is supposed to be out of power, Shangkun gets remarkable attention when he demonstrates his influence, as he did this winter here in Guangdong, China's richest province. One newspaper in Shenzhen, the contained capitalist economic zone across from Hong Kong, published Yang's picture on the front page as if he were visiting royalty. In Zhuhai, which borders Macao, the city fathers banqueted Yang aboard a yacht. After all, one city resident said, it was Yang's influence in the Chinese military that got Zhuhai the rights to build an international airport, putting the sleepy port town on Asia's map.
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8-241/ PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 While Yang's age makes it doubtful that he will dominate Chinese succession over a number of years, his influence after Deng's death could tip the factional balance that has swung between Marxist hard-liners and reformers for nearly two decades. ``Yang Shangkun is making a serious bid to come back and he has a tremendous network inside the country,'' said Douglas Paal, a White House specialist on China during the Bush administration.
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8-242/ PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 ``Yang Shangkun goes along with Deng and always has,'' said James R. Lilley, former U.S. ambassador to China. ``If you go back and look at his career, there is a consistent pattern of his coming down on the side of the reformers.''
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8-243 / PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 Of the six old men likely to remain as revolutionary elders of China after Deng Xiaoping dies, only one has commanded the 3.2-million-man People's Liberation Army, a key institution during the coming political succession. Only one has made a state visit to Washington, talks frequently about the importance of strong relations with the United States, and counts George Bush among his friends. His name is Yang Shangkun, a military man who has often backed reformers. And among the octogenarian elders -- Yang is 88 -- he poses the biggest threat to upend the political order that Deng, his lifelong friend, has bequeathed to a restless nation of 1.2 billion Chinese.
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8-244 / PATRICK E. TYLER, New York Times, 5-14-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Ex-military man could tip China's balance of power; ACS VT96
	 It was said that Yang was retracing the steps of Deng's 1992 southern crusade, which signaled China's economic boom. That Yang made this pilgrimage speaks volumes about his political intention to play a kingmaker role in the post-Deng era.
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8-245 /Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 113; THR VT96
	 With Deng not there to enforce elite conformity, other viewpoints and individuals will certainly emerge. For example, Deng's fellow eider, Yang Shangkun, has close ties to. the military that have helped to make that institution supportive of reform efforts. How Yang and the military will behave in a succession period is uncertain. The same might be said of Qiao Shi, head of China's internal security apparatus, who has been similarly supportive of reform. Finally, the prominence of many sons and daughters of leaders has led some to speak of a future role for such "princelings." Although they did not fare well in the delegate elections to the 14th party congress, the personalistic quality of Chinese politics cautions against discounting their influence. One of the more interesting policy approaches that has grown out of such a group is associated with Chen Yun's son, Chen Yuan. Dubbed neo-conservatives by the Hong Kong press, they seek to combine authoritarian, more centralized rule with a reformed economy. There are sure to be other groups and platforms.
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8-246 / Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 249; THR VT96
	 One name frequently mentioned as a rising star is Zhu Rongji, the reformist who rose to be a Vice-Premier in April 1991 and to the Standing Committee of the CCP's Politburo just after the Fourteenth Congress in 1992. It was Zhu who had followed Deng's initiative so enthusiastically and taken the lead on making the Capital Iron and Steel Corporation a model for giving great autonomy to the country's biggest economic enterprises. If anyone was in the reformist mould so favoured by Deng, it was he.
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8-247/ Kyodo News Service, 5-14-95, Anticorruption drive part of China's power struggle, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 Also taking a high profile role in the anti-corruption drive is Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, another Shanghaiese promoted onto the national stage since 1989. Regarded as an advocate of a more open market economy, Zhu recently has been making speeches suggesting the need for more central planning in order to root out the spiritual pollution caused by provincial-level officials suddenly being given too much power over economic affairs.
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 8-248 / Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 239-240; MDS VT96
	 The most attractive leader in the post-Deng lineup is Deputy Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, who has managed the remarkable economic surge of the 1990s. Zhu's brain trust of young Chinese university economics graduates reminds Chinese of the teams Zhao and Hu assembled to extend the reforms into the political sphere. But no such talk emerges now from Zhu's two domains, the Bank of China and the State Council. His teams keep their focus on the economy.
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8-249 / Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G.. Goodman and George Segal, p. 156; THR VT96
	 After the elders (especially Deng Xiaoping and Deng Yingzhao) are gone, Li Peng is not likely to survive, much less Jiang Zemin. A possible candidate is Zhao Ziyang. In the absence of a few of the hard-liners, Zhao might be positioned for a come-back. Zhao evidently won a measure of acceptance from the PLA high command in 1988-9, when he became directly involved with military planning issues.
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8-250/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 36; THR VT96
	 Unfortunately for most Chinese, the basic policies of the Zhao group differ only in degree from those of Deng. The "new authoritarianism" advocated by many intellectuals associated with Zhao (who would benefit from it) would replace Deng's "old authoritarianism," but this would only replace a form of fascism with a benevolent (but largely unchecked) despotism, and would continue the capitalist style industrialization of China, and its further entrance into the international economic order.
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 8-251 /Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 115 ;THR VT96
	 The least-well-known member of the Politburo Standing Committee cannot be excluded as a come-from-behind candidate for the succession, He is Qiao Shi, Almost nothing is known about his political base, his personality, or his beliefs that would indicate how well he could establish power or what policies he would favor if he did win, But because he controls the security apparatus, he has to be taken seriously as a possible winner in a succession crisis.
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8-252/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p.52 ;THR VT96
	 The exact shape of this leadership has, to be sure, been a matter of persistent controversy, among CCP elites no less than among Western China-watchers. The contest between an emphasis on obedience to organizational superiors and a need to stimulate mass initiative, between adherence to formal procedure and the resort to more flexible informal expedients, and between collective leadership and a cult of personality has lasted for decades, and the leadership itself has changed its form from time to time depending on who prevailed. But one generalization remains fairly constant. As a general rule, CCP leadership has been essentially monocratic. There has normally been a Paramount Leader (hereinafter the PL), though he has not necessarily held the highest formal positions, and the prerogatives and role expectations of the PL have differed perceptibly from those of his colleagues. These include the right to final say over major national decisions, including the nation's disposition to the rest of the world (alliance, war, or peace), whether and what kind of propaganda campaign to launch, which policy line to promote, and so forth; consequently, the PL has had ultimate command of the Party, the armed forces, and domestic security apparatus. There are occasional exceptions to this rule, as we shall see, but these exceptions tend to give rise to various political deformations and are viewed as pathological among Chinese participants.
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 8-253 / Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p. 3 , THR VT96
	 China has entered a deathwatch similar to that of the last years under Mao Zedong. Since 1956 every individual groomed as the future leader of China--Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang--has been purged from office. Deng Xiaoping recovered his footing, but not before being twice purged. The impending deaths of the entire senior leadership of octogenarians will force the current "chosen successors," Li Peng and Jiang Zemin to operate without their patrons. It will also bring to power a new generation of leaders whose political orientations are still unclear. The actors and political dynamics of a post-Deng era may be different, but the underlying problems and choices will! remain.
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 8-254 / Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "Slippery succession" p. 23 ;SEG VT96
	 Four broad scenarios, all with plenty of latitude for overlap or hybridisation, dominate most analysts' projections for the post- Deng succession: - a smooth transfer to a transitional collective- leadership, - a resurgence of those within the elite who are currently out of power, - a devolution of power to the regions, or - a rallying around Beijing's banner of militant nationalism. "Why choose between these prospects?" a European embassy's political counsellor wonders. "We're just as likely to see all four phases in one sequence or another."
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8-255 /Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," P. 34; CJJ VT96
	 Today, either a real contest for power in China, or a dispersal of power away from the center, would make it difficult for China to play the land 0f leading role in Asia that both it and the world seem to expect. For at least a period of time, China's neighbors would of necessity become involved in trying t0 manage change there in directions they favored. At best they might help in the creation of a constitutional and legitimate Chinese state, willing t0 put into the past the issues that worry Asia today; at worst they might find themselves confronted with an anarchic China in which the "helpers" competed for influence and economic access 0r with a China where hard-liners had won a tenuous victory. As we have seen, such speculations raise a myriad 0f possibilities. What they share, however, is that they would all be results 0f regime change. It is time we thought more about it.
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8-256/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 All leaders want to continue the current situation, avoid bloody leadership struggles like the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, and they know the benefits of a faceless collective leadership, which serves, more or less, a common interest. The report [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] set three possibilities for a post-Deng transitional period:
 -- The "Linear Future" scenario, in which a collective leadership holds together with support from the People's Liberation Army and the security apparatus. The leaders would give priorities to economic growth and social [reform].
 -- The "Liberal Reform" scenario, in which a radical reform coalition wins out over conservative reformers with support from provincial leaders, security forces, and key sectors of the army. Political reform is judged necessary to keep the Communist Party in power.
 -- The "Disintegration" scenario, in which China will break up like the Soviet Union because of unresolved factionalism at the political center and loss of control over the instruments of economic, political and social control.
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8-257/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 The group [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] set five sub-scenarios after breakup:
 --A nationalist strongman will emerge
 -- China will totally collapse
 --A democratic China will emerge
 --A rhetorically aggressive but relatively weak China will emerge.
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8-258 /Andrew J. Nathan, Well l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 65 ;THR VT96
	 Scenario A, "The Expected Future," foresees the success of the plans which Deng Xiaoping now has in train. Politically, it involves an orderly succession from Deng to his designated successors. Economically, it entails continuation of the development policies Deng has initiated, and in the foreign economic realm it means continued development of economic ties with the West through trade, technology import, and joint ventures. As the 1980s begin, Deng has achieved a degree of dominance over the Politburo and Central Committee rare in the past 30 years, has presented a clear vision of the future, and has apparently gained widespread bureaucratic and social support. His chances of success are considerable. Yet, our analysis of leadership factionalism suggests that there is a serious possibility that anti-Deng factions exist and that during the next decade, at an opportune moment, they will form coalitions to unseat or checkmate Deng or his successors in the time-honored pattern of Chinese factionalism. Our analysis of policy disputes shows that in such an eventuality the movement of policy would probably be toward the left. And our analysis of the bureaucracy and society has shown that despite the attractions of Deng's program, there are forces that may oppose it. All these considerations make it impossible to assign "The Expected Future" a dominant chance for success. We assign it a probability of 30 percent.
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8-259/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p .46; THR VT96
	 Radical reformers endorse much more sweeping marketization and privatization--such as complete price reform--than do conservative reformers. More significantly, they believe that reform cannot be restricted to the economic realm but must include politics. This means not only separation of party and government functions but some movement toward democratization and expanded human rights. (just how much remains moot). Radical reformers include the late Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang; his successor, Zhao Ziyang; former Secretariat member Hu Qili; Vice-Minister Tian Jiyun; and presumably Li Ruihuan, a Politburo member and CC Propaganda Department chair. 
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8-260 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 66; THR VT96
	 Scenario F is "A Shift to the Right." I have shown that, in the ideological spectrum, few defend policies further to the right than those now in train. If a "more rightist" policy position exists, it has barely been articulated. Some of the writings of theorists and politicians associated with Deng--particularly Chen Yun, Xue Muqiao, and Zhao Ziyang--contain suggestions of a domestic development strategy involving looser planning and greater reliance on market mechanisms of coordination, but so far they have said little about foreign economic policies. One cannot exclude the possibility that, if Deng succeeds in consolidating his power and if the present program is spectacularly successful, China may experiment with even closer ties to the West. I assign this scenario a probability of 5 percent.
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8-261 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 In this scenario [Liberal Reform], which was supported by only 20 percent of the study group, a radical reform coalition wins out over conservative reformers--the development that would be consistent with U.S. interests. It is the kind of China that the United States believes it wants.
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8-262 /Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 66; THR VT96
	 Scenario E, "Immobilism," envisions a factional stalemate at the top and a bureaucratic response of crippling caution. There is no reason why "lingering fear" cannot become a way of life in the /./' bureaucracy for a decade or more; hence the urgency for Deng both of consolidating his power 'and of being seen to have consolidated it. Many bureaucrats can be expected to wait as long as another year or two to see whether it is entirely safe (in the case of supporters) or necessary (in the case of opponents) to work wholeheartedly for Deng's program. Any leadership dispute or purge in the interim is likely to be echoed and amplified in government offices and thus lead to frustrations and perhaps serious losses for foreign businesses- . Given my estimate of the likelihood that leadership factions persist, I assign "Immobilism" a fairly solid probability of 20 per- cent.
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8-263 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 43 ; THR VT96
	 Scenario E, "Immobilism," joins B and C in assuming the existence of leadership factions for whom foreign economic policy is a matter of disagreement. But this scenario does not envision the fall of the Dengist faction. It foresees simply the survival among the leadership of strong anti-Dengist factions, perhaps unclearly seen in the West but known to the Chinese bureaucracy. The consequence of mixed signals at the top would be bureaucratic inaction at the middle and below, where the fate of most foreign-related projects is determined. Economic or international-security reverses could encourage both factional debate and bureaucratic malaise, as could unpleasant incidents involving tourists or resident foreign technicians. However generated, immobilism could lead to a slow strangulation for foreign businesses--an outcome not always classified as political risk but one that I argue has a fair chance (20 percent) of occurring in China. 
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8-264 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS -OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 43; THR VT96
	 Scenario D, "A Change of Mind," is scenario C without the purge. Deng remains in power or hands over power peacefully to his followers, but the leadership becomes disenchanted with current foreign economic policies and switches to a more isolationist development policy that significantly reduces opportunities for Western businessmen. Obvious causes for such a shift would be poor economic performance or Soviet success in tipping the balance of power against the West. Either development would lead to a reappraisal of the utility of Western ties in developing China and assuring Chinese security. While Westerners might assume that economic disappointments can be remedied by opening even further to the West (scenario F), scenario D assumes that the practical limits of the outward-looking economic strategy have already been approximately reached and that room for adjustment lies in the isolationist direction. I will argue that this scenario is neither highly probable nor out of the question. I assign it a probability of 10 percent.
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8-265 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 65; THR VT96
	 Scenario C is "A Factional Shift to the Left." It involves a seizure of power by a faction using Maoist slogans to promote a foreign economic policy of self reliance. Our inspection of the current political scene suggests that factions do still exist and that the leftist policy options remain attractive to my Chinese. If the dynamics of Chinese politics remain what they have been, Deng's consolidation of power will stimulate factional counter-activity within the leadership. Since Deng's group has occupied the "right" in the Chinese policy spectrum, an opposition coalition is likely to move to the still vital left. Hence, I assign this scenario a probability equal to that of scenario A, 30 percent.
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8-266 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 65 ; THR VT96
	 Scenario B is "Another Cultural Revolution." This would entail the emergence of an opposition faction using Maoist slogans, that faction's call for a mass movement against Deng's line, and strong response from dissatisfied elements in society. I have argued that opposition factions may exist, that Maoist slogans will continue to make sense to many in China, and that a large dissatisfied youth population will be present during the 1980s; nevertheless, it is unlikely that all these elements will come together as the scenario requires. The balance of social forces would militate against the success of this strategy, and strong sentiment among both the leaders and the people would probably isolate a leadership faction that used this strategy of conflict. This scenario cannot be excluded, but its probability is small--I estimate it at 5 percent.
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 8-267 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 42 ;THR VT96
	 Scenario B is "Another Cultural Revolution." An anti-foreign faction claiming loyalty to Mao's memory emerges as a dominant group or strong minority in the leadership. It criticizes the foreign economic policies listed in scenario A as betrayals of Maoism that subvert socialism and tie China to dependency on the capitalist West. It finds a mass response from those who have not benefited from the new policies, especially unemployed and underemployed young people. Bureaucrats whose careers have not prospered under Deng (perhaps those who first rose in the Cultural Revolution) join the movement. There is widespread civil disorder. Joint ventures are confiscated, contracts abrogated. China turns inward. This scenario might be sparked by a collapse of the world market, a major war in Korea or Southeast Asia, poor economic results under Deng or conspicuously growing economic inequality. Businessmen seem to view it as the most likely of the alternative scenarios. I will argue that it is one of the most unlikely, with a probability of 5 percent.
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8-268 / Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
	 Clearly, the American strategy towards the potentially worst outbreak of instability since Mr Deng's ascendancy in late 1978 is a show of force.
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8-269 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 Deng's precipitous decline in health has also coincided with a notable toughening of Chinese rhetoric on sensitive issues. Beijing recently advised Washington that its continued support for a U.N. resolution critical of Chinese human rights policies "could affect other aspects of the relationship," according to a senior U.S. official.
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8-270 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 32; CJJ VT96
	 Any conflict for power in China will see contenders seeking to mobilize foreign resources of all kinds. Some will be economic: Hong Kong and its wealth will come into play, as well as Shanghai and perhaps Taiwan. Some will be technical: access to print media, to overseas transmitters, to intelligence-all of these could be provided by neighbors of China, and would play a part in a power struggle. Military supplies might play a role: although China is highly self-sufficient in most weapons, certain systems, such as state-of-the-art aircraft, are largely lacking, and could prove decisive. But the most important foreign resource will probably be recognition and diplomatic support. For most of this/s century, Chinese governments have vied with one another for international recognition, which they have then sought to parlay into domestic legitimation.
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8-271 / Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p. 39; THR VT96
	 Finally, it is important to realize that no matter how much individual Chinese leaders may desire stable Sino-American relations, political developments in Beijing may undermine the Chinese leadership's ultimate ability to cooperate with its American counterpart. As China's succession politics intensify, if Western support for China's democracy movement is sustained, any policy suggesting accommodation with Washington's interests would evoke the opposition of China's still-powerful conservative ideologues and Communist party bureaucrats. Thus, while they may prefer to cultivate better relations with the United States over time, China's present leaders and foreign-policymakers may foist the responsibility of maintaining good Sino-American relations onto the Bush administration.
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8-272 / Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College , 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 122; THR VT96
	 In the past, periods of political uncertainty have usually engendered fears of outside intervention on the part of China's leaders. Should disturbances break out or provinces use the occasion of leadership transition to enlarge their privileges, then one might expect aspiring leaders to react sharply to such perceived or real attempts at interference. Finally, succession brings political posturing and opportunism. Aspiring leaders could mobilize support behind appeals to nationalism that could touch upon a wide range of issues, from Taiwan to the disputed islands in the Pacific and South China Sea to cultural and economic penetration.
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8-273 / Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 123; THR VT96
	 Indeed, during a post-Deng succession the bases for such a position might actually increase, not simply because the chances for repression will increase, but because the chances for affecting political change in China also will appear to have increased. Not only will there be temptations to direct American policy toward the support of more "progressive" leaders, but there might be talk of giving special encouragement or support to some of the exporting provinces in the southern part of China that seem particularly oriented toward the United States. If past history is a guide, such attempts to change China from the outside will not only fail, but in a postsuccession atmosphere of vulnerability and nationalism, they could be used to drum up patriotic opposition- to outside interference and throw relations into yet another crisis.
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8-274 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 Many Sinologists here expect China's immediate agenda to continue along current lines. ''As there is a broad consensus [within the Chinese leadership] in favor of a smooth transition, I would foresee a period of maybe three years in which there will be the normal process of political competition,'' says Ron Montaperto of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington.
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8-275 / Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, March 30, 1995, Transcript # 1345, HEADLINE: Dr. Henry Kissinger Talks about Foreign Relations Now; ACS VT96
	 Dr. HENRY KISSINGER: I think Deng Xiaoping has become so feeble that the successors are pretty well in place now. 
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 8-276 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Polit cs, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 42 ;THR VT96
	 Scenario A is the "Expected Future." It foresees Deng Xiaoping's continuation in office or an orderly succession of his followers. The government continues the foreign economic policies Deng has laid down (allowing for reasonable adjustments to changing circumstances). Foreign trade grows along the lines predicted by Western projections described earlier. Tax and other laws are promulgated; they satisfy prospective foreign investors and increasing numbers of joint ventures are established. Most do reasonably well. Offshore oil development proceeds on schedule, with the continued participation of foreign firms. Tourism grows; hotels are built; internal air routes expand. China uses all normal forms of international credit, including concessionary credits and government-to-government development aid. Growing social constituencies form behind the new policies. The bureaucracy, assured of the nation's direction, becomes increasingly efficient in processing decisions required to conduct business relations with the West. By the end of the 1980s, China is still a highly centralized, Communist Party-controlled society, but the standard of living is rising. Some of the social and political problems of "developed communism" familiar in Eastern Europe are evident but well under control.
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8-277 / Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 68; THR VT96
	 In the short run, China may soon witness a nasty]leadership succession struggle, fueled by personal and fictional antipathies. But it would be a mistake to equate elite turmoil for a change in political course. When the smoke clears, it is highly likely that the Leninist-capitalist consensus will still be in place, no matter who is in charge. Likewise, conflict between the Beijing regime and the provincial governments is bound to grow as capitalist development creates increasingly distinct economic interests. But such conflict, intense and tumultuous as it may be, won't inevitably undermine the Leninist-capitalist consensus prevailing nationwide, particularly with a Chinese military committed to maintaining China's unity.
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 8-278 / Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 38 ; MDS VT96
	 With Deng's authority intact, all actions are measured against his past statements and policies. No senior Chinese leader dare deviate from the Dengist line. In this atmosphere the Chinese leadership remains committed to fundamental ideology and to economic reform. One can expect, therefore, continuing economic modernisation and high growth rates and no movement on political reform. Beijing also takes a hardline stance in dealing with the outside world. In this environment there can and will be no concessions on issues such as Hong Kong or Taiwan.
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8-279 / Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, ; p. 15 THR VT96
	 The low level of leadership institutionalization and the inability of political structures 10 resolve intra-elite differences or open better channels between the leadership and the masses point to the deterioration of older patterns of governance. Because the chosen successors and bureaucratic technocrats may not be able to manage inherited political problems, the passing of the party elders will not automatically end political stagnation.
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8-280 / Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p. 16 , THR VT96
	 In short, the crisis of the Chinese political system transcends the immediate problems, as great as they may be, of finding successors to the aging leaders and resolving intra-elite disputes. Collapse of party authority and the inability of formal ideology to foster popular legitimacy or elite consensus have destroyed the old mechanisms of effective governance. At a time when long-term internal and external trends are unfavorable to the existing party-state, political power in China remains poorly institutionalized and heavily dependent on personal connections.
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8-281 / Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 WINSTON LORD, Asst. Sec. of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs: [Washington] Well first, we should begin with the axiom that a Chinese expert is an oxymoron, or just a plain moron. Having said that, obviously, they're in a success phase. In fact, they have been for some time. This has been a gradual succession. Deng Xiaoping retired from making decisions or daily involvement in decisions, some time ago and is gradually setting up a transition. So you've had sort of a coalition leadership, led by a man named President Jiang Zemin and others in place for some time. I think the conventional wisdom - I see no reason to challenge it - is that that will certainly be the case for at least the coming months and the early period after Deng Xiaoping fades from the scene. I think what you're seeing now certainly both on foreign and economic policy, a certain caution at a time when people are jockeying for leadership in the future, they're not inclined to make bold decisions, particularly on controversial issues.
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8-282/ Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord made comments to that effect in recent Congressional hearings. And Admiral Richard Macke, the US Pacific Command's chief, told Congress that the transition in China was being "orchestrated very well" and that the Clinton administration does not expect Mr Deng's death to lead to changes in Chinese policies. Those remarks may have reassured the members of the leadership in Beijing. But it is doubtful that they were heartened by a new Pentagon report issued last month titled United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, which could reignite the concerns about China's military posture in Asia and its policies in the post-Deng era.
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8-283 / Jim Anderson, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 9, 1995, HEADLINE: The new geometry of Asia: a shaky quadrangle; ACS VT96
	 Lampron told a news conference introducing the study that the Chinese, despite problems with a leadership succession, are convinced that their foreign policy is correct and it supports their domestic strategy of economic reform. ["The Strategic Quadrangle," published by the Council on Foreign Relations] 
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8-284 / Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 187; THR VT 96 Driven by their nationalistic objective of making China more modernized, Chinese leaders will not step down from the "reform race." Whether reform and the open door policy will succeed in modernizing China is unknown, but the leaders will never go back to the closed planned economy.
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8-285 / Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.70; THR VT96
	 Despite the historical significance of the change in the elite types, Chinas immediate future is extremely uncertain. Jiang Zemin and Li Peng at the moment face almost impossible tasks--consolidating their power base while regaining the people's confidence after the regime lost its popular mandate to rule, and reimposing socialist ideology while continuing economic reforms and the open-door policy. The only way to regain some legitimacy is for the regime to produce tangible results from economic development.
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 8-286 / Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p . 38; THR VT96
	 A more nebulous yet important element in the evolution of Chinese politics in the past year is the growing sense that the end may indeed be near for Deng Xiaoping. It is impossible to evaluate reports of Deng's health from afar, though rumors of his ill health do seem to be more frequent of late. Even if the octogenarian, who turned 89 in August 1993, should survive to visit Hong Kong in 1997 as he has declared he will, it seems that in a significant way the era of Deng Xiaoping is passing, despite his important interventions over the past year. Not only is the energy that an 89-year-old man can devote to political affairs limited, but the problems China faces and the solutions to them that are likely to be attempted transcend the issues that have defined the Deng era. The old debate between plan and market that engaged Deng and his chief rival, Chen Yun, throughout most of the 1980s and defined Chinese elite politics has become irrelevant in an economy in which mandatory industrial planning by the State Planning Commission accounts for only 7 percent of total output. The new debate is about how to make the transition to a market-based economy as quickly and with as little social cost as possible and about the political implications of such a transition.
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8-287 / Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 49; THR VT96
	 Offsetting this conservative shift was the continuing presence of Deng Xiaoping. It has been said that reform in China is like riding a bicycle--you either go forward or you fall off. Events suggest that Deng subscribed to this view. In the fall of 1991 he was quoted as saying, "Don't be satisfied with the status quo. To bog down means regression." Thus, while his preoccupation with political stability left him with few doubts that the 1989 crackdown had been justified, over time Deng became increasingly concerned that postTiananmen factional alignments might threaten his economic reform program--and hence his place in history. Although he had resigned from his last formal Communist party post in the fall of 1989, Deng did not retire. The title bestowed upon him by the Western press, "China's paramount leader," was a recognition of his continuing role in the reform process. And, despite the blows that process suffered, Deng for the next three years strove to maintain its momentum.
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8-288 /Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 73; THR VT96
	 Moreover, once departure of the senior revolutionary leaders gives a free hand to the bureaucratic technocrats in policy matters, the new leaders probably will more forcefully pursue the goal of raising the level of production rather than equalizing distribution, and raising efficiency rather than social justice. As they learn how to use macroeconomic leverage and improve their ability to control the economy in a time of crisis, the bureaucratic technocrats will be more willing to introduce market mechanisms and reduce the scope of the economic activities that the party-state regulates through administrative means. Li Ruihuan's defense of the present policy of recentralization, subtly different from Chen Yun's analogy of a bird cage, hints at the possibility of such change: "What we are trying to do is fly a kite, not set it free. When we are flying a kite, it is still controlled by our hand. We can have many ways to control it. Our controlling ability is expressed by how far and how flexibly we can fly it."
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8-289/ NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVICE, 5-5-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China accused of marketing organs from executed prisoners; ACS VT96
	 ``Basically, they look at the prisoner's body as whatever they want it to be,'' said Gao Pei Qi, a former member of China's Public Security Bureau who lives in exile in London. ``They would take the prisoner's skin, if necessary.'' Gao described a prison system so entwined with China's hospitals that executions are scheduled and sometimes ordered in concert with transplant demands.
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8-290/ Rieko Saito, Kyodo News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; FOREIGN COMPANIES REMAIN OPTIMISTIC TOWARD CHINA; ACS VT96
	 A Japanese financial expert stationed in Shenzhen, the Chinese boom town located just across the border from Hong Kong, wrote reassuringly to his bosses in Tokyo earlier this year. ''No disturbances have occurred here over reports about the declining health of the nation's patriarch Deng Xiaoping.'' ''The reports may depress Chinese stocks, and maybe the Hong Kong stock market somewhat, but there will be buyers on dips as well,'' wrote Yoshitaka Goga, assistant general manager of China International Finance Co., a joint venture set up by the Bank of China, Japanese brokerage Nomura Securities Co. and others.
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8-291 / Gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China and the Soviet Union," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. q ; THR VT 96
	 Looking at the stages of socialism from its inception and at its successive, usually abortive, attempts to reform, we discern many reasons for the timing and the intensity of the reform impulses. The dynamics of communism can be traced to generational change at the top in the leadership and the party, to internal developments in the society related to modernization and popular mood, and to external developments in the international communist system and the world economy. Relatively weak impulses stemming exclusively from exhaustion of the internal society and domestic economic collapse produce tentative reforms. Stronger impulses aroused b>' changes in leadership heighten the will to undertake lasting reforms. When these factors are in sync--a major change in leadership, a desperate society, and an inviting international arena--fundamental reforms can be achieved.
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 8-292 / Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," p. 15; THR VT96
	Reform stimulated the rise of societal groups which then became alienated from official norms because the party-state failed to pursue even more vigorous changes. Most of these groups lack the capacity or motivation or both to initiate political movements on their own. These independent groups organized for political ends at critical moments when intra-elite factionalism created opportunities for expression of dissatisfaction. meanwhile, the old political mechanisms of Communist China have atrophied to a point where they cannot resolve intra-elite differences, co-opt newly emerging social groupings, or convert alienated segments of the population. Insufficient to impose a solution, the residual power of the party-state is sufficient to suppress open expression of dissent Thus decisive change or resolution of internal tensions remains unlikely until the party elders die. 
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8-293 / Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 54 ; THR VT96
	 Many organizational and systemic consequences flow from these generalizations about top-level Chinese leadership. Some consequences are structurally implied, and others result because popular emulation of "models" focuses on symbolic individuals defined by, and often personified by, top leaders. One corollary of the essentially monocratic nature of CCP leadership is that the PL's vital statistics become of great analytical utility thereby justifying the type of biographical approach we undertake below. Structurally, the dominant position and prolonged tenure of the incumbent makes for a bureaucratic order in which the prevailing orientation is upward, and little personnel mobility occurs unless prompted from above. The leader is assumed to be infallible, whereas everyone else is deemed to be fallible. This assumption is in effect even when it is not explicitly defended (as it was in connection with the personality cult). This encourages an even greater reliance on seniority than is normally associated with bureaucracies, with consequent "gerontocratic" tendencies tacitly reinforced by the Chinese tradition of ancestor worship? Under these circumstances certain historical "moments" become more pivotal than others: The overwhelming advantages of incumbency tend to inhibit change that transcends established paradigms within the life-time of a given PL; only in the context of leadership transition is a fundamental departure from the status quo conceivable.
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8-294 / Dr. R.I.D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 268; MDS VT96
	 There are other political ramifications. While successors to Deng Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, would seem unlikely to reverse the economic open-door policy, further Chinese moves to participate in the economic integration of East and Southeast Asia could depend on the ability of a new leadership to establish its own legitimacy. It would need to contain any political dissent born of rising expectations among the populace.
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8-295 / Rieko Saito, Kyodo News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; FOREIGN COMPANIES REMAIN OPTIMISTIC TOWARD CHINA; ACS VT96
	 Most important, he assured the brass back in Tokyo, ''There has been no change in the economic climate for foreign businesses here.'' Then, as now given new reports that Deng is near death, there were many media reports about possible political and social confusion in China once Deng dies. But Goga says he remains convinced that China will not -- or rather cannot -- reverse its open-door policy, no matter who assumes leadership.
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8-296 / Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests n Science and Technology Relations with China," edited by William T. Tow, p.154 THR VT96
	 The boundaries of the Chinese political elite and the technical community have come to be more overlapping than is commonly realized. In the first instance, the Chinese state structure in its upper middle ranks has become more "technicized" over the past decade as younger, technically trained individuals come to occupy important positions as state cadres. Secondly, generational change in the military is also bringing to the fore a new cohort of officers with keener appreciation of the importance of S&T for Chinese defense. In those parts of the military which have been responsible for strategic weapons programs, there is much shared experience with the leaders of the scientific community who emerged in the 1980s. Most importantly, many of the children of the senior leadership have career interests in S&T development, either as scientists or engineers themselves or, in recent years, as officers of the new technology-driven corporations spun off from the military-industrial complex. On the assumption that China's political future will be settled less on the streets of China's cities than by the curtained machinations of elite family networks, the interests of the children of high-level cadres (gaogan zidi) are likely to figure prominently in the political deals cut to assure a stable succession. To the extent that those interests are linked to advanced technology industries and the research system, the "S&T factor" in the succession may not be insignificant.
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8-297 / Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 158; THR VT96
	 This is the most extreme and least likely, but still conceivable, scenario. It would come about if intra-PLA fighting spread beyond Beijing and lasted longer than a few days. If it did, the PRC itself could split up.
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 8-298 / Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 42; THR VT96
	 Political conflicts among different interest groups strugglling for power have created disorder and the risk of chaos. For example, the confrontation between the Russian parliament and president is obviously a negative factor increasing the difficulties of the transition. In other states, the politicalstruggles sometimes even lead to internal wars." 
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 8-299 / Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 83; THR VT96
	 Thus the government cannot be said to enjoy the esteem or affection of most of the governed; it surely does not enjoy their consent either. The government has other problems. First, there is no obvious successor to Deng Xiaoping after he finally passes to his reward, and there is no formal procedure for selecting one. It has the world's most bloated and perhaps least efficient bureaucracy, but it is not able to tax effectively, making it difficult to generate large amounts of revenue for capital investment or to maintain and expand the infrastructure, or to maintain and expand desperately needed social services. A further weakness, perhaps the most important, is that the Party of one-party government seems to have lost its vision. With the death of Deng and his cohort, the last of the Long Marchers will be gone, and even most of those who fought in the Anti-Japanese and Civil Wars as well. There does not seem to be any political or moral consensus among Politburo members, and discipline and morale are lax and low throughout all echelons of the Party.
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8-300 / William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.59; THR VT96
	 One big question is: how far will this centrifugal disintegration go? The question is especially acute since China is in the midst of a serious succession crisis. Without consensus on who will fill Deng's shoes a protracted struggle could well ensue after he is gone. China could break up. That has happened before. If it happens again the multinationals, fronting for various rival powers, would find it comparatively easy to carve out new spheres of influence, dividing the investment opportunities, the market, and the spoils between them--all in the name of a new "open door."
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8-301 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 30; CJJ VT96
	 Furthermore, 'such transition may fail. The Chinese political situation today is, at root, a product of the collapse in the 1920s and 1930s of China's attempts at democratic and constitutional role, and its pursuit instead of the largely illusory advantages of corporatism (in the case of the Kuomintang) and communism. What is more, the weaknesses and problems of Chinese society that led to democracy's failure earlier in this century are by and large still present today, which means that if the transition outlined above does not succeed, we could be in for a period of chronic political instability.
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 8-302 / Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p. 5, THR VT96
	 China's problems stem from generic defects of the Leninist party state. Signs of systemic disintegration in China--the declining authority of a once all-powerful party, the collapse of faith in ideological orthodoxy, and a stagnating centrally planned economy--are typical of other contemporary Leninist states. When the deficiencies of centrally planned economies became more obvious and limited reforms failed to increase economic performance, the authority and legitimacy of the party-state was called into question. Corruption, nepotism, and depressed standards of living are intrinsic to contemporary Leninist patterns of governance. Under these circumstances, leadership based on the unchallenged organizational structure of an omnipotent Communist party and legitimized by a sacrosanct ideology could not be maintained. Rising demands for change made interelite unity difficult, further undermining- the will of authorities to act decisively in defense of their privileged position.
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 8-303 / Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 40-1, "The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 True, the succession crisis that will follow the death of Deng Xiaoping may bring to power a more reformist or united coalition. Nevertheless, any future PRC government will have to tackle growing social problems--widening inequalities, increasing rural unrest and urban workers' strikes, protest against inflation, and escalating unemployment.
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8-304/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network; ACS VT96
	 [DIGNITY, 5/7] Beijing -- A confidential report on potential social unrest in China from the secret service was unveiled,claiming that China is facing severe social unrest after death of the "older generation of revolutionaries". The report, shown in Germany Der Spiegel magazing Monday edition, said that "As long as Deng Xiaoping and the other leaders are alive they will use their stature to prevent conflict in party and state ...But thereafter severe crises are inevitable. There will be a revolt of those desperate groups who have not gained any social advantages from reforms." "More and more people will lose their jobs,the number of migrants will reach dangerous levels and the social differences will become explosive." "If the government is then not in a position to take tough action, conflicts at leadership level are inevitable. The result would be that various groups would mobilize their support in society and carry out their political conflict in the open," it said.
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8-305 / Amelia A. Newcomb, Special to The Christian Science Monitor, The Christian Science Monitor, February 14, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: China Without Deng: US Debates Scenarios; ACS VT96
	 Whoever succeeds Deng faces numerous social and economic problems -- and the lack of institutions to deal formally with them. As a result, says Thomas Christensen, professor of government at Cornell University, New York, ''Certain central policies that are crucial to economic and social stability will be harder to control. They [Beijing] will have a harder time doing things they already find difficult such as controlling inflation, guaranteeing a social safety net, and securing taxes for the central government.''
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8-306/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 Total collapse [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] The leaders will launch personal attacks. The sense of chaos and unpredictability dominates people. Some take refuge in other countries and migrant workers riot. Its economy will be highly vulnerable and there will be corruption and mismanagement of Three Gorges Project, the world's largest dam project on the Yangtze River. Foreign investment in China drops drastically and peasants riot in inland provinces. China will be a security threat to U.S. and Japanese investments. Its foreign policy will be paralyzed. Taiwan will get away with declaring independence and Hong Kong's reversion to China will be questioned. North Korea will collapse. The military, which concentrates on controlling local territories and repelling foreign invaders, will likely lose its tight grip on nuclear and conventional weapons.
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8-307 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 In the next year, China's "paramount leader," Deng Xiaoping, who is 90 and in falling health, will almost certainly die. Cracks within the government will not appear immediately, as the military remains strong and united under elderly officers who served with Mao Tse-tung on the legendary Long March in the 1930s. Even after Deng dies, though, central authorities will probably refuse to recognize their loosening grip on the society, and this will eventually prompt secessionist movements in the Muslim lands to the west, Tibet in the southwest, and perhaps Sichuan.
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8-308 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China's international behavior in general will be shaped primarily by its internal political and economic developments. 
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8-309 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China's interaction with its neighbors in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, therefore, will be determined in part by the leadership succession that will occur upon the death of Deng Xiaoping. Equally important for its relations with its neighbors in Asia will be the ability of economic reform in the PRC to create stable, sustained economic growth. 
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8-310 / Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 They [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] say in it that the most significant uncertainty about post-Deng Chinese foreign policy is how Beijing would handle the challenge of interdependence.
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8-311 / Robert Sutter, Senior specialist . in international politics tics, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "China and the US. Congress: Policy Determinants and Constraints," edited by William T. Tow, p. 40; THR VT96
	 Events in China leading to the Tiananmen massacre and the subsequent political crackdown and economic retrenchment vividly demonstrated the fault lines that run through the Chinese leadership over a range of sensitive domestic and foreign policy questions, including relations with the United States. Such division and debate intensify among ambitious younger officials jockeying for power as the older generation of leaders headed by eighty-six-year-old Deng Xiaoping approaches its end. Internal political intrigues add to uncertainties regarding Chinese policies as a result of the reversal of reforms at home and radical changes abroad.
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 8-312 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 37; CJJ VT96
	 But as we have seen, Deng's changes have been almost entirely negative, in the sense that they have removed restrictions, rather than positive, in the sense of creating new institutions. On the political and constitutional side, Deng's decade and a half of one-man rule has to a considerable extent simply postponed the political problems created by Mao's three decades, while squandering the opportunity to make real institutional changes -- like those instituted by Chiang Ching-kuo in the ROC--while the strongman can still preside over them. Such reflections come dose to forcing an unwelcome conclusion about the future of Asia: that domestic problems in China may lead, not far down the road, to unpleasant intemational surprises.
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 8-313 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 19; CJJ VT96
	 As the years of Deng Xiaoping's paramountcy draw to a dose, the most fundamental issues facing the People's Republic of China today--official pronouncements notwithstanding--are in essence the same that confronted the USSR a decade ago when Constant Chernenko died: namely, regime transition and constitutional structure. Moreover, the manner in which the Chinese solve, or fail to solve, these issues will affect far more than domestic governance alone. The influence of domestic change in China, as in the Soviet case, is bound to spill out, perhaps messily, into the intemational arena and bring with it either promise or threat to East Asia, all of Asia, perhaps the world.
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8-314 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 35; CJJ VT96
	 Greater coordination of policy, and structures to articulate it, need to be created. The problems they face are enormous: not just the natural desire of states to ride free (as in the North Korean nuclear issue), but also issues of understanding where interests lie (with the current regime? with change?) and developing frameworks robust enough to express them. Realistically speaking, the work of creating such a structure of consultation and a coordinated policy to deal with regime change in China is unlikely to take place until it is forced upon the world. Not far down the road, it most likely will be, perhaps by problems with the transfer of Hong Kong, or conflict in Inner Asia, or a revival of dissent within China. When that happens, we should be as ready as possible. 
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8-315 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 32; CJJ VT96
	 If the next regime in China attempts to continue Deng's authoritarian ways, then some foreign-policy problems will almost certainly get worse. Remember that a small spark can ignite the train that eventually detonates a massive charge; history is full of examples. So suppose that the current disagreement between Vietnam and China over the Spratlys continues. At the moment, neither side shows any sign of compromising. Quite the opposite, each is acquiring the armaments necessary for a military contest. Vietnam, the weaker party, is also acquiring potential allies through ASEAN. China's calculation seems to be that, in the end, her claims will not be effectively resisted. Vietnam, however, probably realizes that a small increment in military effectiveness will make it possible to interfere substantially with Chinese actions; anti-ship missiles, for example, could prove devastating. If Vietnam and China should come to blows, what will the rest of the world do? ASEAN, quite likely, would tilt towards Vietnam. And the United States? This is not a question to which our current policy provides an answer, because our current policy assumes the question will not be asked. This scenario is a single example for a whole class, covering most of China's territorial disputes. They share three features. The first is a Chinese calculation that force can be used in a limited or controlled way to achieve an objective, or may not even prove necessary: Vietnam, Taiwan, or whoever, will ultimately prove pliant. The second is a Chinese misunderstanding of the amount of damage a threatened state can do. Vietnam cannot conquer China, nor can Taiwan, or any other power. But modem weapons make it possible for even a medium-rank power to inflict grievous damage on Chinese forces: to sink a naval task force, for example. Such a setback, moreover, might spell serious domestic trouble for the Chinese government at the time. The third is the near-inevitability that other powers will be drown into such a dispute, through their treaty relations or calculations of national interest. The best way to avoid such dangers is to deter them dearly and early, both through unambiguous policy statements and through providing military counterweights to new Chinese military capabilities.. Deterrence can probably cope with the sorts of problems just outlined: nearly thirty years of peace in the Taiwan Strait, for example, are owed not to negotiation but to a sustained balance of power. Managing the last sort of problem China may present, however, is not even that easy.
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 8-316 / Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 8- 4-94; "SIippery succession" p. 23; SEG VT96
	 And if rhetoric alone didn't suffice to rally public opinion, a truly desperate leadership could resort to international adventurism in such disputed territories as the South China Sea or even Taiwan, the political counsellor warns. Granted, any such ploy would only destroy China's hard-won post-Tiananmen international acceptance. "But when it comes to something as important as leadership succession, the rest of the world matters infinitely less than we might like to imagine," he says. 
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8-317 / JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 "I'm worried, I really am," says Paul Godwin, a China specialist at the Defense Department's National War College. "I had assumed that when China's revolutionary elite passed away, the venom of Marxism-Leninism would be removed from China's defense policies. "But that venom has been replaced by extreme Chinese nationalism. The young guys I meet (from the Chinese military) are extremely nationalistic. . . . The objective is, 'Rich country, strong army.' "
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8-318/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-30-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 China's Asian neighbors already are jittery about the possibility of social unrest and a power struggle after the death of patriarch Deng Xiaoping, who is reported to be weak and ailing at age 90. "Anything China does these days is looked at through a magnifying glass," said one senior Asian diplomat. "Nobody can be sure that Deng's successors will not pursue a more chauvinistic policy in the region. China now has the economic clout to flex its military muscle."
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8-319 / Lincoln Kaye, staff writer 3-2-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 14 ,"The mantle slips;" XYZ VT96
	 On the international stage, the intensifying power struggle is reflected in confrontational stances on issues like trade disputes with the United States or offshore garrisons in the disputed Spratly Islands. No player in the post-Deng succession stakes can afford to relinquish the "nationalism card" to his rivals. The same can be said of a sudden burst of mainland-initiated proposals in the long-stagnant field of China-Taiwan relations. Taiwanese observers fear that, in a jingoistic post-Deng climate, the latest "smile offensive" could turn into an ultimatum, triggering military action if rebuffed 
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8-320 /Reuters World Service, January 20, 1994; Reuters World Service, "TAIWAN SEES CHINA TIES REMAINING TENSE IN 1994"; PMS VT96
	 Kao also said the eventual death of China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, 89, ''is bound to send shock waves through relations between the two sides.'' He did not elaborate.
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8-321 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Size and growing economic influence make the People's Republic of China a major power in Asia. This fact increasingly will shape U.S. policy in Asia in the coming decades. Also shaping U.S. policy, however, will be the extent to which the upcoming struggle over who succeeds Deng Xiaoping influences political stability and economic reform. If China becomes politically unstable and backtracks on reform, its foreign policy will be less cooperative and may even be dangerous for the region. If the PRC continues more or less down a linear path of liberalization, its foreign policy may well be more cooperative and far less of a threat. Either way, how China deals with its many political and economic problems will influence significantly the degree to which it isolates itself or adheres to international norms.
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8-322 / The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 Nationalist strongman [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] A non-Communist leader emerges with mass support and with obedience of the army and security apparatus. This leader, playing zero-sum politics, has no tolerance for elite dissent. His emergence will create an aggressive, noncooperative China. He implements foreign policy resembling chauvinism in the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-8 A.D., 25-220) and launches nationalist campaigns to seek a greater China. He will likely make irredentist claims and take anti-U.S. lines, which will also be tough on Japan. Taiwan will likely declare independence from China and China will respond with force. The event will pressure the United States to stand by Taiwan. The country is likely to attack Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, have a conflict with Kazakhstan and adjust borders with Russia. He will boost military expenditure and strengthen naval, amphibious and air-mobile rapid reaction forces. He will also try to develop nuclear war-fighting capability and increase ground forces. On the economic front, he will make mercantilist policies. The wealth gained from economic growth will be used for strengthening the military power. [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] 
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8-323 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 Other senior U.S. officials said they fear that a key test for all who aspire to replace Deng, including those in Jiang's clique, will be how firmly they stand up to Washington. With Deng gone "it will be harder for pro-Western people to speak out as openly and easier for strong nationalists to assert themselves," predicted one official who closely follows Chinese matters. 8-324 / Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "in search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p. 85; THR VT96
	 The historical course of the people-state relationship in China does not dictate a course for the current crisis of the Chinese state. Indeed, according to my analysis, China stood at a crossroads in the spring of 1989 between a decisive move toward party-state democracy or a fail back into party authoritarianism, either of which would have been a significant change from the ambiguity of the Deng Xiaoping era. Moreover, the age and frailty of the top leadership, its lack of ideological credibility, and the contradiction between repression and modernization all suggest an instability in the current situation. It seems likely that the leadership's failure to resolve the succession problem has brought China to a period of, unpredictable crises and crossroads.
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8-325 / David S.G. Goodman, Prof. Asian Studies Murdoch University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Introduction: The Authoritarian Outlook," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 1; THR VT96
	 This Introduction to the following more detailed chapters on specific aspects of China's current crises examines the dynamics of the current authoritarian regime, to assess the prospects for its future, and against the background of recent developments in Eastern Europe in order to contribute to the wider debate. It concludes that the present political situation in the PRC is inherently unstable, but that a liberal democracy is not a likely outcome. There' was no significant pressure to establish a liberal democracy of any sort before mid-1989, but rather a more pluralist (or, more accurately, corporatist) communist-party-led political system. The ideological divide which characterized the late 1980s was not one between the status quo of the Mao-dominated era and liberal democracy but rather between two different visions of an authoritarian communist party state. Paradoxically, the leadership's actions in mid-1989 are likely to have jeopardized both of those possibilities. Change is thus probable but by no means certain or radical. If there is to be change 'then, for structural reasons as much as because of the PRCs inherently authoritarian political culture, an authoritarian regime may still result and even one where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may play a role.
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 8-326 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 208; THR VT96
	 The opening for a new attempt could be created by Deng's death, by renewed social disorder, or by the fall of Li Peng as a result of rivalries within the regime. The chances for success will be greatest if it is a dominant faction which uses democratization to try to solidify its power against weaker rivals. But since the rival factions are sure to lose from such a change they will try to form a veto bloc, and the weakness of authority in the regime always makes it possible that such a bloc can succeed. Devolution of power is easier for a strong leader like Chiang Ching-kuo whose personal authority overrides opposition in all sectors of the party and government, or for a new, legally elected, and popular leader like Gorbachev who enjoys a political honeymoon during which he is able to make policy innovations.28 But there is little likelihood that China will have such a strong leader after Deng dies.
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8-327 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 But power and authority will no doubt become more diffuse and bureaucratically fragmented after Deng; no one in this successor generation commands Long March loyalty across the army, party, and goveminent. 
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8-329 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 China's Growing Problems. Underlying this question are China's many economic and political problems. Paralyzed by the prospect of succession, China's government is unwilling to undertake the kinds of reforms that would ease the problems of inflation, corruption, state enterprise reform, and growing unemployment. Competition among the country's leaders has increased the likelihood of instability after Deng's death, leaving them even less able to deal with political, social, and economic pressures.
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8-330 / Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 68 ;THR VT96
	 A succession crisis is (according to Myron Rush) a crisis not because the system necessarily threatens to fall apart but because for the time being no significant decisions can be made, for each such decision begs the question of who is to make it. Because this question cannot be answered until the succession crisis is resolved, and because many at the highest level fear that their own positions or even lives might be jeopardized by such a resolution, significant decisions can be arrived at only through circuitous and time-consuming consultation and compromise. This is known as "collective leadership" and may last for a period of several years. In the absence of authoritative (i.e., monocratic) leadership, tendencies toward rift, vacillation, and deadlock are prone to reduce the political efficacy of the regime. This crisis scenario has, however, been disputed by Valerie Bunce.44 Whereas Rush argues that succession crises paralyze the regime's capacity for political innovation, Bunce argues that such crises stimulate political innovation, as potential successors strive to consolidate their hold on power with policies calculated to appeal to a politically significant constituency, making succession an opportunity for renewal analogous to electoral turnover in bourgeois democratic systems. Although the meaning of succession is thus conceived quite differently by Rush and Bunce, for both the immediate outcome is similar: For Rush, collective leadership is followed by eventual return to personal rule to end vacillation and rift; for Bunce, too, strong personal rule is the ultimate outcome of successful political innovation. Yet again, the implications for postsuccession policy developments are different: For Rush, the new monocratic leadership can afford to innovate boldly; for Bunce, there is a danger of stagnation as the structural incentive for innovation is removed.
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8-331 / Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 203 ;THR VT96
	 A partial reform crisis at the system level is analogous to a succession crisis at the level of leadership. A succession crisis tends to paralyze the decision making capacity of the system by raising the prior issue of who decides. Succession is perhaps an even more serious problem in China than in other Leninist systems due to the tendency of incumbents to play with the issue long before it occurs, partly in order to resolve it premortem but partly also as a way of manipulating the ambitions of other would-be successors to rearrange the elite lineup. Thus the situation becomes doubly complicated if these two crises happen to coincide if, in the context of relatively severe transitional difficulties en route to market socialism, a succession crisis flares up to further bedevil the situation.
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 8-332 / Andrew J. Nathan, We l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 43 ;THR VT96
	 Scenario C is "A Factional Shift to the Left." This would be stimulated by the same factors as scenario B (world depression, war, economic stagnation in China, or gross economic inequality). It would also lead to similar (perhaps less extreme) foreign economic policies: a rejection in theory of the opening to the West and a relatively anti-foreign, more self-reliant model of development. It differs from scenario B because it is limited to a factional shift at the top and a purge of Deng or his successors by a new coalition of leaders. It calls for no mass uprising and the policy reversals would probably be less severe. I will argue that this is one of the most likely of the six scenarios, although I estimate its chances at no more than 30 percent.
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8-333 / Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P.26; THR VT96
	 The durability of China's leadership has confounded widespread Western expectations of its imminent collapse after the suppression of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. The most important cause of stability has been the relatively good performance of China's economic system compared to that of eastern Europe' and the U.S.S.R., which collapsed principally because they failed to meet basic economic and human needs. Second, the Chinese have yet to discern a successful road map in other countries' efforts to exit planned economies. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, the Chinese see economic drift, political instability, ethnic fragmentation and violence, with more frightening outbursts possible in the foreseeable future. Finally, Deng Xiaoping and other survivors of the rounding revolutionary generation are still in control. These elders, though increasingly frail, remain tremendously influential and, until. their passing, are a factor for stability in its narrowest sense.
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 8-334 / Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 40 ; MDS VT96
	 The good news is that the leadership - though paralyzed as it awaits the death of Deng Xiaoping and the succession crisis that will follow his demise -is committed to economic reform and admits its problems. The key question remains whether Beijing has the ability both to find reasonable solutions and to implement them once they have been identified. If it does not or cannot, then China will continue to experience cyclical growth, moving from periods of boom to moments of bust. China will still be a profitable place to do business, although it will continue to develop unevenly with greater disparities emerging among the provinces. From a long-term perspective this type of growth will prove untenable.
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8-335 / Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 30; CJJ VT96
	 Hence, many in the Chinese Communist Party and the current PRC government understand both the imperative for change and its inescapability. If a post-Deng leadership acts on that understanding, and begins, for example, to enlarge the circle of rulers and systematically to apportion the power now theoretically held at the center, then China may be able to bridge the chasm between the governmental structures it now possesses and those that it needs. Such initiatives will require discarding much of Deng's legacy and will certainly not be unopposed. Their chances for success will be greatly increased if the economy can be kept growing steadily, with inflation brought under control. But even under ideal circumstances, such a change will not be entirely smooth. There is a moment in any genuine process of reform when the system changes, when real authority passes from the strongman or ruling party into the hands of the people, including the opposition. Such moments can be risky and often highly conflictual--as the gridlock and fistfights in the ROC parliament amply demonstrate.
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8-336 / TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
	 The nationalist card is a useful tool in any difficult period of transition. This week's row with Washington over granting an entry visa to Taiwan's president firmly establishes the US as an "enemy without". Mr Jiang must hope this will divert attention from problems closer to home. Standards of living have been transformed for most of the population, but people still deeply resent today's problems.
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8-337 / ASSOCIATED PRESS, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-27-95; CHINA COULD BE NEXT NUCLEAR `LEAKER,' SAYS CARNEGIE REPORT; ACS VT96
	 Turmoil in China after Deng Xiaoping's death could weaken central control over the nuclear establishment and feed a global black market in sensitive nuclear goods, U.S. proliferation experts said Thursday. In a detailed, 194-page report, issued at a conference here to renew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, specialists with Washington's Carnegie Endowment for International Peace surveyed proliferation threats worldwide. (Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough and Evan S. Medeiros)
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8-338 / ASSOCIATED PRESS, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-27-95; CHINA COULD BE NEXT NUCLEAR `LEAKER,' SAYS CARNEGIE REPORT; ACS VT96
	 They (Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough and Evan S. Medeiros of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) said China, a nuclear weapon power, could follow the pattern of the former Soviet Union, where political upheaval, a crime explosion and economic dislocation have weakened security and led to ``leaks'' of nuclear material from research institutes, storehouses and other facilities. ``Ensuring the security of such materiel in the Soviet successor states has emerged as today's most serious proliferation challenge,'' the report said. It noted that some China experts believe civil turmoil is possible once senior leader Deng, 90 and reportedly in failing health, leaves the scene. ``This will greatly increase the possibility of unauthorized transfers of sensitive nuclear materials and technology and could conceivably result in fragmentation of the country's nuclear arsenal among competing factions or, in an extreme case, new splinter states,'' the report said.
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 8-339 / Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 208; THR VT96
	 A weak regime that tries to democratize under the pressure of economic stagnation and popular dissatisfaction faces a larger risk than a stronger regime that political reform will spin out of control and lead to a rapid "deflation" of power? To make a successful transition under these circumstances, it is helpful to have a powerful external force to guarantee stability. Poland in 1989 enjoyed the benefit of a distant, silent, ambiguously threatening Soviet Union to persuade the factions in both government and opposition to work together for a smooth transition. It is possible that China's army will play the silent guarantor in its own country, just as in 1989 it emulated the repressive role which the Soviet army played decades earlier in Eastern Europe. It may be just as well, then, that the Chinese army shows no sign of splitting. Also, the patience and nonviolence of the democratic opposition in China, even if it is a product of weakness, may help the regime navigate a democratizing reform as did the cautiousness of Solidarity in Poland. 
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8-340 / David S.G. Goodman, Prof. Asian Studies Murdoch University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "introduction: The Authoritarian Outlook," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.18; THR VT96
	 The strength of the state and the dominant state idea both indicate an authoritarian future, if a modified form of the status quo. Almost every social, economic, and political group of any significant account is integrated into the state system. There are certainly groups who have become alienated from the current leadership and its policies, but there is as yet little evidence that they have become disaffected from the state. On the contrary, as one might expect in an inherently authoritarian political culture, they appear at least for the present to be doing their best to come to terms with current political imperatives.
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8-341 / Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 204; THR VT96
	 There are two main reasons for the tendency to retrogress during crises of transition. The first is that the pattern of structural reform, unlike the previous ideologically based pattern, lacks any clear vision or "map" of the future toward which change is presumed to be moving. This is, to be sure, not officially admitted--change is still said to be moving toward socialism, and any public disagreement with this is effectively precluded--but there is no discernible relationship between the end of communism (from each according to one's abilities and to each according to one's needs) and reformist means (viz., marketization, privatization, opening to the outside world). Yet it is not deemed valid to reject any given means because it appears inconsistent with the end, so long as it increases production. Under normal circumstances, when the economy is operating efficiently and living standards are rising, the procedural rules of the game suffice to enable the leadership to reach consensus on practical solutions to whatever problems arise. During a situation of crisis, however, when standard operating procedures no longer apply, metacriteria are needed to point in the direction of a "correct" solution? Without them, crises tend to "deepen," raising issues of general direction. In that context there is a tendency to retrogress to previous!), established criteria and tactics, if not to old ideological dogmas.
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 8-342 / Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.51; THR VT96
	 The apparent death of ideology in China and the perplexed and intensely aversive elite reaction to its consequences place the entire future of reform in some question. Should this trend continue, the leadership's task becomes far more difficult. Without ideological legitimacy, the leadership must pay high "transaction costs" to implement its policies. If the regime continues to enforce a lockstep with stale ideas, inconsistent reforms may be expected eventually to wither in the dead grip of "adjustment" and "consolidation," giving way to a Chinese form of Stalinism. Yet if freedom is again granted to reassess the dominant idea system, the consequences are unpredictable and quite possibly volatile. The only way in which popular faith in the old legitimating ideology might conceivably be regenerated is through the rise of some vigorous, charismatic leader--another Mao--with all the attendant risks. Failing that, the long-term prospects of the current leadership arrangement do not appear rosy.
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8-343/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Fact or in. Sino-American Relations, edit ed by William T. Tow, p.169; THR VT96
	 Having become openly skeptical of some of the core collectivist values of the regime, many students began to look to the West as a source of new moral, philosophical, and political concepts. As noted earlier, articles in the official press broadly sympathetic to the concepts.of privacy, academic freedom, and even ideological diversity and pluralism encouraged the students to experiment with new theories and legitimized their quest for a viable belief system. Indeed, the search for new ideas and the interest in Western concepts seem not to have been limited to youth, but were rather a society-wide phenomenon
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8-344/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p.192; THR VT96
	 Despite the propaganda onslaught, it is difficult to see how what in effect remain half-measures can reverse the impact that the decade-long reform program has had on Chinese youth, or how they can restore the government's greatly diminished legitimacy. Indeed, the ambivalent nature of China's relationship with the West constantly reveals itself, even in articles devoted to combatting "peaceful evolution." Thus, in the same paragraph, Chinese citizens are told to maintain a high degree of vigilance against the schemes of the "imperialist forces," whose advanced technology and capital are nonetheless deemed essential "to accelerate China's social modernization. "
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8-345/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p.l75; THR VT96
	 By their own admission, political workers were facing insurmountable obstacles in trying to stem the influence of Western philosophy on the campuses. Western humanism had convinced many students that since both traditional Chinese morality and the collectivist values of socialism restricted the development of the individual, both were essentially tied to China's feudal past. Political workers not only had little knowledge of Western theories, but also had an unsophisticated view of Marxism and its twentieth century evolution. They were no match for China's "elite" intellectuals, a considerable number of whom had travelled to the West and introduced much of this new literature, either through commentaries or in the form of translations.
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8-346/ JAMES SEYMOUR, East Asia Inst., Columbia Univ., Current, January, 1995; Pg. 28; HEADLINE: Repression or reform? Human rights in China? ACS VT96
	 Unless China largely excludes foreigners again, the subversive influence those from abroad have in China is bound to continue, however indecisively. China's leaders now say they are determined that the country will become more and more "open." If indeed it does, the government will increasingly be confronted with challenges to its human rights practices.
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 8-347/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p.11, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLTC OF CH[NA, Essays in Public policy; ACS VT96
	 Another shared Chinese value is a strong propensity for this worldliness, largely because the Chinese lack a religion that depicts an afterlife (except Buddhism). The Chinese attach enormous importance to their allotted lifetimes. Committed to realizing their personal goals in the present, the average Chinese allocates most of her or his energy to solo-type activities in the strong hope that such activities will produce spectacular results. These expectations reinforce the belief that other parties, including the government, will deliver as they promise. Such expectations can put Chinese society at risk; any sudden collapse of those expectations immediately produces public outrage toward political authority. The present danger for Beijing's leaders is that, if people do not experience substantive improvements in their living standards in the near future, widespread discontent might erupt to threaten public security.
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 8-348/gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China and the Soviet Union," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. 52 ; THR VT 96 In both countries the Deng and Gorbachev eras began with a mood of popular skepticism laced with apathy. People did not expect very much from a new leader's promises of reform. Yet, even a pragmatic reformer could rather quickly elicit a mood of narrowly' channeled optimism marked by opportunism. Not expecting a radical change in the overall system, people became cautiously hopeful that some areas would continue to improve and they could seize the moment for personal benefit. With a shift to the ruling style of an enlightened reformer battling against great odds or with a pronounced gap between types of reform-asynchronic or unbalanced reform--the popular reaction could take the form of idealism (common among intellectuals) against a backdrop of short-term pessimism about the overall course of change. Motivated by a newfound sense of idealism, Chinese students in 1989 took to the streets because they were pessimistic that any other course would succeed.
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8-349/DIPAK K. GUPTA, Prof. Public Administration, San Diego State Univ., 1990; THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, p. 56 By using this direct method, Patchen (1961) found significant evidence for the existence of a correlation between relative deprivation and collective action.
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8-350/DIPAK K. GUPTA, Prof. Public Administration, San Diego State Univ., 1990; THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, pp. 59-60 All of these [Hibbs (1976), Gupta & Venieris (1981), and Venieris & Gupta (1985)] found fairly significant correlation between political violence and relative deprivation within the context of a single country.
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8-351/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p.160 ; THR VT96
	 In accounting for the timing of the 1989 protest movement, it is clear that the efforts of the Chinese state to undertake reform have played a major hand in encouraging dissent on the part of both political elites and ordinary citizens. Although the relationship between reform and revolution is poorly under- stood, it is obviously significant. As the history of modern China shows, reform is often the harbinger of revolution. The 1911 Revolution that toppled the imperial system followed upon the Hundred Days' reform and New Policies of the ailing Qing dynasty. The reformist New Life Movement of Chiang Kaishek's Kuomintang heralded the irtuninent demise of the Nationalist regime. Serious reforms exact substantial costs on at least some sectors of both state and society. Furthermore, they raise expectations to levels that can seldom be attained. Most important, reforms are admissions by the regime of its own inadequacies. As a result, they encourage widespread disbelief. This is especially unsettling in Communist systems, where claims to ideological truth have been so central. When the leadership publicly repudiates many of its past practices, it invites ordinary citizens to engage in open criticism as well.
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 8-352/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 240-1 ; MDS VT96
	 Deng's successors, too, must face the likelihood that the more successful the economic reforms in China, the more inevitable the political changes. "By initiating economic reform ... Deng Xiaoping unleashed powerful centrifugal forces that threaten to overwhelm the Communist party-state he sought to preserve," David Shambaugh, editor of The China Quarterly of London, has written. "Deng studied the East Asian developmental model carefully, but learned incomplete lessons. He did not, or refused to, recognize the inevitable political pressures that well up from below as a result of economic growth and wealth accumulation.
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8-353/ Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Second, Deng could not have foreseen that allowing thousands of ordinary Chinese citizens to tie themselves by their own choice to the twoway flow of the world's goods and services would inescapably link them to the world's modes of Competitive production and introduce them to the world's ideas and ideals as well. This tying of China to the modern world establishes expectations and procedures with which Communist doctrine and the governing structure are seemingly finding it difficult to keep pace. 
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8-354/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power.
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 8-355/John Israel, Prof. of history at the Univ. of Virginia, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Reflections on 'Reflections on the Modern Chinese Student Movement"' edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 103;THR VT96
	 We must bear in mind, of course, that Chinese students do not attack strong central governments except as a last resort. What laid the stage for the confrontation of the late 1980s was a level of inflation unequaled in post-1949 China, with a concomitant rise in the level and visibility of corruption and a growing disparity between the nouveaux riches and the impoverished intellectuals who were part of the hard-hit salaried class. The convergence of these phenomena was reminiscent of the 1940s, during the latter stages of the war and the civil war, when latent resentment against one-party rule became manifest during a period of rampant inflation and corruption. In fact, neither inflation nor corruption in the late 1980s equalled that of the 1940s, but that those old enough to remember the KMT era made the comparison suggests the depths to which the CCP regime had fallen in the eyes of the intellectuals.
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8-356/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.47; THR VT96
	 There are several reasons for this variability of elite response. First, the radical reformers tend to have the upper hand during a boom, and they dislike cracking down on the students and intellectuals who make up their natural constituency. Second, a harsh crackdown is functionally inappropriate for economic reform and expansion, tending to have a chilling effect. During a bust, in contrast, the conservatives are riding high and have both pretext and opportunity to attack the reform constituency and purge the radical reformers for its excesses. Moreover, a crackdown is fully compatible with an economic retrenchment policy. The implication is that radical reformers are most vulnerable to purge when spontaneous mass activism arises during bust phases, whereas conservatives are most vulnerable during boom phases when mass activism is low.
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8-357/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. 
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 8-358/David Shambaugh, Prof, Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY J0URNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. ;SEG VT96
	 It is not only the countryside that concerns the government. Incidents of urban unrest have also increased sharply in 1994 due to the vast number of paralyzed state industries. Nearly two-thirds of China's 13,000 large and medium-sized state industries operate at a loss. The ballooning budget deficit is principally due to the subsidies paid by the central government to keep these socialist behemoths afloat. The People's Bank of China (the central bank) has earmarked 470 billion yuan in lending (subsidies) to state industries during 1994 (an approximately 20 percent increase over 1993). Nonetheless, production lines in most factories remain idle and worker absenteeism is high. Salaries are paid in a combination of cash and kind, if at all. Incidents of industrial action have sharply increased, particularly in the Manchurian "smokestack corridor." According to some reports, over 2,000 incidents of labor unrest occurred in the first quarter of 1994.6 The problems in the state industrial sector offer a major challenge to the regime. The Communist party need not be told of the revolutionary potential of an aroused proletariat. It prefers to shoulder the burden of financial bailouts than risk the political and social fallout that would result from bankruptcies and privatization.
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 8-359/RAMON MYERS, Sr. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 4 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Unless the PRC's leaders successfully meet these three challenges, their political system will be subject to severe stress and possible collapse. And if a new market system cannot be created to support the living standards the people want, political dissatisfaction could threaten social and political stability.
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8-360/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: Th e @ Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.54 ; THR VT96
	 'Fhe reversal Of the austerity program in November 1993 is an ominous sign. At the currently torrid pace of economic growth and investment, overheating will likely reemerge in early 1994. If the government is unable to contain price increases to a tolerable level, popular unrest may once again emerge and affect the course of reform. Three economic factors were key to motivating the urban populace to march on Tiananmen Square and elsewhere in spring 1989: inflation, corruption, and growing income disparities. The potential gains from official corruption are enormous in transitional economies, since officials enjoy privileged information and access that can be easily converted to private gains. Current perception in China is of an officialdom whose appetite for private gains has sharply escalated in recent years as these privileges have been steadily eroded by market forces. Popular resentment of official corruption could easily spill out into the streets again, especially if provoked by the sense that standards of living are jeopardized by another round of inflation. Add an uncertain political climate in the wake of Deng Xiaoping's death and a restive rural populace to the mix, and the situation could become unmanageable.'
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 8-361/Andrew J. Nat han, Well-writ ten author o f Chinese Pol it i cs, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 58 ;THR VT96
	 A final social distortion that concerns many Chinese is the rise of a technocratic elite that seems to accompany the import of advanced technology. The new elite learns foreign languages, travels abroad, and reads foreign business and technical periodicals. The government has decreed their exemption from most requirements for political study, and factory party committees and managers are ordered to work harmoniously with them at all costs. The technocrats' growing power and their deepening exposure to foreign cultures revives a long-standing argument over whether "science and technology have a class nature" and inevitably carry a "decadent bourgeois ideology and way of life." For at least one segment of the political leadership, the answer to this question has long been that they do.
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8-361/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 82; THR VT96
	 And the peasants? I do not know, and I don't believe anyone else does either, including the members of the Politburo. Long inclined toward passivity, they could easily rise up if widespread famine should strike, especially in some of the poorest areas. The last two harvests have been good,2 but a drought year could bring a rebellion, because Party authority has been weakened even more in the countryside than in the cities, owing both to the economic reorganization that accompanied decollectivization, and due as well to the greater concentration of the PLA armies in and around the cities--along with a beefed-up People's Armed Police-to prevent new urban uprisings.
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8-362/ Henry Rosemont, Jr. Prof of Philosophies and religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991: A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p.82, THR VT96
	 And the peasants? I do not know, and I don't beleive anyone else does either, including the members of the politburo. Long inclined toward passivity, they could easily rise up in widespread famine should strike, especially in some of the poorer areas. The last two harvests have been good, but a drought year could bring a rebellion, because Party authority has been weakened even more in the countryside than in cities, owing both to the economic reorganization that accompaneid decollectivization, and due as well to the greater concentration of the PLA armies in and around the cities- along with the beefed-up People's Armed Police- to prevent new urban uprisings.
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8-363/Jeffrey Parker, Staff Writer, January 25, 1994; Reuters World Service, "JIANG DEMANDS TOUGH PARTY CONTROLS ON CHINA MEDIA"; PMS VT96
	 China is on guard against popular discontent this year as it undertakes sweeping economic reforms -- including overhauls of the tax and banking system, price liberalisation and the cutting of industrial and social subsidies. Leaders have said repeatedly that disaffection with double-digit inflation, party corruption and other economic dislocation poses major threats to Communist Party authority.
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 8-364/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.431; THR VT96
	 Deng's new policies had, in essence, created two separate Chinas that now existed in parallel. On the one hand there was the new China of entrepreneurs with briefcases and businessmen with Italian suits; of neon night clubs and five-star hotels; and of Mercedes Benzes equipped with cellular phones. But just behind this impressive facade was the old China of failing state-owned factories filled with angry workers and belching pollution out over the landscape; of poor peasants in poverty stricken rural areas dreaming of making it to the cities; of prisons where murderers and democracy activists were incarcerated together; of the Red Army whose loyalties were to feudal leaders not to elected officials; and of veteran revolutionaries weaned on Marxist-LeninistMaoist doctrine who could conceive of no path to stability save political repression.
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8-365/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.429; THR VT96
	 What drove this unique dialectic in circles was not just the unresolved tension between reformers and hard-liners, but a deeper tension between the needs of the Leninist state and its dependence on expanding markets. While the hard-liners had been weakened as a bloc by ' Deng's manipulations at the Fourteenth Party Congress, they had not vanished any more than had China's age-old penchant for authoritarianism. After four decades of revolution, China still found itself relying on one larger-than-life leader rather than on a formal political system to mediate between warning political factions and contradictory interests. This particular Big Leader seemed convinced that economic development could somehow be quarantined from the country's existing political system. However, others felt that this presumption was problematic at best. For all their paranoia and myopia, this was one crucial cause-and-effect relationship that the hard-liners understood. After all, twice in recent memory economic reform and "opening up to the outside world" had, in fact, led to major political protest movements, and then crackdowns. By lurching from one extreme to another, then trying to settle somewhere in the middle, Deng may have imagined that in some novel way he was attaining the golden mean. But even as he was solving certain fundamental problems by economic growth, he was generating new and grave contradictions that would ultimately have to be resolved lest they lead China into yet another confrontation with itself that was even more disruptive than 1989.
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 8-366/Yongnian Zheng., Prof. Beiji. ng Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, V189 #2, "Development: & democracy: are they compatible in China?" p.247 ;SEG VT96
	 Why did economic growth liberalize politics a bit but not democratize China's political system? This article argues that the development of democracy in China cannot be understood by reviewing democracy as a result of economic development alone. Instead, democratic development must be considered in the context of the connectedness between the state and development. The state in a developing country like China is not only an agent of political order; it is also responsible for facilitating socio-economic development. In other words, differing from states in the West, state authorities in China have to generate capitalism and economic development. The state thus faces a dilemma between economic development and democracy. The state must at- tempt to establish legitimacy and order, on the one hand, and has to promote socio-economic changes from above on the other. But the state authorities often find that these two sets of goals are in conflict. Whereas democracy tends to require that the state accommodate many competing demands, effective performance of developmental ruinations pushes the state to stand above society in order to act as a rational agent of change. This tension seems to be irreconcilable in China's case. The state often enforces its rational order on society, which tries to free itself from the state.
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8-367/Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 38 ; MDS VT96
	 Civil unrest may very well resurface in China. In a country undergoing such radical change, the population is under a great deal of pressure. In fact, periodic demonstrations have occurred in the countryside as peasants, often severely abused by local officials, rise up in protest. Any major urban demonstrations in the future will, however, be dealt with differently by the authorities than at the time of Tiananmen. Future civil disorder in China will be managed in ways similar to those employed by South Korea against student demonstrators in the 1980s and by Japan in the 1960s.
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8-368/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.378; THR VT96
	 Massing in front of the municipal offices, demonstrators smashed windows, overturned and burned vehicles, and waved placards and banners reading, "Fight for Justice!" and "Down with Corruption!" The scene was hauntingly reminiscent of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Although nervous police fired into the air, this time they relied mainly on high-pressure water hoses and tear gas to quell the disturbance. Nonetheless, more than a dozen people were injured before officials promised to distribute 5 million more application forms the next day. Deng, who had been among the hard-liners in 1989, now urged Shenzhen officials to keep their response well tempered. The last thing he wanted was for the Shenzhen protest to spin further out of control and possibly spark sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere, providing hard-liners with exactly the pretext they needed to condemn his reforms and initiate a crackdown.
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8-369/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 20; CJJ VT96
	 China's striking economic progress, and the openness and pragmatism associated with it, are causes for substantial optimism. But the picture is by no means entirely positive. Domestically, none of the basic causes have been removed that produced the democracy movement and Tiananmen massacre of five years ago: neither the grievances of the people nor the inflexibility of the government. Internationally, China's neighbors are increasingly dissatisfied by Beijing's almost total lack of flexibility in dealing with territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Taiwan, and warned by its steady military buildup. It is no exaggeration to say that China's present situation, if it is projected without change into the future, must provoke some son of crisis within a few years: domestically, a major strike, perhaps, in which the regime's survival will depend on the loyalty of this or that element of the People's Liberation Army, or a foreign adventure, such as a serious sea barde in the Spratly Islands, or a combination of domestic and external conflicts.
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 8-370/David Shambough, Pro-f, Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994;'WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fa11, "Chino's fragile future" p. 41 ' ;SEG VT96
	 Overhauling an economy the size of China's without significant social and political dislocations is impossible. Many vested interests are tread upon and new ones created, expectations are raised and often go unfulfilled, the economy grows apace without adequate laws or infrastructure to support new growth, and strains are placed on the system at all levels. Nationwide protests over corruption, inflation, and democracy in 1989 were one such manifestation of the stresses but were hardly isolated events. Many of the factors that stimulated the outbreak of discontent in the spring of 1989 are still present in China today. 
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 8-371/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," P-32; CJJ VT96
	 The most worrying, and in many ways also the most likely, possibility for China in the years ahead is that power will be contested domestically. Tiananmen revealed the gulf between rulers and ruled in China
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8-372/Timothy Cheek, Assist. Prof. of history at The Colorado College, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State Under the CCP,'" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 140 ;THR VT96
	 To be of use, the three circles of intellectual activity that Tu Wei-ming has suggested should help us understand the conundrum that permeates this essay: Are intellectuals in China moving from the "priestly" deal of the early PRC to a "professional" contract in China's polity, or not? I think the answer is yes, but that the going will be painfully slow, much slower than Poland's thirty-year rise from reassertion of Party-state authority in 1956 to a democratically elected government today. Still, when the circles of activity are as disassociated as they are now, intellectuals are confronted with de facto "secularization" of academic and transcendent activities (and "demoralization" of political activity) by dint of the disbelief of political assertions on the part of the intended audiences. The circles, then, simply help us keep in focus the contexts of intellectual endeavor both at the individual and (by specific period) polity level. In the shift toward disengagement from the priestly mandarin role, context is important: 1967 would have been a terrible time to try it, the social anomie of the 1930s made it a frustrating time to try it, and the 1990's look to be a promising time to push ahead.'
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 8-373/Andrew J. Nathan, Wel l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 199; THR VT96
	 The major cleavage' in Chinese political culture today may not be between the advanced intellectuals and the backward masses, but between a people ready for more freedom and political leaders afraid to grant it. Zhao Fusan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, suggested that China is now "torn between two cultures .... The leadership class is locked in China's traditional culture--a kind of benevolent despotism. Young people, however, have become Westernized and dream of dialogue.''22 Democracy has been defined as a system of institutionalized uncertainty; and "it is the act of alienation of control over outcomes of conflicts that constitutes the decisive step toward democracy.''23 Such a transition begins when the ruling elite, or a substantial section within it, perceives that the potential advantages of giving up some control over outcomes outweigh the risks.
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 8-374/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 116 ;THR VT96
	 The signs of the legitimacy crisis can be seen not only in the student demonstrations but also in peasant grumbling, worker strikes, official corruption, urban crime, and a wave of criticism on the part of the intellectuals, who are slipping out of the role of behind-the-scenes advisers into that of a public opposition. The Chinese people are far from being dissatisfied enough to risk revolution, and the government is too strong to be overthrown. But the pressures that are building call for some sort of change
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8-375/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 432; THR VT96
	 Hard-line economic planner Chen Yun used to describe China's economy-in-the-throes-of-reform as being like a capitalist bird growing within the confinement of a socialist cage. By 1994 this capitalist bird had grown so large that it had not only fractured its socialist cage, but was threatening to rupture the entire Leninist political structure as well. No one, Deng included, seemed to know how it might be confined again, much less what this formerly caged bird might turn into as it kept growing. But given China's history, it seemed more than likely that it would only be a matter of time before a new crisis between this rapidly mutating avian upstart and the old political structure erupted. "Until the Chinese people have an opportunity to choose their own leaders in free elections and stable democratic institutions start to be constructed," predicted Zhang Weiguo, "China will remain vulnerable to the quixotic whims of Party ideologues and to cycles of spontaneous social unrest."
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8-376/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 85 ; THR VT96
	 These strengths of the government and the Politburo notwithstanding, I believe the latter are correct in fearing new uprisings, for new uprisings there will be. Whether they begin tomorrow, or at the death of Deng Xiaoping, or are triggered by some more mundane event I am not sure; but I believe they will come, because things cannot remain as they are, yet the government no longer*seems capable of even knowing what to change, let alone how to effect change. Future uprisings may well be bloody, because there does not appear to be any faction within the Party that would be trusted enough to be capable of restoring order peacefully, no other organization in China has either the numbers or political apparatus to take over, and on the basis of my limited experience, there is little interest or enthusiasm inside the country for the "government-in-exile" opposition groups that formed in France and the U.S. after Tiananmen.
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8-377/Steven Mosher, Prof. at Claremont Institute, 1990; CHINA MISPERCEIVED: AMERICAN ILLUSIONS AND CHINESE REALITY, p.204; THR VT96
	 The war of nerves continued for 'the rest of May. The students occupied Tiananmen Square, the symbolic heart of China, and vowed to remain there until their demands were met: an end to the widespread corruption in the government, a streamlining of the massive bureaucracy, and a more open political system. The Chinese leadership retaliated on 20 May by imposing martial law but found itself unable to enforce its decision. Two days later, in the largest spontaneous demonstration in the history of the PRC, an estimated one million persons peacefully paraded through the streets of Beijing in support of the students' demands. Columns of troops were sent marching into the city, only to become becalmed in huge seas of people who barricaded the streets with their bodies. The students were denounced as "counterrevolutionaries and hooligans" in an effort to place them beyond the pale, but it was too late. What had begun as a student protest had already assumed the character of a broad-based democracy movement. An Independent Federation of Workers was organized in Beijing, and demonstrations spread to other cities. Chinese in increasing numbers began to look beyond the present one-party dictatorship, whose misrule they had suffered for decades, to a Chinese government that would be respectful of their wishes..
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 8-378/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 197; THR VT96
	 No one has ever drawn up an authoritative list of cultural requirements for democracy. One scholar argues that democracy requires widespread acceptance of such values as dignity, autonomy, and respect for persons; belief in individual rights; trust, tolerance, and willingness to compromise; commitment to democratic procedures and values; public spirit; and nationalism, among others. An influential study of the political cultures of five democracies identified a number of attributes that are helpful for stable democracy, including a relatively high degree of consensus on some basic political values (including nationalism, modernization, and the desire for order); widespread acceptance of the present constitutional order as legitimate; and a certain degree of alienation from politics which reduces expectations directed at the political system. The Beijing demonstrations of 1989 put many of these attributes on display. The people of Beijing evidently desire democracy and freedom. They are nationalistic and concerned about politics. They are wary of government. They showed a capacity for public spiritedness, spontaneous public order, and tolerance.
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8-379/John Israel, Prof. of history at the Univ. of Virginia, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Reflections on 'Reflections on the Modern Chinese Student Movement"' edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 107 ;THR VT96
	 A sense of history is crucial, however, for understanding how student protest has become a central and enduring feature of contemporary Chinese political culture. As the preceding pages and other chapters in this volume show, the students of 1989 need to be seen as part of several overlapping traditions of revolt, as successors to the remonstrating scholars of imperial times, the campus activists who spearheaded the mass movements that threatened the warlords and then the KMT, and the youthful iconoclasts' of the first decades of the Republican era. In light of the enduring potency of each of these three traditions, the key question is not whether campus activism will continue to play a central role in Chinese politics in the years to come, for that seems certain. What is less certain is just how each of the three traditions described above, as well as the legacy of the Red Guards from which the activists of 1989 tried to distance themselves, will shape the words and deeds of the next set of student protesters. Although history may not tell us precisely what the future holds, in short, in this case at least it does tell us to watch for the reappearance of a variety of issues, tactics, and themes, all of which have long pedigrees but all of which have also been invested with different meanings by different generations of youths.
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8-380/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 441 THR VT96
	 And yet, in the hurly-burly of new commercial activity that was once again uniting exiles with their homeland, for the moment few people seemed interested in pondering the question of how history would finally embrace the protest movement in which Wu'er, Wang, and Wei had figured so prominently and how it would ultimately influence the mandate of heaven. But if the history of Tiananmen Square taught any lessons at all, it was that China rarely overlooked such epic events for long, especially when they had taken place in this hallowed spot. China's next upheaval might be triggered by economics rather than politics, it might erupt in the provinces rather than Beijing, and it might be led by workers rather than students, but if the past was any guide, sooner or later the aftershocks would reverberate back into "the square."
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8-381/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 28; CJJ VT96
	 But although economic development(is forecoming some devolution in fact today, the idea of genuine and legally sanctioned devolution remains out of the question for China's present leadership. Their defining crisis was the democracy movement and the Tiananmen massacre five years ago, an event that focused a whole series of constitutional issues. The development of that crisis demonstrated just how ineffective and weak both government and party had become--ineffective because they had failed to prevent the high inflation that stoked the protests, weak because of the great difficulty they had in overcoming them. Although the foreign media focused on Beijing, the protests were nationwide, and they drew many government, army, and party people into their ranks, as well as ordinary citizens. The crackdown was driven as much by the need to reassert central political power over the country as by the immediate imperative of retaking control of the capital.
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8-382/Steven Mosher, Prof. at Claremont Institute, 1990; CHINA M ISPERCEIVED: AMERICAN ILLUSIONS AND CH NESE REALITY, p. 203; THR VT96
	 The demonstrations began on 18 April, sparked by the death in mid-April of Hu Yaobang, a former party leader deposed by Deng and the orthodox Marxists for being too soft on democracy. As the marches came to include workers as well as students, and as their antigovernment tone became more pronounced, China's rising tide of unrest captured the attention of the American public. It was clear that the democracy movement was more than just the creature of a "tiny number" of malcontents, as the Beijing regime was later to claim. In fact, the students had tapped into a deep vein of popular discontent with Communist rule and had broad popular support through all segments of Chinese society.
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8-383/Joseph W. Esherick, Prof. of history and Chinese Studies at Univ. of California at San Diego and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Prof. of history at Indiana Univ. at Bloomington, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 5.2.; THR VT96
	 Of we are to understand the enormous appeal of the student demonstrations in Beijing and across China, we must begin by appreciating these symbolic meanings of their protest. The slogans--attacking the corruption of official profiteers (guandao), calling for a fleer press, mocking China's highest leaders, advocating a never-defined "freedom" and "democracy"--were certainly important. But they gained their power because the very repertoire of the movement symbolized a demand for a voice in government, for a more open political process, and for an end to leadership by a self-serving elite.
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 8-384/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, II 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1.994, "Rural China in Transition, Edited by William A. Joseph, p.109; THR VT96
	 The younger generations will be less content than their' elders to accept state authority without question. They may be more willing to challenge state policies that restrict their opportunities, such as the household registration system that limits their social and geographic mobility. They will also question the disparity between city and countryside in the availability of public services such as education, medicine, recreation, and transportation, and they may even question the state's authority to regulate the number of children they may have as they become less dependent upon the state for their livelihood. This expectation gap is likely to emerge in the south much earlier than in the north, because southern China has experienced more dramatic decollectivization, has received more foreign investment, and hence has become more industrialized; political controls have also been relatively weaker in the south.
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8-385/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Fact or in Sino-American Relations, edit ed by William T. Tow, p.165;THR VT96
	 Linking these two sections is the interpretation of American l intentions offered by China's post-Tiananmen leadership. In the long-term strategy for transforming China they impute to the United States, Chinese authorities see the students, as future leaders and opinion-makers in their fields, playing a key role. The battle for the future of China, as they see it, will be fought in the minds of the students.
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8-386/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p. 162; THR VT96
	FOLLOWING THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN of June 4, 1989, the hardline Chinese government sought. t explanations for the anti-regime activities of the broad masses of its urban constituency. Restored to influence, conservative elders who had been eased out of power by Deng Xiaoping pointedly noted how the side-effects of China's reform program had contributed to a social order in which material values dominated spiritual concerns, and where political consciousness had become appallingly low. Perhaps most alarming to the elders, this erosion of regime-sponsored values was particularly serious among those who were expected to inherit the revolutionary goals of their predecessors, that is, China's youth.
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8-387/Timothy Cheek, Assist. Prof. of history at The Colorado College, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State Under the CCP,'" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p.125; THR VT96
	 The crackdown changed this situation. Although many still serve or hope to serve the current government, a significant group has been disestablished, forcibly alienated from the regime by its leaders, and has thus moved closer to professional autonomy. Losing one's position in the state bureaucracy does not make one instantly an independent professional. Indeed, the tragedy of mainland China's intellectuals is, as David Kelly notes, that they "remain, as a stratum, an artifact of the system they oppose.''4 However, combined with the social forces unleashed by a decade of reform--a new class of entrepreneurs, the return of inflation along with government corruption, the increased contact with foreigners and travel outside China, the increased translation of a variety of foreign books on social, economic, and literary topics--the violent reaction of the government in 1989 (and its continued repression of enemies, real and imagined) marks a major step in the punctuated evolution of China's educated elite.
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8-388/Steven Mosher, Prof. at Claremont Institute, 1990; CHINA M ISPERCEIVED: AMERICAN' ILLUSIONS AND CHINESE REALITY, p. 214; THR VT96
	 Yet there is a larger lesson in the ongoing struggle between the democracy movement and the government: it is that the unitarian view of China is incorrect. The Beijing regime no longer enjoys even the tacit consent of the governed and confronts active opposition in many quarters. By recognizing the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, we may, at last, reconcile our two sets of antipodal images.
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8-389/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISS I DENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.420; THR VT96
	 But the crisis was not just a matter of angry individuals taking matters into their own hands. Throughout 1992 and 1993, labor disputes led to thousands of work stoppages and wildcat strikes across the country. Disaffection even spread to some foreign-owned industries. By 1993 some dozen Korean- and Japanese-owned plants had been disrupted by wildcat strikes over poor work conditions. And what was even more threatening from the perspective of the government was that labor activists were again linking up in an organized fashion with intellectuals through such new de facto groups as the Association for the Protection of Labor Rights.
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 8-390/ Chai Ling, Shen Tong, Gao Xin, Wang Jungtao, Tiananmen ': square survivors, Sept. ,1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Tiananmen and China's future: the view five years later" p. 249 ;SEG VT96
	 Some people however, may say that economic development in China is strong, it's going well, there's not great unrest in China; Deng Xiaoping's influence has been restored to a great extent---even among people overseas who have accepted Western thinking. Why, then, do you say that the Deng era has ended and a new era is beginning? This kind of view of [a stable] China is an optimistic view that is only possible if one views China from outside China. If one goes to China, one will discover that the Chinese people feel China is in the midst of a crisis.
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 8-391/Shigeki Hakamada, Prof in the International Politics and Eonomics Dept. at Aoyama Gakuin Univ., Tokyo, and Gi Ibert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity," edited by G il bert Rozman, p. 168; THR VT 96 The most serious problem for the implementation of reform policy is the lack of popular trust in the government, parliament, and leaders. In general, the reason why military command methods, administrative methods, or a bureaucratic system to control people is necessary is because mutual trust between the authorities and the people is missing.
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8-392/Timothy Cheek, Assist. Prof. of history at The Colorado College, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State Under the CCP,'" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 128 ;THR VT96
	 Generational differences have changed and will continue to change the nature and strength of the deal (first forged during the Party's Yan'an period) that binds establishment intellectuals to the Communist state, and cataclysmic events (such as those of June Fourth) have the potential to destroy the very foundation upon which the social contract is built. Nonetheless, the stability of China following the turmoil of 1989 (which contrasts so markedly with the situation in eastern Europe) demonstrates that some sort of deal between intellectuals and the state (not to mention the state and the army) still holds force. Even before June Fourth, not all intellectuals were full-fledged participants in this deal, because (as Bonnie McDougall rightly points out) throughout the Communist era there have always been members of the Chinese intelligentsia who have shied away from being "politically active." Among artists and writers (groups that have traditionally produced state ideologues and critics), for example, there have consistently been professionals who would rather steer clear of public policy issues and stick to less overtly political versions of their art. However, for at least some of the politically active members of the intelligentsia, even the brutality of the crackdown of 1989 was not enough to trigger a complete repudiation of their contract with the state, in part because of the limited options available to intellectuals unprepared to take the personal and career-related risks associated with pursuing change through extralegal channels. Whether or not they felt betrayed by June Fourth and related events, establishment intellectuals in summer 1989 were faced with an unavoidable fact: There was (and still is) no functional alternative to the "Communist state" in China for the present, no nationwide, legal organization through which political alternatives could develop to parallel the Catholic church in Poland or the Lutheran church in what used to be East Germany.
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 8-393/Andrew J. Nathan, Wel l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 206;THR VT96
	 The repression has done nothing substantial to reverse the decay social control which helped bring on the crisis of spring 1989. Propaganda about the "counterrevolutionary rebellion" seems unable to persuade many people. Coercive measures to reform the thinking of students are likely to make them more dissatisfied. The regime has arrested large numbers of participants in the April June demonstrations, but it cannot restore the ideological fervor or the tight system of social controls which used to make possible Mao-style campaigns of mutual persecution. Control mechanisms that rely primarily on the police and cannot draw on voluntary cooperation are costly and relatively ineffective. 
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8-394/Gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China and the Soviet Union," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p.5 THR VT 96 Changing order is 'supposed to sacrifice these sacred cows on the name of efficiency, but communism harbors claims to both agendas at the same time. Whether initiated in the name of socialism or in the hope of replacing it, reforms threaten the maintenance of public order, the claims to great-power nationalism, and the minimal guarantee of popular welfare. Sooner or later, communism responds to the frustrations aroused by reform and capitalizes on its role as defender of these deep-seated values. Given these circumstances, we must avoid the temptation of simply predicting its speedy and total collapse, with no lingering impact on the shape of the future. Instead, we must search for new patterns of interaction between forces new and old.
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 8-395/ Joseph Fewsmith,: Prof. East Asian Studies; Boston Univ., Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "America and China: back from the brink" p. 257; SEG VT96
	 Such thinking was deeply flawed. The Chinese government may indeed be losing control, as some argue, but only a process of steady change can bring about a pluralistic and perhaps even democratic society. A sudden collapse would be catastrophic to hopes for democracy, yet adopting a confrontational policy would provide grist for the Chinese conservatives' mill and undercut the position of reformers, making such a collapse or a hard-line dictatorship more likely. Moreover, pressure on China alienated other nations in Asia and, as the Far Eastern Economic Review later editorialized, did what "no one in 1989 would have thought possible: created sympathy the leaders in Beijing.
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 8-396/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISS I DENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.412; THR VT96
	 Whether such signs of relaxation were just so much cosmetic image polishing aimed at enhancing China's chances of assuring renewed MFN status and winning its bid for the 2000 summer Olympic Games or part of an ineluctable trend toward greater political liberalization was still not clear. But even the ambiguity came as a relief, and many Chinese allowed themselves to be soothed b]( a cautious optimism. Perhaps, they reasoned, if political confrontation with the government could be avoided while Deng's economic reforms took deeper root and the country gathered a new sense of dignity a. pd self-confidence, aspects of a civil society, of which gray culture was a harbinger, might mature and slowly nudge the Party into accepting more openness and political pluralism. The hope of many of those who allowed themselves to be encouraged by such optimism was that since the Party was obviously not about to relinquish political control voluntarily, free markets provided the best available goad toward greater democracy. But few had forgotten that for Deng, development and political stability, not democracy, were the primary goals. He might allow a certain vague promise of political liberalization to be 1ofted about, but for him the ideal was still authoritarian politics combined with market economics. While there was no doubt by 1994 that life in Chinese society was in many ways becoming increasingly relaxed, there were few signs that the Party was any more prepared to tolerate real challenges to its political hegemony. Each time manifestations of even moderate political opposition arose, the Party moved to suppress then with a familiar thoroughness.
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8-397DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network; ACS VT96
	 [DIGNITY, 5/7] Beijing -- A confidential report on potential social unrest in China from the secret service was unveiled,claiming that China is facing severe social unrest after death of the "older generation of revolutionaries". The report, shown in Germany Der Spiegel magazing Monday edition, said that "As long as Deng Xiaoping and the other leaders are alive they will use their stature to prevent conflict in party and state ...But thereafter severe crises are inevitable. There will be a revolt of those desperate groups who have not gained any social advantages from reforms." "More and more people will lose their jobs,the number of migrants will reach dangerous levels and the social differences will become explosive." "If the government is then not in a position to take tough action, conflicts at leadership level are inevitable. The result would be that various groups would mobilize their support in society and carry out their political conflict in the open," it said.
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 8-398/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p11 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Those living in Beijing during the spring of 1989 observed the enormous crowds that quickly formed in city streets; they realized how difficult it would be for the authorities to maintain public order if such crowds became enraged. Similar incidents could precipitate a political crisis; leaders then blame each other for the mess. A divided leadership inevitably causes power struggle.
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8-399 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Jiang is treading a fine line. Do too little, and public anger over corruption could explode. But going too far carries the same risks. The last time the public openly protested corruption, up to 1 million people took to Beijing's streets in the mass pro-democracy demonstrations of 1989 that eventually were crushed by troops.
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 8-400/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China," edited by Wi II iam T. Tow, p.235; THR VT96
	 A top-level meeting on December l 1-17, 1989, discussed the impact on China of the Eastern European events, concluding that preventive steps were essential. According to Deng, events in Eastern Europe showed that "our guiding principle of quelling the [Tiananmen] rebellion was completely correct."24 Imperialist and hostile foreign forces had never ceased to subvert and undermine socialist states. "But some comrades inside the party simply turn a deaf ear to it, saying that we are talking nonsense. Now everything is clear .... We must oppose bourgeois liberalization and never show mercy to it." The plots of international hostile forces to foment peaceful evolution, n midst be foiled; there could be no retreat.
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8-401/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES:CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.134; THR VT96
	 On 5 February 1990 the governments of China's four main cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Canton) were delegated authority to declare martial law in the event of public disorder, and to use force without prior clearance from Beijing. In late February, the CCP Central Commission of Political Science and Law issued a circular calling for public security procuratorate and court systems to step up their suppression of dissent. The circular also called for better political intelligence work. Specifically, command centres of provinces, prefectures, and key cities were to be reorganized and reinforced. Anti-riot police forces and tactical units of the P A P were to be organized to struggle against 'sabotage, subversion, and infiltration'. The circular further called for strengthened ideological and political work in the PAP and in the public security forces.
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 8-402/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 207; THR VT96
	 A weak regime facing so many problems is bound to be tempted an authoritarian solution. The conditions for Mao-style popular mobilization no longer exist; the most an authoritarian regime can achieve is repression. Chinese authoritarianism would involve reasserting direct control over foreign trade, financial institutions, major enterprises, and the grain supply, suppressing incomes and consumption, tightly controlling the propaganda media, concealing intra-regime conflicts, and deterring autonomous political discussion. There is probably no limit to the number of years an unpopular, inefficient, coercive regime can survive as long as it retains control of the armed forces. But it seems unlikely such a regime can solve China's economic problems or win popular legitamacy IT IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED STABLE.
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8-403/Ernest P. Young, Prof. of history at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Imagining the Ancient Regime in the Deng Era," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 15 ; THR VT96
	 The simplest explanation may be the best. One can argue that Deng's first priority had always been power and the perpetuation of the system that seemed to grant that power. He was willing to reform so far, but no further, and he always stopped when the reforms began to threaten the autocracy. According to this argument, Deng has always been a pragmatist who would use ideological claims to gain support for his programs but never let ideology get in the way of practical concern with maintaining existing power relations. This kind of argument carries a good deal of weight because Spring 1989 was not, after all, the first time since Deng's ascendancy that a liberal oppositional voice had been silenced.
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8-404/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. of Political Science at the University of California, 1991; CONI'EMPORARY Chinese POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "From revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 202 ;THR VT96
	 Applying these three steps to China, one sees that China has reached the stage where only leaders at the top level articulate the interests of their constituencies. But the Leninist party system still prohibits a leader from mobilizing his constituent group in order to bring pressure on his colleagues in the policy-making process. Besides the lingering legacy of democratic centralism, the historically conditioned fear of political chaos and civil war will tend to make Chinese leaders intolerant of the uncertainty that inevitably will arise from the crucial stage of the democratization process. The bureaucratic technocrats are not liberals advocating democracy, and their memories of Mao, who mobilized the masses against his adversaries, are still quite vivid.
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8-405/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUILOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 For their part, the Chinese Communists will see that there will be no recurrence of another uprising like that of Tiananmen. They have more than once conducted some self-examinations, Peking has learned a lesson from the incident. 
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8-406/Martin Lee, Elected member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, and Chairman of the newly-rotaTed Democratic Party, Feb 1995; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Hong Kong's 1000 Days," p. 3 ; MDS VT96
	 CHINA HAS given its verdict: Tiananmen worked. Five years after the massacre the Chinese leadership has pronounced it a success: "Without the resolute measures taken then, China would not enjoy today's stability. History shows that anything conducive to our national stability is good ". As far as Beijing is concerned, the end justifies the means - even when the means are of the order of a massacre of its own people. New-found economic leverage has helped China back into the world community, with Western governments and business anxious for a piece of its booming market. President Bill Clinton's abandonment of the earlier linkage between trade and human rights, and his about-face in granting Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to China, has only contributed to Beijing's restored confidence.
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 8-407/Chai Ling, Shen Tong, Gao Xin, Wang Jungtao, Tiananmen square survivors, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Tiananmen and China's future: The view five years later" p. 247 ;SEG VT96
	 We all learned a lesson in '89; if there are no checks and balances, if there is no separation of powers, and if there are no laws, then sooner or later, the people's lives and the fight to pursue happiness, freedom, and liberty will be taken away, will be abused. I think that is the root of China's human rights problems.
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 8-408/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.71; THR VT96
	 Nor is it likely that the ruling elite will allow the drastic democratization that is happening in Eastern European countries. The bureaucratic technocrats are not politically democrats. Given the technocrats' general orientation toward outcome rather than the due process of decisionmaking (to which the democrats attach paramount importance) and their aversion to uncertainty, they tend to be less sympathetic, if not openly opposed, to political democratization. The technocrats tend 10 see their mission as improving and perfecting the existing system because they possess narrowly defined technical knowledge (mainly related to formal rationality) that helps choose the best means once the basic goals of the society are agreed upon.
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 8-409/gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China and the Soviet Union," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 50 ; THR VT 96 In the 1980s China's de-ideologization had spread to all disciplines. Yet artificial limits operated in each and in the journalistic areas that complemented them. By drawing the line most clearly in the area of ideology, China's leaders kept reform from turning into dismantling. At the same time, they made it difficult for reform to continue. Conservative forces were not scattered in disarray as they were during the first five >'ears of the Gorbachev era and again in the seventh year when they were further discredited by their failed coup. Instead, they were well organized, and during intermittent campaigns they became mobilized into crash offensives against ideological deviance. Ideological conservatism in China in the 1980s, as in the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, remained well entrenched even when permission was briefly given to men such as Liu Binyan or Su Shaozhi to stretch the limits of reform thought. By late 1989 Chinese ideological limits had tightened.
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8-410/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p. 254 ; THR VT96
	 Two factors which played a very important role in the dramatic shifts of power in the countries which used to make up the Soviet Union were the masses of Moscow and the army. In China, both were central to the events of 1989. In contrast to Moscow during the attempted coup d'etat against Gorbachev in August 1991, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) sided firmly with the Communist Party. Although dormant as of 1993, the student movement could easily reassert itself in the future, especially some time after the death of Deng Xiaoping. If the past is any guide, however, the PLA is more likely to be a crucial player in determining which group or party comes to power than student or other demonstrators. The history of the PLA would make it unlikely to support any party but the CCP, although which fiction it would favour in the wake of Deng's death is uncertain.
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 8-412/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 84 ; THR VT96
	 To be sure, the government also has some assets, not the least of which is an unequaled capacity for repression through the People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police, and the Public Security Bureau. And the sheer size and tendency toward inertia of the bureaucracy also contributes to a stability--whatever the cost--that the government, and perhaps a great many people, seek to maintain. Further, while the Chinese peoples do not see themselves as part of a nation-state as that concept is known in the West, they do participate in the world's oldest continuous culture, and the binding strength of this cultural cement is not to be passed over quickly.
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8-413/Marlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE Nineties :CRISIS MAAGENENT AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S.g. Goodman and George Segal, p.154; THR VT96
	 Despite their reservations about the wisdom of their orders, and about the ad hoc authority of the 'gang of elders', the vast majority of PLA officers obeyed. It certainly was not a 'military takeover'. They went into the streets, and did what they were ordered to do. They recognized that a unified, disciplined, national army enforcing bad policy is better than a divided army at war with itself, even for the best of reasons. But many officers resent being cast as the instrument of repression, and being thrust back into factional politics.
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8-414/Anita Chan, Associate Contemporary China Centre Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINEI'IES:CRISIS MANAGEMENF AND BEYOND, "The Social Origins and Consequences of the Tiananmen Crisis," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p 128; THR VT96
	 The ruling CCP octogenarians appear to recognize, better than the intellectuals, the importance of solidarity across class boundaries in any protest movement, and measures have been taken by the government to forestall such co-operation in future. As an initial step, in the months immediately after the Beijing massacre, Deng and the party's hard-liners revived the slogan 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the term that had been used to justify suppression of dissent under Mao in the name of the working class. 'Dictatorship of the proletariat' was, in particular, the rallying cry of the Cleansing of Class Ranks campaign of the late 1960s, arguably the most vicious campaign in the previous forty years of CCP rule, in which many tens of thousands of people died. During that campaign, vigilante workers' corps were mobilized to take control of universities and schools, and were called upon to ferret out and 'struggle against vast number of targeted victims.
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 8-415/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.96; THR VT96
	 On a number of grounds the situation appears to look rather bleak. The conservative victors of the elite struggle that erupted during the Beijing Spring have taken a number of measures designed to check and reverse the emergence of civil society. They have arrested large numbers of liberal-reformist opinion leaders and are trying to intimidate the rest. Certainly the harshness of the crackdown demonstrates vividly to the public that the institutionalization of autonomous associational life and freedom of expression that appeared to exist was ephemeral. Some of the independent groups that emerged prior to or during the demonstrations (e.g., the Beijing Autonomous Student Union and the Stone Institute of Social Development) have been banned or emasculated, and new sets of regulations and registration procedures have been introduced in an effort to bring under some degree of official control all such organizations that remain. Large numbers of magazines and publication series have been dosed, and wholesale purges have altered the editorial boards in many parts of the mass media. A wide range of ideas and cultural products of the period prior to the crackdown have been subjected to denunciation. Advocacy of the virtues of privatization, interest groups, and alternatives to Marxist theory is now dangerous. Political study rituals have been beefed up throughout society, with college students subjected to especially intensive doses, in some cases as part of a temporary stint of "remolding" in a military academy.37 In general many of the time-honored (or shopworn, depending upon one's point of view) ideological control devices of the Maoist era have been dusted off and put into service again. Even that paragon of competitive selflessness, Lei Feng, is supposed to be the object of study and emulation once more. Finally, in justifying their crackdown, the conservative leaders have appealed directly to popular fears of "turmoil" and "chaos" and have argued that all individuals and groups need to submit to party authority if these dangers are to be avoided. It is not impossible to turn back the clock and suppress an emerging civil society, as developments after 1949 showed, and this seems to be what the conservative leaders are trying to do.
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8-416/Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CON±'EMPORARY CH]INESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "in search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p.85 ;THR VT96
	 Perhaps the most important historical resonance of the conservative position is with the fear of chaos and the drive for order in the twentieth century. The postulate that the interests of the parts should be subordinate to the interests of the whole becomes salient when the existence of the whole political order is threatened. The historic achievement of the CCP was meeting the challenge of total crisis presented by imperialism and internal disintegration, and the conservative viewpoint is defined by that experience. Every crisis is seen as one of life or death, and every challenge appears to lead ineluctably to a crisis. Any demonstrator calls for the overthrow of the party and the socialist system, no matter what that demonstrator actually says. The overriding concern for order reinforces the traditionaIist and Marxist predilection to deny legitimacy to pluralization, institutional and procedural structure, and citizen rights. Even if the leadership does not really believe itself to be mortally threatened, it is to the interest of its complacency of power to sound the alarm. Crisis justifies dictatorship, even if the party produces the crisis.
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8-417/Gerald Segal, Senior fel low in the Internat ional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openess: Linking Domest i c and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p.354; THR VT 96 The PLA, under the instructions of the central leadership, demonstrated the limits of reform. Under no circumstances was decentralization to mean independence. So long as no outside power did anything to assist the rebels, China was able to draw such a line, although blood had to be shed to maintain it. Yet China was also clear that as the Soviet empire proved less solid, then China might find itself with a far more serious problem, especially in Central Asia.
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8-418/HAROLD PEPINSKY, Prof. Criminal Justice, Indiana Univ., 1991; GEOMETRY OF VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY, p. 20 The theory is that violence begets violence, whether the offender has committed or received unresponsiveness in the past. 5 8-419/Shigeki Hakamada, Prof in the International Politics and Eonomics Dept. at Aoyama Gakuin Univ., Tokyo, and G il bert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 178; THR VT 96
	 Despite the flirtation with neo-authoritarian ideas in China's disquieting inflationary days of 1988 and early 1989 and again in the midst of the Soviet Union's economic deterioration of 1990, many in the population did not abandon their faith in reform and democracy, especially when confronted with the threat of a reversion to hard-line Communist Party control. In an atmosphere of polarization, the citizens of Beijing flocked to the streets in support of democracy. Leading them were the students. In the ensuing emergency, the compromise formulas for guided democratization were quickly set aside. Finally, after Deng Xiaoping and the older generation of party leaders resorted to force, they unleashed a barrage of communist dogma very different from the growing call for a mixture of centralized authority and advancing democracy. They couched their appeal in terms of a struggle between the forces of order and those of anarchy, the forces of national dignity and those of subservience to the imperialists, the forces of stability needed for economic growth and those of risking the well-being of the country. China's leadership opted for polarization, not compromise.
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 8-420/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," P.27; THR VT96
	 Since the Beijing massacre and the suppression of open political dissidence, the government has imposed stringent controls on even the most innocuous student activities. Memories of June 1989 and the intensification of public security precautions are sufficient to intimidate youth. Young people have retreated into passivity and despair' about the future, made worse by the awareness that the "people's army" would use naked force against its citizens. Most notably in Beijing, this low morale adversely affects study and production. The current status quo leaves the government in a quandary: It has neutralized the threat of an insurrection by youth using measures that preclude mobilizing youth on the government's behalf. Anniversaries of past student movements, once celebrated by the Communist party, become a time to step up security. Officially sponsored norms alienate youth, yet adapting ideology to their concerns threatens to condone "bourgeois liberalism" or "pornographic influences." A new spurt of economic growth could conceivably create enough professionally rewarding jobs to provide some breathing room for the government. A meaningful reconciliation between state and youth, however, requires a better match between official and youth norms.
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8-421/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 34; CJJ VT96
	 Yet much of what we have said above should indicate just how difficult that domestic change will be. It is not simply a matter of "political openness catching up with economic reform." Rather it is a matter of recasting China, and giving it what so many thought communism had, namely, a modern form. The list of issues to be resolved is enormous: how to establish legitimacy; how to structure relations between provinces and the center; how to accommodate the rapid southward shift of the economic center of gravity; and how to find work for hundreds of millions of farmers who have left the land, and for tens of millions of highly educated and ambitious urban dwellers. Beyond China proper, the issues are: how to deal with Tibet, Sinkiang, and other areas of culturally distinct population now incorporated in the PRC; how to develop constitutional mechanisms for Hong Kong and Macao, allowing them to retain their present characters, and for Taiwan to associate itself (assuming anyone on Taiwan wants to.)
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8-422/FRANCIS BEER, Prof. Political Science Univ. Colorado, 1981; PEACE AGAINST WAR: ECOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE, p. 57 From a psychological perspective, domestic political turmoil may increase the anxieties of the elites. As levels of insecurity rise, leaders may project their fears into the international arena and act out their repressed hostilities at a distance (Rosecrance, Haas & Sterling, 1965).
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8-423/FRANCIS BEER, Prof. Political Science Univ. Colorado, 1981; PEACE AGAINST WAR: ECOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE, p. 57 Domestic strike may be projected outward. If revolution or turmoil threatens a regime, it may undertake wars as diversions, "foreign circuses," or crusades, looking for external "targets" or "scapegoats" (Blainey, 1973).
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8-424/FRANCIS BEER, Prof. Political Science Univ. Colorado, 1981; PEACE AGAINST WAR: ECOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE, p. 169 In some situations groups "search for enemies...in order to help maintain and increase group cohesion" (1955). [Ellipsis in original]
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8-425/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China-at the Crossroads:Reform after Tiananmen, p. 103; THR VT96
	 In a similar fashion, the leadership's perception of the nature of Tiananmen within the context of the developing international environment profoundly shaped China's policy toward the United States. Almost immediately after Tiananmen, some of China's leaders fell back on their own stereotypes by linking the demonstrators with foreign forces seeking to undermine socialism. The nation was once again under siege from hostile, external forces.
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8-426/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 198 ;THR VT96
	 Until Tiananmen prompted a revision of its national agenda, China seemed well on the way to successful adaptation to the newly emerging regional and international realities. Beijing had in the course of reform successfully reversed the garrison state priorities of the Maoist era (i.e., economic autark) large heavy industry and defense budgets, geographic location of investment based on strategic rather than economic criteria) and showed promise of becoming Asia's fifth and largest NIC. Chinese foreign policy seemed to have adapted very well to these new priorities, burying the hatchet with old and new adversaries and putting the country, for the first time, on good terms with nearly everyone. China's international status reached new heights, despite the country's still modest level of economic and technological advancement.
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8-427/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p.209 ;THR VT96
	 And what of Tiananmen? The crackdown did not reverse as many domestic reforms as its supporters hoped and its victims feared. It has contributed to a healthy caution among both elites and masses that should, ceteris paribus, diminish the likelihood of another such tragedy during succession. In the international arena it has contributed to a certain slippage, a loss of moral self-assurance. China's national identity is less secure without the accustomed international reference groups to set its course b}6 and the regime has resorted to accelerated armament efforts in the absence of any visible security threat and rigidified its position on certain sensitive issues, such as Hong Kong and the Spratleys. Although understandable under the circumstances, fids policy has been the source of some unease among China's regional neighbors and may prove hard to square with Beijing's self ambitious diplomatic and developmental objectives. All things considered, however, these difficulties seem relatively manageable--twists and bumps in the road toward a future that can be viewed with cautious optimism.
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8-428 / Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 Beijing officials, to manage possible dissent at home, will probably seek to make an example out of Hongkong. The territory can therefore expect a rougher time in 1997. Corruption and the absence of the rule of law will grow. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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 8-429/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p .34; THR VT96
	 Chinese politics now revolves around the question of how to complete the transition to a market-based economy, how to secure the authority of the central government vis-a-vis the provinces, and how to integrate the economy into the world system. Although reformers have made substantial progress in all these areas since late 1992, social and political conflict could produce a backlash in the post-Deng period. The growth of corruption, the increasing inequalities among regions, and declines in peasant incomes in some areas will inevitably feed discontent. Such social issues have appeared on the agenda when Beijing seems increasingly weak vis-a-vis the provinces. Moreover, many in China believe that the country has compromised too much on a large range of issues, from market access to arms control, with the West in general and the United States in particular. This provides fertile ground for conservatives to try again to place the blame on the reformers and attempt to rally the nation around a different banner, especially if the economy should falter.
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8-430/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, edited by WiII iam T. Tow, p. 164;THR VT96
	 In the aftermath of June 4, the contradictions between state and society have been exacerbated, with state policies themselves often internally inconsistent. Thus, on the one hand, the government is attempting to attract back to China the tens of thousands of overseas students and scholars crucial for modernization. But those studying abroad, given their tenure in ideologically hostile territory, must be viewed warily, must even be "reeducated," if and when they return. In like manner, facing a serious legitimacy problem after June 4 and recognizing the inroads of Western philosophical and political thought in China, the regime has be- gun to embrace traditional Chinese culture and nostalgia for the certainties of the Mao era. These are viewed as bulwarks against the encroachments of "Westernization," to be chosen unequivocally for stability at any cost, despite the likely negative effects this will have on the reform program.
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 8-431/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 207; THR VT96
	 The crackdown is likely to make the economic situation worse. The regime is more divided than ever about the solutions to its economic problems, and even if it could formulate a clear policy it would not have the power to carry it out. Political demoralization makes it even more likely that enterprises and individuals will evade government policies whenever it seems to be in their interest to do so. The rate of foreign investment is likely to decline, not only because of economic sanctions but because of concern about political risk. Inflation, one of the proximate causes of the 1989 crisis, is likely to increase because the regime lacks means to control the rate of investment, the money supply, or prices. And corruption, another major cause, will probably worsen because the government can neither move back to a planned system or forward to a market system. The trend toward economic federalism is likely to accelerate as the central government is increasingly unable to provide anything of economic value to the provinces in exchange for the taxes and regulations it imposes on them. ]
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8-432/DIPAK K. GUPTA, Prof. Public Administration, San Diego State Univ., 1990; THE ECONOMICS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, p. 179 It is a well accepted fact that a sustained level of serious political disturbance can have disastrous consequences for an economy.
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 8-433/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p. 36; THR VT96
	 Old Deng's prescription for reform is a little like yingzhen zhike (dnnking poisonous wine to slake one's thirst)," a Chinese friend laughingly told me. Then she added, "But never mind. If he wants to kill socialism, it's fine by us" But if socialism was fading, those who would rule in its name were far from allowing themselves to be completely vanquished. Moreover, hard-liners remained in waiting for the next interlude of"turmoil" so that they might once again reassert their leadership. In this sense, student protest served their purposes well. After all, it had been the eruption of demonstrations in 1986 and 1989 that had allowed hard-liners to form alliances of expedience with Deng, and regain power during the crisis of the moment. All they could do for no._w was once again to bide their time.
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8-434/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "Chin@'s Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 29; CJJ VF96 The perils that a repetition of such an incident would bring to East Asia are hard to overstate. To begin with, no leadership succeeding Deng is likely to have the authority necessary to keep the whole military under control; recourse to force, therefore, may well lead to a split within the army, and perhaps usher in domestic conflict. And even if repression should succeed, it will have a chilling effect on trade and investment, which will further weaken a government that already confronts massive budget deficits.
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8-435/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Navel War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p.29; CJJ VT96
	 In the absence of such a resolution, of course, the military was the only resource, and it yielded an apparent short-term success: the government survived, the economy did not collapse, and, most important, foreign governments either maintained unbroken their support for Beijing or reaffirmed it after an interval of protest. But this was at best a stop-gap solution that only postponed inevitable change. Today it is becoming increasingly dear that, despite positive economic developments in China since 1989---indeed, to some extent because of them and the aspirations they feed--the massacre cannot be deleted from China's collective, memory. There is both a demand, and, more important, the expectation, that before too long the official line will change, the protesters' patriotic motives will be affirmed, and the massacre itself disowned. 
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 8-436/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 118 ;THR VT96
	 How strong are the democratic trends in China? Students and intellectuals, after all, are only a tiny minority in this vast peasant country: Most of the people care little about politics and are absorbed in scratching out a living. China has a long tradition of authoritarianism and faces enormous economic problems. The leaders at the top are obsessed with keeping order in a tumultuously changing society. They command strong military and police forces. With forty years' experience of one-party dictatorship behind them, how likely is it that the leaders will voluntarily throw some of their power into the unpredictable hands of the people, especially in the midst of an economic crisis?
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8-437/Anita Chan, Associate Contemporary China Centre Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "The Social Origins and Consequences of the Tiananmen Crisis," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.128, THR VT96
	 The exiled students and intellectuals' vast outpouring of speeches, essays, and political treatises during 1989-90 barely recognized the role played by the workers and the ordinary people in the movement, nor paid tribute to the many who are still in jail or died for the cause. At the same time that six student and intellectual exile groups were negotiating an amalgamation, some fifty or so exiled worker activists set up their own separate 'China's Overseas Workers Autonomous Association's If the relationship between student-intellectuals and workers in exile reflects in any way the relationship of these social groups inside China proper, it would appear that the events of 1989 have, if anything, exacerbated the distrust between them. The students and intellectuals do not seem to realize that for their cause to succeed they need to forge a united front with the workers and the rest of the Chinese people.
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8-438/Timothy Cheek, Assist. Prof. of history at The Colorado College, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State Under the CCP,'" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 125; THR VT96
	 Intellectuals have made a further step in the movement from priest-rentiers serving the cosmic state (Confucian or Leninist) to professionals salaried a bourgeois society. They are not there yet, and that is one of the reasons why the popular protests of 1989 in China did not result in the dramatic change of regimes we saw in Eastern Europe (a phenomenon Chirot's chapter elucidates so well). The significance of Tiananmen is that this critical "event" has pushed that process forward. However, the mandarin vocation--which calls for a generalist serving the state through a central bureaucracy and with a unified ideology, rather than professional specialists serving the nation through a variety of separate institutions within a pluralistic range of ideologies--has not yet disappeared in China today. It is the purpose of this chapter to suggest that a greater appreciation of the "establishment" role of intellectuals will help us better understand the events of 1989 and the likely future contribution intellectuals to China's unfinished revolution.
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8-439/Timothy Cheek, Assist. Prof. of history at The Colorado College, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "From Priests to Professionals: Intellectuals and the State Under the CCP,'" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 127;THR VT96
	 Under this deal with the CCP, the educated elite gave up claims to the wealth and political power of their scholar-gentry ancestors to serve what they felt was a more egalitarian and socially just government. They rejected the status of landlord and scholar-elite (shenshi) and accepted the status of intellectual (zhishi fenzi) and cadre (ganbu). They honored the common people (the worker, the peasant, the soldier) as never before in history and gave of their talents to raise the cultural and economic level of every Chinese. In essence they sought to select the good of the literati past and to discard the bad.
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8-440/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p. 54 ; THR VT96
	 Outside Beijing, opinion is much less clearly sympathetic to the students. A rural cadre outside Guiyang at the end of 1990, when asked what the peasants thought of the Beijing events, replied simply: 'People here want stability, they don't understand what the students were talking about.' The peasants and other ordinary people said they did not understand what the students were demanding: they worshipped Deng Xiaoping and his reform policies and opposed anything which could possibly endanger them. Such people accepted the government line that bad elements had used the students for their own ends, which included a .rebellion against the CCP. Certainly there were middle-aged people who were convinced that the government action was necessary and who continued to support Deng Xiaoping. Young city-dwellers may have been much less enthusiastic about Deng and much less sure about any rebellion. However, the view expressed by the rural cadre outside Guiyang appeared to be very widespread indeed throughout the whole country in the early 1990s. Few people wanted instability. What they wanted was to get on with economic growth and modernisation.
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 8-441/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 197; THR VT 96 The student or democratic movement is the movement of an absolute minority The students scarcely tried to organize the peasants to democratize the apparatus. They tried, as a first step, to build an "elite" democracy by intellectuals. Chinese society, however, is still dominated by a rural mentality within the party, although the peasants themselves have been victims of fluctuating economic policy since 1949. The famous saying that the cities are surrounded by the villages still applies. Unlike China, European socialist countries are city oriented and more integrated as nations. Even if a similar movement occurs in Chinese cities, its influence will be small unless rural people as well as city dwellers are organized to wage a protracted conflict. 
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8-442/Joseph W. Esherick, Prof. of history and Chinese Studies at Univ. of California at San Diego and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Prof. of history at Indiana Univ. at Bloomington, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 53 ;THR VT96
	 In addition, China and the remaining state socialist regimes are all poor Third World countries. They have large, impoverished, and still poorly educated rural populations. At least in China, there is unquestionably substantial peasant discontent over a variety of issues--the payment for grain requisitions in IOUs instead of money, the government's failure to deliver promised supplies of chemical fertilizer. But in general peasants displayed little sympathy for the demands of the student demonstrators. Only the attack on corruption struck a responsive chord. And when the crackdown came, rural residents tended to believe the government contention that the peasant soldiers of the People's Liberation Army would not fire on unarmed civilians unless there was a genuine threat to law and order. In short, China's large peasant population remained largely preoccupied with its own immediate material interests, and it viewed these interests as dependent on continued political stability. Consequently, China's peasantry provided a reservoir of support for the hard-liners in Beijing that was missing in any East European regime.
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8-443/James L. Watson, Fairbank Prof. of Chinese Society and Prof. of anthropology at Harvard University, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "The Renegotiation of Chinese Cultural Identity in the Post-Mao Era" edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 80 ;THR VT96
	 That university students relied so heavily upon what are essentially foreign (or international) symbols in their Tiananmen Square demonstrations (i.e., fasting, slogan-bearing headbands, V for victory signs, a version of the Statue of Liberty) is revealing and significant. These internationalist forms of political expression have been incorporated into the urbanite culture that is emerging in China's central cities. Thus, in terms of the symbolic reconstruction of a new sense of cultural identity, the activists in the square and their supporters probably have more in common with their Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong, Taipei, and New York than they do with their remote kin in the rural districts of Anhui and Guangdong.
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 8-444/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 191 ; THR VT96
	 It is difficult to imagine an insurrection in China that is not based in the countryside. So far as I know, the democratic movement did not enjoy much active support in the rural areas. The rural dwellers may have lacked information about the democratic movement; if they participated in it, they would not have enjoyed the same anonymity as did urban crowds; they were busy earning a living; and, perhaps most importantly, although the farmers were dissatisfied with the regime, they have not been as severely affected by inflation as urban dwellers and have greater possibilities for making do economically. As Wan Runnan has said, "When the economy worsens, the peasants will suffer. This is what is needed to change their political stance. For now, they still hope to muddle through; they still think they can make it.''47 Of course, the social makeup of the countryside is becoming increasingly complex. Rural dwellers include not only farmers but also industrial workers, shop clerks, peddlers, fishermen, teachers, monks, and local officials. Members of some of these groups have evidently been willing to help the democratic activists go underground or escape. But this scattered assistance does not provide the critical mass for a peasant uprising. 
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8-445/Joseph W. Esherick, Prof. of history and Chinese Studies at Univ. of California at San Diego and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Prof. of history at Indiana Univ. at Bloomington, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 31 ; THR VT96
	 Nor do the words and deeds of the protesters of 1986-1987 or 1989 fit easily with more radical Western ideas of direct or participatory democracy. In many cases the students seem to have read the rain in rainzhu in a limited sense to refer not to the populace at large but mainly or exclusively to the educated elite of which they are part. This elitist reading of rainzhu was dear in the wall posters that appeared in Shanghai in December 1986, many of which took their lead from the speeches Fang Lizhi gave at the city's Tongji University earlier that year. The main theme of these posters, as in many of Fang's lectures and writings, was not that the CCP should be more responsive to the ideas of China's masses but rather that it should allow the intelligentsia a greater voice in national affairs. This elitist strain carried over into student tactics in 1986: At one point, when Shanghai workers came out to sup. port their protesting "younger brothers," the students told them to go home. 
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8-446/Elizabeth J. Perry, Prof. of political science at the University of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Introduction: Chinese Political Culture Revisited," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 10 ;THR VT96
	 That Chinese political culture gives shape to recognizable but flexible patterns of protest can be seen by comparison with Taiwan, another Chinese society recently rocked by popular unrest. In March 1990 a massive, weeklong student sit-in occupied the Chiang Kaishek Memorial grounds in the center of Taipei. The demands (for dissolution of the national assembly and direct elections of the president) were different, but the style of protest was remarkably reminiscent of the previous year's student movement on the mainland. The Taiwan protesters donned the same white headbands, broadcast the same rock music, and undertook a similarly dramatic hunger strike. One Taipei student captured the special attention of the media precisely because of her striking resemblance to Chai Ling, the activist of Tiananmen fame. Yet there were important departures as well. In place of the U.S.-inspired goddess of democracy that loomed over Tiananmen Square, the Taiwan students erected a huge papier-mache lily, a native plant symbolic of both purity and independence. And although Taipei protesters imitated the Beijing exemplar in establishing a picket line to separate themselves from ordinary citizens, they actually welcomed members of the labor movement, the farmers' movement, the women's movement, and environmental and homeless advocates inside the cordon.26 Thanks to the socioeconomic changes of recent years, the distinctions between urban intellectuals and other social groups had become much less pronounced in Taiwan than was the situation on the opposite side of the straits.
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 8-447/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 173;THR VT96
	 Several factors account for the moderation of the democracy movement. The Chinese democrats have long believed that the regime was capable of reform from within, and the democrats themselves continued to believe m socialism, albeit of a democratic variety. But a moderate approach was also prudent, for the regime re.rained command over the police and the military, and it previously showed itself willing to use these instruments of coercion to suppress the opposition. Finally, the democracy movement was made up almost entirely of students and intellectuals, a small minority within Chinese society. These people lacked the numbers and the willingness to confront the regime head-on. These factors combined to incline Chinese democrats to press for a "self-limiting revolution" in the People's Republic Of China.
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 8-448/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of Fast Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 28; CJJ VT96
	 But like the other critical turning points of the post-Mao period, beginning with the coup against Mao's widow and her followers, the suppression of the democracy movement was conducted in an extra-constitutional manner. This fact was not lost even within the circles of government. During the period immediately before the Tiananmen massacre, a substantial number of the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC)--nearly a third---were involved in signing petitions calling for the convening of an emergency meeting of the NPCSC, an event known as the "Signature Incident." If it had succeeded, and the NPCSC had become involved in discussions of the grievances of the Democracy Movement and possible ways to resolve the conflict with the government, the dynamics of the confrontation would have changed completely,_.. and it is quite likely that a solution would have been found without bloodshed.
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8-449/Barian W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETES:CRISIS Management AND BEYOND, "China's Army, China's Future," Edited by David S .G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 148; THR VT96
	 First, and perhaps most important, the prestige of the army was irreparably damaged by the massacre of citizens in the streets ' • of Beijing. The special trust and empathy between the PLA and the people, which persisted through decades of economic and political turmoil, is gone. The officers who must lead the PLA into the future resent that deeply, for China's defensive strategy of last resort-'people's war'-is now problematic. They also resent the suspicion and paranoia their top leaders have directed at them. Further, they resent that after ten years of promises, technical modernization has been further (needlessly) delayed by foreign sanctions and the shifting of limited resources to the police. 
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8-450/Harlan W. Jencks, Research Fellow Centre for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINTIES :CRISIS MAKGEMENT AND BEYOND, "China's Arffy, China's Future," Edited .by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 152; THR VT96
	 Regardless of which group prevailed in the power struggle in... 1989, neither the reform group nor the hardliners can be comfortable with the actual or rumoured command relationship between the party and army. At best, it is messy.' We do not know, and quite possibly nobody in China knows, just what is the 'accepted or legal military chain of command at the top of the national command structure'. The most fundamental 'party-army question arising from [the Tiananmen crisis] was "Who in the party controls the army?" rather than "Does the party control the army?" ,70 Closely related questions are 'How is control exercised, and through what channels?'
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 8-451/Chai Ling, Shen Tong, Gao Xin, Wang Jungtao, Tiananmen square survivors, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Tinnanmen and China's future: the view five years later" p. p. 248 ;SEG VT96
	 Thus, the massacre on June 4 actually had two purposes. The first purpose was to suppress the will of the people, the students, and the citizens. The second was to prevent the convening of the meeting of the standing committee. You can see that, for example, last year when there was a convening of the standing committee, 300 votes were against and abstained in the vote for Li Peng as prime minister. The resolution on building Three Gorges dam project received 800 negative votes. .
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8-452/Stanley Rosen, Prof. Political Science University of Southern California, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Students and the State in China: Crisis in Ideology and Organization, Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.168 THR VT96
	 Far from seriously addressing the concerns that contributed to the students' loss of faith--which would have required, at a minimum, a wide-ranging public dialogue over the nature and direction of the Chinese Revolution at the current stage--Chinese authorities have responded to the authority crisis dividing state and society with policies primarily aimed at controlling any independent student behavior, only halfheartedly seeking to shepherd the wayward back into the flock. In their appeals to the glories of the pre-1949 Communist Revolution and their revival of the campaigns to study the selfless revolutionary heroes of preCultural Revolution China, they have conceptualized a society that no longer exists, raising issues far removed from the concerns of Chinese students in the 1990s. Having "'lost" the current generation of university students, the regime has focused on future generations, introducing extensive military and ideological training for new students in an effort to counter the influence of their more jaded peers on the university campuses. In this chapter I attempt to document the extent of the students' ideological and organizational estrangement from the regime and the response of the authorities.
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8-453/Business China, January 24, 1994; Business China, "China's soaraway economy looks set to rise further: Up, up and away"; PMS VT96
	 But even if there are outbreaks of protest, no form of social unrest looks likely to destabilise China in the foreseeable future-the communist government in Beijing, unlike its counterparts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, has not lost its appetite for power. This means that foreign companies can concentrate on the business difficulties most likely to affect them:
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 8-454/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Int roduct ion, p. 10, THR VT96
	 Whyte's explanation of the growth of autonomy in post-Mao China has been widely accepted; his assessment of its strength, however, is more controversial. In 1989, he argues, China had a more advanced civil society than the Soviet Union. The failure of democratic movements in 1989 was due to the staying power of China's first-generation revolutionaries and the strength of the army, not the weakness of civil society. The post-Tiananmen crackdown can only restrict rather than completely suppress the manifestation of civil society. Would-be hardliners hoping to turn back the clock will face grassroots resistance and the opposition of moderate elements in the leadership.
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8-455/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 183; THR VT96
	 The student movement thus emerged against the background of a general crisis in the regime and a specific crisis in relations between the regime and the intellectuals. But in rhetoric, tactics, and demands, the students at first avoided pressing their advantage too aggressively. They positioned themselves within the established tradition of moderate democratic remonstrance. They cast themselves not as dissidents but as loyal followers, appealing to the authorities to live up to the values they themselves had articulated. The purpose of the hunger strike, which was symbolically undertaken in front of the Mao Mausoleum, in the shadow of the monument to the martyrs of the communist revolution, was to force the leaders to recognize the movement as being patriotic. The message was that the students valued the welfare of their own lives. It was thoroughly in the tradition of Qu Yuan, who had lived in the fourth century B.C., and who committed suicide to show his loyalty to the ruler who failed to heed his advice. Indeed, Qu probably represented a more influential precedent for the opposition's tactics of nonviolence than the examples of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, or Corazon Aquino, so often mentioned in the Western media.
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8-456/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 189 ; THR VT96
	 Besides intellectual reasons for nonviolence, practical concerns have ' dictated a nonviolent approach as well. The regime still controls overwhelming military and police force, and recent events have confirmed the importance of this factor. The events of June showed that the instruments of proletarian dictatorship--the least mentioned but perhaps the most important of Deng's four cardinal principles--are still firmly in the hands of the senior leaders. It is hard to say whether their control is due to ordinary military discipline, the effectiveness of the political commissar system, or the reinforcement of the control system with personal networks. Whatever the reason, the army and police forces have stood firmly with the regime.
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8-457/TED GURR & JACK GOLDSTONE, Prof. Government, Harvard, & Prof. Sociology, Univ. of California Davis, 1991; REVOLUTIONS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, p. 340 
	Revolutions are not intrinsically or inevitably violent.
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8-458/TED GURR & JACK GOLDSTONE, Prof. Government, Harvard, & Prof. Sociology, Univ. of California Davis, 1991; REVOLUTIONS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, p. 338 
	The use of violence for political ends is central to most definitions of revolution, but the evidence of our ten cases suggests that this is a misplaced emphasis.
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 8-459/TED GURR & JACK GOLDSTONE, Prof. Government, Harvard, & Prof. Sociology, Univ. of California Davis, 1991; REVOLUTIONS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, p. 339 
	Although it is true that elites who command an old regime seldom give up without a fight, the struggle is not necessarily a violent one. The Communist regime in Poland gave up power to Solidarity after a protracted political content in which there was virtually no violence, and Poland provided a scenario for more rapid transitions from Communist to multiparty democracy elsewhere in central Europe. The Aquino people power revolution in the Philippines, incomplete though it has proved to be, is another example in which the revolutionary drama was played out in nonviolent street confrontations.
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 8-460/TED GURR & JACK GOLDSTONE, Prof. Government, Harvard, & Prof. Sociology, Univ. of California Davis, 1991; REVOLUTIONS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, p. 339 
	Events of the 1980s demonstrate that in some circumstances, revolutions occur without substantial resort to deadly force and that when violence is an intrinsic part of the revolutionary struggle, it is not necessarily of high magnitude.
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 8-461/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 199; THR VT 96 One of the most important objectives of modern China is to raise its international rank. Stalinist socialism has been discredited as the way to create a "strong country China cannot go back to it. But the indoctrination of "nationalism" has not been very effective. Nationalism (or aiguozhuyi, which can be literally' translated as "love-state-ism") is not strong at the grassroots level. Chinese nationalism has mainly been the concern of intellectuals and cadres, those politically' committed to some causes. At the same time, it cannot become a rallying point for mass opposition. Among the Hart Chinese, love of people of Chinese origin, no matter where (ethnonationalism), is strong, but it lacks political implication most of the time. In this sense, nationalism cannot be the core 01' the political opposition, with the exception of minority nationalism.
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8-462/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 85; THR VT96
	 On the basis of these considerations, my first hope for the Chinese is that students and intellectuals will be able to overcome their elitist prejudices against workers to the point of being trusted by the latter sufficiently to make common cause in the cities, not to destroy the Party, but to break once and for all the Party's stranglehold on the country, and that they will be able to accomplish this with the aid of PLA forces, without large-scale violence. There are no good grounds for believing, however, that these groups could remain united enough thereafter to run the country effectively, with the consequences of power vacuum followed by a loss of central governmental authority; and it is my second hope that this is exactly what will happen.
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8-463/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p.53 ;THR VT96
	 On the other hand, even had there been no specifically organised rebellion against the rule of the CCP in China, might not the student movement have led quite quickly to the CCP's overthrow had it not been suppressed? When one considers that virtually every other communist party in the world, even including that of the Soviet Union itself, was overthrown in the two to three years following the Beijing massacre, it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the Chinese student movement might have been at the forefront of a kind of Zeitgeist hostile to Marxist-Leninist parties of all kinds and in all places. This argument gathers force in the light of the fact that the method of overthrow in virtually all cases has centered on massive demonstrations of protest against the ruling communist power.
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 8-464/TED GURR & JACK GOLDSTONE, Prof. Government, Harvard, & Prof. Sociology, Univ. of California Davis, 1991; REVOLUTIONS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, p. 340 The alternative winning strategy for modern revolutionaries is to moblize enough political force, with credible threats of disruption and violence, so that the old leaders are persuaded that the costs and risks of resistance are greater than the costs of early retirement.
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8-465/TED GURR & JACK GOLDSTONE, Prof. Government, Harvard, & Prof. Sociology, Univ. of California Davis, 1991; REVOLUTIONS OF THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, p. 343 The most significant revolutionary gains enumerated this far are political ones: dictators deposed, more effective state institutions founded, national identity reaffirmed, international stature enhanced.
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CHAPTER NINE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA
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Editor: Andrea Looby
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A. Economic Growth is Good.
1.	China is moving away from becoming a hegemonic power. (1-2b)
2.	China is heading for prosperity. (3-15)
3.	Political reform will occur with growth. (16-24d)
4.	Growth will help China have a strong market. (25-28)
5.	Growth is good for China's domestic situation. (29-39)
6.	Growth makes China interact peacefully with other nations. (40-44)
7.	China should be involved with GATT. (45-46)
8.	China has a lot of foreign investment. (47-51)
9.	Trade does not hurt human rights in China. (52-56)
10.	The US doesn't benefit from China's money because of the human rights issue.
11.	Sino-American economic relations are positive. (58-65)
12.	China's growth influences regional growth. (66-67)
13.	China's governmental influence is not bad. (68-73)
14.	Internal mass mobilization will happen with or without growth. (74)
15.	China's new tax laws are fine. (75-76)
16.	China is working on environmental projects. (77-81)
17. 	China goes along with the norm of intellectual property. (82)
18.	China does not have corruption. (83)
19.	China independently make its economy strong. (84)
20.	China allows the US access to China's currency. (86)
21.	China's interest in its economy has led to regional cooperation. (87)
22.	A strong American economy can make others conform. (88)
23.	China is opening the energy industry to the private sector. (89)
B. Economic Growth is Bad.
1.	Economic growth causes China to be an international threat. (90-107)
2.	Growth causes environmental horrors. (108-136)
3.	China's increase need for energy use of coal causes environmental problems. (137-152)
4.	Growth hurts biodiversity and resources. (153-155)
5.	Growth of the auto industry causes environmental problems. (156-157)
6.	China doesn't have strong environmental protection or interest. (158-170)
7.	Water pollutants are in the food. (171)
8.	Deforestation is a problem. (172-175)
9. 	Grain is becoming scarce. (176-178)
10.	Environmental problems have caused a $17 billion loss. (179)
11. 	Energy consumption has become a problem with growth. (180-186)
12.	Smuggling and piracy have become problems. (187-191)\
13.	Growth has caused more poor. (192-195)
14.	Growth has caused numerous domestic problems. (196-205)
15.	Growth has caused rural problems. (206-208)
16.	Growth leads to human rights' problems. (209)
17.	Economic disparity can lead to a large number of refugees. (210)
18. 	A fear of labor backlash now exists. (211)
19. 	The US is not comfortable with China's economic growth. (212-217)
20.	China's quick economic growth leads to serious problems. (218-226)
21.	China's economy is poor. (227-236)
22.	China's government can't deal with the economy well. (237-245)
23.	China wants to invest in science and technology. (246-248)
24.	China is hungry for investment. (249-252)
25.	China's market is fragile. (253)
26.	Corruption occurs with growth. (254-255)
27.	China wants to decrease foreign competition. (256)
28.	China wants to keep communism through capitalism. (257-258)
29.	The Stalinist view is that bourgeois control everything. (259)
30.	Growth leads to an increase in health problems. (260-262)
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9-1/Dr. Hung Lien-re, Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of National Development National Taiwan Institute, Sept/Oct 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "Republic of China 's Relations with Southeast Asia and ROC's South Bound Policy," p. 34; MDS VT96
 Especially true is that in the post-cold war era, economic strength will surely replace military strength to be a key factor in affecting regional or even global prosperity and security. Given the circumstances, it is only natural that the ROC endowed with the prowess of capital, technology, managerial skill and trade, should march into Southeast Asia to link up with the ASEAN and Vietnam for economic cooperation and common prosperity.
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 9-2/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p .32; THR VT96
 It is difficult to say at this point what these changes will mean for China's political system, but there is likely to be an important if subtle shift to open up the policy- pre-Tiananmen period when party eider Peng Zhen oversaw the NPC Standing Committee and used it to block the formation of economic and other legislation.
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 9-2a/George Tsai, , p. 100 ,Feb., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, "Beijing's foreign relations: Prospects for 1995;" MDS VT96
 Recognizing that international rivalry is now concentrated in the economic arena and that economic security concerns are becoming increasingly important for all countries, Beijing will likely focus its diplomacy on supporting domestic economic development, especially since mainland China is giving such high priority to economic reform and opening up. As for the techniques it will use, we can be sure that Beijing will do all it can to maintain a peaceful and stable environment both at home and abroad. There is little chance that it will launch any military adventures.
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9-2b/ ED OFFLEY, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-25-95; PACIFIC RIM MILITARY LEADERS MEET IN CANADA; ACS VT96
 	``Due to the shift (in post-Cold War military requirements), China is now concentrating all of its energy on the economy,'' said Xu, whose rank is equivalent to a brigadier general in the U.S. Army. ``We have demobilized 1 million soldiers since 1985, and this is quite a new system for us.''
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9-3/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.406; THR VT96
 Of course, if the economy were to take a turn for the worse, disaffection would probably reappear. But for now the order of the day was three-piece Western suits with ties and regimental briefcases rather than headbands and banners. Since the past could not be undone, and since the government that had perpetrated that past was not about to voluntarily step down, the only option was to forget. I don't know how many times during this period I heard Chinese cut off nascent political discussions with "Let's not get into that! There's no point!" By abandoning service to the people as the Party's official credo, and by sanctioning the creation of private wealth, Deng administered a powerful antidote to those Chinese who might otherwise have been inclined to confront the government as they had in Tiananmen Square. He also gave Chinese new hope, that after so many years of self-inflicted revolutionary turmoil, the country might now be edging toward greater prosperity and long-term stability, if not political openness.
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 9-4/Chai Ling, Shen Tong, Gao Xin, Wang Jungtao, Tiananmen square survivors, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Tiannnmen and China's future: the view five years later" p. 248 ;SEG VT96
 The historical development of China does not look like that of the United States or England. It looks more like France a hundred years ago. Of course, China has not reached the full-fledged stage like Napoleon Ill's Liberal Empire, but it is going in that direction--that is, parliamentarians cannot criticize the emperor, but there is more freedom of speech down below. And of course the economy is rapidly developing, and the standard of living is on the rise. With some minor differences, China will basically follow this path toward democracy.
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9-5/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sc iences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 97 ; THR VT96
 One of the most significant changes in China is its fast opening up to the outside world. The open-door policy has closely interlinked the Chinese economy with the world market. Between 1978 and 1990, the total value of exports and imports increased from $20.6 billion to $115.4 billion, an average growth rate per year of more than 15 percent. In southern China, a large number of manufacturing industries are highly export led. Foreign direct investment (FDI} in the Chinese economy has increased quickly. By the end of 1992, the total value of effectuated or agreed upon FDI was $108.9 billion. FDI plays an important role in export-led industries, in particular in the special economic zones and the coastal areas. In 1991, China became the largest recipient of capital inflows in Asia, and the second largest (after Mexico) among all developing countries. Following this opening toward the outside, the structure and working of the Chinese economy has changed dramatically. The institutions, mechanisms, and policies of the Chinese economy increasingly conform to world market economic standards. Chinese growth is now highly dependent on the world market, since foreign trade amounts to more than one-third of GNP. The process of integration has created interdependencies between the Chinese economy and the outside China through the linkages of international trade and financial markets. With China's huge population, fast economic development, and increasing income level, the significance and influence of its economy in the world market can hardly be overestimated.
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9-6/ Richard Lawrence, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Vietnam Seen Nudging Out China as Asia's Fastest-Growing Market; ACS VT96
 	 China, it said, will remain the region's fastest growing economy this year, though growth there will slow. This year, it estimated, China's economy will expand by 10.2 percent, compared with 11.8 percent in 1994. Next year, the foundation projects 9.3 percent growth.
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9-7/ JOHN D. McCLAIN, Associated Press, 4-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Administration sees faster Growth in Global Economy; ACS VT96
 	 The global economy in 1995 will grow at the fastest rate in seven years, fueling continued growth in U.S. exports that have helped create millions of American jobs, the Clinton administration said Wednesday.
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9-8/Wenhai Liu and Steve Sun, Chinese Finance Association Update, Volume 1, No. 13, May 1, 1995; "Reports Say China's Economy Will Grow about Ten Percent This Year" ACS VT96
 	 In another report, a United Nations agency also predicted that China's economic growth will be about 10 percent in 1995.
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9-9Wenhai Liu and Steve Sun, Chinese Finance Association Update, Volume 1, No. 13, May 1, 1995; "Reports Say China's Economy Will Grow about Ten Percent This Year" ACS VT96
 	 The annual report released by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) said China's economy will grow 10.5 percent this year and 8.9 percent next year, and its inflation rate will be around 15 and 8 percent.
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9-10 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-27-95; News Global; ACS VT96
 	 Nine Percent Growth Predicted for 1995 [CND, 01/23/95] China's economy will grow about 9 percent this year, predicted by China's State Statistics Bureau and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, AP reported. The inflation will be controlled at about 15 percent. China's exports and imports this year will be $140 billion each, lower than earlier estimate, Xinhua said. (Ming ZHANG, Daluo JIA)
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9-11/ Richard Lawrence, AirCommerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, World Trade Seen Up 50 Percent by 2000, Paced by East Asia; ACS VT96
 	 By the year 2000, world merchandise exports will likely top $6 trillion, up nearly 50 percent from last year, while U.S. exports may reach $1 trillion, doubling last year's total, U.S. and other economists estimate. East Asia, paced by China, probably will score the biggest percentage gains of all, averaging nearly 10 percent average annual export growth over the next 10 years, the World Bank estimates. China, says the WEFA Group, a Bala Cynwyd, Pa., economic forecasting group, may expand its foreign sales at almost twice that rate.
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9-12 /P. Parameswaran, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; Agence France Presse, "Clash between China and Japan on the cards, Asian conference told", SECTION: Financial pages; PMS VT96
 	China's real gross national product in 1992 increased to 3.3 times that of 1978, with an average annual growth rate of nine percent during that period when real per capita income almost tripled, delegates said. They said that China's total trade in 1992 increased to eight times that of 1978 while its share in world trade more than doubled. 
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9-13/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Commmittee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 26; THR VT96
 Despite a worsening budget deficit and enormous shortcomings and inefficiencies (about one-third of state enterprises lose money, even by Beijing's generous accounting standards), the Chinese economic system is not a basket case. Rather it is a system that in 1991 extended one billion Swiss francs in commercial credits to the Soviet Union, generated a worldwide trade surplus of about $8 billion, and by February 1992 had foreign exchange reserves totaling almost $43 billion. Recently it has extended food credits to the former Soviet Union. China's economic system also has performed well by the standards of its Asian neighbors. From 1984-90 the P.R.C.'s [People's Republic of China's] economic growth rate was nine percent--more than four times that of the Philippines, nearly twice that of Indonesia and a percentage point higher than Thailand's. Among the major economies of Asia, China's growth rate was exceeded only by South Korea's. In broader measures of performance, infant mortality in China in 1991 was 33 deaths per thousand live births, compared to 109 in Pakistan, 91 in India, 73 in Indonesia, 54 in the Philippines, 37 in Thailand, and 6 in Hong Kong.
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9-14 / JOHN D. McCLAIN, Associated Press, 4-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Administration sees faster Growth in Global Economy; ACS VT96
 	 The global economy is expected to grow about 3.5 percent this year, up from 3 percent in 1994 and 2.3 percent in 1993, the report said. It would be the fastest pace since 4.7 percent in 1988.
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9-15CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 3, 1995; ACS VT96
 	U.N. Report Predicts Inflation Rates in China [CND, 04/27/95] BEIJING - An annual report release by the U.N. agency, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), said China's inflation rates for this and next year will be 15% and 8%, respec- tively, Reuter quoted Xinhua news agency as saying. The report also said China's economic growth rates will slow to about 10.5% this year and 8.9% next year, as compared to this year's average economic growth rate of 7.5% and average inflation rate of 8.3% for developing coun- tries in the Asia-Pacific region. (Zhengwei SU, Jian LIU) 
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 9-16/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, P.97; THR VT96
 The limited nature of the retreat of civil society is also influenced :: by the less than total nature of the crackdown. Despite the considerable coercion involved and the return to Maoist slogans and practices, to date we do not see a total effort by the conservatives to turn back the clock and eliminate all of the changes unleashed. Rather, they claim they want to restore their political hegemony while retaining the open- door policy, private enterprise, market reforms, and a policy of "letting 100 flowers bloom" in cultural and intellectual life. Perhaps this mixed message should be attributed not to restraint but to divisions within the leadership, with surviving proreform forces' helping to stay the hand of those who would like to see a fuller return to the practices of the Mao era. But whatever the reasons for this approach, it is internally contradictory. As Stanley Rosen observed, The imperatives of economic reform are creating an increasingly heterogeneous society, which is marked by decentralization, rampant commercialism, privatization, even internationalization, all contributing to the loss of social control by the state .... The party is seeking to unify public opinion and harmonize interests, politically and ideologically, at a time when economic and social forces are pulling society away from the state. 
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 9-17/Yongninn Zheng, Prof. Beijing Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol 109 #2, "Development & democracy: are they compatible in China?" p. 259 ;SEG VT96
 Finally, with economic progress and political change, more individuals, especially intellectuals, are tending to be liberal. Although this does not mean that they will actually participate in politics, their being liberal is a potential pressure on the state to prepare channels for their possible participation. Therefore, democracy's failure to develop does not mean that China is not able to develop it. Its failure is due to some structural obstacles, which arc difficult to eliminate in a short period of time. However, further economic progress will neccesarily deepen changes in state-society relations, which will push China toward democracy.
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9-18/Merle Goldman, Prof. Chinese History Boston University, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "The Intel lectuals in the Deng Xiaoping Era," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 216; THR VT96
 As of 1991 it appeared that even if economic reforms would resume, political change would be illusory. Nevertheless, that the students failed in their demands for democracy in the spring 1989 demonstrations has more to do with the Leninist political system, the internal dynamics of the power struggle, and the revolutionary elders' continuing control over the military than with any inherent obstacles to political reform. If the elders had already left the scene, Zhao Ziyang might have prevailed and the students and intellectuals might at least have been given a hearing. The social and intellectual forces for change and the desire to restrain political power remain--and are perhaps even greater today. Just because China reverted to totalitarian practices does not mean that the desire for political reform is lacking. Ostensibly, the population appears to have fallen into line. In addition to ubiquitous military and police presence, the party still controls assignment of jobs, housing, ration tickets, medical treatment, and education of most of the population. The difference this time, however, is that there has been a popular uprising not just by students and intellectuals but by people from all walks of urban life in defiance of the party for the first time since 1949.
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 9-19/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.47; THR VT96
 Having examined the basic leadership structure, we turn now to the dynamics of change. There seem to be at least two types of change involved. The first is transitory, reversible change. The second consists of nonrecursive or secular change. The main form of transitory change to have affected leadership dynamics is a cyclical one in which the economic business cycle interacts with episodes of mass activism to create opportunities for elite conflict and purge. The business cycle goes through phases of vigorous expansion (booms) alternating with phases of retrenchment (busts). The main force pushing expansion has been the market, which encourages capital investment on the part of collective and private enterprises. It is the central planning authorities and ministries who have enforced periods of retrenchment, during which the collective and private sector is cut back and the planned state sector subsidized. The boom phase is obviously most favorable to the interests of the radical reformers, ceteris paribus, whereas a bust serves the interests of the central planners.
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9-20/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 135, THR VT96
 Moreover, continued economic expansion will allow for the slow emergence of social forces--the civil society--that may eventually lead to a democratic transition. External pressure can create the context within which liberalization will occur; but unless society is ripe, as it was in South Korea in 1988 when hosting the Olympics prevented the Korean military from cracking down on popular protests, it cannot be the critical force triggering democratic change. [Author's note: Another mistaken belief in the United States is that China was on the verge of a democratic transition in 1989; one need only recall the numerous predictions after June 4 that the system was about to collapse. Even now there is no real opposition force in China that could step in and govern. Today many Chinese look back with some relief that the students did not take power in 1989.
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9-21/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p.201; THR VT96
 Thus, the gap between economic and political reforms will continue for some time to come. In the long run, however, economic reform, if it becomes successful, will inevitably produce a market economy, and the plural interests in the market will conflict with each other. The situation will require some adjustments of these conflicting interests and will make political reform inevitable. The reform policy of utilizing the commodity economy will substitute for the "capitalist stage" that was supposed to be needed for modernization. At that time China may follow the pattern of Eastern Europe in 1989. Stagnation of economic reform and development, however, may delay this turning point. The lingering "subject culture" will be the biggest delaying factor in the political sphere, if no one manages to organize a large number of people to channel diverse political demands into the political system. China's elitist intellectuals may not be able to do that. The peasant-minded party' leaders are more experienced in accommodating themselves to the peasants, but the>' will not be willing to activate peasant participation into politics except through their favored formula, "the mass line." 
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9-22/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 72; THR VT96
 The bureaucratic technocrats, as the products of new China, have benefited from the existing political system. Their memories of Mao, who mobilized the masses in the Cultural Revolution against his adversaries, are still vivid. In addition, they apparently believe that China presently not only lacks conditions for political democratization but also needs a strong state system in order to sustain economic growth. In fact, the examples of Taiwan and South Korea demonstrate that only when economic development has produced differentiated social groups and classes--including the middle class--with some independent economic and political resources will an authoritarian regime begin to pay attention to the political demands of such groups.'
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9-23/Marc Blecher, Chair and Prof. of the Dept. of Government at Oberlin College, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "The contradictions of grass-roots participation and undemocratic statism in Maoist China and their fate," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 145 ;THR VT96
 Moreover, growing economic crisis threatens the reproduction of the Dengist state. Economic demands - complaints about miserable campus conditions and poor economic prospects from students and faculty, and condemnation of inflation from them and from the workers, clerks, and other groups who joined them - were integral to the urban protests of April and May. Peasants, many of whom were paid in scrip for their fall 1988 harvests, did not weigh in during that round of protests, but the deepening fiscal crisis of the state and shortages and inflation in essential inputs like chemical fertilizer' may well induce some of them to do so next time. An alliance of broadly and deeply discontented peasants with radicalized urban groups - the nightmare of Louis Bonaparte and Deng alike - cannot be ruled out. That could begin to bring down the Dengist regime.
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 9-24/Yongnian Zheng, Prof. Beijing Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, V1O9 #2, "Development & democracy: are they compatible in China?" p. 259 ;SEG VT96
 It is economic progress that has more significance for Chinese democracy, however. First, the state must change its basis of legitimacy. As data demonstrate, the old basis of state legitimacy is being weakened by economic development and political change. The state has tried to introduce a new basis of its legitimacy, that is, to accelerate the country's economic growth and to carry out limited political reform and let people's delegates have a say in politics to some extent. But the state-society relation has not been institutionalized. The 1989 democracy movement revealed the tension between the two. Since 1989, the state has had to implement further economic reform in order to improve its relation with the mass. Second, there is great potential for the rise of a counterelite. The Communist party is declining fast, although it still rules the country, and any other independent parties are still prohibited. But more and more individuals no longer believe that the ruling party is able to meet their expectations Further, the leadership is no longer qualified. There is also the possibility that the lasting elite will be challenged by those who are alienated from the existing system or who rose from the masses as a result of liberalizing the existing system. Third, the state must change the basis of political agendas. In the past, almost all political agendas were set forth by the state. That time is gone now. The state is still playing an important role in establishing national agendas, but it has to pay attention to society, because without support from society, the state policy may not be successful.
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9-24a/ Agence France Presse, January 24, 1995, HEADLINE: Japan to pursue "more proactive foreign policy" : official; ACS VT96
 	 Maintaining friendly relations with China based on a "policy of openness and economic reform," would make Beijing "a civil society," and not push it into [confrontation]."[Hisashi Owada, Japan's permanent representative to the United Nations]
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9-24b/Jeff Sommer, Newsday Foreign Editor, January 31, 1994; Newsday, "Rights and Wrongs; Linking trade to democracy irks Chinese", SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 15; PMS VT96
 	China has moved ahead at an unprecedented rate with development of a market-oriented economy, transforming its coastal regions and raising living standards for millions of people. The economic changes have given individuals far more personal choices, and have brought in far more foreign influences than before Tiananmen Square, even though political repression continues. Some dissidents say the economic transformation of the country ultimately will undermine the Communist political system.
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9-24c/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
 	 This policy also has another, more positive aspect. The more China develops a market economy, the more it will need the legal and technical expertise of the West. Beijing welcomes the economic growth unleashed by market growth but is uncomfortable with the freedom and outside influences needed to make the market work. This is an opportunity for the United States. Washington should help Beijing help itself, but only in ways that foster reform.
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9-24d/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," P.17; THR VT96
 According to Western European precedents, autonomous associational life leads to institutionalization of organizations and moves from private to public concerns. Market economies facilitate these trends by creating alternatives to state-controlled channels for services, institutions, and the flow of goods. The existence of market economies and civil society is not a sufficient condition for a pluralistic democratic society, but it may be a necessary condition.
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 9-25/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanfor p. 9 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public PoIicy; ACS VT96
 A large bureaucracy and widespread corruption are legacies of the past: namely, the failed policies of the 1956-1992 period and the bad habits they produced among the people. Only a continual opening up of the PRC's market economy can create the ferment and innovation to promote new market habits, loosen bureaucratic control, and allow subcounty organizations to expand and manage their affairs freely. Changing human habits and reducing bureaucracy greatly depend on market enhancement, particularly greater domestic market integration linked to the outside world and the U.S. economy. As more American imports circulate within the PRC, consumer tastes and habits will change, just as they did when the PRC began importing Taiwan's products in the late 1980s.
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 9-26/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 98 ; THR VT96
 From an ideological point of view, China has become isolated. Yet its open-door policy, causing increasing integration, has brought it closer to the outside world. Obviously, the existing world economic structure, or order, set up after World War II is outdated and unjust. Uneven globalization has adverse effects mostly in the developing countries. But China does not want to launch a movement to disrupt these trends even though in principle it supports the idea of a new economic world order: Above all China supports stability and peace. China's top priority appears to be active participation in and use of the existing market and division of labor for the benefit of its own development and modernization. Of course, China belongs to the developing world and shares many interests with the developing countries; but it can no longer represent the interests of the developing countries, since they are rather diversified. At the same time, China has become a strong competitor facing the other developing countries in an increasing number of areas of the world market. Many of the developing countries will have to painfully confront China's economic challenge in the near future.
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9-27/Anita Chan, Associate Contemporary Chins Centre Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "The Social Origins and Consequences of the Tiananmen Crisis," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 129; THR VT96 
	The CCP leadership's efforts simultaneously to appeal to and frighten workers are little more than desperate stop-gap measures to stave off in the short term another wave of worker unrest. But the longer term prospect of placating the populace rests ultimately with the success of economic reforms, which would need to be accompanied by a reasonably equitable redistribution of the nation's wealth.
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 9-28/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p.11 , THRVT96
 The spectacular explosion of private business throughout China, according to Dorothy Solinger, has neither led to a civil society nor institutionalized the power of urban entrepreneurs. The decay of the hegemonic party-state allowed the emergence of new career patterns outside the formal state sector, but state domination--what Solinger terms the "monolith"--remains. Urban economic reforms in a mixed economy created a new category of business entrepreneurs who depend on bureaucrats for support. This is not civil society nor a ruggedly individualistic bourgeoisie about to fulfill its historic role as leaders of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Instead, bureaucrats and merchants fuse in an ill-defined, multifaceted, symbiotic relationship that encourages preservation of the monolith. The state needs merchant capital and entrepreneurial skills to build the economy and generate state revenues; individual bureaucrats need the business sector to supplement personal income and employ relatives and friends. Because they cannot operate a business without political and financial assistance from officials, merchants are willingly co-opted. Reform-minded merchants who aspire 10 greater independence cannot forget that free competition would deprive. them "of their special inside channels."
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9-29/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-24-95, News Global; ACS VT96
 	 Living Standards Improving [CND, 05/23/95] BEIJING -- Xinhua cited numbers to indicate the rising of ordinary people's living standards. In 1993, people in the countryside spent 58 percent of their income on food, down by about 10 percentage points from the 1978 figure. In the cities, food expenses constitute 50 percent of people's income, down from 57 percent in 1981. (Hong TANG, Daluo JIA)
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9-30/Zhang Yunl ng, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 96 ;THR VT96
 The greatest achievement of China is that drastic reform has been accompanied by extremely rapid economic growth, and the average living standard of 1.2 billion people has significantly improved. The reforms must be considered irreversible now; they have gained their own internal momentum and can no longer be stopped politically.
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 9-31/ Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing journalists, June, 1994; CHOICES: THE HUMAN DEVE.LOPMENT MAGAZINE, "Chino's own agenda 21" p. 19 ;SEG VT96
 Beijing, China's economic boom caught the world's attention in 1993. Outside the country, exaggerated media claims alleged that the Chinese economy was already the third largest in the world, and that China was going to be the "next superpower" of the 21st century. To be sure, there are plenty of signs that the standard of living of the Chinese people is steadily improving, particularly in the country's coastal areas. And more and more, these changes are beginning to spread into China's interior. One indication of this rapid economic advancement is the growing abundance of material goods that have come to symbolize progress: television sets and electronic gadgets, refrigerators, air conditioners and motor vehicles, to mention only a few, with fast food chains and high-rise buildings becoming more the norm than the exception.
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 9-32/Yongnian Zheng, Prof. Bejjng Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, V109 #Z, "Development & democracy: are they compatible on China?" p. 241 ;SEG VT96
 Economic growth and political progress have had a great impact' on individual behavior and thus have significance for China's fifth moderation - democracy. China is now transforming from a planned economy to a mixed one. The market is playing an increasingly important role. In control to the planned economy, the base of a market economy is that every human being, as an owner of property, is economically independent and chooses how to cooperate with others in production (division of labor). The market economy is characterized by free choice. Individual initiatives are importer. With economic development, economic rationality is changing human relationships and other human behavior and making human beings equalize. Although a market economy also leads to income difference and creates new kinds of difference, it does not create an unequal society, but rather changes the base of inequality. Under a market economy, inequality based on official rank and other political factors is replaced by inequality based on income and other economic factors. An individual's social status is determined more by economic factors, less by political factors. What is important for individuals is that they can change their social status by creating economic opportunity using their ability. They can try to get what only those who controlled political resources and thus controlled economic resources could get in the Maoist old days.
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9-33/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1.994, "Rural China in Transition," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.87; THR VT96
 China's recent success in rural reform, achieved through the introduction of the production responsibility system, has generated broad interest among scholars, the media, and policymakers worldwide. The production responsibility system has several policy variations, but its essence is to turn over farm operation and management from rural collectives to peasant families. The rationale is simple: when peasants can see the direct link between their work and their pay, they have an incentive to work to their full potential. Launched in 1978, the production responsibility system had significanfly increased farm outputs by the early 1980s. This success further legitimized and justified the dismantling of the rural communal organizations that had dominated China's rural landscape since 1958. Under the new system the Chinese government restored the peasant family farm as the centerpiece of China's agriculture. This shift concluded the experiment with agricultural collectivization in rural China and signaled the reduction of government control over peasant economic and social life.
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 9-34/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 3, 1995; ACS VT96
 	Foreign Investors Move Inland and Go Hi-tech [CND, 04/29/95] BEIJING - For foreign investors in China, the inland looks better than the coast and high-tech enterprises better than labor-intensive ones, Reuter reported quoting the Xinhua Daily Telegraph. International fund providers agreed to put $1.5 billion in Sichuan last year, moving the province into the top 10 in receiving foreign investment. Hubei was also to receive $1.39 billion from foreign investors. In 1994, the machinery indu- stry brought in $1.5 million ($833,000 in1993), the electronics industry $1.45 million ($893,000 in 1993). Meanwhile, foreign money flow into real estate has dropped. (Frank LING, Jian LIU) 
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9-35/China Radio Network, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 17, 1994; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Guangdong: Qingyuan experimental zone a model for Tibet, Xinjiang and others", SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; INTERNAL AFFAIRS; FE /1897 /G; PMS VT96
 	Guangzhou, 13th January: An experimental economic development zone in south China's Guangdong Province, designed to help the local poor, has reported initial achievements just a year after its establishment . Located in Qingyuan City in central Guangdong, the Qingyuan Experimental Economic Development Zone last year had a total of some 1.6bn yuan in investment, 48% of which was investment from overseas.. . To date, the zone has provided jobs to more than 1,000 people from the relatively poor counties and towns around the city. This year the zone envisages employing in stages more local people from such areas of the province. 
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9-36/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 49 ; THR VT96
	 The most notable aspect of local government behavior throughout the reform period in China has been its growth orientation. Empirical studies uniformly find local officials everywhere, from city halls down to villages, busily promoting local development, especially of industry. Reports on the work of local governments typically begin with recitations of growth achievements in the local economy--for example, gross value of industrial output and agricultural output. Only more recently have they included mention of price indices and measures of job growth. This is a clear continuation of the trend begun during the Cultural Revolution period, when Maoist policies called for governments at all levels to promote rapid industrialization. In part, the current mend reflects the persistence of traditional Marxist views on the role of local governments.
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 9-37/ Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing Journalists, June, 1994; CHOICES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT MAGAZINE, "China's own agenda 21" p. 20 ;SEG VT96
 China has also demonated that it has the political will to adopt a strategy for sustainable development. It played an active part in the Earth Summit in 1992, and ratified Agenda 21 and other important initiatives that were adopted at the world conference. Agenda 21 calls on all countries to draw up their own national action plans for sustainable development, which China has already completed. According to Richard Conroy, assistant resident representative for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Beijing, "China is , very much in the lead among all the world's countries in developing a comprehensive strategy of this type." Through its five-year, US$176 million programme in China, UNDP is helping China carry out this national strategy, which includes phasing out ozone depleting substances and the introduction of environmentally-sound technologies . 
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9-38/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1.994, "Rural China in Transition, Edit ed by W i I I i am A. Joseph, p. 108; THR VT96
 Rural China is enjoying an unprecedented level of prosperity. The reestablishment of the family farm has generated significant increases in agricultural production. Furthermore, the family-centered rural economy has promoted diversification in rural production. This newly gained flexibility permits the peasant family not only to work more intensely but also to allocate family labor more judiciously into areas with higher returns, such as raising farm animals or developing rural industries. A fundamental economic transformation is taking place, in which the rural livelihood is gradually shifting away from farm and agriculture to industrial and service trades.]
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9-39/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Rural China in Transition," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.112; THR VT96
 Many leading officials at the village and township levels have taken advantage of the reform process to position themselves as the new ruling elite. This new "gentry" class is not unlike its counterpart in premodern times: both derive power from official ideologies (Confucianism for the premodern elite and Marxism for the new communist elite), and both have entrenched connections to the national bureaucracy. In terms of the relationship between the peasantry and the state, reform may have thrown rural China back to premodern ways of doing things in some respects. As the government gradually removes itself from involvement in rural economic affairs, it needs to consider carefully proper institutional mechanisms for the allocation and distribution of scarce resources that affect the livelihood of rural masses. The state should work out legal and institutional infrastructures in order to ensure open and equitable competition among the peasants in the market system. It should reconsider its insistence that all farmland remain owned by the village rather than by families and allow peasants to transfer or sell their leased land. It should also consider removing the barriers that restrict peasant mobility. Recent reforms have achieved much, but much more still needs to be accomplished to lead rural China into a truly prosperous future.
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 9-40/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 97 ; THR VT96
 China is a latecomer in the world market, but it has become a successful player very quickly. Some argue that China will become a superpower by the early 200os, second only to the United States. Although this is probably an exaggeration, it is true that economic interests are a major factor in shaping @ China's relations with other countries and its policies in international affairs.
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9-41/Gerald Segal, Research Fellowinternational Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA IN THE N'lNEI'IES:CRISIS MANAGEMENFANDBEYOND, "Foreign Policy," Edited by David S.G. Goodman andGeorge Segal, p. 175; THR VT96
 Of course, i: is still too early to tell how successful this radical change in Chinese attitudes will be. China also sees the obvious benefits that come from playing a major role in international organizations. Basic features of the Chinese approach, including racism to Africans or distance from any foreigner, remain characteristic of China's handling of the outside world. China is still not happy about its open doors and they still swing and creak on their hinges. But it is hard to see even a more nationalist leadership closing China's doors to anything like the extent it once did. In a more interdependent modern world, and one that is recognized as such nearly everywhere else in the communist world, the idea of closing doors and ignoring the global market economy seems unlikely and fruitless.
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9-40 / Rieko Saito, Kyodo News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; FOREIGN COMPANIES REMAIN OPTIMISTIC TOWARD CHINA; ACS VT96
 	But China International Finance's Goga says the appearance of these problems indicates that business interaction between China and foreign companies has become much wider and deeper. According to official Chinese figures, direct foreign investment in China in 1994 totaled 81.4 billion dollars on a contract basis, down 27% from the year before. Economists at Citibank in Hong Kong forecast such investment in 1995 will further drop but will remain ''sizable.''
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9-41 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
 	 This potential is the grist of International Monetary Fund and World Bank analyses based on purchasing power parity equivalents that rank China's economy third in the world -- and the world's largest by 2010 if current growth continues. 
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9-42 / DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
 	 [DIGNITY, 5/19] Beijing -- China will have to take over 100 years to catch up with the level of developed nations, said an academic report released Friday. The report, titled "Chances and Challenges", predicted that China's gross national product (GNP) will rand first in the world during 2020 - 2030, and by 2040 - 2050 the country's per capita GDP(gross domestic product) and other important indices concerning economic and social development will be equal to those of the developed countries. China could catch up with and overtake the developed countries "by seizing historic chances, meeting challenges and difficulties and drawing lessons from economic development in many other countries", the report said.
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 9-42a/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China," edited by Will iam T. Tow, p.244; THR VT96
 The decision to maintain the Open Door also reflected the new realities of China's interdependence. The reform era had brought about a revolution in Chinese foreign trade. About 25 percent of the country's gross national product depended on foreign trade in 1989 as opposed to 6 percent in 1980. The situation was totally different from that in the 1960s, when China could close the door to the Soviet Union because the PRC was far less dependent on foreign trade at that time. By the late 1980s, external markets had become a central component of China's economic life. Sanctions hurt, and it was in the Chinese interest to try to get them lifted using diplomacy rather than to take actions that might exacerbate foreign hostility to China still further.
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 9-43/Gi Ibert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Disma'ntl ing of Communism in China and the Soviet Union," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, P.47 ; THR VT 96 The move toward convergence produces a snowball effect. Once barriers are dropped and pragmatism becomes the chief criterion for policy selection, the rush toward convergence becomes faster and faster. Approval of foreign investment leads to encouragement of joint ventures, then to special economic zones, and eventually to a convertible currency and foreign subsidiaries. Openness to the outside starts with a crack, widens to an open door, and, unless artificially blocked by costly barricades, eventually becomes an open house where foreigners are welcomed. China's attempt to place a screen in the open door to keep out "bourgeois liberalization" is a temporary interruption, which many foreign partners anticipate will be pushed aside as the holes in the screen widen and the logic of greater convergence more fully impresses itself on China's leaders and people.'
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9-44 / McNaugher, september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
 	 How seriously should we take the notion of a "threat" from China? Alarmists would seem to be exaggerating. China's military is huge but also vastly underdeveloped doctrinally and technologically. That will change if present trends continue, but recent double-digit economic growth, while striking, is probably unsustainable. At least as plausible as an "awakening dragon" is a China plagued by economic decentralization and political decay and thus unable to exploit its enormous power potential. Finally, since 1978 China's leaders have sought a stable and friendly international environment to encourage economic growth. They have solved their once-rancorous border dispute with Russia and shelved their territorial disputes with India. Far from bring a threat, today's China would seem to confirm liberal claims that economic growth and interdependence encourage cooperation and conflict resolution. 
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9-45/Financial Times, January 31, 1994; Financial Times, "China and the Gatt", SECTION: Leading Article; Pg. 17; PMS VT96
 	Napoleon once advised the world to let the Chinese giant sleep since 'when he wakes he will move the world'. By now it is too late. The question for the world is how to respond to the quake. On balance, the best choice is to facilitate rapid market-oriented development of the Chinese economy. One implication is that China should be accepted into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on strict economic conditions.
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9-46/Financial Times, January 31, 1994; Financial Times, "China and the Gatt", SECTION: Leading Article; Pg. 17; PMS VT96
 	Last but not least, China is a corrupt despotism. The notion of China as an economic colossus under anything like the present regime is bound to cause concern. But rapid export-oriented industrialisation is likely to create strong pressures for political change in China, as it has in other east Asian countries. This is why the west should focus its attention on sustaining market-oriented reforms. China's application to join (or, as it would argue, rejoin) the Gatt presents an opportunity for achieving just that. 
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9-47/Xinhua News Agency, January 28, 1994; Xinhua News Agency, "foreign investment in china increasing rapidly"; PMS VT96
 	wu yi, chinese minister of foreign trade and economic co-operation, told a press conference that last year china approved 83,265 foreign-funded projects, with a total contractual value standing at 110.852 billion u.s. dollars. the actual amount of foreign investment used in the period was 25.759 billion u.s. dollars. the figures were 70 percent, 90 percent and 134 percent, respectively, more than in 1992. by the end of last year, wu said, china had accumulatively approved over 174,000 foreign-funded projects with the pledged and actually used foreign investment topping 217. 216 billion and over 60 billion u.s. dollars, respectively.
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9-48 /Business China, January 24, 1994; Business China, "China's soaraway economy looks set to rise further: Up, up and away"; PMS VT96
 	In the past, foreign companies have protected themselves against inflation by initiating a number of different measures, including:
* Buying housing for staff. Instead of issuing a housing allowance, some companies have chosen to buy flats. The new land appreciation tax (see pages 1-2) by taking the heat out of the property market should make this a more viable option for foreign-invested businesses-though it will also slow down the rate at which these assets will increase in value.
* Extending site leases. Although there are strict restrictions on buying property in China, foreign companies are often given leeway in deciding how long they wish to lease a site for. Extending a lease can be a good hedge against inflation.
* Expanding operations. To keep economic growth racing ahead the government will want to keep on encouraging foreign investment across the board. The speed with which the service sector has been opened up is the best example of this policy. Companies which are confident they have the resources to handle doing business in China will find ever greater opportunities open to them. A paradoxical consequence of this is that businesses need not rush in for fear of missing the China boat-the need and the demand will be there for years.
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9-49/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
 	 The PRC leadership desperately needs the rest of the world for markets, capital and technology in order to sustain the economic growth rates, produced by market reforms, which are the principal basis for the Communist government's continuing claim to power. Paradoxically, China becomes, day-by-day, more deeply enmeshed in a web of international interdependence (tangles of trade, investment, communications, and scientific exchange), while the Communist Party appears more insistent on defending China against affronts to "state sovereignty" and the designs of "peaceful evolution", an alleged conspiracy by the West to sabotage Communist rule in China.
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 9-50/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 96 ; THR VT96
 The second dimension is the role of the state, which has moved away from direct control toward indirect management. Most state central planning of production has been given up. Now more than 90 percent of production and retail are not under state command and the prices have been liberalized. Government intervention has shifted toward conventional monetary and financial macroeconomic measures, that is, long-term monetary policy, financial policy, and so on.
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9-51/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 207 ;THR VT96
 Finally, with the shift fro.m . "extensive" to "intensive" development, implying greater reliance on science and technology to improve productivity and less reliance on forced draft mobilization of the primary factors of production (land, capital, and particularly labor), an increasingly intricate functional division of labor may be anticipated, as web as a shift of investment priorities from primary to secondary and tertiary sectors.9 What is distinctive about the Chinese case is that the imperative for such a shift does not arise from factor shortages, as in the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe (which face labor and possibly material supply and energy shortfalls), but rather from consumer quality demands in Western markets-given the PRC's intention to pursue an export-oriented growth strategy a la the Asian Nics. 
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9-52 / Amelia A. Newcomb; Yomiuri Shimbun Washington Bureau, The Daily Yomiuri, May 25, 1995, Pg. 3, HEADLINE: U.S. lawmakers debate China's trading status ACS VT96
 	 "The best foreign policy tools available to us to encourage political reform abroad are policies that promote capitalism, market reform, and free trade," stated Rep. Jim Kolbe, R-Ariz. Revocation or limitation of trade with China, he added, would "retard, rather than promote, the cause of human rights 
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9-53/Margaret Warner, Staff Reporter, and Special Correspondent Robert Oxnam, a former president of the Asia Society, now with Columbia University and the Bessemer Group, a New York investment firm, January 31, 1994; The MacNeil /Lehrer NewsHour, "State of Health; Any Progress; Raising Objections; Eureka"; PMS VT96
 	MR. OXNAM: Some in the U.S. business community argue that economic development advances human rights. Virginia Kamsky is a consultant to American companies who do business in China. VIRGINIA KAMSKY, Kamsky and Associates,Inc.: Trade is allowing China to develop. The economy is booming. As the economy booms, there is more money. When there's more money, there's more education. Does education promote human rights? Of course it does.
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9-54/Financial Times, January 31, 1994; Financial Times, "China and the Gatt", SECTION: Leading Article; Pg. 17; PMS VT96
 	The west cannot ignore gross violations of human rights in its relations with China, or any other country. But its trade relations should focus on the policies that affect trade. If trade and economic issues move in the right direction, the politics will follow.
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 9-55/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.405; THR VT96
 Most foreign businessmen had also become ready supporters of the Party's status quo, vigorously lobbying Washington not to connect trade and China's MFN status to human rights conditions lest the Chinese leadership take umbrage and retaliate. (Sino-U.S. trade hit a record $40 billion in 1993, with China selling more than 30 percent of its total exports to America, creating a trade surplus with the U.S. of more than $22 billion, second only to that of Japan.).
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9-56/ DIGNITY, 5-20-95; (No. 9512) ACS VT96
 	 Written by: Sophia Woodman Source: China Rights Forum, Winter 1994 I don't think there's an American view on human rights, and I don't think there' s an Asian view... If you want to change the fundamental values of society, change the economy first. Linda Lim, professor at Michigan Bus- iness School.
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9-57 / RICH MILLER, Reuters News Service, 4-23-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S. strives to keep up in race to tap new economies; ACS VT96
 	 Much is at stake. China's economy grew a sizzling nine percent annually over the past 16 years. U.S. companies did not benefit as much from that rapidly-growing market as their Japanese rivals, however, as relations between Washington and Beijing were dominated by battles over human rights.
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 9-58/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORT,D OUILOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 79; CJJ VT96
 Why did Bush stick to his gun bestowing MFN treatment on China without any conditions even in the face of strong censure? His election campaign speech at the Yale University in 1992 may shed some light on this. He argued that it would be unwise to isolate China and that by .giving it the MFN status, external influence could be extended into the home front of that vast country
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 9-59/Patrick E. Tyler, Staff Writer, January 29, 1994; The New York Times, "Crossroads for China; With Democratic Stirrings Among Chinese, U.S. Is Pressing Beijing on Crucial Choices", SECTION: Section 1; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk; PMS VT96
 	Many economists say the key to China's uninterrupted expansion lies in the United States, where China sold as much as $40 billion in goods in 1993, a phenomenal leap from $2.5 billion in sales just 10 years earlier.
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9-60/BNA Management Briefing, January 27, 1994; BNA Management Briefing, "CHINA'S OVERHAUL OF TAX SYSTEM CREATES PROBLEMS, BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS"; PMS VT96
 	Martin [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] added, "the U.S. shouldn't complain because it just got a 50 percent bonus from the devaluation of the currency." Because the currency is unified now, Martin [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] said, there is a greater incentive to expand operations in China. 9-61 / ROBERT A. KAPP, The China Business Review, January, 1995 ; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: New year, old story; US-Chinese relations; ACS VT96
 	 The Clinton Administration has wisely understood that commercial and economic ties are at the center of the complex Sino-American relationship. If the rhetoric heats up in the new US political environment and US- China relations once again become a political cudgel, it will be up to the business community to make the case for sobriety, long-term thinking, and mutual respect. American business has the depth, the perspective, and the mass of direct experience in China to anchor US- China relations during tough times. Let's hope we don't have to take on this role, but let's be prepared to play it fully if we have to.
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9-61a/ Asiaweek, February 24, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Sweet and Sour; The Taiwan Question May Poison Sino-American Ties; ACS VT96
 	 Despite the sound and fury over commercial issues, it is worth remembering that the economic relationship between China and America continues to expand steadily. Even as Mr. Kantor was beating the trade war drums, a cabinet-level colleague was getting set to travel to Beijing to drum up more business for U.S. companies. Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary will this week lead a large delegation of American corporate chiefs to sign billions of dollars' worth of deals to develop power supplies in China. Whatever the outcome of the copyrights dispute, the two countries have such huge stakes in commercial ties that no setback in that sphere is likely to be more than temporary.
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 9-62/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 79 ;cJJ VT96
 His (Bush) advocate was espoused by Nixon, Kissinger, Michel Oksenberg in the era of Jimmy Carter, and more recently supported by A. Doak Barnett and Harry Harding. They all agreed the U.S. policy toward China should be structured on maintaining contact and association with it, while separating politics from economic issues.
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9-63/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUILOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 26; CJJ VT96
 In October, Christopher at a State Department seminar revealed a report on "American Foreign Policy ," pointing out that economic factor forms the core of U.S. foreign policy. He elevated economy to a status that has much to do with national security. Without its strong economic power, the United States will not be able to maintain world order and sustain the institutions it upholds."' To show his focus of attention on economic problems, Clinton set up an Economy Security Council in the White House. This is an unprecedented move. 
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9-64/Harry Harding, Senior fel low in the Foreign Pol icy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan and Greater China," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.263; ANA VT96
	 Indeed, the emergence of a dynamic Greater China is likely, on balance, to generate significant new opportunities for American trade and investment. The decline of barriers among the various Chinese economics will create a more unified market that is already attracting American investment. And, as this transnational Chinese economy grows, it will be able to absorb more imports from other countries and, increasingly, generate savings that can be invested elsewhere.
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 9-65/Robert Ash, Prof. Economi. cs, Uni. v. of London, Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 5 ,"Mai. nIand Chi. na's emergi-ng role i.n the world economy;" MDS VT96
	Geopolitical and economic factors have constrained the PRC's relations with Western industrialized countries. They have particularly affected Sino-U.S. relations. The obstacles which have impeded realization of the full bilateral economic potential are unlikely to prevent trade and investment flows between these two countries from expanding, especially if the economic orientation of the United States continues to shift toward the Asia-Pacific rim.
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9-66/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 197 ;THR VT96
	Like the nouveau nches that China seeks to become, the country has in the course of scaling the ladder of development become alienated from its revolutionary origins, evoking an occasional sense of bad faith. At a time of domestic legitimacy crisis (such as that represented by 'Iiananmen), such bad faith becomes politically intolerable, and there is a felt need to return to the communities logically linked to the idea system on which legitimacy was originally based. Thus, for at least the time being, indentification with traditional transnational reference groups has enjoyed a brief revival-only to have one of these groups explode while the other could offer little coherence. Without triangular leverage and without the ability to use transnational appeals as a form of leverage to magnify its international impact, the PRC's influence has tended to shrink to a regional ambit. This may be but one facet of a more general trend toward economic regionalization in the post-Cold War world. Whether this is a transitory or more lasting phenomenon it is difficilt to say.3@ for the international system is still groping for a coherent new structure at this point. In any case, the Asian Pacific has emerged as perhaps the world's most "'. , economically vital region, and China's prospective role as regional "growth pole" is quite attractive. 
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9-67/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-8-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan to lead economic growth in Pacific, report says; ACS VT96
 	 Within a decade Japan will have the highest per-capita income of the ''old'' industrial economies at 45,000 U.S. dollars, at 1995 exchange rates, followed by Singapore and Hong Kong, according to a report presented at the fifth annual Asia-Pacific Economics Group meeting in Hong Kong on Monday. Last year saw powerful growth throughout developing East Asia, although Japan kept the Northeast Asian average low at 4.1%, the report said.
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 9-68 /Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 61 ; THR VT96
 In addition, there are several concrete reasons for China's failure to reduce the size of the bureaucracy. First, the regime tried to trim the cadres without simultaneously modifying the overall bureaucratic structure and changing the interventionist roles of the party-state. To use a colorful Chinese phrase, the regime tried to remove the burning candles (in this case, the cadres) before abolishing the temple (the bureaucratic functions). On the contrary, the task and responsibilities of the local governments have been expanding as they address such modern issues as environmental protection, urban planning, social welfare, and managing the retired cadres. The economic reforms so far created call for new organizations to facilitate the flow of information and technology, to coordinate operation of the various agencies, and to consult with the increasingly diversified demands of society.
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9-69/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.367; THR VT96
 As Deng's new political line was publicized, no one proved more enthusiastic than ordinary Chinese who, despite the small number of initial listings, queued up outside the new trading houses by the tens of thousands like teenage fans seeking tickets to a popular rock concert. Of course, relatively few had a very sophisticated understanding of how financial markets actually worked, much less an awareness of the downside risks involved in securities trading. Most simply reasoned that since Deng had anointed the exchanges with his blessing, stocks and bonds must be a sure thing--something like putting money in a savings account, except considerably more lucrative. And with one of the highest savings rates in the world, China was a dream come true for brokers and swindlers alike.
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 9-70/Megan Ryan and Christ opher F lavin, Researchers for t he Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits, edited by Lester Brown, p.131l , ANA VT96
 In terms of public-sector investment, government planners have yet to fully embrace the idea of smaller-scale, less- centralized projects. They continue to look for grand projects that reflect Soviet-style thinking, such as the Three Gorges Dam project on the Yangtze River, which would flood an area half the size of Luxembourg and could tie up more than $34 billion of capital--equivalent to nearly one sixth of China's cur- rent GNP. Instead of trying to improve bicycle-based transportation. the government speaks of a "world-class" auto industry and a system of roads that is likely to become gridlocked as soon as it is completed. China would get a lot more for its yuan if it focused on smaller-scale and more flexible options.
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 9-71/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduct ion," p. 2.; THR VT96
 The conservative backlash cannot undo a decade of reform, nor can it completely change China's agenda. Every Chinese government since the 1880s has sought national wealth and power, both to enhance China's international position and to improve living conditions at home. Because in today's world such a quest requires access to foreign countries (capital, trade, and technology) and a domestic infrastructure that sup- ports modernization, the search for wealth and power constrains conservative options. As long as Chinese conservatives acknowledge the importance of modernization, they cannot resolve the contradiction between party control and modern economic growth. Furthermore, the erosion of party authority undermines the political and social mechanisms used to enforce official policies. Authorities can restrain "deviant" behavior, but they can no longer compel people to believe or cooperate.
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9-72/Zhang Yunl ing, Director of Inst tute of Pac fic Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 101 ; THR VT96
 A number of observers have taken a skeptical attitude toward China's future behavior and role, since it is still undergoing a process of transformation that might be long and unstable. Given the thrust of modernization in China, however, China will most likely play a positive rather than a negative i role in regional development. 
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9-73 / Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.85; THR VT96
 Second, integration of China into the world economy seems likely to'lead to pressures from within China to liberalize further the country's treatment of foreign trade and investment. While it has been apparent for some time that China will not reverse its policy of opening to the outside world, the question of how far such liberalization will proceed has remained open. In the 1980s, further liberalization seemed to depend primarily upon the will of China's topmost political leaders (particularly Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun). As China approaches the end of the century, however, the "open policy" has become so deeply entrenched that a coalition in favor of the policy's expansion--made up of middle- and lower-level officials in the central, provincial, and local governments, as well as nongovernmental actors who have business ties to the foreign sector--may be expected to act as a strong domestic constituency pressing for even greater integration into the world economy. Indeed, the government's unrelenting need to respond to the strong boom mentality is one early manifestation of this process. The PRC governmental elite will undoubtedly continue, as it has in the past, to try to control how the policy plays out, and voices for protectionism will remain; these forces may well succeed in slowing down further trade and investment liberalization. However, it seems likely that the center increasingly will be required to negotiate with local officials and private actors who, as the forces controlling the real points of contact between China and the outside world, now are deeply interested in China's further participation in world markets.
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9-74/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.47; THR VT96
 Mass mobilization may take place either during booms or busts, depending on whether the issues on the national agenda arouse the students and other protesters. Whatever the stimulus for the movement, if it occurs during a boom there appears to be less likelihood of a sharp crackdown than if it occurs during a bust. Thus the Democracy Wall protest movement began in spring 1978 and lasted through 1980, arising in a boom and surviving with difficulty until a bust was deemed economically expedient, whereupon a harsh crackdown put the residual underground tabloids out of business. The fall 1985 student mobilization against the Japanese commercial invasion arose during a boom, was handled with kid gloves, and died a natural death by December. The student protest demonstrations of December 1986 and the democracy demonstrations of April-May 1989 both occurred during busts, and both were met with violent repressive tactics that included the purge of those leaders who supported the demonstrators or were considered insufficiently firm in repressing them.
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9-75 /BNA Management Briefing, January 27, 1994; BNA Management Briefing, "CHINA'S OVERHAUL OF TAX SYSTEM CREATES PROBLEMS, BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS"; PMS VT96
 	The upheaval in China's tax system probably will not have a significant impact on the growing level of investment in China, the analysts said. While China's tax system is pretty chaotic right now, and some businesses will be hurt by the new system, Martin [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] said the new tax laws probably will not affect the growing rate of investment in China because the market is very attractive. "People are going to go into China no matter what, because there are 1.8 billion people there," Martin [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] said.
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 9-76/BNA Management Briefing, January 27, 1994; BNA Management Briefing, "CHINA'S OVERHAUL OF TAX SYSTEM CREATES PROBLEMS, BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS"; PMS VT96
 	The United States signed its first income tax treaty with the government of the People's Republic of China, along with a protocol and an exchange of notes, on April 30, 1984. The treaty, which entered into force Nov. 21, 1986, is still currently in effect. A Treasury Department official told BNA that he did not know if the recent changes in China's tax laws and market system since 1984 would create the need to renegotiate another tax treaty. He said the issue really has not been brought to Treasury's attention, which probably means there is not too much of a demand for a new treaty.
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9-77/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "China's Environment," Reprinted in CH]RkFk AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 101; THR VT96
 China has for over 20 years forged its own perspectives on what its environmental problems are and how they should be thought about and managed. While it is easy for outsiders to criticize perceived shortcomings in policy development and enforcement, no other poor country has developed a more extensive institutional, research, and educational base for environmental programs. What should. be expected of China, given the spotty record of Western countries, including the United States? Why should China be held to a higher standards?
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 9-78/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 163 ; THR VT96
 Environmental protection measures such as the green belt project have been widely praised by the United Nations and other international organisations. But the implementation of such projects requires enormous amounts of money, and that is what China demands from the developed nations in exchange for compliance with international environmental agreements. The government has said that it is 'ready to assume responsibilities commensurate to our economic possibilities'.
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9-79/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. I26; ANA VT96
 Energy efficiency is the first priority. China has already reduced its energy intensity by one third between 1978 and 1990, but it is still inefficient by industrial-country standards. One study estimates that by investing $3 billion in efficiency each year, the country could cut future growth in energy demand by nearly half, eliminating the need for $16 billion of new power plants, oil refineries, and other energy installations. Among the priorities are improved building practices (see Chapter 6) and better enforcement of existing industrial and residential appliance efficiency standards.
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9-80/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's II @ Limits, edited by Lester Brown, p.130; ANA VT96
 As China plunges headlong into capitalism, it will need to work quickly to install an adequate regulatory structure. As economist Michael Porter has noted, countries that implement strong environmental standards are generally more successful economically, since they encourage development of state-of-the-art industries that do not require remedial cleanup.
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9-81/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 130; ANA VT96
 On paper, China's government seems well aware of the resource limitations it faces, and has publicly embraced the goal of sustainable development. The constitution requires protection and improvement of the natural environment. And as a follow-up to the 1994 Earth Summit, the government has issued a several-hundred-page action plan with 62 pilot projects. But as with many countries, there has been a gap between Beijing's rhetoric and the reality of what is going on in China's vast countryside and its now bustling cities.
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9-82/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth Col Iege, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.84; THR VT96
 USTR has used Section 301 provisions against China to target two sensitive areas: protection of intellectual property in China and market access for U.S. goods.. On both these issues, USTR in 1992 negotiated broad agreements with the Chinese government. With regard to intellectual property, China has joined the Berne Convention on Copyrights, set up bilateral copyright regulations with the United States, and published regulations designed to protect existing copyrighted works (including software and sound recordings). It also has broadened patent protection to include two important areas of American industry, pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals. Enforcement of these provisions has remained problematic, as was expected given the newness of the regulations, the practical difficulties Beijing faces in policing them in the provinces, and the lack of structural support for enforcement within China's evolving judicial system. Still, the formal agreements are a first step toward meeting U.S. goals in this area, and they indicate how far China has gone to accede to international norms on intellectual property.
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 9-83/ RAMON MYERS, St. Fe11ow Hoover Inst:., Stanford, 1994; THOUGHTS ON U.S. FORETGN POLTCY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLTC OF CHTNA, Essays in Public Policy; p. 9ACS VT96
 Much of the current outcry in China over corruption is because of the lack of markets, clear property rights, and laws for contracting and enforcing contracts. As more markets and new laws emerge, the corruption people rage against will diminish. But the PRC's economic legacy still casts a shadow over the Chinese people, who struggle to do business in primitive markets without clearly defined property rights and laws to protect those rights.
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9-84/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.405; THR VT96
 Despite the gloomy prognoses of almost every expert back in 1989, China had somehow managed to emerge economically stronger than ever from both the political calamity of June 4 and the economic slump that followed. In fact, in a way that almost no one had foreseen, the tragedy seemed to have proven a perverse blessing in disguise. By providing the government with an opportunity to implement an austere retrenchment program-something that ordinary Chinese would never have tolerated had they not been reeling from the massacre and paralyzed from protesting by martial law--the leadership had succeeded in bringing the country's badly overheated economy under control. Moreover, by jolting Deng and other Party leaders into a realization that nothing short of high-speed economic change would be enough to save their unilateral political rule, the tragedy had forced them to radical reformist action.
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9-86/Crossborder Monitor (formerly Business International), January 26, 1994; Crossborder Monitor (formerly Business International), "China Opens Chute: Economy Bucking into Westernization"; PMS VT96
 	More recently, China allowed US and other foreign banks greater access and permitted them to accept deposits in Chinese currency.
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9-87/ Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
 	 China, which received a shot in the arm in the 1970s from its neighbors' rapid economic growth, shifted radically toward internal economic reform and liberalization in the 1980s. Its engagement in the world economy has produced a borderless network of Chinese merchants in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The Chinese Economic Area, consisting of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, now boasts a trade volume surpassed only by the United States, Japan, Germany, France and Britain. The CEA is not based on a regional agreement; its expansion is prompted solely by the market. Struggling to adjust to the unexpected opening of the Chinese economy and the decline of its oil revenues, Indonesia has already liberalized terms for overseas investment. Socialist China's shift to a market economy has encouraged Vietnam to follow suit, and the walls dividing ideological and political systems in Asia are gradually coming down, albeit in a different way than in Europe and Eurasia. 
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 9-88/Alan Tonelson, Fellow at the Economic Strategy Institute, March/April 1995; CURRENT, "Power and Human Rights: A Post-Cold War Dilemma," p. 36; CJJ VT96
 A vibrant industrial base that creates millions of new high-wage jobs can give America the economic leverage needed to negotiate the beneficial economic agreements with the rest of the world. A prosperous America can generate enough markets, capital, and technology to give other countries powerful incentives to conform to U.S. labor, environmental, and other standards voluntarily -- not as acknowledgments of American moral superiority or as acts of surrender, but simply as the price of access.
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 9-89/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 126; ANA VT96
 Though solar and wind energy were neglected in the past, this is changing. The State Science and Technology Commission drew up a 1994 plan to accelerate development of these new energy technologies. One encouraging sign is that China is beginning to open up its power system to private ownership and even to joint ventures with foreign companies. This will help break the political stalemate favoring coal..
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9-90 / McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
 	 More broadly, growing Chinese assertiveness and military strength could strengthen hawks in Japan's ongoing security debate, in turn raising tensions among Japan's neighbors. And a souring of Sino-Russian relations could encourage Moscow to refurbish its nuclear doctrine, imperiling the arms control agreements fashioned as the Cold War ended. A growing China can threaten U.S. interests even if it means to threaten no one, and long before it can threaten the United States directly. 
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9-91/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
 	 For some of China's neighbors, the security dilemma posed by China's growth is compounded by ancient territorial disputes. Japan, China, and Taiwan, for example, all claim a small island group (called Diaoyutai in China, Senkaku in Japan) northeast of Taiwan. 
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9-92/ FRANK GAFFNEY; director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, Defense News, April 3, 1995 / April 9, 1995; Pg. 19. HEADLINE: U.S. Leadership Must Awaken To Onrushing Tide of Crises; ACS VT96
 	 The following are among the dynamic conditions in play today that could produce the next international cataclysm, possibly on a global scale: * American trade deficits and infusions of militarily relevant technology are helping Communist China transform itself into a global superpower. China's growing audacity in projecting its power and its willingness to do so even at the risk of coming to blows with the United States is but a taste of what is to come.
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9-93/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
 	 Yet China's growth is indeed worth worrying about, not because it will surely continue, nor because a strong China will seek to dominate its neighbors, but because if China continues to grow it will confront the world with a change in power relationships of unprecedented size, ultimately involving the emergence of a power capable of overshadowing Japan, perhaps even the United States. In the past, large power transitions have been marked by instability and conflict. China's ties to the global economy may soften this one. But if not, China's growth is likely to threaten regional stability--a vital U.S. interest--regardless of China's intent. 
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9-94/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
 	 China is another major power that might, over the long term and perhaps sooner than Russia, emerge as a global rival to the United States. [..] if domestic turmoil can be avoided -- China will become an increasingly important player on the global scene in coming decades. The country has had dramatic economic growth. Between 1978 and 1992 its GNP increased by 9 percent annually. In 1992, that rate increased to 12 percent. Its foreign trade increased from $ 21 billion in 1978 to $ 170 billion in 1992. According to the International Monetary Fund, Chinese output may have exceeded $ 1.6 trillion dollars in 1992. The World Bank gives an even higher estimate: $ 2.3 trillion. Militarily, China has been increasing its power projection capability -- both naval and air -- in part by purchasing advanced equipment from Russia. 
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9-95/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
 	 Most of the U.S. defense experts agree that China won't pose much of a threat to the United States over the next 10 to 15 years -- but few are willing to make any predictions after that time. "My sense is that they (Chinese leaders) are trying to keep their powder dry over the next few years," says Jonathan Pollack of the RAND Corp., who urges U.S. defense officials to hedge their bets on whether China will be peaceful or threatening in the future. 
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9-96/ David Friedman is a visiting fellow at the MIT Japan program.November 21, 1993, Los Angeles Times p. m1 HEADLINE: TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC BULLIES THAT AMERICA REFUSES TO FACE UP TO; COMMERCE: WHILE JAPAN -- AND NOW CHINA -- RUN UP HUGE SURPLUSES, THE U.S. FRETS OVER GEOPOLITICS AND MOUTHS FREE-TRADE PRINCIPLES. //MDS-VT96
 	 Burgeoning defense budgets, continued reports of labor, ethnic and dissident harassment, and the possible sale, despite global objections, of a sophisticated ballistic-missile system to Pakistan seem to confirm that Chinese economic liberalization may be coupled with increased domestic authoritarianism and international irresponsibility. 
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9-97/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
 	 Few believe that the two countries will be adversaries within the next 10 or 15 years. But China's fast-developing economy, its steady increases in military expenditures, its purchases of warplanes and submarines from Russia and some of its recent actions in the South China Sea are making U.S. military and intelligence officials begin to think about possibilities for future conflict.
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 9-98/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND S'IUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 42-3; FEDS VT96
 Mainland China is by far the most active regional power in Asia. As its economy prospers, the PRC may attempt to project its power far beyond its borders. The next century will see an economically stronger PRC,yet quite possibly one still ruled by an authoritarian regime. This is why in Northeast Asia, American, Chinese, and Russian policies may conflict. In addition, Japan is greatly worried about the ever increasing Chinese military and economic potential. Other states like India have also voiced concern over the growing power of mainland China. This will only increase the amount of tension in the AsiaPacific region.
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9-99/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURPINt HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHIMa AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.129; THR VT96
 As the United States contemplates building this East Asian security system, it must deal with a "rising China," whose economy is growing rapidly and whose military is in a stronger position domestically than at any time since 1971. The rapid growth of China's GNP will put more funds in the hands of the Chinese military. Continuing unresolved territorial claims, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea, require China's enmeshment in a host of multilateral agreements that will limit its external actions and ensure responsible behavior. China, however, is likely to resist such efforts. Already, the perception of Chinese military expansionism has alarmed China's neighbors, particularly the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan, and could fuel a growing arms race in the region, which is not in America's interests. [Author's note: According to some Chinese sources, China's military buildup is aimed at Taiwan, with plans already drawn up for an immediate invasion of Taiwan when it declares independence. A more likely scenario would involve various Chinese threats as Taiwan moved toward independence, ending...with a possible attack if Taiwan persists.
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9-100/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
 	 When U.S. strategic planners comb through history in search of precedents for the growing economic and military strength in China today, they are coming up with some ominous examples: Germany in the 1880s and Japan in the 1920s. For the first time in decades, U.S. military and intelligence officials are beginning to cast a wary eye at China as a possible long-term rival, a future threat to American interests in Asia and the Pacific.
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9-101/ McNaugher september 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
 	 Leaders in Beijing are already claiming border areas and offshore islands with a new assertiveness and buying weapons from Russia capable of backing those claims with force. As one Singaporean diplomat told American researcher David Hitchcock last year, "All of Southeast Asia is scared" by the growth of China's power. 
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 9-102/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-Ckina Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.27; THR VT96
 Demands for political change stem not so muck from economic failure as from moderate economic success, the resulting rising expectations and the magnetic appeal of the neighboring Chinese free-market communities of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Drawing lessons from the Soviet Union's demise, China's leaders have concluded that the regime's survival rests on genuine and rapid economic reform. Indeed it was precisely such an acceleration that was approved in mid-October at the 14th Party Congress in Beijing.
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 9-103/George Tsai, , p. 49 ,Feb., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, "Beijing's foreign relations: Prospects for 1995;" MDS VT96
 From an overall perspective, Beijing is well aware that a multipolar system is in the making and that though the Cold War is over, the world is far from being a peaceful place. Instability and uncertainty are rife, and hegemonism and power politics still play a role in world affairs. Nevertheless, in Beijing's eyes, the situation in East Asia is stable compared to that in some parts of Europe. Beijing is also aware of the growing importance of economic factors in international relations, and the regime expects its regional economic cooperation to expand with the growth of its economy and its influence in international affairs to increase.
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9-104/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
 	 In this scenario, China will not fully fit in the Asian model of economic development, like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other newly industrialized economies. "While the Chinese leadership seeks to emulate the Singapore-Japan-South Korea pattern of modernization, China has not demonstrated the same degree of institutional capacity," the report says. [Pentagon Report, China in the near term] 
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9-105/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
 	 If China continues to grow at a higher rate than the United States, at some point in the next century it could become the world's largest economy. n7 Such a development would produce a significant shift in relative economic power, with important potential geopolitical and military implications.
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9-106/ Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
 	 A leading American sinologist detected a whiff of xenophobia in the coterie of President Jiang Zemin, which, he said, was based on "a hubris growing out of very rapid economic growth plus an element of nationalism".
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9-107/Stephen Chapman, Staff Writer, January 23, 1994; Chicago Tribune, "THE SUDDEN RISE OF A NEW GIANT COULD REMAKE THE WORLD", SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; Pg. 3; ZONE: C; PMS VT96
 	But the real source of conflict in the years ahead won't stem from illegitimate business tactics, which can often be excused. It will arise from the unforgivable sin of winning in world competition. As the Japanese can attest, any nation that runs large trade surpluses can expect to become a punching bag for protectionist demagogues everywhere. In 1992, China sold $18 billion more here than the U.S. sold there, an imbalance exceeded only by Japan. In the November /December issue of Foreign Affairs, former New York Times Beijing bureau chief Nicholas Kristof compares China with Germany before World War I: " China shares with turn-of-the-century Germany the sense of wounded pride, the annoyance of a giant that has been battered and cheated by the rest of the world. . . . The latter's experience should remind us of the difficulty that the world has had accommodating newly powerful nations." But Germany didn't have one-fifth of the people on Earth. China could eventually attain such power as Hitler could only imagine. For the rest of the world-and most of all for the world's only current superpower-adjusting to that change looms as the central problem of the 21st Century.
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 9-108/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' P. 153 ; THR VT96
 Environmental problems include acid rain, deforestation, soil degradation and water pollution, to name just a few. The idyllic image of China with its lush green peaks rising in the clear blue skies already appears to be a thing of the past. Carbon dioxide emissions from hundreds of thousands of chimneys across the country make China the world's fourth biggest contributor to global warming, after the United States, the former Soviet Union and Brazil.x Coal is the most widely used fuel in China's industries and homes, though the country is also self-sufficient in oil production. With increases in industrial production, consumption of non-renewable energy resources rose by 63 per cent during the decade from 1981 to 1991. At 70 per cent, the rate of increase in the consumption of coal was even higher. Toxic fumes produced by the fossil fuelburning industries and homes shower most industrial cities and the surrounding countryside with acid rain, causing severe health problems, especially lung cancer. The problem is most serious in the cities, where between 17 and 31 persons in every 100 000 are likely to die of lung cancer, although the national average is only four to five.
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9-109/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-25-95; MURAYAMA TO OFFER GREEN AID TO CHINA DURING MAY VISIT; ACS VT96
 	With rapid economic development in China, environmental problems have become serious, including growing air and water pollution and an increase in industrial waste. In particular, a rapidly increasing amount of sulfur dioxide, which causes acid rain, has been emitted into the air. Conditions are expected to worsen in the 21st century, and also to affect the Japanese environment.
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9-110/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-27-95; JAPAN TO SEND ENVIRONMENT MISSION TO CHINA IN LATE JUNE ; ACS VT96
 	China is faced with air pollution and other serious environmental problems caused by its rapid economic growth. As an example, the phenomenon of desertification is spreading at an annual rate of some 2,100 square kilometers of land.
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 9-111/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURPaNT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 129; THR VT96
 The United States also has a strong interest in China's environmental policy. As Douglas Murray has argued in American Interests in China's Environment, China's "ecological problems [are] so severe that they constitute a collective crisis with global consequences and powerful implications for America." According to Murray, helping China avoid the globally harmful effects of its rapid industrialization, rising consumption levels, and relative neglect of its environmental problems would be extremely costeffective--more so than the investments the United States must make to correct its own. Also, cooperative research involving Chinese facilities and scientific talent would be less costly and more productive than projects based solely in the United States and relying primarily on American scientific know-how. Moreover, investing in cleaning up China's environment means China will become a major market for environmental products--another plus for the United States, since it is a leader in clean energy technologies. Already by 1991, about 20 percent of China's $200 million in purchases of environmental equipment came from American firms, and the United States is well positioned to participate in contracts funded by the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Global Environmental Facility,
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9-112/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 11, 1995; ACS VT96
 	China Claims Five of the Ten Worst Cities for Pollution [BEIJING, 01/09/95] Five of the world's ten most polluted cities are in China, AP reported Saturday. Beijing, Shenyang, Xi'an, Shanghai and Canton are among the world's ten worst cities for air pollution. China's economic growth in recent years has come at the cost of its environment. Nearly one-third of the country is polluted with acid rain and half of the major rivers are contaminated. To fight the pollution problem, the National Environmental Protection Agency of China is considering using taxes and fines. New environmental laws are also expected to be passed in the spring of 1995. (Guang HONG, Chuck LIN)
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 9-113/CoIin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' P.I151 ; THR VT96
 It is by now widely recognised throughout China that the country's physical environment is heavily polluted. Environmental issues have attracted the attention of decision-makers at the highest levels of government, while a network of government institutions has been created. But the scope of the problem is so great and its nature so complex that government intervention alone is not enough to improve the situation. Since 1949, government preoccupation with economic growth has meant that the environment has become the main casualty of industrial development, while the problems have worsened since 1978 simply because industrial growth has been much faster.
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 9-114/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.424; THR VT96
 From a long-term perspective, the darkest side of this economic miracle was probably the exploitation of China's natural resources and the degradation of its environment. Traveling across the country in the seventies and early eighties, one often saw stacks belching clouds of bituminoid black smoke into the air and outfall pipes spilling untreated waste into waterways. Nonetheless, in most cities it was still possible to see the blue sky, and while rivers and harbors were far from pristine, the relatively undeveloped state of Chinese industry mitigated against terminal pollution. China's proletarian politics and its Maoist vilification of material consumption turned out to have provided an inadvertent form of environmental protection. But now that everyone was answering Deng's call to "modernize," and going about it with the same unquestaonmg hell-bent energy with which they once answered Mao s call to "make revolution," Mother Nature--wehich had not been particularly robust in China for millennia--was i?? serious peril. Leading the fall were the thousands of "township industries" whose proliferation was almost impossible for the central gov,government to control.
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9-115/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.425; THR VT96
 But it was urban environments, each one marching down its own unique path to ecological ruin, that were most obviously being graded. In the ancient city of Wuxi, the Grand Canal had become so befouled by chemicals that it looked more like an industrial-wastetreatment lagoon than a waterway; in Xining, state-owned stores were helping deplete stocks of rare wildlife by paying premium prices for such prize traditional medicaments as snow leopard bones, Tibetan brown bear paws, and blue bharal sheep horns; in Shanxi, cement plants emitted so much ash that workshop roofs appeared to be covered with gray snow; in Sichuan Province, tourists and loggers were threatening the habitat of China's last few pandas; in Beijing where skies were once renowned for their azure blueness, one could rarely see the sun through the pall of automotive smog from traffic jams of vehicles still operating on leaded fuel without any emission controls; in Liaoning, whole cities had become invisible from space satellites because of coal-burning factories; and in Dalian, the once pellucid green harbor had turned an inky blue-black from industrial waste.
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9-116/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.426; THR VT96
 Each year's environmental statistics were more disturbing than the last's. Although the central government had set up numerous bureaus and promulgated endless regulations--including a five-year plan to reduce pollution announced by the National Environmental Protection Agency in February 1994---the rapid slide toward ecological collapse continued because it was in so many people's short-term interest to allow it. Since the central government was so concerned with regaining popular approval by raising the level of material consumption, it was loath to impede the economic boom, much less to alienate increasingly powerful and boosterish regional governments--trying to win new industries for their regions--by enforcing environmental controls from above on local officials profiring from development. And the fact that living standards were rising made urban dwellers more indulgent about industrial pollution than they might otherwise have been. But even if a citizens' group had wanted to protest, government prohibitions against organized opposition made it virtually impossible to do so. When environmental hazards became so extreme as to directly menace life and property, ordinary people were left with no alternative but to take matters into their own hands, sometimes violently.
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9-117/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD' 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 114 ; ANA VT96
 Ongoing trends are also placing severe stress on the domestic environment, dirtying the air and water, and further undermining the health of China's cropland, forests, and fisheries. Already, its cities have air that is dangerous to breathe, and many regions are running short of water. Although a traditional development strategy might allow millions of Chinese to enter the middle class, the quality of life of the majority would be at risk. 
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9-118/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 117 ; ANA VT96
 China will soon become another Asian Tiger. The World Bank estimates that greater China (which includes Hong Kong and Taiwan) will have a slightly larger gross domestic product in 2002 than the United States (roughly $10 trillion). Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, says, "The size ofChina's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance in thirty to forty years." This is as true for the world's ecological equilibrium as it is for its economic or political stability. An unsustainable path could be disastrous for China--and for the rest of the world.
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9-119/Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing journalists, June 1994;I CHOICES: THE HtNAN DEVELDPMENT MAAZINE, "China's own agenda 21" p. 19 ; SEG VT96
 But there are other consequences of industrialization and economic growth that pose a danger not only to the Chinese people but to the planet as a whole. Dying forests have been traced to acid rain, and global warming to excessive use of fossil fuels and the emission of greenhouse gases. It was only recently that scientists linked holes in the , Earth's protective ozone layer to certain chemicals known as ozone-depleting substances (ODS) commonly used in refrigerants and aerosols. For these and other reasons, the Chinese government has been quick to dispute the optimistic claims for its future that have been touted in the foreign press. It knows that the modest goal of achieving a comfortable standard of living for a developing country with more than one billion people will be a long and difficult task, taking at least several more decades. And it is very aware that the industrial development strategy of high inputs, high consumption and high contaminatiors quickly reaching a dead end.
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9-120/ Anthony G. Stegman, San Jose Mercury News, 4-23-95; LESS CONSUMPTION WOULD HEAL U.S. ILLS; ACSA VT96
 Over-consumption is a chronic problem in the world today. Natural resources are being depleted at an alarming rate, pollution of air, water and ground expands worldwide. And the population explosion continues unchecked. With large nations such as Russia and China poised to join the ranks of capitalist nations, these problems can only grow worse.
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 9-121/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "China's Environment," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 95; THR VT96
 Environmental problems in China seriously threaten 1990s economic modernization plans. Technological remedies and regulatory controls at national and provincial levels are generally weak and ineffective despite a constitutional guarantee of environmental protection as a "national principle." Economic productivity suffers from pollution and resource degradation in industry, agriculture, fisheries, animal husbandry, forestry, energy, and other sectors. Problems include rural and urban air and water pollution; arable land encroachment, conversion, and reclamation; soil erosion and fertility loss; deforestation; and health effects of random disposal of municipal garbage and hazardous wastes. In some respects, factors contributing to China's poor environmental condition resemble those in other developing countries. Population pressure overwhelms natural systems' ability to remain productive in the face of pollution insults and physical degradation. Ecosystem processes which support food production, waste assimilation, watershed and aquifer recharge, and other functions essential to human welfare are undermined.
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 9-122/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p.150 ; THR VT96
 In China, with its vast size and population, the four modernisations and reform program, while promoting economic growth, have also contributed to environmental degradation by adding to already existing problems and creating new ones. Although some efforts have been made to repair the damage and to prevent further damage from occurring, environmental problems continue to grow. China's economic development, backed by rapid industrialisation, is seen by many as potentially the world's greatest source of environmental pollution. The spectre of ever/Chinese family owning and driving a car, with its damaging impact on the depletion of the ozone layer, is often raised. It may be the dream of a large proportion of Chinese to own a motor car and the improvement in individual incomes that has come with the reform policies will ensure that some among them will fulfil their dreams. The possibility of this happening is limited only by the rate of development and the space on China's already congested roads.
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9-123/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p 246; THR VT96
 As economic development has gathered momentum, so also has damage to the environment. The problem was highlighted on a worldwide basis by the holding of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, but China is affected with particular severity by environmental problems, above all because of its enormous population. Industrial and economic development has traditionally brought with it poisoning of the atmosphere and of water and soil, the cutting down of forests, and noise incompatible with a decent lifestyle. Although China's policy on the environment is reasonably enlightened, the forces fighting for economic development are likely, in case of conflict, to win out against those trying to protect the environment. Up to now, China has by no means been rich enough to give top priority to that kind of clean industry which will develop the economy without damaging the environment. Its insistent demands for funds and technology from the advanced industrialised world to help with its sustainable development have been only partly successful.
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9-124/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 153 ;THR VT96
 As described in Chapters 6-8, since the implementation of the reform policies, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of over 9 per cent between 1978 and 1990. The economic structure also underwent radical change; the economy is more pluralistic, with private and collective sectors matching the state sector in economic importance. But one cost of all this development and change was damage to the environment. If China today is economically richer, its environment has positively deteriorated. In fact, the industrial growth of the past twelve years has become the main source of environmental pollution. In agriculture, too, the shift from collective to private farming has resulted in the decline of environmental standards in the countryside.
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 9-125/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment," Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p 169; THR VT96
	While resource degradation is also serious in the east, the immediate problem facing the population there is pollution. As small scale township and village enterprised rapidly proliferate with virtually no government regulation, pollution is becoming widespread in the rural areas.
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9-126/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p. 157 ; THR VT96
 Water pollution is another area of concern for the Chinese. The country's waterways carry a whole range of pollutants, from organic wastes to chlorinated hydrocarbons, nitrates, sulphates, cyanides and heavy metals such as lead, chromium and mercury. Nearly a quarter of all fresh water is polluted, and 85 per cent of the river water flowing through the urban areas is so heavily polluted that fish cannot survive in it. Millions of tonnes of industrial and household waste are discharged into riven and irrigation systems every day. In 1990 a total of 24.9 billion tonnes of industrial waste water were discharged, a slight drop of 1.4 per cent over the 1989 level. Coalfired power plants discharge approximately 15 million tonnes of ash into the rivers each year. Only a small fraction of the industrial waste water and domestic sewage is treated before it finds its way into rivers and canals. In Shanghai, for example, drinking water is taken from the Suzhou and Huangpu Rivers. Together they receive 4 million tonnes of industrial waste water and domestic sewage daily, of which only 4 per cent is treated. The failure of the municipal authorities to treat water for use by local residents often results in serious health problems. The untreated waste water eventually finds its way into the sea, where it affects the marine life. In 1988, an accumulation of wastes contaminated shellfish beds off Shanghai, causing an outbreak of hepatitis which affected 300 000 people. Overtapping of underground water has depleted underground water reserves in more than 20 cities. The ground water table in Xi'an has dropped so much that the ground level is sinking five times as fast as it did in 1972.
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 9-127/ Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing journalaluists, June, 1994; CHOTCES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT MAGAZTNE, "China's own agenda 21" p. 19 ;SEG VT96
 And while these changes were intially welcomed by the Chinese people, they are now seen by some as a mixed blessing. No longer can one say with certainty that the changing quality of life in China is an absolute gain. Indeed. the country's wondrous ecosystems and environment have suffered in the speedy rush towards modernization. Growing problems such as inefficient energy. consumption, hazardous levels of air pollution - clouding many of China's age-old cities - and poor controls on industrial waste disposal are undermining the sustainability of China's development.
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 Some of the negative aspects of China's rapid growth are widespread, hazardous and eminently visible: the increase in fly ash dust from belching smoke chimneys, the urban smog that results from exhaust fumes of motor vehicles, the growing accumulation of solid waste resulting from the uncontrolled use of indestructible plastic sheets and styrofoam containers, the stench of contaminated rivers and waterways.
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9-128/ Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing journalists, June, 1994; CHOICES:' THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT MAGAZINE, "China's own agenda 21" p. 21 ;SEG VT96
 Wuxi, on the shores of once beautiful Lake Taihu - which gave inspiration to poets in centuries past - has a water contamination rate 20 times higher than the national average, and an air pollution level 32 times higher. The situation in Changzhou is somewhat better, but its water and air pollution rates are 10 and 20 times above the national average, respectively. The Yangtze River Delta, consisting of Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces and the city of Shanghai, has always been known as a land abundant with fish and rice. The ecosystem of Lake Taihu has been the foundation of economic and social development in that region, known as the Golden Triangle. But the indiscriminate use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, along with other industrial processes, is resulting in more than 40,000 tons of phosphorous and 3,000 tons of nitrogen being discharged into Lake Taihu each year, either directly or via smaller rivers and streams. There is a popular saying describing the lakes and rivers in the Yangtze River Delta. It goes like this: "In the 1950s people washed rice and vegetables in these waterways. Alas, water quality began to deteriorate in the 1960s. By the 1970s fish and prawns had disappeared, and the water was no longer fit even to wash toilet bowls in the 1980s.
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9-129/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p.125 ; ANA VT96
 If the world's climate does change, China will be among the most vulnerable countries. It has always been plagued by weather-related disasters, ranging from floods and typhoons to droughts--the kind of climatic events that are likely to become more common in a warmer world. In the spring of 1994, for example, a flood killed 1,600 people and caused $6 billion in damages. In August, a typhoon killed 700 and led to economic losses of $1.6 billion.
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9-130/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 120 ; ANA VT96
 Because of centuries of intense pressure, China now has more low-quality land under cultivation than most countries: one third of the total. In some areas, such as the northeast plain, soil erosion already affects yields. In the extraordinarily deep topsoil of the Loess Plateau in northern China, soil erosion's most immediate threat is that it dumps millions of tons of sediment into the Huang He each year. Waterlogging from inappropriate irrigation practices is thought to diminish the productivity on approximately 10 percent of China's cropland, and salinization also reduces yields.
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9-131/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 1, 1995; ACS VT96
 	The state councillor responsible for agriculture, Chen Junsheng, quoted by the People's Daily, warned the nation the danger in its agricultural production. According to Chen, in some areas especially coastal provinces, planted crops have dropped under 10% of peasant family incomes as a result of increasingly migrating rural population into urban areas for better rewards.
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 9-132/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.423; THR VT96
 By the fall of 1993 unrest in the countryside also reached a danger point as cash-strapped local officials were unable to pay teachers and were forced to give farmers IOUs for grain they were obligated to sell at fixed prices to the state. In fact, the government was having such cash-flow problems--in 1993 China's budget deficit rose to $20.5 billion yuan ($2.4 billion), with a projected shortfall of 66.9 billion yuan ($8 billion) for 199/1 that many rural post offices were also forced to issue IOUs to peasants receiving remittances in the form of postal money orders from relatives working in the more prosperous coastal areas. Needless to say, this de facto system of involuntary loans 'to the government did not go down well among the peasantry, whose standard of living was already substantially below that of city dwellers. By 1993 the average annual income of an urban resident was $365, while that of rural peasants was still only $140. And if this were not enough, scores of different taxes, corvees, tithes, and fees (including such levies as "movie-watching fees," "education taxes," "rodent extermination," "family planning," "toilet improvement fees," "land registry taxes," and "social stability tithes") were arbitrarily assessed by local officials on angry rural residents. It sometimes seemed as if the Communists were turning into carbon copies of their Nationalist precursors, who had themselves lost power by forfeiting the support of the peasantry. It was hardly surprising that in some localities a number of protorebellions soon sprung up. In June 1993 after a special road construction fee had been levied on peasants in Sichuan Province's Renshou County, thousands attacked government offices. That same month Deng was quoted as saying that "the peas- ants' burden has already passed the limits of their endurance." By summer even the Beijing Review was warning of the "alarming rate of deterioration in agricultural development.
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 9-133/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 151 ;THR VT96
 But can the Chinese people and their government be blamed for aspiring to expedite their economic development and for trying to catch up with the developed countries in individual incomes and living standards? After all, many of the global environmental problems were created by the developed countries, which concentrated on industrial development to the neglect of the physical environment. China and the other developing countries are indeed latecomers to , the ranks of guilty nations who have, for example, contributed to ozone depletion. Chinese leaders argue that the blame for such environmental destruction should be apportioned fairly and the developing nations should not be penalised for the past and present mistakes of developed countries. They reason that if developed nations want to stop using technology and chemicals that are harmful to the environment, then they must use their vast material and scientific resources to develop alternative technologies and provide the developing countxies with access to them. Such differences of opinion on the sources of environmental problems and on approaches to solving them have hampered international negotiations ' on several occasions.
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9-136/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.425; THR VT96
 As development surged, one saw signs of advanced environmental degradation almost anywhere one looked. In Guangdong, where only six of the province's twenty largest cities had any waste-water treatment facilities, inland waterways were foul with effluent; the Yangtze River, where the world's largest hydroelectric dam was planned, had become so industrially polluted that its rare fresh-water dolphin was almost extinct. In Manchuria and the foothills of the Himalayas where forests had been clear-cut of old growth, whole mountainsides had begun to wash away. Grasslands in Qinghai Province and Mongolia were so overgrazed and compacted by too many animals that they looked like putting greens. In suburban areas new factories and industrial-development zones not only gobbled up natural resources and polluted the surrounding air and water, but devoured large amounts of scarce arable land as well. By 1993 approximately 4 million acres of cropland had been consumed by such development, forcing some 16 million peasants out of agriculture. At the same time, the rapidly growing use of chemical fertilizers was further depleting already exhausted soils of tilth and helping reduce the country's annual grain harvest by approximately 3 billion kilograms.
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9-137/ Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
 	 Based on an annual GNP growth estimate of only 6 percent, coal consumption in China is expected to almost double from 1990 levels of 868 million tons to 1,555 million tons by the year 2000; if a 9 percent growth rate is projected consumption could increase to 2,055 million tons. 
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9-138/ Richard L. Grant The Washington Quarterly, 1994 Winter, Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59, HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
 	 One consequence of an economically successful China is, however, a source of increasing concern in Northeast Asia, namely energy consumption in the PRC. In order to sustain its targeted growth rates China's energy consumption will have to increase significantly-perhaps double-from 1990 levels by the year 2000. China, with the second largest proven reserves in the world, will have to meet its increased energy demands by turning to coal, which already accounts for over two-thirds of its energy consumption. Oil accounts for only 15 percent of energy consumption, and China has limited domestic oil production capacity which is already under severe strain. China became a net importer of oil in 1993. Hydroelectric power, natural gas, and atomic energy together account for less than 10 percent of energy consumption in the PRC and no significant increase in these areas is projected by the year 2000. 
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9-139/ Mark Magnier, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-6-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia's Bulk Coal Market Shifts Ahead of Anticipated Boom; ACS VT96
 	 Also, for environmental reasons, new power stations will be placed increasingly at sites away from major cities and established port facilities. This will require in many cases construction of dedicated facilities. Bulk ports developed for coal may lead to port facilities for other bulk commodities.
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 9-140/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 154; THR VT96
 Coal provides 76 per cent of China's energy. Heavy reliance on coal as an energy resource is undoubtedly the main cause of air pollution in China, but the problem is accentuated by the use oh Outdated technology which also leads to inefficient use of natural resources. For example, although in the late 1980s China's average annual energy consumption was about 850 million tonnes hard coal equivalent (HCE), which was less than double that of former West Germany, dust emissions in China were more than fifteen times higher than in West Germany.6 China's sulphur dioxide emissions "at 15 million tonnes annually were also at least four times higher than West Germany's. Apart from the use of old and inefficient technology, the low quality of coal used by many of China's industries is also a major contributory factor in environmental pollution, especially air pollution. According to Glaeser, four-fifths of all emissions are caused by the combustion of low quality coal, washed inadequately and used wastefully, in power plants, industrial boilers, steam locomotives, ships and household stoves.7 Most Chinese coal is high in sulphur.
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9-141/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 113 ; ANA VT96
 As the twentieth century draws to a close, however, China is putting the concept of sustainable development to a se- vere test, and on an unprecedented scale. With 1.2 billion people--one fifth of the world--now taking eagerly to .Deng Xiaopeng's belief that "to get rich is glorious," China's use of natural resources is growing at staggering rates. If recent growth patterns continue, China's use of coal will double in the next 16 years, and its consumption of grain will rise by 40 percent. Emissions of some air and water pollutants are growing even more rapidly.
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9-142/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 123; ANA VT96
 One of the first things that visitors to Beijing notice these days is the quality of the air, which frequently has an acrid, sulfurous odor, and carries a heavy burden of particulates that quickly blacken everything from building facades to curtains. The "Beijing cough" is heard everywhere, and gives a sense of the respiratory damage being inflicted on the city's residents. From urban air quality to acid rain and greenhouse gas emissions, China has some of the world's worst air pollution. The reasons for this deadly brew of contaminants are clear: energy demands are burgeoning, and they are mainly being met by a nineteenth-century-style system based on the direct burning of coal, much of it of low quality and so.me of it high in sulfur.
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9-143/Megan Ryan and Christ opher F lavin, Researchers for t he Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 125 ; ANA VT96
 Along with more than 100 other governments, China signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change at the Earth Summit in 1992, but 10 far it has taken few steps to limit its carbon output. Unlike other air pollution problems, carbon dioxide cannot be economically controlled with pollution devices. The only way to reduce the output is to use less coal, but that is the fuel that China's energy planners and their supporters at the World Bank are counting on to meet the lion's share of the country's energy needs.
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9-144/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 125; ANA VT96
 Even as China struggles to cope with "traditional" pollutants and with growing oil imports, concern is spreading about its contribution to one of the most serious global threats: human-induced greenhouse warming. With its heavy reliance on coal--the fossil fuel with the highest carbon content--China is already the second largest contributor to rising atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas. Its 725 million tons of carbon emissions in 1993 (see Figure 7-4) trailed only the United States, though in per capita terms it was behind 50 other nations. At current growth rates, China will become the number one emitter of carbon dioxide by 2020.
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9-145/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "China's Environment," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 107; THR VT96
 Construction of hydroelectric and thermal power plants, water storage and flood control reservoirs, power lines, and other energy-related structures has wide and immediate social and ecological impact. Especially in the crowded eastern third of the country, construction displaces many people, destroys precious agricultural land and natural habitats, induces erosion from site preparation, pollutes water bodies, and increases deforestation. Offshore oil drilling and production platforms also contribute to marine pollution in biologically productive nearshore areas, although there has been better control in recent years, especially in Bo Hai Bay, an important oil and gas production area.
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9-146/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
 	 Based on an annual GNP growth estimate of only 6 percent, coal consumption in China is expected to almost double from 1990 levels of 868 million tons to 1,555 million tons by the year 2000; if a 9 percent growth rate is projected consumption could increase to 2,055 million tons. n4 The environmental consequences are enormous, not just for China but for all of Northeast Asia. Chinese industry is not only highly energy inefficient, it is also highly polluting. Acid rain is already a significant problem in industrialized cities and wind currents spread it into Northeast Asia. Japan in particular is concerned about the impact on its forests. 
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 9-147/ Mark Magnier, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-6-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia's Bulk Coal Market Shifts Ahead of Anticipated Boom; ACS VT96
 	 In absolute terms, analysts expect demand to reach 200 million tons by 2000 and 300 million tons by 2010, assuming various power plant construction programs are realized. That would compare with 100 million tons in 1993, Mr. Robertson said.
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 9-148/Megan Ryan and Christ opher F lavin, Researchers for t he Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 174 ; ANA VT96
 Sulfur is the main precursor to acid ram, and China would have a more severe acid rain problem were it not for an accident of geochemistry: in northern China, where much of the coal is burned, alkaline dust sweeps through the area, neutralizing the acidifying effects of sulfur deposition. In southern China, however, where the local coal has lots of sulfur and there is no alkaline dust, serious damage has been reported in some areas. Acid rain from Chinese coal has been measured as far away as Japan and South Korea. Acid rain's toll on crops, forests, and buildings is estimated at $2.8 billion a year.
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9-149/ Mark Magnier, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-6-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia's Bulk Coal Market Shifts Ahead of Anticipated Boom; ACS VT96
 	 Although environmental concerns will almost certainly grow, they are not expected to seriously deter coal shipments, Mr. Robertson said. But coal-fired generators designed with environmental considerations in mind are favored as reliable and economic sources of electricity. In such cases, low-sulfur coal is often preferred as the least-costly, most-secure source.
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9-150/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-31-95, (News Global), ACS VT96
 Fossil-Based Power Plants to be Phased out in Pearl River Delta [CND, 05/31/95] BEIJING - No more coal- or oil-burning power plants in the Pearl River Delta, Reuter reported citing the Guangdong government. To reduce excessive sulfur dioxide emissions, the provincial government will turn down any new proposals of thermal power plants and will require existing ones to install desulfurization devices. The hustling Delta area contributes more than 70% of the gross domestic product, but accounts for 72% of the sulfur dioxide exhaustions, and generates 64% of the industrial waste water of the province. It is likely that nuclear power will help solve the dilemma of development and environmental protection of the Delta. (Ye HE, Jian LIU)
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9-151/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 14, 1995; ACS VT96
 	China Admits Rapid Scattering of Acid Rain [BEIJING, 1/10/95] China admits that rapid scattering of acid rain has resulted in huge economic and ecological losses, Xinhua reported Tuesday. Acid rain has propagated to 2.8 million square kilometers (out of a total area of 9.6 million square kilometers) by the end of 1993, up 60 percent over 1985. According to Xie Zhenhua, director of the National Environmental protection Agency (NEPA), acid rain, resulted from the discharges of sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere, is now propagating northward from southern China. A new law will soon be issued to restrict such discharges, according to the official. (Zhiping YU, Daluo JIA) 
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 9-152/ Mark Magnier, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-6-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia's Bulk Coal Market Shifts Ahead of Anticipated Boom; ACS VT96
 	 In China, India, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, demand for new power plants will exceed economic growth rates, compared with coal demand that matched gross domestic product growth in advanced countries like Japan, he said.
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 9-153/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p.122 ; ANA VT96
 The habitat on which this biological versity depends has been shrinking rapidly in recent decades. For example, the forests of Xishuangbanna, along China's border with Myanmar and Laos, are home to 4,000-5,000 species of higher plants and more than 500 species of vertebrates. This area, which used to be China's richest tropical rain forest, has lost half of its forest cover since 1950. Many of China's plants and animals are in trouble: 15-20 percent of them are classified as threatened or endangered.
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9-154/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 114 ; ANA VT96
 China's efforts will be complicated by the fact that the country is undergoing a series of historic economic, political, and social transformations that will test it in many ways. Attempts to establish a mar- ket economy, democratize the political system, protect human rights, and ex- tend the country's social advances are all intricately linked to the goal of sustaina- ble development. Progress in each of these areas is critical, and failure to move forward could lead to social strife and political breakdown..
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9-155/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p.113 ; ANA VT96
 Despite these limits, China has managed reasonably well as a rural, agri- cultural, and relatively poor country. It has made substantial progress in reduc- ing poverty, improving nutrition, and providing basic amenities such as health care and education to its people in re- cent decades. But with its economy now doubling in size roughly every eight years, China's shortage of resources threatens to become a serious impedi- ment to its development plans.
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9-156/Megan Ryan and Christ opher F lavin, Researchers for t he Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 124 ; ANA VT96
 China's air is about to be assaulted by another major source of pollutants- motor vehicles. In a country well known for its dependence on 400 million non- polluting bicycles, the automobile has so far had a negligible role: the entire coun-,, try has only 700,000 private cars (which were illegal until a few years ago) and only as many kilometers ofpaved road as the United States did at the turn of the century. Yet the number of motor vehi- cles ballooned from 613,000 in 1970 to 5.8 million in 1990. Now the govern- ment is eager to create a world-class au- tomobile industry, and envisions in- creasing the number of cars produced annually from 1.3 million in 1993 to 3 million in 2000.
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9-157/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 124; ANA VT96
 These cars will, of course, exacerbate China's air pollution. Ozone readings in Beijing, Guangzhou, and several other cities average about 20 micrograms per cubic meter, more than three times the average in Los Angeles. The use of leaded gasoline and the prevalence of inefficient and infrequently maintained trucks and buses make the emissions problem far worse. Unless China adopts emissions standards similar to those already in place in Japan, the ongoing auto boom will have devastating effects on China's air.
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9-158/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 130 ; ANA VT96
 While government planners talk of sustainable development and building a green China, local industrialists are rushing to put up steel mills and chemical plants that would have been illegal in Japan even two decades ago. Enforcement of environmental laws remains weak, the old command-and-control systems are breaking down, market incentives are often inadequate or absent, too large a share of government investment is going into megaprojects, and citizens have not been given the freedom to participate fully in environmental reform. Clearly, China faces a big challenge in converting its green words into sustainable action.
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 9-159/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 163 ; THR VT96
 n addition, the government hopes to raise more kinds by introducing new taxes for chemical discharges by industrial units. One of the taxes being considered is the sulphur dioxide discharge tax. Collecting taxes or fines from state enterprises is, however, not easy, as most of the factories found guilty of discharging excessive quantities of chemicals are state owned. Taxes or fines paid by them would ultimately come from the funds that they are supposed to transfer to the state, which would simply mean that funds were transferred from one account to another.
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 9-160/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "China's Environment," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.113; THR VT96
 Finally, there are several ways in which regulators can employ tax and fiscal incentives to further pollution control objectives. These include buying and selling pollution rights to stimulate cost-effective pollution clean-up, introducing least-cost, longterm investment strategies at municipal or provincial levels to foster integrated technical and institutional response to pollution, and recycling effluent fees to factories to improve technical controls. None of these measures, however, are effective on a national scale. The Environmental Protection Law, passed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in December 1989, establishes norms and codifies many existing regulations. It was intended also to improve the efficiency of an effluent fee and rebate system introduced in the 1980s, which has led to reduced pollution in some large industries. However, low fee structures, misleading assumptions in pollutant discharge assessment, and technical flaws in the rebate return system have weakened the effectiveness of this regulatory tool.
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9-161/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Commmittee, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, "China's Environment," Reprinted in CH]2qA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.101; THR VT96
 Yet in China it is especially difficult to establish criteria for weighing the costs of doing nothing or something about environmental problems. While problems are interconnected in China as elsewhere, the China case poses special challenges beyond those of size, physical constraints and population pressure on resources. For instance, there is no tradition, as in the West, of neoclassical cost-benefit analysis to test assumptions about how to value natural resources in relation to short or long-term human welfare goals. Nor is there sensitivity to the time value (discount rate) of investment in environmental infrastructure or nature conservation in weighing present versus future environmental and health benefits and costs. Capital investment decisions are the product of a complex system where rivalry among territorial units and bureaucracies and competition among high level agencies for investment funds determines project priority. Most important, cost-benefit concerns seldom enter into the planning process, and capital is not valued as a commodity.
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9-162/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgets University, 1991; China's Economic DilemTas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Canmittee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "Ckina's Environment," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.97; THR VT96
 International demands for domestic policy shifts to address global problems like climate change often are unrealistic in light of national conditions. For example, pressure on China to improve energy efficiency and reduce coal use underestimates difficulties of finding politically and economically acceptable alternatives. Problems include dependency on cheap coal and unwillingness or inability of technical and financial institutions in China to support alternative energy and conservation programs like centralized heating systems for cities. It is assumed by foreigners that information availability, technology and capital transfer, and management assistance are sufficient to bring China into line with international environmental norms. This is questionable. A range of potential climate change phenomena (e.g., sea level rise, temperature migration, spatial shifts in biological productivity, increased ultraviolet radiation) could affect domestic economic performance in unknown ways. There has been little study in China (or elsewhere) of relations between economic and environmental i.mpacts of domestic climate change scenarios.
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9-163/Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing journalists, June 1994; CHOICES: THE HUMAN Development MAgAZINE, "China' s own agenda 21" p.22; SEGVT96
 While it can be it can be demonstrated that economic development and environmental protection are mutually reinforcing, lack of capital and the availability of new "green" technologies remain serious obstacles. In the view of SongJian, chairman of the State Council's Environmental Protection Commission, it is this technology that will provide the key to sustainable development. Over the next seven years, he says, China will spend 200 billion yuan ($33.3 billion) on environmental protection, most of which will be used to develop new technologies and equipment needed to reduce the level of pollutants being discharged in China each year. But a successful national programme will also require the adoption of specific laws, coordinated action by the many agencies concerned and effective law enforcement. Above all, there is the need to educate the general public in the importance of preserving China's natural resource base. Only public awareness and concern can strengthen the political will needed to implement the costly but crucial strategy of sustainable development, the necessity of which becomes more apparent by the day. Viewed in this context, the road ahead for China a long and arduous one. Only by persisting in its policy of openness can China benefit from the experience of other countries, build partnerships with international organizations and improve prospects for meaningful development so that the country's environmental riches will be safeguarded for future generations. 
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9-164/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "China's Evvironment," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 108; THR VT96
 It is doubtful that administrative measures alone can significantly reduce pollution and ecological impacts of construction and operation of energy production, processing, and distribution' facilities. Prospects for improved policy coordination among government agencies became weaker in the 1980s as bureaus, agencies, and research units spawned quasi-governmental corporations to facilitate cooperation with foreign investors and firms. In the early 1990s, in a period of fiscal austerity, it remains to be seen whether this openness will continue. Resistance to foreign contacts on the part of the oil industry has been mentioned, although wider state control in oil and other energy sectors does not necessarily imply that there will be more attention paid to environmental concerns in energy development and distribution. Limited environmentally benign solar, wind, and tidal energy production capability has been achieved, but soft energy contributions to easing environmental impacts remain insignificant.
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 9-165/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's II " Limits, edited by Lester Brown, p. 118 ; ANA VT96
 Water shortages are exacerbated by e fact that a growing share of "fresh" water is polluted. According to China's National Environmental Protection Agency, 60-70 percent of the recent shortfall results from pollution. This has led to shortages of clean water even in the humid south. Only 20 percent of in- dustrial and residential wastewater re- ceives even preliminary treatment, and pollution is spreading in rural areas as township and village enterprises spring up.
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9-166/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' P. 158. ; THR UT96
	 More importantly, the reform of the industrial economic structure has produced two related outcomes that affect the environment. Firstly, it has significantly boosted production, and increased industrial production almost always means more pollution. Secondly, it has made managers at least partly responsible for the profits or losses of their enterprises, which makes them less willing to spend money on costly anti-pollution technology. Them is little incentive for managers at the factory level to use environmentally friendly technology. Further, such technology is expensive and often not available in China. In an economic environment where some 40 per cent of enterprises in the state sector (which accounts for 50 per cent of industrial production) are losing money, securing compliance with environmental safety regulations is not an easy task. 
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9-167/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 164 ; THR VT96
 The lack of funds will continue to be a major factor in China's efforts to contain environmental pollution. At this stage of its economic development, few people would expect China to slow down its rate of growth. But there is greater awareness among Chinese politicians that they need to strike a better balance between economic growth and environmental protection. At the Third Environmental Protection Work Conference in Beijing, Song Jian went to the extent of saying that, if necessary, China should 'slow down the economic development'. In spite of such signs of political maturity on the issue, the Chinese approach to environmental protection is marred by the country's political system. Obsessed with political stability and control, the CCP is unwilling to allow any independent public initiative to address the problem. In the past, those dissatisfied with government-sponsored efforts to control pollution have been reprimanded and even arrested for speaking out. The Hong Kong people's concerns about the potential dangers from the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant on their doorstep were similarly brushed aside. Reaching the right balance with environmental protection is going to be an extremely difficult task, no matter who is in power.'
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 9-168/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p. 113; THR VT96
 The National Environmental Protection Agency, a central government bureaucracy set up in 1988 to supervise the implementation of environmental laws, has set a goal: to keep industrial sulphur dioxide emissions in the year 2000 to 1990 levels. Taking into account future economic growth and continued increases in coal consumption, this means that sulphur dioxide emissions will have to be cut by 5 million tonnes. This is a great challenge. Given the fact that most state-owned industrial enterprises rely on government subsidies for their survival, it will be interesting to see how they respond to the seemingly mutually contradictory goals of increasing their profitability and strengthening environmental protection.
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 9-169/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "China's Environment," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 112; THR VT96
 Progress will depend to a large degree on the rate and level of investment in environmental protection. Several questions arise. Should domestic and foreign investment be directed at technical .upgrading of pollution control capability in factories, mines, citrus, and provinces, or should investment primarily support institution-building, technical training, education, and public awareness? What are the sources of investment funds? At present, Japan and The World Bank are the main sources of funding to support environmental improvement in China, although loan prospects are still uncertain because of international reaction to the June, 1989 Tiananmen incident. An environmental investment strategy and allocation plan for China are currently under development by the Bank.
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 9-170/Baruch Boxer, Prof. Rutgers University, 1991; China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s, Joint Economic Committee, 102nd Congress, ist Session, "Cb/na's Environment," Reprinted in CH]RMA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 113; THR VT96
 Clearly, China's leaders are well aware of the serious environmental problems the country faces. Nevertheless, as is the case in most developing countries, the quest for economic modernization has superceded concern over environmental pollution. Formal analysis of environmental policy issues has barely begun and given bud.g.etary constraints, institutional inadequacies, and lack of recognition by the population of the seriousness of the pollution problem, China's environment is not likely to see much improvement during the decade of the 1990s.
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9-171/Chen Xiuxa & Wang weiqun, Beijing jourrnalists, June 1994; CHOICES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT MAGAZINE, "China's own agenda 21" p.21; SEG VT96
 In 989, more than a million tons of cereals produced in Jiangsu Province contained toxic substances in excess of acceptable standards. Fluoride contaminants in the air destroyed a batch of new silkworm eggs in a national breeding base in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province. One-third of the water resources in rural areas of the province was badly contaminated by heavy concentrations of acid rain. Prior to 1992, the National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA) had put in place specific anti-pollution standards relating to the design of new factories. Industries that did not comply with these standards were liable to be shut down. Yet sources from the agency acknowledge that less than 50 per cent of the township enterprises in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces are honouring these standards, and that the rapid growth of township enterprises has become one of the most serious environmental problems in China's rural areas. The majority of the large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises were built at a time when there was less awareness of environmental concerns. According to a source at NEPA, there are some 3,000 public sector enterprises among the chemical, metallurgicaI, papermaking, food processing, power generation and building material industries in China. And while they represent only four per cent of the country's manufacturing firms, they are responsible for discharging 60 per cent of the annual volume of industrial pollutants.'
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9-172/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 155 ; THR VT96
 Another serious environmental problem facing China is deforestation. About 79 million hectares of forest have been lost over the past 40 years, accelerating the processes of wind and water erosion.8 Forests cover only about 12 per cent of the total land area. More importantly, nearly one-third of all arable land is affected by erosion and silting. The problem of soil erosion is manifestly serious in the Loess Plateau, an area of bald mountains spread across half a million square kilometres north of Xi'an along the Yellow River. Scientists have estimated that losses deposition in this area began more than 2 million years ago, 'with the shift to cooler, drier conditions at the end of the Pliocene'.9 It is therefore clear that the problem of soil erosion in this region is not directly related to the development of modern society. The economic needs of modern humans and their approaches to fulfilling them do, however, add to the destructive natural processes that afflict the region. The Loess Plateau is .currently one of the areas of the world most affected by soil. erosion. The amount of soil lost through erosion each year varies between 1000 and 10 000 tonnes per square kilometre. The loss of topsoil in this manner causes the erosion of 30 million tomes of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium each year. @0 The loss of topsoil leads to a worsening of conditions for agriculture because the natural elements lost through erosion cannot be compensated for by increased applications of fertilizer.
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9-173/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 156; THR VT96
 What worries China's environmental scientists even more is the transformation of formerly fertile land into desert over the past 20 to 40 years. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, an average of about 700 000 hectares of land turned into desert each year, and topsoil from an additional 16 000 hectares lapsed into potential desert land. Nearly 6.6 million hectares of farmland and grassland were also buried in sand by wind erosion. Natural forces do play an important part in the transformation of formerly fertile land into desert in these parts of the world, but human factors also exacerbate the problems. While the urban Chinese are increasingly turning to natural gas or cleaner burning briquettes for cooking, rural residents still rely on firewood for use in home stoves. Logging of forests for commercial and domestic use reduced the forested area of Yunnan by 13 per cent over a period of ten years. Forests in Sichuan have also been reduced by about 30 per cent since the 1950s. The impact of deforestation has been felt both by humans and animals. Many bird and animal species have become extinct, and only a worldwide campaign has been able to save the giant panda from extinction. There are now about a thousand giant pandas in the wild, their number actually having slightly increased during the past ten years as a result of close co-operation between the Chinese Ministry of Forestry and the Worldwide Fund for Nature.
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9-174/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 121 ; ANA VT96
 China's forest and wood-products situa- tion is well summarized by the saying "one hoe making forests, but several axes cutting them down." Although tim- ber shortages have plagued China's ship and palace builders for centuries, de- mands have soared in recent decades. Today, China has only 3 percent of the world's remaining forests; with a nation- wide construction boom, wood short- . ages have appeared in many regions.
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9-175/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 122 ; ANA VT96
 Timber scarcity is also threatening what remains of the country's biological resources. China is one of just 12 "megadiversity" countries, with more than 32,200 species of higher plants, 1,100 species of birds, and 394 species of mammals. This represents 12 percent of the world's higher plants, which are both a unique biological resource and a vital storehouse of traditional herbal medicines on which Chinese doctors still rely.
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9-176/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 27-28, 1995; ACS VT96
 	Grain Crisis Looming in China [CND, 03/26/95] China's grain surplus is being drastically reduced, Agriculture Ministry official Zhu Mei was cited as saying by the China Daily. China's current annual demand for grain is 520 million tones against 700 million tones reserve, including 12 million tones from imports. However, the remainder is rapidly shrinking. Grain yield in 1994 was 444.6 million tones, reduced by 11.9 million tones due to the continued loss of cultivated land to industry and construction. The per-unit yield is still going up but will soon go down as the fertility and quality of the farmland decline. The climbing cost also discourages farmers from growing grain. On the other hand, with the rising living standard, per capita meat consumption demands more grain to feed domestic animals and livestock, Zhu said. He estimated that if each person consumes two-kilogram more meat per month, the annual demand for grain will be boosted by 120 million tones. The only apparent solution to the demands of a growing population on a shrinking farmland could be a sharp increase of imports in the near future, officials and experts said. (Tien ZHANG, Daluo JIA)
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 9-177/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journal ism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.l04 ; MDS VT96
 Chinese farmers do remarkably well in feeding such a huge pop- Population in a country where the arable land has dropped from 12 percent of the nation's area to only 7 percent. Improved seed, increased use of chemical fertilizers, even some mechanization have boosted crop yields. However in 1993 alone, building, erosion, and desertification erased another 9 percent of the existing farmland. For centuries, peasants have struggled to protect their fields and paddies from floods, droughts, and pestilence, but the growing population, the new economic policies, and the burgeoning factory and business zones they have brought are new threats to crop-producing land.
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9-178/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 120 ; ANA VT96
 At the same time that China's farmland is disappearing, its demand for grain is soaring. As consumers become richer, they are eager to switch away from a heavily grain-based diet to one richer in meat and dairy products, making China the world leader in the consumption of pork. Since its grasslands are already stretched beyond their sustainable capacity, livestock must be fed grain, which is pushing grain demand up dramatically.
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9-179/Chen Xiuxa & Wang Weiqun, Beijing journalists, June 1994; CHOICES: THE HLMAN DEVELOPMENT MAGAZINE, "China's own agenda 21" p. 20 ; SEG VT96
 In a national conference in October 1993 in Beijmg, Qu Geping, chairman of the committee on environmental protection in the National People's Congress, laid out the cost of environmental pollution to China's long-term development. In a written report he disclosed that "more than 14 million tons of coal dust, 16 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 36 billion tons of contaminated water and 700 million tons of industrial waste and other garbage are being relea sed in China every year. The economic loss caused by environmental pollution exceeds 100 billion yuan RMB [roughly $17 billion] annually." But the loss in China cannot be measured solely in economic terms: pulmonary disease linked to hazardous air pollution levels, and to such emissions as sulfur dioxide, has become a marked cause of death here. China currently spends about 0.7 per cent of its Gross National Product on environmental protection. In a recent issue of China Daily, Mr. Qu was quoted as saying that he hoped the government would increase this to 1-15 per cent. He also recommended that 8-10 per cent of industrial investments be used for environmental protection, as opposed to the current 4.5 per cent. 
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9-180/ KIM JIN-HYUN professor at Korea University's graduate school of journalism and a former science-technology minister in South Korea.November 29, 1993 The Nikkei Weekly Page 7 HEADLINE: Three nations hold key to Asia's futureChina, Japan and South Korea should work together to achieve change, promote prosperity//MDS-VT96
 	 China will become an energy importer by the beginning of the next century if the country continues to liberalize its economy at the current pace. Otherwise, its energy consumption - consisting mostly of coal - will turn the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan into environmental nightmares. 
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9-181/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
 	 Oil accounts for only 15 percent of energy consumption, and China has limited domestic oil production capacity which is already under severe strain. China became a net importer of oil in 1993. Hydroelectric power, natural gas, and atomic energy together account for less than 10 percent of energy consumption in the PRC and no significant increase in these areas is projected by the year 2000. 
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9-182/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-17-95; News Global; ACS VT96
 	 China Becomes World's Leading Energy Buyer [CND, 01/16/95] Eager to reduce its estimated 20-percent shortfall in electricity output, China has become the world's leading purchaser of power plants and is on the verge of signing a multi-billion-dollar contract with French ventures for a second nuclear plant at Daya Bay. French Industry and External Trade Minister Jose Rossi arrived in Beijing on Friday to negotiate the estimated 2.45 billion contract. Chinese annual energy consumption has risen by eight percent since 1980 due to economic growth and will pass the 980 billion kilowatt/hour mark this year. Some factories in fast developing areas have been warned of "inevitable" power cuts in coming months. Currently nuclear power plants in China produce only 1.5 percent of the toal electricity, although the official hope to boost the raio up to two percent by year 2000. (Daluo JIA, Chuck LIN)
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9-183/ Reuters, September 15, 1993, SECTION: Financial Report. Energy News. HEADLINE: SLACK JAPAN OIL DEMAND OFFSET BY CHINA, INDIA--ELF//MDS-VT96
 	 "China should dominate the increase in Asian oil demand, because of its population expansion and favourable perspectives for economic growth," de Combret earlier told an oil conference. China represents 19 percent of current Southeast Asian demand, which is expected to rise to 25 percent by 2000, Chinese officials at the conference told Reuters. 
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9-184/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
 	 One consequence of an economically successful China is, however, a source of increasing concern in Northeast Asia, namely energy consumption in the PRC. In order to sustain its targeted growth rates China's energy consumption will have to increase significantly-perhaps double-from 1990 levels by the year 2000. China, with the second largest proven reserves in the world, will have to meet its increased energy demands by turning to coal, which already accounts for over two-thirds of its energy consumption. 
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9-185 CRAIG S. SMITH, The Wall Street Journal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA IMPORTS A LOT OF OIL BY MOONLIGHT; ACS VT96
 	China's tussle with oil smugglers began more than a year ago when Beijing boosted domestic crude oil prices to help its beleaguered producers, bloated state-owned companies that were operating at staggering losses. The higher cost of Chinese crude in turn pushed up Chinese prices for refined products. When world oil prices fell below China's fixed prices early last year, demand for cheap foreign oil soared. China quickly swung from a net exporter to a net importer of oil and oil products. As a result, sales at China's northern refineries stalled and their storage tanks filled up. Beijing tried to stem the flow of imports by issuing fewer licenses to bring in oil. By choking off imports, it hoped to force oil users in the south to buy from the northern refineries.
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9-186/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 29-30, 1995; ACS VT96
 	Saudi Arabia to Invest Big Money on China's Oil Industry CND, 03/27/95] DHAHRAN - Saudi Aramco, a big oil company, which produces 96% of Saudi Arabia's oil, is negotiating with China to build two refineries in Eastern and Southern China, AP reported. Each refinery will cost 1.5 billion US dollars with a processing capacity of 15 million tons of oil a day. Both will go on stream by 1998. Currently, China imports 3.5 million tons oil from Aramco. This amount will be doubled after the operation of the two refineries. Saudi Aramco will invest 45% on the eastern China refinery while China will provide 40%, with the remainder coming from South Korea. The capital-sharing arrangements for the second one have not been settled yet. This deal will be the first direct Saudi Arabia investment in China. (Tien ZHANG, Jian LIU)
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 9-187/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELFVOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.61; THR VT96
 As for import substitution programs effectively constricting the inflow of consumer goods and expanding China's export capacity, large-scale smuggling has made a mockery of them. Smuggling, in turn, can only reach such levels when coupled with endemic corruption. Border guards and customs officials look the othe. r way, then share in the
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9-188/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Centuury," p.429; THR VT96
 Rapidly growing economies produce interstate competition and trade frictions. The dumping of inferior 'goods on regional export markets has already become a problem. Illegal movement of capital and shady investment chains are increasingly frequent. So too are smuggling and piracy.
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9-189 / CRAIG S. SMITH, The Wall Street Journal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA IMPORTS A LOT OF OIL BY MOONLIGHT; ACS VT96
 	Getting foreign oil into China has gotten more and more difficult. Unless you're a smuggler, that is. Royal Dutch-Shell Group, Exxon Corp. and other Western oil companies have found their sales efforts hampered by import restrictions put in place in the past year to protect China's creaking state-owned petroleum industry. Meanwhile, outlaw traders are doing a roaring business running boatloads of refined oil up the Pearl River and other waterways along the country's coast. Even China's own oil companies are starting to complain.
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9-189a/CRAIG S. SMITH, The Wall Street Journal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA IMPORTS A LOT OF OIL BY MOONLIGHT; ACS VT96
 	``The oil-import business has been crippled by smuggling,'' says Gao Shan, general manager for oil products at China National Chemical Import & Export Corp., known as Sinochem. The company is one of three in China authorized to act as import agents for refined oil. Western oil executives claim China created the problem by virtually shutting its domestic market to foreign oil. That primed the pump for smugglers in the same way limited access to Western music and movies created huge demand for pirated goods in those markets, oil men say. ``This is still very much a closed market,'' grumbles Peter Ng, Shell Oil's director for southern China.
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9-190/ CRAIG S. SMITH, The Wall Street Journal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA IMPORTS A LOT OF OIL BY MOONLIGHT; ACS VT96
 	Analysts figure that as much as a quarter of all oil products entering China are illegal. Mr. Gao estimates that 10,000 metric tons, or about 77,000 barrels, of oil products are smuggled into China each day, mostly aboard fishing boats and small barges that ply the Pearl River delta. Boatmen loading at oil terminals in Hong Kong agree that smuggling is rampant.
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9-191/ CRAIG S. SMITH, The Wall Street Journal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-5-95; CHINA IMPORTS A LOT OF OIL BY MOONLIGHT; ACS VT96
 	``No one fishes anymore,'' laughs Mr. Cheung, the skipper of the Art Sail 1, a grimy green barge similar to those that make the illegal runs. Mr. Cheung, who wouldn't give his full name, is quick to insist that his cargoes are legal. But, he adds, he knows of many boats whose cargoes aren't. Barges the size of the Art Sail 1 could carry about 200 metric tons of oil and can unload directly to tanker trucks along the maze of canals that crisscross the delta. Mr. Cheung says larger barges rendezvous at night with fishing boats offshore, filling them with oil.
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9-192/ TERESA POOLE, THE Independent, May 26, 1995, Page 17; In search of Deng's successor; Jiang Zemin is in pole position as the struggle intensifies for the leadership of China. ACS VT96
 	 Inflation is more than 20 per cent and the wealth gap between rich and poor is stark; this year, to the government's considerable embarrassment, grain coupons have been reintroduced in 29 out of China's 35 largest cities. The Chinese government admits that many of the country's 800 million peasants cannot afford new charges for basic health care and education. The threat of unemployment hangs over tens of millions of state enterprise workers. And highest on everyone's list of grievances is corruption, which even the party accepts is destroying its authority.
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9-193 / C.F.A. UPDATE, 5-29-95, (A Newsletter of the Chinese Finance Association) Volume 1, No. 17, ACS VT96
 - Chinese Spending Less Incomes on Food The Chinese living standards are rising with people spending less part of their income on food, according to Friedreich Engels theory, the Reuters quoted Xinhua News Agency as saying. In 1993, rural Chinese spent 58 percent of their incomes on food, 9.7 percent down from 1978, while city-residents spent 50.1 percent on food, 6.6 percent down from 1981. It is believed that people spending 60 percent or more of their incomes on food are below the poverty line. China says about 80 million people are in poverty, most of them living in rural areas. No details of spending on food in countryside are reported. (Wenhai Liu)
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 9-194/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS, "China's 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 11; THR VFT6
	 The same release of controls that has allowed the Chinese economy to grow has also made space for a variety of serious problems: corruption is practically taken for granted; crime rates, including those for robbery and murder, have risen sharply; prostitution has returned and is flourishing again; in some areas a market has developed in kidnapped peasant women and children; and fraudulent products and services have appeared in the marketplace. School dropout rates have risen as state investment in education has continued to decline. Young people have become liumang (hoodlums) in increasing numbers. A "floating population" of people from the countryside who have flocked to major cities in search of work now number about fifty to seventy million nationwide. Unplanned and unchecked development in some areas is rapidly pushing China's already strained natural environment toward the brink of disaster. Reflecting on all this, Liu Binyan, China's famous investigativejournalist, uses the Chinese word xie (bedeviled, irregular) to characterize much of Chinese life today..
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 9-195/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HFAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FVTURE,p. 419; THR VT96
 While some Chinese were becoming astoundingly prosperous, others stuck on minuscule pensions and fixed incomes faced near dispossession. Where China was once a society that made social equality its raison d'etre, it was now becoming highly stratified, and this social stratification was giving rise to a panoply of new and intractable problems. Millions of workers were still employed in unprofitable state enterprises. Since it was politically too dangerous to bankrupt them all,; turn them into joint-stock companies, or sell them to foreigners, the government was still left with no choice but to begin reducing their bloated workforces.
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 9-196/ Henny Sender, staffwriter, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 16-27-94; "This will hurt" p. '72 ;SEG VT96
 As long'as no one paid real money tor purchases, nobody paid much attention to the quality of what was bought. Now, money matters. That is changing the cir- cumstances for a broad sweep of Chinese industry -- both for troubled state enter- prises and their more efficient corp- oratised counterparts. During the first half, 46% of state en- terprises posted losses. But their problems stem only partly from tight credit. Sec- tors such as textiles, machinery and min- ing are bleeding because of "low effi- ciency, inadequate working capital, unres- ponsive management and poor market- ing strategy," says Guocang Huan, a vice- president at J.P. Morgan in Hong Kong. Structurally, state concerns suffer from over-capacity and excess labour even m good times. Some 20 million workers at state enterprise and urban collectives are considered underemployed, and the number is growing. More of them are being told to stay at home at a fraction of their full pay, Huan notes, and few are able to find alternative work.
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9-197/Orv lie SchelI, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.422; THR VT96
 By 1994, China was in rapid flux; even though it was far more prosperous, it was also far less stable than at any time during the previous four decades with the exception of the Cultural Revolution. Not only did the enormous number of contract and pieceworkers make society extremely vulnerable to ,even relatively small economic perturbations, but rates for serious crimes increased dramatically, up over 23% in 1993. Gangs and hoodlums operated with impunity. Thefts and robberies were increasingly common, often perpetrated by criminals bold enough to dress up in stolen police uniforms. (One official investigation conducted in Zhengzhou reported that of thirty-seven uniformed people surveyed, only seven turned out to actually be police!) Long-distance buses and trains were regularly held up by chefei luba (highwaymen) who could always count on a bountiful harvest because with bank checking accounts still uncommon, merchants had to travel with large amounts of cash. Theft and rape by bandits became so commonplace on the Trans-Siberian Railway that after a gang brandishing guns, knives, and axes took over a whole train in the spring of 1993 (even threatening to hack off the fingers of passengers who resisted surrendering rings) the PSB launched an extensive raid, arresting over seventy.
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9-198/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS, "China's 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.23; THR VT96
 [As a short-term ideology, "'make money" does have some advantages for China. First, no one can gainsay the benefit of more wealth for a poor country. Despite the boom in China's coastal provinces, many in the hinterland still live in dire poverty. Second, the Chinese cultural penchants for family-based enterprise, saving, and investment (which are so obvious in Chinese communities outside the People's Republic) make the get-rich policy both popular and effective. Third, the policy allows the Chinese people at least one kind of freedom. Many who were eager for "democracy" in 1989 are now willing to bide their time on that front while turning to the current opportunity for money-making. This opportunity seems doubly urgent when people recall the history of sudden and unpredictable policy reversals under Communist rule. When might the green light for money-making turn red? Should we not grab what we can until then? It is thinking like this far more than happiness with the current regime that explains the political quiescence in China since 1989.
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 9-199/David Shambaugh, Prof, Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. 44 ; SEG VT96
 Beijing's social and political problems are born of economic success. Rising inflation is pinching urban incomes, and rural in- comes have actually declined over the last three years. The potential for rural unrest has petrified the regime. In 1993, there were over 200 reported large-scale rural demonstrations, in which farmers stormed government offices and beat up officials to protest arbitrary levies imposed by local authorities, declining state grain purchase prices and payment in loans instead of cash for contracted output, and rural cadre despotism.
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 9-200/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 128; ANA VT96
 One disturbing side effect of China's transition to a market economy is that women are losing ground on a number of fronts. The Communist system did much to raise women's status, including banning prostitution, female infanticide, child marriages, and the sale of brides. Female participation in the labor force increased dramatically and was substantially higher than in most western countries by 1977. But according to one study, 70 percent of the 20 million workers laid off in recent years have been women; as unprofitable state enterprises reduce their work forces, factory managers are looking to cut costs for maternity leave and child care.
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9-201 / Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 37; MDS VT96
 Clearly, from an economic perspective, the Chinese approach has been successful. The economic statistics cited earlier are firm evidence of this. But success has not been cost-free. The gradual, incremental approach to reform does cause strains. In particular, economic growth is not evenly spread throughout the country. The coastal regions are booming, while the interior provinces are not. As a consequence millions Of people - perhaps as many as 150m - are leaving the countryside for urban areas in search of jobs and higher wages.
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 9-202/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 120 ; ANA VT96
 As diets continue to change, China is going to have more difficulty meeting its food needs. (See Chapter 1.) If per capita grain consumption rises from just under 300 kilograms in the mid-nineties to 400 kilograms in the year 2030-about the current level in Taiwan--total demand will climb more than 70 percent. Yet even with yield increases, production is likely to fall by at least one fifth, due to loss of cropland, leaving a deficit to be made up by imports of nearly 400 million tons. It is not at all clear who would supply this. Since 1980, annual world grain exports have averaged just 200 million tons.
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9-203/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. of Political Science at the University of California, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PErSPECTIVES, "From revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," edited by Brantly Womack, p.198 ;THR VT96
	 Inflation is almost inevitable in the process of reforming a socialist economy characterized by permanent shortages of goods and heavy state subsidies for the basic necessities for its urban dwellers. In addition, the Chinese regime's policy of pursuing a high growth rate, supplying money faster than the total increase in material output, and regulating those goods in short supply through price increases further contributed to the extremely high rate of inflation. Of course, the rising expectations of the Chinese people posed another problem. In turn, the inflation undermined the price stability that in the past had enabled urban dwellers to survive on low wages (the only advantage of the Maoist system), hurting particularly intellectuals, who were mostly employed in the units that generated no profit.? 
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9-204/Ann Kent, Associate of the Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "HuMan Rights: The Changing Balance Sheet," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p .85; THR VT96
 It is likely that this trend of giving cautious priority to social and economic rights and at the same time allowing a measure of informal political change will continue in the 1990s. It is now clear that a simple reversion to the Marxist hierarchy of rights favouring social and economic rights exclusively, which was the initial policy reflex of the post-June government, can no longer be relied upon as a solution to China's problems or those of her leaders. First it appears that, despite the recent easing of inflation and credit, the current state of China's economy will not allow a sufficient expansion of social and economic rights to cover the needs of workers and the pool of unemployed which has enlarged as a result of the austerity measures. Rural poverty, once geographically contained and disguised as underemployment, is spilling over into the cities, despite the government efforts to stem the flow, in the form. of millions of surplus laborers seeking work. This significant alteration to the social configuration in urban areas, this merger between urban and rural 'have-nots' has had, and will have. important implications for Chinas political system.
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 9-205/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 127; ANA VT96
 Analysts fear that as millions of peasants move to cities to improve their lot, the rate of urban poverty--now estimated at less than 1 percent--will skyrocket, and with it a range of social problems. The government is trying to stem this problem by limiting migration: Beijing is even planning to charge individuals $5,800 to move there, and employers $11,600 for residence permits for future employees. But it is rapidly losing control. To prevent an explosion of urban poverty, China will need to make social safety net programs accessible to more of its urban dwellers.
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9-206/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 120; ANA VT96
 Industrial and urban development, fish ponds, and orchards also are rapidly encroaching on cropland. According to the World Bank, land on the outskirts of cities that is rezoned as industrial immediately soars to 15-20 times its agricultural value. Local governments can make millions of dollars renting land at prices equivalent to those of suburban parcels in the United States. As land values rise, rents are increasing to the point where it is too expensive to farm in some areas. A farmer in Guangdong Province facing a 20-percent increase in rent for his land said "I do not know how anybody can afford to stay."
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9-207/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journal ism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 102 ; MDS VT96
 What had begun as a promising start to prosperity for rural China was beginning to sink into crisis for millions of peasants. Harvests dropped precipitously in 1985 and were disappointing the following two years. By the early 1990s the central government could no longer ignore agriculture's problems: inflation, unemployment, growing peasant discontent, corruption, the mass migration of peasants to cities, and shrinking arable land.'
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 9-208/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Rural China in Transition," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.109; THR VT96
 Despite the significant improvements in peasant livelihood, the current reform will ultimately produce new problems. The first problem will result from the limits of agriculture. The substantial growth achieved when agriculture was decentralized has probably already reached its full margin of improvement, even with more modern scientific inputs. Annual national grain production of approximately 400 million to 450 million tons is probably the maximum that China can expect. With rapid urban expansion and construction that continuously cuts into prime agricultural land, the likelihood is that current levels of grain output will be difficult to maintain. Furthermore, in the long term the small-scale, labor-intensive peasant mode of agricultural production is uneconomical, cannot provide a satisfactory livelihood for the younger generations, and is likely to lead to a downward spiral of shared poverty. Recent expansion of rural industries and sidelines has allowed the absorption of large numbers of rural laborers, especially the young and better educated. The issue for the future is how to maintain this trend and create even more nonfarm jobs for future generations.
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9-209/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.417;THR VT96
 By the end of 1993, there was no sign of relaxation in government control over public expression and assembly. In November, eleven intellectuals in Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan who had circulated a "Peace Charter" (modeled on Czechoslovakia's Charter 77) calling for a dialogue on democratic political change were harassed by police, with three being arrested. These were just a few of the myriad Chinese who had stuck to their guns and were also harassed, detained, and sentenced in a strange counterpoint to the economic boom. Sometimes it seemed as if Chinese and foreigners alike had become so accustomed to such detentions and arrests that, far from being viewed as a particularly al, alarming state of affairs, they had come to be accepted as almost normal. J 
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 9-210/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p .429; THR VT96
 Rapid growth also stimulates domestic social dislocations that may spill over borders. In recent years East Asia has had to cope with refugees from Vietnam, ,Cambodia, and East Timor. However, the region should brace itself for an exodus--the likes of which the world has never seen--from China. By the government's own admission, China today has 105 million transients moving about the country (other estimates run as high as 150 to 170 million!). This "'floating population" could easily begin to migrate beyond China's shores. Taiwanese officials already report a greatly increased flow across the strait. Should China, as some predict, convulse in civil conflict after the death of Deng Xiaoping, Asia would be confronted with a major refugee crisis.
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 9-211 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
 	 On the economic front, the government has slowed its revamping of the debt-laden state sector, fearing that more drastic action could lead to mass labor unrest. It also has cut back on foreign borrowing and sought to impose controls on foreign investment -- perhaps hoping to neutralize inflationary loans to the state sector by cutting back in other areas.
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9-212 / JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
 	 The American unease about China is based on several factors. The continuing growth of China's economy. Throughout the 1980s, China's economy expanded at rates of more than 9% a year, and recently some annual growth rates have been about 12%.
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9-213/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth Col Iege, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edit ed by W i I Ii am A. Joseph, p. 76; THR VT96
 Sino-American bilateral economic relations mirror the broader trends in trade and investment in important ways. Trade between the two countries continues to grow, and American investors are increasingly enthusiastic even euphoric--about the promise of a more accessible' China market. Yet in terms of official government relations with China, ' the United States is something of an anomaly; as economic ties between the two countries have deepened, there has been not only more cause for negotiation but also, not surprisingly, greater friction and mutual
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 9-214/Robert Ash, Prof. Economics, Univ. of London, Jon., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p.21 ,"Mainland Chino's emerging role in the world economy;" MDS VT96
 Two major issues have impeded the development of economic relations between Washington and Beijing. One of these is noneconomic in its origins and embraces concerns about human rights violations in mainland China.68 The other, more purely economic issue is the widening American bilateral trade deficit--a phenomenon which has elicited so much concern within the United States in recent years. Attention has already been drawn to the need for caution in interpreting trade statistics issued by both American and Chinese official sources. This apart, the evidence of the increasing U.S. trade deficit.
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9-215 / David Friedman is a visiting fellow at the MIT Japan program.November 21, 1993, Los Angeles Times p. m1 HEADLINE: TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC BULLIES THAT AMERICA REFUSES TO FACE UP TO; MDS-VT96
 	 Meanwhile, America's trade deficit with China has exploded, up from $3.5 billion in 1988 to an expected $23 billion this year, as Chinese companies ship ever more sophisticated textile, electronic and machinery products across the Pacific to pay for their capital imports from other Asian producers. Total U.S. exports to China's much-ballyhooed "liberalized" market, however, rose from just $5 billion in 1988 to a paltry $7.4 billion in 1992 -- about one-sixth the value of U.S. exports to Mexico. 
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9-216 / William P. Alford.; professor of law at Harvard University, Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1995; Pg. 23; HEADLINE: U.S. TAKES THE WRONG ROAD IN CHINA; ACS VT96
 	 But even beyond such problems, the leadership's failure to recognize how difficult it would be for President Clinton to back down politically over this issue after having capitulated so thoroughly on most-favored-nation status last spring betrays an arrogant indifference to a country which has been a principal source of the capital, technology and markets that has fueled China's reforms. A falling-off of American involvement in the Chinese economy seems certain to exacerbate the anxiety that investors across the world have been feeling of late about the PRC.
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9-217 / Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
 	 The economic vitality and interdependence now forming in the region have given Asia confidence. The days when the United States sneezed and Asia caught cold are over. Now, as Malaysian Vice Minister of Trade Chun Jui Meng boasts, even a high fever in America will not make Asia cough. Interest is growing in Asian models of economic development. Several tenets of international organization exemplified by the Asian Development Bank are now seen as distinctive to the Asian region: economic development premised on political stability; emphasis on education, infrastructure, agriculture, light industry and exports; and democratization muffled and deferred to suit the progress of economic development. Philosophical and theoretical frameworks are forming around these models. 
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9-218/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 49 ; THR VT96
 This trend is also due to the fact that the career paths of local officials, along with their incomes, perks, and prestige, still depend largely on their ability to produce impressive growth rates. At the same time, the growth orientation is strongly reinforced by current fiscal incentives in areas where economic, especially industrial, growth is necessary to support and sustain government operations. Vigorous investment in local industry, commerce, and foreign trade has helped to fuel the impressive rates of economic growth throughout the reform period. At the same time, it has also contributed to pushing the economy periodically to overhearing. 
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9-219/Edmond Lee, Phd. in Political Science at University of Chicago, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "A bourgeois alternative? The Shanghai arguments for a Chinese capitalism: the 1920s and the 1980s," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 120 ;THR VT96
 Yet, if nothing else, the unexpected reemergence of a bourgeois alternative, even in mutated form, does tell us that a new and fierce ideological debate over the basic truths of economics is taking place in communist China. Mao the philosopher was right. Ideas can change history for the better. But in the hands of men who have the power to misuse them, they can also be deadly. The Chinese realized that long ago. Now the forces unleashed by the great debate over economics may force the Chinese, rulers and ruled alike, to confront the very nature of their entire system, not only its economics but also its politics, in a way they never , have, and perhaps have never wanted to before. The stakes are enormous. If the Chinese make the wrong choices, they may well lose their last chance for a more prosperous - and freer - future.
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9-220/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.433; THR VT96
 The Shenzhen stock market riots had, perhaps, been a hint of things to come. All that it would take to refocus attention on all the contradictions that had been arising was a downturn in the economic miracle. The CIA was warning that China's manic growth and inflation rate were "threatening to spiral out of control." By September 1993 even China's own economic czar, Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, was using the words "relatively grim" to describe the situation in which his country's overheated economy found itself. "Inflationary pressure has gradually increased, the monetary system has been aggravated, regional disparities in economic growth have developed," he warned. "They demonstrate the real and present dangers of the macroeconomic imbalance that now exist." Despite a rigorous sixteen-point austerity program announced by Zhu that aimed to bring bank lending under control, curb corruption, rein in real estate speculation, and halt construction of luxury hotels, villas, resorts, apartments, and office buildings, by the beginning of 1994 the economy was still threatening to burn itself up with dangerous levels of unplanned growth.
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9-221/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p.203.;THR VT96
 We might term such a compounding of quandaries a "transition crisis." A transition crisis tends to be characterized by power struggle and either a sudden lurch forward or temporary retrogression to an earlier phase. Transition crises arose repeatedly in the 1980s. In a typical scenario, economic expansion is encouraged beyond the system's capacity, triggering inflation ("overheating"), which causes recriminations to ricochet among the elite, which in turn arouses anxieties and second thoughts among "retired" veteran leaders about their succession arrangements, and everything is soon in flux. Since Tiananmen, the economic recovery has hitherto remained under tighter control, and elimination of much of the radical reform wing and the stabilization of elite turnover seem to have allowed the current successors to consolidate their prospects. Yet a recurrence of transition crises cannot be precluded.
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 9-222/ Lincoln Kaye, staffwriter, 3-24-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 17 ,"Don't tread on us;" PMS VT96
 Yet analysts wonder whether Beijing's cockiness is justified in the long run. Looming economic problems could put a damper on Chino's boom times just as the recovery gathers momentum in the rest of the world. If that happens, far from being the only game in town for international traders and investors, China could finish out the Year of the Dog in the kennels.
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 9-223/Robert Ash, Prof. Economics, Univ. of London, Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 4 ,"Mainland Chino's emerging role in the world economy;" MDS VT96
 That the reformist strategy pursued since 1979 has generated unprecedented economic growth in the PRC is undeniable. But quite apart from many difficulties of policy implementation associated with it, the same strategy has also been the source of serious structural problems in the domestic economy. The disproportionate accumula- tion of economic benefits by the special economic zones (SEZs), open coastal provinces (OCPs), and open coastal cities (OCCs),s .has exacerbated geographical distortions. Enclave activities have characterized economic development in some provinces, leading some to express fears of a damaging economic dualism. 
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9-224/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 1O1 ; THR VT96
 There is great vigor and dynamism in current development in China. But there are also a number of challenges. Even if evolutionary reforms have proceeded smoothly so far, a number of structural problems stand in the way of further development. The old planning system has been discarded, but a new system of economic macromanagement for a market economy is not yet full)' in place. For example, there is no strong and independent central banking system, and the commercial banking system is far from perfect. Reform of the state-owned industries is still rather slow and difficult even though more than one-third of them continue to lose money; the problem is not one merely of efficiency but also of employment and social stability. The impetus that has come from removing features of the old system will not continue. An institutional macrostructure compatible with the market economy is urgently required. Economic development will not maintain steam for long in a half-baked system. In addition, fast growth itself has caused additional imbalances. There are built-in impediments such as bottlenecks of infrastructure and resources. 
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 9-225/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 5 ; THR VT96
 Reforms in China in the 1990s have reached a stage where more of the same types of incremental, gradualist measures will not achieve a smooth transition to a market economy. An examination of the Chinese economic reform program over the past 14 years reveals that in sectors where gradualist reform has succeeded, most notably in agriculture, foreign trade, nonstate industry, and commerce, the process primarily involved liberalization that allowed the spontaneous forces of the market to bring about growth and adjustment. These forces, along with the entry of new firms, gradually corrected market signals and incentives to improve outcomes. The process whereby the government "got out of the way" and allowed the "invisible hand" of the market to guide the actions of economic agents has been called "enabling" reform.
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 9-226 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China's Strategy: Domestic Stability, Nationalist Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
 	 In place of boldness, officials like central bank governor Zhu Rongji are urging caution. The signs point to a slower, more manageable pace of growth.
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9-227 / John Gittings The Guardian, October 11, 1994, Pg. 12, HEADLINE: CHINA SEES AN ERA GO DOWN TO ITS LAST FLICKER;As rumours abound that Deng's death is imminent, John Gittings asks what lies in store for Beijing when the architect of economic reforms is no more//MDS-VT96
 	 A report published yesterday in London by DRI/McGraw Hill - China's Consumer Markets: Here comes the boom! - only tells half the story. Certainly no one in China wants to be left out of the new consumer society, but the latest figures show the standard of living has declined for 30 per cent of urban dwellers. The state statistical bureau has warned that the boom is again turning into an explosive bubble. As a result of rising inflation, uncontrolled bank loans, and the ratcheting up of industrial production, it says, the Chinese economy is "on the rim of the red light zone". 
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9-228/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 14, 1995; ACS VT96
 	Over Forty Percent of State Firms in Red [BEIJING, 01/12/95] About 41.4% of China's state-run firms were in red in the first 11 months of 1994, AFP reported Sunday. This was an improvement from 49.6% at the end of March, with 3,238 firms turning back into the black during the year. However, an official said that "the situation remains very serious and the task of putting an end to the losses remains very arduous". This year, the official said, the government would encourage money-losing firms to reform their management, and promote the annexation and bankruptcy of firms deeply in trouble. (Lixiang WANG, Daluo JIA) 
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9-229/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 29-30, 1995; ACS VT96
 	Foreign Investment in China Down $3 Billion [CND, 03/28/95] BEIJING -- 1995 saw foreign investment in China fall by more than $3 billion to $30 billion, according to Reuter. The China Business Weekly said the drop follows a 40 percent decrease in promised investment in 1994 and also reported that 1995 investment will continue to fall at a slower rate. The report further stated that foreign investment could rebound as China takes measures to ensure better treatment for foreign companies as it prepares for entry into the World Trade Organization. Current estimates place 1995 foreign investment at approximately $30 billion, due in part to lower government spending and less real estate speculation. Officials characterized the current period as one of consolidation as more Chinese markets become accessible and as conditions for the operation of foreign companies improve. (Adam Johnson, Jian LIU) 
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9-230/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), April 28, 1995; ACS VT96
 	China Posts 200 Million Yuan Deficit in First Quarter [CND, 04/21/95] BEIJING -- China announced a state budget deficit of 200 million yuan (24 million dollars) in the first quarter of 1995, the China Daily quoted Vice Finance Minister JIN Renqing as saying. According to analysts, the low deficit figure reflected the distinctive seasonal feature of China's state spending program, under which expenditure increases dramatically in the final two quarters. The estimated deficit figure for the whole year is 66.68 billion yuan. (Ming TIAN, Daluo JIA) 
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9-231/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 19, 1995; ACS VT96
 	Foreign Investment Shows Slower Growth [CND, 05/18/95] BEIJING - The foreign investment in the first quarter of 1995 had grown more slowly than in the same period last year, and the trend would continue in the years to come, the China Daily Business Weekly quoted a foreign trade official. The growth of foreign capital inputs in 1992 and 1993 were "unrealistic," while in 1994, the increase was another 38 percent, although contracted funds decreased by half from 1993. (Jim YU, Daluo JIA) 
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9-232/Wenhai Liu and Steve Sun, Chinese Finance Association Update, Volume 1, No. 13, May 1, 1995; "Reports Say China's Economy Will Grow about Ten Percent This Year" ACS VT96
 	 China's Economic growth will slow to 10.2 percent this year, the Reuters reported, citing a report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the State Statistics Bureau on Tuesday. Earlier this year, the government set the target growth rate at 8 - 9 percent in 1995. 
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9-233/ Anthony G. Stegman, San Jose Mercury News, 4-23-95; LESS CONSUMPTION WOULD HEAL U.S. ILLS; ACSA VT96
 These changes need not result in economic catastrophe. In fact, quality of life may very well improve as the need to work long and hard to earn money to buy fancy cars, fancy clothes and the other accouterments of the middle class lifestyle diminishes. We may learn that less really is more. Gross Domestic Product may decline but Gross Domestic Happiness may likely increase.
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9-234 / Mark Magnier, The Journal of Commerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-6-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asia's Bulk Coal Market Shifts Ahead of Anticipated Boom; ACS VT96
 	 The market for Asian bulk coal shipments is expected to double by the year 2000, but traditional patterns and market forces are changing as new players expand, according to an analyst. Graeme Robertson, chief executive of Indonesia's Swabara Group, said Asia's robust coal demand will continue. Asia now handles 50 percent of the world's seaborne coal, compared with 8 percent in 1978.
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9-235/Business China, January 24, 1994; Business China, "China's soaraway economy looks set to rise further: Up, up and away"; PMS VT96
 	But before the government is censured for stoking up inflation, it must be remembered that structurally these changes were all needed. Each reform moves the Chinese economy closer to a true market economy. And although a high rate of inflation can be uncomfortable it is almost certainly one of the prices that has to be paid for high economic growth. Comparing China's GNP growth and inflation rates over the last few years with South Korea during its lift-off period shows a strong similarity (see chart). If China can realise anything like South Korea's standard of living in a comparable period, then high inflation now is a small price to pay. After all, even the 20%-plus rate of China's major cities is far below what anyone could term hyperinflation-and South Korea's near 30% rate of 1980.
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 9-236/BNA Management Briefing, January 27, 1994; BNA Management Briefing, "CHINA'S OVERHAUL OF TAX SYSTEM CREATES PROBLEMS, BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS"; PMS VT96
 	Although the unification of the currency was needed, Martin [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] said, one resulting problem is that the rate is inflationary. "This was a substantial depreciation of their assets overnight," he [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] said. However, the companies that listed their assets in hard currency, such as oil and gas companies and others who demanded their contracts be written in that manner, will not be affected as drastically by inflation, he [Dan Martin, associate of business advisory services of the U.S. / China Business Council in Washington] said. Peck [Joyce A. Peck, director of China Services for the Hong Kong division of Price Waterhouse] warned that the change could place expatriates who receive foreign currency income into higher tax brackets, because all foreign currency sales or income must be translated at the market rate rather than the former official exchange rate.
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9-237/David Shambaugh, Prof, Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p.42 ;SEG VT96
 The economy is overheating with unrestrained capital expansion; inflation is running high, causing great dissatisfaction among consumers; infrastructure is strained past the breaking point; unemployment is mushrooming; huge internal migration pressures (more than 100 million rural migrants are on the move) are taxing urban governments; crime and corruption are rampant; social stability is breaking down; and demands are being made for greater political liberalization. How the Communist party and government handle these pressing problems will be decisive for both their own sustainability and in ensuring the future integrity of the nation-state. Adding to the current fragility is the looming succession to political patriarch Deng Xiaoping.
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9-238/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 51 ; THR VT96
 In the fiscal sector, in spite of the myriad changes in tax types and tax rates, the present tax structure retains many Soviet-style features that hamper its effectiveness and revenue capacity. Incremental changes implemented in the revenue-sharing system over the last decade, largely in reaction to budgetary crises, have so eroded the system that the budget has been left fragmented and increasingly irrelevant to the more prosperous local governments. And fiscal incentives have made local governments increasingly business oriented, with a new breed of local officials who are devoting more energy to running profit-making enterprises than to running the government.
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9-239/Marc Blecher, Department of Government Oberlin College, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES:CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Sounds of Silence and Distant Thunder?: The Crisis of Economic and Political Administration," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.54 ; THR VT96
 On conclusion, state sector economic reforms intended to separate the state from enterprises and enhance the autonomy of the latter have by and large met with failure. The effort to grant managers fuller responsibility for their enterprises has proceeded unevenly and uncertainly at best. In the few places where it has been implemented, it has tended to produce technocratic elitism which does not get the state out of enterprises but only transforms its mode of insertion into them. And increased managerial power poses a serious contradiction with political reform too, by making enterprises more authoritarian. Attempts to use taxation to deprive local governments of the financial power they garnered by appropriating enterprise profits have met with such serious political opposition from within the state and such poor results that they were ignored or, where implemented, reversed. Bankruptcy, another way of making enterprises responsible for their own finances, has up till now gone nowhere too. And the attempt to deregulate or even privatize the financial sector in order to reduce political control of the economy and promote economic rationality has been difficult to implement, proven inappropriate to the economic conditions in much of China, contributed to economic overheating and inflation, and incurred political opposition from within the state. Thus far, then, removing the state from the administration of state enterprises has proven impossible in some places and problematical in others. 
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 9-240/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1.994, "Rural China in Transition," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.11O; THR VT96
 The third potential problem created by the rural reforms concerns the role the state plays in economic development. The initial agrarian reform was designed and engineered by the state in the post-Mao era. But several recent studies stress the gra[ss-roots or bottom-up nature of rural development and suggest that the role of the state in the economic boom in rural China is less crucial than was previously thought. This view argues that the state has been mainly "enabIing" rural development rather than directing it. Wh/le it is important to look at peasant spontaneity and creativity in the reform process, the pivotal role of the state in future rural development should not be overlooked.
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9-241/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.44 ; THR VT96
 The crucial factor determining whether the government can hold consumer confidence and maintain popular support for the reform program is whether it can keep inflation within tolerable limits. The government's task of maintaining macroeconomic stability is difficult because of the weakness of fiscal and monetary policies. In addition, local governments play an expansionary role in the economy that is increasingly difficult to curb.
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9-242/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.58 ; THR VT96
 Not only have decentralization policies turned more resources over to local government control, but local governments have also been increasingly freed from the restraints of either fiscal or monetary policy during the reform period. While local budgets have been under intense pressure from fiscal decline and growing expenditure responsibilities, local governments command growing financial resources outside the budget, from fees and levies that they impose on producers in all sectors to profit remittances from their own enterprises. Indeed, in the richer areas, extrabudgetary resources far outweigh resources available within the budget, and local officials often behave more like business tycoons than public servants. As noted earlier, the banking system is vulnerable to local government pressures for credit expansion. Increasingly too, with financial liberalization, local governments can reach outside the banking system to set up their own NBFIs to raise investment funds. Impatient with the slow bureaucracy in Beijing, many local governments have encouraged share issuance by local enterprises, even though such shares are not permitted to be traded openly. By 1992, 3,700 enterprises had been converted to shareholding enterprises. Although only 54 of them have shares traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, active underground trading of "internal" shares (those issued only to workers within the enterprise) is reported in many localities. The internal issuance of "bonds" to workers is another common practice whereby local governments allow enterprises to raise funds for expansion, often with few regulations to safeguard their financial soundness.
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 9-243/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," p52, Edited by William A. Joseph, ; THR VT96
 The central task now confronting China is how to 'reinvent government." Having largely dismantled the planning apparatus, the government must install new indirect instruments for effecting macroeconomic coordination. The urgency of this task was demonstrated in mid-1993, when Zhu Rongji was forced to rely on his personal power to tame the inflation dragon. Upon taking over as the new central bank governor, he dispatched ten assistants to "jawbone" local officials into accepting voluntary restraints. However, these traditional tools cannot remain effective for much longer in the increasingly decentralized economy.
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 9-244 /Business China, January 24, 1994; Business China, "China's soaraway economy looks set to rise further: Up, up and away"; PMS VT96
 	Even so, none of this should disguise the fact that the government has so far fought inflation rhetorically rather than with concrete measures. Furthermore, each of the reforms initiated on January 1 will send some prices up further:
* Freeing up price controls, especially that of coal, China's primary fuel, will push up input prices, and in turn raise consumer prices.
* Devaluing the currency will free the prices of imported goods and materials.
* Initiating a value-added tax will translate into higher consumer prices.
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9-245/Richard Louis Edmonds, Senior Lecturer Geography at School of Oriental And African Studies University of London, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Environment," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.170; THR VT96
 Many analysts see improved economic efficiency, largely from the implementation of pricing mechanisms, as the ultimate key to improving China's environmental problems.36 Pricing mechanisms have helped to control some forms of degradation, such as pollution in the state-run industries, and have aided in the promotion of environmentally friendly products. Although an array of price reforms has been introduced during the past decade, pressure from government nonetheless remains the main force regulating investment in environmental control since many in. puts, such as water, timber, and coal, are still artificially underpriced.
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9-246/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 19, 1995; ACS VT96
 	China will increase its investment in scientific research and development (R & D) to 1.5 percent of its annual gross domestic product by the year 2000, in a bid to boost the technological thrust for economic growth, according to official sources. The dramatic increase, about one percentage point higher than for last year, was approved at a recent executive meeting of the State Council. The State Council and the Central Party Committee will jointly hold a high-level national conference later this month to discuss detailed measures for ensuring strong support for scientific progress. The State Council meeting also decided that the state's budget for R & D should increase by a higher rate than that of the State revenues, and the State Council should hold two executive meetings each year to discuss science and technology issues.
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9-247/CFA UPDATE (A Newsletter of the Chinese Finance Association) Volume 1, No. 15, Monday, May 15, 1995; ACS VT96
 	 - China to Boost Science Investment to 1.5 Percent of GDP China has made the decision to increase investment in scientific research and development to 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product by 2000, the Reuters quoted the China Daily as saying. This is a hike of one percentage point from the level in 1994. Half of the investment will come from central and local governments. The other half is expected to come from enterprises, which account for only 23 percent now. (Wenhai Liu)
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9-248 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
 	 It is said that Beijing's top leaders maintain that backwardness in science and technology implies that China will fall behind in competition in the next century. On this matter, the top leaders are both ambitious and full of anxiety... The top Beijing leaders have come to see increasingly clearly that having their own advanced science and technology and top-notch scientists will be important hallmarks of China's place in the world and that this will sufficiently boost the self-confidence of the nation. It is understood that this will be embodied in the Ninth Five-Year Plan which begins in 1996.
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9-249 / Clayton Jones, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor The Christian Science Monitor December 1, 1993, Pg. 11HEADLINE: Japan Dominates Region's Economy, But China Is Awake//MDS VT96
 	''The competition in Asia for the 1990s is economic, not military strength,'' says Zakaria Haji Ahmad, a University of Malaya security expert. Communism's decline has opened up large new markets in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and to some extent, Burma and even North Korea. India, too, has begun to release its economy from a socialist straitjacket. Half the planet is now hungry for foreign investment, and Japan is the richest capitalist around. 
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9-250/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.53; THR VT96
 Making due allowance for this aberrant counter-current, the total capital exported from China annually, both legally and illegally, must run into billions. And this from a country starved for the capital urgently needed for infrastructure, for the modernization of old plant, for the development of new industries, and for the development and diversification of agriculture; a country, furthermore, with its hand out to every international agency, every bilateral donor, and every non-governmental relief and development organization operating on the world scene..
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 9-251 / Geoffrey Murray , KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; CHINA SEEKS FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO OVERCOME POWER SHORTAGE; ACS VT96
 	Ministry officials say that top priority must therefore be given to the rapid expansion of power capacity. By the end of 1995, it is due to reach 1 million megawatts, and to increase by almost one-third again by the turn of the century. To raise the necessary finance, Beijing must increasingly look overseas to export credits granted by foreign governments, to issuance of Chinese electricity bonds and stocks internationally, and to direct investment and leasing by foreign enterprises. ''Priority will go to hydroelectric projects, large-scale coal-fired plants and long distance power transmission projects. Those in central and western regions (of China) will be emphasized, and projects with overseas loans on favorable terms will get preference,'' a senior source at the Ministry of Power Industry said.
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9-252/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 117 ; ANA VT96
 China's economy', largely isolated for three decades, is now a magnet for global investors. The country exported nearly $100 billion in goods in 1993, up nearly 50 percent from 1989, and im- ported $96 billion worth. The World Bank projects that China's trade will more than double in the next five years. Textiles and garments are the largest ex- port earner, and the United States is the largest customer. Major imports include chemicals and electric power equipment. Much of the economic boom is financed by ethnic Chinese living abroad, who often combine business acumen with wealth and a familiarity with the lan- guage and culture. Hong Kong and Tai- wan are rapidly being integrated into the Chinese economy--financial and mana- gerial bases for enterprises located on the mainland.
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9-253/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 27; THR V]296 China's system has done rather well in sustaining high rates of growth, meeting basic human and material needs and getting its development priorities in some sort of balance. Education and health are still in desperate need of more money, and underlying population growth and environmental stresses will become mounting problems in the years ahead. Moreover China remains an agricultural society whose almost 1.2 billion people collectively hover at a low per-capita GNP level. The economy is fragile, and suppressed inflationary pressures could explode rapidly. None- theless this is not a system that has entirely failed.
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 9-254/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beij ing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 7 ; MDS VT96
 Corruption and crime, petty and major, perhaps inevitable in a period of such flamboyant expansion, have flourished along with the opportunities to make deals, reap unheard of sums of money, and get rich. Party officials and bureaucrats, as well as ordinary cit- izens, have been tempted by illegal opportunities to make money. In Anhui, a province in eastern China that is one of the nation's poor- est, one in five provincial officials, a total of300,000, were caught in an anticorruption sweep that found they had embezzled or mis- spent more than S1oo million in public funds for private homes, gambling, or prostitution. Nationwide, there have been hundreds of executions of government or party workers, most of them lower ranking, for corruption:
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9-255 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
 	 China's citizens, facing another year of static wages and rising food prices, are, "demanding a solution to their country's many economic problems. What they are getting is widespread government corruption. Corruption has become so prevalent that, at the opening of the National People's Congress in 1995, Chinese Premier Li Peng characterized tackling corruption as "a matter of life and death." n1 China's leadership recognizes that popular revulsion over Party graft was a principal factor in the 1989 disturbances that led to the Tiananmen Square massacre. 
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9-256/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 149; THR VT96
 Beijing is also determined to reduce foreign competition in order to protect its inefficient state enterprises. The Chinese leadership appears convinced that communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union because those societies allowed their state sectors to fail; the Chinese have no intention of making that mistake. Through subsidies as well as control over credit, energy, and raw materials, the central government works to protect the state sector against its competition, both foreign and domestic. There is no chance that China will take substantial steps toward opening its economy when the country is ruled by a party that considers outside companies to be a threat to the state enterprises that are the very essence of the socialist system.
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9-257/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 66; THR VT96
 In short, Chinas communists nave concluded that the only way to preserve Communist rule and keep themselves in power is to junk Communist economics and convert to capitalism. In fact, the key document that came out of Deng's campaign made it clear that the main issue was the party elite's survival. "If we... do not develop the economy, and do not try to improve the people's livelihood, when there will only, be the road to ruin.-
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 9-258/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.348; THR VT96
 In sum, openness at home and abroad does reshape domestic decision making. Reform does not necessarily buy stability for the regime, but failure to reform seems to lead to crisis. But it is still not clear that foreign economic policy reform must fail if there is no sweeping political reform at home. The Chinese and Vietnamese cases suggest there is much that can be done that is more reform than revolution. The key, at least in the Chinese case, is producing enough economic goods to ensure legitimacy for the ruling regime. Because of its size, China may be able to go in different directions at the same time. At least for the medium term, it may continue to be ruled by the Communist Party and yet retain some reforms.
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9-259/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.279; THR VT 96
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 More refined clusters of perceptions were also identified within each school. In the Marxist School there exists a more determinist and Stalinist line of interpretation, for whom the structure of classes in advanced capitalist countries (such as the United States) is paramount. To them, all activities in both the economic "base" and the political "superstructure" are a function of the disposition of economic class power--which is dominated by the financial oligarchy within the monopoly bourgeoisie. This stratum, in the view of the Stalinists, dominates and controls the economic, social, and political life of the nation, and dictates its foreign policy.3 ..
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9-260/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 121 ; ANA VT96
 The Chinese may also want to recon- sider how far to move in the direction of a meat-based diet. Not only is this an inefficient way of providing nutrition, but it contributes to heart disease, a leading cause of death in countries where people consume fat-rich livestock products. Soybeans and fish are a health- ier way to provide protein.
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9-261/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 121; ANA VT96
 China's cities have some of the world's highest sulfur and particulate readings-particularly in northern cities where coal is used for winter heating. Throughout the country, their concentrations frequently exceed World Health Organization standards. Particulates are known to provoke respiratory diseases such as asthma, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and lung cancer. They can also transport toxic metals deep into the lungs, and inhibit the development of the brain and immunity system. Lung diseases are rising steeply in all major urban areas, and have recently become the leading cause of death in China, accounting for 26 percent of mortality.
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9-262 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-31-95, (News Global), ACS VT96
 Smoking Costs China Dearly [CND, 05/31/95] SHANGHAI - An university professor said loss from smoking exceeded tax revenue gains in China, Reuter reported. LI Wanxian, professor of infectious diseases at Shanghai Medical Science University, pointed out that with 300 million smokers, China's medical costs caused by tobacco- related diseases and loss of arable land to tobacco had more than outweighed its taxes collected from the tobacco industry. She called for imposing a higher tax on tobacco companies and ban on smoking in public places. (Ye HE, Jian LIU)
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CHAPTER TEN
MODERNIZATION OF CHINA
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Editor: Gordie Miller
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I. Current Status of Modernization in China
	A. Modernization is main objective of Chinese policy 1-9
	B. China's modernization based on American culture 10-13
	C. China's modernization strategy
		1. China wants incremental modernization 14-18
		2. China is committed to lasting modernization 19-20
		3. Reform socialism is unlikely 21
		4. China is part of world modernization 22-23
		5. Local governments are key to modernization 24-26
	D. Reforms don't guarantee modernization 27-29
	E. The Communist party and modernization
		1. Communist party has no ideology on modernization 30-35
		2. Youth do not accept party views 36-40
		3. Party ideology fails to guide reform process 41
		4. Party can adapt to modernization 42-44
		5. Party decisions don't help modernization 45-48
	F. China is not prepared for modernization
		1. Must reform military first 49
		2. China cant maintain exports 50-52
		3. Transition will take decades 53-54
		4. Leaders think modernization occurring too fast 56
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II. Modernization is Good
	A. China must increase reforms and modernization 57-60
	B. Economic Modernization smoothes problems from political reform 61-63
	C. Economic modernization leads to political modernization
		1. Market reform leads to more freedom 64-65
		2. China giving more rights in intellectual expression 66-71
		3. Party is accommodating returning students 72-76
		4. Foreigners allowed more free travel 77
	D. Political reforms not needed for economic reform
		1. Ordinary people don't need political reform 78-82
		2. China can control Modernization to avoid western mistakes 83-84
	E. Chinese modernization is good for all Asia 85-86
	F. China has increased high tech modernization
		1. China has high tech exports 87-88
		2. Science and Tech modernization is critical 89-90
		3. China is building high tech infrastructure 91-96
	G. Economic modernization creates strong civil tradition
		1. Economic reform needed for civil society 97-102
		2. China has institutions to maintain society 103-104
	H. Modernization is the best policy approach 105-106
	I. Modernization will help democracy
		1. Tianamen proves democracy is not doomed 107-109
		2. Political reform is occurring with Modernization 110-111
		3. Current institutions can become democratic 112-113
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III. Modernization is Bad
	A. Chinese Government wants money not reform
		1. Deng's reforms require an unreformed government 114
		2. Current leadership cant lead reform 115-119
		3. Modernization is guise to maintain political power 120-123
		4. China wants money not political rights 124-128
		5. China's past prevents modernization 129
	B. Modernization Destroys Chinese Culture
		1. China is trying to forget her past 130
		2. China is hooked on Western culture 131-132
		3. Chinese youth are bribed with economic offers 133-134
		4. China is adopting a consumerist, consumption ethic 135-137
		5. Modernization creates social and spiritual dilemmas 138-142
		6. Reforms are robbing Chinese individual identity 143-145
		7. Reform is destroying Chinese culture 146-149
	C. Modernization leads to corruption
		1. Corruption is increasing 150-153
		2. Corruption influences all policies 154
		3. Corruption decreases economic progress 155
		4. Party is unable to stop corruption 156-159
	D. Modernization hurts education
		1. Modernization has commodified education 160-165
		2. Reform has decreased educational quality 166-170
		3. Party goals are unrealistic 171-172
		4. China is losing qualified teachers 173-176
		5. Education is needed for societal progress 177-178
	E. Modernization decreases stability
		1. Modernization is leading to societal collapse 179-184
		2. Modernization leads to overwhelming societal burdens 185-186
		3. Modernization is stratifying society 187-189
		4. US MNC's won't allow stability 190-191
	F. Modernization leads to patriarchy
		1. Modernization has increased patriarchal attitudes 192-193
		2. Reform causes prostitution 194-199
	G. Modernization hurts Societal Protest 200-203
		1. movements on brink of being spurred 204
	H. Modernization hurts peasants
		1. Peasants ignored by intellectuals and activists 205-208
		2. Modernization puts peasants on the Brink of Revolt 209-211
		3. Peasants are key to modernization 212-213
		4. Township industries are rural developments 214-215
	I. Modernization decreases Free Expression
		1. Chinese sacrifice rights for economic gain 216-218
		2. Skepticism of modernization is disallowed 219-220
		3. China doesn't allow intellectual freedom 221-223
		4. Modernization has increased bureaucracy 224-228
	J. Modernization increases Chinese power 229-230
	K. Modernization leads to mental illness 231
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10-1/ Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Depending on whether one emphasizes elements of continuity or change, China's fourth revolution is also its fourth period of structural modernization. 
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10-2/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 THE developed world is likely to find itself on the edge of a major confrontation with a post-Deng Xiaoping China as the successors to the Chinese patriarch looked unlikely to accept the constraints of its interdependence
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10-3/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 22; CJJ VT96
	 That is true even though what might be called the transition out of communism in the visual and rhetorical realms has already been largely achieved in China. The red flag with five gold stars still flies there, of course, and Mao Zedong's portrait still hangs at the Gate of Heavenly Peace. But the streets and shops of Beijing, not to mention those of the booming south and coast, Guangzhou for example, have lost the socialist character that was once so pronounced. The enterprises are commercial and many are effectively privately owned; the crowds of shoppers dress in fashion; even the style of signs has changed: traditional and modernistic calligraphy instead of the once uniform, red-painted simplified characters on a white background. The same is true of the intellectual landscape: communist ideas are barely visible, except in official Publications, and ring false when expressed; they seem out of place in today's China, rather like the occasional poor, stranded statues of Mao Zedong that one encounters. 
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 10-4/Robert Ash, Prof. Economics, Univ. of London, 3on., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 2. ,"Main1and Chino's emerging role in the world economy;" MDS VT96
	 In any case, the new imperatives of reform which emerged from this policy reorientation have guided and shaped mainland China's economic development and structural change during the 1980s and into the 1990s. With economic modernization still at the center of the PRC's agenda, it is likely that they will continue to assume the same preeminence in the foreseeable future.
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 10-5/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 10; THR VT96
	 The convocation of the 14th Party Congress marked an important, perhaps even decisive, breakthrough in the decade-long struggle between conservatives, who favor a continued strong role for the planned economy, and reformers, who favor moving ahead rapidly with a thoroughgoing marketization (though leaving some room for state control of certain vital areas of the economy). The congress was a critical success for reformers. It abolished the Central Advisory Commission, a body set up in 1982 to ease the retirement of party elders, which had become a bastion of conservative opposition to reform; removed two conservative stalwarts (Yao Yflin and Song Ping) from the Politburo Standing Committee, the party's top decision-making body; named the energetic economic reformer Zhu Rongji and the relatively young (age 51) Hu Jintao to the Politburo Standing Committee; declared the goal of reform to be building a "socialist market economy"; and officially adopted Deng Xiaoping's theory of "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" as the guiding thought of the party. All these changes, though not ending conservative influence in Chinese politics, certainly strengthened the hand of reformers.
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10-6/Megan Ryan and Christ opher F lavin, Researchers for t he Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 116 ; ANA VT96
	 Even after the industrialization drives of the Communist era, China remained (and still is) a largely rural and agricul- tural country in which less than 30 per-cent of the people live in cities. Yet ever since Mao's death in 1976 and Deng Xiaopeng's subsequent endorsement of market reforms, China has pursued an aggressive, market-oriented economic strategy in which "socialism" is more a slogan than a daily reality.9 The Chinese have taken to capitalism with a vengeance, particularly in the South. Where business owners were once jailed as "enemies of the people," they now drive Mercedes and vacation in Hawaii. Private companies and township and village enterprises now produce about half of China's industrial output. An estimated two thirds of the gross na- tional product (GNP) is currently gener- ated outside the state sector, remarkably similar to the economic makeup of France or Italy.
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10-7/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 21; THR VT96
	 Deng's tactics appear to have worked. The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee, which convened from November 11 to 14, 1993, endorsed the most radical program of reforms to date. The plenum approved a package of "all-out" reforms that encompass the monetary, financial, investment, taxation, and foreign-trade systems as well as the administration of state-owned assets. According to the People's Daily editorial that marked the conclusion of the plenum, the four-day meeting "fully reflects Comrade Deng Xiaoping's numerous propositions, especially the guidelines of the important talks he made during his 1992 tour of southern China."
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 10-8/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Success-ion," Edited by William A, Joseph, p.30; THR VT96
	 The declining influence of conservative elders is also reflected in the ideological changes authorized by the 14th Party Congress and confirmed by the NPC. While Westerners tend to play down the importance of ideological shifts such as the announcement in 1992 that China intends to build a "socialist market economy," the importance of such a change in the Chinese context should not be underestimated. In Marxist economics, the planned economy has traditionally been taken to be the sine qua non of a socialist system. In the early 1980s, well after Deng's reforms had been inaugurated, there was a very important debate over whether the planned economy constituted the "essential characteristic" of the socialist system. The 1984 Decision on Economic Structural Reform made an important breakthrough in declaring the goal of reform to be a "socialist planned commodity economy," but the formulation carefully sidestepped the issue of whether or not a "commodity economy" was a market economy. Writing the formulation "socialist market economy" into both the party and state constitutions is thus not an insignificant change. It makes clear that whatever the role of planning, the market is the foundation of China's economic system. The ideological changes endorsed by the 14th Party Congress andThird Plenum make a conservative challenge to reform more difficult.
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 10-9/Orville Schel I, wel l-written author on Chinese alfa rs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAY CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.435 THR VT96
	 It was possible that through his unique halfway reforms Deng had found the answer to his country's penchant for opening up only to become alarmed at the consequences and then to crack down again. Perhaps by drawing China so irrevocably into the global market, Deng had at last pulled his people free from their age-old tendency toward isolationism, had helped them forget the trauma of Tiananmen Square, and set them off on a new and unprecedented tangent that would break the old pattern of epicycles. That was the dream of many people, anyway.
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 10-10Gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China. and the Soviet Union," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.49 ; THR VT96
	 Communist leaders long railed against the notion of universal human values. Yet those values quickly began to operate once educated and urban citizens discovered the arts and even the political culture of the West. Simultaneously, the youth culture of rock music, dance, and material possessions ranging from jeans to Walkmans penetrated the psyche of an entire generation. The citizens of communist-led countries were starved for culture and ready, in many cases, to embrace wholeheartedly the popular culture of the West.
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 10-11/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, P.302; THR VT96
	 For much of the Chinese intelligentsia and millions of Chinese youth, however, the United States serves as a model. This is testimony not only to the appeal of the United States, but to the growth of knowledge about the United States in China in no small part due to the efforts of the America Watchers. Yet, many pro-American Chinese intellectuals are quick to condemn the United States for what they perceive as hegemonic behavior and interference in China's internal affairs. How can this be? The answer lies in China's modern historical experience.
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10-12/Stanley Rosen, Assoc. prof. of political science, Univ. of Southern California, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Role of Chinese Students at Home and Abroad as a Factor in Sino-American Relations, edited by WiIIiam T. Tow, p.192; THR VT96
	 If the Chinese government finds America's wealth and tech- nology crucial for the achievement of developed socialism, China's young people likewise are inexorably drawn to the United States. Retelling the story of America's role in subjugating China during the Opium War 150 years ago, or even recounting the glories of the Chinese revolution and the birth of the PRG, now over forty years in the past, has little practical significance for those born during the Cultural Revolution. The wealth of the United States is portrayed on Chinese television by shows like "Hunter" and "Falcon Crest," dubbed in Chinese. The freedom and inde- pendence of American youth comes across in such movies as "Breakdance," which helped set off a break-dancing fad among high school youth when it was shown in China.
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 10-13/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p. 6; THR VT96 
	America watching in China has become a growth industry, respond- ing to the insatiable demand among the populace for knowledge about the United States. Chinese have long been fascinated by "Old Gold Mountain" (the term for San Francisco but used more generally to describe America),s but during the 1980s the thirst for knowledge about the United States grew at an unprecedented rate. Untold mil- lions of Chinese .tune in daily to the Voice of America, and Chinese bookshops are swamped by eager readers searching for translations of American books (of which nearly a thousand were published in China during the decade 1977-1987
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10-14/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p.429 THR VT96
	 Cycles are not simply the product of Deng's reforms, but are the unavoidable consequence of the inner logic of the way things are set up in China's dictatorial political system," writer Wang Ruowang told me in 1992 after emerging from sixteen months of detention. "First the Party feels a need for opening up to invigorate the economy, then there is protest, then crackdown, then arrest and imprisonment, then a conservative interlude, and then, because the same need to invigorate the economy is recurrent, things start to open up again, and the process begins all over. We writers have started to call these patterns 'cycles of weirdness.' They may take two, three, or four years, but the cycle always reappears, and they will continue to reappear until the Party collapses."
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10-15/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 199 ;THR VT96
	 Over the past forty years there have been profound changes in the Chinese political system, begging the question of where these changes seem likely to lead. The most important overall pattern has been the shift from revolutionary change wrought by breakthroughs and great leaps, and by breakthroughs involving charismatic leadership, elite-sponsored heaven storming, and revolutionary transnationalism to reform, accomplished via disjointed incrementalism, entailing the disenchantment of ideology, the routinization of charisma, the establishment of a more calm and civil culture, and, in the international arena, the calculated pursuit of national interests. 
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 10-16/Gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Introduction," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.54 ; THR VT96
	 Opening socialist countries to the world is an incremental process. In 'The first phase the advanced capitalist countries acquire new importance as the models of high technology and high living standards. Foreign relations must be normalized and, in important respects, open in order to capitalize on the superiority' of the outsiders. To galvanize reform forces at home, the attractiveness of foreign achievements must be vividly presented. In the second phase foreign countries become models of economic organization. As restructuring the domestic system assumes a high priority, attention turns to borrowing from the organizational methods of capitalist states. Hesitantly in 1986 and again in 1988 China moved toward a third phase of discovering models of Western civilization. This means recognizing that the humanistic and democratic traditions of the West make a positive contribution to world development, contrasting with one's own country's abnormal or stunted development under communism of earlier decades.
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 10-17/Nicholas R. Lardy, Prof. at the Center for Chinese Studies, Univ. of Washington, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: Sustaining Development," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p.22I; THR VT96
	 Incremental econ.omic reform has had some success in China for several reasons. First, it has been politically feasible. China's Communist Party in the late 1970s would never have approved a comprehensive reform package, however appealing it might have been in economic terms. It took all of Deng Xiaoping's considerable political resources to persuade the party to approve cautious reforms largely limited to the rural sector.
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 10-18/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 204;THR VT96
	 For these two reasons, the PRC has, since the death of its most distin- ed revolutionary hero-leader, been characterized by a stop-and-go pattern: reform under routine circumstances, with a tendency to revert to "revolutionary" behavior (e.g., spontaneous mass movements, factional struggle, purge) during systemic crises. The "first front" of the leadership is allowed to cope with reform; the gerontocratic "second front" returns during crises. Although activity by the first front is deemed by both participants and outside observers to be "normal," action taken by the second front engenders anxiety due to the uncertainty about when it may suddenly intrude as well as about the capability of a crisis to reset the partadigrns of normalit.
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 10-19/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 49 ; THR VT96
	 / These recent reforms are well within the tradition of incremental, gradual changes to nudge the economy doser to market allocation. What is significant about them is that they signal the government's willingness, for the first time, to tackle some of the "sacred cows" of the socialist economy, most notably the urban grain and housing-supply systems. In addition, the government called for bankruptcies of unviable state-owned enterprises to be speeded up and for large-scale enterprises to shed unneeded workers. These changes, when fully implemented, will have a direct and dramatic effect on urban incomes and the costs of living. In Shenzhen, for example, where housing reform has proceeded further than elsewhere in China and over 90 percent of housing is privately owned, the share of household expenditures devoted to housing has risen from less than 1 percent to more than 25 percent. Thus, the government has been understandably cautious in the pacing and implementation of these reforms. Rent increases introduced so far have been extremely moderate and are being partially offset with wage supplements.
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10-20/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NLM. 3, Edited by DonBid Altschiller, P. 28; THR VT96
	 In short, economic reform never was halted, but, instead, took a temporary back seat to dealing with the more pressing problems of maintaining a stable currency, assuring adequate hard currency reserves and boosting grain production. It was the backdrop of political repression and the elite argument over the direction of policy that created a widespread impression abroad that economic reform had been reversed or jettisoned.
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 10-21/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 206; THR VT96
	 How this all will work out is of course hard to fathom.? From the present perspective it appears likely that reform socialism in China will evolve from its present half-reformed, amphibian form toward a corporatist form of market socialism, initially under authoritarian but nontotalitarian political auspices. China may realistically hope to take the same road to political reform as Taiwan or South Korea. The Eastern European route of instantaneous democracy after spontaneous mass upheaval can probably be precluded in China, due to an indigenous revolutionary tradition, the presence of a strong, pro-Communist army and the absence of partisan or religious traditions around which opposition forces might coalesce. Should reform socialism collapse, it would probably be followed by a less coherent alternative (than, say, Hungary).
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 10-22 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 Interaction with the World Outside. Finally at the heart of this fourth period Of transformation, and with a pace, scope, and reach unprecedented in its long history, is this change: China, increasingly including its interior, is becoming part of, and more like, the external modern world, which is itself in a continuous process of modernization. 
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10-23/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 52; MDS VT96
	 unification of Korea, the transfer of Hong Kong to PRC control, and the settlement of the "interns] affair" with the Republic of China on Taiwan would likely lead to such improvement in the Chinese economy that the United States and apart would feel compelled to move closer together. Such a scenario would also heighten the role of Russia in ,the future multipolar world. 
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10-24/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 50 ; THR VT96
	 In the 1990s, the tenuous hold of the central government over macroeconomic control is under assault, with traditional administrative restraints (for example, price controls, credit allocation, and material allocation) rapidly losing potency, while effective indirect mechanisms are slow in developing.. Local governments have led this assault. Their success is reflected in fantastic growth rates in 1992, such as the 43 percent growth in gross value of industrial output in Jiangsu, followed by 31 percent growth in Guangdong, 29 percent in Zhejiang and Hebei, and 26 percent in Shandong--all achieved under the proud tutelage of local governments. Individually these accomplishments of local governments are praiseworthy, as are the innovations they bring to creating markets and increasing the degree of competitiveness in the Chinese economy. Cumulatively, however, in an atmosphere where localities are competing to outdo one another in circumventing central controls, these actions push the economy to overheating.
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10-25/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.52 ; THR VT96
	 Whether the government can implement these bolder, sweeping reforms and regain macroeconomic control will depend mainly on political forces, and local governments hold the key to the outcome. Through the government, spheres in which government oversight is provided to create a stable economic environment and supply public goods that the market is inefficient in supplying. In these sectors, the problems of reform are not how to get government out of the way, but how to alter the government's management roles and levers to fit the new decentralized economy.
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10-26/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradual ist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.54 ; THR VT96
	 While local governments have been strong supporters of reform in the past, it should be emphasized that their pro-reform stance stems first and foremost from their opposition to central planning, which they see as inimical to local development. They will likely turn against reforms aimed at curbing their autonomy in investment and spending, reforms that are needed for the central government to regain macroeconomic control. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which local governments will willingly support efforts to reduce their own control over resource allocation.
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 10-27/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 93 ; THR VT96
	 Moreover, it is not clear that this transformation will necessarily lead to a stable democracy or a prosperous market economy. In Russia, present instalility continues to be a threat, and future prospects give cause for alarm. As Andrei Kozyrev, minister of foreign affairs, warned, "History has witnessed many times how the domestic problems of Russia made that state a ganderous and unpredictable participant in international affairs."s It seems too early to say whether Russia will emerge a partner or an adversary to the Western world. The transition of the other countries in the former Soviet Union are even more complex and unpredictable.
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 10-28/Gi Ibert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton University, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Stages in the Reform and Dismantling of Communism in China and the Soviet Union," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 5 ; THR VT96
	 Especially for the Soviet Union and China, it is simplistic to expect convergence with Western capitalism without, at the very least, a mixed system of indefinite duration. In place of central plans and ministerial powers, local and regional authorities gain considerable power. Monopolies thrive during shortages and when dependency on authorities is high. Small and weak firms often must seek permits, protection, supplies, and other favors in a nonmarket environment. Bartering has spread in the Soviet Union as the ruble and state allocations of materials and funds have become unreliable. In China there has been no collapse 0@' the center nor of the currency, but price controls, enterprise subsidies, and other artificial barriers to market competition still distort the forces of capitalism. There is no direct transition from socialism to capitalism.
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 10-29/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradual ist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.38; THR VT96 
	This chapter first reviews recent developments and assesses the short and long-term prospects for the Chinese economy, highlighting the difficulty the government faces in maintaining popular support as reforms turn to dismantling the core features of socialism that directly affect urban consumers: subsidized food and housing@ job security, and income support. The key to this task is the government's ability to maintain high growth and price stability, which requires exercising effective macroeconomic management and reining in the expansionary tendencies of local governments. The second part of the chapter argues that although the incremental, gradualist strategy of reform has in the past produced very significant results in improving living standards and developing markets in many sectors of the economy, the usefulness of this strategy may be coming to an end. The central problems confronting the government in the 1990s are how to build a set of effective levers for managing aggregate demand and how to rationalize central-local relations. These problems do not appear to be conducive to incremental, gradualist solutions.
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10-30/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF. REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.69; THR VT96
	 It is very "unlikely that China will return to the Maoist system, which was the product of several accidental factors that are now nonexistent. Moreover, the bureaucratic technocrats are too sophisticated to subscribe to Mao's values of a simple life, hard work, self-sufficiency, and economic development by human labor. Even if these values continue to dictate policy choice, the bureaucratic technocrats will be less willing 10 blindly carry out policies made by the top leaders, as the peasant cadres previously did. They will be more inclined to use their own expertise and judgment rather than the structural legitimacy of the party organization to evaluate the validity of a policy. Even Deng Xiaoping warned against regressing: "China cannot possibly return again to the previous closed era."
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10-31/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, P.69; THR VT96
	 Attributing the student demonstrations to Zhao's negligence of ideological works, the regime has tightened up ideological control. Ideological orthodoxy is now emphasized; the regime vows to develop "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and more frequently mentions class struggle and warns against the dangers of the "peaceful evolution of socialism." In personnel management, the renewed stress on political criteria replaces discussion of a civil service system. College students are to be educated using "ideals, discipline and ethics, as well as MarxistLeninist theories." They are required to be "steeled" in the rural areas or factories before assuming any cadre positions. Criticizing the practice of emphasizing only skill and ability, Li Peng insists that personnel management of cadres should pay more attention to political ideology, practical experiences, and leadership skills. As part of an attempt to reimpose ideological orthodoxy, Li Peng even plans to assign one political cadre, who will have a professional job title, to every 100 workers and staff members within an enterprise.
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10-32/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.58; THR VT96
	 Second, the bureaucratic technocrats are less committed to any political ideology--regardless of whether it is a broadly defined socialism or Mao Zedong's discredited thought--than the revolutionary cadres. Instead, they are rather critical of the existing ideology. Like their counterparts in Western Europe, if they have any common ideology, it is probably the simple pragmatism necessary to get the job done.a As pragmatists, they would resent the bureaucratic rules that have constrained their work in the past, and they view ideology not as dogma but as something to be flexibly interpreted for economic ends. Instead of the ideological solution that the revolutionary cadres tended to opt for, the bureaucratic technocrats will likely desire a structured and orderly environment, preferring technical and piecemeal measures to comprehensive political solutions to overcome China's problems.
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10-33/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," P.12; THR VT96
	 The reform program and readjustments of party ideology are partly to blame for this situation. By presenting itself as the promoter of modernization and higher standards of living, the party liberated itself from Maoist obsession with class struggle but made itself hostage to rising living standards. The modification of ideological orthodoxy to provide sanction for economic reforms muddied the distinction between capitalism and socialism. If in the primary stage of socialism it is appropriate to have higher levels of inequality, foreign investment, and construction of luxurious international hotels, the average person found it difficult to understand what makes socialism superior. Ideological campaigns to build modern normative values based on "socialist spirituality" or to combat "bourgeois liberalism" seem atavistic and selfcontradictory.
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10-34/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 69; THR VT96
	 The current policy of slowing economic reform and reimposing political control through repression may work as a temporary measure to deal with immediate problems, such as information and social unrest, but it will not resolve China's basic problems. Particularly unworkable are the present efforts 10 control the party and Chinese people through ideological education. Ideological education proved to be ineffective during the thirty years of Mao's rule and again failed during the three years of the party rectification campaign. The social changes that China has experienced since 1978 are too great for such an archaic method to work: The Chinese people's expectations are too high, cynicism too deep, the society 100 complex and diversified, the regime's legitimacy too low, and the official ideology too incoherent and irrelevant for China's mounting problems. Most important, as Renrnin Ribao (People's daily) concedes, reassertion of ideological orthodoxy clashes with avowed policy of reform and the open door. Zhao Ziyang's tolerance of ideological liberalization was not due to his personal preference but rather to prerequisites of economic development. So-called ideological confusion in China is not derived from neglected ideological works but reflects the very social values that the regime tried to promote for the sake of economic development. Moreover, the present coalition of bureaucratic technocrats, with such old ideologues as Deng Liqun and He Jingzhi (whom critical intellectuals hate), is unstable and will not last long. 
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10-35/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns of Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p50); THR VT96
	 In the wake of the latest and hitherto most emphatic repression of spontaneous mass mobilization, the leadership has attempted to regenerate the ideological language and value system of the Maoist era in order to define ideologically correct collective goals and preclude all spontaneous alternatives. But this language clashes at so many points with the thrust of the reform program as to jeopardize the program's credibility. The contradiction seems likely to force an eventual choice between a more definitive retrenchment of reform or the abandonment of the ideological revival. The leadership is at a crossroads, seeing only further social dissolution if the trend toward ideological secularization continues and a cold war with an alienated populace if it is forcibly arrested. It is a painful dilemma: Retrenchment of reform, on the one hand, might place the leadership on firmer organizational footing, but if economic growth bogs down, the situation could quickly become dangerous. Abandonment of the ideological revival, on the other hand, might imply surrendering all hope of leading the masses toward positive collective goals--at least within the existing conceptual framework.
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10-36/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," p. 17; THR VT96
	 For the first time since 1949, official ideology and norms no longer find a receptive audience among any segment of China's youth. Stanley Rosen's study of youth and public opinion emphasizes the limited appeal of values associated with "socialist civilization." Government attempts to resuscitate political commitment through compulsory political study are counterproductive, often alienating instructors and students alike. Attitudinal surveys of youth document the waning popular appeal of "politically correct" role models. Instead, personal goals emphasize material success and private achievement; altruistic behavior ranks near the bottom. Any campaign to mobilize youth confronts massive apathy, if not outright antipathy, toward official norms and political orthodoxy.'
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10-37/Stanley Rosen, Prof. Political Science University of Southern California, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Students and the State in China: Crisis in Ideology and Organization, Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 167; THR VT96
	 In their postmortem analyses of the spring 1989 "turmoil;' the more perceptive Chinese authorities were compelled 10 acknowledge that a significant number of students had become highly skeptical of some of the regime's core ideological, organizational, and economic values. Many students refused to accept uncritically that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought should be adopted as their governing belief system. More and more students questioned whether the Communist party's dictatorship was the most appropriate party-state form to lead the country to modernization. There were widespread doubts--even before the cataclysmic events that began to unfold in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union--that socialism was superior to capitalism. In short, with regard to the sacrosanct Four Cardinal Principles, students had turned agnostic. This loss of faith inevitably affected the party's "transmission belts" to youth. The Communist Youth League had atrophied to the point that many students found it irrelevant to their concerns. In the absence of a viable belief system, students turned, almost reflexively, to any new thought trend that was introduced into China, pausing only briefly before moving on to some newer, usually foreign, hot topic to fill what had become an ideological vacuum. Bypassing the CYL and officially sanctioned student unions, they organized their own societies and special interest groups on campus, less lettered by the myriad constraints that had limited the appeal of the official organizations.
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10-38/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 45;THR VT96
	 The radical critique of revisionism turns out to be correct in the sense that in the absence of further progress toward distinctively socialist goals the Party loses its ideological legitimacy and with it its raison d'etre. It becomes more and more like Western socialist or social democratic parties, with a vague commitment to social justice for the working classes but with no transcendent claim to legitimacy. It is interesting to note that whereas during the Cultural Revolution it was science that had to be legitimated in terms of Mao Zedong Thought, in the reform era it is the Party that claims to be "scientific"--the Party must borrow its legitimacy from institutions it once subvened. Its mass support is contingent simply on running the economy competently. This does not place the CCP in any immediate jeopardy as the CCP's economic record has been quite good. Over the longer term its appeal is likely to fade, however, particularly to the young people and intellectuals for whom ideals tend to be important. The CCP will continue to attract adherents because it is the ruling party and has the power to advance cadre careers or interests. But even here its attractiveness is likely to fade, eclipsed by the relative vitality of the market sector (the state-owned sector's proportion of total GNP is facing gradual extinction).
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10-39/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p.205;THR VT96
	 And what might such an ideological raod map look tike? The country seems to be moving in two different directions at once: on the one hand, toward the normative goal of the communist utopia, and, on the other, toward the economic goal of modernization. Yet the former has been increasingly eclipsed by the latter, gravitating into the position of "heaven" in Christian theocracy, a sort of compensatory utopia that fades from the foreseeable future (Jesus clearly expected to see it in his lifetime)4 to the millennium. Yet unless the Party-state is redefined convincingly in terms of its historical mission--which will necessarily involve fundamental rethinking and probably controversy--it will lose its idealistic appeal to the nation's intellectuals and youth and undergo decay,5 perhaps even following its European confreres into extinction.
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10-40/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.59 ; THR VT96
	 Fourth, the new leaders are more self-confident, less dependent on the party for guidance, urban oriented, forward- and outward-looking, and have minimal emotional ties to or understanding of the rural peasants. They have greater understanding of and better qualifications 10 deal with such prerequisites of an industrialized society as functional specialization, coordination of various parts, rational decisionmaking, and problem solving. At the same time, the new leaders also lack moral integrity and the commitment to the Communist code that the old revolutionary cadres possessed. In the eyes of old revolutionaries, this quality causes the widespread corruption and abuse of political authority for, private gain.
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 10-41/Ann Anagnost, Assist. prof. of anthropology at the Univ. of Washington, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Socialist Ethics and the Legal System," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 182; THR VT96
	 The construction of a socialist spiritual civilization'centers on the promotion of socialist ethics (shehui daode) that underlie the Party's continuing effort to intervene into everyday practice--to make behavior conform to an ideal model, to reform society. However, the post-Maoist composition of this effort has fundamentally changed in ways that reflect a shifting conception of the relationship between base and superstructure. "Ideology" no longer figures as a powerful force in which subjective will can overcome an underdeveloped material base (a Maoist fantasy now repudiated as "superstructural determinism"); it is now conceived of as a stabilizing force in the face of the profound dislocations of the economic reforms. In other words, although the economic base provides the motor for modernization, ideology becomes a brake on the social disorder arising from the economic reforms.
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 10-42/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 205;THR VT96
	 A third solution would be to adumbrate a new ideological road map setting forth general goals toward which the system is moving and delineating possible routes whereby those goals might be approached. Whereas the first two solutions would aim to eliminate crises of the type that precipitate retrogression, the third, somewhat more modestly, would merely try to equip the system with a compass to navigate crises while staking the course.
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10-43/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 47;THR VT96
	 The third, and perhaps the most likely alternative is for the Party to attempt to neither resist nor actively steer the perplexing socioeconomic transformation now under way but rather to cling to its present status and attempt to adapt to changes on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis, resorting to force as that seems necessary. This low-risk option would foresee the Party's gradual decline over the long term from its vanguard role to a more passive position vis-a-vis increasingly autonomous social forces, managing crises as they emerge rather than seeking to maintain a distinct elite subculture and lead society toward some foreordained
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10-44/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 208 ;THR VT96
	 How to foster mass input into the political process without either rising disruption of normal work routines or raising expectations to unrealistic levels. The mass line and its attendant devices for channeling mass participation have not functioned effectively since the 1950s; neither elite-sponsored nor mass-initiated mobilization has proved entirely satisfactory. The fact that the Deng leadership has been so timid in broaching this question (and tends to overreact to any disturbance) does not mean it is not an issue. Yet a refusal to talk is no answer and simply allows resentments to fester invisibly until the situation becomes explosive. Can some constructive synthesis between a Western-style civil society and CCP-style top-down mobilization and control be achieved? The. re are likely to be experiments along these Lines in the future.
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 10-45/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p.7, THR VT96
	 Popular dissatisfaction arises from the failure of the reforms to attack the root problems of the old regime. Deng's strategy of partial reform deferred action on unpopular or controversial measures. Failure to deal decisively with structural weaknesses in the economy and politics eventually left the system unable to cope with the demands placed upon it. Even at its apogee (late 1986 or at the Thirteenth Party Congress of 1987) the reform program was illusionary because it left intact the Communist political system. Although the leadership was committed to economic modernization and liberalization, its desire to preserve the party-state's dominant role and "socialism with Chinese characteristics" set limits on reform. Each attempted reform intensified the inherent contradiction between modernization and Leninism. Hence the partystate's rearguard struggle to retain its dominant position is the primary cause of mass discontent and intra-elite disagreement.
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 10-46/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THF CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," P. 30; THR VT96
	 The crisis of 1989 was maple possible by a confluence of factors exacerbated the prevailing mood of frustration and dissatisfaction: inflation caused by Zhao Ziyang's bungled attempt to promote price reform, corruption, declining growth rates, poor living and work conditions on campuses, and dissatisfaction with the slow pace of political reform. The enabling factor, however, was intra-elite divisions, which protests, precluded a strong government response to the initial student either through repression or by modest concessions. Given their obsession with "stability and unity" and their belief that political liberalization in Eastern Europe led to economic and political disintegration, the current leaders are unlikely to appeal to the public for support in factional struggles. As long as Deng Xiaoping or a sufficient number of the rounding generation survive, the potential of the new institutions and groups to openly challenge the status quo will not be tested.
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10-47/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 108; THR VT96
	 Deng Xiaoping's case demonstrates that formal reforms of tenure arrangements may not go far enough: If the PL remains PL despite some facile sestructuring of formal roles, the problem remains--now immune from legal solutions. Our brief review of Deng's efforts at constitutional engineering arrived at a very mixed picture. Democratization, or other sweeping structural reforms, would constitute a sufficient but not necessary condition for stabilizing the CCP's leadership arrangements. A few relatively limited rule changes could have considerable impact. One useful reform would involve endowing the second-tier leadership (viz., the CC) with the authority to vote out a sitting PL and elect a replacement. Whereas the Soviet Union made a major step forward in this direction decades ago with the electoral deposal of Khrushchev, nothing of this sort has happened in the CCP since at least 1935 (Hua Guofeng, we 'would argue, was never a PL). An even more modest but probably helpful procedural reform would be the elimination of "expanded" sessions or at least a requirement that an "executive" session (formal members only) be convened for important decisions. The current situation is a highly irregular one in which important decisions are reached only in expanded sessions.
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10-48/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 43 ; THR VT96
	 Taken together, these reform measures have corrected (or will correct) some long-standing inequalities. The virtual elimination of grain rationing and subsidization has finally ended a costly and irrational item in the government budget that was targeted at the most affluent portion of the populace-the urban population. Indeed, one study of interhousehold income distribution in China found public subsidies, including housing and other in-kind benefits to workers, to be "massively disequalizing" because they are all urban, and concluded that together they constitute the "greatest single source of inequality" in China. Similarly, the termination of agricultural procurement at low fixed prices will eliminate what is essentially a tax on agriculture and allow farmers to capture the full market value of their output, which should in the long run also help to reduce the urban-rural income gap. Moreover, these measures will significantly reduce the degree of distortions in the economy and improve resource allocation.
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10-49/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. 201; THR VT96
	 Unless modest reform occurs--that is, unless surplus labor is absorbed, enterprises become more independent, and efficiency or productivity increases to give China modest international competitive power--social and political confusion will follow. At that time the only integrarive power will be the military. After the reform started, an attempt was made to professionalize the military and to build state armed forces rather than party armed forces. Nevertheless the military is still led by the part?: In fact, indoctrination of the armed forces in Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong thought has been strengthened. The biggest task of the armed forces is now to maintain domestic security.48 If the military is divided at the time of national confusion, the picture will be tragic.
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10-50/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in China AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.52; THR VT96
	 In any underdeveloped country investment capital is most precious. Strict regulations against the export of capital, capital repatriation, and capital withdrawal are usually deemed essential if development is to proceed. But in the field of capital export, China has virtually lost control as private individuals and government units, both local and central, rush to invest abroad. There are provincial capitalists from remote interior towns who periodically travel to Switzerland and deposit their profits in numbered bank accounts. There are provincial bureaus responsible for foreign trade that are buying up millions of dollars worth of land and assets in the United States. Their purpose: speculation. A central unit recently sent six persons to New York with tens of millions of dollars to be multiplied on the New York Stock Exchange. After suffering huge losses they invested their last six million in various savings accounts and now live high on the hog in New York City on interest alone. They do not intend to return to China,
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 10-51/Dorothy Solinger, Assoc. prof. of political science at Univ. of Ca li fornia-Irvine 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Future of China's Industria ization Program: Why Should the United States Care," edited by W II iam T. Tow, p. 104; THR VT96
	 Linked to the general industrial policy, the second prong of the post-crises policy was focused upon enhancing the quantity of China's exports while reducing imports. Especially in the aftermath of the freeze in foreign lending that followed the Tiananmen crackdown, as an economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission explained, '"the Chinese are desperately trying to increase their exports .... It [China] must now depend almost entirely on export revenues for hard currency."
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 10-52/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONIHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 50; THR VT96
	 If illegal imports threaten sound development, so do the vast numbers of legally imported consumer commodities that compete with and pre-empt domestic production. Since the age of capitalism began there is no record of any national economy developing without government protection for the home market. This applies to England at the time of the industrial revolution, to post-independence America, to the capitalist powers of the European continent, to Japan (both pre- and post-war) and to South Korea and Taiwan today. Yet China is openly handing over big chunks of her consumer market to foreign firms with world-wide sales networks--food and drink companies first of all: McDonalds, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut, Heinz Baby Food, Coca Cola, Pepsi Cola, Pabst Blue Ribbon; cosmetics, apparel, and footwear companies come next--Lux soap, Lever Brothers soap and detergents, Avon cosmetics (18,000 saleswomen already on hand), Elizabeth Arden (lotions at $100 a bottle), Pierre Cardin fashions, Giordano Clothes (five stores open, ten more planned), Nike shoes (Nike's retail outlet in Shanghai grossed $5,000 on opening day).
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 10-53/Jiri Valenta, Feb., 1995; p.91; ISSUES & STUDIES, ,"Coping with the red brown spirit in the postcommunist countries;" MDS VT96
	 There are no quick fixes for the deep structural and economic problems of the postcommunist countries. Most of these countries have not yet dealt seriously with their ailing economies and they will not rebound as quickly as did Chile, Mexico, and Argentina. The transformation in the postcommunist countries will take not years but decades. 
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 10-54/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 54;THR VT96
	 When compared to the head-spinning transformations in Eastern Europe, the Chinese outcome has been tragically anticlimactic. To account for this difference, two sorts of explanations are commonly given. The first, ironically enough, points to China's revolutionary heritage. In contrast to the communism in most of Eastern Europe, Chinese communism was the outcome of a hard- fought civil war. Having been won from within rather than imposed by alien tanks, the Chinese system was said to enjoy a considarably higher level of popularity than its East European counterparts.'
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10-56 / Rob Tucker, The News Tribune, Tacoma, Wash. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Won't Interfere with Hong Kong Economy, Beijing Banker Says; ACS VT96
	 Zhou [Zhou Xiao Chuan, a leading Beijing banker ] also said Chinese economic liberalization is slowing to a gradual pace. The government is concerned about what can happen when free market reforms come too quickly and unsettle a controlled economy, as occurred in Russia, he said.
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10-57/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 China's newly rich, once satisfied with material advancement, are beginning to grow curious about such things as government accountability and democratic politics. The political liberalization of Taiwan and South Korea shows that even authoritarian societies can adopt more pluralist systems as they become more prosperous. Beijing, although wary of easing control over the country, eventually will have to answer to this rapidly growing class of entrepreneurs. Another class feared by the government is the migrant workforce, which exceeds 130 million people and is expected to reach nearly 400 million by the year 2000. Urban areas, already swamped, cannot hope to provide employment or proper housing for the millions of Chinese who flee the countryside looking for work in the cities.
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10-58/RAMON MYERS, St. Fe11ow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 15, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FORETGN POLTCY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHTNA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Having experienced enormous change in the last fifteen years, the PRC is now at a historical crossroads: it can move as the ROC on Taiwan did some thirty years ago, or it can resist reform and risk political power straggle, political upheaval, and collapse. Such chaos would have serious repercussions on bordering nations and threaten much of the new global economy. The PRC government needs time to carry out a property rights reform, to integrate its domestic markets, and to develop a modern fiscal and monetary system so that inflation can be controlled and modem economic growth sustained. These reforms might be derailed if the U.S. government resorts to retaliatory trade policies to achieve other foreign policy goals. The reforms must continue. If the PRC can promote greater domestic market integration and absorb more U.S. imports, the Chinese leaders and elite might just be able to affirm those other two important marketplaces needed to improve human rights: the intellectual and political marketplaces, which represent full-blown modernization.
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 10-59/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 202 THR VT96
	 On the other hand,'if modest reform with gradual development succeeds, a Chinese version of "corporatist" mediation in solving problems by pro-party but more independent interest groups may arise as party control deteriorates.49 This may be the best possible course. It will take time and will be accompanied by confusion, but as long as the major aim of China's modernization is an established status in the international community, reform and the open door policy are a necessity. Perhaps, after trial and error, party control will gradually diminish to allow spontaneous organizations to appear.
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10-60/Richard Suttmeier, Prof. of political science and director of the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies at Univ. of Oregon, 1991; BUILDING S INO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Minimizing Maximum Regrets: American Interests in Science and Technology Relations with China," edited by Will iam T. Tow, p. 158; THR VT96
	 A final factor conditioning Sino-American science and technology relations today is the increasing concern felt internationally for global environmental dangers. Many of these considerations lay behind the establishment of S&T relations with China in the late 1970s, but they have now taken on greater urgency. China's enormous population, its great land mass, and its geographical characteristics make it especially important for the future of the global commons. Having access to China is important for understanding such global issues as world weather patterns, ocean currents, and biological diversity. How China manages its energy, transportation, food, and pollution problems is of major interest to the United States and to the international community.
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10-61/ The Daily Yomiuri, March 6, 1995, Pg. 6, HEADLINE: Three scenarios for China after Deng Xiaoping; ACS VT96
	 There will be significant social dislocation and stress on its way to reform, but the nation institutes new social security framework that cushions uncertainties.
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10-62/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 61 ;THR VT96
	 Should it survive, China may (with luck) undergo an evolutionary, nonviolent form of change. Over time and amid periodic crises and retrogressions, so long as rapid growth of GNP and per capita income continues, the tension between elites and masses will gradually be contained, as the masses' sense of political efficacy rises with their living standards and the role of elites changes from command to coordination as their legitimating competence shifts from ideology to various economically useful secular vocations. The role of ideology will continue to ebb, to the extent that "domestic policy disputes no longer involve ideology, but conflict between the goal of economic ,modernization and the tendency toward bureaucratic stagnation.
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10-63/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p.9l ; THR VT96
	 'The end of geography" (see Chapter 7) due to the end of the Cold War has placed China in a unique position in world politics as a modernizing socialist power. With increasing participation in the world market, China has become more and more dependent on the world economy. As a large country with rapid growth, China finds it vitally important to pursue a pragmatic policy in both the region and the world. Furthermore, in a wave of drastic changes, pressures of disorder and even chaos may increase. China has to walk a tightrope, carefully balancing stability, transformation, and development.
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10-64/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 China's integration into the international economy and the broader inter- national community is happening at a rapid pace and no domestic political force will be able to reverse this trend. It may not be too long before the political climate changes enough so we see China becoming a signatory to the ICCPR, ICESCR and other rights treaties as well as thousands of rights groups mushrooming all over the country. The long struggle invol- ved in creating effective mechanisms for conducting human rights educa- tion and monitoring, including the work at the United Nations described here, will lay down the foundations for the progress of the Chinese human rights movement.
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10-65/Yongnian Zheng, Prof. Beijing Univ., 1994; POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY.', "Development & democracy: are they compatible in China?" p.239 ;SEG VT96
	 With economic development, political changes have also been introduced into Chinese political life. Although it is hard to believe that China's political system is becoming a liberal one, China's political system is departing from the old totalitarianism and is tending to be more authoritarian. Harry Harding calls it a "consultative authoritarian regime" characterized by "a significant departure from the totalitarianism of the past but not yet a fully democratic, or even a quasipluralistic, political system .... It is increasingly consultative in its recognition of the need to obtain information, advice, and support from key sectors of the population, but still authoritarian in its desire to suppress dissent and maintain ultimate political power in the hands of the party."
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 10-66/Merle Goldman, Prof. Chinese History Boston University, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "The InteIlectuals in the Deng Xiaoping Era," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.217; THR VT96
	 So long as the party's goal remains economic modernization, the critical intellectuals will resume their demand for fundamental political changes some time in the future. Even though Hu Yaobang's intellectual network has been crushed, other critical intellectuals will emerge as they have throughout Chinese history. The party cannot repress them altogether without also alienating the scientists and engineers needed for scientific and economic modernization and jeopardizing its relations with the outside world. Yet until new political institutions are established that change the party-dominated state and separate the state from society, the age-old tradition of small numbers of intellectuals' pointing out the government's misdeeds and demanding reforms will continue. What makes the critical intellectuals of the Deng period different from those of the traditional and Mao periods is that what they propose--democratic institutions--renders their traditional role as spokespersons for the people obsolete. But if and when new political institutions emerge, it may be because of the efforts of the critical intellectuals as well as the underlying forces of modernization.
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10-67/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p 409. THR VT96
	 But by 1993 there was so much money being made that few had the time or inclination to reflect on 1989. As soon as one raised any question about politics--much less about dissent, dissidents in exile, or political prisoners--most Chinese businessmen immediately disconnected from the conversation. Not infrequently, they even condemned political dissidents as "troublemakers," as if it were they rather than the government who should be held accountable for what had happened. "Yes, people want to forget the past and politics and get on with their lives," one Chinese friend working for a foreign company in Beijing told me. "They only want to think about the here and now, hoping that after all these years of being deprived they can get something for themselves. And I say, 'Good for them!' Even if it's just fashion, food, and karaokes, the point is that at last they are thinking about themselves rather than the Parly. In a curious way, this may be their first step forward to independence and individualism--a real break wit, h the past.
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10-68/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p. 409 THR V.T96 That same month officials announced that, henceforth, authority to approve publication of several categories of materials--including ancient classics, photo calendars, and nude art!--would be transferred from the hard-line SGPPA to publishers themselves. The impetus behind this move grew more out of the government's urgent need to relieve itself of financial responsibility for debt-ridden state-ran publishing houses by helping them find ways to become more profitable and self-sufficient (and better able to compete with the "second channel") than from any desire to promote freedom of expression. However, by allowing publishers to put out girlie calendars, seventeenth-century erotic novels, and books of nude Western art without restriction, officials were also allowing the marketplace to take another giant step into the heartland of state control over the printed word.
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 10-69/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. II; THR VT96
	 A final surprise was the failure of any members of the so-called princeling party--the sons and daughters of high-level party leaders--to be elected to the Central Committee. Prior to the congress, there had been much talk about the elders passing on political control to their offspring, at least in part out of the expectation that they would not dishonor their fathers by betraying the communist cause. Prominent among those expected to be elevated to the Central Committee were Chen Yuan, the son of Chen Yun; Deng Pufang, the eldest son of Deng Xiaoping; and Liu Yuan, the son of former PRC president Liu Shaoqi. None of these "princes" were selected, suggesting the party's acute awareness of widespread public resentment of cadre children, who are widely perceived as owing their high positions to their parents' influence and as being corrupt (whether or not they are.
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 10-70/Andrew J. Nathan, Wel l-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 120; THR VT96
	 Let us leave the economy on this ambiguous note and turn to an evaluation of intellectual freedom in China today. To borrow a metaphor from Liu Binyan, the relationship between China's political structure and its civil society is like an eggshell with a chick growing inside it. Outwardly, the apparatus of totalistic political control still exists, but inwardly an independent society is developinge.
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10-71/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.407; THR VT96
	 When during the summer of 1992 word began circulating that Deng had been holding a new round of shenghuohui with key Party leaders and was calling for officials to take practical steps to help people "emancipate their minds," intellectuals who had felt shortchanged by his agenda of economic liberalization allowed themselves to hope that reform might, at last, be on the verge of gaining a political dimension. "Regarding those intellectuals who are engaged in science, technology, and scientific and academic research, they should be allowed to have different value concepts, to believe in socialism and communism or not, and to express their own political and ideological tendencies," Deng was reported as saying. "As long as they do not go too far and violate the Constitution, intentionally challenge and jeopardize laws and decrees, or pursue antagonistic activities against the Party and the People's Government in an organized way, I suggest they be allowed to carry out a certain level of activity, such as debates, exploratory discussions, and exchanges with little or no administrative interference.
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10-72/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 7, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Only 70,000 students, roughly one third of those sent overseas by the Chinese government since 1978, have returned home, reported by Los Angles Times Report quoting official Chinese sources. It is estimated by experts that the return rate from the United States is even lower, only 5 to 10 percent. Now the trend may start to change.
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10-73/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 7, 1995; ACS VT96
	 It will not be a big claim for one to say that much of ChinaUs future depends on "our stored brainpower overseas,S an expression used by former Premier Zhao Ziyang. Indeed, those 230,000 plus overseas students represent ChinaUs best, brightest and most politically connected elite class.
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10-74/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 7, 1995; ACS VT96
	 "For most people to even think about coming back they need this guarantee of freedom to travel," said Jiang Qinguo, 37, a holder of master's degree in fine arts from Columbia University and a graduate from the University of California's Hastings Law School. Jiang who recently returned to his native Shanghai to set up a business, thinks that "in this respect, the Chinese government has been pretty enlightened." However, a recent survey of 273 Chinese students in the United States and Canada conducted by David Zweig, showed that more that half of them were not confident that the Chinese government "would keep its wordS about allowing people who returned to go out of China in the future.
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10-75/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.408; THR VT96
	 Deng's utterances launched a major government-sponsored public relations campaign to woo back as many hesitant students as possible. To reassure those abroad who still recalled Yuan Mu's characterization of the "contradiction" between the Party and protesters as "antagonistic," and who feared they might not be allowed to leave again if they returned to China, the government promised that citizens with valid passports would henceforth not be required to apply for exit visas in order to reexit the country. And as added bonus incentives for the brightest and best to return, those coming back "to serve the motherland" were not only permitted to bring in duty-free computers, printers, VCRs, and other electronic equipment, but to buy a car tax-free, no small consideration in a country where duties on private vehicles more than doubled their cost.
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10-76/Orville SchelI, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.410; THR VT96
	 At the same time, some of the country's best-known political dissidents were also permitted to go abroad. They included Han Dongfang; human rights activist Professor Guo Luoji, who had been suspended from his teaching duties at Nanjing University; editor and political philosopher Wang Ruoshui, who had been fired from the People's Daily; and essayist Wang Ruowang, who had been jailed in Shanghai for marching with students in 1989. Optimists tended to view these concessions as important symbolic steps which, when factored in with the growing freedom in the marketplace, were helping to lay the foundations for a society that would ultimately become both more prosperous and more open.
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10-77/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.411; THR VT96
	 Foreigners living in China also began to notice the changing political climate when the Ministry of State Security and the Foreign Ministry took the unprecedented step of issuing an "internal" circular decreeing that security agents no longer needed to follow foreign reporters everywhere they went. This did not mean that gumshoeing and electronic surveillance would be completely suspended, but it did suggest a new sensitivity to the image of brute authoritarianism that China had been projecting abroad as a result of its often clumsy efforts to intimidate and control foreign journalists. Then in the fall of 1993 just before President and Party chief Jiang Zemin was scheduled to meet with President Bill Clinton in Seattle, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announced that while he rejected the notion of "linking" human rights questions to trade, requests from the International Red Cross to visit Chinese political prisoners would receive "positive consideration."
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10-78/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 China's command-and-control economy is changing slowly into a market economy as the Chinese people become increasingly impatient with the country's old authoritarian system and demand more accountability from government. This translates into a growing public desire for a less arbitrary government and a more accountable legal system. On top of this, the need for economic efficiency is increasing the demand for foreign management and technical expertise. The upshot is growing popular pressure not only for outside contacts, but also for a more open and pluralistic political system.
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 10-79/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Phi Iosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 49; THR VT96
	 Identical issues are confronted in the political realm. Enforcing the "one family-one child" policy by physical threat and/or coercive economic sanctions is anti-democratic and morally dubious; yet there is not a dissenting voice to the claim that China would be twice as livable with half its population--which hasn't even leveled off yet. It is a basic affront to freedom not to be able to move to a city within one's own country, but granting that freedom would quickly give China twenty Mexico Citys, and the major urban areas are already bursting at the seams; depressing slums are growing up in a number of cities where none were before. Allowing peasants to grow as many vegetables as they wish, instead of grains, enriches some of them, and increases the vegetable consumption in the cities. It also resulted in the country becoming a net importer of grain again in 1988--after being a net exporter for four years--and requires the government to continue heavily subsidizing grain purchases to prevent hunger riots, with monies the government does not have.
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 10-80/ColinMackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p.250 ; THR VT96
	 Ordinary people appeared to have lost interest in politics, diverting their energies into making money and, in the case of many young people, getting as much amusement from life as time and means permitted. Peasants, workers and professionals seemed content to get on with the job, doing it as well as possible. As the private sector of the economy grew, so also did private life. As of late 1992 it was still true, as one commentator put it, that 'the intellectuals remain, as a stratum, an artifiact of the system they oppose'.7 Yet they also became more able to create ideas and arts, and even publish, quite independently of the government, provided that their ideas posed no threat to the rule of the CCP. There appeared no likelihood at all of any united front between intellectuals and students, workers and entrepreneurs against the CCP; such a coalition seeming as unlikely in 1993 as it had been unsuccessful in 1989.
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 10-81/Nicholas R. Lardy, Prof. at the Center for Chinese Studies, Univ. of Washington, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: Sustaining Development," edited by Gilbert Rozman, P.221; THR VT96
	 Incremental reform may have been politically feasible. But won't the lag in China's political reform ultimatdyshort-circuit its economic reform? Over the long run a competitive, market-oriented economy must be paired with a pluralistic political system. In the short run, however, this linkage can be quite loose, as the experience of countries in East Asia reminds us. Not one of the six Asian economies that grew fastest in the past twenty-five years--China, Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong--could be characterized as democratic. None experienced a transfer of power to another political party. In East Asia pressures for far-reaching political reform, such as those observed in the second half of the 1980s in Taiwan and 'South Korea, emerged only after decades of sustained economic growth created per capita incomes several times those of present-day China? If the East Asia pattern continues to hold in China, the Chinese Communist Party may be able to postpone sweeping political reform for another decade or...more..
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 10-82/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, D ISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 362; THR VT96
	 Intellectuals, in particular, were wary, .,not just because of past Party perfidy, but because nowhere in all of Deng's propaganda about economic reform were there references to the need for a commensurate restructuring of China's political system. During the mid-1980s many educated Chinese had come to view economic and political reforms as complementary parts of the same process. In 1986 even Deng himself had declared that "after reform of the economic system has advanced one step, we will feel the need to reform the political system." However, the two recent episodes of mass student demonstrations had changed his mind. Now he made it clear that any new reform efforts would be confined to the economic realm alone. He seemed to hope that he could sweep the country up in a new wave of economic progress that would make Chinese overlook politics. Nowhere was the success of his new policy more evident than in the way in which China's nascent stock markets began to grip the popular imagination.
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10-83/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONIHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p 59; THR VT96
	 Any country entering the world market must develop strong central leadership and maintain strong central control. Multinational corporations, backed up and subsidized by predatory imperialist states, have grown rich, large, and powerful enough to outspend, outmaneuver, outlast, and overwhelm political units as big as large American states and even much larger sovereign countries. Driven by the categorical imperative of capitalism-expand or die--these corporations constantly strive to carve out new spheres of influence, monopolize raw material resources, expand market share, and make less-developed lands safe for investment capital. A country the size of China, with a strong national government and a coherent development strategy can, if it maintains its integrity, withstand the onslaught of such states and corporations and find its own way forward on its own time schedule. But only if it is willing to carry on a protracted struggle for political, economic, and cultural autonomy, and only if it patient pursues its goals and does not try for short cuts and quick fixes.
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 10-84/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERN ISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 134 ; THR VT96
	 In terms of 'civil society' since the late 1970s, therefore, several trends have been very significant, though still limited. Social organisations which are voluntary, or at least not entirely imposed from above, have become more prominent; the activities of organisations have been less restricted by the state; and they have had greater scope in seeking to influence the state, including acceptance of a role in pursuing their members' interests. State authorities have at times tightened controls, most notably after the 1989 crisis, in reaction to what they regarded as too threatening assertions of autonomy. But there are good reasons why political leaders are reluctant to restrict social organisations too much. In particular, allowing economic organisations or professional associations to operate according to their own concerns is seen as beneficial to modernisation programs. And restriction may itself generate antagonism. Thus one reason for allowing greater latitude to the official trade Union structure in more effectively representing workers may be to forestall the demands for genuinely autonomous unions, the stirrings of which so alarmed Party leaders in 1989. In sum, civil society in China is still no more than embryonic. Despite continuing restrictions on social activity and organisation, there have been marked changes in the relationship between state and society over a decade or more, and extension of such changes may encourage the longer'term consolidation of a far more robust and mature civil society.
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 10-85/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p.12 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FORETGN POL]CY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLTC OF CHINA, Essays on Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 U.S. leaders'and politicians should realize that for a long period Taiwan's modernization experience diverged from that of the mainland but that both Chinese societies are now gradually converging. U.S. policy can nurture a beneficial marketplace development sequence in the PRC if Washington negotiates with Beij ing on an issue-by-issue basis rather than linking, say, trade and human rights issues. By promoting the Taiwan-style modernization pattern in the PRC, U.S. foreign policy could help the PRC develop a new economic marketplace based on more private property rights and hybrid property forms and encourage the PRC government to allow an ideological marketplace to debate and legitimate the new economic narketplace.
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 10-86/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International nstitute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openess: Linking Domestic and Foreign Pol icy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.360; THR VT96
	 Thus, the patterns of trade and investment of reforming communist states seem relatively clear. Without reform, little sustained increase in trade, finance, or aid is possible. Chaotic or unsustained reform only leads to brief and erratic increases in economic relations with the capitalist world. Now that the East Europeans have had their revolution and seem determined to explore new economic relations, it is likely that trade patterns will undergo major changes. Chinese reforms have already . transformed bilateral relations in the region to the extent that Japan and the NICs seem anxious to minimize the economic impact from the political unrest in 1989. China has developed a vital need for an open door, and the East Asian region seems to be developing a vital stake in a stable Chinese economy.'
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10-87/ Geoffrey Murray, Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China seeks funds for development of info industry; ACS VT96
	 For potential foreign investors in China's fledgling information industry, the future is golden.
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10-88 / Richard Lawrence, AirCommerce Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, World Trade Seen Up 50 Percent by 2000, Paced by East Asia; ACS VT96
	 Though its chief exports - footwear and textile products - are labor- intensive, China is scoring significant gains in higher-tech goods. Between 1989 and 1993, for example, its shipments to the United States of telecommunications gear roughly tripled, and its exports of data-processing machines jumped from $12.4 million to $437 million.
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10-89 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 Jiang Zemin stresses that science and technology are the key to future competition Jiang Zemin recently pointed out: "Competition in science and technology has become the key to competition in overall national strengths in the international arena today." Thus, it is necessary to " quicken the pace of the reform of the scientific and technological structure" and "increase the intensity of scientific and technological progress" .
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10-90/Dorothy Solinger, Assoc. prof. of political science at Univ. of Cal i fornia-Irvine 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Future of China's Industria ization Program: Why Should the Uni'ted States Care," edited by W II iam T. Tow, p. 104; THR VT96
	 The other way the Chinese leadership hoped to maintain -- or, more precisely, attain- an augmented self-reliance was through increasing its technological capabilities. Along with atten- tion to the basic industries, economists hoped to apply advanced technology and equipment'to upgrade China's competitiveness in world markets.36 The 1990s are also slated to see a major overhaul of the computer industry in China, both to meet growing domestic demand and to export parts. Investment and preferential treat- ment will go to the largest government-owned (as distinct from the so called minban, ("people-managed") computer companies in the next five years. 
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10-91/ Geoffrey Murray, Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China seeks funds for development of info industry; ACS VT96
	 Last year, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications finally abandoned its monopoly through the creation of two competitors. One of these, Ji Tong, whose principal shareholders are the Electronic Industry and Power and Railways ministries, the Bank of China, and China International Trust and Investment Corp., was given the task of creating a national information infrastructure under the so-called ''Three Golden Projects.'' These are: Golden Bridge providing a network of economic information through a satellite-based integrated services digital network (ISDN) backbone connecting various private networks. Twenty-four regional centers are due to be linked up to the system by the end of this year. Golden Customs, an electronic document interchange system for facilitating automatic clearance of exports and imports, linking foreign trade companies to banks, Customs and taxation bureaus. Golden Card, a national network supporting automatic teller machines, credit and debit cards. A pilot project is now being tried in 12 cities, with the midterm role of 200 million credit cards in operation by 2003. In fact, a fourth project has now been added, Golden Tax, to computerize the taxation system and crack down on tax evasion.
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10-92 / Geoffrey Murray, Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China seeks funds for development of info industry; ACS VT96
	 Addressing a conference of telecommunications officials from Japan, Western Europe and the United States earlier this year, Vice Premier Li Lanqing said: ''We have started late and the infrastructure is still relatively weak. The current scale of operation cannot meet the country's increasing economic demands. ''Therefore, the Chinese government will welcome overseas involvement in high-tech and large-scale information projects, in developing joint information technology programs and in international economic exchanges.'' Li predicted that ''information products'' would take a large share of the 1 trillion dollars of imports expected to be achieved from now until the end of the century.
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10-93/ Geoffrey Murray, Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China seeks funds for development of info industry; ACS VT96
	 Guangdong Province, in which Shenzhen is situated, is also carrying out its own feasibility study for an information superhighway. It plans to build an ''ITV multimedia network'' in the Pearl River delta that would be developed gradually to provide information on the national economy to provincial subscribers. Fiber-optic links will be made available to every grassroots organization and individual household, with a high-speed, wide-band large capacity.
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10-94/Satellite Communications, January, 1994; Satellite Communications, "The Tibetan connection; Chinese Ministry of Post and Telecommunications provides telecommunications services to Tibet; includes related article; VSATS", SECTION: Vol. 18 ; No. 1 ; Pg. 40; ISSN: 0147-7439; PMS VT96
	 Depending on a village's demographics, anywhere from four to 40 channels are provided at each site. In the larger towns, telephone hookups to individual houses may be justified; most smaller villages are being serviced through a single handset located at the local post office. "It's not unlike the early days in small American towns," says K.C. Kuo, Hughes' director of marketing for the Asia-Pacific region. "When a call comes in for someone, they'll put it on hold and go get that person. It may not be convenient by Western standards, but it's a major, life-changing enhancement for many of these villages, where telegraph and hand-carried letters were previously the only ways to communicate beyond the next mountain range."
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10-95 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-21-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Encrypted Satellite TV Channel Starts Service [CND, 01/19/95] According to South China Morning Post, the Chinese Channel (CC), Europe's fledgling Chinese-language satellite television station, has started encrypting its service. It will now collect subscription fees of 13.99 (about HK$155) per month and provide the necessary decoder and an "access key" free of charge. Recently CC also signed deals with stations in Beijing and Shanghai to exhange programming. Since its launch in March last year, CC has been free-to-air, broadcasting across continental Europe to a potential audience of one million Chinese in about 250,000 households. Darren Shaw, a CC director, said: "Many ethnic Chinese in Europe cannot speak the local languages, but they spend freely on videos for entertainment and on Chinese publications for news." He said market research showed between 30,000 and 50,000 homes tuned into CC, and he was confident of much greater penetration. Currently, advertising and marketing campaigns are being prepared for a Lunar New Year blitz. CC broadcasts from midnight to 5 a.m. each day, which is effectively prime time for a customer base predominantly linked to the restaurant trade. Mr Shaw said that from February 1, CC would start earlier each evening and, by mid-1996, should be on air for between 8 hours and 12 hours a day. Its programming is a mixture of TVB feature films, entertainment shows and the China-focused Daily World News and European Chinese Community News. The hard news programme uses the raw satellite news feed from Reuter.
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10-96/ Geoffrey Murray, Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China seeks funds for development of info industry; ACS VT96
	 Compared with Japan, and some developing Asian economies such as Singapore, China lags well behind in electronic data transmission, an inevitable consequence of a backward telecommunications system. But massive amounts of domestic and foreign capital have been poured into telecommunications in recent years so that all provincial capitals are now linked up in a digital network providing voice, data and even video transmission capabilities, while the framework has been laid for an advanced fiber-optic cable network linking all major towns throughout the vast country. And with this in place, the Chinese can finally contemplate joining the information technology revolution.
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 10-97/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.80; THR VT96
	 I am not arguing that a fully developed civil society has to exist in order for Leninist systems to be changed. Instead, I simply contend that whether before or after major changes in a democratic direction at the elite level, democratic reform involves the creation of the social basis for a more pluralistic society. To the extent that a civil society develops within a Leninist political system, it will produce pressure on elites for democratic reforms. If a civil society does not exist for reasons other than elite manipulation and suppression (say, because of an unfavorable cultural tradition or the weakness of conditions fostering associations beyond a family or village context), elites will not feel such pressure. If a civil society that would have developed has been actively suppressed by the party-state, elites may feel that they can conduct business as usual, but they may learn to their surprise and sorrow, as Ceausescu did, that a nascent civil society nurturing and spreading protodemocratic views lies just beneath the surface of official controls.
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 10-98/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THF CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p 78; THR VT96
	 Much of the autonomous social and associational lite mat takes place in a civil society may be avowedly apolitical, involving activities such as bird watching, promotion of the opera, or the salvation of souls. Nonetheless, the existence of a well-formed civil society involves clear limits on the state's ability to control society and its constituent individuals. Dissident activity can thus find some protection within civil society, and an independent public opinion will emerge that both individuals and the state have to take into account. The term institutionalized used in the definition above implies fairly explicit, although not necessarily legal or constitutional, recognition by the state of the right and ability of the activities and organizations of civil society to proceed without substantial state interference or control. Such autonomy is never absolute, of course, and the state may restrict the activities of civil society in certain ways. For a civil society to exist, however, there must be a fairly predictable amount of autonomy within which grassroots associational life can operate freely.
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10-99/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.94; THR VT96
	 To be sure, there were still very important sources of weakness in this newly revived civil society of urban China, Much of the new and autonomous activity depended upon the tolerance of the authorities, for there were still no well-institutionalized legal or other guarantees protecting civil society from the stale, Most urbanites remained highly dependent upon their work units and quite reluctant to engage publicly in heterodox activities, Chinas entrepreneurs and peasants did not enjoy the well-entrenched private property rights that gave the bourgeoisie such autonomy in the West, Furthermore, the influence of China's cultural tradition was still strong, and many urbanites worried that the bewildering array of new organizations and ideas was weakening Chinas moral and political cohesion, Many still held to the traditional view that interest groups and factions were selfish and divisive and therefore bad, Some even yearned for the enforced unity of the Mao era, In spite of these sources of weakness, I would say, the elements of an emerging civil society in urban China in the late 1980s compare favorably with those in Eastern Europe--to be sure, they were weaker than their counterparts in Poland and perhaps in Hungary and East Germany, but they were fairly comparable to the level of autonomous associational life in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and probably stronger than such phenomena in Bulgaria and Romania. 
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10-100/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.78; THR VT96
	 "The term civil society has been of central importance in the thinking and political strategies of Eastern European dissidents, particularly in Poland. This centrality reflects a conviction that democratic reform of Leninist political systems involves not so much the implementation of procedural elements or' what is called "normal democracy" (e.g., direct elections, competitive parties, checks and balances, etc.) as the devel- opment of a social basis for pluralism and state-society separation. Or perhaps the existence of a civil society can be considered as the infrastructure or as a precondition that makes the development of formal democracy possible, with formal democracy, once established, serving to protect and expand civil society. In any case, the creation and strengthening of civil society is a central part of the democratic reform agenda. 
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 10-101/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.72; THR VT96
	 China, therefore, needs not only economic development but also further strengthening of the civil society--with more differentiated social groups' and classes' possessing not only functional autonomy but also economic resources independent of the state--in order to satisfy the prerequisites of a stable democracy. At the moment the main obstacle to the development of this process is the work unit (danwei) system. Although the regime recognizes that the unit ownership system has "refeudalized" the Chinese, the effort to change the organizing principle of society has not yet made much progress. The only way to change the system of work units is to introduce a market principle.
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 10-102/Ann Anagnost, Assist. prof. of anthropology at the Univ. of Washington, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Socialist Ethics and the Legal System," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 189;THR VT96
	 How may we situate the issues raised by the village compact within the debates on the "emergence" of civil society in China in the post-Maoist period? These debates in Chinese studies borrow terms derived from parallel discussions on the status of civil society during the disintegration of the Eastern European socialism, to which Chirot alludes in Chapter 11. In both cases, civil society is marked by its absence or its weak development.48 This posing of a "lack" in terms of a Western standard should, one would think, immediately alert one to the dangers of Eurocentric theorizing. Moreover, the definition of civil society that appears dominant in this discourse appears to be overly narrow, an impoverishment of the theoretical richness of this concept within the Western philosophical tradition. Civil society appears reduced in liberal philosophy to the notion of a sphere of discourse and practice auton- omous from the state. In the discussions of civil society in China, this notion is even more rigorously narrowed to some notion of the regulation of society by the market, free of interference from the state. Civil society therefore "emerges" with the loosening hold of the state on economic practice, leading to autonomous associations that can represent the parochial interests of sovereign individuals. And yet some have suggested the impossibility of any clean separation of the institutions of state and civil society in China, finding them.so tightly fused as to resist any attempt to prize them apart analytically.
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 10-103/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduct ion, p. 9 , THR VT96
	 Yet despite these caveats, Lee is convinced the modern civil service represents China's best hope for the future. The decline in ideology and collapse of party authority will continue despite the post-Tiananmen campaigns to reverse these trends. Because neither an army coup nor a democratic revolution from below is likely, bureaucratic technocrats are China's last good chance. Drawing implicitly on analysis of the experiences of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, Lee looks to economic development and a further strengthening of civil society as the requisites for ultimate democracy. Ironically, the necessary reforms to promote these changes, Lee says, require an interim stage of an "authoritarian regime with efficient, bureaucrataic, administrators'"
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 10-104/Dorothy Sol inger, Prof. Political Science University of California, Irvine, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, Urban Entrepreneurs and the State: The Merger of State and Society," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.130; THR VT96
	 As noted above, in the 1980s new institutions emerged that co-opt either the bureaucrats or the merchants into dependent relationships. Their combined effect has-. been to prolong the decomposition of the monolithic position of the state and to foster a symbiosis between the two groups. These institutions are of several types. One category contains institutions established by the state bureaucracy to incorporate the private sector. Second are those formed by the merchants themselves, albeit with assistance from the state or its assets. And a third variety includes institutions that are generated directly by the reforms. All three facilitate deals across the now more than ever blurred boundaries between sectors. They do so in a way that serves to freeze the transition to a market economy so that this amalgam of classes persists.
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10-105/Arthur Waldron, Prof. of Strategy at the Naval War College and adjunct professor of East Asian studies at Brown University, Winter 1995; ORBIS, "China's Coming Constitutional Challenges," p. 30; CJJ VT96
	 Even a China that puts communism behind it and embraces constitutionalism will face serious problems, and these will have important intemational implications. But they are as nothing when compared to the problems a regime will confront that resists political change, as the current Beijing govemment is doing. 
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10-106/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 93; THR VT96
	 These examples, and they could be multiplied, provide at least some grounds for believing that the breakdown of central authority in China would not result in chaos, or a dog-eat-dog existence for the Chinese peoples. There are other grounds as well. At a philosophical level, it must be the case that the larger the political unit, the higher the probability the members of that unit will have few values in common, and the converse also holds: the smaller the unit (Serbians, Sioux, Sichuanese), the greater the number of shared values. And I would argue, as a corollary to this view, that the greater the number of values shared by a community, the more will its members see themselves as nurturing and nurtured role-bearing persons within that community, rather than as rights-bearing' autonomous individuals set more or less against the community.
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 10-107/Martin K. Whyte, Prof. Sociology University of Michigan, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.94; THR VT96
	 The observations presented here lead me to argue that the failure of The observations presented here lead me to argue that the failure of the Beijing Spring 10 push the system toward fundamental democratization was not due to the weakness of elements of civil society in China as compared to those in Eastern Europe. Those elements appear to have been growing robustly, in spite of the generally unfavorable Chinese cultural and historical context. Rather, the differing outcomes were the result of the existence of other elements in the Chinese case-for example, a core group of original and still powerful revolutionary leaders who were not dependent upon Soviet support, who had confidence in their ability to ride out any internal and international criticisms, and who did not hesitate to use military force against their own people. If this observation is correct, then the failure of the Beijing Spring does not provide compelling evidence for the view that democracy is simply unsuitable to Chinese conditions.
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10-108/Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Specialist in the social and cultural history of the Chinese Revolution, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Afterword: History, Myth, and the Tales of Tiananmen," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 273; THR VT96
	 The main potential source of optimism lies in the idea that political culture is a fluid rather than static force, and that just as cataclysmic events change individual psyches, they also leave their mark on political cultures. The protesters may not have succeeded in creating the kind of "new political culture" the authors of the "June 2 Hunger Strike Declaration" envisioned, but the demonstrations and the violence that followed certainly did not leave the old political culture unscathed. The China of today, in short, is different in important ways from that of 1989. Its population (at least in the cities) is now more crucial of all claims made in official language. Its young workers and students are more experienced in staging impressive acts of street theater. And its dissidents are much readier to accept the possibility that saving the nation may require overthrowing as opposed to merely reforming the CCP. Differences such as these create room for hope: To leave open the possibility that the events of 1989 may have fundamentally altered Chinese political arrangements, and perhaps even Chinese political culture itself, is to suggest that those who died on June 4 may not have sacrificed their lives in.vain
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10-109/Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Specialist in the social and cultural history of the Chinese Revolution, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Afterword: History, Myth, and the Tales of Tiananmen," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p.272; THR VT96
	 In short, when taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume contradict Pye's claim that no revolution worthy of the name has taken place in China. They suggest instead that we need to think in terms of not one but several Chinese "revolutions," each of which has tried to present itself as part of an ongoing quest, but each of which has also subtly changed the rules of Chinese politics. Each revolution has transformed the ideological concerns of both the powerful and the powerless and even the relationship between these two groups, leaving rulers and their opponents with new configurations of ancient regimes against which to define their quests.
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 10-110/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 29; THR VT96
	 Westem commentary on Chinese politics has generally held that the CCP is pursuing economic reform while staunchly opposing any meaningful political reform. There is certainly validity to this generalization, but there have nevertheless been a number of significant if subtle political changes over the past year or so that could prepare the way for more rapid and profound shifts when Deng dies.
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10-111/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy' of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 101; THR VT96
	 At the same time, the economic problems are related to the political system. It is increasingly recognized that without a corresponding political reform, many problems cannot be solved quickly and thoroughly. The economic reform itself, with the structural changes and emergence of new forces and interests, has created internal pressure for political changes. However, any drastic move toward deep-going political reform will probably cause a chain reaction of disorder and chaos. China has to strike a balance between dynamic development and stability. In the near future, an evolutionary path involving a state that is strong in terms of both economic intervention and political control may be a realistic and pragmatic choice. Such a path would lead, in effect, to a socialist market economy--an East Asian model with Chinese features.
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 10-112/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 209; THR VT96
	 For when Chinese democracy begins to take shape, it may turn out to be a mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements, openness and secrecy, idealism and selfishness, turbulence and stability, hard for Western and especially American observers to recognize as democracy, and far from satisfactory to the Chinese themselves as an end point of their political development. Democratic politics in China will have many characteristics of Chinese politics in the past, only they will occur in the open rather than in secret.
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 10-113/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF RFFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 210;THR VT96
	 The institutions of a democratic China will probably evolve from the present structure. The system will probably have a single supreme legislature like the National People's Congress, unicameral and not subject to judicial review. It may have a single dominant party like those in Taiwan and Japan that stays in office permanently. This is most likely to be the Communist Party, because they will enter the democratizing transition with enormous advantages --size, organizational sophistication, control over resources--and will use them to fight and win elections. Protecting the vested interests of party members and party-chosen bureaucrats will be high on the agenda of the politicians who engineer the transition. 
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10-114/Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CONI'EMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "in search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p. 84 ; THR VT96
	 The Achilles' heel of the reform program was that it was fostered by and depended upon an unreformed central leadership structure. Deng Xiaoping was the hero and patron of reform, much as Mao had been for leftism. The power of reform did not depend on the support of its beneficiaries, but on the support of its ultimate target. Political reform was acceptable as long as it provided an orderly accompaniment to economic reform and made difficulties for the midlevel bureaucrats remaining from the Cultural Revolution. But when societal forces became self-confident enough to challenge the party's political monopoly and to criticizing the center leadership, Deng abandoned and attacked his clients.
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 10-115/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 73 THR VT96
	 If the present policy continues indefinitely, it may lead China to at is known as "Brezhnev's syndrome"--a stagnated economy with a petrified bureaucratic regime. If there will be a change, it will be in the direction of what Zhao Ziyang originally advocated: the marketization of the economy and strengthening of a central authority staffed by experts rather than revolutionaries. Only such an authoritarian regime with efficient bureaucratic administrators will be able to push economic reform step by step toward marketization while effectively dealing with all the problems arising in the process of reform. Paradoxical as it may seem, China may need a strong and powerful political authority in order to create preconditions for a market economy and to overcome the resistance of those Chinese people who wish to preserve the benefits gained under the old socialist system and fear the risks of a full-scale market-oriented economy.
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 10-116/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduct ion, p. 13, THR VT96
	 Whereas the' Communist party once stood as the symbol of integrity and self-sacrifice, it is now tainted by corruption and nepotism. Youth have a low regard for officially sanctioned forms of political activism and altruism; the party-state fears unsupervised youthful idealism might be directed against the government. 
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10-117/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p 205;THR VT96
	 This would also be a tall order, however. Taboos against the revision of existing dogma would have to be overcome (i.e., breaching Deng's Four Cardinal Principles), and a new doctrine elaborated that could satisfy both the functional imperatives of the economic system and the ideal interests of elites, masses, and various special interests (e.g., national minorities, intellectuals). It is unclear after the most recent crisis whether Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought retains sufficient credibility to serve as the framework on which such a belief system r!ght be built.
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10-118/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 45;THR VT96
	 The underlying dilemma has to do with the function of the Party in an age of reform. As might be expected, the Party's legitimacy is based on the premise that it is the vanguard of the proletariat, needed to lead that class in overthrowing the old, rotten bourgeois class structure and mode of production and in establishing first a socialist, and then a communist, mode of production and political order. The implicit assumption of revisionism is that with the socialization of the means of production the unique historical role of the revisionist vanguard has basically been completed; its future task is to administer the planned economy efficiently ..and increase the capacity of the forces of production (e.g., science and technology)? This was the besetting crime of the revisionists, in the view of the radicals, who were convinced that the Party's function must include leading the march into the communist utopia; without sustained momentum in that direction not only would the Party lose its legitamte); it would reverse course and take the "capitalist road."
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10-119/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 7 ;THR VT96
	 One of the implications of the mushrooming TIiananmen demonstrations and the regime's tragic overreaction to them is that the shift from revolution to reform was less complete than it at first appeared to be. Although Deng has accelerated his efforts in the twilight of his reign, he is likely to leave his country still only "half-reformed." Whether China will execute the other "half" of its domestic reform (and if so, precisely how) remains to be seen, but in any case it should hardly surprise anyone even slightly acquainted with history to predict that the post-Mao era will continue to bear the stigmata of its revolutionary origins. Despite the collapse of communism nearly everywhere else, it may continue to survive here for some time to come certainly that is the strong preference of a strategically positioned and highly motivated segment of the Partystate.s After all, in spite of its reservations about the "errors" Mao is said to have committed during his later years, the Deng Xiaoping regime has by no means repudiated its revolutionary heritage. Unlike Mao, Deng has not sought to draw a sharp 'qame of demarcation" between himself and his predecessor in order to create a brave new world, but has sought to craft a working synthesis between a "feudal-colonial" past and a "modernized" future. Mao Zedong and his Thought are still reaffirmed, and since Tiananmen, tributes to his memory have made a noteworthy resurgence. The challenge for the future is likely to remain one of integrating the (currently quiescent) revolutionary impulse for social justice with the unleashed dynamism of a marketizing economy.
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10-120/Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "in search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p. 86 ; THR VT96
	 The Deng Xiaoping era pragmatically combined conservative habits of power with reform policies, and as a result its political direction oscillated as it struggled on the two fronts of defending the existing orthodoxy while promoting modernization. But the declaration of martial law introduced a qualitatively new level of uncertainty. By once again preventing the transfer of power from the old guard to designated successors, it put the center of Chinese politics at the mercy of a handful of very old biological clocks. Moreover, the regime is fully committed to a repressive consolidation of its own power that threatens ever-widening circles of people and policies. Its declarations of support for modernization and openness merely demonstrate that, in contrast to the idealistic turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, repression now serves no higher end than the preservation of power. Clearly, there is a practical contradiction between the tightening of central party control and the premises older control and diversification inherent in modernization and openness"
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10-121/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 46 ;THR VT96
	 The revisionist reform attempt to maintain a functional division of labor between politics and economics, between Party elite and social environmental, will probably prove untenable in the long run. The Party has about the same chance of turning back the economic tide it has set in motion as Canute. Three alternative "lines" seem open at this juncture. The first would be to abandon the functional division of authority and reassert "politics in command," reaffirming the Party's special role and imposing its authority on the rest of society--via the central plan, the military and security apparatus, the propaganda network, and the Partystate apparatus. This line seemed to be the preference of the Party's ascendant left wing upon the suppression of the ¶iananmen protests, but it soon roved to be indefensible in view of its negative economic repercussions.
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10-122/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 197 ;THR VT96
	 The PRC has, under the foreign policy adjustments of the reform era, reached its international apogee. By all empirical indicators, it has b@come one of the world's leading trading states, has gained a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and been seated on most other important international organizations, and has gained recognition from most other states in the world on terms accepting in principle its sovereignty over Hong Kong and Taiwan. We have witnessed in the course of reform an overall tendency to shift from the transnational to the international dimension, elsewhere referred to as an aspect of ideological "deradicalization. Of course, part of the reason for this is that foreign policy is no longer viewed as a symbolic blank slate on which new visions of political salvation may be itinerate but is rather viewed as a commercial artery for access to economically remunerative technology or goods and for the transaction of other profitable business. Unfortunately, China's traditional international reference groups have not proven to be its best business partners. A rift has emerged between the "old friends" whereby the country is still prone to legitimate itself ideologically and the international "associates" on whom it has come to rely for commercial advantage and strategic security.
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10-123/Joseph Fewmith, Assoc. Prof. of International Relations at Boston University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "The Dengist reforms in historical perspective," edited by Brantley airport, p. 48 ;THRVT96
	 Such an outcome seems conceivable whether or not China remains a Marxist system. The revival of regional economies, the failure of Marxism as an integrating ideology, the increasing scope of the state's "zone of indifference," and the tentative reemergence of a public sphere over the past decade all suggest that trends strengthening society vis-a-vis the state are likely to continue. 
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10-124/ Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Seeing Japan's success in exploiting the open U.S. market while placing barriers on foreign investment at home, China is building up a huge bilateral trade surplus. Americans who hope that capitalist development will inspire a democratic and peaceable China will almost certainly be disappointed. 
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10-125/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.32; THR VT96
	 The combination of integrating party and government while separat- ing government and enterprises appears to be a self-conscious effort to emulate the Singapore model of a strong, authoritarian government with a vibrant market economy. Although such a model, if successfully implemented, would not bring about an open press and electoral de- mocracy, it would produce significant political change in the PRC. In a system in which political power and economic power have always been combined, their separation would have profound effects on the way the state relates to society.
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10-126/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1.994, "Rural China in Transition," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.111 THR VT96
	 The government has been skillfully manipulating these factors as the means of political control. It can easily dole out scarce resources to selected villages in order to promote them as "model" communities for others to imitate. Or it may restrict the flow of rationed goods to other villages to discipline them for disobeying government instructions. Even though reform has brought about many structural changes in the Chinese bureaucracy, in actual operation it has maintained the same authority system and compliance enforcement characterized by Andrew Walder as "principled particularism"--the reliance of higher-level authorities on dispensing or withdrawing special favors to control their subordinates' loyalty.24 Although Walder's analysis focuses on industrial organizations in the cities, the same practices are seen in rural society. Loyal village-level officials are given above-quota allocations of valuable resources, such as employment positions in cities, construction material, pesticides, or gasoline. In return, these officials will be expected to support government policy or special projects launched by higher-level authorities. This reciprocal "favoritism" is to a large extent built upon personal connections. While government propaganda has criticized this type of personal patronage, the social reality is that China's rural society is still operating on these principles.
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10-127/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 97;THR VT96
	 For a long time after World War 11, China focused its foreign policy on its own security through targeting both of the superpowers. However, this strategy did not work well. China started to change its theory and strategy of foreign policy from the early 1980s. A more positive, pragmatic, and flexible policy was adopted following the end of the Cold War. China argues that the major concern after the Cold War should be peace and development. This is because China needs a peaceful international environment to support its open-door and modernization policies. China does not endorse the existing structure of the world economy and politics, but it does not want to isolate itself. Therefore, China has operated pragmatically due to its priority interest in upholding a stable world order. In the UN Security Council, China has taken a flexible and cooperative approach. China understands that it can play an active role only through participation and cooperation in international affairs. For its immediate and long-term interests, China will have to manage to improve relations with the developed countries, especially with the big powers, because its modernization program relies heavily on their capital, technology, and markets. China might be more and more willing to participate in a central coalition of big powers in keeping international order. However, it will surely not share all views of the other powers. China does not belong to the West. It has its own culture and civilization. Clashes may be expected on issues such as democracy and human rights.
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10-128/Ernest P. Young, Prof. of history at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Imagining the Ancient Regime in the Deng Era," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 25; THR VT96
	Could the reformer Deng Xiaoping be also the cruel tyrant of June 4, 1989, because of the multitude of ghosts that China's modern history has conjured up? Deng was faced with the uncompleted tasks of each previous reform and revolutionary movement. Their failures were examples of paths that should not be taken. And yet the protests were seen as pushing the regime to repeat old errors. As a challenge to Deng's authority, the movement was cast as an agent, no matter how unwitting, of revived Maoism, the foreign dependency of the KMT, the chaos of warlordism. It wished, in Deng's view, to force a precipitate jump into democracy, which threatened to release the large "feudal" residuum in the Chinese population. Faced with too confusing an array of anciens regimes, Deng ferociously defended the status quo. But there cannot be reform without forward motion. "Authoritarian modernization," what Paul Cohen describes as China's reforrmst mainstream, is in crisis. 
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 10-129/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 185; THR VT96
	 The disadvantageous remnants of China's past that impede modernization are as follows: bureaucratism, centralization of power, paternalism, the personality cult, rule by man and not by law, a rigidly hierarchical system, noninstitutionalization of decision-making practices, despotism, special privileges for rulers, nepotism, egalitarianism in distribution of income at the expense of material incentives, conservatism, anticommercialism, and closed thinking about the country and the world.
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 10-130/Vera Schwarcz, holds the Freeman Chair in East Asian Studies at Weslyan University, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Memory and Commemoration: The Chinese Search for a Livable Past,"' edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 110 ; THR VT96
	 China today is in danger of losing its past. Like a snail robbed of its shell, it has nothing to pull back into, little to carry forward with certainty. No homecoming to memory is allowed: The mass movement of 1989 did not happen. The government claims it was nothing but "counterrevolutionary turmoil" instigated by a handful of "hooligans." The authorities have honored the soldiers who died during the repression of June by calling them "- revolutionary martyrs" (see the Afterword for more details), but the students and ordinary citizens killed in Beijing, Chengdu, and other cities may not be mourned publicly. On the first anniversary of the June Fourth Massacre, in fact, even to wear white (the traditional Chinese color of mourning) or black (its Western equivalent) was forbidden. Remembrance of the dead--which, as James Watson suggested in Chapter 3, has long been the anchor of personal, familial, and to a certain extent national identity in China--is crushed under the weight of officially mandated amnesia. To compensate for the stifling of personal memory, China has gone through a period of loud, official commemorations- and spectacles. First came the 1989 celebrations of the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement and the fortieth anniversary of the rounding of the People's Republic on October 1, and then a year later came a new round of state rituals associated with the Asian Games, which were designed to convince the world that life had returned to normal in Beijing. In all of these ceremonies, the CCP tried to use or disguise the meaning of the past, never to encourage historical remembrance. But can commemoration replace memory?
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10-131/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of' the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p58; THR VT96
	 On the cultural front China has surrendered to the Western monopoly bourgeoisie all the way down the line. "Worship . America Thought," against which the Communist Party struggled with marked success for so many years, has won the day. It is here, in the sphere of ideology, that the comprador warp of the current regime shows up most clearly. There is no longer any sign of struggle over world outlook, class consciousness, or even national integrity. Once the party accepted Deng's aphorism "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it can catch mice" and put "enrich yourselves" forward as the key slogan, a huge wave of naive and avaricious Babbitry flooded China, submerging everything in its path. Just as a large segment of officialdom and a large slice of the intelligentsia felt themselves affronted and frustrated by the frugality of socialist development and rushed to wallow in commodities and luxuries as soon as the bars were down, so they have longed for and now welcome with open arms Western bourgeois culture, including all its most Philistine and venal forms. They view as simple-minded and deserving of pity anyone who doesn't share their enthusiasm.
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10-132/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.58; THR VT96
	 The neocolonial implications of such massive cultural inundation 'should alarm anyone concerned with the health and autonomy of China's values, mores, and national ethos. The minds of young successor generations are being warped, seduced, and possessed by the market-oriented mass culture of the monopoly bourgeoisie of America, Europe, and Japan.
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 10-133/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, Introduction, p.27, THR VT96
	 One of the most serious challenges confronting the regime is the diminished appeal of ideology and official norms to the population-and perhaps even to the elite. If the life of China's youth seems spartan and squalid in comparison to their U.S. or Taiwanese counterparts, a decade of economic growth and consumerism has given China's younger generation an adolescence filled with material benefits unimaginable to the previous generation. Most youth do not spend their evenings carousing on the town in bars and discos, but they are likely to possess tape recorders, wear more fashionable clothes, and occasionally eat out. Relaxation of political controls over culture allows them more opportunities to pursue their own interests, such as reading martial arts novels, listening to rock music, or playing mah-jongg. But just as U.S. youth in the 1960s were unmoved when defenders of the status quo pointed to progress since the Great Depression, Chinese youth take for granted the changes since 1976.
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10-134/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 Num. 3, p . 55 Edited by Donald Altschiller, THR VT96
	Most shocking are the number of leading revolutionaries' sons and daughters who have taken positions with the biggest American and European banks and multinational corporations and now represent them in China. The list reads like a "Who's Who" of new China. Some of them may, in spite of all temptation, still serve China's best interests, but the majority iii serve the interests of those who hire them, and, unless one is naive enough to believe that there is no conflict of interest here, "comprador" is the word that describes them.
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10-135/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p .54; THRVT96
	 China's all-out building boom of the last decade-and-a-half appears to have warped the growth of the whole economy toward consumerism. Now conspicuous consumption of luxury goods, hard and soft, many of them imported, appears to have added a new twist to that warp. Expensive imports--cars, clothes, furniture, appliances, cosmetics, sound and video equipment, plus the tapes to activate them--are tying up and diverting money which could and should be invested in economic growth. Hard work, simple living, and saving to build up the country have given way to flash, dash, and extravagance unlimited'
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10-136/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA] AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.54; THR VT96
	 It appears that most of the officials and virtually the entire educated elite have revolted against the restraints of country building imposed on them by China's real position in the world. Dumping the erstwhile sober socialist response to underdevelopment, they have opted instead for a buying orgy targeted at such commodities and luxuries as the Indian bourgeoisie and other Third-World elites have long enjoyed in the midst of the mass squalor and deprivation that surround them. It's a response generated by a deep gut feeling. China's privileged strata sense that their homeland, with its vast size, huge population, and strong work ethic, can support, in world-class style, one hundred million or more entrepreneurs, coupon clippers, and a matching set of professional retainers. So why not go for it?'
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10-137/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.54; THR VT96
	 'A large part of the surplus generated by the economy of any underdeveloped country ought to be invested in the reproduction of capital, in the expansion of the productive forces of society, including the infrastructure to facilitate and back up that expansion. But it seems, from personal observation, that the emphasis in China in recent years has been more on consumption than production. The greatest single growth sector, both urban and rural, has been housing. In the main cities a huge drive to construct high-rise apartments, office buildings, and world-class hotels is ongoing. In the countryside an equally huge drive to construct peasant dwellings continues unabated. These dwellings are often two or three stories high, with the upper floors unoccupied. Plenty of cropland, walled-in and paved-over, provides courtyard elbow room.
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10-138 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 At this historic juncture of contemporary China, when money-making has become the trend and materialistic needs prevail, some people have become rich by fair or foul means and have become morally degenerate, while some officials have become corrupt and decadent. These unhealthy practices have been much criticized by people abroad. The CCP's recent efforts to strengthen patriotic education and study Deng's works have a hint of "moral reconstruction" about them. While the methods and concepts used in patriotic education, the fight against pornography, party building and the study of Deng's works may be outdated, seen from a higher plane, they may be necessary measures taken by the authorities to resolve, on the cultural and ideological levels, the "moral dilemmas" confronting China in achieving modernization and bringing about the market economy.
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 10-139/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, P. 14 . THR VT96
	 Throughout history, Chinese intellectuals' sense of obligation to - critique abuses of power has been balanced by the quasi-Confiucian feeling that it is their duty to serve as advisers to the government. Feelings of patriotism, fear, self-interest, and duty discouraged dissenting - intellectuals from adopting a stance of totalistic opposition. The recent willingness to attack socialist principles, advise student protesters, and, for those who fled abroad, join opposition movements is a watershed in the self-identification of Chinese intellectuals. The failure of the 1989 democratic movement showed many intellectuals that they needed to develop closer ties with other strata of society; it also forced them toabandon any lingering illusions about the nature of the political system.
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 10-140/Joseph Fewsmith, Assoc. Prof. of International Relations at Boston University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "The Dengist reforms in historical perspective," edited by Brantiy Womack, p. 47;THR VT96
	 The most significant long-term developiment brought about by the reforms, however, has been the reemergence of "society" as a meaningful participant in political life. This development, stimulated by the devolution of economic authority to local governments, makes the continuities between the pre-PRC period and the present all the more clear, while highlighting the very real sense in which the Maoist period has come to appear as an interregnum. This reemergence of society means that the questions that preoccupied earlier generations - defining the relationship between public and private and working out ways of relating local government to central government (possibly including some notions of a federalist arrangement) _ have once again appeared on the political agenda.
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 10-141/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS, "China's 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.22; THR VT96
	 The metaphor of a "path" or "road" (the socialist path, the capitalist road, and so on) has often been used in the Communist period to label alternative policies for development. The problem m the early 1990s is that, other than "make money," no road is clear. Many people, whether looking outside or peering within, come up empty. The Four Basic Principles? Repugnant to many, these seem at best to be a sickly shadow of what an official ideology should be. Democracy? For some the word generates genuine hope, but the concept remains poorly defined, iII-understood, and, because it is an import, raises questions about "Chineseness." Qigong? The Chineseness is solid, and the pride of ownership effective, but can something so narrow (and possibly superstitious) take the place of a proper Chinese ideology? A revival of Confucianism? There are advantages here, as the Four Little Dragons seem to demonstrate. 
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10-142/Gerald Segal, Research Fellow Interr@tional Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINTIES:CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Foreign Policy," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.178; THR VT96
	 On balance, there remains a basic dilemma. Does China seek global influence, or does it concentrate more on domestic problems? This is not merely a matter of ideology versus pragmatism, for there are ideological justifications for both isolationism and internationalism, for both a closed and an open door. The dilemma remains unresolved, and China has experienced various different ways of coping with the choices.
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 10-143/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, P.27; THR VT96
	 Entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and other new social groupings are torn between their perceived need for official backing and a yearning to assert their autonomy and self-worth. The inherent tensions in the present symbiotic relationship mean that interpenetration may be a transitional phase rather than a permanent condition. As long as they lack institutional legitimacy and official recognition, new groups will feel frustrated and resentful. Judging by what has happened elsewhere in Asia, we can see that the most likely scenario is their gradual movement toward an autonomous group identity and greater political independence. The separation between the state and economy/society, however, will probably be less apparent than in the West and the role of bureaucrats greater. 
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 10-144/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," p. 15; THR VT96
	 The collapse of official ideology and appearance of a marketand use of pose problems that transcend political issues. Consumerism and and use of personal relationships for private gain have created a spiritual and ideological vacuum that has been exacerbated by Tiananmen. 
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10-145/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS, "China’s 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF , VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.21 ; THR VT96
	 A new or revived identifying core for China, if it can emerge, wiIl probably need to resemble earlier ones. It will need to define what is right in social relations, be accorded widespread assent, be considered universally applicable, and perhaps be inscribed in texts. These are all public features that the Chinese have traditionally wanted in their ideologies. But the public side is only half the picture. For individuals, a sense of emptiness within can be as much of a problem as the lack of external symbols. In the early 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have been discussing the current "thought vacuum." A young Chinese historian, speaking in Beijing in early 1989, said, "I feel a need for something to hold on to, a zhichidian (point of purchase); I think many of us feel this way; it may be the special weakness of Chinese intellectuals, but we need this." This young man was unusually articulate; yet, he is undoubtedly correct to guess that his problem is not unique to him. Broadly conceived, it is not unique to intellectuals either. Many kinds of Chinese feel the need for the "point of purchase" he refers to.
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 10-146/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction, p 28 , THR VT96
	 As the country rushes headlong toward modernization and consumerism, and with communism being abandoned in Eastern Europe, the value system of China is being reassessed. Because Marxist and Maoist ideals were associated with austerity and self-sacrifice, calls for public-service-oriented behavior and egalitarianism do not speak 10 the concerns of a population infatuated with the baubles of consumerism. The older generation's open disdain for the perceived hedonism of youth vividly adumbrates the ideological chasm between the generations. The deep antipathy students and intellectuals show toward official ideology, as well as the indifference of merchants and urban workers, illustrates the irrelevance of Leninism to resolving contemporary problems. Television programs recounting glorious victories of the past or atavistic campaigns to study Lei Feng evoke little popular interest. Some images of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai still appeal to youth, but often because they symbolize a time when China's leaders were , uncorrupted by self-interest.
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 10-147/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE,p.419; THR VT96
	 When I raised the same question with writer and critic Wu Liang in Shanghai, he shook his head disparagingly and replied, "People are so excited and optimistic about the 'economic miracle,' but what I see is all business and no culture. The suffocation of culture is coming directly from blind worship of economic development. Here we have this huge city, but where are its great museums, concert halls, galleries, and bookstores? They are practically all gone. 
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10-148/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS, "China's 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.24; THR VT96
	 Get many, whether explicitly or not, still lean toward preservation a core. Morality, propriety, and public service seem self evidently desirable. The fear of "chaos"--which many fear would be the result of a full ideological breakdown--is deep in the modern Chinese mind. And there remains the issue of Chinese pride. Is the twentieth century to mark the end of China's history as a • unique and exemplary place? (China has absorbed major outside influences before, such as Buddhism and the Mongol invasion, without dislodging the notion of a core of Chineseness.) If modern international culture does indeed become the first force in history to dissolve China's notion of its moral uniqueness, that process will, at a minimum, take decades or centuries to finish. Before then, the core problem will remain
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10-149/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS, "China's 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.23; THR VT96
	 But as an answer to the problem of an inner core,' "make money" can be only a stopgap. It leaves deeper and inevitable questions on hold: To what do the moral implications of the Chinese language, including much of daily-life language, now refer? What is proper behavior? What makes China distinctive? To look at the rapid modernization in China's "special economic zones" such as Shenzhen, one can wonder whether the traditional problem of a Chinese core might not just erode away in the universal solvent of modern commercial culture. 
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 10-150/ David Shambaugh,. Prof, Chinese Politics, UnIv. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY J0URNAL, FALL, "China's fragile future" p.45 ;SEG VT96
	 The government and citizenry are also deeply concerned about rising crime and corruption, both of which have become endemic. Despite widespread arrests and executions, law enforcement authorities pear to be losing the fight against both. In many cases, police and customs officials are themselves deeply involved in corruption and smuggling rings.
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10-151/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 Num. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, P. 61; THR VT96
	 Under present circumstances, with corruption so deep and widespread, almost everyone has their price for selling out China's interests. At the same time the powers that be are willing to pay whatever it takes to open up avenues of penetration, market share, and financial control. Sad to say, often it doesn't take much. An expensive car will suffice for some, a generous kickback for others. A scholarship at a prestigious foreign university for the son or daughter of a high official will put the latter in debt to whoever can arrange the favor and smooth the way for return favors to come. Thus the rot spreads..
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 10-152/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p. 19; THR VT96
	 This wave of speculation and corruption led one Chinese economist to complain that "the acceleration of the transfer to the market economy is tantamount to speedily completing the transformation of the CCP top levels into landlords and capitalists.'' What has come to be called "cadre capitalism" appears to be one of the greatest threats to China's ability to maintain social order.
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 10-153/Orville Schell, well-written author' on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS , BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 424 THR VT96
	 Next to unemployment, inflation, and rural instability, perhaps the gravest social problem was official corruption. By 1994 it was almost impossible to do anything without using influence, presenting gifts, dispensing favors, or proffering bribes. With official position being regularly used as another means to riches, scandals--some of them grand in scale-erupted with increasing frequency. In June 1993, for example, it was revealed that corrupt officials from one branch of the Agricultural Bank of China7 had issued $10 billion worth of phony letters of credit. And Shen Taifu, the manager of the Great Wall Machinery and Electronics Scientific and Technological Industry Company, had made his contribution to "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" by duping some 100,000 investors into buying 1 billion yuan ($172 million) worth of high-yield bonds with an advertised annual interest rate of 24 percent. Instead of supporting research into new kinds of power generation as promised, however. the money was squandered on high living and luxurious offices. When this house of financial cards finally collapsed, more than a hundred other officials were detained and Shen was seized trying to flee China on a phony passport. "You can't get a Chinese person to do anything these days without providing a very major incentive," Baker & McKenzie law partner Eugene Theroux told the National Journal. "Corruption has reached very serious proportions in China. It's pervasive and demoralizing."
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10-154/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 60; THR VT96
	 Corruption influences, and in the final analysis may determine, the outcome of the struggle to resolve all the other problems raised here. Tang is long on the rhetoric of the Deng regime--rules regarding- bank accounts to pay back foreign debt, rules regarding import substitution, rules regarding foreign exchange controls but how seriously can any of it be taken, given the corruption that starts right at the top and spreads downward to every nook and cranny? 
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 10-155/Richard L. Grant, Feb 1995; THE WORLD TODAY, "Political and economic reform in China," p. 39 ; MDS VT96
	 Corruption and crime are also rampant in China. The main reason why the containers mentioned at the beginning of this article are stored in Hong Kong rather than China is that their owners are afraid they will be stolen if left in China. The sons and daughters of the Party elite are enriching themselves on a massive scale and shipping their new-found wealth - according to some estimates $15bn per year - out of China. This corruption not only creates great resentment in China - anti-corruption sentiment was one of the key elements of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests - it is economically inefficient
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10-156/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 152 ; THR VT96
	 In this respect, the Chinese case would seem to fit comfortably into Daniel Chirot's interpretation of the revolutions of 1989; the cause was essentially moral. Chirot's chapter in this volume links "the endless corruption, the lies, the collapse of elementary social trust, the petty tyranny at every level" to a moral backlash. Similarly, at the height of the Chinese protests, Fang Lizhi offered the following analysis: "The corruption is so obvious now. People see it every day in their factories and offices. Everybody understands what is going on. The blatant profiteering of state offlcials is now the focal point of the movement because it is this profiteering that has directly led to the failure of the economic reform.''26 An attitude survey conducted in Beijing at about the same time provided support for Fang's assertions; the overwhelming majority of respondents saw anticorruption as the most important goal of the movement and predicted that corruption was the most likely precipitant of future unrest in China.27 A startling indication of this moralism was the nostalgia for Chairman Mao that surfaced during the spring protests.2a One popular ditty expressed the general sentiment: "Mao Zedong's son went to the front lines [and was killed as a soldier in the Korean War]; Zhao Ziyang's son smuggles color television sets."
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10-157/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. of Political Science at the University of California, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "From revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 198 ;THR VT96
	 Corruption among the cadre leaders aggravated the social and economic problems. In transitional China, the boundary between legal and illegal ways of making money has never been clear. The dual price system - one fixed by the state, and the other by the market - and the close tie between political clout and economic power provided ample opportunities for the children of high-ranking officials to make large profits. The senior revolutionary leaders apparently had learned that they could not pass on political power to their children, but wealth was another matter. Moreover, helping their children get rich was one way of accumulating the capital that China needed for economic development.
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 10-158/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 20; THR VT96
	 Pressures to crack down on such corruption built up through the spring and on Party Day (the anniversary of the rounding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1921) the People's Daily quoted Deng Xiao- ping as warning against "a world dominated by corruption, embezzlement,- and bribery.'' Shortly thereafter, no doubt prompted by Deng's blunt admonition, Jiang Zemin presided over a six-day meeting to launch a new campaign against corruption. The history of such campaigns,- however, is not encouraging. In 1986, Hu Yaobang, then the general secretary of the CCP, presidedlover a similar effort. 
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10-159/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 198; THR VT96
	 As for the corruption under the two-track system, there are only two ways out. First is rapid implementation of reform, including political change, so that "power cannot be changed into money." Second is emphasis on the integrity of the cadres. The former is difficult to implement in a short period of time. The latter has been adopted, therefore, as the only means to cope with the corruption. It will help, but a system of checks among independent actors also is needed. Such a system, however, would be viewed as "bourgeois liberalization" in the post-Tiananmen ideological atmosphere in China.
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10-160/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .121; THR VT96
	 While these changes in authority and responsibility have helped make possible the growth and development of education at all levels, they have also created new problems. With devolution of authority, financial concerns began to preoccupy local-level educators. Whether at elite institutions of higher education or ordinary elementary and secondary schools, the chase for money, prompted by the need to "create income," has redefined the work of school administrators and diverted them from many educational issues. There have also been persistent reports of students dropping out of school in order to make money and of teachers losing their focus on teaching because of extensive moonlighting in more lucrative areas.'
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10-161/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .125; THR VT96
	 Agrowing chorus of criticism has begun to challenge these positive assumptions about the link between education and the socialist market economy. In particular, critics warn against the "commodification" of education, that is, the reduction of education to a set of economic transactions. Certainly, if one looks at major developments in Chinese education in recent years, the problems of the commodification of schooling appear salient. Three areas in particular illustrate the challenges of education's linkage to a transforming economy: the appraisal of education's value, the notion of schools as enterprises, and the situation of teachers.
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10-162/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .131; THR VT96
	 The second problematic area in educational reform concerns the issue of schools as enterprises. The major administrative and fiscal reforms of decentralization and diversification of school funding have naturally led to greater autonomy for schools. Recall that the reform period has produced not only an increase in government revenues for education but also a broadened base of school revenues outside the government. With devolution of responsibility and diversification of support, school funding has become less predictable. The increased role for locally generated funds and the expansion of possible sources of funds have resulted in communities and schools needing to find a greater proportion of their own support. Education officials and school principals are being encouraged.to be entrepreneurs.
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10-163/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.l30; THR VT96
	 The intervention of economic motivation in education is not restricted to student behavior. Local officials have diverted funds for education to "more productive" uses, 'suggesting by their actions that they see education simply as a source of income that can be drawn on to serve their own interests. That this has been criticized by the minister of education indicates that the problem is extensive. Ironically, the criticlsm of this behavior comes as the center reiterates the pivotal role education plays in economic development; it is education's link to things economic that is part of the problem.
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10-164/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .134; THR VT96
	 While such contracts are regulated by central academic authorities if they lead to degrees, there is no limit on what a university can earn through short-term nondegree-oriented training. The income generated is valuable, but it creates other problems. Academic faculty may be kept extremely busy with teaching and training that have little academic or professional significance but are purely money-making exercises. By the same token, research contracts with industry may distract research personnel toward routine and scientifically uninteresting concerns. By an ironic twist, this commodification of knowledge has the potential not only to undermine political control but also to jeopardize academic standards. The commodification of schooling--at all levels--has the serious repercussion of diverting schools and their personnel from the central tasks of teaching, learning, and generating new knowledge.
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10-165/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p.141; THR VT96
	 As Chinese leaders and educators discuss education for market so- cialism, the challenge is to define once more the balance between the political and economic goals of education. In 1993 former minister of education and current member of the State Education Commission He Dongchang, in speaking about the relationship between the reform of the economic system and education, argued that education is influenced by the socialist market economy and must serve it, but that schools themselves are not exactly like enterprises and cannot be run by the same management principles. He took issue with the idea of the com- modification of education.s6 In taking this perspective, he raised the troubling question facing educators in China today: How can education respond to the market economy without entering the market? The challenge of addressing this question is at the heart of the process of educational reform in China today.
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10-166/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .135; THR VT96
	 Critics note that this emphasis on locating funding--whether through redlefining students as resources, strengthening horizontal links with other units, or engaging in money-making activities--makes the process of education and those at its heart--students-commodities to be bought and sold. Accompanying this commodification process is an intensified stratification of education. In a competitive market for good students and good teachers (to produce impressive test results that allow schools to recruit high-priced students or negotiate lucrative contracts with other units), not all schools are equal. The unleashing of market mechanisms in this process results in traditionally strong schools getting more resources (and hence staying strong) and weaker schools finding few avenues for income generation.
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10-167/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, II "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p.113; THR VT96
	 China's education has undergone far-reaching reform at every level of the system. In the Deng Xiaoping era, with its focus on modernization, China's leaders have linked school reform with national growth and development. As one commentator explained, "The 21st century is around the corner. The destiny, fall, or rise of China depends to a large extent on the development of education today.'' Such statements suggest the importance accorded to education in national debates; they also hint at the difficulty of achieving success when the stakes are so high. It is this combination of high expectations for education and persistent problems in its reform that has characterized Chinese education in recent years.'
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 10-168/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .129 THR VT96
	 Similar crises of missions can be found in some sectors of higher education as the market economy redefines the meaning and value of a university diploma. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, economic concerns and discontent found expression in rising enrollments in commercially desirable fields such as management, international trade, foreign languages, and law. Interest in graduate study in academically demanding fields dropped off to such a degree, that quotas for some programs remained unfilled and faculty were concerned as to where younger successors to established scholarship would arise. The two dominant obsessions among young people in the major national universities were going abroad or finding an entry into the commodity sector of the economy upon graduation. This was in striking contrast to their attraction to government and academic careers in the part.
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 10-169/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p.130; THR VT96
	 In short, while some advocate tightening the relationship between education and the economy, in particular through a variety of vocational education programs, others point to the problem of education being affected by the economy in ways that transform its meaning and worth. Students increasingly interpret schooling as being valuable only if they can see an immediate link to the commodity economy. Questions are raised among educators about what the purposes of schooling should be and hence what knowledge is central. Although the state has tried to reassert the centrality of politics to education, it encounters schools, and people within them, that are far more immersed in the pursuit of economic goals.
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10-170/Perry Link, Prof. East Asian Studies Princeton University, Spring 1993; DAEDALUS US, "China's 'Core' Problem," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 13; THR VT96
	 . In the money-first ethos that has prevailed recently in China, In the money first ethos that has prevailed recently in China the underlying cultural values of education and proper behavior have seemed to recede. But it would be naive to suppose that such a long tradition has suddenly disappeared. Moreover, the continuing satire on official corruption, which remains lively and common in China's oral network of gossip called xiaodao xiaoxi (alleyway news), confirms the persistence of popular moral indignation. But indignation, of course, must rest on positive values. In order to judge certain behavior to be improper, one needs at least a hazy concept of what proper behavior is. The problem in China today is that there is no publicly accepted set of moral values to define proper behavior. 
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10-171/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.113; THR VT96
	 High expectations for education are nothing new in Chinese policy debates. China has a long history of seeing education as a solution to broader problems. Whether by using an examination system as the basis for a national civil service in imperial China or by adopting aspects of education in other countries as a way to strengthen China, Chinese leaders long before the 20th century saw education as a means to meet the country's economic, political, and social needs. As China faces the 21st century, its leaders have once again called for revitalizing education .
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10-172/Huang Shu-Min, Prof. Anthropology Iowa State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Rural China in Transition," Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.109; THR VT96
	 The second problem posed by China's recent rural development Lies m the widerung gap between rising expectations, especially among youth, and the limited opportunities young people face. The members of today's younger generation have experienced relatively little harshness in life and have received more education than their parents and older siblings. To them, the famine of the Great Leap Forward and the bloodshed of the Cultural Revolution are events of the remote past. With increased incomes, peasant families are investing in their children's education beyond the elementary school level. For instance, the enrollment for agricultural middle schools and vocational middle schools has increased sixfold--from 454,000 students in 1980 to 2,823,000 in 1989.20 This enhanced education has improved the younger generation's understanding of the government and the rights of citizens. The pervasiveness of the mass media, especially the global reach of television, has exposed them to alternatives beyond their village. In a sense, rural China has also entered the information age.
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10-173/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p 139; THR VT96
	 It is not surprising, then, that with a somewhat freer labor market and growing commodity consciousness, many find options other than teaching- more appealing. Many experienced teachers have been willing to give up the benefits of their permanent employment (and the household registration card that comes with it) to seek opportunities outside of teaching. Teacher education programs, despite a range of inducements, have been hard-pressed to recruit good students. Despite some well- publicized examples of institutions that have successfully recruited strong teachers to professional preparation programs, reports of programs- that have not been able to fill their quotas are more common. An especially discouraging example comes from a provincial teacher -education program that had anticipated admitting 147 students but found, at the time of the entrance examinations, that only one student had actually listed the program as a preference.
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10-174/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.14O; THR VT96
	 The impact of the socialist market economy' has been in many ways unwelcome in terms of recruiting and retaining good teachers. The problems of shortage and quality have not been easily resolved through market-oriented changes. This is in large part because those market incentives that have been available within education have not been able to compete with those outside it. Yet economics does not explain all. Past political events such as the Cultural Revolution negatively affected the recruitment of new teachers. More recent events have also - influenced the situation of teachers. In the wake of the repression of the democracy movement in 1989, the political dimension of teaching and the political role of teachers once again gained prominence. Teachers in China (as elsewhere) are asked to differing degrees to serve as both agents of the state and representatives of technical expertise. Finding a balance between these two tasks is one reason teaching is a complex and ambiguous practice. As the state reasserts the importance of the first of these tasks--through attention to teachers' political loyalties and their teaching of moral and political values--many teachers, especially young ones, complain of the vulnerability of their positions compared with professions where the tasks are defined more in business terms. - Teachers, and the institutions of teacher education that prepare them, are thus caught in a search for a metaphor to define their work. They are seen as the keys to modernization, the "mother tool." But they are also asked to be the political guardians of the next generation.
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10-175/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.l38; THR VT96
	 Teachers in the early 1990s are sometimes being paid with IOUs, which only exacerbates the long-standing problem of teaching being poorly rewarded. Teachers also face other material hardships, such as the shortage of housing. In addition to material issues, discussions about the position of teachers inevitably turn to the relatively low social status accorded them. In this regard the state has launched energetic publicity campaigns to encourage people to "respect teachers." But for the ordinary person, reports about teachers being publicly humiliated, assaulted, and even killed are perhaps more powerful than official
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/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Re form, Edited by W illi am A. Joseph, p .140; THR VT96
	 During this period of the construction of a socialist market economy, competing economic and political priorities have complicated the task of improving teachers' conditions and the practice of teaching. 
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 10-177/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.114; THR VT96
	 Given education's close ties to domestic policy, it is perhaps not surprising that in the years since the rounding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Chinese educational policy has experienced dramatic shifts; each new major political period produced an education agenda that sharply critiqued the previous era's and launched new reforms. The accumulation of such reversals over time produced a demoralized teaching force, made the profession of teaching singularly unattractive, weakened the secondary-education sector, and made higher education particularly vulnerable to political change. At the same time, given education's role as a window on the world and hence its international linkage, educational policies and the content of schooling have undergone often-intense scrutiny and redefinition as national policy has struggled to redefine China's relationship to the rest of the world.
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 10-178/Lynn Webster Paine, Prof. Teacher Education and Sociology Michigan State University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Progress and Problems in China's Educational Reform, Edited by Will iam A. Joseph, p.l2l; THR VT96
	 A central thread that connects the promises and problems of - education in the reform era is the challenge of negotiating a balance between the economic and political meanings of education. The government undertook educational reform in order to promote economic - development. But student involvement in the democracy movement at the end of the 1980s demonstrated that the effects of education's expansion, differentiation, and reform are not limited to economic change. Tiananmen clearly showed that education was linked to politics. After the repression of the democracy movement, students and teachers were held partly accountable for the turmoil, and higher education in - particular became a target for official criticism. At the same time, the 1990s brought potential conflicts between individual interests in education as a key to personal advancement and state goals that, whether - understood economically or politically, put collective interests first. These tensions between individual and collective aspirations are most clearly expressed in the growing discussions about the role of education in the development of China's "socialist market economy."
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 10-179/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 92. ; THR VT96
	 The collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet ' Union, and their subsequent transformation toward capitalist marker sys- terns, appears to have made democracy and the market system the winner of the great contest between East and West. Yet this has not brought about stability and prosperity for the countries concerned. In the former Eastern bloc, the transition has caused all kinds of crisis and instability: Economic crisis has created a serious threat to stability. 
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10-180/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 2 ;THR VT96
	 Yet despite the temporary pause in reform momentum that followed the crackdown, reform has henceforth resumed with apparently undiminished vigor: China's gross domestic product (GDP), already the third largest in the world, according to new World Bank calculations, surged In 1992 by 12.8 percent (the fastest in the world); per capita GDPjumped by nearly 20 percent; and China attracted U.S.$11.6 billion-worth (all dollars are U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted) of foreign investment--nearly as much as was lured by the United States, the world's biggest economy. At the same time, despite the regime's best efforts to put worries to rest through a rotation of elites at the Fourteenth Party Congress (October 1992) and the Eighth National People's Congress (NPC) (March 1993), the structure of the political system has remained essentially Leninist, leaving it still susceptible to factional splits, purges, succession crises, mass movements, and other forms of politically driven instability. Although China's unique synthesis of economic reform and political dictatorship has thus far spared it the fate of the former Soviet Union, how well can such a patchwork of contradictions be expected to survive the storms yet to come?
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 10-181/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 34; THR VT96
	 Chinese politics has evolved considerably in the five years since Tiananmen. Rather than trying to reestablish the planned economy, the party is working to build a "socialist market economy." Rather than virulently denouncing "bourgeois liberalization," the party is striking a more positive note of "building socialism with Chinese characteristics." Most important, rather than being caught in the throes of a decade-long debate over the course of reform (as defined by conservatives and reformers), the polity is orienting itself toward the post-Deng period. These are not trivial changes.
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 10-182/Christine Wong, Prof. Economics University of California, Santa Cruz, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "China's Economy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 44 ; THR VT96
	 However laudable all of these reforms are in reducing distortions and injustices in the economy, they form a package that may be creating a volatile social climate. Especially in combination with the increased layoffs and bankruptcies, they are contributing to a sense of growing economic insecurity among the populace.
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 10-183/Orville Schel I, wel l-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 419; THR VT96
	 With materialism the .new standard of success, corruption--cumself-aggrandizement running rampant, the old values of hard struggle and sacrifice sneered at and supplanted by unalloyed greed, state subsidies for everything from publishing houses to art troupes being slashed, and low-brow commercial pop culture rushing in to fill the vacuum, China did seem to be losing not only its intellectual, but also its spiritual soul. To resist what the NCNA unabashedly called a "cultural desert," some officials in Guangdong tried to impose a 3 percent vulgarity tax on bars, karaoke clubs, and dance halls in order to create a special fund to support "serious" art. But what the government really feared was not losing its culture or even its soul, but its political power. And while unsuppressed democratic opposition was an obvious danger, as the middle of the decade neared, Party leaders began looking with equal apprehension toward the social dislocation their own economic boom had begun to create.
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 10-184/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduct ion," p. 6; THR VT96
	 Reform creates disequilibrium by its successes in liberating social forces, discrediting old values, and generating rising expectations; unless political structures change fast enough to accommodate the developments, the disequilibrium can destroy the government. Thirteen years of reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping dramatically weakened the state and rejuvenated society but did not end the domination of the hegemonic party-state.
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10-185/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.61; THR VT96
	 Given the depth and breadth of corruption in China today, the decadent moral atmosphere, the get-rich-quick fever, the scramble to sell influence for a price, the porosity of the borders, the burgeoning tide of imports, the flight of capital, the warped investment strategy, the comprador ideology, the tenuous trade balance, the cultural surrender, the centrifugal spin, who can possibly guarantee that on entering the world market China will be able to maintain autonomy, independence, economic initiative, and self-reliance in the main?,
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10-186/Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Prof.at the Univ. of California, Santa Barbara, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Connection Between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p. 107; THR VT96
	 The working class bears the brunt of this social cost. There can be two ways in which the working class reacts to the marketization process. The first is resentment at the economic sacrifices. Mass dissatisfaction finds an avenue for articulation through the spaces opened up b>' liberalization. Hard-liners, who oppose transition, often use this mass discontent in their attempt to arrest the reform process. Nevertheless, it is also true that the command economy has miserably failed the working class's expectations. It is therefore possible for the working class to accept economic sacrifices in exchange for participation in the political process from which they have been excluded. But the opposition united against the regime inevitably splits itself into those who favor differentiation and those who advocate social protection.
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10-187/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduct ion, P. 13, THR VT96
	 As faith in Marxism waned, the regime appealed to nationalism and promises of improved living standards. Admiring accounts of wealthy entrepreneurs contributing to China's new prosperity conveyed the impression that "to be wealthy is glorious" but did not link this behavior broader ethical and moral values. In a world just discovering the pleasures of consumerism and filled with uncultured, nouveau riche "operators;' idealism and self-sacrifice seem slightly old-fashioned. After seeing the unfair advantages enjoyed by children of party officials, most Chinese conclude personal relationships (guanxi) are more important than merit.
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10-188/Dorothy Solinger, Prof. Political Science University of California, Irvine, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, Urban Entrepreneurs and the State: The Merger of State and Society," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.123; THR VT96
	 The onset of reform has begun to erode this singularity of the path to power, just as it has seemingly freed nonstate actors, by opening opportunities for new occupational alternatives for the members of the long-isolated society. Nonetheless, the differentiation of social forces that is accompanying the reform is quite a partial one, so that categories that were previously discrete and unrelated have instead become in some senses symbiotic. The result is a continuation (if in quite altered form) of the state's social hegemony, under which a business sector that is still largely incorporated and captured has appeared. The presence of this new sector has recast officialdom as well. Thus as the monolith of the party-state's elite stratum breaks apart, freeing both official and merchant from the fixity of the former party-controlled frame, the pieces chiming off it are all different amalgams of that monolith. 
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10-189/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FAT ,T, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 67; THR VT96
	 The domestic implications of Leninist capitalism for China are also immense. Rising income disparities between regions--one study indicates that per capita income in southern, coastal China as already 16 times that of the interior northwest--will get worse. So will class differences. Those becoming rich will usually be members of the Communist Party elite, their relatives and cronies, or entrepreneurs who pay off the Communists. In the short term, at least, it's unlikely that the disparities and the corruption will prompt a political struggle between the haves and the havenots. More likely is a huge, public order problem, with millions of poor peasants' sons trekking coastward to seek their fortunes.
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 10-190/Henry Rosemont, Jr., Prof. of Philosophies and Religions of Asia at St. Mary's College of Maryland, 1991; A CHINESE MIRROR: MORAL REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, p. 89; THR VT96
	 One answer to this question, of course, is that it would : become more costly and difficult for multinational corporations to conduct international business under such arrangements, which is very probably why the U.S. media so consistently slant the coverage of such tendencies toward bemoaning them. The vast majority of corporations with offices in China pared down, but did not close up, following the Beijing slaughter; they did not want Bush to impose strong sanctions (he didn't), and they want him to continue supporting most-favored-nation status for the country (and he does). These corporations favor a strong central government in China--and in the Soviet Union, and elsewhere--which is responsive to capitalist investment. Under such conditions, there are relatively few people to deal with, stability is more assured, continuity guaranteed, and economies of scale to be obtained, all of which maximize profits. This point should be emphasized. Those who insist on a transition from a command to a freemarket economic system never suggest that the governments stop investing, because if they did, no transitions could occur (and foreign investment would be unsupported and unprotected). Capitalist investors, and the economists who support them, uniformly want the formerly socialist governments to make many but different investments than they did before.
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10-191/Dorothy Solinger, Assoc. prof. of political science at Univ. of Cal ifornia-Irvine 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Future of China's Industrial ization Program: Why Should the United States Care," edited by Will iam T. Tow, p. 112; THR VT96
	 Thus, in the United States' role as an importer, China's present industrial policy emphasizing basic industries and exports could pose certain challenges to American businesses. If so, however, it is more because of Washington's rising trade deficit with the PRC than it is because of any specific product competition between the Americans and the Chinese.
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10-192/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, p. 247; THR VT96
	 Gender equality of the sort advocated by some schools of Western feminism was never on the agenda for Deng Xiaoping and his followers. At the same time, Article 48 of the 1982 Constitution of the PRC lays down that women 'enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, political, economic, cultural and social, including family life? The CCP and Deng Xiaoping undoubtedly regard a degree of gender equality as being 'modern'. However, while many women have benefited from the reforms, especially in the cities, the modernization process has also allowed the strong revival of the patriarchal family in the countryside. This has militated strongly in favour of men and against gender equality. Quite a few women may well have been more equal during the Cultural Revolution than in the period of reform.
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10-193/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young,Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 201;THR VT96
	 One of the implications of all of these explanations is that the status of women has fallen in the countryside during the era of Deng Xiaoping. The old family values have been allowed to reassert themselves and the population policy has had the effect of encouraging this trend. The situation is better in the cities, where women have, for example, joined in the race to make money with great enthusiasm. Indeed, women in economic business actually outnumbered men in the late 1980s, female representation being 38.92 per cent in 1982 and 50.75 per cent in 1987.27 Few are suggesting real equality between the sexes, either in the cities or the countryside, but since the rural areas still contain the great majority of the population, the general picture is probably even less equality between the sexes...
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10-194/Edward Liu, Staff Writer, January 14, 1994; AsianWeek, "Prostitution In China--Socialist-Market Style", Volume & Number: V.15; N.20, Page: p. 6; PMS VT96
	 To be fair about it, some Chinese females do work legitimate jobs in karaoke bars, barbershops, discotheques and massage parlors, but many others, out of sheer greed, moonlight as prostitutes to make the fast buck, or yuan.
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10-195/Edward Liu, Staff Writer, January 14, 1994; AsianWeek, "Prostitution In China--Socialist-Market Style", Volume & Number: V.15; N.20, Page: p. 6; PMS VT96
	 The world's oldest profession is not only alive and well in the world's oldest living civilization; it is thriving and joining China's economic boom. In China's boom cities of Shenzen, Shanghai and Canton, the phenomenal growth of karaoke bars, discos, dance halls, barbershops doubling as massage parlors have spawned an industry of lust and lasciviousness which is quite amazing. This is obviously antithetical to traditional Confucian values.
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10-196/Edward Liu, Staff Writer, January 14, 1994; AsianWeek, "Prostitution In China--Socialist-Market Style", Volume & Number: V.15; N.20, Page: p. 6; PMS VT96
	 By the latest 1993 projection of the World Health organization, China reportedly has 15,000 people with AIDS infection, and it is growing explosively in China's booming socialist market economy. God knows how many HIV cases which remain inactive or asymptomatic at this stage! If Thailand and the Philippines are any indications, I surmise that at the dawning of the Asia Pacific century, the growth of AIDS in China would reach crisis proportion.
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10-197/Edward Liu, Staff Writer, January 14, 1994; AsianWeek, "Prostitution In China--Socialist-Market Style", Volume & Number: V.15; N.20, Page: p. 6; PMS VT96
	 Prostitution is China's poor man's "get-rich-quick" scheme in a socialist market economy. Prostitution is not a capital-intensive venture. All one needs is a bed, some linen, a few chairs, a red light bulb, a steady supply of condoms and a woman with good, strong hips who can playact, moan and groan. It is not a particularly glorious economic activity. But one can do relatively well in a brief period of time. And let's face it, for some girls, it beats working in a sweatshop for from $1 to $4 a day!
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10-198/Edward Liu, Staff Writer, January 14, 1994; AsianWeek, "Prostitution In China--Socialist-Market Style", Volume & Number: V.15; N.20, Page: p. 6; PMS VT96
	 In China today, if you are poor, don't have brain power or political connections, spreading your legs is a sure way of raising venture capital. Young girls gravitate toward this kind of fast life because the money is so good. In Chinese cities like Canton, Shenzen, Beijing, Sian and Shanghai, prostitution has become part of the social, cultural, economic fabric of cosmopolitan consumer life.
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10-199/Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journal ism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p.49 ; MDS VT96
	 A declining number of eligible young women may account for rising prostitution and kidnapping of young women. The China Daily reported x5,000 cases of gang kidnappings of women, sold as brides to peasants in x993. During the same year, 240,000 prostitutes were arrested, according to the All-China Federation of Women, a government-controlled organization that enlists and mobilizes Chi- nese women in support of state policies.
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10-200/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.71; THR VT96
	 A democratic revolution led by social forces outside the system, such as the Democratic China Front organized by some of the exiled critical intellectuals and students studying abroad, is also implausible, although not impossible. No revolution will succeed in China without the support from the workers and peasants, and the chance for democratic forces in exile--which are prone to split over the control of the movement as well as on crucial issues such as the means by which to achieve their goal--to coalesce with them appears to be very slim.
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10-201/Lowell Dittmer, Ph.D. Political Science, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Patterns Leadership in Reform China," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.49;THR VT96
	 The decline of ideology has rendered mass participation--at least the only type of mass participation that affords leaders a role as leaders rather than possible targets--infeasible. During the three decades of postliberation Maoist rule, mass participation took place exclusively through mass movements or campaigns. The ground rules were spelled out in the "mass line" (i.e., "from the masses, to the masses" and "out of struggle, unity"), which allowed a certain amount of tactical flexibility to accommodate local conditions and requirements but presupposed movement toward common objectives-laid down by the central leadership. The existence of a common ideological language and value system in which everyone was painstakingly socialized made it possible to generate consensus on these collective objectives. Certain obvious alternatives (e.g., pursuit of private interests) were not even conceivable within that language and value system. The decay or discrediting (with the complicity of the reformers) of that language and value system makes it increasingly difficult to generate consensus on positive collective goals. Sending young people down to the countryside was quietly abandoned at the beginning of the Deng era, as were such programs as barefoot doctors and local medical facilities, off-season water conservancy construction projects, and worker emulation drives. The only campaigns launched under leadership auspices in the post-Mao era have been focused on essentially negative objectives, in which the masses would be enjoined to renounce certain of their own ideological failings-spiritual pollution, bourgeois liberalism, and other "ill winds" (bu zhengzhi feng). Negative ideological campaigns ran at cross-purposes to the logic of the economic reforms, which were all premised on appeals to material incentives. Whenever this contradiction cut into economic performance, the campaign had to be curtailed, sometimes after only a few months.
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10-202/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduction," p. 30; THR VT96
	 No adequate channels for grassroots protest exist in China today. A major transformation is not imminent while the first-generation revolutionaries remain in power, but significant change is inherent in the situation China faces. China's involvement in the international community and its search for great-power status force the government to modify domestic policies. In order to maintain access to international credits and trade, especially annual renewal of most-favored-nation status by the U.S. Congress, it must make minimal concessions to human rights concerns and allow reporters to ask embarrassing questions at press conferences. The domestic scene also imposes a context that cannot be ignored: the rise of a bureaucratic technocracy, limited leadership institutionalization, autonomous private organization, coastal zones open to foreign influences, and the appearance of new social groupings. These seeds of potential change could blossom under the right conditions. But in June 1989 even the combined weight of massive popular discontent, the proreformist tendencies of important components of the party-state--including the party secretary general, the National People's Congress, some retired marshals of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and much of the new bureaucracy--and active agitation by urban entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and students were insufficient to carry the day. Instead, the armed forces, acknowledging the informal authority of China's elders, crushed the most spontaneous expression of the Chinese people in the twentieth century.
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10-203/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 150 ; THR VT96
	 The incestuous relationship between state and society that had developed as a consequence of communism rendered familiar forms of protest ineffective. Although danwei could serve as a vehicle to mobilize millions of people for a Tiananmen demonstration, because these units (whether schools, factories, or Party organs) were ultimately dependent on the state for their very survival, they could easily be demobilized once the state leadership was united in its determination to take action. The frailty of "civil society" in contemporary Chinese cities, even when compared to the late imperial and Republican scene, has made much of the old protest repertoire anachronistic. Lacking autonomy from state domination, urbanites restage the pageant of May Fourth without the social power that invigorated the initial performance.
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10-204/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. p. 166 ; THR VT96
	 The omnipresence of'the Chinese Communist state, even more than its Confucian forerunner or its East European counterparts, has inhibited the florescence of "civil society" and rendered the formation of cross-class coali-tions correspondingly difficult and dangerous. Accordingly, Andrew Walder cautions against interpreting the Tiananmen upheaval "as a direct expression of the growth of an independent society. Such independence was greatly restricted in China relative to Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union.''73 But if the answer lies not in a developed "civil society," how do we explain China's recent turmoil? For Walder, "the key to the 1989 upheaval appears to be the splintering of the central leadership and the Party-state apparatus after the initial student protests of April.''74 There is considerable merit in Walder's emphasis on elites and political institutions. As we have seen in the case of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, elements of the state did indeed play a significant role in facilitating the protest movement of 1989. At the same time, however, we must not underestimate the potential for self-gener-ated political action by nonstate entities. The traditions of Chinese civil society are admittedly weaker and different from those of Eastern Europe. Absent in China are the Catholic church of Poland, the old democratic parties of Hungary, or the dissident intellectual circles of the Soviet Union and Czecho-slovakia. Yet there is evidence that recent reforms have encouraged the resurgence of meaningful traditions of extrastate economic and associational behavior in China, just as in Eastern Europe. Today's independent entrepreneurs, practitioners of folk religion, and members of autonomous labor unions are all building on patterns of collective identity and action with proven records of resisting state domination in the Chinese context. These practices may well lack the democratic character of the institutions of civil society in Eastern Europe. But as Strand has noted, "When Chinese seek to revive a democratic tradition, it is a tradition of movements, not institutions, they are drawing upon.''76 And China's merchants, peasants, and workers--as well as students--can rightfully lay claim to a vital part of that inheritance.
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10-205/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p.148 ; THR VT96
	 A second type of explanation would seem to have more staying power. This is the view that stresses the peasant nature of China. Mired in poverty and the 800 million rural dwellers are held responsible for China's political impasse. The tendency to lay the blame for tyranny at the feet of the peasantry is a familiar theme in social science analysis on both the left and the right. Marx claimed that Louis Napoleon's rise could be attributed to those French "potatoes in a sack," a notion that parallels the explanation many a modernization theorist has proffered for Third World dictatorships. Among Chinese intellectuals, this line of reasoning has been especially pronounced. Mao's cult of personality and the resultant tragedies of the Cultural Revo ution and its aftermath--are said to have sprung from the benighted peas antry's undemocratic-messianic yearnings. It was these peasants, we are told, who were so attached to the anthem of the Cultural Revolution: "The East is red; the sun is rising. China has given birth to a Mao Zedong. He works for the people's happiness; he is our great savior." The same adulation that had propped up imperial despots for thousands of years was now being transferred to Communist tyrants--first Mao and then Deng Xiaoping. Little wonder that democracy advocates like Fang Lizhi allude to the need to limit peasant political participation; democracy demands an enlightened citizenry--some thing that in China only the intellectuals claim to be.
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10-206/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 152 ; THR VT96
	 Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the demand for dialogue was the limited cast of characters included in the request. Perpetuating a Confucian mentality that assigned to intellectuals the role of spokespeople for the masses, students assumed that they were the only segment of society whose voice deserved to be heard. The disregard for peasants and workers was a prejudice that intellectuals shared with state leaders. As Young argues in Chapter 1, Deng Xiaoping--like Chiang Kaishek and Yuan Shikai before him--was a reformer who viewed the Chinese peasantry as an obstacle to the fulfillment of national objectives. When each of these reformers turned repressor, he pointed to the "backward" peasants as the reason why China's march toward representative government would have to be postponed. Similarly, in last year's "democracy" movement, students were reportedly "horrified at the suggestion that truly popular elections would have to include peasants, who would certainly outvote educated people like themselves.''22 As a young intellectual in Wuhan explained, "While the people support our aims of stamping out corruption, they just don't understand the ideas of freedom and democracy."
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10-207/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 160 ; THR VT96
	 The uprising of 1989 was a dramatic expression of the Chinese people's appetite and aptitude for political criticism. Influenced by forty years of socialism as well as by international cultural currents, the demonstrators staged an innovative performance. Dunce caps from the Cultural Revolution, rock music from Taiwan, headbands from South Korea, and a hunger strike from Gandhi's India all contributed a seemingly contemporary and cosmopolitan flavor. Yet in its core values the student movement was in fact remarkably traditional. Thanks to the special bond between state and scholar that had persisted for so long under the imperial system and was reconstituted (on different terms, to be sure) under the socialist system, Chinese students engaged in an exclude of protest that served to reinforce preexisting authority relations. At the same time, however, other social groups showed themselves ready to reclaim the true spirit of the May Fourth Movement--in which a fledgling civil society had challenged a troubled Chinese state on both moral and material grounds.
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10-208/Elizabeth Perry, Prof. of political science at the Univ. of California at Berkeley, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Casting a Chinese "Democracy" Movement: The Roles of Students, Workers, and Entrepreneurs," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p.158; THR VT96
	 The tragic ending to China's uprising of 1989 is explained neither by the salience of its revolutionary ideology nor by the silence of rural inhabitants. If the persistence of "tradition" served as a brake on political transformation, the relevant tradition was not that of the committed revolutionary or the conservative peasantry. Ironically, it was the very instigators of the Tiananmen protest--the urban intellectuals--who appeared most wedded to a limiting legacy. In their style of remonstrance (presenting petitions and banners and demanding dialogue with the authorities), their search for political patrons (emphasizing the need for state strengthening and switching quickly from one "hero" to the next), and above all their stress on moralism (contrasting their own selfless martyrdom to the crass materialism of the masses), the students evinced a brand of political behavior and belief replete with the stigmata of the past. The traditionalism of student protesters was not due to some immutable Confucian culture, forever lurking like a sea monster beneath the surface of China's political waters--waiting to seize and sink any unsuspecting would- be democrat who happened to swim by.7@ Rather, the intellectuals' political proclivities were shaped by the close links between state and scholar that persist in contemporary China.
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10-209/Shigeki Hakamada, Prof in the International Politics and Economics Dept. at Aoyama Gakuin Univ., Tokyo, and Gilbert Rozman, Prof. of sociology at Princeton Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS,"The Soviet Union and China: Coping with Modernity," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.158 ; THR VT 96
 It would be hasty for us to conclude that the lowest level of Chinese society is now well suited for a new era. The reassertion of traditional entrepreneurialism and of aspirations for learning, which at first seemed very impressive, have also been accompanied by widespread skepticism. Proprietors must contend not only with corruption from above but also with the "red-eye disease" of some envious communities, which do not recognize the individual's right to the extra benefits from his or her hard labor. 
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10-210/Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, P. 193; THR VT96
	 Another problem is the population in the rural areas. This will become one of the biggest troubles in China in the near future. With modernization, it is natural for many people to move from rural areas to cities (social mobilization). Especially in China, income gaps between coastal areas and the hinterlands are great. There are push factors in rural areas such as the rise of productivity or the overpopulation. In cities there are pull factors such as expanded needs for labor and higher income. In China for a long time this movement was artificially controlled. The major means for that are the strict registration and rationing systems.26 It has been very' difficult to change registration from rural areas to cities. After the reform started, though the system existed as before, its implementation became more difficult because of the general loosening in society. As a result, China began to suffer from a population explosion in its cities. The leadership tried to continue a policy of control by adopting measures for absorbing the rural overpopulation, not in agriculture but in township industries across small towns in rural areas. The policy' of population control was about to change in a more liberal direction easing the restrictions on movement on the eve of the Tiananmen incident. The former population policy, however, was continued after the tighter austerity program started in 1988. Many who had lived for a long time in cities, both legally and illegally, were sent back to rural areas to become a potential unemployed population. Still, it is reported that there are about 60 to 80 million "floating" (liudong) persons in China.
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10-211/Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p .21; THR VT96
	 At the same time that peasant incomes have stagnated or fallen, rural cadres have apparently increased their economic demands on peasants. Whether they have done so in order to meet higher-level pressures for the construction of public works or to enrich themselves--both appear
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 10-212 /Joseph Fewsmith, Prof. International Relations Boston University, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Reform, Resistance, and the Politics of Succession," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 21; THR VT96
	 China's greatest challenge in maintaining social order, however, comes from the peasants in the countryside. Over the last several years, as the growth in rural enterprises has propelled the economies of the provinces along the eastern seaboard and as the prices of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, plastic sheeting, and diesel fuel have increased, the gap between the coastal and interior parts of the country has widened and the income of peasants in some inland areas has declined. Not only did the gap between the per capita income of peasants in the coastal and interior regions nearly double between 1985 and 1992, but the real income of peasants in the interior region actually fell, in some cases quite substantially. Data show that from 1985 to 1990, per capita peasant income in the provinces of Henan, Hubei, and Hunan fell 9.5 percent, 10.5 percent, and 19.5 percent, respectively.
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10-213/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 77; THR VT96
	 The structural reform of China's rural economy is at a critical juncture. Since the events of June 1989, the central leadership has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the collective segment of the rural economy. But public pronouncements cannot hide the differences in approach to economic reform among Chinese leaders. Attempts to attach equal importance to both the collective and the individual components of the rural economy are indicative of such ideological divisions. At the same time, however, the leaders seem to be aware of the need to reassure peasants about the stability of reform policies. Tian Jiyun, a Vice-Premier of the State Council, was seeking to send this message when he said: 'We should not boost the collective economy through taking back land already contracted to peasants.' Whatever the outcome of policy debates and power struggles within the CCP, a return to the rural commune policies appears highly unlikely.
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10-214/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 96 ; THR VT96
	 Third, rural society is moving toward industrialization through the fast development of township industries. More than one-third of the national income now comes from township industries, and around 120 million workers are employed by them, more workers than employed by state owned industries.
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 10-215 /Tatsumi Okabe, Prof. at the Faculty of Law, Tokyo Metropolitan Univ., 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "China: The Process of Reform," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 194; THR VT96
	 Remedies by the leadership are threefold. One is to encourage labor intensive township industries. They are not very effective except in some well-situated areas. Second, the government has tried to increase labor input on farms even by resorting to old-fashioned "voluntary labor." Third, the government has tried to build a dual management system in which collective commercial and service industries encircle the family contract system to make the collective economy as useful as possible, although the recollectivization of farms is impossible for fear of peasant protest. It seems that these measures, at least in the short term, are working to support the rural economy and to reduce peasant discontent to a tolerable level. This seems to contribute to the relative stability of the country.
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10-216/South China Morning Post, January 19, 1994; South China Morning Post, "Change brings change", Section: News, PMS VT96
	 Beijing has learned from burgeoning economic development that economic incentives work better than punishment. As the iron rice-bowl cracks, China is discovering that not only those with new sources of income but also those who suddenly find themselves with nothing to lose are harder to punish than in the days when the party was the source of all benefit. Wielding the carrot of priority in housing, medical benefits, loans and farm inputs beats using the stick of social and economic deprivation.
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10-217/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DlSSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 430 THR VT96
	 But there were some things that had undergone changes profound enough to influence this pattern of cycles. Having irrevocably joined the world market system, China was no longer an autarky and thus no longer able to isolate itself as before. For the first time since 1949, the outside world had economic, diplomatic, and strategic levers at its disposal to influence the course of its economic and political development. And while China had begun to generate real wealth which gave its burgeoning middle class more independence than ever, prosperity also gave it new reasons not to rock the boat, even to forget the May Fourth Movement's dreams of a more democratic society, which had found reexpression in Tiananmen Square in 1989. However, by trading the right to rule for the right to make money, this incipient middle class had struck a Faustian bargain with the Party. As long as the leadership was willing to modify its Stalinism and to maintain enough economic liberalization to allow people to go about their private lives, many Chinese seemed willing to forgo immediate confrontation over public politics. In fact, some who had been critical of the Party in 1989 now expressed real pride in their country's unanticipated economic accomplishments. Even many intellectuals who had once prided themselves on being "the conscience of society" were now willing to default and xiahai.
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10-218/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p. 440; THR VT96
	 "Of course!" Wu'er exclaimed almost indignantly when I asked him if he still wanted to go home again. And what did he want to do? With the same cheeky candor that had made him such an appealing subject for foreign interviewers in the Square, he replied, "I want to go back and do one of two things. Either I want to do something that is really politically meaningful or,"--he grinned and hesitated for a moment, "or I want to become a billionaire!" So, even here in California, Deng's strategy of rapid economic development had become a powerful antidote to opposition. But how long Chinese would accept having their politics subordinated to the dream of riches, or, at least, a better standard of living was the million-, even the billion-, dollar question.
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10-219/William Hinton, Author, July/August 1993; MONTHLY REVIEW, "Can the Chinese Dragon Match Pearls with the Dragon God of the Sea?," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 54; THR VT96
	 Given the power of the established economics China hopes to penetrate and challenge, the dream could well degenerate into a manipulated, boom-bust nightmare, but it seems to have seized hold of the imagination of everyone that matters. Anyone who doesn't buy in is looked upon with astonishment, pity, even ill disguised contempt.
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 10-220 /Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 204 ;THR VT96
	 The second reason for the tendency to retrogress is that the' reform regime has been, in effect, politically stuck in a Leninist organizational structure by Deng's taboo on political reform, making it difficult to resolve new problems with which the existing structure was not designed to deal. For example, it lacks any provision for the articulation of legitimate opposition; the situation is perhaps even worse than during the Maoist era, when opposition and struggle were at least rhetorically affirmed, although no practical measures were undertaken to permit them to be vented constructively. Despite a somewhat more tolerant view of intellectual discussion, the regime remains a single-party system in which opposition is driven underground, erupting unpredictably when the system is weakest rather than on prescribed occasions in arenas built to contain it. Having forfeited its claim to own and manage all "means of production," the Party-state has yet to articulate adequate mechanisms to regulate money supply, credit, and other market variables. Given a political apparatus that does not fit the economic landscape, obstacles are often encountered requiring a rethinking about how to proceed.
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10-221/Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, Ph.D. Chinese History, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Introduct ion, p. 13 THR VT96
	 The state's relationship to intellectuals is similarly strained. According to Merle Goldman, intellectuals are both beneficiaries and victims of reforms that prepared the ground for a civil society in the making. Repression has declined and working conditions improved, but intellectuals still find themselves caught in alternating cycles of "relaxation" and "tightening." The intensity of the cycles and the harshness of punishment is constrained by the state's need for intellectuals to help promote the Four Modernizations- The process of scientific modernization, building a modern economy, creating a modern culture, and upgrading administration requires granting specific categories of intellectuals enough autonomy to do their jobs. To encourage new thinking about reform, the government has funded a variety of research institutes and think tanks and has even tolerated a few that were privately financed. This atmosphere encourages intellectuals to place professional competence above adherence to ideological orthodoxy. Growing numbers of scientists, social science professionals, and apolitical writers seek freedom of inquiry, access 10 the outside, and conformity to international standards of professionalism. Moreover, the government cannot respond to these indirect and direct challenges to its monopoly of power by distinguishing between technical experts and nonscientific intellectuals. Memories of the Cultural Revolution and anti rightist campaigns remind scientific personnel that they are not immune to the movements to repress nonscientific intellectuals. The growing autonomy of the intellectuals suggests a potential civil society in the making that cannot be checked without threatening scientific and economic modernization.
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10-221a/Edward Liu, Staff Writer, January 14, 1994; AsianWeek, "Prostitution In China--Socialist-Market Style", Volume & Number: V.15; N.20, Page: p. 6; PMS VT96
	 For all of its hype about an economic take-off, and an estimated gross domestic product growth rate exceeding 12 percent this year, China is a harsh and brutal place to be for ordinary Chinese, who are not politically connected or have relatives who are party cadres in high places. The name of the game is "guanxi," literally translated as "connections."
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10-222/Merle Goldman, Prof. Chinese History Boston University, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "The Intellectuals in the Deng Xiaoping Era," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p.'216; THR VT96
	 If history has taught anything, it is that nothing is inevitable; certainly reform is not inexorable nor is a continuing loosening of controls over China's intellectuals. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, China faces another period of tightening control and emphasis on orthodox ideology. The revolutionary elders may not have a program, but they can obstruct and even reverse reforms. Nevertheless, the reforms of the previous ten years had some residual effects. The atmosphere after June 4, 1989, was less stifling than under Mao, but for a time the forces for change, the students and critical intellectuals, were silenced and withdrew to their private lives or overseas. Virtually all the members of Hu Yaobang's network of intellectuals who had opposed the remaining Maoists and conservatives in the leadership and demanded democratic reforms for nearly ten years (despite periodic repression) were suppressed. They either were imprisoned for at least a year (like Li Honglin), escaped abroad (like Yan Jiaqi and Su Shaozhi)., or are no longer able to speak out publicly (like Wang Ruoshui).
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10-223 / Brantly Womack, Prof. of Political Science at Northern Illinois University, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "in search of democracy: public authority and popular power in China," p. 87 ;THR VT96
	 The other possibility is that the intervention of the old guard into the general trend toward modernization and democratization will prove temporary. If vanguardism is interred with the last of the revolutionary vanguard, and a new regime condemns the Tiananmen massacre, much of the political optimism of the 1980s could be rescued. The triumphal return of reformers and their policies, strengthened in their popular support by their mistreatment, would be reassuring. But the trauma of the June 4 massacre probably would require that a returning reform leadership provide institutional guarantees of popular control of authority. Constitutional reform would be a high priority, and the task would be to structure a modern democratic regime with Chinese characteristics. At that point, China's search for democracy would not be over, but perhaps its path could be expected to be less tortuous.
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10-224/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. of Political Science at the University of California, 1991; CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, "From revolutionary cadres to bureaucratic technocrats," edited by Brantly Womack, p. 203 ;THR VT96
	 As the Leninist party undergoes transformation, the role of the bureaucratic technocrats in the party offices will change. They will become what Jowitt calls "political managers," coordinating a multitude of functionally specialized organizations that are bound to arise as China experiences structural differentiation. In the case of China, coordination will involve not only the mechanical process of directing the information flow but also the political process of reconciling the conflicting interests and demands of diverse social groups. The "mixed" nature of the Chinese economic system - neither totally controlled by the state planners nor a perfectly free market - will make such coordination absolutely imperative. In fact, many Chinese leaders have already suggested that party cadres will play the roles of coordinators "among the various parts of the power organs of the state, the economic organizations, and the cultural organizations," as well as among the managers, labor unions, the Communist Youth League, and the workers' congresses. This type of broadly defined coordination requires that political managers be more receptive to the wishes of the various groups and rely on their leadership skills of manipulation (particularly of perceived needs and symbols). It seems that the new generation of cadre leaders, most with technical backgrounds, are better prepared than the former revolutionary leaders, even for this mixed type of political and technical coordination.
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10-225 /Andrew G. Walder, Prof. Sociology Harvard University, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "Urban Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s, Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 119; THR VT96
	 Observers often ask whether industrial workers in Communist regimes are proreform or are more conservative in their political orientations. In China the Deng era showed the potential of economic reform and international openness for speeding economic growth and living standards, but inflation served to take away many of these gains, and future reforms promised to threaten workers' vested interests. Workers' mass reaction to the student democracy movement, however, suggests a new way of posing the question. For in all three of their patterns of activity, workers were neither proreform nor antireform. They exhibited a clear frustration that the opportunities for decisive advancement were available only to other segments of Chinese society, and they exhibited a clear anger toward party officialdom from top to bottom for arrogating so many of the opportunities for advancement for themselves, their families, and friends. But it is evident that workers fully appreciate the opportunities for greatly enhanced living standards that only a policy of reform and openness can promise. Workers, in other words, are very much for the opportunities promised by reform but are very much against the institutional conditions that illegitimately, in their view, give those opportunities almost exclusively to other groups and leave workers unprotected against the ravages of inflation.
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10-226/Hong Yung Lee, Prof. Political Science University of California, Berkeley, 1992; STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFORM, "China's New Bureaucracy?," Edited by Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, p. 60; THR VT96
	 There are additional reasons to believe that the bureaucratic technocrats will be more prone to bargain and compromise among themselves. Given their political style and rapid rise in the past few years, it is very unlikely that any bureaucratic technocrat--including Jiang Zemin (whom Deng Xiaoping designated as his successor)--will emerge as an undisputable, paramount leader and come to exert as much real power and influence as Mao or Deng did. Moreover, the personal ties among the bureaucratic technocrats are much weaker than those of the revolutionary cadres. These two factors will compel the new leaders to rely more on formal procedural rules and to take a collective decision making approach, which in turn will foster compromise and consensus building rather than confrontation. Of course, these factors can turn out to be decisive liabilities, keeping the bureaucrats from reaching any compromise and instead ending in division, stalemate, and immobility. And any decision that is arrived at collectively will be less innovative and revolutionary than one made by a paramount leaden The collective decision making process, however, would less frequently result in power struggles, purges, and counter purges.
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10-227/Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Researchers for the Worldwatch Institute, Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, 1995; STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, "Facing China's Limits," edited by Lester Brown, p. 131 ; ANA VT96
	 One thing is clear: China simply will not be able to follow for long any of the development paths blazed to date. Its abundance of people, shortage of resources, and collision with the technologies and political philosophies of the twenty-first century will force the country to chart a new and different course. Although this is a daunting challenge, China is well equipped to face it. Throughout most of history, China has led the world in scientific and industrial development, and has charted its own course. The country that invented paper and gunpowder may now have the opportunity to leapfrog the West and show it the way to a sustainable economy. If it succeeds, China could become a shining example for the rest of the world to admire and emulate. If it fails, we will all pay the price.
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10-229/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 "From the Chinese point of view, everyone else in the region is modernizing," says Godwin. "Their view is, 'Why should we be left behind?' I have an answer for that. I tell them, 'Because you're too big, and because you have nukes.' "
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10-230/ JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 However, other defense analysts in Washington warn that the United States has, for much of the past two decades, underestimated China's potential. "Chinese military modernization has gained momentum and will likely bring forward a more assertive China in international interactions," says Chong-Pin Lin of the American Enterprise Institute. "This trend challenges a widely shared, but unspoken, U.S. hope that modernization will tame a once-militant Marxist-Leninist China. "
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10-231/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 11, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Mental Illness Soars in Hainan [CND, 05/08/95] BEIJING - Mental patients have increased rapidly in Hainan Province as a result of huge social and economic changes and slow develop- ment of mental health care, the Beijing Youth Daily reported. Most patients were women who suffered from lottery losses and bad stock investments. A provincial health official had requested that government pay priority atten- tion to those illness in connection with economic problems, according to the newspaper. (Zhiping YU, Jian LIU)
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
NUCLEAR ISSUES AND CHINA
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Editor: Gordie Miller
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I. Links and Brinks
	A. Us must influence Chinese nuclear policy 1-3
	B. China and us willing to cooperate on nuclear issues 4-6
	C. China not effected by Us policy pressures 7-8
	D. China is not supporting arms control policies 9-11
	E. Us must keep strong nuclear force
		1. US must be firm with its nuclear weapons 12-15
		2. Decreasing US nukes is bad policy 16-18
	F. China is increasing use of nuclear energy
		1. Asia's nuclear industry is growing 19-20
		2. China uses little nuclear energy 21-22
	G. China is pursuing nuclear weapons
		1. China is modernizing its nuclear forces 23-24
		2. China wants a nuclear deterrent force 25-27
		3. China is the only nuclear threat to US 28
		4. China is not aggressively pursuing nukes 29
	H. China and NP
		1. NPT has gained permanent extension 30-31
		2. NPT has decreased nuclear tensions 32-34
		3. NPT review conferences will focus on disarmament 35-37
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II. Impact scenarios
	A. China and Iran 
		1. China providing Iran with nuclear technology 38-40
		2. US opposes Iran/Chinese nuclear sales 41-45
		3. China/Iran deal is legal 46-48
		4. Iran trying to acquire nuclear weapons 49-51
		5. Iran nukes lead to war with Israel 52
		6. Iran is not becoming a nuclear power 53-57
	B. China and Pakistan 
		1. China is providing Pakistan with nuclear tech 58-60
		2. India is threatened by Chinese nukes 61
		3. India / Pakistan can be a flashpoint for World War 62-64
		4. India / Pakistan is not tense 65
	C. China and nuclear testing
		1. China only nation to continue nuclear testing 66-69
		2. Us is not opposed to nuclear testing 70-71
		3. China is willing to stop testing 72-74
		4. Chinese tests hurt chance for CTBT 75
		5. Japan wants China to end testing 76-79
		6. Testing threatens China's neighbors 80-84
		7. South Asian Arms situation is unique 85-89
	D. China and Disarmament 
		1. China interested in only peaceful tech 90-91
		2. Nuke weapons not needed 92-94
		3. China and its neighbors want disarm 95-100
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11-1/ /Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 So far the administration has been focused and cautious with China. This approach must continue. While Washington could pressure China to stop all testing and sign a CTBT, going for broke will likely leave the US with nothing and the world much less stable. Sino-US politicking remains a delicate affair. The Clinton administration would do well to keep its eyes on the real prize: China's inclusion in a comprehensive test ban treaty.
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11-2/Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 STOPPING the modernization of China's nuclear weapons on a permanent basis benefits US security interests as well. US defense analysts believe that 50 to 60 percent of China's current missile force is still targeted at the US. As China grows into a regional power, we would not want China to be upgrading to more powerful and more precise multiple-warhead missiles - taking on an offensive nuclear posture at a time the rest of the world is downsizing. Washington's moves on testing will directly affect nonproliferation efforts. China's unwavering support of a CTBT would go a long way to assuring participants of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference that the nuclear powers are serious about disarmament and extending the treaty. 
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11-3 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 The United States, for instance, could urge China to forthrightly explain its nuclear and missile policy regarding Pakistan and its arms supply policy regarding Myanmar, as well as its naval activities in the Bay of Bengal. And it could more strongly encourage China to make concessions on a comprehensive test ban as well as bring an end to the Chinese nuclear test program.
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11-4 /Carol Giacomo, Staff Writer, January 26, 1994; Reuters World Service, BC Cycle, "U.S., China Open Arms Talks"; PMS VT96
	 The United States and China, in another step aimed at improving ties, Wednesday opened two days of talks on non-proliferation issues, including missile transfers and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. While the talks are expected to be wide-ranging, senior officials said a special focus is an attempt to negotiate an agreement that would permit the lifting of U.S. sanctions barring the sale of American-made satellites to China. The meetings, between U.S. Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu, are the latest in a series of high-level contacts designed to halt what had been a dangerous slide in U.S.-Chinese relations.
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11-5 / DONALD M. ROTHBERG, AP Diplomatic Writer, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Administration Stung by China, Russia Rebuffs; ACS VT96
	 Leonard Spector, director of the non-proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was less willing to write off the prospects for convincing the Russians and Chinese to change their minds. ``I don't think this rebuff is the end of the story,'' he said.
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11-6/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 In the post-cold war era, nuclear weapons reduction is a key element in American diplomacy, and China has the capability to help achieve that. To embroil in a confrontation with China will not help in gaining its cooperation on such issues as nuclear nonproliferation and arms sales.
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11-7/Lincoln Kaye, March 9, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Beijing exacts a high price for copyright accord," p. 16 ; MDS VT96
	 In the same vein, China's leaders confidently shrugged off visiting U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary's remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and respecting the test-ban treaty. "They basically told her to get lost -- they'll stop testing by 1996, when they're good and ready," the Western diplomat says. "And meanwhile they'll sell whatever nuclear technology they please to whomever they please -- Iran, Pakistan, what have you -- under" the heading of 'atoms for peace'."
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11-8 / DONALD M. ROTHBERG, AP Diplomatic Writer, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Administration Stung by China, Russia Rebuffs; ACS VT96
	 Once again, the United States looks isolated in an uncooperative world as Russia and China rebuff arguments against selling nuclear reactors to Iran. Unmoved by U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons, Moscow and Beijing responded that their deals with Tehran are legal under the nuclear treaty the Clinton administration wants renewed. A striking aspect of the U.S. campaign was how public it seemed. Whatever happened to private diplomacy, to secret talks where ranking diplomats worked out differences far from the glare of publicity?
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11-9 / Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
	 Moreover, Washington continues to be alarmed by the rapid expansion of the People's Liberation Army, and the fact that Beijing has dragged its feet in discussions about disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
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11-10/Douglas Stuart, Assoc. prof. of political science and director of international studies at Dickinson College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Determinants of PRC Arms Control: Policies in the 1990s," edited by William T. Tow, p. 303; THR VT96
	 With reference to future Chinese arms control policies, me PRC's limited interest in strategic arms control is likely to decline even further as the international system moves toward multipolarity. But other forms Of arms control can play an important part in China's new diplomacy. It is not inconceivable, for example, that China will conclude that it is in its interest to use confidence building measures to ameliorate some of the more threatening aspects of the new Asian system in order to enhance its own security. If so, four areas of opportunity seem open to Beijing.
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11-11/Douglas Stuart, Assoc. prof. of political science and director of international studies at Dickinson College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Determinants of PRC Arms Control: Policies in the 1990s," edited by William T. Tow, p. 307 THR VT96
	 For the next few years, then, China's behavior in the field of arms control is likely to be more cautious and reactive. Even in those circumstances where the PRC recognizes that it has a stake in encouraging arms reductions, nonproliferation, or confidence building, it will be very reticent to take the necessary steps if they will constrain China's indigenous defense modernization program or further restrict its foreign policy options. Under these circumstances, the one step forward which China took in the field of arms control in the mid-1980s is likely to be followed in the next few years by at least a half step back. 
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11-12 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 First, besides maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent capability because of concerns with Russian and Chinese existing or potential nuclear postures, the United States needs to acquire increased capability to deter, prevent, and defend against the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in major conflicts in critical regions. The regional deterrence requirements might well be different from those with regard to the Soviet Union during the Cold War because of the character and motivations of different regional powers. U.S. ability to prevent and defend against use is currently very limited. In the near term, therefore, to deter use of WMD against its forces and allies, the United States may have to threaten nuclear retaliation.
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11-13 / Michael Mandelbaum; Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, 1995, Spring; Pg. 22, HEADLINE: Lessons of the Next Nuclear War; ACS VT96
	 The next nuclear war could, like World War II, give rise to a powerful bias in favor of preemptlye intervention. Once one nuclear weapons program led to nuclear war, the United States might decide to take whatever steps necessary to put a stop to similar programs in other countries. The next Hiroshima could create in American public opinion a consensus in favor of preventive war to keep the bomb out of the hands of rogue states.
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11-14 / Michael Mandelbaum; Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, 1995, Spring; Pg. 22, HEADLINE: Lessons of the Next Nuclear War; ACS VT96
	 The next war could, however, have the opposite effect. Its legacy could be more like that of World War I, which reinforced the historical American determination to remain aloof from the political and military quarrels of Europe. It could revive a foreign policy of isolation, although the geographic scope might differ from the past. Traditional isolation applied to Europe but not Latin America or East Asia. From the next nuclear war Americans might learn to eschew political engagement in any part of the world where nuclear weapons are located or might be used.
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11-15 / The Tampa Tribune, March 13, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: How U.S. might send a message to itchy nations with nuclear arms; ACS VT96
	 This is not idle speculation, but an issue whose discussion brings its own form of deterrence. Any nation considering the advantages of a limited nuclear war against a neighbor might assume the United States would remain neutral. That nation should be inspired to think ahead to a more probable U.S. reaction. Good hopes for peace lie with renewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty next month, keeping the U.S. nuclear umbrella in place, and with tightening efforts to keep nuclear materials off the international market. But because nuclear weapons may spread anyway, it won't hurt to give anyone with nuclear ambitions a huge new risk to consider.
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11-16 / Robert J. White; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 16, 1995, Pg. 21A, HEADLINE: Why a zero-nukes goal is dangerous; ACS VT96
	 The underlying thesis is well argued in a Foreign Affairs magazine article by Michael Mandelbaum, a Johns Hopkins University professor who was a top foreign policy adviser to Clinton during his presidential campaign. Mandelbaum writes bluntly: "Steep reductions in and the ultimate abolition of the arsenals of the nuclear 'haves' would promote rather than discourage nuclear proliferation." And proliferation, Mandelbaum argues, is "the major military danger now facing the United States. "
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11-17 / Michael Mandelbaum; Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, 1995, Spring; Pg. 22, HEADLINE: Lessons of the Next Nuclear War; ACS VT96
	 Germany and Japan forswore nuclear weapons during the Cold War because they received security guarantees from the United States. Whether they continue as nonnuclear states depends on whether those guarantees continue.
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11-18 / Michael Mandelbaum; Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, 1995, Spring; Pg. 22, HEADLINE: Lessons of the Next Nuclear War; ACS VT96
	 The emergence of Germany and Japan as major nuclear powers would likely set offa chain reaction. This emergence would signal the end of the American system of nuclear guarantees; if Germany and Japan gave up their American protection no country could count on the American shield. 
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11-19 / KIM JIN-HYUN professor at Korea University's graduate school of journalism and a former science-technology minister in South Korea.November 29, 1993 The Nikkei Weekly Page 7 HEADLINE: Three nations hold key to Asia's futureChina, Japan and South Korea should work together to achieve change, promote prosperity//MDS-VT96
	 Of the 421 nuclear power stations around the world, only 66 are in Asia. 
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11-20 / KIM JIN-HYUN professor at Korea University's graduate school of journalism and a former science-technology minister in South Korea.November 29, 1993 The Nikkei Weekly Page 7 HEADLINE: Three nations hold key to Asia's futureChina, Japan and South Korea should work together to achieve change, promote prosperity//MDS-VT96
	 Most of the nuclear power plants that will be erected through the early 21st century are concentrated in a handful of Asian countries and regions - China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea Taiwan and Thailand. Nearly all of 85 nuclear-power facilities in the drawing board will be located in the heavily populated Asia Pacific region, in particular Northeast Asia. T
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11-21 / Geoffrey Murray , KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-28-95; CHINA SEEKS FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO OVERCOME POWER SHORTAGE; ACS VT96
	 China has abundant coal, which looks like fueling the bulk of power generation for some time to come. With the opening of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant near Hong Kong, the government was talking about the end of the coal era being in sight. But Daya Bay quickly encountered serious problems, causing it to be closed down. The alternative to coal, therefore, seems more likely to be hydroelectric power, given the vast untapped potential of the country's mighty rivers such as the Yangtze.
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11-22/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 8, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Third Nuclear Power Plant Construction Approved [CND, 05/05/95] BEIJING - After months of discussion, the construction of China's thrid nuclear power plant has been approved, Xinhua news agency reported Friday. The total investment tops 27 billion yuan ($3.2 billion), and the plant, which will be located on southern Liaoning peninsula, will use two Russian 1,000 megawatt reactors. Currently, China has one nuclear power plant at Qinshan near Shanghai, and another at Daya Bay near Hong Kong. The electricity generated by nuclear power accounts for less than one percent of the national total. (Jim YU, Jian LIU) 
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11-23 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-31-95, (News Global), ACS VT96
	 First Non-Stationary ICBM Said Test Flown [CND, 05/31/95] BEIJING - According to Reuter citing western diplomats here, in a land test on May 30, China test flown "Dongfeng (East Wind) 31", its first mobile inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM). Diplomats estimated the range of the missile to be about 8,000 km, covering the U.S. west coast and most of Europe. It is believed that currently China has at least 15 silo-based stationary ICBMs and between 60 and 90 inter-regional ballistic missiles. China's foreign ministry refused to confirm the test. (Xi PEI, Jian LIU)
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11-24 / Agence France Presse, October 12, 1994 HEADLINE: China developing new nuclear weapons: IISS//MDS-VT96
	 "The differences in yields tested suggest that a number of new weapons are being developed," said the report. "The first is a dual-purpose missile for both submarine (JL-2) and ground launch (DF-31), estimated to have a range of 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). "The second, designated DF-41, could have a 12,000-kilometer (7,500 mile) range. All three missiles will have solid fuel propulsion and the DF-31 and DF-41 can be fired from mobile launchers," said the report. 
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11-25/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," P. 263; MDS VT96
	 Should a threat occur, however, analysts envisage border war where the key to successful defense lies in a distinctively Chinese conventional deterrent. Should an attack come from further afield, a limited conventional war with a major power could pose a tactical nuclear threat, in anticipation of which eventuality China must prepare a distinctively mobile nuclear deterrent in conjunction with more conventional ones.
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11-26 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 * A combination of nuclear weapons capability and a policy of public restraint about displaying it enables regional players to blackmail friendly great powers to strengthen their defense capability. In the Reagan-Zia period, Pakistan sought--and got--U.S. economic and military aid to induce Pakistan not to go nuclear. India, too, gained Soviet military support in its disputes against China.
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11-27 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 * A nuclear weapons capability creates an incentive to negotiate confidence-building and regional arms control measures between or among regional enemies. 
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 11-28 / Triplett, september 12, 1994 ( William C., chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, International Herald Tribune, September 12, 1994, HEADLINE: Why Cooperate With China's Unrepentant Military?//MDS-VT96
	 Only China is testing nuclear weapons. It is clearly bent on producing a new generation of strategic arms. The submarine-HL launched DF-31 missile has a range of 5,000 miles (8,000 kilometers) and will be operational within two years. The land-based DF-41, capable of reaching the United States, should be operational by the end of the decade. China is the only country that aims nuclear weapons at the United States. It is buying every modern weapons system the increasingly desperate Russian defense industry will sell. 
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11-29/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow n the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.383; THR VT 96 Nevertheless, China has not exported nuclear weapons, even to Pakistan. Nor has China been a conspicuously dirty tester of nuclear weapons. It switched to underground tests when the technology became available. Free of any constraint except cost, technology, and doctrine, China has continued to modernize its arsenal. The decision to retain minimum levels of nuclear weapons in most categories does not especially aggravate international security, although it certainly does not help build confidence in a nuclear free world. India obtained nuclear weapons in large measure because China did, and Pakistan seems to be trying to follow the Indian course.
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11-30 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-11-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Chronology of major events linked to the NPT; ACS VT96
	 The following is a chronology of the major developments related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT):
July 1968 - Sixty-two nations, including the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, sign the treaty.
March 1970 - The treaty comes into force.
June 1976 - Japan becomes a signatory.
Aug.-Sept. 1980 - The second conference of review of the treaty fails to adopt a final resolution after developing countries express dissatisfaction over a lack of efforts on the part of the nuclear powers to disarm.
Dec. 1985 - North Korea becomes a signatory.
Dec. 1987 - The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign a treaty for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).
Aug.-Sept. 1990 - The fourth review conference is characterized by a standoff between the nuclear powers and the nonaligned nations over the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
July 1991 - The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) I treaty.
March 1992 - China becomes a signatory.
Aug. 1992 - France becomes a signatory.
Jan. 1993 - The U.S. and Russia sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) II treaty.
March 1993 - North Korea refuses special inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and announces it will withdraw the treaty.
Jan. 1994 - Commencement of substantive negotiations toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty begin in Geneva.
Oct. 1994 - The U.S. and North Korea conclude a comprehensive agreement aimed at removing suspicions surrounding North Korea's nuclear program.
April-May 1995 - New York conference considers indefinite extension of the NPT.
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11-31 / CHARLES J. HANLEY, AP Special Correspondent, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, World Steps Into Nuclear Future With a Permanent NPT; ACS VT96
	 After a month's debate on the world's nuclear future, a global conference Thursday renewed the Non-Proliferation Treaty permanently, extending its limits on man's deadliest weapons into the next century. It was a diplomatic victory for the U.S.-led nuclear powers, which resisted efforts by non-nuclear states to make extending the 25-year-old treaty conditional on greater, faster cuts in their nuclear arsenals. American U.N. Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright hailed it as a ``sterling success,'' and President Clinton, visiting Ukraine, said it would ``build a better future for our children and the generations to come.''
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11-32 / CHARLES J. HANLEY, AP Special Correspondent, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, World Steps Into Nuclear Future With a Permanent NPT; ACS VT96
	 When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was being negotiated in the 1960s, experts predicted dozens of nations would build nuclear arms within a decade or two. Three nations that did not sign the pact -- India, Pakistan and Israel -- did develop weapons capability. And two signatories -- Iraq and North Korea -- tried to do so. But the treaty system has largely held the line against proliferation.
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11-33/ Michael Mandelbaum; Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Foreign Affairs, 1995, Spring; Pg. 22, HEADLINE: Lessons of the Next Nuclear War; ACS VT96
	 Because they enhance national power, nuclear weapons are potentially attractive to a wide variety of countries. Yet relatively few have these weapons. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council -- the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China . . . all do. Several others either have or are very close to having operational nuclear weapons. The number, however, is far smaller than expected in the early stages of the nuclear age. In 1963 President John E Kennedy predicted that 15 to 20 countries would have nuclear arms by 1975. Overall, Cold War efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have been successful.
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11-34 / Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; CHINA REBUFFS U.S. ON SALE OF REACTORS TO IRAN; ACS VT96
	 ``Many of the NPT's achievements cannot be quantified -- the weapons not built, the nuclear materials not diverted and the wars not started,'' Christopher said. ``(But) the NPT has kept the number of nuclear powers far lower than initially forecast. . . . It has reduced the risk of nuclear conflict.''
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11-35 / CHARLES J. HANLEY, AP Special Correspondent, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, World Steps Into Nuclear Future With a Permanent NPT; ACS VT96
	 ``The nuclear powers have claimed they need a permanent NPT to provide certainty for nuclear disarmament,'' said Greenpeace's Stephanie Mills. ``They must now take action to prove that.'' One of the treaty's ``fathers'' expects they will. Roland Timarbaev, who helped negotiate the treaty for the former Soviet Union, said governments for years were consumed with the issue of how to extend the treaty. ``Now every year these disarmament (goals) will be scrutinized,'' he said. ``Now that there is no need to discuss extension.''
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11-36/ Kyodo News Service, San Jose Mercury News, 5-8-95; ; NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE TO BE GIVEN DISARMAMENT FUNCTION; ACS VT96
	 Delegates reviewing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at a meeting in New York have basically agreed to give future review conferences a stronger say in nuclear disarmament, conference sources said Monday. In its first-ever upgrading the conference will be empowered to decide on concrete measures to speed up the realization and implementation of nuclear disarmament agreements, the sources said.
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11-37/ Kyodo News Service, San Jose Mercury News, 5-8-95; ; NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE TO BE GIVEN DISARMAMENT FUNCTION; ACS VT96
	 Since an indefinite extension of the expiring 25-year-old treaty became certain last week, the review conferences, to be held every five years as in the past, will become the major forum for nonnuclear states to pressure the nuclear powers toward abolishing nuclear weapons.
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11-38 / ELAINE SCIOLINO, New York Times, 5-14-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, IRAN SAYS IT PLANS 10 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NO ARMS; ACS VT96
	 Iran has already made a ``down payment'' for the project, which will cost $800 million to $900 million and involve training by Chinese experts, said Amrollahi, director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization. Although the United States has doubted that China is capable of building the reactors on its own because the original model included parts from Germany and Japan, Amrollahi said the Chinese now believed that they had successfully duplicated the technology.
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11-39 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-22-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Economic activities between China and Iran are on the increase. Xinhua reported today that three contracts were signed between Chinese companies and Tehran Urban and Suburban Railway Co. in March and May.
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11-40 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-22-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Reported by: Weijun LIU, Hong TANG, Daluo JIA Iran Reactor Sale to Go as Planned [CND, 05/21/95] Beijing -- China will not stop the planned sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, The Washington Post reported Thursday. The multi- billion dollar deal, initiated following a preliminary agreement signed by both sides in 1992, includes two Chinese made 300-megawatt pressuried-water reactors.
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11-41 / Mercury News Wire Services, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-17-95; China bucks warnings on Iran deal; ACS VT96
	 ``No nation ought to go forward with nuclear cooperation with Iran,'' Christopher said at a joint news conference before his luncheon meeting with Qian. ``It's too dangerous to do so.'' He called Iran the most ardent opponent of peace in the Middle East and said it projects terror worldwide.
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11-42 / Mercury News Wire Services, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-17-95; China bucks warnings on Iran deal; ACS VT96
	 The fear that nuclear weapons will fall into new hands, heightened by black market smuggling of Russian nuclear materials and the discovery of the bomb-making capabilities of North Korea and Iraq, has transformed these otherwise obscure negotiations into high-stakes diplomacy that will affect U.S. security in the 21st century.
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11-43 / Mercury News Wire Services, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-17-95; China bucks warnings on Iran deal; ACS VT96
	 U.S. officials say that oil-rich Iran has little need for civilian nuclear power and is trying to obtain items with dual civilian and weapons use. Although Iranian government representatives have repeatedly denied that the country is interested in nuclear arms, other statements by Iranian officials -- some public and some intercepted by U.S. intelligence -- indicate otherwise, the U.S. officials said.
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11-44 / TOM RAUM, Associated Press Writer, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Clinton Vows to Press Russia, China on Nuclear Sales to Iran; ACS VT96
	 President Clinton objected strongly to plans by Russia and China to sell nuclear technology to Iran and vowed Tuesday night to be ``quite aggressive'' in pressing the issue at an upcoming summit in Moscow.
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11-45 / Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; CHINA REBUFFS U.S. ON SALE OF REACTORS TO IRAN; ACS VT96
	 Christopher's emphasis on Iran in his talks with Qian demonstrated the extent of Washington's determination to keep Iran out of the nuclear weapons club. Russia has agreed to sell Iran nuclear technology worth about $1 billion, a deal the United States has worked furiously -- and so far unsuccessfully -- to prevent. U.S. officials believe that if the Russian sale goes through, Iran would have no particular need for Chinese technology. But if Moscow reconsiders, China would become the last possible supplier. All the major Western suppliers already have refused to consider sales to Iran. Although Russia insists it will go ahead with the deal, some U.S. officials believe Iran may lack the hard currency needed to pay for it. China, where the economy is in better shape than Russia, might be able to extend credit.
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11-46 / R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 4-17-95; China-Iran nuclear deal worries U.S. It fears furthering of weapons ambitions; ACS VT96
	 ``There is some parallel'' in the potential Chinese deal to the Russian-Iranian agreement, a senior official said. ``China is technically not doing anything that conflicts with the NPT and its international obligations. But we have the same kind of concern . . . (and) we think it would be in their self-interest'' to cancel further negotiations with Iran.
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11-47 / Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; CHINA REBUFFS U.S. ON SALE OF REACTORS TO IRAN; ACS VT96
	 With Christopher standing at his side, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qiachen told reporters that, if China wishes to sell reactors to Iran, ``there is no international law or international regulation or international agreement'' to stand in the way. U.S. officials later conceded that Qian was on firm legal ground because the proposed reactors would be delivered under international supervision intended to prevent the diversion of technology for weapons use.
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11-48 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-22-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Apparently referring to Washington's objection on the basis that these reactors could help Iran develop nuclear weapons, a senior official of the China National Nuclear Corp. pointed out that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had never confirmed Iran's military purpose of its nuclear programs nor shown any objection to the sale. China maintains that its sale of nuclear energy equipment and technology does not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that Iran's nuclear programs are subject to IAEA's inspection, Both China and Iran have signed the Treaty, which has been extended indefinitely earlier this month.
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11-49 / ABC NEWS, SHOW: ABC World News Tonight, May 15, 1995, Transcript # 5096, HEADLINE: Iran Denies U.S. Accusations of Nuclear Weapons; ACS VT96
	 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, Secretary of State: We know that since the mid-1980's, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons.
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11-50 / FRANK GAFFNEY; director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, Defense News, April 3, 1995 / April 9, 1995; Pg. 19. HEADLINE: U.S. Leadership Must Awaken To Onrushing Tide of Crises; ACS VT96
	 The following are among the dynamic conditions in play today that could produce the next international cataclysm, possibly on a global scale: * The strategic Persian Gulf is in turmoil. Both Iran and Iraq are contending with failing economies and restive populations [.] Saddam Hussein's desire for revenge for Desert Storm and the Iranian mullah's Islamic revolution constitute ample motivation for military, terrorist and other challenges to the West. And the growing array of weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated offensive technology at Iran and Iraq's disposal are already inducing regional realignments to the detriment of U.S. long-term interests.
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11-51 / ABC NEWS, SHOW: ABC World News Tonight, May 15, 1995, Transcript # 5096, HEADLINE: Iran Denies U.S. Accusations of Nuclear Weapons; ACS VT96
	 LEONARD SPECTOR, Carnegie Endowment International Peace: If you saw this kind of behavior on the part of any country, especially if it was conducted behind the scenes, it would make you nervous. In the Iranian case, we're all the more suspicious because of their notorious international behavior - support for international terrorism; their threats to other Gulf states and so forth.
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 11-52/ MICHAEL PARKS, 1995, Staff writer, "Israel looks past borders, arms for long-range war," THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb 5, p. A1, JGM VT96
	 Maj. Gen. Uzi Dayan, the armed forces' planning chief, reportedly suggested at a strategic studies conference at Tel Aviv University last month that Iran might find a shortcut to getting nuclear weapons. He said Israel might then have to decide, maybe as soon as this year, on what action to take, perhaps making a preemptive attack like the 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant. Although military sources maintained that Dayan's remarks were taken out of context, that he was simply providing an example of strategic planning against all contingencies, the comments were widely interpreted as a calculated warning to Iran to curb its ambitious nuclear program. 'The Iranian nuclear program is not a distant and vague threat but a concrete and worrying danger that is no less a matter of concern for us than the Iraqi nuclear program ,' commentator Danny Leshem wrote in Yediot Aharanot, the country's biggest newspaper. "Whoever was worried in the past by the setting up of an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak should be concerned at least to the same extent by the construction of nuclear reactors in Iran by the Chinese and the Russians, even if six years will pass until the first 300-megawatt nuclear power plant is completed by the Chinese."
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11-53 / ABC NEWS, SHOW: ABC World News Tonight, May 15, 1995, Transcript # 5096, HEADLINE: Iran Denies U.S. Accusations of Nuclear Weapons; ACS VT96
	 Pres. HASHEMI RAFSANJANI: [through interpreter] I can only say all these words are lies and accusations. What we are after is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. PETER JENNINGS: [voice-over] The Iranian government openly admits to a long-term nuclear program as a way to diversify its energy sources. This week, attention is focused at Bushir [sp?] on the Persian Gulf, where the Russians have agreed to complete a nuclear reactor begun by the Germans but stopped at the time of the Islamic revolution.
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11-54 / ELAINE SCIOLINO, New York Times, 5-14-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, IRAN SAYS IT PLANS 10 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NO ARMS; ACS VT96
	 Other senior U.S. officials in Washington said that Iran sent a purchasing team to Kazakhstan three years ago, but that it came home empty-handed. The visit contributed to a decision by the Pentagon last year to secretly airlift 500 kilograms of bomb-grade uranium from Kazakhstan's nuclear fabrication plant for safe storage in the United States. ``We didn't send any team,'' Amrollahi said. ``Definitely not. What is the use of enriched uranium for? The Russians do have many, many nuclear weapons but they couldn't use them. I think the bomb age is over. We don't think we need a nuclear weapon.''
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11-55 / ELAINE SCIOLINO, New York Times, 5-14-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, IRAN SAYS IT PLANS 10 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NO ARMS; ACS VT96
	 Iran's top nuclear official said Saturday that his country intended to build about 10 nuclear power plants in the next two decades, but denied charges by the United States that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons. The official, Reza Amrollahi, also said that last year he signed a formal contract with China for two nuclear power reactors and that Chinese experts had completed a feasibility study and had begun to draw up blueprints and engineering reports for a site in southern Iran.
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11-56 / Reuters News Service, 5-13-95, Iran planning 10 nuclear power plants, report says, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 The Iranian official [Reza Amrollahi, who has headed Iran's nuclear program for about 15 years] also denied reports that Iran had negotiated or even discussed a plan to buy a gas centrifuge from Russia that could have rapidly enriched uranium to bomb-grade quality, according to the Times. ``This was a diplomatically-made cake,'' he said about Washington reports of a separate, tentative agreement with Russia.
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11-57 / Reuters News Service, 5-13-95, Iran planning 10 nuclear power plants, report says, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; ACS VT96
	 The article said German and U.S. officials believe Amrollahi controls only a part of Iran's nuclear program and that the country has a parallel program through its military that is largely responsible for purchases of nuclear material. But the official denied that. ``I am the responsible for the atomic energy of Iran,'' he [Reza Amrollahi, who has headed Iran's nuclear program for about 15 years] said. ``Believe it. We don't have any other institutions or departments that pay attention to nuclear issues.''
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11-58 / Mercury News Wire Services, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-17-95; China bucks warnings on Iran deal; ACS VT96
	 China also has supplied nuclear weapons-related technology -- even a design for a nuclear bomb -- to Pakistan over U.S. objections. U.S. officials also claim that China has supplied Pakistan with equipment for intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
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11-59 /Jeff Sommer, Newsday Foreign Editor, January 31, 1994; Newsday, "Rights and Wrongs; Linking trade to democracy irks Chinese", SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 15; PMS VT96
	 But the two countries failed last week to reach an accord on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States says China has transferred materials and technology to Pakistan, enabling it to build missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
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11-60 / ASSOCIATED PRESS, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-27-95; CHINA COULD BE NEXT NUCLEAR `LEAKER,' SAYS CARNEGIE REPORT; ACS VT96
	 China is believed to have already contributed to proliferation by giving Pakistan advice and supplies, reportedly including a nuclear weapon design in the 1980s, the report said. It also noted the Chinese are planning to supply Iran with two power reactors, in a deal opposed by the United States, which contends the Iranians plan to build atomic weapons.
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11-61 / MICHAEL J. MAZARR, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE & ALEXANDER T. LENNON, RESEARCH ASSISTANT IN POLITICAL MILITARY STUDIES AT CSIS, 1994; TOWARD A NUCLEAR PEACE: THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, "PART ONE: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR POLICY" p. 16-17 AGL, VT96
	 Thus, while India has many motives besides central deterrence for acquiring nuclear weapons--to support its military objectives in South Asia, for example, and to reaffirm its position as a major world power--a drastic reduction in U.S. and Chinese arsenals would help remove Indian justifications for nuclear weapons. If such a move did not persuade New Delhi to abandon its existing program, at least it would help forestall the trend in Indian (and Pakistani) thinking that favors open declaration and deployment of nuclear arsenals rather than secretive research and covert assembly of bombs. This is not a trifling concern, for once the weapons are out in the open it may be impossible to get rid of them.
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 11-62 / WILLIAM E. BURROWS & ROBERT WINDREM, NUCLEAR JOURNALISTS, 1994; CRITICAL MASS: THE DANGEROUS RACE FOR SUPER WEAPONS IN A FRAGMENTING WORLD, p. 351, AGL, VT96
	 The Indian subcontinent is the most dangerous place on Earth. It is the incubator of racial and religious hatred that is more virulent and persistent than any biological epidemic (though it, too, could be unleashed in a war). The slum of every city of consequence is a purgatory in which rampaging Hindu and Muslim fundamentalists search for their opposite number and kill them. The race for super weapons is therefore driven as much by sheer hatred as by geopolitical considerations. While both sides have invented elaborate excuses for developing nuclear weapons--strategic deterrence, for example--their real purpose is genocide. The Indians and the Pakistanis fundamentally despise each other. The mutual contempt is so deep that even television programming is affected.
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 11-63 / MERRILL GOOZNER, 1995 , staff writer Chicago Tribune, "India-Pakistan Hone N-Weapons;" THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, March 12, p. A43, GM VT96
	 With independence and partition, the bitter antagonists immediately fought a war over the mostly Muslim province of Kashmir. They renewed hostilities in 1965 and fought again in 1971 when India successfully intervened in Bangladesh's war of succession from Pakistan. Since 1990, Kashmiri independence fighters and pro-Pakistani militants have fought a low-intensity guerrilla war against India's occupation of Kashmir, making the Himalayan outpost a flashpoint for renewed full-scale war and nuclear conflagration.
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 11-64 / MERRILL GOOZNER, 1995 , STAFF WRITER Chicago Tribune, "India-Pakistan Hone N-Weapons;" THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, March 12, p. a43, JGM VT96
	 As years pass with little change in the status quo, some experts fear the subcontinent's threshold of terror ultimately will destabilize and lead to an accidental nuclear confrontation. Neither country has developed strategic doctrines for the use of nuclear weapons nor developed the sophisticated control mechanisms- permissive action links- that are needed to keep unauthorized personnel from detonating a bomb.
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11-65 / DEEPA OLLAPALLY & RAJA RAMANNA, 1995 ; Prof. Political Science Swarthmore & former Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, "US-India Tensions; Misperceptions of Nuclear proliferation," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan-Feb, p.13, JGM; VT96
	 But the behavior of Indian and Pakistani leaders suggests otherwise. In the three Indo-Pakistani wars since independence, considerable restraint was exercised in avoiding civilian targets and in not pushing the military advantage to gain territory in the heartland or disputed areas -- for example, India's decision not to thrust forward in the western sector in 1971 or to "liberate" Kashmir. There is little reason to believe that the two countries will change their behavior after obtaining nuclear capability and act with less caution than before. Indeed, a strategy of "nuclear realism" by India and Pakistan has given rise to bilateral confidence-building measures, including a mutual agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations, reciprocal notification of key military exercises, and a hot line between the nations' army generals. The United States' policy in the region gives a hollow ring to its current nonproliferation exhortations. Throughout the 1980s, at the height of Pakistan's nuclear weapons project, the United States pursued a policy of strategic alliance and military largess without which Pakistan's success would have been unlikely.
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11-66 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 16, 1995, HEADLINE: With a Nuclear Blast, China Issues Challenge; ACS VT96
	 China says it supports the ban on tests, but that it will continue to conduct them until the ban takes effect in 1996. It argues that it has conducted far fewer tests than the United States or Russia. This is believed to be China's 42dnuclear test, far short of the 1,000 conducted by the United States.
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11-67/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 17, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Weijun LIU, Hong TANG, Jian LIU [CND, 05/16/95] -- China exploded an underground nuclear device on Monday, Reuter reported. The test was conducted four days after China agreed with 177 other nations to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely. However, the treaty does not ban nuclear tests by the five existing nuclear powers. In France, different political forces argue on whether the country should resume its nuclear tests. Possessing the least nuclear arsenal among the five, China will likely to continue to carry out such tests until a new treaty banning all tests is signed. The other four nuclear powers, the US, Russian, Britain and France, are observing a worldwide moratorium on nuclear testing that has been honored by other nuclear powers since 1992. It is expected that China will conduct four more nuclear tests by the end of 1996.
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11-68 / Agence France Presse, October 12, 1994 HEADLINE: China developing new nuclear weapons: IISS//MDS-VT96
	 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in its annual report, "The Military Balance," said China had conducted two nuclear tests in the previous 12 months. (In addition, China conducted an underground nuclear test last Friday, after the IISS report had been printed.) 
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11-69 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 16, 1995, HEADLINE: With a Nuclear Blast, China Issues Challenge; ACS VT96
	 Despite the protests, China is expected to conduct two to four more tests late this year.
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11-70 / Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. sees no problem in China's missile test" ACS VT96
	 Davis [Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis] rejected any link between the testing and China's retaliatory moves against Washington over its decision last week to allow Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S. in June. Preparation for missile testing generally takes a long time, she said, noting she would be surprised if there was such a link.
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11-71/ Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. sees no problem in China's missile test" ACS VT96
	 State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly told a regular press briefing, ''Periodic testing of ICBMs to ensure safety and reliability is a necessary and routine part of any missile program.'' ''I understand that there are no multilateral or bilateral treaties or other agreements which would prohibit or restrict such testing,'' Shelly said. On the timing of China's test-firing, she also ruled out any intentional move in line with the Taiwan issue, stressing, ''I don't believe that we're making any particular linkage.''
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11-72 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 16, 1995, HEADLINE: With a Nuclear Blast, China Issues Challenge; ACS VT96
	 "On the question of nuclear tests, China has always exercised great restraint,a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Monday. "It stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and has taken an active part in the Geneva talks on the comprehensive test ban treaty."
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11-73 / Kyodo News Service, 6-2-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Kono urges China to stop nuclear tests" ACS VT96
	 Li [Chinese State Councillor Li Tieying] reiterated China's stance that it is exercising self-restraint over its nuclear experiments and that it hopes the CTBT will be concluded by 1996, the official said.
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11-74 / Kyodo News Service, 5-16-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China said to be ready to halt nuclear tests; ACS VT96
	 Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian on Tuesday expressed Beijing's readiness to halt nuclear tests, the Russian Interfax news agency reported in a dispatch from Beijing. The statement, which according to Interfax was relayed by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev following talks with Chi, came just one day after China announced it had conducted another underground nuclear test.
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11-75 / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 Nuclear hopes are blasted by China (The Australian, Sydney): Alone of the declared nulcear weapons powers, China had refused to join the 1990s moratorium, arguing that it needed to bring its program up to the standard of other powers. But China's last test had been more than six months ago, and last week's renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had raised expectations that the voluntary moratorium might endure until it could be made permanent and binding. In those circumstances, Monday's blast was all the more disappointing.
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11-76 / Kyodo News Service, 6-2-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Kono urges China to stop nuclear tests" ACS VT96
	 Foreign Minister Yohei Kono on Friday repeated Japanese calls for China to stop conducting nuclear tests and make efforts to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as soon as possible, a Foreign Ministry official said. In a meeting with Chinese State Councillor Li Tieying, Kono also indirectly called on China to improve relations with the United States currently marred by a U.S. decision to allow Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui pay a private visit to the U.S.
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11-77/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japan confirms China conducted ICBM test"; ACS VT96
	 Japan has confirmed China's test-firing earlier this week of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile,'' a government spokesman said Wednesday. ''We assume China conducted a test-launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile in late May,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi told a news conference.
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11-78 / Kyodo News Service, 5-15-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan raps China for nuclear test; ACS VT96
	 Japan on Monday blasted China for its underground nuclear test, saying it came at a time when the world is striving to totally ban nuclear weapons. ''China's nuclear experiment is quite regrettable,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi said at a news conference, adding that Vice Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito will lodge a formal protest against Beijing through the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo.
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11-79/ Irene Kuni Reuters, Limited November 20, 1993, HEADLINE: JAPAN URGES CHINA TO MEDIATE ON N.KOREA NUKE ISSUE //MDS-VT96
	 Japan's prime minister urged China to halt nuclear weapons testing after it conducted an underground test recently, the official said. Jiang skirted the issue, telling Hosokawa that China's arsenal was intended only to show the world it had nuclear capability. 
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11-80 /Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 However, given the volatile nature of Sino-US relations and China's sensitivity about nuclear testing, Washington's insistence that Beijing join the current moratorium could pose an even graver threat. It could undercut China's already uncertain support for a CTBT and exasperate Beijing to the point where it would not sign at all. China generally views Washington's positions on testing as intrusive and hypocritical. In response to US condemnation of its last test Oct. 5, 1993, Beijing pointed out the inequality of its situation: Within the last 40 years the US conducted more than 1,100 tests compared with China's 39. China's foreign ministry states that '' China has conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests ... and it is their own business of other countries to handle their nuclear testing affairs.''
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11-81 / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 Nuclear hopes are blasted by China (The Australian, Sydney): As the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Evans, said, China's continued testing defies the spirit of the NPT negotiations and is out of step with Beijing's declared support for nuclear disarmament and stated commitment to a CTBT. Central leadership unpredictability surrounding the final stages of Mr. Deng Xiaoping's paramountcy, the Spratly Islands dispute, and uncertainty about what may follow Hong Kong's reincorporation are making the region more nervous about the course of domestic and foreign Chinese policy. The test at Lop Nor, with the prospect of more to come, adds to the concern about China's unsettling behavior.
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11-82 / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 China and the region (The Jakarta Post, Jakarta): China's latest nuclear test, conducted on Monday, only four days after representatives from 178 countries agreed to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is designed to stem the spread of nuclear arms, has understandably caused some tremors around the region.
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11-83 / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 China and the region (The Jakarta Post, Jakarta): The test, conducted in defiance of a moratorium, which is respected by all the other major nuclear powers of the world, is a clear indication that, ban or no ban, the Middle Kingdom, under its present leadership, has not the slightest intention of slackening its efforts to turn the country into a major military power within the shortest possible time.
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11-84 / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 Nuclear hopes are blasted by China (The Australian, Sydney): Asia-Pacific nations, already worried about the failure of China to match its increasing economic and military power with a foreign policy geared toward regional stability, lined up to condemn the test. Japan was doubly affronted by the fact that its Prime Minister, Mr. Murayama, had visited China barely a week ago and asked his counterport, Mr. Li Peng, to ensure a cessation of tests.
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11-85 / Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Winter; Pg. 123, HEADLINE: The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific; ACS VT96
	 Moreover, if striking first against an adversary's offensive weapon systems confers a clear strategic advantage, then preemption may seem a rational strategy in a crisis. The strategic logic, which applies to each side equally, is simple: destroy the adversary's offensive systems before your systems are destroyed. Neither side need harbor aggressive intentions toward the other for war, nevertheless, to result. This is a classic example of the so-called security dilemma, in which the defensive preparations -- and actions -- of each side conspire to undermine the security of both. Thus so-called inadvertent wars, that is, wars that none of the protagonists originally sought, are not the result of a revisionist impulse to old-fashioned aggression, but arise from a combination of uncertainty about intentions and the destabilizing dynamics of the security dilemma.
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11-86 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 * A nuclear weapons capability induces caution among regional enemies by encouraging them not to push the other country into a corner. In South Asia, the fear of punishment is the basis of restraint. The history of the region suggests that the fear of punishment must become part of an enemy's psychology before diplomatic agreements become do-able. Since the 1960s, the pattern of Indian-Pakistani behavior has been first re-arm ... then talk.
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11-88 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 insisting in recent years that India and Pakistan must ultimately give up their nuclear weapon ambitions and dismantle their nuclear weapon programs. That Johnny-One-Note insistence has been insulting to both nations and therefore counterproductive.
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11-87 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 It is not clear that either India or Pakistan has actually built nuclear weapons, although it is widely believed that each could do so quickly. That fact alone should suggest that arms control schemes developed in the Cold War East-West context are not likely to work well in South Asia.
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11-89 / Michael MccGwire, Cambridge Univ. (UK), Brookings Review, March 22, 1995; Pg. 36; HEADLINE: Eliminate or marginalize? Nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy; importance of striving for nuclear-free world; ACS VT96
	 One needn't subscribe to Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" to conclude that a quarter century from now global relations are likely to be at least as conflict-ridden as they were during the Cold War years, albeit in ways that have yet to be foreseen. And despite the lesson of the two World Wars that war is no longer a rational instrument of policy in great-power relations, arms racing will remain a feature of the international scene, with nuclear weapons having a totemic value unrelated to military utility.
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11-90 / R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 4-17-95; China-Iran nuclear deal worries U.S. It fears furthering of weapons ambitions; ACS VT96
	 China might not agree. When Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and Chinese Premier Li Peng met in Beijing three weeks ago, a Chinese spokesman said the countries were pursuing only ``normal cooperation . . . in peaceful areas'' and denied any trade in nuclear technology.
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11-91 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 16, 1995, HEADLINE: With a Nuclear Blast, China Issues Challenge; ACS VT96
	 China is believed to have the smallest arsenal of the declared nuclear powers, with 250 to 300 warheads.
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11-92 / Michael MccGwire, Cambridge Univ. (UK), Brookings Review, March 22, 1995; Pg. 36; HEADLINE: Eliminate or marginalize? Nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy; importance of striving for nuclear-free world; ACS VT96
	 The world was immensely fortunate that neither side made a fatal mistake during the 25 years of bipolar confrontation. But what lies ahead is a multipolar game of indefinite duration, where the new players' nuclear command, control, and communications will be more prone to system errors, and each player's understanding of the others' thought processes will be even more rudimentary. Can we still rely on luck? As Robert McNamara puts it, "Human beings are fallible. . . . The indefinite combination of nuclear weapons and human fallibility will lead to a nuclear exchange."
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11-93 / Michael MccGwire, Cambridge Univ. (UK), Brookings Review, March 22, 1995; Pg. 36; HEADLINE: Eliminate or marginalize? Nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy; importance of striving for nuclear-free world; ACS VT96
	 The claim by Western "traditionalists" that nuclear weapons are the key to peace is subject to several problems. The argument that the "very existence of nuclear weapons" accounts for the absence of major war between advanced military powers during the past 40 years is a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc. By the early 1950s, they had set a pattern of war avoidance that was well established when the strategic nuclear arms race took off in the 1960s. The new danger of nuclear escalation merely underlined the point. And nuclear weapons were singularly ineffective in preventing other kinds of war, even in areas of the world where the United States had an effective monopoly.
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 11-94 / Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 383; THR VT 96 The nuclear issue is distinctive because of the strange esoterica of nuclear weapons strategy. The doctrine of deterrence, especially in its variant of Mutual Assured Destruction, requires a peculiar mix of certainty and uncertainty: certainty about the destructiveness of weapons and uncertainty about the conditions under which they would be used. Thus, if defense policy reform means openness, it will tend to run up against a doctrinal desire to leave some uncertainty about the whereabouts of weapons and the chances that they might be used. Confidence about a secure second-strike potential as a guarantee of deterrence positively requires that the adversary not be able to find and destroy SLBMs, bombers, or even mobile-land-based weapons. The paradox of nuclear strategy is clear. Nuclear weapons are a basic reason for seeking common security and a more open discussion of nuclear strategy. Yet stable deterrence requires secrecy and some uncertainty, thereby limiting any possible openness in nuclear strategy. 
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11-95 / AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, 1995, ("Ukraine backs nuke ban extension," March 24, JGM; VT96
	 Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma said Friday that his country supported an indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However he told a news conference here that "the process is not easy as we think" and that various problems should be discussed before the NPT came up for renewal later this year. Kuchma, on the third day of a four-day visit to Japan, suggested that the treaties on strategic arms reduction and a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests be signed before the NPT's renewal. "The nuclear states. or the nuclear club, should first make clear their intention to eventually abolish all nuclear weapons." he said.
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11-96 / Reuters World Service, 1995 ("North Korea urges nuclear states to disarm," January 22, JGM, VT96
	 North Korea, suspected by the West of developing its own nuclear weapons, on Sunday urged states with nuclear weapons to take steps to abandon them. "The nuclear-weapon states must...take practical steps lot nuclear disarmament, joining in the trend o1 the time towards detente, disarmament and peace," said the official North Korean daily Rodong Sinmun. "If the nuclear haves intend to remain outside nuclear control, considering that the NPT ( Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) is applicable only to nuclear have-nots, the danger of a nuclear war will never be removed,' the daily said."
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 11-97 / MICHAEL J. MAZARR, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE & ALEXANDER T. LENNON, RESEARCH ASSISTANT IN' POLITICAL MILITARY STUDIES AT CSIS, 1994; TOWARD A NUCLEAR PEACE: THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, "PART ONE: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR POLICY" p. 16; AGL VT96
	 China, whose cooperation will be vital in forestalling the spread of nuclear weapons, has real and legitimate concerns about the relative size of U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles compared with its own. If dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals put Chinese leaders more at ease about their strategic position, then they might be more willing to cease undermining the spirit and enforcement of the NPT.
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 11-98 / JANE E. NOLAN (et al. Steinbruner, Flamm, Miller, Mussington, Perry, & Carter), SENIOR FELLOW IN THE BROOKINGS FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES PROGRAM, 1994; GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, p. 53, "The Imperatives for Cooperation" AGL, VT96
	 China has been exhibiting some movement toward international accommodation in return for continued access to Western trade and technology. For all its recalcitrance, China acceded to the NPT, agreed in principle to adhere to MTCR guidelines, and, although it currently remains the stumbling block to progress, initially joined in the permanent five discussions to consult about the international arms trade. China is not fully complying with some of these arrangements, however, in part because of a perception that the regimes are discriminatory.
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 11-99 / Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; CHINA REBUFFS U.S. ON SALE OF REACTORS TO IRAN; ACS VT96
	 China's nuclear power industry, however, is less sophisticated than Russia's. China has produced its own nuclear weapons but Beijing has been meticulous in meeting its obligations not to sell nuclear arms. And its reactor technology may fall short of what Iran wants.
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11-100/ FRANK GAFFNEY; director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, Defense News, April 3, 1995 / April 9, 1995; Pg. 19. HEADLINE: U.S. Leadership Must Awaken To Onrushing Tide of Crises; ACS VT96
	 The following are among the dynamic conditions in play today that could produce the next international cataclysm, possibly on a global scale: * The recent nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system is a graphic reminder of a fundamental reality: The technology associated with chemical and biological warfare is so widely known that essentially anyone who wishes to get their hands on it can do so. This fact makes a mockery of arms control agreements that purport to rid the world of such weapons.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CHINA AND ARMS SALES
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Editor: Andrea Looby
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A. China sells weapons.
1.	China is a big arms seller. (1-4)
2.	China is selling arms in the Middle East. (5)
3.	China is selling arms to Pakistan. (6-8)
4.	China is selling arms to Iran. (9-10)
B. China is not an arms dealer.
1.	It is unknown how arms sales will be in the future. (11)
2.	China is working with non-proliferation organizations. (12)
C. Weapons sales are dangerous.
1.	Arms trading leads to conflict and death. (13-16)
2.	China's arm sales cause tensions in the Middle East. (17-18)
3.	The arms race makes China and Japan threatening. (19-19a)
4.	China's arm sales make it a threat. (20-21)
5.	China won't ban the sale of long-range missiles. (22)
6.	Arms trading is rising. (23-25)
7.	US interactions with China weapons dealing is difficult. (26-32)
8.	China's arms race has begun. (33-35)
9.	The US has sanctions on China for selling weapons to Pakistan. (36)
10.	Israel sells weapons to China. (37-38)
11.	France sells weapons to China. (39)
D. Arms sales are fine.
1.	There is no threat of conflict. (40)
2.	There are no arm races in the Asia-Pacific region. (41)
3.	The US lifted the ban on China arms exports. (42)
4.	The US should sell weapons to China. (43)
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12-1/ Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1995, SECTION: Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Boom in the Trade of Small Arms Fuels World's Ethnic and Regional Rivalries; ACS VT96
	 China, with at least 16 factories, is believed to have the world's largest small-arms industry. The United States ranks fifth.
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12-2 / Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 12-1-94; "Storm warning" p. 15 ;SEG VT96
	 The tug-of-war between 'Washington and Beijing on the issue of China's mis sile sales came to a head in August 1993, when the U.S. imposed sanctions on the sale of satellites and other high technology items to China. But on October 4 this year, the two countries signed an agreement that seemed to defuse the quarrel. Washington lifted its sanctions and Beijing pledged not to see missiles which, while technically not of the range and power to fall under the purview of the control regime, were "inherently capable" of being upgraded to come under it. Beijing had argued that the M11 lay below the control regime ceiling. But despite the October 4 agreement, a cloud of suspicion hangs over the issue. One reason, Washington sources say, is a continuing stream of intelligence showing Chinese supply and training activity in Pakistan. A Clinton administration official says that bits and pieces of evidence found over the years lead us to surmise that Pakistan has received M11 missiles, but we haven't seen conclusive evidence like a satellite photograph of the missile. However, he acknowledges that the US has satellite photographs showing Chinese ships delivering crates containing M11 missile components. According to the administration official, Washington also possessed information about the visits of Chinese missile scientists and engineers to the Pakistan military base of Sargodha, where the crates are kept. If the missiles continue to be kept packed in crates, the conclusive evidence that would trigger sanctions may not be available. But officials fear that it is only a matter of time before the missiles are assembled and deployed -- and photographed.
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12-3 /Donald and Constance Shanor, Prof. at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and editor of the Xinhau News Agency in Beijing, 1995; CHINA TODAY, p. 8 ; MDS VT96
	 The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has become a major factor in the Chinese economy, dealing in arms, trading in currencies, and running a variety of businesses, from small hotels to TV game shows that simulate warfare. Although the military has published a list of the "ten nos" of forbidden business transactions, including smuggling, PLA units account for much of the piracy in Hong Kong waters, and at least one general was dismissed for smuggling in 1,000 cars from Korea. One PLA subsidiary supplies some of the assault weapons sold in U.S. inner cities."
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 12-4/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by Gilbert Rozman, p.376; THR VT 96 The decision not to sell at friendship prices any more was part of China's reforms in foreign policy. By 1990, however, China also found that shrinking markets meant arms sales were reduced. But this did not mean China had decided to reduce arms sales for profit. In fact, before the slump in the market, China had emerged as a major player in the international arms market. Economic reform seems to be a key limit on this aspect of defense policy reform. China's armed forces seek profits to plough back into the defense budget. Foreign policy pragmatism has led China to sell to both sides of the Iran-Iraq War and in some cases to become leading suppliers of heavy equipment. China sold tanks to Iraq and antitank weapons to Iran. While trying in the Security Council to arrange an end to the conflict, China sold antiship missiles that sank Western-flagged tankers. China acquired modern military technology from Israel, but sold some of its newer missiles to Israeli adversaries in the Persian Gulf. China also acquired modern technology from Western states in Europe and the United States, only to sell to Iran other technology that sank Western ships. The basic motive was money, but there was also a hope of finding friends in the region when the war was over.
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12-5/ Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 266 ;SEG VT96
	 That China is selling weapons is of less concern than that certain countries are buying them. Beijing has denied United States allegations that it was selling M-9 and M-l1 missile parts to Pakistan, despite an earlier promise not to; the wording of the Chinese statement, however, seemed less than forthright. China .also reportedly stepped up cooperation with Iran on missile technology, and last year it signed an agreement to help the Iranians build a nuclear power plant. Hong Kong authorities discovered that American-made military aircraft parts were being modified in China and then shipped to Iran via the crown colony on commercial flights. In addition to gamering foreign exchange, China's motives were believed to include the desire for continued access to Iranian oil and Teheran's agreement, tacit or otherwise, to eschew support for growing fundamentalist sentiment among China's Muslims.
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12-6/Elaine Sciolino, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; The New York Times, "U.S. AGAIN WARNS BEIJING ON RIGHTS", SECTION: Section A; Page 3; Column 4; Foreign Desk; PMS VT96
	 In a little-noticed move in recent weeks, the White House reversed itself and approved the launching of three commercial satellites for China. The launchings had been banned under sanctions imposed last August after United States intelligence agencies reported that China had shipped technology and components for M-11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of an international accord.
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12-7 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 While these are positive signs, there are negatives. China has sold M-11 missile equipment to Pakistan. The details are shrouded in secrecy. According to Senate testimony by CIA Director James Woolsey in February 1993: "Beijing has consistently regarded a nuclear-armed Pakistan as a crucial regional ally and as a vital counterweight to India's growing military capabilities. And building on a close and extensive defense cooperation effort, Beijing prior to joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 probably provided some nuclear weapons-related equipment."
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12-8/ PATRICK E. TYLER, The New York Times, May 23, 1995, Section A; Page 10; HEADLINE: The U.S.- China Slide; A Relationship Strained by Trade Tension Could Worsen Further Over Taiwan Flap; ACS VT96
	 The last time Beijing accused Washington of reneging on their understandings over the status of Taiwan was in the summer of 1992, Within days, China's civilian and military leaders met in secret and authorized the sale of M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan in violation of its pledge to Washington not to do so, Western officials say. Just so there was no mistake about the reciprocal activity that was at hand, China's leaders made sure that American intelligence satellites could observe the long M-11 shipping canisters from the time they left the Chinese missile factory to their off-loading from cargo ships in Pakistan.
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12-9/ Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 China also has broken its word to the international community with respect to the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. While promising to adhere to terms of the Missile Technology and Control Regime in 1992, Beijing is suspected of transferring M-9 intermediate-range ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. Similarly, in 1993, former CIA Director James Woolsey cited China as Iran's most important source of nuclear technology and claimed that transfers have allowed Iran to continue its quest for nuclear weapons. n2 China also has refused to halt nuclear weapons tests despite the moratorium by other nuclear powers.
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12-10/ Japan Economic Newswire SEPTEMBER 4, 1993, HEADLINE: China protests U.S. arms sales to Taiwan//MDS-VT96
	 In late July, the U.S. accused a Chinese cargo ship of delivering chemical weapons precursors to Iran. After a month of haggling, an inspection was agreed upon and according to a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman none of the alleged chemicals has so far been found. 
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 12-11/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?, edited by William T. Tow, p. 217; THR VT96
	 A year and a half after the Tiananmen incident, results of the Bush administration's conciliatory policy toward the PRC are minimal. Some dissidents, including the prominent Fang Lizhi, have been released from prison or allowed to leave the country. However, the human rights Climate in China continues to be repressive, and it is not clear that American pleas for liberalization have had any effect. In the military sector, China has not acceded to American wishes with regard to the sale of medium-range missiles in the Middle East or ceased its arms deliveries to the Khmer Rouge; it has held talks with Libya on the sale of items used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. The PRC has supported the American-backed United Nations Security Council decision condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait while abstaining on a subsequent resolution to authorize the use of force against Baghdad. However, it is likely that other .considerations besides a desire to coordinate its own strategic policies with those of the United States were paramount in the Chinese leadership's decision to support, or at least acquiesce to these UN Security Council initiatives. While China is currently pursuing a low-key military and arms sales posture in the Persian Gulf and other third world areas at present, it remains unclear to what extent Beijing will continue to do so over the longer term.
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12-12/Lowell Dittmer, Prof. of political science at the University of California- Berkeley, 1994; CHINA UNDER REFORM: POLITICS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, p. 190;THR VT96
	 The issue of arms sales also became more salient. Given the more explosive North-South polarity noted above, American attention shifted from newly dormant superpower relations to the risks of nuclear proliferation to regional powers, in which context China's refusal to observe sanctions on the export of missile or nuclear technology (or, according to U.S. intelligence, to honor promises once made) became more annoying than before. Thus a nuclear cooperation program and process for liberalizing U.S. controls on technology transfer remained frozen until 1992, when China finally agreed to abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and (with conditions) the Missile Technology Control Regime regulating missile technology proliferation. China has also begun to participate somewhat more actively in multilateral arms control. Since 1984, the PRC has signed the Outer Space Treat)5 joined the International Atomic Energy Agency, and endorsed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. China has also become quite active in various UN organs dedicated to arms control and disarmament.
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12-13 / Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Winter; Pg. 123, HEADLINE: The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific; ACS VT96
	 States usually engage in arms races to prevent war. They seek to achieve a military balance by matching the arms buildup of their adversary with a countervailing buildup of their own. In realist theory, this balancing process acts as a disincentive to war. But arms races generally do not achieve this desirable end. A study by Michael Wallace, a Canadian political scientist, found that 82 percent of arms races associated with serious international disputes culminated in war. 
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12-14 / Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1995, SECTION: Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Boom in the Trade of Small Arms Fuels World's Ethnic and Regional Rivalries; ACS VT96
	 From Bosnia to Cambodia, Nagorno-Karabakh to Somalia, and even to gangland turf battles in US cities, these weapons are fueling rivalries and adding daily to the estimated 40 million lives claimed by conventional arms worldwide since World War II. By comparison, 200,000 people died in history's only atomic bomb attacks.
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12-15/ Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Winter; Pg. 123, HEADLINE: The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific; ACS VT96
	 Because offensive arms can be used for aggression as well as defense, their very existence will inevitably raise suspicions about intentions in the minds of prudent adversaries who think in worst-case terms. When rival states each start adding offensive weapons to their inventories, following the ancient precept "If you want peace prepare for war," they are laying the basis for an arms race.
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12-16/ Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1995, SECTION: Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Boom in the Trade of Small Arms Fuels World's Ethnic and Regional Rivalries; ACS VT96
	 Lora Lumpe, of the Federation of American Scientists' Arms Sales Monitoring Project, says there is a pressing need for such an effort: ''The new security paradigm now is regional stability and regional conflict. If you look at regional conflicts, an absolute common denominator is the presence of large quantities of small arms.'' Small arms range from pistols, rifles, and grenades to machine guns, antitank and antiaircraft rockets, mines, and mortars. They are the most basic building block of an army's arsenal as well as being cheap and, therefore, cost-effective. These weapons are also low-tech, durable, easily transported and concealed, and widely available. As such, they have become the muscle behind the emergence of some of the world's new post-cold-war states and major instruments of ethnic or religious zealotry.
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12-17/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p. 25; THR VT96
	 Various functional issues will also require Chinese cooperation. Beijing is a major arms exporter, and its participation is essential in limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Chinese arms sales are a major source of foreign exchange and yield Beijing significant regional influence. Once again, the Middle East is a main concern. During the Iran-Iraq war China supplied both countries with significant amounts of weapons and it continued to supply Baghdad with weaponry until Iraq invaded Kuwait. In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis, future Middle East stability will depend in part on Chinese cooperation.
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12-18 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 The purpose of the Chinese missile sales is unclear. The Chinese aren't talking; Beijing takes the view that its activities vis-a-vis Islamabad do not create a problem. Furthermore, China refuses to discuss nuclear disarmament issues with India. China claims that only nuclear powers discuss such issues--and it is a nuclear power and India is not. Indian strategists are not persuaded by that explanation. They suggest that China's evasiveness regarding nuclear issues and its aid to Pakistan is actually part of an old strategy designed to keep military pressure on India, thus raising the cost of Indian defense.
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12-19/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.427; THR VT96
	 Intraregional trade and investment may serve to stabilize and create interdependencies in the region, but the security situation is less settling. As was discussed earlier, virtually every nation in the Asia Pacific is building up and modernizing its armed forces. The introduction of sophisticated weaponry and the force modernization programs under way are especially worrying given the territorial disputes and general fears of a resurgent China and Japan.
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 12-19A / Kyodo News Service, 5-20-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN not to raise S. China Sea disputes at ARF meeting; ACS VT96
	 ASEAN's move underscores the priority it places on using the ARF as a means to engage China, which ASEAN views as a potential security threat because of its disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea.
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12-20 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S.-Japan alliance called 'irrelevant'; ACS VT96
	 Lind (Harper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind) suggested that China ''may be the greatest threat to (U.S.) interests'' because of its role as an arms supplier to anti-American regimes and its quest to become an economic and military power. ''History warns us, however, against overestimating China's potential -- and underestimating that of Japan,'' warned Lind, adding that with economic and technological might, ''Japan could become a high-tech military superpower overnight.''
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12-21 / Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. sees no problem in China's missile test" ACS VT96
	 But Davis [Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis] , in charge of arms control and international security affairs, said the United States strongly opposes China exporting its missiles, particularly pointing to a deal with Pakistan. Speaking to foreign journalists here, she noted that Beijing decided last December to ''forego'' the deal.
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12-22/ Agence France Presse September 4, 1993 HEADLINE: China protests new U.S. arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 China threatened late last month to renege on its agreement to abide by a international regime that bans the sale of long-range missiles, in retaliation for over U.S. trade sanctions. 
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12-23 / Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1995, SECTION: Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Boom in the Trade of Small Arms Fuels World's Ethnic and Regional Rivalries; ACS VT96
	 Aaron Karp, an arms trade expert at Virginia's Old Dominion University, says there is no reliable mechanism to track global light weapons sales and transfers since most are secret. But he estimates they account for 10 to 15 percent of all government-to-government arms transfers, or as much as $ 2.5 billion annually. Paramilitary groups spend another estimated $ 2.5 billion to $ 3 billion a year on small arms, he says. Other experts estimate the total annual trade at up to $ 10 billion.
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12-24 / Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1995, SECTION: Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Boom in the Trade of Small Arms Fuels World's Ethnic and Regional Rivalries; ACS VT96
	 The hardware slipping into Bosnia is symbolic of a massive global trade in light weapons that is becoming a growing concern in foreign capitals around the world. While attention often focuses on big-ticket items -- tanks, jet fighters, and ships -- small arms sold by governments and black marketeers are increasingly fueling ethnic, religious, and political conflicts worldwide.
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12-25 / Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer, The Christian Science Monitor, April 5, 1995, SECTION: Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Boom in the Trade of Small Arms Fuels World's Ethnic and Regional Rivalries; ACS VT96
	 In contrast, many experts believe the light-arms trade is soaring. One reason is that many of the countries the cold-war rivals transferred arms-making technologies to are no longer restricted by political considerations in their trading. So some sell to just about anyone.
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12-26/ Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 12-1-94; "Storm warning" p. 15 ;SEG VT96
	 The Clinton administration is concerned that if evidence surfaces that Beijing supplied full-scale M11 missiles to Pakistan, it would be obliged under the Helms-Glenn legislation to impose heavy sanctions on China. "We have made it clear to the Chinese that the category 1 sanctions that this would trigger could affect US$15-17 billion in Chinese exports to the US," an administration official says.
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12-27/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p. 27; THR VT96
	 The one area of cooperation that cannot be restored is American arms sales to China. Now that the cold war is over, the strategic value of this policy is gone while the human rights aspect of it has increased. The mere idea of sending weaponry to the murderers of Chinese students is politically untenable, no matter how pro reform the Chinese military may be and no matter how reluctant the military may have been to fire on the democracy demonstrators. Indeed, China's decision to cancel its agreement with Grumman for upgrading the avionics of its F-8 fighter removed the most sophisticated and high-profile arms package from SinoAmerican military cooperation, easing the political dilemma faced by American policy makers. It is unlikely that in the near future Washington will restore the remaining arms sales programs, much less seek further arms sales agreements with Beijing. 
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 12-28/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement" edited by William T. Tow p. 217; THR VT96
	 On balance, arguments appear to be valid that American arms manufacturers who have assisted in building China's military capabilities or aspire to do so for profit have been or will be hurt more than will China by the Bush administration's military sanctions levied against Beijing. Alternative suppliers exist in abundance, and no other country appears to have canceled or postponed making contracts with the PRC because of the Tiananmen incident. However, the overall dollar amounts involved are not great, since the PRC wishes to minimize its foreign military purchases.
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12-29/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?, edited by William T. Tow, p. 21O; THR VT96
	 An analysis of how well these theories have been borne out by events since the Tiananmen crackdown yields mixed results. There is no evidence whatsoever that continued military sales to China have influenced the PRC leadership to side with the United States on geostrategic issues, or that it has had positive spinoffs in terms of domestic liberalization. Three specific instances come to mind: the PRC's sale of missiles in the Middle East, its refusal to cease supplying the Khmer Rouge, and its willingness to discuss sales of poison gas chemicals to Libya.
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 12-30/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 33; THR VT96
	 Finally, China is a major seller of affordable and serviceable weaponry to developing nations, and an actual or alleged source of nuclear and/or missile technology to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The United States and other nations must continue to encourage China to cooperate on limiting proliferation of arms and technology for weapons of mass destruction, as well as better policing Western companies engaged in illicit and unwise technological transfers. China's recent accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--and its promise to adhere to the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime--are testament to the importance of continued engagement and pressure by the United States, Europe and Japan.
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12-31/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?," edited by William T. Tow, p. 203; THR VT96
	 The issue of whether it would be preferable to punish China by imposing curbs on military sales and exchanges (the hard-line approach) or continue to do business as usual (the soft-line approach) is not a simple one, with both sides able to present convincing arguments for the course of the action they support. Moreover, the outcomes of any course of action are uncertain, given, first, the differences of opinion within the Chinese elite at present; second, the growing cleavage between that elite and the people in whose name it governs; and, third, the rapid changes in international power configurations that have been occurring in months since the events at Tiananmen. This paper will discuss the implications of different policy options that the United States might pursue and the possible consequences thereof.
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12-32/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p. 80; THR VT96
	 As the United States takes the lead in policing China's arms sales, it faces a number of sticky problems. Not only have its actions significantly increased tensions with China, but they also have raised the question of how well China's central civilian apparatus is able to control a military with its own increasing commercial interests. Domestically, the actions have harmed American businesses vis-a-vis their competition and added to business criticism of US. China policy. For example, some aerospace and telecommunications companies, feeling strapped by US. controls, have argued that sales of certain high-technology items to China are no longer a security threat in the post-cold-war era. Sensitivity of the US. government to such domestic criticism, as well as its broader moves to place economic considerations at center stage in its foreign policy, have been major factors behind its efforts to ameliorate or lift the various sanctions and its reconsideration of post-1989 US. policy toward China.
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12-33/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 2994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific century, p .424; THR VT96
	 Asian military establishments are increasingly armed with sophisticated, state-of-the-art weaponry. The introduction into the region of F-16, MIG-31, and SU-27 fighter-interceptors and a range of modern naval vessels has led many analysts to conclude that an arms race has begun. Defense spending is also dramatically rising as the region's militaries attempt to modernize their forces. Unlike other parts of the world where the end of the cold war has brought a "peace dividend" and a reduction in military forces, the trend has been the opposite in Asia. 
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 12-31/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF, VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.69; THR VT96
	 No. group has been more enthusiastic. about the recent, firesale prices at Russia's arms bazaar than Chinese generals. China is buying both advanced hardware and the modern technology needed to build it. It recently purchased 24 SU-27s, the most advanced warplanes China has ever deployed, and is reportedly negotiating for two additional squadrons. It is also negotiating the purchase of advanced missile guidance systems from the Soviets. China has also been modernizing its military-industrial complex by entering into joint ventures with foreign companies, including some in the United States, in order to acquire up-to-date technology in electronics and other fields. This spring, an increasingly assertive China conducted its largest ever nuclear test, breaking the informal international ban on large detonations. The armed forces are also proclaiming their growing offensive capabilities with well-publicized military exercises.
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12-35/Ross H. Munro, Coordinator of the Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute, FALL, 1992; POLICY REVIEW, "Awakening Dragon," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 63; THR VT96
	 Recently, Chinese military power has been growing rapidly in both relative and absolute terms. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the prevailing pacifist mood in Japan, China faces no serious regional threat for the first time in centuries. Indeed, no other East Asian country alone could conceivably confront China today. Nevertheless, Beijing has increased military spending by more than 50 percent since 1989. Much of the new money is being spent to give China's armed forces the capability to fight and win major conflicts outside Chinese borders.
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 12-36/ Agence France Presse September 4, 1993 HEADLINE: China protests new U.S. arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 Washington announced the sanctions after determining that China had sold components of its M-11 missiles to Pakistan, which it said was a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
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12-37/ June TeufeI Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miomi, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 265 ;SEG VT96
	 China has also acquired military technology from Israel, sometimes against Washington's wishes. The People's Republic was reportedly using Patriot missile technology sold to it by Israel to upgrade Soviet designed surface-to-air defense weapons and to develop ballistic missile reentry vehicles that can evade American defensive systems. The aim was assumed to be capture of a larger share of the growing demand for weapons by third world states. Pentagon analysts opined that China would be selling cruise missiles and other military systems as well.
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12-38/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 12, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Israel Denies Transferring U.S. Jet Technology to China [JERUSALEM, 01/10/95] "Israel did not transfer any American technology or American components to China", Oded Ben-Ami, spokesman for Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, said Friday, just before a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, Reuter reported. According to a Los Angeles Times report last week, Israel was using U.S. military technology to help China develop an advanced combat aircraft. "I cannot confirm the accuracy of the report," Perry said. "We are looking into it. And if it turns out to be accurate, we will have some difficult words with the Israeli government." Under U.S. law, countries receiving U.S. military technology or components may not transfer them to a third country without authorization, otherwise they will face U.S. economic sanctions. There were similar reports about Israeli violations in the past, but proof has been elusive. "We will fully answer all the Americans' questions" as before, said Ben-Ami. (Lixiang WANG, Chuck LIN)
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12-39/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?, edited by William T. Tow, p. 214; THR VT96
	 The argument that China will eventually be able to find other countries to satisfy its military procurement needs is certainly true. One country that was considerably more vehement in its denunciations of China's human rights abuses after the Tiananmen incident was France. In August 1989, it was announced that the French state-owned company Aerospatiale would proceed with its military programs with China. Aerospatiale had already licensed production of at least fifty SA 365-B Dauphin 2 helicopters for the PLA air force and naval air arm under the designation of Z-9a. France also cooperated with development of the SA 321 Super Freion helicopter and sold Super Puma battlefield helicopters to the PLA.
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12-40/ Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Winter; Pg. 123, HEADLINE: The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific; ACS VT96
	 Some regional security planners argue that for these and other reasons, there is no cause for concern. Indeed, as long as political relationships in the region remain generally benign, the arms buildup poses little threat to regional security. 
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12-41/ Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Winter; Pg. 123, HEADLINE: The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific; ACS VT96
	 This said, and alarmist claims to the contrary, there is no arms race in the region at the moment. With the exception of the two Koreas, regional states are not arming competitively against each other, but rather against an uncertain security future. Moreover, no states within the region are seeking to acquire the numbers or types of weapons needed to mount invasions, or other major assaults, against their neighbors. n52
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 12-42/Richard Cronin, Congressional Research Service, Jan. 1995; ASIAN SURVEY, "The United States and Asia in 1995," p. 115; SEG VT96
	 On the security front, Washington achieved some promising gains. After months of negotiation, the US. agreed (October 4) to lift the 1993 ban on high technology exports in return for a new commitment by Beijing not to export ballistic missile technology to Pakistan and other countries. In the interim, the administration had responded to domestic pressures and agreed to allow the export of three communications satellites for commercial launches by China, which had been put under contract before the sanctions were imposed. Beijing had committed itself to abiding by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions in 1991, but argued that the agreement did not cover the M-11 ballistic missile. Now, China essentially accepted the US. standard of "inherent capability" and agreed to undertake detailed discussions with the United States on missile sales issues. High level security exchanges continued, including a four day visit to China by Defense Secretary William Perry in mid-October. 
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12-43/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?," edited by William T. Tow, p. 209; THR VT96
	 Yet another rationale for wanting the Chinese to adopt American weapons was that it would give the United States some leverage over the Chinese. A China equipped with American weapons, it was argued, would be more likely to side with the United States on geostrategic and commercial issues. Moreover, training Chinese officers in American academies would presumably give them a better understanding of America and its values. It would also facilitate the formation of personal friendships among service personnel of the two countries. Democratic values are best taught by example, and here was a chance to allow some Chinese to personally observe them in action. Additionally, forging military relationships with China would be good for American suppliers. Were the United States to deny China the right to purchase weapons, the PRC could simply go elsewhere: to Britain, France, or perhaps even the Soviet Union, with concomitant gains in those countries' influence over developments in China.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
CHINA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
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TAIWAN / REPUBLIC OF CHINA
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Editor: Steve Woods
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RELATIONS BETWEEN INVOLVED PARTIES
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A. PRC - US Relations
	1. PRC opposed to Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 1-7
	2. Importance of PRC - US relations 8-12
	3. PRC not like US support of Taiwan 13-14
	4. PRC prefer policy in "Communiqués" over TRA 15-18
B. PRC - ROC Relations
	1. Situation is uncertain 19-26
	2. PRC has power over ROC 27-28
	3. ROC is in strong position 29
	4. Situation is improving
		a. general trend positive 30-32
		b. circumstances favor stability 33-34
		c. informal exchanges positive effect 35-41
		d. relations and contacts improving 42-49
	5. Situation is getting worse
		a. in general 50-52
		b. internal obstacles 53-56
		c. PRC not like ROC foreign policy 57-59
C. ROC - US Relations
	1. In general positive 60-64
	2. US support ROC growth 65-66
	3. Taiwan Relations Act has increased Human Rights in ROC 67-71
	4. Others model US policy toward ROC 72
	5. ROC in dilemma from diminishing US support 73
D. ROC - Russia 74-77
E. ROC and International Community
	1. PRC seeks to isolate ROC 78-81a,b,c
	2. ROC is big international player 82-86
	3. ROC has difficulties due to status 87-94
F. Hong Kong 95-99
G. Uniqueness: Lee visit to US
	1. PRC upset with visit 100-102
	2. PRC fallout over visit 103-107
	3. US Position on visit 108-112
	4. Visit no major impact on relations 113-114
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IMPLICATIONS
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A. US
	1. US interconnected in conflict 115-120
	2. US would act in crisis 121-122,a,b
	3. Taiwan Relations Act
		a. background of 123-125
		b. support for 126-127
	4. Republicans pursue Pro-Taiwan policy 128-134
	5. Clinton actions 135-139
	6. US policy pragmatic 140-143
	7. US should treat Taiwan better 144-146
B. PRC
	1. Separate ROC helps PRC reformers 147
	2. ROC situation used to weaken Deng 148
	3. Deng will be strong on ROC 149-150
	4. PRC not reform to fit ROC demands 151
	5. Succession
		a. reason for concern 152-154
		b. presents new opportunity 155-156
	6. PRC see Taiwan as internal affair 157
	7. PRC will act regardless of logic 158
	8. PRC army has Taiwan agenda 159
	9. Reforms in ROC pressure PRC 160-161
c. ROC
	1. ROC moving toward democracy 162-165
	2. Internal dissent for independence 166-168,a
	3. ROC electorate not want independence 165-169
	4. ROC can act autonomous currently 170
	5. Increased democracy hurts ROC ruling party (KMT) 171
	6. Ruling party will remain in control 172-175
	7. ROC planning for smooth PRC succession of power 176
	8. ROC poor environmentally 177
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REUNIFICATION
----------
A. Complication in ROC
	1. Freer ROC makes more difficult 178-179
	2. ROC policies 180-181
	3. ROC wants equal status to negotiate 182-187
B. At impasse 188-190
C. "One China" Doctrine
	1. ROC rejects 191-193
	2. ROC interpretation makes equal with PRC 194-195
	3. PRC must shift 196
	4. PRC has abandoned since Tiannamen 197
D. PRC not change to meet ROC demands 198-204,a
E. Time frame
	1. Favors ROC 205-207
	2. Favors PRC 208-210
	3. Long time frame 211-213
	4. No formal time frame 214
	5. Improbable quickly 215
	6. Time key: PRC must change before ROC 216
F. Situation favorable due to ROC concessions 217-218
G. Aggressive action unlikely 219-220
H. ROC independence
	1. By end of 90's complete de facto autonomy for ROC 221
	2. ROC see no advantage in independence 222
	3. Independence equals turmoil 223-225
	4. Independence movement not China focused 226
	5. TRA allows ROC to seek independence 227
	6. ROC independence would force Japanese re-arm 228
	7. Current conditions not favor independence 229
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ECONOMIC ISSUES
----------
A. ROC economy strong
	1. Overall 230-232
	2. Regionally 233-236
	3. Openness increases economic growth 236a
	4. GATT membership would increase importance 237
B. ROC influences PRC 238-240
C. Significant trade between ROC - PRC 241-242
D. Trade increases contact between ROC - PRC 243-246
E. ROC economy gives it important position 247-251
F. ROC economy does not give it importance 252
G. Strong ROC economy fuels nationalism 253
H. Trade makes situation stable 257-258
I. Economic link gives PRC power over ROC 259-260
J. Economic power gives ROC edge over PRC 261-262
K. Economics intertwines US- PRC- ROC 263-266
L. ROC and Japan trade issues 267-269
M. ROC and Viet Nam ties 270
N. ROC growth threatened by environmental issues 271
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MILITARY ISSUES 
----------
A. Arms sales
	1. ROC seeks political not military advantage 272-274
	2. PRC upset with US sales 275-279
	3. ROC seeks defense 280-283
	4. ROC seeks suppliers other than US 284-285
	5. ROC request Air Defense 286
	6. No F-16's to ROC yet 287
	7. F-16's domestic economic issue for US, not political 288
B. Military actions
	1. No military invasion 289-292
	2. No nuclear attack 293-294
	3. PRC still threatens action 295-301
	4. TRA would require US to act if ROC attacked 302
	5. PRC would act only against non-Chinese 303-304
	6. Status
		a. PRC superior 305-306
		b. ROC could make attack costly 307-308
		c. current status favors PRC 309-310
	7. Japan would act to defend ROC 311-312
C. Blockade
	1. PRC feel blockade could get reunification 313
	2. ROC would respond militarily 314-315
	3. Blockade would draw in others to conflict 316-318
	4. ROC could handle forcing PRC to escalate 319
	5. Most likely PRC strategy 320
D. No Spratly crisis 321-322
E. ROC adhere to NPT and CBW pacts 323 
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JAPAN
----------
Editor: Jethro Hayman
----------
I. Sino-Japanese peace
	A. Japan opposes militarism in all forms (324-335)
	B. Japanese leaders are committed to peace with China (336-338)
	C. China/Japan ties very strong (339-341)
	D. Japan not capable of military hegemony (342-348)
II. Sino-Japanese conflict
	A. Catalysts of Japanese military modernization (349-352)
	B. China's military capability concerns Japan (353-357)
	C. Bi-lateral relations already shaky (358-361)
	D. Economic competition leads to political clash (362-364)
	E. Senkaku island dispute (365-368)
III. Sino-Japanese diplomacy
	A. China struggling to repay loans demanded by Japan (369-373)
	B. Japan's colonial past resurfaces
	 1. Chinese WWII victims seek compensation from Japan (374-378)
	 2. Asian perception favors China over Japan (379-382)
	 3. Japan remorseful about past (383-386)
	 4. Japan promises to remove chemical weapons left in China (387-389)
	C. Japan assists China with intellectual property rights (390-391)
	D. Japan aids China with environmental clean up (392-394)
	E. Bi-lateral relations are future-oriented (395-400)
IV. United States/Japan alliance
	A. U.S. hegemony avoids Japanese military aggression (401-402)
	B. U.S./Japan solidarity endangered by diverging Chinese policy(403-407) 
	C. Strong China improves U.S./Japan relations (408-409)
	D. Japan should be militarily independent of the U.S. (410-411)
	E. U.S./Japan Trade tensions
	 1. Trade war threatens World Trade Organization (412-413)
	 2. U.S. trade deficit with Japan growing (414-416)
	 3. U.S. complacent with Japanese economic status (417-418)
	 4. Auto dispute does not threaten U.S./Japan ties (419)
	 5. Closed Japanese markets to U.S. will cause crisis in relations (420)
V. Miscellaneous information on the Japan/China/U.S. triangle
	A. Japan foreign policy on the verge of change (421-424)
	B. Japan will not ally with U.S. during U.S./China conflict (425-426)
	C. Japan tough on China about nukes (427-429)
	D. Taiwan important to Japan (430-431)
	E. Japanese involvement in world affairs acceptable to China (432-433)
	F. Japan/China/U.S. relations key to Asian peace and stability (434-439)
	G. Japan's economic condition
	 1. Weak (440-443)
	 2. Strong (444-448)
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RUSSIA
----------
Editor: Jethro Hayman
----------
I. Sino-Soviet partnership
	A. Positive bi-lateral relations a priority (449-456)
	B. Military cooperation upheld (457-460)
	C. Russia stands by border pact with China (461-462)
II. Russia threatens region and globe
	A. Russia depends on nukes for defense (463-467)
	B. Russia reverting to hegemonic ways (468-470)
	C. Russia hardline vying for power (471-473)
III. Miscellaneous Soviet/China/U.S. information
	A. U.S. must have consistent MFN standards for Russia and China (474)
	B. Russia and China ethnic tensions spill over borders (475)
	C. Changes in Russia release democracy forces in China (476)
	D. Sino-Soviet ties do not hinder Taiwan (477)
	E. China avoids economic failure of Russia (478)
	F. Strong Russia balances China/Japan (479)
	G. Russia influences Asia due to China ties (480)
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INDIA
----------
Editor: Jethro Hayman
----------
I. There will be stable Sino-Indian relations (481-483)
II. Sino-Indian relations are problematic (484-489)
III. Weapon Proliferation 
	A. India can nuke China or Pakistan (490-492)
	B. China's military acts ensure Indian proliferation (493-494)
	C. NPT discrimination justifies Indian proliferation (495-497)
	D. Indian Navy has limited power (498)
	E. Pakistan purchases undetectable sub (499-500)
----------
Hong Kong
----------
Editor: Jethro Hayman
----------
I. China will give Hong Kong regional autonomy (501-507)
II. China will control Hong Kong completely (508-517)
III. China already influences Hong Kong economic planning (518-521)
IV. Miscellaneous Hong Kong/China/Britain/U.S. information
	A. Hong Kong will never be independent (522)
	B. Hong Kong reforms must be accelerated before China rule (523)
	C. Sino-British relations good (524-526)
	D. China interference with Hong Kong hurts U.S./China relations (527)
	E. Singapore able to take Hong Kong's trade role (528)
	F. Hong Kong not pleased with British rule (529)
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North Korea
----------
Editor: Jethro Hayman
----------
I. Positive China influence needed for peaceful Korean penninsula (530-537)
II. North Korea can't stand without Chinese support (538-543)
III. North Korea faces resource shortage (544-549)
IV. Miscellaneous North Korea/China information
	A. No threat North Korea conflict (550)
	B. North Korea fears invasion (551-552)
	C. China deals arms to North Korea (553)
	D. Collapsed reactor deal for North Korea risks war (554)
	E. North Korea is a challenge to China (555)
	F. China ambivalent about sanctions against North Korea (556-557)
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13-1 / Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of Chins am[ and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 2 ; ANA The ROC government on Taiwan was profoundly disturbed by the events of 1979. It perceived them as an "abandonment" of Taiwan by the United States after three decades of close collaboration, including a military partnership that had most recently involved ROC tactical support for the United States during the Vietnam War. To minimize the immediate impact and to facilitate unofficial relations between Taipei and Washington, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter on April 10, 1979. In so far as it sought to replace formal diplomatic ties with relations that were unofficial in name, if not in substance, the TRA was a unique document in the annals of diplomatic history. It not only provided for a close and friendly relationship between two international nations in the absence of diplomatic recognition, it also defined the scope and terms of this relationship as a binding set of national commitments. It enabled the United States to provide defense assistance to a state with which it had no formal relations. This latter fact has remained a source of ongoing tension in U.S.-PRC relations as well as a source of potential conflict in the region.
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13-2/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 145; ANA VT96
	 Deng's critics are quick to point out that the TRA gives Taiwan sovereignty. Deng cannot deny this; he has said so himself. Therefore, he must, with the appearance of sincerity at least, attack the TRA, which he has done. He has refused to forswear the use of military force against Taiwan; he has also mentioned boycotting Taiwan. In that sense he has openly challenged the TRA. Since the U.S. response has been mild at most, Deng has not been hurt politically by the U.S. in this regard.
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13-3/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 61 ; ANA VT96
	 Beijing's main complaint was, and is, that the TRA treats Taiwan as a nation-state, not as territory of the People's Republic of China. Chinese leaders also take issue with the provisions guaranteeing arms sales to Taipei. They believe that the arms sales provision in the TRA makes it possible for Taiwan to refuse Beijing's proposals to negotiate reunification and, therefore, legitimizes Taiwan's continued sovereignty as the Republic of China (though that term is not used in the TRA). If Taiwan had no defense capabilities, Beijing would, it reasons,. be able to force Taipei to the negotiating table. 
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13-4/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 61 ; ANA VT96
	 While the U.S. Congress debated the Taiwan Relations Act, Chinese leaders in Beijing complained. When it was passed by Congress and signed by President Carter in April 1979, they launched a formal protest. Since then Chinese leaders have regularly criticized the TRA. They have asked members of Congress to revise it or cancel it, and they have taken various other actions to undermine the Act--some subtle, some direct. They have also pointed out that the TRA contradicts the Normalization Agreement and the other two communiques. 
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13-5/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 60; ANA VT96
	 finally, it is the objective of the People's Republic of China to under- mine dilute or even have the TRA canceled Chinese leaders in Beijing have said this. And it is clear from the China's foreign policy statements and actions that this is true.
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13-6/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 50; ANA VT96
	 In early 1982, China's major official newspaper, People's Daily, addressing the Taiwan issue, referred to U.S. "hegemonic" moves and its interference in China's domestic affairs. (Since normalization, the term "hegemonic" had been used exclusively to describe the Soviet Union.) Beijing subsequently canceled celebrations planned for the ninth anniversary of the Shanghai Communique. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials ridiculed the theory that a domestic law--namely the TRA--could govern international relations and cited the U.S. Civil War (other countries dealing diplomatically with the Confederacy) experience when condemning U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. When Senator Howard Baker visited Beijing in mid-1982, Deng told him publicly that Congress "should amend the TRA to resolve the arms issue."
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 13-7/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 41 ; ANA VT96
	 In as much as President Carter altered U.S. policy regarding Taiwan's legal status and did so without consulting Congress, or even allowing any debate on the decision, the sovereignty issue instantly became a controversy. Taiwan's sovereignty, or lack thereof, was thus a central issue to deal with in writing the Taiwan Relations Act. In fact, it was the most salient issue decided by the TRA, and it made the TRA contradict, in fact, repudiate the Normalization Agreement. 
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13-8/Gerald Segal, Research Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Foreign Policy," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.167; THR VT96
	 China sought to isolate Taiwan politically, and starve it of military support. This meant a direct approach to the United States to cut its links to Taiwan. China remained especially sensitive to American perceptions that Sino-American detente meant that Taiwan was no longer important. The Chinese view was that Taiwan was as important as ever, but that the method for its incorporation into the mainland was to be peaceful. This required the ending of United States arms sales and above all a growing sense in Taipei that it had no choice but to deal with Beijing. On both counts Chinese policy largely failed. Taiwan survives, and indeed flourishes, as a pariah but an important trading partner for the West. The United States has reduced but not severed relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan problem has not gone away and remains the key symbol of China's unsatisfied national integrity. It therefore also remains the main problem for Sino-American relations. Major cosmetic deals have already been arranged, but the reality of an independent Taiwan remains as real as ever.
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13-9/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the Nationsl Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Corning Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.34; THR VT96
	 In the Taiwan Strait relations between Taipei and Beijing have their own dynamic and are not under Washington's control. Indeed Beijing-Taipei relations easily could become one of the most serious problems in Sino-American relations. -Recent Chinese protest over Washington's decision to sell F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan is just one indication of the conflict, contradictions and policy dilemmas that lie just below the surface. The P.R.C.'s incentive to continue a policy of moderation toward Taiwan would be greatly lessened by a deterioration of its relations with the United States.
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13-10/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 132; THR VT96
	 Finally, while the Chinese would never admit that they need help in solving an issue deemed an "internal affair," they do need the United States to maintain its "One China Policy," and its pressure on Taiwan not to seek independence. Recent conferences by China scholars and presentations before congressional hearings have called on the people of Taiwan to remain patient. For China, a declaration of independence by Taiwan would be the worst possible scenario; the inevitable use of military force would, at the very least, scuttle the current economic boom.
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 13-11/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of Chins army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA , p. 93; ANA VT96
	 The international status and future security of the Republic of China on Taiwan have been the focus of increasing uncertainty since U.S.-PRC normalization and the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. It is clear that both the People's Republic of China and the United States play a critical role in resolving the Taiwan issue.
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 13-12/Richard Bush, Staff Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Rep. with responsibility for East Asia, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's International Role: Implications for U.S. Policy," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p 297; ANA VT96
	 Sixth, although U.S. policy in the last decade has been able to address Taiwan for its own sake, there is an irreducible degree to which it is inextricably linked to the U.S. relationship with China. That is because the PRC insists that is be so (or, more precisely, will only tolerate a certain level of autonomy to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship). To ' the extent, therefore, that Washington retains an interest in good relations with Beijing, there are limits to which it may associate itself with trends on Taiwan that the PRC opposes. Even if U.S.-China relations were to deteriorate to the point that there were few common interests left, it may still be in Taiwan's interest for the United States to avoid provoking China to take actions against the island that could otherwise be avoided. Obviously, PRC tolerance will vary from time to time, and political forces on Taiwan are right to test the limits of tolerance. Yet because favorable U.S.-China relations have, in fact, been good for Taiwan, reckless initiatives may turn out to be doubly counterproductive.
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13-13/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 165;THR VT96
	 In parallel fashion, as the prospect of reunification recedes, Beijing tends to blame U.S. arms sales for emboldening the KMT, to see the U.S. hand behind KMT reforms, and to perceive a hidden American agenda of protecting economic and strategic interests in Taiwan. A November 1988 article in the official weekly Outlook was revealing of this belief--perhaps too much so, for it was quickly withdrawn. It charged the U.S. with "increasing its interference in Taiwan's affairs, strengthening its political, military, and economic infiltration and control with a view to consolidating the situation in the Taiwan Strait of no peace no war, no unification no independence, no economic rapprochement or estrangement." 
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13-14/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 186; ANA VT96
	 An article in the Hong Kong PRC publication Liaowang in 1991 declared that "the support of a small number of U.S. Congressmen is another important reason why the 'Taiwan independence' movement has escalated .... Although only a few people in the U.S. Congress support 'Taiwan independence,' what they say and do serves as an injection in the arm for the 'Taiwan independence' movement." There is little doubt that President Yang Shangkun had Americans in mind when in October 1991 he referred to "some foreign forces that are instigating the Taiwan independence movement to split the motherland" and went on to warn the "splittists" not to play with fire.
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 13-15/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 4O; ANA VT96
	 The only controversial wording in the Normalization Agreement was the reference to Taiwan: "Within this context [of establishing relations with the People's Republic of China], the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." The use of the term "people" implied that the Republic of China was no longer a nation-state and that Taiwan possessed no government or sovereignty. In other words, it suggested a change in U.S. policy regarding Taiwan's legal status. 
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13-16 / BBC Summary of World Broadcasts February 19, 1994, SaturdaySECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; FOREIGN RELATIONS; FE/1926/G ; HEADLINE: [1]; Foreign Ministry spokesman on US position on arms sales to Taiwan; Japan; visits //MDS-VT96
	 The spokesman said: The essence of the revised Taiwan Relations Act of the United States is to attempt to overrule the 17th August joint communique between China and the United States and legalize US arms sales to Taiwan. This is what the Chinese government and people stand firmly opposed to. 
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13-17 / BBC Summary of World Broadcasts February 19, 1994, SaturdaySECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; FOREIGN RELATIONS; FE/1926/G ; HEADLINE: [1]; Foreign Ministry spokesman on US position on arms sales to Taiwan; Japan; visits //MDS-VT96
	 The 17th August joint communique is an international agreement reached between the two governments of China and the United States, which the US government is obligated to strictly abide by in the principle that international laws prevail over domestic laws, and to take necessary measures to prevent the US Congress from making any remarks and taking any actions which are in violation of this principle with a view to the maintenance of Sino-US relations. (CHINESE SPOKESMAN) 
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13-18 / New China news agency domestic service in Chinese BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 19, 1993, SECTION: Part 3 The Far East; 1. GENERAL AND WESTERN AFFAIRS; FE/1771/A1; HEADLINE: QIAN QICHEN WARNS USA OF "TROUBLE" IF COMMUNIQUE ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES REVISED//MDS-VT96
	 On 17th August 1982, China and the United States issued a "joint communique of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America", or the "17th August" communique for short. The communique announced that the two sides had reached agreement on settling the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan step by step until its final, thorough solution [Chinese: fen bu zhou zhi zhi zui hou che di jie jue 0483 2975 7532 4160 5267 2584 0683 1796 1646 6043 0414]. 
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13-19/Lee Lai To, Lecturer Political Science National University of Singapore, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Taiwan And the Reunification Question," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 187 ; THR VT96
	 Taipei's somewhat belated reactions to developments on the mainland definitely disclosed the harsh realities across the Taiwan Straits. The KMT government did not want and could not really hope to overthrow the CCP, even in times of turmoil on the mainland. What Taipei could do was exploit the chaos to project itself favourably not only on the mainland and at home, but to the Chinese abroad and the international community at large. In addition, the Tiananmen incident was very useful in cooling down the China fever and diluting whatever illusions people on Taiwan might have had about the CCP and its policy towards reunification. The concern of the people on Taiwan for their compatriots on the mainland could also make less credible the claim of the opposition that the Taiwanese were not Chinese.
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13-20/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 63; ANA VT96
	 In conclusion, the Soviet Union has moved toward a more forward looking policy in Asia at the same time as the United States has reduced its regional presence. Neither shift is likely to greatly affect Taiwan unless the tone of the new Soviet policy changes considerably. The PRC position is also likely to remain one of patience, as increased opportunities in Northeast Asia and the northern interior provide ongoing distractions to their interests on Taiwan. In the long run, however, the mainland's view that Taiwan is part of the mainland, and that a good leader recovers lost territory, suggests that the PRC will not remain distracted from its Taiwan interests for 1ong.
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13-21/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p.151; ARIA VT96
	 The third general scenario calls for Taiwan to maintain the status quo. This scenario is more probable than the others for a variety of reasons. First, neither of the two cited scenarios is very likely. Second, Taiwan (or the Republic of China, whichever term one wants to use) is a nation-state. Few national leaders are interested in giving up their political authority; Taiwan's decision makers (whether Taiwanese or Mainlander) are no exception. Surrendering Taiwan's sovereignty would assume this. Third, a look at recent world history reveals few cases of nation-states merging; there are more examples of them splitting or staying apart. Taiwan's political opposition, which is Vowing stronger with democratization, believes the latter trend is more relevant to Taiwan. There is considerable evidence the ruling Nationalist party does also. Last, the status quo is doubtless best for Taiwan's population. They are overwhelmingly opposed to rule by a Communist regime in Beijing. 
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 13-22/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 35 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 For instance, answers to the question" Is the mainland friendly or unfriendly toward Taiwan?" do not show a clear trend over time. In October 1990, 22 percent of respondents believed the PRC to be friendly toward Taiwan while 29 percent considered the PRC hostile; in May 1992, after the first contacts between the SEF and ARATS, these percentages were 39.2 percent and 13.4 percent; however, three months later, probably because of the suspension of the talks, the percentages switched again (20 percent and 40 percent, respectively). This switching back and forth has continued up to today.
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13-23/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 209; THR VT96
	 To some extent the politics of Taiwan may serve as a preview, even though Taiwan and the mainland have very different political traditions and face different issues. Since political liberalization occurred in Taiwan there have been carnival-like rallies and demonstrations, some featuring the throwing of rocks at the police; an opposition politician jumped on tables in the Legislative Yuan to grab the microphone and the neckties of elderly politicians of the ruling party; numerous small opposition parties have been formed and there have been constant joinings and defections from the opposition groups. Although self-immolation is not a Chinese tradition, in 1989 two Taiwan independence activists burned themselves to death in political protests. During the May 1989 demonstrations in Beijing, similarly, more than a dozen demonstrators registered to burn themselves in protest against the government's failure to enter into dialogue, although none actually did so. It is not likely that democratic politics in China will be any less turbulent than those in Taiwan.
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13-24/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 166; THR VT96
	 The future prospects for Taiwan-mainland relations can be sketched in terms of three scenarios, in increasing order of probability. The first is for increasing tension in the Taiwan Strait. This scenario could come about at the initiative of either the Taiwan or the mainland side. On the Taiwan side, it could be engendered if Taiwan acquired nuclear weapons, if there were a military coup or widespread social disorder in Taiwan, or if the Taiwan independence forces gained much strength. On the mainland side, this scenario would be triggered if the Beijing authorities decided for some reason to step up efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and to increase the level of military threat. But for reasons implicit in the/foregoing analysis, all these events are highly unlikely.
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13-25/Charlotte Ku, Deputy executive director of the American Society of International Law in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Commentary," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.184; ANA VT96
	 What might induce caution on the part of the PRC is a functioning regional framework, which makes any military action taken by China against Taiwan subject to regional review and response. U.S. participation will likely be required to forge a common purpose of regional stability out of the disparate interests represented by the countries of the Pacific region. Genuine stability in the region will be hard to achieve until the relationship between China and Taiwan is clarified and made manageable. The present challenge is to channel the various political forces inside and outside China and Taiwan to that end.
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13-26/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 17 ; ANA VT96
	 The greatest fear of PRC leaders is a declaration of independence by Taiwan, making it a separate sovereign state, permanently detached from the China mainland. The greatest fear of ROC leaders is the use of military force by the PRC to subjugate the island. The PRC uses the threat of force to prevent a declaration of independence, while the ROC holds in reserve the option of declaring independence as a warning to Beijing not to resort to force. The ROC also maintains sizeable military forces in order to ensure that any attempt by the PRC to subjugate the people of Taiwan by military force would be costly, both in loss of lives and materiel and in the PRC's reputation in the world community. Thus, the two governments confront each other in uneasy balance.
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 13-27/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 119 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 Secondly, Taiwan is diplomatically isolated whereas the PRC is more and more perceived as a great power. Though mainland China's economic and military strength remains mostly potential, the very fact that many governments overestimate its power provides it with a supplementary international influence no one can ignore. Moreover, the PRC enjoys diplomatic relations with 159 countries while the ROC has maintained official ties with only 29 states, most of them being small Central American or African nations. 
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 13-28/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 119; ANA VT96
	 In the international rivalry between the governments on opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait, the PRC holds the high cards. It controls all Chinese territory except for Taiwan, Penghu, and a few small offshore islands. It has been recognized by the great majority of countries in the world as the sole legitimate government of China, and it occupies the China seat in the United Nations and in nearly all other intergovernmental organizations. By refusing diplomatic relations with any country that maintains diplomatic relations with Taipei, Beijing has forced governments to choose, and few have chosen the small China over the large China. Because it is in such a strong position, the PRC has taken a hard line against ROC appeals to be allowed greater scope to function at an official level in the international community. PRC diplomats are highly sensitive to ROC attempts to increase the official nature of its relations with foreign countries and intergovernmental organizations and quick to protest such moves.
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13-29/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; Woe OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 27; CJJ VT96
	 Finally, for the Republic of China in the midst of such an interlocking complex scenario, I offer the following three points of views: 1) The world at large cannot but look up to us as our economic might is stronger than at any time in the past. 2) With modern science and technology for information developing apace, totalitarian countries can no longer shut the doors to keep their misconducts from leaking out. 3) It is inadvisable to resolve cross-strait relation by the use of force. Through time the Chinese people can steer the cross-century development using their own wisdom.
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13-30/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 104; ANA VT96
	 Events in recent years suggest that the ROC and PRC have followed a path of rapprochement, albeit with both sides displaying considerable caution. The ROC has been mindful of the need to maintain peace in a world of superpower struggle and keen economic competition. Areas of disagreement have been downplayed in order to minimize the possibilities of conflict. Consequently current policy focuses more on rapprochement than struggle, and areas of least tension such as kinship and cultural ties and economic relations have been stressed.,
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12-31/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 4992; TAIRAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 106; ANA VT96
	 Clearly the option of rapprochement with the mainland has become more realistic in recent years. This has ramifications not only for relations between Taiwan and the mainland but also for U.S.-Taiwan relations. Should reconciliation with the mainland ever occur, U.S. security arrangements might be withdrawn and the ROC would have to rely instead upon the good faith of the PRC. A more realistic scenario, however, is that Taiwan and the mainland will continue to find more areas of cooperation and even understanding in economic relations and private bilateral affairs. This may lead to direct government-to-government contact. In the short run, however, negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist parties regarding the future status of Taiwan remain an unrealistic option. 
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13-32/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNISATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p..209; THR VT96
	 China took its own steps to move towards reunification with Taiwan, and these began to be reciprocated as the 1980s progressed. By the early 1990s, relations between the PRC and Taiwan were better than at any time since 1949. People visited the mainland from Taiwan in substantial numbers and the government of Taiwan was comparatively conciliatory in its reaction to the Beijing massacre. Although reunification did not appear imminent and Taiwan remained a serious issue in 'China's foreign relations, as made obvious from its reaction to the announcement of the sale of the F-16 fighter jets, it did not bulk nearly as large as a divisive issue between China and the United States in the early 1990s as it had done in the early 1980s.
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13-33/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEJING TRIANGLE, p. 75; ANA VT96
	 In recent years, especially after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Beijing has been less effective in influencing U.S. foreign policy as it relates to Taiwan. Not only has Chinas human rights record undermined its influence in the U.S., but its arms sales, nuclear technology transfers, and cheating on trade have engendered a less positive image of China in the United States. Thus Chinese leaders have been less vocal about the Taiwan problem. In fact, it appears they now think they can better aim at Taiwan than Washington. Efforts to open talks with Taipei (the Chinese avoid the word "negotiations;' since this would imply bargaining between two nation-states) have been going on for some time; they were being given higher priority in the early 1990s.
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13-32/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U.S. State Dept., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:AN ANALYSIS II FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p .255; THR VT96
	 For similar reasons, a PRC attempt to bring Taiwan to its knees by blockade or embargo also would not be successful. It is hard to believe the island's major trading partners would respect such a maneuver, and harder still to believe Beijing would court a confrontation by arresting or sinking an American or Japanese merchant vessel. It is well to remember the language of the Taiwan Relations Act on this point (see page 252 above), along with the fact that the United States many times in its history -- including most recently in the Persian Gulf-- has token military action to protect substantial commercial interests.
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 13-36/RaIph N. CIough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 169; ANA VT96
	 The people-to-people form of track-two diplomacy, which results from millions of individual decisions, is not subject to direct government guidance and, to a considerable extent, is beyond government control; nevertheless, it is the most important factor promoting a peaceful climate between the two sides of the Strait. It serves as a powerful restraining force against elements on either side of the Strait who would push for extreme solutions to the Taiwan problem: the use of force by Beijing or a declaration of independence by Taipei. For this reason, mainstream leaders on both sides of the Strait have fostered and probably will continue to foster this form of track-two diplomacy. 
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13-37/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 168; ANA VT96
	 In the minds of the majority of individuals making people-to-people contacts, these contacts are not regarded as contributing to their government's strategy of unifying China. These people have individual goals: seeing relatives, sightseeing, making money, reporting, or exchanging views with academic colleagues in their area of specialization. Yet the fact that such contacts can occur with relative ease and in such huge numbers--at least in the travel of people from Taiwan to the mainland--has greatly moderated tension and hostility between the two sides of the Strait. It has become increasingly difficult for people on Taiwan to regard those with whom they have had personal relationships as subjects of a faceless "communism" posing a great threat to Taiwan. Hence, ROC officials worry that too many people no longer take seriously Beijing's refusal to renounce the possible use of military force against Taiwan; they see them becoming psychologically disarmed. Still, the ROC must incur the risk of these people-to-people relations, for it would be politically impossible to halt them now that people have become accustomed to relatively free intercourse with the mainland. Of course, ROC government officials have considerable confidence that this interaction not only reduces the risk that Beijing might resort to force but also instills in people on the mainland admiration for Taiwan's accomplishments and a desire to emulate them, which, in the long run, will help make China more susceptible to the currents of capitalism and democracy now sweeping the world.
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13-38/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 148; ANA VT96
	 While frequently reiterating their irreconcilable positions on unification, the leaders of the two sides promote people-to-people interchange, each side hoping by this means to alter the situation in its favor. ROC leaders are playing for time. They see time working to their advantage, given the ages of the present hard-line leaders in Beijing and the world trend in favor of democratization and free-market systems. They also recognize that Taiwan itself is midway through a difficult transition to a democratic system in which all the legislators at the national level will be elected by the people of Taiwan and the president himself will be elected either directly by the voters or by an electoral college that is popularly elected by the people ofTaiwan. A government legitimated through this process will be in a far stronger position to confront pressures from the mainland. In the meantime, the carefully regulated growth of people-to-people interchange will keep the risk of military conflict low, thus serving to protect Taiwan's security. 
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13-39/Ral ph N. CIough, Pr f. l ecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 127; ANA VT96
	 People-to-People Interaction. The PRC warmly welcomed Chiang Chingkuo's decision to allow visits to the China mainland and the subsequent liberalization of travel, trade, and other contacts. As will be discussed in detail below, Beijing sees these developments as an irreversible process that will lead ultimately to negotiations on reunification. Referring to the lack of mutual trust between the people on the two sides of the Strait, Yang said that there were not enough exchanges by the authorities and the people of Taiwan with the mainland to overcome the doubts harbored by the KMT regarding the CCP. He urged more contacts and more links in order to enhance mutual trust and exchange. PRC authorities have repeatedly criticized the inequality of the exchanges across the Strait and the various restrictions imposed by the Taiwan authorities to hold down the expansion of exchanges. They have particularly pressed for the lifting of the ban on direct travel and trade. 
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13-40/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 41 ; ANA VT96
	 BY THE END of 1991, the PRC's proposals of 1979 and 1981 for direct travel, communication, transportation, and trade between Taiwan and the mainland had not materialized, but indirect travel, mail and telephone service, transportation, and trade and investment had grown explosively. The unwillingness of the Taiwan authorities to negotiate with mainland officials continued to impose limitations even on indirect intercourse, but in 1991 two-way trade was $5.8 billion, and cumulative Taiwan investment in the mainland exceeded$3billion. 
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13-41/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. I8 ; ANA VT96
	 Although few of the encounters between people from Taiwan and .those on the mainland have focused on the long-term future ofmainland-Taiwan relations, they are having a significant effect on the way that the governments and peoples perceive each other. Through a myriad of newly formed connections, signals are sent, impressions made, ideas exchanged, and concepts explored. Both governments endorse the increase in interaction, although the ROC favors a more deliberate pace than the PRC. The result to date of this proliferation of track-two diplomacy has been to lower tensions between the two adversaries. An informal flamework is being created for long-term peaceful coexistence between the China mainland and Taiwan, and the groundwork is being laid for eventual official negotiations.
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13-42 /CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 27-28, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Taiwan Suggests Talks with China [CND, 03/26/95] TAIPEI -- Taiwan has called for talks between Beijing and Taipei from April 24 to 28, according to Reuter. Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) proposed the new round of talks in a letter Saturday to China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Taiwan and China have no official relations; both SEF and ARATS are semi-official organizations. The talks would center on fishing disputes an issue only partially settled in previous talks, as well as economic and cultural exchange, repatriation of hijackers, and problems with illegal immigration. These is a possibility that Taiwan government officials may participate in these meetings for the first time. (Adam Johnson, Jian LIU). 
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13-43 /CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 4, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Another Semiofficial Talk accross the Taiwain Strait Arranged [TAIPEI, 01/02/95] Taiwan government plans to hold another round of semiofficial talks with mainland China between Jan. 19 and 27 in Beijing about civilian contacts of the two rival governments, AP reported Sunday. Mainland China will be informed later this week about the proposal made by the government's Mainland Affairs Council and the Semiofficial Straits Exchange Foundation. Semiofficial talks between mainland China and Taiwan began in April 1993 on the issue of repatriation of aircraft hijackers, illegal immigrants and the settlement of fishing disputes. An consensus was reached by the two sides last August that hijackers ought not to face retrial if they have already been tried in Taiwan. (Reported by: Guang HONG, Chuck LIN) 
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13-44 / Asiaweek, February 24, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Sweet and Sour; The Taiwan Question May Poison Sino-American Ties; ACS VT96
	 Indeed, cooler heads in Beijing as well as Taipei seem to understand that neither side can afford to push things over the brink. In a groundbreaking Lunar New Year's address, Chinese President Jiang Zemin sent a highly conciliatory message across the strait. Significantly, it was delivered in the capital of Fujian province, which faces Taiwan and has been the chief source of migrants there over the centuries. Mr. Jiang reaffirmed the notion of one China, but offered to meet Mr. Lee on either side of the strait. He also permitted mainland officials to get together with their counterparts in Taiwan so long as the encounters are not billed as "international." And Mr. Jiang seemed to soften Beijing's longstanding threat to use force to prevent Taiwan independence. That option, he explained, was not aimed at Taiwan compatriots but at the "schemes of foreign forces" to sever the island from China.
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13-45 / JAMES KYNGE, Reuters News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Taiwan's economic future in China, premier says" ACS VT96
	 Lien [Taiwan Premier Lien Chan] urged harmony and stability in relations with China. ``From now on...to maintain harmony and stability within cross-straits relations are our priority in mainland China affairs,'' Lien said on television.
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13-46/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 171; ANA VT96
	 Only the SEF has been officially authorized by the ROC government to conduct negotiations with PRC officials. The ROC designated the SEF "unofficial" so that the ban on official negotiations with the PRC could be maintained. The MAC commissions the SEF to deal with the PRC on practical problems that arise out of the people-to-people interaction between the two sides of the Strait. The SEF has no authority to discuss political questions with PRC officials, such as the establishment of the "three links." Although the SEF had functioned for only a year by the end of February 1992, it had proved its value as a negotiating conduit to PRC officials. It played an important role in the Eagle King smuggling case of June 1991 and the piracy incident of July 1991 (discussed in Chapter 4). It did not Supplant the Red Cross Society as the organization returning illegal immigrants to the mainland, but in February 1992, after the establishment of the PRC's counterpart "unofficial" organization, ARATS, the SEF took over from the Red Cross the exchange of criminal suspects. 
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13-47/Ral ph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 35 ; ANA VT96
	 The two governments reproached each other harshly over the Tiananmen killings and the movement for democracy in China, but both of them favored the continuation of travel and trade between Taiwan and the mainland. The Taiwan authorities even opened direct-dial telephone service on June 10 so that residents of Taiwan could communicate more readily with their relatives on the mainland. Each government regarded the interchange as serving its long-term interests better than those of its rival, although a ROC official frankly acknowledged that the interchange was "a two-edged sword." 
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13-48/Robert G. Sutter, Senior specialist in internaional policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Role in World Affairs: Background, Status, and Prospects," edited by Robert G. Sutter and Will am R. Johnson, p.13; ANA VT96
	 Beijing, meanwhile, has succeeded in recent years in winning over a number of international actors also important to Taiwan. Saudi Arabia and South Korea have switched official relations from Taipei to Beijing. South Africa and the Vatican are also reportedly seeking to establish official ties. Indonesia and Singapore now have diplomatic ties with Beijing, and virtually all of the new governments coming from the former Soviet empire in Europe and Asia have opted for official diplomatic relations with Beijing rather than Taipei. China is seen as critical to the future of most international organizations and so these groups too generally endeavor to accommodate Beijing's insistence that Taiwan not be accorded official status in official international organizations. The mainland government also pursues economic development policies that increase its standing and led it to surpass Taiwan among world traders, and it has acquired enough foreign exchange reserves (around $40 billion) to rank fifth in the world. Progress toward the reunification of Hong Kong with the mainland and greater Taiwan mainland contacts are cited as evidence of the PRC-backed view that Taiwan's reunion under Beijing's rule is "inevitable."
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13-49/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p.162.;THR VT96
	 For the KMT, these steps are risky. Externally, they risk playing into the PRC strategy of "Hong-Kongizing" Taiwan. According to this scenario, Taiwan's economic ties with the mainland might create a powerful pro-unification constituency among Taiwan entrepreneurs, a constituency subject to manipulation from the mainland because of its economic interests held hostage there. At the same time, increased people-to-people and quasi-governmental contacts across the Strait could erode the international credibility of Taiwan's insistence on its legal personality as the sole legitimate. government of China, leading to an erosion of foreign support.
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13-50 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 27, 1995, HEADLINE: Beijing Steps Up Push-Pull Policy on Taiwan; ACS VT96
	 The background of churning domestic politics in both Taiwan and China makes thissue particularly volatile. Taiwan, heading into its first democratic presidential elections early next year, has seen a pro-independence opposition party gather strength. China's leadership, with Deng Xiaoping fading, is eager to make its own mark in foreign policy and stand firm for reunification.
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13-51/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins Univ., 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan-PRC Relations," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.215 ; ANA VT96
	 The relationship between Taiwan and mainland China is an odd mix of cooperation and contention. Basically, the relationship is contentious, because the two governments disagree on crucial points: Taiwan's identity, the method and timing of bringing about Taiwan's unification with the China mainland, and the channel to be used for negotiations between the two sides. Moreover, the People's Republic of China (PRC) threatens Taiwan with the use of military force if the government should declare Taiwan de jure independent of China and the Republic of China (ROC) maintains a strong and costly force of its own to deter Beijing from resorting to forceful reunification. In addition, the ROC strives to strengthen its position in the international community, while the PRC tries to enforce limits on its status.
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13-52/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 151; ANA VT96
	 Taipei's policy regarding unification, though it supports it in theory, is one of seeing it as possible in the long term but not in the short term. But the short term is the foreseeable future. Taipei has parried Beijing's offers with its own, such as unifying China under the Three People's Principles. This may mean that if Beijing gives up communism, which it seems to be doing, then unification will be possible. But being ruled by the Three People's Principles means in essence being ruled by Taipei. Chinas leaders will hardly accept that. Taipei is also balancing its increased connections with China with democracy at home. Thus one may question whether Taipei's overtures toward Beijing will continue. Meanwhile, Taipei is garnering further support from the international community (including the U.S.) for retaining its sovereignty. If Taiwan is gravitating in any direction, it is going in the direction of democracy, nationalism, and self- identity rather than moving toward one China. This may be otherwise in the future--but not soon.
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 13-53 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-2-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Reported by: ZHAO Hua, Daluo JIA, 1/31/95 BEIJING, Jan. 30, 1995 - The day before the Chinese New Year, Beijing sent a signal to Taiwan by saying that Chinese should not fight against fellow Chinese, while remaining strong on not hesitating to use force against Taiwan's independence, remarks that Taiwan officials regarded as nothing new and "highly unfriendly", according to reports by Agence France Presse and Japan Economic Newswire.
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13-54/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 159; THR VT96
	 Taken together, the four developments just sketched mean that it is too late for any decision on the future of Taiwan to be taken over the heads of the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan electorate has entered the reunification game as a third player, indeed as the one which holds the most valuable cards and has veto power over any agreement. This development is far more threatening to CCP strategy than the obstacles it confronted in the past: the activities of the Taiwan independence movement, which the CCP correctly regards as having limited influence; the anti-communism of the mainlanders on Taiwan, which the CCP has always regarded as negotiable; and the economic and security interests of the U.S. in Taiwan, which the CCP believes it can preserve in a unified China. It means that the CCP's Taiwan strategy has failed. 
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 13-55/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 41,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 Moreover, the ROC constitutes a dangerous democratic alternative whose influence on mainland Chinese society can but grow with the expansion of economic, cultural, and people-to-people relations between the two shores of the Taiwan Strait. This instability weakens Beijing's position in its negotiations with Taipei. Not only does the instability of the Beijing regime discourage the Taipei government from embarking on critical political negotiations before Deng's death, but it may also encourage a number of KMT leaders to bet on the collapse of the CCP. And any political crisis or disruption of social order in mainland China helps strengthen the DPP's independence cause.
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13-56/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 118; ANA VT96
	 The Tiananmen Square Massacre had the effect of making Taiwan and the Nationalist party look good. Students were not being murdered in Taipei; instead, legitimate (and some not so legitimate) protest was being heard and often heeded by the government and the ruling party. The Beijing Massacre had still other effects. For both the government and the ruling Nationalist party, it resolved, for the moment at least, the problem of a mainland policy. There was now no need to have a policy to conduct serious relations with Beijing. Taiwan's three "no's" now made sense. Moreover, Taiwan's progress in democratizing the political system looked much more impressive in this context.
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13-57/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 121 ; ANA VT96
	 The PRC rejects the view of ROC officials that pragmatic diplomacy is an effective counter to those in Taiwan and abroad who argue that only by declaring independence can Taiwan gain greater stature and respect in the international community. On the contrary, declare PRC spokesmen, Lee Teng-hui's pragmatic diplomacy is a disguised means of moving toward an independent Taiwan, encouraging advocates of Taiwan independence, damaging the hard-won atmosphere of peace in the Strait, and hampering eventual peaceful reunification. 
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13-58/Robert G. Sutter, Senior specialist in international policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Role in World Affairs: Background, Status, and Prospects," edited by Robert G. Sutter and WiIiiam R. Johnson, p. 12 ; ANA VT96
	 In any event, Taiwan's pragmatic or tierable diplomacy is not without its possible disadvantages for the nationalist government. These may explain why nationalist leaders have been less than clear in pursuing their new approach to foreign affairs. Potential disadvantages of the "one country/two governments" and "pragmatic diplomacy" efforts could include:
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 ". A very strong PRC reaction, especially during conditions when "hardline" leaders may become active in Beijing. Beijing in turn could increase pressure on the United States and others to choose between relations with the PRC or support for Taiwan's greater role in world affairs. Although it is unclear that the United States or others would side with the PRC under these circumstances, some nationalist officials are cautious in facing : - this possible risk. Possible resistance, from conservatives within the Nationalist Party who still feel strongly about a reunified China, to efforts that would implicitly reduce Taipei's status as the government of all of China. Efforts on the part of Taiwanese oppositionists to use the government's pragmatic diplomacy as an opening to press their demands for de jure independence--a policy seen as having dangerous consequences as far as PRC reaction and continued Nationalist Party rule in Taiwan are concerned.
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 13-59/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 158; THR VT96
	 Flexible diplomacy is connected with political reform. It is made possible by the Taipei government's new-found self-confidence in its democratic legitimacy within thc island, since it tacitly dispenses with the legitimizing fiction that the Taipei government represents all of China. And it is a sign of the government's increased responsiveness to the demands of the local electorate, who are anxious to gain better access to and security within the international system. The CCP leaders see the new strategy as dangerous, because it aims to establish a viable international personality for Taiwan that will enable it to survive indefinitely outside the motherland's control .
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13-60/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplamacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altsckiller, P.137; THR VT96
	 On the Taiwan issue, the administration must recognize that despite the numerous Sino-American confrontations since the 1950s centering on Taiwan, Americans have consistently underestimated the importance of Taiwan to the Chinese government. Despite an apparent amelioration in relations with Taiwan, the Chinese government will not tolerate an independent Taiwan; and if an invasion follows a declaration of independence, the United States will be forced to confront the Chinese militarily. Thus, while it asserts that it has no position on this "internal affair" between the Chinese, the real challenge for the United Stat.,es will come if Taiwan proclaims its independence.
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13-61/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China amy and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMHRICAN DILEMMA, p. 115 ; ANA VT96
	 In short, 'for the time being the ROC will most likely pursue this flexible strategy. It does not, however, provide a long-term resolution of the Taiwan issue. Both the Kuomintang party on Taiwan and the Chinese Communist party on the mainland agree that there is only one acceptable solution to the Taiwan issue--reumfication. However, while the leadership on both sides of the Taiwan Strait may hold the same vision of a united China, the subjective geopolitical understandings of the ROC and PRC are not the same.
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13-62/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 126; ANA VT96
	 This role of the U.S. as a protector was formalized in 1954 when the two countries signed a defense pact--the U.S.-Republic Of China Defense Pact. The Pact remained in force until January 1980--after which the Taiwan Relations Act was already in effect with provisions guaranteeing Taiwan's security. In other words, since 1950 the U.S. has provided Taiwan, in one form or another, a secure environment in which democracy could survive and grow. 
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13-63/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 95; ANA VT96
	 Taipei's policy vis-a-vis the Taiwan Relations Act remains one of subtle and indirect support--but strong support. Taiwan does not want the TRA to be weakened, nor does it want the three communiques to assume a higher priority. Yet Taiwan does not want to be seen as too assertive. The government seeks to prove that it is deserving of its sovereignty, keeping its deterrence vis-a-vis Beijing and preventing diplomatic isolation. It seems to be succeeding. 
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 13-64/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 164;THR VT96
	 Among some pro-Taiwan-independence politicians, the opinion is prevalent that, as one such person told me, "If Taiwan declares independence, I believe the U.S. will support us. Taiwan's strategic value as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' is too great for America ever to abandon it. America will welcome an independent TaiwaN that is friendly to its interests.
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13-65/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 106; ANA VT96
	 In short, the legislative branch of the U.S. government has been the source of efforts to guarantee Taiwan's continued economic development by writing provisions for this in the TRA and through subsequent reviews of the Act. In addition, Congress in 1983 passed a "sense of the Congress" amendment to an appropriations bill, declaring that Taiwan should remain a full member of the Asian Development Bank. And Taiwan did remain in the Bank. Congress has also pressured the administration to help Taiwan maintain its membership in other international financial organizations. 
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13-66/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 101; ANA VT96
	 The foundation stone, or some would say the precondition, of the economic growth process in Taiwan was the security umbrella provided by the United States in 1950 at the start of the Korean War. This came at the close of a long period of war for the Nationalist Chinese, enabling them to finally concentrate on economic development without distractions. Economic development was charted in Sun Yat-sen's teachings--the first writer in history to link economic and political development in a joint modernization theory. The Nationalists also perceived that economic growth was not only important to promoting political modernization and democracy but was necessary to support a strong military and was also desired by the local population. Giving economic growth a high priority also reduced ethnic tensions and helped unite the country.
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13-67/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: , p. 124; ANA VT96
	 Whether or not the improvement in the human rights condition in Taiwan was and is the prnduct of a democratizing system, Taiwan's own concern for reform, or outside pressure is difficult to say for sure. Clearly, however, the Taiwan Relations Act brought the kind of pressure to bear on Taiwan that human rights critics have long advocated and said would be effective. In view of the other effects the Act has had, it seems it does deserve considerable credit for a much greater regard for human rights in Taiwan and a human rights situation that by global standards is now quite good. 
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13-68/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 124; ANA VT96
	 In a State Department human rights report, it was also noted that martial law was terminated in Taiwan, thus ending the use of military courts to try civilian cases while expanding the freedoms of assembly and association. Likewise, press freedoms have been broadened significantly, it said, and trials are described as public wherein defendants have the right to an attorney, at public expense if necessary. Finally, the role of the military in domestic affairs "has been appreciably reduced." The most recent Department of State report states that the human rights situation in Taiwan "continued to improve." Positive developments cited include a lively print media, a more representative Nationalist Party, more freedom for people to assemble peacefully, the inception of genuine multiparty politics, lifting of restrictions on the return of overseas critics, and the release of political prisoners.
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13-69/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 124; ANA VT96
	 Another human rights organization rounded in Taiwan at about the same time, also seemingly in response to the Taiwan Relations Act, is the Taiwan Human Rights Association. This organization is pro-opposition and is viewed as run by and for the Democratic Progressive party and/or other opposition groups. It reports on human rights abuses in Taiwan, almost always with an anti-government, anti-Nationalist party slant. It has admitted on numerous occasions, however, that the human rights situation in Taiwan has improved over the last ten years. It gives credit to the Taiwan Relations Act and to opposition politics in Taiwan.
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13-70/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 120; ANA VT96
	 At the time the TRA was written, some in the U.S. Congress expressed concern that the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China might cause Taipei to take actions (based on resentment, insecurity, or for whatever reason) that would cause the human rights condition on Taiwan to deteriorate. Others opined that the human rights clause was a "fair" demand in exchange for the TRA returning sovereignty to Taipei and for ensuring Taiwan's economic prosperity and national security. Some viewed this provision as an assurance of the continued democratization of Taiwan's politics. Some thought it would eventually guarantee Taiwan's separation from the People's Republic of China----it being .axiomatic that democracy would mean that the people of Taiwan would control the future of the nation, and they would certainly choose to remain independent and sovereign. Whatever the reasoning behind this provision, since the writing of the TRA the U.S. has maintained close scrutiny over human rights standards in Taiwan. Moreover, there has been marked progress in the human rights condition there during that period. The two clearly seem related.
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13-71/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 104; ANA VT96
	 Not only did people in Taiwan realize the connection between economic development and democracy, but the authors of the Taiwan Relations Act also recognized Taiwan's economic miracle and the positive role it played in political modernization. They wanted to protect it. Thus, they wrote into the TRA provisions guaranteeing Taiwan's economic health. To them a strong economy was essential to guarantee the continuation of the democratization process. It was also clear to members of Congress that the U.S. played a major role in Taiwan's economic and social development. In fact, they were proud of the "U.S. success" in making Taiwan what it had become. This role was not to be sacrificed; it it was to be sustained.
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13-72/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 136; ANA VT96
	 The TRA was a unique move by Congress in participating in making foreign policy. It was unprecedented. Although the TRA has not become a model for U.S. relations with other countries, it has served as a model for other countries dealing with Taipei while recognizing Beijing. It is more than a model; it is a signal. Most other countries maintain informal relations with Taipei--no doubt in part because the U.S. did--and continue to regard Taiwan, or the Republic of China, as having sovereignty. Taiwan has not been isolated, though Beijing has tried. Some say that the TRA influenced China to take another approach toward Taiwan, namely to change itself and deserve reunification. Recently, Beijing has given more signals that it wants to resolve the Taiwan issue only by peaceful means, though it still (and understandably so in view of the factional nature of Chinese politics and the sensitive nature of national unity) refuses to state this officially. 
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13-73/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 90; ARIA VT96
	 Despite U.S. provisions to preserve Taiwan as an independent entity, Taiwan's position in the international community has been profoundly affected by U.S. actions. The ROC has become isolated from bilateral relations as well as intemational organizations. In response to this Taiwan has pursued several strategies to overcome its isolation--for example, by winning support of "mini-states," by preserving its membership in a select group of organizations, and by promoting nonpolitical exchanges of all types. Nonetheless, Taiwan remains caught in a security dilemma brought about by diminishing U.S. support and continuing PRC threats.
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13-74/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 103; ANA VT96
	 In sum, seeking to establish relations with the Soviet Union under the present circumstances does not seem to offer ROC leaders a promising altemative for resolving the Taiwan issue. Rapprochement with the Soviets would be attempted only as a last resort if ROC leaders felt they were being abandoned by the United States. Even then such a move would be practical only if the Soviet Union had abandoned hope of improving relations with Beijing and were willing to face intensified hostility from the PRC. In light of General Secretary Gorbachev's conciliatory speech at Vladivostok in 1986 and PRC-Soviet "normalization" in May 1989, such a scenario appears unlikely.
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13-75/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of Ckina army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 103; ANA VT96
	 There is no evidence that the ROC and the Soviet Union arc contemplating substantive political and military relations. Yet as the intemational environment has become less hostile the two sides have begun to increase their economic and cultural interchanges. In 1989 bilateral trade reached US$7.8 million and it is steadily increasing (Taiwan Statistical Databook 1990). Since Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech several Taiwanese businessmen have invested in the Soviet Far East (Pi 1989a). Finally when Taiwan held an intemational beauty contest in 1989 a Soviet contestant was invited for the first time. 
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13-76lJen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's Nationsl Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 103; ANA VT96
	 It seems unlikely that the ROC will upgrade diplomatic andstrategic relations with the Soviet Union in the near future. First, ROC leaders remain deeply suspicious of the Soviet government. They do not wish to become dependent on the Soviet Union for they believe that Moscow would easily sever connections with Taiwan if it ever served Moscow's interests. Second, developing a relationship with the Soviet Union runs counter to Taiwanese policy of maintaining the closest possible relations with the United States and Japan. Both of these countries would be highly suspicious of a significant and expanding relationship between Taiwan and the Soviet Union (Clough 1978:170). 
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13-77/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASiAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 101; ANA VT96
	 After the Sino-Soviet split in early 1960 the Soviet Union aggressively sought to build its ties with the ROC. In terms of geopolitical grand designs, better Soviet-Taiwan relations would allow the Soviet Union not only to challenge U.S. dominance in the Westem Pacific but also to contain and/or isolate the PRC. Establishing sea control of the Taiwan area has several advantages for the Soviet Union (Melior 1982; Yin 1983):
 1. Taiwan falls in the middle of the United States's forward line in theWestern Pacific stretching from Japan to Singapore. 
2. Taiwan and its outer islands would be a particularly strategic navalport, allowing the Soviets to complete a line of naval bases from Vladivostok through the East and South China Seas to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay.
 3. Talwan is the key to Japan's strategic western flank leading to itsNational Security Line in the south.
 4. Taiwan is located along the Soviet trading routes in the Pacific andIndian oceans.
 In short the Soviet Union has long recognized the geopolitical importance of Taiwan and sought better relations with Taiwan in order to challenge U.S. naval dominance in the Pacific and to contain the PRC. 
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 13-78 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 27, 1995, HEADLINE: Beijing Steps Up Push-Pull Policy on Taiwan; ACS VT96
	 China continued its two-track policy toward Taiwan on Friday by pressing hardfor Taiwan's diplomatic isolation while simultaneously trying to draw the island closer to the mainland economically.
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13-79 / Steven Mufson, International Herald Tribune, May 27, 1995, HEADLINE: Beijing Steps Up Push-Pull Policy on Taiwan; ACS VT96
	 At the same time [as Lee's visit], however, China's top negotiator with Taiwan arrived in Taipeand offered reassurance on protection for Taiwanese business interests after thereturn of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. At present, Taiwan's substantial economic ties to China mostly go through Hong Kong, a British territory. The two-track strategy seems designed to both push and pull Taiwan into Beijing's embrace.
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13-80 / Tan Tarn How, China Correspondent, The Straits Times (Singapore), May 24, 1995, SECTION: East Asia; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: Boost for Taipei but ties may be hurt; ACS VT96
	 China has mounted a concerted diplomatic campaign to hem in Taiwan internationally, and has unleashed its verbal ire at the countries which have occasionally allowed visits by leaders from what it considers a breakaway province, even visits that are "unofficial".
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 13-81/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 121; ANA VT96
	 The PRC has also continued to be successful for the most part in preventing the ROC from joining or rejoining intergovernmental organizations. It was compeHcd to tolerate Taiwan's continued membership in the ADB but forced it to use the name "Taipei, China." In the more recent case of APEC, in order to join, the ROC had to agree to membership as "Chinese Taipci" with ROC participation by the economic minister rather than the foreign minister. Lee Teng-hui's flexibility with respect to nomenclature has not yet led to the admission of Taiwan to other intergovernmental organizations employing the ADB model. Bcijing's strong opposition to the prior admission of Taiwan to GATT, even with a geographical designation, is evidence of its unwillingness to consider concessions to Taipei in the international arena. 
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13-81a/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China amy and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAiWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILENMA, p. 78; ANA VT96
	 The second factor leading to Taiwan's extreme isolation came from the People's Republic of China. The PRC employed every possible means to isolate Taiwan and force Nationalist leaders into negotiations. Since its inception in 1949 the PRC had promoted its own version of the one-China policy.
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13-81b/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that countxy's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILFMMA, p. 78 ; ANA VT96
	 However, the People's Republic of China has also employed many of the same tactics in order to win recognition from smaller states. Increasingly, as the PRC has tumed its attention to these countries it has become more difficult for the ROC to maintain its current relations. Thus, for example, Fiji and West Samoa both recognized the PRC in 1975. At their countries' request, however, Taiwan continued to offer agricultural and technical assistance even after severing diplomatic relations (Hsieh 1985:336). Indeed, in 1988 the ROC govemment allocated $1.2 billion to "assist friendly developing countries in their economic development, improve bilateral trade relations, and help enterprises to develop overseas investment/technology cooperation"(Liang and Shan 1989:9). In 1989 the ROC also established the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for the purpose of promoting academic studies focusing on China, Taiwan, or Pacific area affairs. This was intended to provide nations without formal diplomatic relations with ROC access to funds for promoting international goodwill. Despite all these efforts the ROC recognizes that it will be difficult to encourage another reversal in formal diplomatic recognition from most states.
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 13-81c/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 122; ANA VT96
	 The PRC is in a strong position to continue to block ROC efforts to increase its formal diplomatic relationships. The ROC may win over a few more small countries, but is unlikely to make a substantial breakthrough during the coming five years, except for its possible admission to GATT. PRC officials regard the expansion of cross-Strait economic relations as driven by businesspeople's desire to make a profit and have expressed the view that direct trade and travel eventually will be forced upon the Taiwan authorities by the businesspeople, without the need for concessions by the PRC to that end. 
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13-82 / The Tampa Tribune, January 30, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: U.S. mistreatment of Taiwan is an odd and high-handed outrage; ACS VT96
	 It [Taiwan] is this nation's sixth-largest trading partner, just behind Germany. In that country's booming economy, the United States is the biggest investor. It enjoys a multiparty democracy, its newspapers are free to criticize all politicians, it maintains high standards of human rights, and it sends thousands of its teenagers to college in America. Freedom of religion is guaranteed. Yet about the only countries that recognize it are the recipients of its generous foreign aid.
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13-83/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 78; ANA VT96
	 Since the break in diplomatic relations with most African nations in 1971, the ROC has sought to establish official relations with as many newly independent "mini-states" as possible to boost Taiwan's international status (Copper 1976). Consequently the ROC has concentrated foreign aid, agricultural and technical assistance, and "visit diplomacy" on countries such as Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and the Commonwealth of Dominica (Lin 1987). In addition, the ROC has offered political loans to a targeted group of countries. Ironically Taiwan has used its increasing prosperity and abundance of hard currency to facilitate the efforts of many small countries to emulate Taiwan's model of economic development. 
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 13-84/Hung-mao Tien, Prof. of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Commentary," edited by Robert G. Sutter and Wil l iam R. Johnson, p.209; ANA VT96
	 In short, Taiwan's influence in world affairs is indeed considerable despite its limited diplomatic ties (with only twenty-nine states) and lack of membership in significant international organizations, except the Asian Development Bank and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. It has "substantive relations" (nondiplomatic) with 120 countries and unofficial representation in fifty-five. Taiwan has a large number of transnational ties and activities. These accomplishnents have been possible mostly by virtue of Taiwan's economic prosperity and success in trade that have accumulated a range of US$80 billion to $90 billion in foreign exchange reserves in recent years. 
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13-85/Robert G. Sutter, Senior specialist in internaional policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Role in World Affairs: Background, Status, and Prospects," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 10; ANA VT96
	 After Taiwan lost its UN seat and the United States switched recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, Taiwan began to work seriously to overcome its diplomatic isolation, especially with world economic powers. By mid-1993 Taiwan claimed to have unofficial relations with close to 150 countries, and established ninety unofficial offices in sixty countries that did not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Furthermore, thirty-seven countries that did not have diplomatic ties with Taipei had established unofficial instrumentalities in Taiwan and more were expected to follow suit. Taiwan's two most important unofficial relationships, politically as well as economically, were with the United States and JaPan.
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13-86/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. ecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the Schoo of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 117; ANA VT96
	 Thus, the ROC has reached out to develop relationships with communist or former communist countries from which it had been cut off for over 40 years. None of these countries is likely to become a major trading partner for Taiwan or risk Beijing's wrath by establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC. Nevertheless, by casting off previous ideological constraints, Lee Teng-hui has greatly expanded the areas of the world with which Taiwan can maintain useful ties. 
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13-87 / James A. Robinson, regents professor at the University of West Florida, International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1995, HEADLINE: For Taipei, a Warmer Hearing in the New Congress; ACS VT96
	 Conventional wisdom holds that the road to Taiwan's membership in the United Nations passes through Beijing. China can, of course, effectively veto Taipei's application to join the UN under any name
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13-88 / Evelyn Leopold Reuters, Limited October 29, 1993, HEADLINE: CHINA IN ROW WITH HAITI'S ARISTIDE OVER TAIWAN //MDS-VT96
	 China, a permanent Security Council member with veto power, considers Taiwan a part of its territory and is vehemently opposed to granting it separate U.N. membership. 
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13-89/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China amy and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 78; ANA VT96
	 As a second diplomatic survival strategy the ROC has tried to remain in intemational organizations without having to compromise its one-China policy. In light of the ROC's isolation from bilateral diplomatic relations and the mainland's internationalist appeal, Taiwan has found this strategy difficult to implement. This was well illustrated by the Republic of China's membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB)--the most prominent intemational organization to which Taiwan still belongs. When the PRC was admitted to the ADB in the early 1980s it demanded that the Nationalist government use the name "Taiwan, China" in order to continue participation in the bank. At Washington's suggestion the PRC agreed to the name "Taipei, China." The former shifted the Nationalist govemment to the status of a local govemment and was unacceptable to the ROC. However, the 'Taipei, China" option did allow some room for interpretation---Nationalists could argue that the capital of China was only temporarily located in Taipei.
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13-90/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 79; ANA VT96
	 To date, Taiwan's status in the Asian Development Bank appears to be an unresolved issue. The PRC has clearly stated that adoption of "Taipei, China" by the Bank does not constitute a precedent for Taiwan to regain membership in other international organizations. For this reason the most impoRant strategy in the ROC's battle has been concentration on substantive relations.
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13-91/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 110 ; ANA VT96
	 The ROC has a strong case for admission to GATT because of its market economy and the important position it occupies in world trade. The ROC would benefit from being a GATT member, not only from the political significance of its membership, but also from being able to negotiate economic issues with other GATT members on an equal basis. Other GATT members would benefit from the further opening up of Taiwan's market that membership would require. The PRC, however, has expressed strong opposition to the admission of Taiwan to GATT before the PRC itself has been admitted, on the ground that such action would constitute recognition of two Chinas. It has insisted that the PRC must be admitted first and that Taiwan must then seek its approval, implying that approval would be granted. Taipei, of course, has rejected the demand that it seek Beijing's approval. 
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13-92/June Teufel Dreyer, Prof. in the Dept. of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Position Regarding Transnational Issues," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 125; ANA VT96
	 Similarly, Taiwanwas not represented at the first meeting of the Northeast Asian environmental group, which met in Seoul in February 1993. Its five participating countries, South Korea, Japan, China, Mongolia, and Russia, formally adopted recommendations to negotiate energy and air pollution questions, capacity-building, and ecosystem management. The Asian Development Bank has promised to finance three projects in these areas, and more assistance is expected from the World Bank. It seems unlikely that the ROC will be invited to attend the next meeting, to be held in Beijing in September 1993.
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13-93/June Teufel Dreyer, Prof. in the Dept. of Political Science at t he Universit y o f M iami in Coral Gab l es, 1994; TA I WAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Position Regarding Transnational Issues," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 125; ANA VT96
	 Taiwan has likewise. been excluded from membership in the 81signatory Montreal Protocol. Its inability to become a Protocol member is worrisome, since local industries could lose as much as $8 billion beginning in 1996, due to provisions calling for international trade sanctions connected with Protocol decisions on phasing out the production of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by that year. 
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13-94/June Teufel Dreyer, Prof. in the Dept. of Political Science at t he Uni versit y o f M iami in Coral Gables, 1994; TA I WAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Position Regarding Transnational Issues," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 125; ANA VT96
	 With regard to regional and international environmental management issues, the ROC has had problems stemming from the PRC's opposition to allow it to participate in regulatory groups. The island was not invited to participate in the UN's Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, though the government informed representatives to the conference that the ROC also wished to help save the Earth. It proclaimed Taiwan's determination to follow the environmental conclusions reached there in setting worldwide industrial pollutant standards. In line with this decision, the Ministry of Economic Affairs established a task force on the effect of global warming to draft standards for control over carbon dioxide emissions and the use of chlorofluorocarbons. 
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 13-95 / Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 China's toughness towards Hongkong will cast a cloud over prospects of reunification with Taiwan or general relations with the West. The more Hongkong is affected, the more Taiwan will seek to go its own way. As Taiwan has found, it can have the benefits of economic cooperation with the mainland without surrendering to Beijing. The risks in continuing de facto independence seem less great. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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 13-96/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 147; ANA VT96
	 Commentators in Taiwan and abroad have said that the PRC's treatment of Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, will be a critical test of the "one country, two systems" concept. People in Taiwan', observing Beijing's opposition to the democracy movement in Hong Kong and the sizeable emigration from the colony in the past few years, are already predicting that the heavy hand of the Beijing bureaucrat will damage the quality of life in Hong Kong once Hong Kong has come under PRC sovereignty. Those most distrustful of Beijing's intentions point to repression in "autonomous" Tibet as a warning of what might happen in Taiwan. The basic objection in Taiwan to "one country, two systems" is that once sovereignty over the island had been conceded to the government in Beijing, central government leaders would be free to modify at will the relationship between the central government and the island province. 
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13-97/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that countxy's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 82 ANA VT96
	 However even as these elements have combined fo {solate Taiwan, its status is clearly distinguished from states such as Hong Kong. Taiwan maintains standing annies with the capability of self-defense and a representative govemment with the capacity to resist pressure from the mainland. The Republic of China is unlikely to remain passive if the PRC pressed its advantage and attempted to blockade or take over Taiwan militarily. Although the PRC is aware of this resolve it hasnever renounced the option of taking Taiwan with armed force.
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13-98/Gerald Segal, Research Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Foreign Policy," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.167; THR VT96
	 Just as the Special Economic Zones are seen' as examples of how China will manage the translation of capitalism into a socialist state, so Hong Kong is seen as an example to Taiwan of how its future will be managed. China is offering Taiwan greater independence than presently promised to Hong Kong, but the example of Hong Kong's transition remains essential. In the end, China seems willing to sacrifice some economic gain in return for political principle and territorial integrity. Beijing's hard-line response to what it interpreted as subversive support from Hong Kong for protestors inside China in 1989 was a typical example of putting politics in command of economic self-interest. The reaction in Taiwan, which at the same time was widening its own democracy, was to reinforce further the sense of more than one China and encourage those who favoured de facto independence. The regime in Beijing could see Taiwan slipping further away and thus the military option was not ruled out. 
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13-99/Lee Lai To, Lecturer Political Science National University of Singapore, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Taiwan And the Reunification Question," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 196 ; THR VT96
	 It remains to be said that Beijing seems absolutely set on its master plan of introducing the 'one country, two systems' formula in reunifying China. The plan will be implemented and tested in Hong Kong, as demonstrated vividly by the adoption of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in April 1990 after two rounds of consultation. As such, it is not likely that Beijing would forsake the 'one country, two systems' approach towards reunification until it has gained sufficient experience in realizing the problems involved in the implementation of the Basic Law in Hong Kong. Such experiences will probably be used to improve or even modify the introduction of such an approach in incorporating Macao and Taiwan into China later on.
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13-100/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 U.S. visa for Lee boosts Taiwan's image overseas (Nation, Bangkok) China on Tuesday warned Washington of ''grave consequences'' in bilateral ties after it allowed President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan to visit the United States. Washington's decision...broke a 16-year policy. No Taiwanese president had been previously allowed to visit the U.S. since 1979, when Washington recognized Beijing as the sole government of China. The granting of a visa to Lee was seen by Beijing as an interference in China's ''internal affairs'' by the U.S.
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13-101 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 U.S. visa for Lee boosts Taiwan's image overseas (Nation, Bangkok) The overriding question now is whether Beijing would retaliate further bearing its recent aggressive behavior in East Asia. The U.S. must now realize that it is set on a much more difficult confrontation course with China.
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13-102/ Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. misperceptions lead to disputes: Asia Society head" ACS VT96
	The U.S. invitation to Taiwan President Lee is the ''latest outrage'' in Chinese eyes, Levin [Burton Levin, director of the Asia Society in Hong Kong] said, calling the move ''disaster'' for China policy.
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13-103 / George Gedda, AP staffwriter, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "U.S. OFFICIAL REGRETS HOSTILE ACTS BY CHINA"; ACS VT96
	Lord acknowledged that China's cancellation of the visit by its defense minister to Washington will slow the process of establishing bilateral military ties to the detriment of both country's interests.
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13-104 / Kyodo News Service, 5-25-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China says U.S. to 'pay price' for Lee visit; ACS VT96
	 ''Now the U.S. has breached its commitment on the (Taiwan) issue, thus undermining the very underpinnings of the bilateral relations. The consequences are serious and will seriously harm Sino-U.S. relations,'' he [Shen Guofang, China Foreign Ministry] said.
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13-105/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Taiwan independence move, Japan rearmament linked; ACS VT96
	 Freeman [Chas Freeman, former assistant defense secretary] blasted what he called the U.S. government's current lack of vision, weakness and indecisiveness. He said that granting Taiwan's Lee a visa to visit Cornell University was causing a deterioration of relations that could lead to serious instability in the region.
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13-106 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-29-95, (News Global); ACS VT96 Reported by: Hong TANG [CND, 05/28/95] Beijing decided today to defer missile and nuclear technology control talks with the United States, to retaliate against the U.S. for its decision to allow Taiwan President LEE Teng-hui to have a private visit to Cornell University in New York state. A foreign ministry spokesman said the U.S. decision violated the Chinese sovereignty and therefore the talks on global Missile Technology Control Regime and nuclear energy cooperation will not be held as scheduled.
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13-107 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-29-95, (News Global); ACS VT96 Last week, planned visit by Defense Minister Gen. CHI Haotian to the U.S. was cancelled as one of the reactions to the Washington decision on LEE's visa. Beijing says it puts more weight on reunification with Taiwan over the Sino-U.S. relations.
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13-108 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-31-95, (News Global), ACS VT96 [CND 06/01/95] WASHINGTON -- Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord said in a news briefing that China had overreacted over Washington's allowing Taiwanese leader LEE Teng-Hui to visit Cornell University, Reuter reported on Tuesday. Beijing has called back its military delegation, suspended talks with the United States on issues of missile technology control and nuclear cooperation, and canceled high level official visits since the White House announced its Taiwan decision last month. Lord, a longtime opponent of such a visit, repeated that LEE's "strictly private" visit will not change the decades-old U.S. policies toward China and Taiwan. Meanwhile, he urged Beijing to resume the negotiations which, he argued, were also in China's interest. (Weijun LIU, Jian LIU)
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13-109/ George Gedda, AP staffwriter, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "U.S. OFFICIAL REGRETS HOSTILE ACTS BY CHINA"; ACS VT96
	China is acting contrary to its own interests in retaliating against the United States for deciding to grant a visa to Taiwan's president, a top U.S. official said Tuesday.
China has taken four actions since the Clinton administration announced last week that President Lee Teng-hui will be allowed to visit Cornell University, his alma mater. Among other measures, Beijing has put off planned visits involving nuclear cooperation and controlling the spread of nuclear technology.
``We, of course, regret their doing this,'' said Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord. ``We don't think it's in their own self-interest.''
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13-110 / George Gedda, AP staffwriter, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "U.S. OFFICIAL REGRETS HOSTILE ACTS BY CHINA"; ACS VT96
	Lord, who heads the State Department's East Asia bureau, told reporters he hopes the dialogue with Beijing on these issues can resume shortly.
He said the United States has made clear to Chinese authorities that Lee's visit in no way changes the unofficial relationship with Taiwan that successive administrations have maintained since 1979.
``This visit will be strictly private,'' Lord said. ``We've been talking to Taiwan to assure that it is a private visit and carries no official overtones.''
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13-111 / George Gedda, AP staffwriter, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; 5-30-95; "U.S. OFFICIAL REGRETS HOSTILE ACTS BY CHINA"; ACS VT96
	The issue [Lee visit], he [Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord] added, ``assumes importance only if Beijing inflates its importance.''
Beijing regards Taiwan, seat of the Nationalist government, as a renegade province. Washington recognized the Nationalists as China's sole legitimate government and kept military forces on Taiwan until 1979, when it formally recognized Beijing and downgraded relations with Taiwan.
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13-112 / Kyodo News Service, 6-1-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. sees no problem in China's missile test" ACS VT96
	The U.S. State Department said Wednesday it sees no problem for China testing its missiles, while brushing off any link between the test-firing and a U.S. decision to allow visits by the president of Taiwan.
''There is no regime that prohibits China (from test-firing missiles),'' Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis told reporters in referring to Tokyo's confirmation earlier Wednesday that Beijing conducted a test-firing of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in late May.
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13-113 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 U.S. visa for Lee boosts Taiwan's image overseas (Nation, Bangkok) The granting of a visa to Lee is a major victory for Taiwan and there is a strong likelihood that Taipei will use it as a catalyst for building diplomatic bridges in the future. The risk is that Taiwan will feel emboldened not to seek short-term gains by pushing harder for a seat in the United Nations and full diplomatic recognition. It would be sheer folly if Taiwan did that now, for it would put a considerable amount of pressure on countries like the U.S. and other Western nations to take on China directly, thus jeopardizing world peace.
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13-114 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Asian editorial excerpts; ACS VT96
	 U.S. visa for Lee boosts Taiwan's image overseas (Nation, Bangkok) There's one consolation in this week's events. The bilateral ties between Taiwan and mainland China will not undergo a major change because as it is right now, the Chinese stand to gain a great deal from the continuing economic relationship between the two countries. If the Chinese are smart, they would realize this and not shoot themselves in the foot. (May 25)
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13-115/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.34; THR VT96
	 The most serious threats to American security and economic interests in Asia include armed conflict with nuclear potential between the two Koreas and between India and Pakistan; a deterioration of relations between Beijing and Taipei that could lead to economic or military conflict; a re-ignition of the Cambodian conflict; and a botched transition to Beijing's sovereignty in Hong Kong in 1997. None of these problems can be handled effectively without substantial Sino-American cooperation. Constructive relations with Beijing will not assure P.R.C. cooperation in all cases; needlessly bad relations will nearly ensure conflict. The Republic of Korea's formal diplomatic recognition of Beijing last August, at the expense of Taipei, is just one indication of the increasing importance the region attaches to building positive ties to the PRC.
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 13-116/Richard Bush, Staff Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Rep. with responsibility for East Asia, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's International Role: Implications for U.S. Policy," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 29O; ANA VT96
	 However successful Lee Teng-hui's balancing of reunification and independence objectives is, a new vicious circle may be in formation. The PRC's acquisition of a weapons system that threatens the security of Taiwan, plus the need for American arms manufacturers to compete in all available markets, will fuel pressures for the Clinton administration to permit the transfer of a countervailing system to Taiwan. The United States might face a choice between relations with China and the security of Taiwan. 
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13-117/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 154;THR VT96
	 Beijing is beginning to readjust its strategy to take account of the new situation, but it may no longer have any realistic options that will enable it to achieve its goal. The other actors in the drama --the KMT, the Taiwan electorate, and proponents of Taiwan independence-are also adjusting their strategies to take account of the changed situation on the island and to respond to the new strategies of Beijing. All the actors see the United States as an important potential help or hindrance, but they often misunderstand the American position.
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13-118/Richard Bush, Staff Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Rep. with responsibility for East Asia, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's International Role: I nmpli cations for U.S. Pol cy," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p 278; ANA VT96
	 Because of the U.S. involvement in the Chinese civil war and its dominant position in Asia, every shift in the relationship of the PRC-Taiwan nexus with the international community has had implications for U.S. policy toward Taiwan. That was true when the PRC was rounded, when both the Korean and Vietnam Wars began, when the Sino-Soviet dispute became extremely dangerous in the late 1960s, when the PRC moved toward strategic alignment with the West in the late 1970s, and now with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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13-119/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.35 THR VT96
	 Worsening China-Taiwan relations would also adversely affect U.S. interests. First, many of Taiwan's firms--with $3 billion plus investments in the mainland--are exporting to the United States. If the American market dries up for Chinese exports some of Taiwan's investment in the P.R.C. will also vanish. Second, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act charges the U.S. president with assuring that America helps maintain Taiwan's capacity to defend itself. If U.S.-P.R.C. relations deteriorate one can expect more mainland hostility toward Taiwan, which will exacerbate the dilemmas facing Washington.
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 13-121/Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Faculty member of the Dept. of History and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown Univ., 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Commentary," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.303; ANA VT96
	 Americans admittedly have turned [heir backs on Bosnia, but Taiwan is not Bosnia. For historical, geographic, and strategic reasons, including Taiwan's accessibility to the U.S. Navy, the pressures upon the government to do something would be intense and, as in the Persian Gulf War, the public might believe the prospects for victory irresistibly low-cost and bright. Whatever policy makers say ahead of time, in a military confrontation between China and Taiwan it seems unlikely that the United States could remain a spectator and allow Taiwan to be devastated, occupied, and swallowed. 
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 13-122/Harry Harding, Senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan and Greater China," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.265; ANA VT96
	 Finally, the possibility of the reunification of China will also affect American interests. Of these, the most immediate involve the way in which the process takes place. Although most Americans would not oppose, in principle, the incorporation of Taiwan into a single Chinese state, they would strenuously object if it occurred through coercion. This is arguably the most basic and enduring American interest in Taiwan, and has been embodied in law through the Taiwan Relations Thus, the unprovoked use of force by the mainland against Taiwan would almost certainly trigger a sharp American response, possibly including the deployment of U.S. military power to assist in the island's defense.
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 13-122a/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S' CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 164;THR VT96
	 But this position is freighted with ambiguity. It can be read as saying that the U.S. agrees with the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China, or as saying that the U.S. does not necessarily agree, but does not want to argue about the issue for the time being. While no one involved in Taiwan is under the illusion that the U.S. now actively supports Taiwan independence, the ambiguity in the American position allows some to believe--with hope in the case of Taiwan independence leaders, with fear in the case of the PRC leaders--that the U.S.-might swing its support to Taiwan independence in some future eventuality.
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13-123/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 24; ANA VT96
	 Furthermore, Congress, in writing the Taiwan Relations Act, tied Taiwan's security to the sovereignty issue. Taiwan's security was not mentioned by the Carter administration in the process of forging formal relations with Beijing. The White House made the argument that normalization would make Chinese leaders so dependent upon the U.S. that they would never consider hostile actions or the use of force against Taiwan. But Congress did not accept this argument. Thus, Congress wrote specific defense provisions into the Taiwan Relations Act. As noted earlier, these provisions went beyond the commitments in the United States-Republic of China Defense Treaty and further than defense provisions in treaties with other nations. Congress did not trust Beijing. Alternatively, Congress perceived that being direct and explicit in guaranteeing Taiwan's security would erase any question about U.S. intentions and would more likely result in maintaining peace in the region than if U.S. policy remained unclear. Congress also appreciated the many years of friendship with Taiwan, the fact that U.S. security guarantees had provided an environment for outstanding economic growth with equity, and the political modernization that Taiwan had more recently accomplished. These things, it was felt, should not be sacrificed.
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13-124/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 25; ANA VT96
	 In summation, Congress was meticulous in writing legislation that would respect Taiwan's sovereignty and nation-state status (and return that status because it was taken away by the Normalization Agreement), grant it security guarantees that were rescinded by the termination of the U.S.-Republic of China Defense Treaty, guarantee economic stability in Taiwan as well as growth and prosperity (which Congress viewed as related to the other three major tenets in the Taiwan Relations Act), and speak up for human rights. 
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13-125/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 59; ANA VT96
	 It is also worthy of note that the congressional process leading to the Taiwan Relations Act was both bicameral and bipartisan. The final version of the TRA was the product of a conference committee that worked out differences in the Senate and House versions. The bipartisan nature of the effort is attested to by the fact that both houses of Congress had a Democratic majority. The Republican party had been viewed as espousing a foreign policy more favorable to Taipei; yet the debate that led to the Taiwan Relations Act was led more by Democrats, most of them liberal. There was no heated controversy about the legislation that followed; there was a spirit of cooperation. Moreover, the reaction of both close observers and the public was positive. All of this was proven by the overwhelming vote in support of the bill even though there was reason for-many to be dissatisfied with some part of the legislation. It was difficult to make it popular; yet the document was a popular one. 
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13-126/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 59; ANA VT96
	 If one were to ask which of the four documents should have the highest priority or dominate over the others, the answer is clear:. the TRA. It is a law duly passed by the Congress--an example of "supreme law" according to the U.S. Constitution. The other documents have no legislative sanction. One was not even signed (or initialed) and, according to the Department of State, does not even have the status of an international agreement. All three of the executive agreements are simply statements of policy. Moreover, they can be easily and quickly changed if the president so decides. The Taiwan Relations Act cannot be altered easily. 
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13-127/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 59; ANA VT96
	 Unlike the other three agreements, which are executive in nature, the Taiwan Relations Act was a law passed by the legislative branch. Unlike the other agreements, it was passed in response to an agreement by the president on U.S. China policy--the Normalization Agreement. Unlike the other agreements, the deliberations were public and there were inputs from various quarters: academics, constituents, constitutional lawyers, public opinion. The process took several months. There was debate; amendments and changes were made; and there was compromise. Finally, a vote was taken to register the level of support for the agreement.
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 13-128 / Asiaweek, February 24, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Sweet and Sour; The Taiwan Question May Poison Sino-American Ties; ACS VT96
	 A far bigger threat to Sino-American relations looms on another front. Resurgent Republicans in the new U.S. Congress are displaying a distinct propensity to meddle in Taiwan policy -- the single most sensitive issue between Beijing and Washington. When the two countries normalized their ties in the 1970s, they agreed that Taiwan was a part of China and relations between the mainland and the island were something for Chinese to work out. That fundamental premise looks set to be severely tested as the Republicans flex their political muscle. 
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13-129 / Asiaweek, February 24, 1995, SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 23, HEADLINE: Sweet and Sour; The Taiwan Question May Poison Sino-American Ties; ACS VT96
	 Pro-Taipei Republicans are spearheading moves that range from admitting Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the U.S., to letting his government into the WTO ahead of China. Some, like Speaker Gingrich, openly back the admission of the island into the United Nations -- a body of sovereign states. Indeed, the Republicans may even push for a wholesale review of U.S. policy toward the rival Chinese regimes, tilting it in favor of Taipei.
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13-130/ International Trade Reporter, February 22, 1995; Pg. 356, TITLE: LOBBYING EFFORTS CREATE PRESSURE ON ADMINISTRATION TAIWAN POLICY; ACS VT96
	 The Republican-controlled Congress has shown interest in expanding ties with Taiwan. House International Relations Chairman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) said Feb. 9 that the administration's revised Taiwan policy is "inadequate."
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13-131 / David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
	 Moreover, Beijing is seen as a borderline rogue actor on the international stage, selling weapons to the world's pariahs. This accumulation of images leads some in Washington to ''press for stronger American support for Taiwan.''
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13-132 / Willy Wo-Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, February 8, 1995; Pg. 15, HEADLINE: A chill wind blows from Washington; ACS VT96
	 The other time-tested "cards" are Taiwan and Tibet. It is no accident that as the trade-related salvoes were thickening, the Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich gave a high-profile reception to a Taiwanese government delegation last weekend. Mr Gingrich, who backs Mr Clinton's get -tough trade policy, expressed admiration for Taiwan's progress in democracy, and said the island should be admitted to the United Nations. The same day, four American minesweepers were added to the arsenal of the Taiwan navy.
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13-133 / James A. Robinson, regents professor at the University of West Florida, International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1995, HEADLINE: For Taipei, a Warmer Hearing in the New Congress; ACS VT96
	 Leaders of the majority Republicans in the U.S. Congress evidently believe thathey have some influence in this matter. Key figures in both the Senate and the House of Representatives have recently renewed support for Taiwan in several ways. On Monday, 36 senators passed a resolution urging President Bill Clinton to lePresident Lee Teng-hui visit America this year. The United States, which recognizes China, does not have formal relations with Taiwan. Last year, President Lee was not allowed to leave his plane during a refueling stop in Hawaii. The resolution Monday called on Mr. Clinton to let Mr. Lee visit Cornell University, his alma mater, in New York State this spring and, in September, to attend an annual meeting of the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Council, in Anchorage, Alaska.
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13-134/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-6-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Newt Gingrich Supports a U.N. Seat for Taiwan [TAIPEI, 02/05/95] Speaker of the U.S. House Newt Gingrich said Taiwan was a government of sovereignty and should be allowed to join the United Nations, contradicting U.S. policy. Gingrich, a Republican, told Taiwanese reporters the above in Washington during an interview broadcast Saturday by Taiwan's state-controlled television, Reuter reported. China took Taiwan's U.N. seat in 1971 and has since pushed Taiwan into international isolation. Taiwan's latest bid to rejoin the U.N. failed last year. (Ming TIAN, Jian LIU)
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13-135/ Kuan Wen-liang, 'Wen Wei Po RADIO', Hong Kong, in Chinese 7 Feb 95 p A2, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 8, 1995, HEADLINE: CHINA -US TRADE dispute; 'Wen Wei Po' says USA's foreign policy is harmful to China's sovereignty; ACS VT96
	 The foreign policymaking team of the Clinton administration has been generally regarded as "mediocre" and " incompetent" . Some people hold that it is still uncertain whether the Clinton administration will eventually adopt a "one China, one Taiwan" policy in the United Nations after accepting the canvassing by the pro-Taiwan anti- China forces and, thus, completely tear up the three joint communiques.
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13-136 / Aerospace Daily February 4, 1994Vol. 169, No. 24; Pg. 186 HEADLINE: Move is on to break the logjam in arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 The problem, sources said, is that successive Administrations have chosen to ignore the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which provides a statutory basis for the U.S. to supply Taiwan with military equipment required for defensive purposes. Instead they are relying on a 1982 policy statement issued by the Reagan Administration, the U.S.-China Joint Communique, also known as the Shanghai Communique. 
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13-137/ Aerospace Daily February 4, 1994Vol. 169, No. 24; Pg. 186 HEADLINE: Move is on to break the logjam in arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 Ignoring the 1979 law, the Administration agreed to "reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final solution." Under the Arms Export Control Act, the President has the authority to block an export license if he finds it is not in the foreign policy interest of the U.S. to do so. 
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13-138 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 5-31-95, (News Global), ACS VT96
	 Levin [Burton Levin, a veteran diplomat] told reporters that the U.S. government made mistakes by creating an atmosphere leading to the Taiwan decision. He blamed the mistakes on Americans' misreading and misunderstanding of China, and cautioned Beijing not to overreact. Levin's criticism came with a sharp tone. He described the Clinton Administration's China strategy as a gaffe, and answered "Yes" to the question if he thought the current administration was more ham fisted than the previous ones. (Weijun LIU, Jian LIU)
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13-139/ Nayan Chanda, staff writer, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 12-1-94; "Storm warning" p. 14 ;SEG VT96
	 The upshot, according to sources in Washington, is that the Clinton adminis- tration will have to deal with pressure from Congress to upgrade relations with Taiwan, give greater support to Tibetan nationalists and penalize Beijing for its arms-sale and human-rights policies. One of the first issues that will have to be wrestled with is China's suspected sale of M11 missiles to Pakistan. A related issue is Beijing's missile- and nuclear-technology transfers to what Washington-considers "rogue states" in the Middle East. "'Democratic Sen. John Glenn has co- authored legislation with Helms to im- pose sanctions on China if it is seen to violate the Missile Technology Control Regime, which seeks to halt the spread of missile technology. Says Glenn: "The Chi- nese have made a lot of promises but they are continuing to do things. We need to put pressure on them."
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13-140 / Kuan Wen-liang, 'Wen Wei Po RADIO', Hong Kong, in Chinese 7 Feb 95 p A2, The British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 8, 1995, HEADLINE: CHINA -US TRADE dispute; 'Wen Wei Po' says USA's foreign policy is harmful to China's sovereignty; ACS VT96
	 Although Washington openly claimed that it pursued a "one China" policy, it has never given up its support for "one China, one Taiwan" and "Taiwan independence" . The United States said that it would be " glad" to see the Chinese on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait solve the Taiwan issue in a peaceful way but it continued to overtly and covertly obstruct China's peaceful reunification. Overtly, it continued to sell advanced arms to Taiwan and encouraged Taipei to seek support from Washington in order to maintain the "status quo" and to call itself a "political entity" . Covertly, it meddled in Taiwan's internal politics, manipulated the political factions there and created obstacles to China's peaceful reunification.
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13-141 / James A. Robinson, regents professor at the University of West Florida, International Herald Tribune, March 10, 1995, HEADLINE: For Taipei, a Warmer Hearing in the New Congress; ACS VT96
	 American support for early admission of Taiwan to the United Nations is unlikely in the near future. Efforts will be made, however, to help Taipei broaden its support among other nations.
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13-142/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 120; ANA VT96
	 The survival and status of Taiwan has been, and will remain, contingent upon the vagaries of U.S. and Chinese geopolitical thought and machination. Both the PRC and the ROC have carefully and consistently manipulated the geographical mind in order to preserve the "orthodox principles" on which their governments are founded. Yet the perceived environment and ideology of the respective foreign-policy-makers have been and will continue to be constrained by the geographical field or arena in which they actually operate and in particular by the shifting contexts of great-power competition and cooperation in East Asia.
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13-143/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY ,p. 56; ANA VT96
	 The argument that U.S. China policy is based on four documents-three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act--is not convincing in light of a careful examination of the agreements. This is particularly true if U.S. China policy is supposed to be consistent, logical and easily understood in terms of its goals and objectives. Three of the documents were negotiated by the executive branch--under three different presidents. Six years separated the first two, and four years divided the second from the third. The world situation was quite different when each was negotiated, and the purposes of each were different. U.S. China policy changed markedly in some important ways during this time. 
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13-144 / The Tampa Tribune, January 30, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: U.S. mistreatment of Taiwan is an odd and high-handed outrage; ACS VT96
	 We are speaking of the island of Taiwan, valiant adversary of mainland China ever since its people retreated there following the 1949 communist revolution, and it now deserves far better treatment from the United States. Taiwan is the living promise of all the United States stood for throughout the Cold War.
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13-145/ DAVID LIU, The Houston Chronicle, March 31, 1995, SECTION: A; Viewpoints; Pg. 33, HEADLINE: Truth about Taiwan; ACS VT96
	 I fully agree with you that it's now high time for Congress and the Clinton administration to ""rethink the policy of ostracism toward Taiwan. '' Taiwan should be evaluated by her economic and political accomplishments, instead of by threats from Peking. Above all, U.S. foreign policy should never be dictated by a few leaders sitting around Deng Xiaoping.
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13-146/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 146; ANA VT96
	 Taipei has been and is supportive of the TRA, although it seldom wants to say so. Clearly Taipei does not want to challenge the TRA when that would destabilize Taiwan's domestic politics in the midst of far-reaching political change that is going on in Taiwan. Most in Taipei feel that time is on Taiwan's side. It is democratizing its political system and it is successful economically. The United States cannot abandon a nation that has been so successful, that has done so much for its citizens, and that is a model in terms of both economic and political development. Neither can the global community. 
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13-147/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 145; ANA VT96
	 What is in the back of Deng's mind about Taiwan is impossible to say. What his likely successors may think is likewise not something others can determine. It does seem certain, however, that Deng views his reforms as more important than the recovery of Taiwan. He also realizes that getting Taiwan back, even "on a silver platter," would not be a plus either. Beijing could not govern Taiwan without serious problems. Simply the portent of such an event would result in a flight of people and money out of Taiwan-both in huge proportions. Beijing would have to rule Taiwan with Draconian policies or face serious open opposition. The publicity would be very negative. Taiwan could become a giant Tiananmen Square. Deng also realizes (as some Chinese intellectuals have openly stated) that a separate Taiwan provides a capitalist, rightist-reform model for China to follow toward democracy. Taiwan's separate status thus aids Beijing's reformers; incorporation would change that. 
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13-148/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY: THE WASHINGTON-TAIPEI-BEIJING TRIANGLE, p. 145; ANA VT96
	 One may indeed argue that the Taiwan issue is a bogus issue for the Chinese Communist Party's left wing; certainly one can charge the Maoists with hypocrisy since they were the first to make concessions regarding Taiwan's separate status. But that is not really the point. The political left in China opposes Deng's Taiwan policy and finds it a convenient issue to use against him and his rightist reformists. They argue with conviction, and they influence opinion in the party and among the populace. They contend that Deng is selling out to the United States on Taiwan. Deng, who has promoted Chinese nationalism and rationalizes his policies through claims that Chinas place among the nations of the world has declined and China must act quickly or risk falling further behind, is assailed for his lack of concern about Chinese territory. Deng's opponents argue that if he is going to restore Chinas greatness, he cannot abandon China's "sacred land." While the leftists may not care about the Taiwan issue, or are not convincing in saying they do, they hope to use it to weaken Deng and his reforms and in the process have made it a sensitive issue. 
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 13-149/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 145; ANA VT96
	 But Deng has been unable to resolve the problem or put it to rest. His opponents will hardly drop the issue. Deng will probably continue to face opposition from the Chinese media that is more sympathetic to the views of the left than to those of the reformers. He will have to fend off the critics in the party. He will no doubt have to continue to take the offensive (if only in form) on the Taiwan question.
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13-150/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 69; ANA VT96
	 Deng's approach after this alternated between tough and threatening language about the Taiwan issue and friendly overtures toward Taipei regarding reunification. Although he may have thought this approach would succeed, it is more likely that he sought to answer charges from opponents in the party and government that he was abandoning China's claim to Taiwan. His reforms, linked to his U.S. policy, had brought prosperity to China and were widely popular. Thus, his opponents could not attack his economic policies in view of both their success and the fact that a host of past economic development plans had failed. But they could attack Deng on the Taiwan issue. They charged that Deng's nationalism was bogus. They found the emotionally charged issue of Chinese territory especially convenient to use against Deng. In subsequent years it became apparent that Deng became more hard-line and aggressive on the Taiwan issue as tension between the left and right factions in the party increased and as he saw his policies--domestic or foreign--vulnerable to attack from the left. 
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13-151/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 151 ;THR VT96
	 Even so, prospects for multi-partyism on the mainland have to be counted as slight. As we noted at the outset, the KMT has been an anomaly among Leninist parties because it lacks a Marxist ideology and has been, through most of its history, pro-Western and pro-capitalist. The applicability of its experience to other Leninist parties is thus limited. Moreover, the mainland Chinese population is far less prosperous and educated than Taiwan's, and in this sense the social conditions for pluralism are less promising. Also in contrast to Taiwan, the mainland's succession problem seems, at least outwardly, to be well under control, and the PRC's international standing is high. And unlike Taiwan, the PRC is not dependent on the U.S. economically and militarily, and hence has less concern with American and. other foreign public opinion. In short, the PRC leaders lack the various stimuli for party system reform that motivated Chiang Ching-kuo. While reform in the role of the single ruling party is a major part of the mainland reform agenda, there is no sign so far that the leaders are considering reform of the party system itself, or even that they intend to allow the question to be publicly discussed.
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13-152/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 One need not be superstitious to be concerned. Deng Xiaoping is apparently dying, with no obvious successor in sight despite the paramount leader's attempt, his third, to put in place a successor regime. Public order in the country continues to deteriorate; human rights abuses by the Communist government has worsened; official corruption runs rampant; and Washington and Beijing are experiencing a tumultuous time in bilateral economic ties. Some analysts in Taiwan have argued that the chances of a Communist attack on the island have markedly increased in this period of transition and instability.
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13-153/ Julian Baum, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Taipei planners debate chances of a Chinese attack," p. 29; MDS VT96
	 Yet military planners and some scholars say that the 'Taiwan question," as Beijing calls it, remains a potentially volatile issue in Chinese domestic politics. The scholars say there could be many varia- tions on a basic scenario. This would involve a power struggle in Beijing, with ' the leadership in confusion and the cen- tral government's affairs running out of control. Under such circumstances, the Taiwan issue would provide a basis for nationalist cohesion.
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 13-154/ Julian Baum, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Taipei planners debate chances of a Chinese attack," p. 29; MDS VT96
	 Appeasing hard-line military sentiment on Taiwan would be an easy diversion for an ambitious but insecure leader. The pretext for such action could be alleged foreign intervention in Taiwan's affairs. The rationale for this scenario is that China's military has often warned against Taiwan's political shift towards democracy, and the military is expected to have a key role in determining China's future leadership.
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 13-155 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 The principal military flash point that most U.S. officials worry about under the new leadership is Taiwan. "They have adopted a harsher mood toward Taiwan and are more prepared to intimidate Taiwan," said one official. One reason is that the Taiwanese opposition party has pressed for an outright declaration of independence from China; another is that Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang party has been drumming up support from Republican lawmakers in Washington and others
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13-156/ The Tampa Tribune, January 30, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: U.S. mistreatment of Taiwan is an odd and high-handed outrage; ACS VT96
	 Having two Chinas to deal with is a delicate diplomatic situation that many governments have simplified by pretending there is but one China. But as the leaders of the revolutionary era grow older and die, new opportunities arise. In recent years Taiwan itself has made many improvements. It has ended its long state of emergency, legalized opposition parties, ended its claim that it represents all of China, and allowed its citizens to visit the mainland. Communist China, too, has made some economic progress and opened doors.
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13-157/ BARBARA OPALL, Staff Writer Defense News, November 7, 1994 / November 13, 1994, Pg. 4, HEADLINE: China Forces' Muscle-Flexing Prompts Taiwanese Unease//MDS-VT96
	 China considers Taiwan a renegade province and maintains that it has the right to use military force to settle what Beijing considers an internal affair. 
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 13-158/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 146; ANA VT96
	However, one cannot dismiss the possibility of such intense pressure on Deng from Party leftists that he changes his position vis-a-vis Taiwan.
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13-159/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.427; THR VT96
	 Of course, the greatest concern about Chinese military modernization is expressed by Taiwan. Since 1993 military tensions across the Taiwan Strait have heated up as Taipei has sought to enhance its international standing and voices for independence on Taiwan have grown. Consequently, the Taiwan issue has commanded greater attention from Beijing. It has concomitantly moved up the Chinese military's agenda; the via Academy of Military Sciences and the National Defense University have simulated a naval blockade (probably submarine) of Taiwan. In September 1994 the PLA undertook large-scale joint service maneuvers off the coast of Zhejiang province, which is just north of Taiwan.
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 13-160/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 The immediate risk must be that as Taiwanese politics develops and independence becomes more formalised, a Chinese leader pushed by a conservative military lobby, will seek to halt the Taiwanese democratic process through the threat of force. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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 13-161/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 150;THR VT96
	 Taiwan's reforms are being closely watched in China, which is also involved in political reform. Although we have no hard evidence of the unofficial reaction, news of Taiwan's progress has probably been among the factors spurring public impatience with the slow pace of political reform on the mainland--impatience recently expressed in the form of student and worker demonstrations in several cities. 
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 13-162/RAMON MYERS, Sr. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 7 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays on Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 For many decades, then, the ROC enjoyed a prospering, free economic marketplace and a flourishing ideological marketplace while strictly adhering to political rules that forbade individuals to challenge the regime through organizing political parties, publishing ideas and criticism undermining the regime's legitimacy, or engaging in activities threatening political and social stability. By 1986, the KMT leadership decided that the time was appropriate for democratization. The dramatic changes in the eight years that followed represent the rapid political development to a limited democracy; in late 1996, elections for the nation's top leaders, president and vice-president, will take place, making the ROC a consolidated democracy.
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13-163/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 111; ANA VT96
	 In January 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died. Lee Teng-hui became president and acting head of the Nationalist party. Lees succession reaffirmed the working of the constitutional processes. It also suggested that democracy, the transition from a political system run by Mainland Chinese to the Taiwanese, and a continued separation from China were linked. Many people in Taiwan so opined at the time; so did the Western media. Taiwan's claim to sovereignty was further strengthened as a result. 
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13-164/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p.110; ANA VT96
	 In mid-year 1987, martial law was lifted. Whether it was really martial law or not was questionable. Whether it had been an impediment to democracy was debatable. Public opinion polls suggested the majority of the population did not object to martial law or find it an inconvenience. But it did give the appearance of an authoritarian system, and it was associated with undemocratic practices of the past. More important, those in the U.S. Congress who wrote and supported the TRA criticized martial law. It clearly did not seem in consonance with the provisions in the TRA which encouraged democratic reform. The Western media was also very critical of martial law in Taiwan, noting among other things that it was the longest period in recent history that martial law was in effect in any nation. Terminating martial law thus changed Taiwan's image, and the TRA seemed to deserve credit.
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13-165/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 109; ANA VT96
	 President Chiang Ching-kuo continued to strengthen civilian authority in government. He announced publicly that his successor would not come from the military and that neither the military nor the intelligence services would be in a position to control the government or the party in the event he had a prolonged illness or died. In public declarations, he promised that none of his relatives would be in a position to contend for power. He believed democracy was the only option in Taiwan's political future.
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13-166/Shia-ling Liu, Prof. of Political Science, Jan/Feb 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "Reunification of China: Ideological Perspectives," p. 40 ; CJJ VT96
	 Both sides agree that there is and will be only one China. However, in Taiwan, there is an activist Taiwan Independent Movement, a vocal minority, mostly in, or allied with, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which advocates the establishment of a new nation, possibly in the name of "Republic of Taiwan," independent from China. A few of others are in favor of a de facto independent Republic of China, diplomatically recognized by other nations of the world with membership in the United Nations, and other international organizations.
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13-167/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China arm/and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 97; ANA VT96
	 Although the ROC government has strongly advocated reunification under a one-China policy, a small but vocal group on Taiwan and abroad has advocated Taiwanese independence. In particular, the Formosa Independence Movement (FIM) has pledged to overthrow the Nationalist government, which has always been dominated by mainland Chinese. This pledge of independence dates back to 1947, when the island was returned to mainland role after fifty years of Japanese colonial rule. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Japanese colonial role had been repressive but efficient. It was replaced by mainland rule under Governor Chen Yi, and was heavy handed, inefficient, and corrupt. Moreover, the majority of people on Taiwan spoke Taiwanese, Hokka, and Japanese and were unable to communicate with Mandarin-speaking officials from the mainland. Japanese colonial rule followed by the inept administration of Chen Yi stirred resentment on Taiwan and fueled a desire for independence that was evident well before the arrival of Chiang Kai-shek's forces in 1949 (Hsu 1983).
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13-167a/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 157;THR VT96
	 Third, all kinds of alternative futures for Taiwan are being publicly debated. Although it remains illegal to discuss "Taiwan independence," or even to advocate discussing it, it is nonetheless widely debated both as such, and in the form of discussions over the meaning of the Democratic Progressive Party's platform of "self determination.'' Numerous other proposals have been debated, such as such as "two countries, two systems," "the cultural approach," "one country under separate administrations,'' and a "unification-pluralistic politics model.'' Most of these proposals call in one way or another for legitimizing the status of the Taipei authorities within the larger Chinese national entity, and are therefore incompatible with the CCP's insistence on the Taipei government's illegitimacy. Beijing views all such proposals as going down the road of Taiwan independence either intentionally or unintentionally.
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13-167b/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p.157;THR VT96
	 The Taiwan electorate seems to understand that a formal declaration of independence would be a costly, risky venture with few payoffs. The voters prefer to promote continued political reform at home that will increase their power in the political system, and innovative diplomacy abroad that will increase their government's l international political profile and influence and hence their own convenience in traveling around the world and doing business. The electorate would probably not be averse in principle to some sort of formal reunification with mainland China provided that their rights and freedoms were credibly guaranteed and their access to international markets protected or enhanced. But the Taiwan elec- torate does not want to take even the slightest risk of coming under the actual physical control of the mainland authorities. This atti- tude is likely to continue even if the mainland regime substantially changes its political complexion. The islanders are unlikely ever to want to put their fate in the hands of outsiders, except in the unlikely event that the outsiders are much richer than they are.
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13-168a/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 119; ANA VT96
	 The KMT strongly opposes the independence movement. However, since the lifting of martial law in 1988 it has had to compete with various independence factions in open elections at the local level. The current KMT-dominated leadership insists that there is little to gain and much to lose from independence. Taiwan's international position would not be significantly enhanced and it could provoke a military response from the PRC. 
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 13-169/Hung-mao Tien, Prof. of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Commentary," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 21O;ANA VT96
	 In the foreseeable future, the domestic push for active participation in world affairs and, more importantly, for formal acceptance of Taiwan as a sovereign state, regardless of national title, will continue to enhance its global influence. The ROC government and the people in general, irrespective of partisan orientation, share a rare consensus that Taiwan's available resources must be mobilized to enhance the country's international influence. It is perceived to be a matter of survival.
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 13-170/ Jim Anderson, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 9, 1995, HEADLINE: The new geometry of Asia: a shaky quadrangle; ACS VT96
	 The book sees several issues that could upset the shaky post Cold-war plans for the United States to try to stabilize Asia and to remain a major player in the region. ["The Strategic Quadrangle," published by the Council on Foreign Relations] The first was Taiwan, which has already become more assertive about its role in the world as a commercial and political rival of the Peoples Republic of China. Taiwan, to the extent it chooses to be a spoiler in the Asia situation, is independent of the United States or any other power. Lampton said there was a parallel between Cuba and Taiwan; both were islands which belonged in the natural sphere of their larger continental neighbours, but Cuba oiled the waters of the Cold Water for decades by choosing a more distant protector, the Soviet Union.
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13-171/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 164;ANA VT96
	 The transition from authoritarianism to democracy has been a wrenching experience for the KMT, the DPP, and Taiwan society. As of early 1992 the transition had been only partially accomplished. Many of the attitudes and practices of the KMT, entrenched during the period of one-party rule, have resisted change. The penetration of the government bureaucracy and social organizations by the party, although never approaching that of the CCP on the mainland, probably will take years to disentangle. The KMT elite, bereft of a strong, unchallenged leader, has had difficulty in adjusting to collective leadership. High-level differences have become public, and KMT legislators elected on Taiwan have formed factions.
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13-172/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 149;THR VT96
	 The future evolution of Taiwan's political system will, of course, depend even more upon the post-reform adaptation of the KMT than on the shape taken by the opposition. Those who lightly compare Taiwan's situation to those of South Korea or the Philippines forget that the KMT, for all its problems, is a vigorous organization. Its strengths include a nationalistic ideology with considerable appeal, much fresh blood among its membership, including many Taiwanese (constituting an estimated 70 percent of the party membership) and a cadre of skilled technocrats, strong local political machines, control over the media and, through the political commissar system, control over the military. The KMT would probably perform well in elections even without the special advantages it enjoys under the current electoral system, and it is unlikely to give up all of these advantages in the course of reform. Hence it is unlikely that the Taiwan political system will quickly evolve into a true two-party system.
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13-173/Richard Bush, Staff Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Rep. with responsibility for East Asia, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's International Role: Implications for U.S. Policy," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.296; ANA VT96
	 Fifth, simply because the dynamics of Taiwan's situation create the possibility of fundamental dilemmas for U.S. policy does not mean that they will occur. The scenario that currently creates the most anxiety for U.S. policy makers--the DPP gaining power and, driven by its radical wing, making a unilateral declaration of independence--may never occur. The KMT still has considerable strength, and Taiwan's electorate possesses a strong pragmatic streak. Even if the DPP were to win power, its more moderate wing might dominate policy making and abandon the rhetorical stance it had taken for the sake of gaining power. A DPP government might even work out its own accommodation with Beijing. On the other side of the coin, it may be too early to judge the military impact of the PRC's arms acquisitions. They may be less threatening to Taiwan in the medium term than some suggest, particularly if the PRC is purchasing a limited number of copies of each system with the intent of developing and producing clones in China's military industrial complex. Consequently, the United States need not act right now as if the island and the mainland are doomed to an arms race and as if the DPP is destined to declare independence. U.S. actions designed to head off the worse case may make a manageable situation more unstable than otherwise would have been the case.
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13-174/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 165; ANA VT96
	 Now that the mainland-elected legislators have retired, the DPP will have a new opportunity to challenge the KMT in the December 1992 election, but the ruling party will still hold the high cards. The independence issue has failed to win the needed popular support, and the DPP so far has not developed any political or economic proposals likely to appeal to a broad sector of the electorate. The voters have shown a strong preference for stability. KMT rule has suited most people well enough so that they seem unlikely to reject it in favor of a small, divided party whose ability to govern has yet to be demonstrated. 
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13-175/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 164; ANA VT96
	 The DPP has had difficulty in developing into a responsible opposition party. It is small, split into competing factions, and chronically short of funds. Holding only a handful of seats in the Legislative Yuan, the DPP has had no chance of passing its own legislation against the overwhelming majority of mainland-elected KMT members. Consequently, DPP members have resorted to physical violence against the "old thieves," as they contemptuously called the mainland-elected legislators. Although good theater when shown on television, these antics in the Legislative Yuan did not earn the DPP members much public support. Large street demonstrations, which caused traffic tie-Ups, also attracted criticism. 
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13-176 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-21-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Taiwan Prepares Responses for Deng's Death [CND, 01/15/95] After Deng's daughter announced last week for the first time that Deng's health "was declining daily", Taiwan's top policymaking body on mainland China is preparing its responses to any sudden changes which might follow Deng's death, Reuter reported Sunday. "The Mainland Affairs Council ... is formulating several responses to deal with sudden changes in the Chinese communists' power structures, so as to maintain harmony and stability in relations and make relations independent of Deng's death," a Taiwan's newspaper quoted an unnamed council official as saying. (Ming ZHANG, Chuck LIN)
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12-177/Fu-mei Chang Chen, Research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and member of the National Assembly in Taiwan, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, Commentary," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 137; ANA VT96
	 In 1991-92 the EPA spent eleven months surveying pollution problems among the top 500 industrial companies. The first scorecard, issued in August 1992, gave low marks to 57 percent of the 372 factories investigated, even when applying standards less stringent than those in the West? Clearly, Taiwan has made only the most meager progress toward heightening environmental awareness and mobilizing the determination to ameliorate pollution. 
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13-178/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 156; ANA VT96
	 The political liberalization in Taiwan after 1986 made it increasingly difficult for the government to suppress advocates of Taiwan independence. Under the new National Security Law that replaced martial law in July 1987, civilians could no longer be tried in military courts. Freedom of speech was an important element in the image of a democratizing Taiwan that the government sought to promote abroad. The National Security Law did, however, state that "no person may violate the Constitution or advocate Communism or the division of national territory in the exercise of the people's freedom of assembly and association."
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13-179/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 165 ;ANA VT96
	 Whatever the balance between political parties, the increase in democratic practices in Taiwan is widening the gap between its society and the one-party system on the mainland. Consciousness of a Taiwanese identity is growing. Beijing's proposal of "one country, two systems," never very attractive to the people of Taiwan, is even less so today. If unification with the China mainland is to occur, it will have to be on terms acceptable to a people grown accustomed to electing their own leadership. In the meantime, a government in Taiwan increasingly legitimated by democratic elections will be in a strong position from which to work out with the PRC the conditions for the relationship across the Strait. 
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13-180/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA ANA VT96
	 To date the ROC government has flatly rejected the mainland's "peaceful reunification" initiatives and refused to enter into negotiations on any terms proposed by Beijing. This policy of rejecting reunification under the PRC has been referred to as the three-no policy--no negotiations, no compromise, and no contact with the mainland regime (Central Daily News, October 23, 1987:1). Essentially, the PRC and ROC disagree over whether a unified China should be communist or noncommunist, which basically implies a disagreement over whether the central government of China should be ruled by the Chinese Communist party or the Kuomintang party (Lasater 1988:165). While both sides strive for a unified China there remains a fundamental conflict over how this should be accomplished. 
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13-181/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 28 ANA VT96
	 Taiwan, like the PRC and the United States, agrees that an issue or problem exists between Taiwan and mainland China. However, the ROC completely rejects the idea that Taiwan itself is the cause of the issue or problem. Instead, it claims that the real issue centers on mainland China and in this respect it is really the "China issue." This point of view was clearly illustrated by the comments of Sun Yun-suan, former prime minister of the ROC, at a conference of American scholars held in Taipei in July 1982. He declared that: [It was an] issue of whether the people there [mainland China] should forever continue to live under Communist rule, or an issue of preference for a strong and hostile Communist China or a peace-loving non communist China. (pamphlet of ROC Government Information Office 1983: 12) 
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13-182/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 176; ANA VT96
	 The lack of progress in narrowing differences between the two sides on the issue of China's unification could be interpreted as evidence of the ineffectiveness of track-two diplomacy. Certainly, if unification, the declared goal of both governments, is to be achieved, it can only be done through official negotiations, that is, track-one diplomacy. Negotiations on unification must be authorized by the highest authority on each side, and any agreement must be approved by that authority.
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13-183/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 174; ANA VT96
	 The disagreement that arose between the SEF and ARATS in connection with the discussion of technical legal and communications matters reflects the basic difference between them on the definition of their relationship. The PRC sees China as one, with Taiwan as a subordinate part, and would like to conduct official relations with it on that basis. The ROC sees China as eventually one, but presently with two governments, each with jurisdiction over a different part of China. As a de facto independent government, the ROC will not have official contacts with Beijing until the PRC has recognized it as an equal political entity. Until that time it will try to resolve problems arising in relations across the Strait through an unofficial, track-two agency, the SEF. By establishing ARATS as the SEF's counterpart, the PRC has accepted the necessity, perhaps for an extended period of time, of dealing with the ROC through a formal, track-two mechanism. 
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13-184/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAlS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 165; ANA VT96
	 Until the PRC is willing to acknowledge the ROC as a political entity and agrees to negotiate with it on an equal basis, the ROC almost certainly will continue to insist on track-two diplomacy, rather than official negotiations. The more prosperous and democratic Taiwan becomes, the less likely it is that its people would agree to negotiations based on the assumption that Taiwan is a province of the PRC.
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13-185/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 147; ANA VT96
	 Taipei's leaders, acutely conscious of the latent power of the China mainland and the past history of confrontation between the KMT and the CCP, regard the security of Taiwan as the primary consideration. They seek to maintain a military force that would make the military subjection of Taiwan as difficult and costly as possible. In their view, negotiations with Beijing in which Taiwan accepted a subordinate position could only result in disaster. Consequently, they reject the "one country, two systems" concept and defer negotiations indefinitely by refusing to negotiate on unification until the PRC has met their conditions. 
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13-186/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 125; ANA VT96
	 This proliferation of track-two diplomacy has created multiple channels of communication and has substantially eased hostility and lowered tension, thus transforming the relationship between the two sides of the Strait. Both governments saw advantages in this largely privately initiated interaction, each seeking to guide and shape it to its own benefit. The steady progress in the creation of a network of people-to-people relations was not, however, accompanied by progress toward official negotiations on the reunification of China. The PRC staked out its position in the early 1980s and has held to it firmly with little change. The ROC was slower in defining its conditions for negotiations on unification, not completing its formulation of basic principles until early 1991. A wide gap separates the positions of the two governments. 
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13-187/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 2 ; ANA VT96
	 Official negotiations on the unification issue have not been possible because the ROC refuses to negotiate as a provincial government with a central government and the PRC refuses to negotiate with the ROC as an equal government, even though the ROC has functioned for decades in the international community as a de facto sovereign state. Beijing has proposed that the two ruling parties, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, negotiate on an equal basis, but the Taipei authorities have refused on the ground that Taiwan now has a multi party,, democratic system in which the people of Taiwan can be represented only by their government.
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 13-188/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins Univ., 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan-PRC Relations," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.217; ANA VT96
	 Taipei and Beijing have made no significant progress in narrowing the differences in their views on unification. Nevertheless, since 1987 their contention on basic issues has been accompanied by expanding areas of people-to-people cooperation. Once the ROC lifted the ban on travel to the mainland in 1987, a flood of visitors made the trip--over 4 million visits by the end of 1992. Many of these travelers visited their poorer relatives to whom they brought substantial gifts in the form of goods or hard currency. Fewer persons have traveled from the mainland to Taiwan, perhaps 50,000, but ROC restrictions have gradually been eased. The bulk of those going to the mainland went to visit family members, to sightsee, or to do business, but other visitors included media representatives, politicians, scientists, academics, athletes, legislators, and officials. The PRC welcomed the visitors from Taiwan and urged the ROC to relax further the restrictions on travel from the mainland to Taiwan. In general, both governments see the travel as improving understanding and easing tension across the Strait.
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13-189/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 118; ANA VT96
	 A number of specific obstacles must be overcome before a mutually acceptable formula for reunification can be reached. According to Wu, the principal obstacles are "ideological hostility, impetuosity, and misunderstanding the other side's political and economic situation" (Wu 1989:88). Ideological hostility is undoubtedly the greatest single obstacle to reunification- All ROC leaders have expressed severe anti communist sentiments and have charged that communism is inappropriate for China. The PRC leaders have held tenaciously to the "four fundamental principles'' (the Socialist road, Communist party leadership, the people's democratic dictatorship, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought). The refusal of the leadership on both sides to modify their official ideological stance reflects the paramount importance placed upon orthodox principle in Chinese geopolitical thought On a more practical level, both governments and their leaders derive legitimacy from their ideological convictions. It is clear that both sets of elites are unwilling to compromise since this might undermine their own position and influence.
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13-190/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council., 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 117 ; ANA VT96
	 Although both sides agree that China must be re unified, so far the ROC and PRC have rejected each other's proposals for unification. Taipei maintains that Beijing's one-China proposals, including the recent "one country, two systems" formula, are part of a Communist strategy designed to annex Taiwan. Beijing maintains that Taipei's formula to unify China under the Three Principles of the People is "impractical." These polarized positions have been reflected in the antagonistic statements of political leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In terms of integration theory, it is clear that "elite consensus" has reached a sticking point (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981; Wei 1981; Lodge and Vogel 1987). Progress toward integration is unlikely until the leadership on one side or the other adopts a new geopolitical vision. 
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13-191/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 112 ; ANA VT96
	 The ROC leadership has cited a number of reasons for their firm resistance to PRC overtures. First, they oppose any proposal that would relegate Taiwan to the status of a local government under the national government of the PRC. They have struggled against the mainland regime for decades and foresee no advantage in forfeiting their current status. Second, they believe the mainland regime will eventually impose a socialist system on the island regardless of its "one China, two systems" policy. The ROC leadership points out that the principles on which the PRC bases its legitimacy require the supremacy of socialism in China. Third, they fear that any real change in the status of Taiwan would damage confidence among Taiwan's trading partners and among domestic and foreign investors. Taiwan's economy is heavily trade dependent, and its economic success relies upon a high level of capital investment. Should the economic health of Taiwan be undermined by its entry into negotiations with the PRC, its bargaining power would be seriously diminished. Fourth, they believe Taiwan's security would also be weakened as third countries such as the United States withdrew their support. Finally, they argue that the "one country, two systems" formula merely implies an "integration" or geographical annexation rather than a real "unification" of systems and therefore cannot be considered as an acceptable proposal for full unification. 
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13-192/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 127; ANA VT96
	 One Country, Two Systems. This concept, devised as a means of making reunification more palatable to the authorities and people on Taiwan, has won few adherents on the island. It would require accepting the sovereignty of a government that has been far less successful than the government in Taipei in raising living standards and has imposed harsh controls over the lives of its citizens. Yet Yang insisted that "to realize reunification... the central government must be located in Beijing and be of the People's Republic of China. This is the supreme, non-negotiable principle," Yang declared. 
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13-193/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 155; THR VT96
	 Yet, by extinguishing Taiwan's international persona, the first two 'elements of Deng's policy would lay the groundwork for the subsequent imposition of physical control at a time of the mainland's choosing. Its ability to do this would also be enhanced by the substantial economic integration that would be achieved between the island and the mainland under the one country two systems policy. People on Taiwan are understandably cautious about handing over their bargaining chips to the people on the other side in exchange for a promise of respect for local autonomy.
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13-194/Lee Lai To, Lecturer Political Science National University of Singapore, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Taiwan And the Reunification Question," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, P. 193; THR VT96
	 However, the most important manifestation of the adherence to the 'one country, two governments' principle came from President Lee Teng-hui when he was sworn in to his first full six-year term in May 1990. President Lee made it known that his government was willing to hold talks with China 'within the one-China framework and on a government-to-government basis with the two sides having equal status. He also offered to end the state of war with China. However, Lee's offer was premised on three conditions. They were that Beijing must renounce the use of force against Taiwan, stop interfering in Taipei's efforts to expand its international relations, and move towards democracy and a free economic system. If these terms were met, according to Lee, Taiwan would completely open up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and technological exchanges with the mainland and, when 'objective conditions are ripe', Taipei would be able to discuss the issue of the reunification of China 'based on the common will of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. It was interesting that Lee did not reiterate Taipei's demand that Beijing should forsake Deng's Four Basic Principles. None the less, it was quite obvious that there was no way that Beijing would accept the three preconditions. Knowing very well that that was the case, President Lee's suggestion gave him the advantage of supporting a popular ideal without having to put it into effect. At very little political cost to his government, Lee seemed to be making a counterproposal to Beijing's suggestion of having a party-to-party dialogue. Lee's proposal also highlighted his determination to preserve the parity of status between Taipei and Beijing in working towards eventual reunification. What Taipei wanted was an environment in which both sides of the Taiwan Straits could compete and coexist peacefully.
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13-195/Lee Lai To, Lecturer Political Science National University of Singapore, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Taiwan And the Reunification Question," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. ; THR VT96
	 As a result of its one-China policy and wish to reincorporate Taipei by the 'one country, two systems' formula, it is not surprising that Beijing would find it difficult to accept the 'one country, two governments' proposal from Taipei. From the outset when the 'one country, two governments' proposal was first officially mooted, Beijing had been most negative towards the idea. It categorically denounced it as a scheme which established 'two Chinas' under the name of 'one China'. When President Lee Teng-hui mentioned the proposal again in his inaugural speech in May 1990, Beijing considered his conditions for government-to-government contacts 'impossible'. The response from General-Secretary Jiang Zemin also reiterated Beijing's previous condition of talks 'on a reciprocal basis between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang'. However, Jiang added that China also attached importance to the role of other parties, social groups, and individuals from all walks of life in realizing the cause of reunification. He ventured to suggest that 'representatives from these parties and people's organizations may also be invited to attend the negotiations. 
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13-196/I Yuan, Assoc. Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "Cooperation under Anarchy? Paradoxes of the Intra- Chinese Rapprochement," p. 65; MDS VT96
	 Only a major policy reversal by Beijing, involving a decision to grant de jure recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty, will facilitate the eventual unification of China. A shift by the PRC away from its one-China policy would ease the pressure on its major allies, who would not be under an obligation to use their veto powers in the Security Council to block a bid by Taiwan to gain a seat in the United Nations. However, the PRC itself could still veto such a move.
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13-197/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 87;ANA VT96
	 The events of June 1989--known widely as the "Beijing Massacre"-sent shock waves through Hong Kong Hong Kong, an enclave whose population is composed mostly (about 80 percent) of Chinese who fled from communism, was outraged. Hong Kong was angry but helpless. After the Beijing Massacre, the People's Republic of China rarely mentioned the one-country, two-systems formula. Its officials no longer cited the Hong Kong precedent for resolving the Taiwan issue. It stopped (for the moment at least) trying to appeal to Taiwan on the basis of a peaceful formula for unifying China. Chinese leaders in Beijing knew the one-country, two-systems concept no longer was credible.
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 13-198/RaIph N. CIough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 146; ANA VT96
	 The political leaders on the China mainland and in Taiwan have made little progress since 1987 toward their avowed goal of the political unification of the two parts of China. Wide gaps, not easily bridged, separate the positions of the two sides. The attitude of the leaders and people on both sides of the Strait is profoundly affected by the fact that China looms so large over tiny Taiwan. The issue of the unification of China thus differs radically from the unification of Germany or Korea. PRC leaders, confident that size will prevail eventually, are trader little pressure to back away from their "one country, two systems" concept. They see no reason to give up the threat of force, to recognize the government of Taiwan as an equal political entity, or to accept dual representation for China in the international community. They are even less willing to agree to Taipei's demands for the democratization of the China mainland and the establishment of a free-market system there as conditions for unification.
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13-199/Shia-ling Liu, Prof. of Political Science, Jan/Feb 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "Reunification of China: Ideological Perspectives," p. 38 ; CJJ VT96
	 Realistically speaking, the reunification of Nationalist and Communist China is confronted with a number of difficult and almost irreconcilable issues due to the fundamental difference in their respective ideologies and value systems on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. These differences can be analyzed at many levels from various perspectives by different approaches. The most basic is their different controlling ideologies: on the one side, the Chinese Communists believe in the orthodox revolutionary totalitarian Marxism as projected and practiced by Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. This orthodox Marxism is now somewhat modified by Teng Hsiao-ping's new version of a revisionist "socialism with Chinese characteristics." On the other hand, the Chinese Nationalists pledge to the Three Principles of the People as developed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and adapted to the new development in Taiwan.
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13-200/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 96; ANA VT96
	 From the ROC perspective, the issue facing the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is not whether reunification should occur, but how it should be achieved. However, the ROC reunification can occur only under certain conditions, and it may take thirty years or more before those conditions are met. At the same time, hostility between the two sides has been replaced by increased cooperation. Under these circumstances, Taiwan has searched for other geopolitical strategies that may bring about a satisfactory resolution of the Taiwan issue. Although the public position of the ROC is unlikely to change, the leadership has long considered other options in private. 
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13-201/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of Chins army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 94; ANA VT96
	 Thus, in contrast to the PRC's one-China, two-systems proposal, the ROC offers one-China within a democratic and capitalist framework. Of course, Taiwan's leadership does not anticipate that the present mainland regime will accept these initiatives. Rather, they are willing to wait in anticipation that the current regime will eventually fall and be replaced by a new order.
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13-202/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 147; ANA VT96
	 Lee Teng-hui has envisaged negotiations on unification only after political democracy and a flee-market system have been established on the mainland. This change presumes a central government in Beijing in which the people of Taiwan could have more confidence than they do in the elderly Chinese Communist leaders in power today. The third, or long-term, phase of the national unification guidelines calls for the integration of the armed forces of both sides and the drawing up of a new constitution for a united China. What form the union would take is not specified. Scholars and editorialists have proposed various formulas for a unified China, ranging from a commonwealth through a confederation to a federation, but consideration within the government has not yet reached this stage.
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13-203/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 126; ANA VT96
	 One China. The governments of both Beijing and Taipei agree that there is only one China, that Taiwan is a province of China, and that Taiwan and mainland China should be unified. Both oppose the creation of an independent state of Taiwan. Beijing and Taipei differ widely on the conditions for unification, however. Beijing urges early unification, while Taipei foresees a long period before that goal can be achieved.
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 13-204/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 2 ; ANA VT96
	 The growing people-to-people interaction between the two sides of the Strait has not significantly narrowed the differences between the two governments on the future of Taiwan. Both governments declare that they favor the unification of Taiwan with mainland China, but the), differ fundamentally on conditions for bringing it about. The PRC wants Taiwan incorporated as a "special administrative region" with a high degree of autonomy, but subordinate to Beijing. The ROC envisages unification occurring only after mainland China has become a democratic, free-market society, and the PRC ceases its efforts to isolate the ROC in the international community drops the threat of force, and recognizes the ROC as a political entity.
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 13-204a/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U.S. State Dept., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p. 255; THR VT96
	 For peaceful reunification to take place, integrating Taiwan into the Chinese state, one would have to imagine a combination of several unlikely events: the return to power of liberal reformers in Beijing coupled with successful stabilization of the mainland on the basis of a market economy; a change to democracy on the mainland or a reversion to autocracy on Taiwan; an end to the process within the ROC that has placed more and more decision making power in the hands of the overwhelmingly Taiwanese electorate, or a sudden reversal in their sense of difference; a rise in Chinese living standards to something approximating the Taiwan level (currently about $8,000 per capita) or a fall in Taiwan living standards to something approximating the PRC level (currently about $400 per capita). To list the conditions necessary for reunification is enough to demonstrate how unlikely it is. 
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13-205/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; II HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 101; THR VT96
	 For the KMT government this has proven a useful strat- egy. The growing economic and political gap between the mainland and Taiwan (made more visible by visits to the mainland) has considerably dulled popular enthusiasm on the island for immediate reunification, and there is not much enthusiasm for independence, either because of fear of mainland reaction or due to uneasiness with the idea of a Taiwanese nation. So for the moment President Lee and his colleagues seek the advantages of dialogue as they enjoy many of the benefits of de facto sovereignty. For Deng and his colleagues, this policy has created a deeply worrisome impasse. With the option of force constrained by military capabilities and the impact its use might have not only on world opinion but in triggering an American military response, they must play Taiwan's game. As they do so, the island's confidence and global influence grow--thus driving Beijing's dream of re unifying Taiwan with the mainland fur- ther into the future.
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 13-206/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 145; ANA VT96
	 As spelled out in the Guidelines for Unification, the Taiwan authorities envisaged a prolonged period of peaceful coexistence between Taiwan and the mainland before negotiations on unification could be undertaken. While the PRC urged early negotiations on unification, Taiwan's leaders gave the impression that they could live indefinitely with the political status quo between the two sides, buttressed by a growing network of cross-Strait relations that would give people on both sides an increasing stake in a peaceful relationship.
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13-207/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 17 ; ANA VT96
	 The government and people of Taiwan have been adamantly opposed to entering into negotiations from the position of a province of China negotiating with the central government. For more than 40 years Taiwan has functioned in the world community as a de facto independent state, despite its loss of formal diplomatic relationships. Few residents of Taiwan would prefer subordination to Beijing to their present anomalous condition, however much autonomy the PRC authorities might promise. The deepening apprehension in Hong Kong over the approach of 1997 is not a reassuring precedent.
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13-208/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p.148; ANA VT96
	 PRC leaders, observing the Taiwan authorities giving up ground little by little in their resistance to the "three links and four exchanges," see their patience paying off. From their viewpoint, the denser the network of people-to people exchanges, the more difficult it will be for Taiwan to declare itself independent. Moreover, the denser the network, the more practical problems arise, increasing the pressure on the Taiwan authorities to allow at least low-level official contacts to resolve these problems. The two sides are engaged in a delicate minuet, as Beijing pushes for official negotiations and Taipei seeks to avoid them by recourse to the SEF. 
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 13-209/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 6 ; ANA VT96
	 Since seizing power on the mainland in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled through a single-party, authoritarian political system with a centrally planned economy. The struggle for power at the top has at times been tumultuous, particularly during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Domestic political infighting has not, however, affected the commitment to re unify Taiwan with the motherland. Tactics have varied from time to time, but the assumption that Taiwan must sooner or later be rejoined to China has not wavered, either among the leadership or the populace.
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13-210/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 107; ANA VT96
	 The Chinese people are very aware of their common history and common cultural heritage. They are also conscious of the cyclical nature of unification and division throughout their history. Consequently, there has arisen a tendency to maintain an air of patience during times of disunity, in the belief that the nation will one day be re unified. The Taiwan issue is profoundly influenced by this common belief. Despite more than forty years of bitter division the ROC and PRC governments and their respective peoples share the common philosophy of one China. 
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13-211/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 136; ANA VT96
	 U.S. China policy based on the Taiwan Relations Act was also in consonance with Taipei's long-term policies. One can argue that although the TRA put forth a one-China and one-Taiwan policy, and Taipei's policy was (and is) technically a one-China policy, the two are really not dissimilar. Taipei wants to rule China; but that is only a rhetorical policy or long-term policy--with little hope of realization at the present time or in the foreseeable future. For now Taipei wants to remain apart. Congress and Taipei thus both supported de facto separation. The unification of China is an issue to be resolved in the future, and both assume that if it is to be accomplished, it must be done peacefully and democratically (with the concurrence of Taiwan's population). Indeed, it may take a long time. It may never happen.
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13-212/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 119; ANA VT96
	 At present, it is clearly in the mutual interest of both governments and peoples to practice "peaceful coexistence" and to seek a commonly acceptable way to develop China (Wu 1989:96). In the future, however, relations between the two sides may advance in one of two directions. Either they maintain the status quo while continuing their dispute over the path that China should eventually take, or they become less hostile and seek to improve relations through frequent exchanges and "peaceful coexistence." If the second direction is chosen, leaders on the two sides may slowly be persuaded to consider unification programs such as a Chinese economic community or a China federation. Given the historical and cultural ties between Taiwan and the mainland, reunification seems to be the most likely long-term option once political and ideological conflicts have been overcome.
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 13-213/RAMON MYERS, Sr. Fellow Hoover Inst.:., Stanford, 1994; p.12 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 After 1992, the long-term, divergent developmental trajectories of the PRC and ROC began to converge; the PRC is moving inexorably toward a new economic marketplace based on more hybrid organizational forms, and an embryonic ideological marketplace is slowly expanding. Even the Communist party is no longer like the Leninist organization of old except in organizational form. Most of its members are no longer strongly committed to building a socialist system, and some grope for a new ideological formula as to what the party's new objectives should be.
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13-214/Harry Harding, Senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan and Greater China," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.263; ANA VT96
	 The probability of Taiwan's inclusion in a politically re unified China is lowest of all. Unlike Hong Kong, whose fate was determined by the expiration of the lease of the New Territories in 1997, there is no deadline forcing Taiwan to return to Chinese sovereignty. Under present circumstances, a very small percentage of Taiwan's population would choose to accept the mainland's formula of "one country, two systems," or indeed to re unify with the mainland under any terms. The prospects for an independent Taiwan are therefore as great, if not greater, as the chances for a truly re unified China. If political reunification ever occurs, it is likely to be nominal, involving a confederal system rather than an unitary one. Indeed, it is increasingly likely that the unity of China will be expressed in economic and cultural interaction, rather than in political integration.
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 13-215/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p.28 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 This essay intends to show that, on the one hand and for a number of specific reasons which will be developed hereafter, the reunification of China appears today mostly improbable. Yet, on the other hand, full international recognition of two Chinas--the option Taipei calls a "win-win" situation--remains also very unlikely in the foreseeable future. Like the Korean case, the relationship across the Taiwan Strait shows that the collapse of the Soviet bloc has not put an end to the Cold War in Asia, or more generally to political and ideological rivalries which continue in other forms.
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13-216/Richard Bush, Staff Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Rep. with responsibility for East Asia, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's International Role: Implications for U.S. Policy," edited by Robert G. Sutter and W illi am R. Johnson, p. 302; ANA VT96
	 Prospects for the future, and for U.S. policy, seem to depend on the time-frame. In the short term, the critical factor is whether the Kuomintang, and in particular its new Taiwanese center, can maintain its hold on power. If it loses power in the 1995 elections and before China's remaining elders die, demands for Taiwanese nationhood may provoke the crisis that the United States has worked assiduously to avoid. If, on the other hand, the KMT can stay in power until the communist gerontocracy passes from the scene, then the key variable determining Taiwan's future becomes political change in the PRC. Whether the new leadership will be passively introverted or aggressively extroverted; whether it will be as nationalistic as its predecessors, cannot be predicted, and a dangerous scenario cannot be ruled out. Yet even if that occurs, Taiwan will not be the only actor at risk and the United States is probably more likely to see its interests threatened. Regarding more benign scenarios, the consequences for Taiwan seem to be an international role more of its own choosing, and one that is commensurate with the accomplishments of the island's people. For the United States, that would be a satisfactory dividend from its past policy.
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13-217/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 12O; ANA VT96
	 The PRC has held ada- mantly to the view that Taiwan is a province of China and has no right to estab- lish diplomatic relations with any foreign state. The ROC has clung to the position that it is the only legitimate government of China; it used to break diplomatic relations with states that established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Lee Teng-hui's "pragmatic diplomacy," however, marked a radical change in this policy. By establishing diplomatic relations with states that already had diplomatic relations with the PRC, the ROC implied that it would accept "dual recognition" and "dual representation." The PRC promptly "suspended" diplomatic relations with these states, withdrew its diplomatic missions, and condemned "dual recognition" as creating the unacceptable "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Thus, Taipei has made no progress toward a situation like that of Germany or Korea, in which many states had diplomatic relations with the governments of both parts of divided nations.
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13-218/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 139; ANA VT96
	 On April 30, 1991 Lee Teng-hui took a step with important implications for both domestic politics and cross-Strait relations. He announced the end of the "period of mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion," an emergency measure taken on the mainland in 1948. He also terminated the "temporary provisions effective during the period of communist rebellion," which suspended various provisions of the constitution and gave sweeping powers to the president. Lee told the press that the government would recognize the Beijing government as a political entity and would refer to it as "the mainland authorities" or "the Chinese Communist authorities." He expressed the hope that Beijing would respond positively to this action to improve cross-Strait relations, but he added, "If the Chinese Communists fail to abandon their threat to use force against us and continue to isolate us internationally, we can only treat it as a hostile political entity."
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13-219/Shia-ling Liu, Prof. of Political Science, Jan/Feb 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "Reunification of China: Ideological Perspectives," p. 40 ; CJJ VT96
	 The process of re unification should preferably be peaceful. However, the Chinese Communists have never renounced the use of force and instead have publicly sworn to use force under certain circumstances. One such circumstance is the emergence of a self-declared independent Taiwan, de facto or de jure. However, in recent years both sides have modified their earlier public vocal advocacy on the actual use of force as the only effective way of reunification under their respective ideology and system in favor of more subtle nonviolent political means.
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13-220/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U.S. State Dept., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Relations," edited by William T. Tow, p.255; THR VT96
	 We can eliminate from consideration the idea of forcible incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC. The PRC lacks the necessary air- and sea lift capacity for invasion; it would have to struggle hard to gain control of the air space in a conflict with Taiwan and might not be able to achieve it; and it would face a well-prepared and*' well-armed defender. Perhaps after six months or so of carnage, with casualties mounting to six figures, human-wave attacks could succeed. But that presumes that the rest of the world community would watch week after week and month after month of bloody struggle and take no action. Such international passivity would be most unlikely. Even aside from questions of morality and humanity, the principal industrial nations of the world are too involved with Taiwan economically to stand idly by.
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13-221/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U.S. State Dept., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Relations, edited by William T. Tow, p. 262; THR VT96
	 If the Soviet Union can drop its insistence that there must always be two separate German states, and that one of them must be communist, and agree to one noncommunist Germany within NATO, is it too far-fetched to believe that the United States could drop its continuing "acknowledgment" that there can only be one China, including Taiwan? Given a continuation of present trends, it is entirely possible that by the end of the 1990s a continued refusal to treat Taiwan as a full member of the world family of nations will have become so completely anomalous as to be no longer supportable on any ground. At that point, it will be up to the Republic of China to decide just what it intends to be.
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13-222/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 99; ANA VT96
	 Under present circumstances the current ROC leadership also argues there is nothing to gain and much to lose by declaring Taiwan independent. Neither the United States nor Japan would be likely to formally recognize the new state because of the damage it might do to their relations with the PRC. Certainly, the PRC would regard U.S. recognition of the new state as direct contravention of the spirit if not the letter of the Shanghai Communiqué. If the United States and Japan failed to recognize a newly independent Taiwan, it is unlikely many other countries would do so. Thus, the government argues that Taiwan would do little to improve its international position by declaring independence. In fact, it claims that such action could result in the termination of existing treaties and agreements between the ROC and other countries. Foreign governments might choose not to re negotiate current treaties and arrangements with the new government. In particular, the United States would be unlikely to negotiate a security treaty.
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13-223/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-2-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Meanwhile, Jiang claimed that Beijing cannot tolerate the independent trend and the "increasingly rampant activities" to support "one China, one Taiwan" idea in the island, which are the most obvious phenomena among younger generations in Taiwan. Jiang also attacked anonymous "hostile forces from abroad" for interfering in China's internal affairs.
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13-224/I Yuan, Assoc. Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "Cooperation under Anarchy? Paradoxes of the Intra- Chinese Rapprochement," p. 66; MDS VT96
	 As long as the United States adheres to the long-standing policy of avoiding implicit endorsement of either an independent status for Taiwan in the United Nations, or mainland China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, Taiwan's bid for a seat in the United Nations faces formidable barriers which need to be dealt with by coalition-building inside mainland China. Any attempt at independence could bring on a large-scale regional confrontation with mainland China which will only undermine Taiwan's stability and prosperity.
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13-225/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 99; ANA VT96
	 A declaration of independence by Taiwan might also be seen by the PRC as a challenge. It is argued that independence would discredit those within the PRC who have patiently worked toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. It would encourage the PRC to abandon its other alternatives and resort to the use of military force to gain possession of Taiwan. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the PRC has repeatedly refused to rule out such a possibility. The threat of Taiwanese independence, it is claimed, remains a deterrent to PRC military attack only so long as the threat is not carried out.
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13-226/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China arm/and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 97; ANA VT96
	 Just as the ROC government stakes its claim on the mainland as the true inheritor of Chinese heritage, the independence movement asserts its claim by reference to Taiwan's distinctive heritage. Paradoxically, the independence movement rejects (imperial) Chinese heritage and bases its position on the principle that Taiwan had its own distinct history and culture. The independence movement uses a multitude of geopolitical and historical arguments to support this principle.
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13-227/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 113; ANA VT96
	 Democratization was what the Taiwan Relations Act called for in Taiwan. It also made Taiwan more popular in the eyes of the world and deserving of its sovereignty and its right to choose whether it would be part of China or separate and independent. Establishing better relations with Beijing fit with the U.S. government's (that is, the executive branch) one-China policy and the desire to see the Taiwan issue resolved peacefully. Taiwan also had the TRA on its side--allowing it a policy of wait and see. That had to affect its relations with both Washington and Beijing.
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13-228 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Taiwan independence move, Japan rearmament linked; ACS VT96
	 Japan will be thrown into a rearmament dilemma should China react violently if Taiwan elects a government advocating independence from Beijing, a U.S. defense expert said Friday. ''If the Taiwanese electorate decides to repudiate the (one-China understanding) between Taiwan and Beijing, I believe that Beijing will not have any alternative, given the force of China's nationalism, but to react militarily,'' said Chas Freeman, former assistant defense secretary. He told the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Hong Kong, ''This (poses) a terrible dilemma for both the United States and Japan.''
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13-229 / Jen-kun FU, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 100; ANA VT96
	 Despite such changes in the domestic political situation in Taiwan, a declaration of independence would not be advisable except in three possible situations (Clough 1978:173): First, if the United States were to disengage from Taiwan to such an extent that the ROC had little to lose by declaring independence; second, if U.S. relations with the PRC deteriorated so seriously that the U.S. were no longer concerned about what effect recognition of an independent Taiwan had on PRC U.S. relations; third, if relations with the United States and Japan became so important to the PRC that its leaders believed they had to tolerate those nations' recognition of an independent state of Taiwan. It is possible, however, that a new leader could come to power and in the course of succession struggles proclaim independence as a means of mobilizing popular support without giving much thought to the international consequences of his act. Although none of these contingencies seem likely, in the near future all options need to be kept in mind by the United States, the PRC, and Japan as they formulate their policies toward Taiwan and toward each other.
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 13-230/ TYPE CITE & FIRST PART OF CARD development of the PRC, the ROC cannot afford to finance a gradual adjustment of both economies. This implies that it will be a long time before mainland Chinese citizens are permitted to travel freely or to emigrate to Taiwan (although some limited manpower quotas will probably be allowed for jobs now occupied by Southeast Asian employees.
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 13-231/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 36 ; ANA VT96
	 Taiwan's success in capitalizing upon exports to catalyze its economy not only produced dramatic and sustained economic growth, it also showed up in rising balance of payments surpluses. In part because Taiwan has recognized that its economy remains highly vulnerable to China's power to disrupt not only trade with the mainland but with Hong Kong and elsewhere, it has thus sought to build up its foreign exchange reserves as a cushion against possible disruption. It has managed its foreign exchange rate so as generally to undervalue its currency, with the parallel effect of heightening its export competitiveness. Reinforcing this objective, Taiwan has achieved an exceptionally high national savings rate--roughly 33 percent of GDP--which for long periods has been the highest or among the highest in the world? 'The current result is that Taiwan has now accumulated $88 billion, the world's second largest foreign exchange reserve. A current account surplus at a current annual rate of $8-10 billion in recent years brings substantial annual additions to this exchange reserve. While this reserve may in part also serve as backing for Taiwan's ambitious US$300 billion six-year infrastructure plans, it also puts Taiwan under considerable pressure, especially from the United States, to reduce trade restrictions and to appreciate its currency; its conspicuous magnitude is also a powerful spur for Taiwan to deploy its financial assets for other uses.
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13-232/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 100; ANA VT96
	 Academics, statesmen, and members of the media agree that Taiwan is a model of economic growth. Its growth, measured in increases in the gross national product over the last two decades or more, ranks Taiwan as the number one nation in the world in economic success. Moreover, Taiwan has performed this miracle without inflation, sector dislocation, or many other problems associated with rapid development. Most amazing to many is the fact that income disparity in Taiwan fell during this period of high growth and remains low compared to most nations in the world (lower than the U.S. or Japan).
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13-233/Dr. Hung Lien-te, Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of National Development National Taiwan Institute, Sept/Oct 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "Republic of China's Relations with Southeast Asia and ROC's South Bound Policy," p. 34 ; MDS VT96
	 Singapore and Brunei aside, with the remaining four countries (the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) of the ASEAN, the trend is for Taiwan to gradually take the place of Japan as the principal trade partner and investor in Southeast Asia.
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 12-234/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.38; ANA VT96
	 Measured by its economic size, Taiwan is hardly a towering force in East Asia, accounting for barely 3.5 percent of the region's GNP. Even so, it has used its small size to such excellent effect that it has proven capable, collaborating with other overseas Chinese, of challenging and equaling Japan within East Asia as a foreign investor and successful competitor in niches of some of the fastest-growing advanced technology sectors. Although only ninth in population among Asian economies (after Burma) with only 2 percent of the region's people, Taiwan ranks fourth in both total GNP and GNP per capita (sixth in both cases if Australia and Brunei are included in the comparison).
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 13-235/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.32; ANA VT96
	 With its rapid progression to ANIE status via annual growth averaging nearly 9 percent during the 1980s, Taiwan experienced the same forces eroding competitiveness in its low-end industries as had Japan before it, in common with Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong: rapidly rising wage, land, rent, infrastructure, and environmental costs. In spite of progressive erosion of its labor-intensive industries, it has continued to accumulate trade and foreign exchange surpluses, and has come under increasing pressure from the United States to moderate these surpluses through expanded imports and exchange rate adjustments. As it became a visible capital-surplus economy, it has also faced the necessity of becoming an actor in regional economic change rather than merely the stage on which change was enacted. It has become both a source of technical assistance and of direct as well as portfolio investment to numerous Asian neighbors.
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13-236 / Jen-Ku Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 81; ANA VT96
	 Since the 1960s the Republic of China's economic success has been prompted in part by sizable amounts of foreign investment from the United States, Japan, and European countries. This is clear in Table 5.1. This economic success has been crucial to the ROC's efforts to maintain substantive relations in at least two respects. First, the major industrialized countries have had ongoing economic interests in Taiwan. As a result international business interests have pushed for Taiwan's de facto status as an independent entity. Second, economic prosperity has allowed the ROC to dispatch agricultural, fishery, and other technical missions abroad to help less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The export of technology and expertise has given Taiwan a significant boost in its foreign relations with many developing nations.
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13-236a/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East As ian Development ," edit ed by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 29; ANA VT96
	 Considered broadly, however, Taiwan's decision to pursue an open economic policy subjected its own economy to the stimulus of trade competition and the challenges of foreign markets, and promoted inflows of foreign capital to supplement domestic sources of growth. The result has been to accelerate Taiwan's economic growth.
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13-237/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Tai wan's Economic Role in East As i an Development ," edit ed by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 62 ; ANA VT96
	 Resolution of Taiwan's Entry into GATT Membership. While Taiwan's accession to GATT is far from a done deal, the outline of an arrangement for Taiwan to become a member is said to be in place. (See also discussion of this subject in chapters by Samuel Kim and Ralph Clough.) If Taiwan is finally accepted, the pressures to accelerate liberalization of its economy would quickly take effect, and would probably force it to reduce restrictions directly aimed at Japanese competitors. The flip side is that Taiwan would then also enjoy the ability to appeal to the GATT regarding its trade complaints with Japan. Either way, GATT membership is likely to enhance Taiwan's relative importance in East Asian trade.
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 13-238/ RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p.12 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays on Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 As relations across the Taiwan Straits improve, the ROC modernization experience continues to exercise a powerful influence on intellectual and elite circles of the mainland. They now recognize that the KMT regime on Taiwan produced an economic and political miracle. Whether they give sufficient credit for that achievement to Sunist doctrine is another matter. Taiwan-style modernization is spreading slowly on the mainland. Its mature development will require more time, and there are bound to be differences in how the three new marketplaces take form. But that process now seems irreversible.
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13-239/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 148; ANA VT96
	 Economic decentralization in the PRC has contributed to the multiplication of ties between Taiwan and the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong in southeast China. Local officials have greater freedom than in the past to promulgate their own policies to promote trade and investment across the Strait. The existence of a freewheeling economy in Hong Kong to serve as an intermediary between Taiwan and the mainland facilitates activities by economically motivated business people from Taiwan and makes it more difficult for either the mainland or Taiwan authorities to control such activities for political reasons. Future trends in people-to-people relations across the Strait will depend in considerable measure on whether the present degree of decentraliza-tion is maintained and whether PRC leaders continue to promote vigorously the development of people-to-people relations.
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13-240/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 153 ; THR VT96
	 Taiwan has exerted an increasing influence on mainland China in recent years. Beijing's new "coastal development policy," announced in January 1988, is explicitly modeled on Taiwan's experience. The new move in Chinese economic reform toward turning state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies draws some of its inspiration from the success of the Taiwan model. In the political sphere, Chinese democrats have pointed to the reforms in Taiwan to argue that neither a Leninist party structure nor a Chinese cultural heritage is a bar to democratization, and that similar reforms in mainland China are overdue if China is to stop falling behind its smaller rival in the race to modernize. 
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13-241 / JAMES KYNGE, Reuters News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Taiwan's economic future in China, premier says" ACS VT96
	 But while Premier Lien highlighted the importance of China economically, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui slammed this island's giant neighbor for ``treacherous'' military designs. Speaking to a conference on China policy, Lien said: ``By 2000, the mainland will probably become our biggest trade partner and the most important region for investment, the major source of foreign exchange surpluses and the heartland for economic development.'' Some 25,000 Taiwan-funded enterprises, capitalised at between $10 billion and $20 billion, already operate in mainland China. They have no legal protection because China does not recognize Taiwan.
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13-242/Ralph N. Clough, Pro f. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 42 ; ANA VT96
	 Promotion of trade and investment between Taiwan and the mainland has been a major element in PRC policy toward Taiwan. It has both economic and political objectives. The capital, management skills, technology, and marketing know-how provided by business people from Taiwan have contributed to economic growth in China, particularly in the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. Investors from Taiwan have provided jobs and produced goods for export to hard-currency countries. Trade has been heavily imbalanced in favor of Taiwan, in part because the importation from mainland China of coal and oil, which Taiwan imports in large quantities from other sources, would require the government-owned Taiwan Power Company and China Petroleum Company to have contact with PRC officials, thus breaching the ROC's "three no's" policy. PRC officials criticize the trade imbalance, but recognize that it is largely offset by the influx of Taiwan capital for investment, expenditures by tourists from Taiwan, and gifts of money by visitors from Taiwan to their relatives. Furthermore, many of the imports from Taiwan consist of machinery for factories that are fully or partly owned by Taiwan investors; other imports are components or semi-finished products that are processed into exports to hard currency markets. 
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13-243/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-21-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 Agreement to Pave Way for Direct Trade [CND, 01/16/95] Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has drafted an agreement paving the way for direct trade and navigation with Mainland China, AFP reported from Taipei Monday. At the same time, Beijing has also set up an organization to deal with cross-strait shipping affairs, expected to oversee future direct maritime links with Taipei, Taiwan newspaper reported. It is thought that this agreement would be implemented around the end of the century. (Ming ZHANG, ZHAO Hua)
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13-244 / JAMES KYNGE, Reuters News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Taiwan's economic future in China, premier says" ACS VT96
	 Taiwan's economic future depends largely on its political archrival China, which by 2000 will become this island's biggest trade partner and a major source of funds, Taiwan Premier Lien Chan said Tuesday. His unusually upbeat remarks came days after Taiwan and China agreed to discuss at a key meeting in July a much needed legal protection package for Taiwan's burgeoning investments in China.
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13-245 / JAMES KYNGE, Reuters News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Taiwan's economic future in China, premier says" ACS VT96
	 The difference between Lien's [Taiwan Premier Lien Chan] remarks and President Lee's criticisms of Beijing illuminate the fact that while Taiwan grows closer to China on economic issues, it is still politically at odds with Beijing.
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13-246/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 168; ANA VT96
	 Economic links are the most important element making difficult a reversal of policy toward people-to-people relations by either government. The stakes of people on both sides of the Strait in these links are growing daily. The complementarity of the two economies provides a strong natural attraction. Although ROC officials worry over excessive dependence by Taiwan on the mainland, they no doubt recognize that dependence runs both ways.
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13-247/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 120; ANA VT96
	 There is no doubt that the Taiwan economic "miracle" has enhanced the ROC's geopolitical strength. The combination of Taiwan's strategic location and its economic power means that it will continue to maintain an important geopolitical position both in the region of East Asia and globally.
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13-248/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 107; ANA VT96
	 All of this has contributed significantly to Taiwan's status as a sovereign nation-state. Although it would be difficult to argue that those who wrote the TRA intended that these things happen, they clearly did seek to help Taiwan economically. Put another way, they wanted to preserve Taiwan's economic stability and growth, and the results were not unpredictable. They also sought to give Taiwan back its sovereignty. The economic provisions of the Act helped do that.
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 13-249/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East As ian Development, edit ed by Robert G. Sutter and Wi Iliam R. Johnson, p. 38; ANA VT96
	 Another significant factor is Taiwan's political motivation: 'By offering and in some cases subsidizing attractive trade and outward investment terms, as well as loans and bilateral agricultural and industrial technical aid programs to expand intra-Asian economic transactions, Taiwan has reduced its political isolation and built support vis-a-vis China. In 1992, "Taiwan continued to make progress in leveraging its commercial advantages to ease the political isolation imposed by the mainland. Breakthroughs in relations with Russia and upgrades in relations with its major trading partners have given the Taipei government a larger measure of international recognition than before."
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 13-249/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East As ian Development, edit ed by Robert G. Sutter and Wi Iliam R. Johnson, p. 34; ANA VT96
	Widely noted has been a growing "Asianization" of East Asian economic relationships, particularly since 1985. In part, the growing percentage shares of trade among east Asian countries is a direct function of the rapid growth of the region; if most of a country's trade partners in the region are growing faster than those in other regions, its trade and in turn their shares in its trade are naturally going to increase. Proximity, kinship, and Chinese networks are other factors, increasing the advantages of and preference for intra-Asian transactions.
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 13-251/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 120; ANA VT96
	The ROC and its trading partners, taking advantage of the PRC's declared willingness to tolerate economic relationships, have adopted the methods necessary to facilitate the expansion of those relations. Sometimes these methods verge on the official, only thinly disguised , as in U.S. -Taiwan relations. As Taiwan's economic importance has grown, its principal trading partners have permitted a rise in the status of Taiwan's representation on their territory and have raised the status of their own representative offices in Taiwan. Visa issuance has been simplified, and "unofficial" agreements of various kinds have been signed in order to facilitate trade and investment. Senior officials, sometimes even cabinet ministers, visit back and forth, under the guise of "private" or unofficial visits. The ROC not only seeks the expansion of such substantial relations, but where possible tries to invest them with a sheen of officiality as a means of confirming its status as de facto sovereign state. The PRC has been unable to check this creeping rise in the officiality of Taiwan's international relations. Each step is a minor and low-profile and can be labeled "unofficial" by the state concerned should the PRC protest.
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13-252/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 81; ANA VT96
	Clearly Taiwan has made remarkable progress in the realm of substantive relations, particularly global economic, trade, and foreign assistance. Most scholars who have written on Taiwan's "total diplomacy" agree that the ROC has used this strategy to maximum advantage (Mendel 1970; Bellows 1976). Together with its efforts to promote relations with "mini-states" and to retain its place in international institutions, this strategy has maintained a degree of legitimacy for the idea of the ROC as a state. Nonetheless, it is still uncertain that these strategies have been enough to counteract the mainland's strategy of diplomatic isolation.
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13-253/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 103; ANA VT96
	 L Economic growth also gave rise to a sense of nationhood and nationalism in Taiwan. Economic accomplishment has been a source of pride for Taiwan's citizens. That Taiwan is now number one in the world in economic growth is known to most of the population. Most of them thus perceived Taiwan as a nation; many feel it is a model nation. Economic growth also made citizens of Taiwan much more aware of events abroad.
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 13-254/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 188; ANA VT96
	 'The spreading economic linkage between the two sides of the Strait is the firmest barrier to a return to the level of hostility that existed before 1987. As of early 1992 trade was continuing to increase and the trend in investments from Taiwan was toward larger amounts, higher technology, and diversification to other parts of China than Fujian and Guangdong. So long as the PRC pursues a policy of modernization through economic reform and opening to the outside, the possibility is small that it would take steps with serious adverse effects on Taiwan's mainland trade and investment. Taiwan's business people, even though somewhat restrained by worried ROC officials, will continue to discover opportunities to make profits through mainland trade and investment. Individual enterprises on both sides of the Strait are becoming more tightly connected as they depend increasingly on each other for supplies of raw materials or partially manufactured goods.
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 13-255/ Hsin-hsing Wu, National Cheng-kung Univ., Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p.51,"The political economy of ROC-PRC relations;" MDS VT96
	 In terms of political economy, ROC-PRC relations are quite subtle and complex. Increasingly frequent economic exchanges seem to have nothing to do with politics and certainly have not led--and will not lead in the foreseeable future--to political integration.
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 13-256/ Hsin-hsing Wu, National Cheng-kung Univ., Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 57 ,"The political economy of ROC-PRC relations;" MDS VT96
	 For the sake of its economy, Taipei has little choice but to adopt a pragmatic approach to economic exchanges with Beijing while maintaining a principled stance politically.'7 After all, Taipei, like the rest of the world, cannot afford to ignore mainland China's potential economic power. The Taiwan business community is well aware that after three decades of reliance on the United States, Taiwan's economy is likely to be dependent on the mainland for the next thirty years.
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 13-257/ Hsin-hsing Wu, National Cheng-kung Univ., Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 60 ,"The political economy of ROC-PRC relations;" MDS VT96
	 How should we construe this discrepancy between cross-Strait economic and political relations? The only explanation is that the relationship is governed by a combination of economic pragmatism and political nationalism. In the interests of economic development, the two Chinese governments are willing to put their political differences to one side, as long as these differences are kept in check (opposition calls for independence are one thing, an actual declaration of independence would be another). Differences are smoothed over by the two sides in order to maintain political and social stability within Taiwan and prevent any upsets in their economic relations which, in the long run, could hamper progress toward political integration.
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 13-258/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 27 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 . The dramatic development of nonofficial relations across the Taiwan Strait has not promoted the reunification cause either; it has only prompted the two sides to open a channel of communication for solving practical problems. Negotiations through this channel will probably favor a gradual normalization of relations between the two Chinese states, but any talks on reunification are unthinkable under present circumstances. Although the PRC is much larger and more populous than Taiwan, economic, political, and military weaknesses make it impossible for Beijing to force its unification formula on Taiwan in the foreseeable future. But Taiwan also has vulnerable points which will probably prevent it from taking advantage of the PRC's weaknesses.
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13-259/Ral ph N. Clough, Pro f. l ect urer and coordinat or o f t he SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 144; ANA VT96
	 Trade and investment became an increasingly important aspect of people-to-people contacts. These activities not only made a valuable contribution to the economic development of the mainland but also created a growing body of influential individuals in Taiwan with a stake in preserving and expanding cross-Strait economic links. Moreover, if Taiwan became sufficiently dependent on mainland trade and investment, these economic links could be useful instruments for exerting political leverage. People-to-people interchange provided an arena for trying to maneuver the Taiwan authorities away from their "no contact, no negotiation, no compromise" position. Problems arising from people-to-people contacts, such as trade disputes, illegal immigration, and piracy, were difficult to resolve without agreement between officials of the two sides on methods of resolution. The ROC sought to avoid official contact by setting up the quasi-official SER, authorized to negotiate with PRC officials on specific problems, while the PRC sought to nudge the ROC toward at least low-level official contacts, such as between law enforcement officials on both sides.
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 13-260/ Hsin-hsing Wu, National Cheng-kung Univ., Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 60 ,"The political economy of ROC-PRC relations;" MDS VT96
	 It is possible, then, that Beijing .will gradually gain the upper hand in dealing with Taiwan, provided that post-Deng mainland China is stable and peaceful. The ROC should keep this scenario in mind as it develops its economic ties with the PRC. If it overlooks the connotations and force of political nationalism, economic pragmatism could turn into a Trojan Horse which will help the PRC swallow up Taiwan. Of course, if the ROC could succeed in "peacefully evolving" the Chinese mainland, the story would certainly be different.
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13-261/Charlotte Ku, Deputy executive director of the American Society of International Law in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Commentary," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 182; ANA VT96
	 Driven by the newly discovered possibilities of economic prosperity, segments of China are exerting pressure on the government to continue its opening in the economic area. Since Beijing is pursuing a policy of economic development, and with bilateral trade between Taiwan and the mainland now worth $7.4 billion, it would seem difficult to resist this pressure, even if it means closer relations with Taiwan. Taiwan's economic strength serves as a magnet that has moderated Beijing's campaign to delegitimize Taiwan. The view among the new mainland entrepreneurs is that politics should not stand in the way of market forces and economic development. Taiwan's needs for cheaper labor and new markets also create incentives for it to pursue economic relations with the mainland.
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13-262/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p.122; ANA VT96
	 In the continuing contest between the two governments in the international arena, the ROC probably will be able to further expand and strengthen its substantive relations and edge them toward greater officiality, as Taiwan's growing economic weight in the world convinces its trading partners of the necessity of doing so. Further strengthening of Taiwan's international position is necessary to facilitate economic relationships, to respond to domestic criticism, and ultimately to enter into official negotiations with the PRC in as strong a position as possible.
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13-263/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins Univ., 1994; TAlWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan-PRC Relations," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.227; ANA VT96
	 Economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, the United States and the PRC, and Taiwan and the PRC affect each other. Since the mid-1960s the United States has been Taiwan's most important export market, in 1984 taking 49 percent of Taiwan's exports. By 1991, however, the U.S. share had fallen to 29 percent? An important reason for the change was that Taiwan's manufacturers of labor-intensive products had shifted much of their production to mainland China, causing a sizable increase in Taiwan's exports to the mainland of machinery, components, and raw materials for industrial use. The manufactured products formerly shipped from Taiwan to the United States were now shipped from mainland China, causing a sharp decline in Taiwan's trade surplus with the United States and contributing to the rapid increase in the U.S. trade deficit with the PRC. The growth in this triangular trade would be checked or even reversed if President Clinton were to refuse to extend the most-favored-nation status of the PRC's exports.
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13-264/David Shambaugh, Ph.D. Political Science, 1991; BEAUTIFUL IMPERIALIST: CHINA PERCEIVES AMERICA, 1972-1990, p.229; THR VT96
	 With the important exception of Taiwan, the Marxists do not write much about the penetration of American monopoly capital into Asia. However, they point to Taiwan as a case par excellence of American monopoly capital governing foreign policy. Many analyses point to the long-standing links between caituan and the "Taiwan lobby" (Taiwan bang). As one analysis in Shijie zhishi succinctly put it: The activities of the "Taiwan lobby" actually reflect the interests of certain U.S. monopoly groups that have close ties with Taiwan. The United States exploits the people of Taiwan by direct private investment, Import and Export Bank loans, trade, and other methods .... The U.S. monopoly groups reap huge profits from Taiwan every year, and they are unwilling to let Taiwan, their place of investment and commodity market, go easily. Other analyses claim that U.S. monopoly capital "controls" (kongzhi) Taiwan and that the Taiwan Relations Act passed in the wake of normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic was a means to continue such control. According to a study published in the classified journal Internal Reference Materials on Worm Economics and Politics, continued American arms sales to Taiwan are an example of the "influence" (yingxiang) that the "West Coast war industries have over President Reagan and the White House.
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13-265/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the, Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. l; ANA VT96
	 Despitc this economic success, the ability of Taiwan to translate its economic importance into a stronger power position within Asia, and ,to enhance its military, political, and economic security, has remained highly contingent upon the vagaries of Sino-American-Soviet relations. In particular. Taiwan's status[us and relative power position has shifted with the changing character of American geopolitical thinking about Asia and the Western Pacific, especially the changing nature of PRC-U.S. relations. Finally, in the wider context of a changing world economy, Taiwan has re- mained highly vulnerable to shifts in global trade and investment patterns and to vacillations in the trade policies of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. 
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 13-266/Ral ph N. Clough, Pro f. l ect urer and coordinat or o f t he SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 189; ANA VT96
	 As Taiwan's industry becomes increasingly internationalized, any action by the PRC that reduces or interrupts Taiwan's economic relations with the mainland will have repercussions far beyond Taiwan. Foreign-invested enterprises in Taiwan are beginning to show interest in investing in or trading with the mainland. For example, Logitech, Taiwan's largest computer mouse manufacturer, the subsidiary of a Swiss firm, is planning to set up a computer mouse manufacturing plant in Shanghai to supply the China mainland market. Some of the companies heavily engaged in exporting to the mainland, such as those in the motorcycle industry, are joint ventures with Japanese companies or dependent on Japan for key components. Thus, many foreign companies, including American companies, have an interest in the success of Taiwan's mainland trade and investment. 
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 13-267/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.51 ; ANA VT96
	 Growing roughly in parallel with its trade surplus with the United States is Taiwan's trade deficit with Japan. U.S. pressures on Taiwan to reduce its surplus with the United States brought to a head Taiwan's frustrations over its inability to get better access to the Japanese market. In June 1990 Taiwan introduced a number of tough trade measures designed to force Japan's hand, with .rather limited results to date. Among other things, officials identified some 238 products where dependence on Japan exceeded 90 percent, and urged companies to seek non-Japanese sources. This trade imbalance will continue to irritate relations and may undermine the potential for a broader partnership. 
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13-268/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 117; ANA VT96
	 .Moreover, Vietnam has proved to be a convenient transshipment point for goods produced in Taiwan and destined for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Vietnam has extensive air and sea links with the former Soviet Union. Some manufacturers in Taiwan have even set up factories in Vietnam using machinery obsolete in Taiwan to produce goods for export to Eastern Europe.
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13-269/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development, edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 29 ; ANA VT96
	 Some respects in which Taiwan restricts trade and investment relate closely to its concerns to avoid excessive dependence on China and undue Japanese economic influence or dominance, but to little avail. For example, Japanese investments in Taiwan are activated much more by cost-push in Japan--and Japan's need to move production of more labor-intensive components and products to lower-wage economies--than by demand-pull (to supply the needs of Taiwan's economy). As cost pressures on Japan's economy grew after the sharp yen appreciation following the Plaza Accord of September 1985, Japanese investment assumed growing importance in Taiwan.
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13-270/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC,' 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development, edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 29; ANA VT96
	 In some Taiwanese circles, concern has grown that Taiwan increasingly has come to produce "things that fit the global strategies of those big Japanese multinationals" and that "Japanese multinationals are swallowing up Taiwan little by little.'' The prospect of Taiwan's accession to the GATT raises further apprehension that Japan may be the primary beneficiary since it is in practice the most affected by Taiwan's restrictions on trade and investment.
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13-271/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East. Asian Development, edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 64; ANA VT96
	 Some observers see other reasons that harder times are on the way, noting as one of these that Taiwan may be second only to Russia in damaging its environment in ways that could require many tens or hundreds of billions of dollars to remedy. Moreover, implementation of its US$300 billion infrastructure plans, which includes some funding for environmental repair, is expected to require increased taxes and government borrowing, and to reduce national savings. It is not clear that the' magnitude of these changes will do more than reduce in absolute terms Taiwan's large margin of advantage in economic leverage, leaving its relative strength little changed as other economies in the region face similar or even greater difficulties. As if in confirmation of such dimmed prospects, there have been recent reports that Taiwan decided to delay implementation of a number of such infrastructure projects.
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13-272/Harlan W. Jencks, Research associate with the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Cal i fornia-Berkeley, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 100; ANA VT96
	 Reflecting the increased capability of the ROC armed forces and the primacy of the "situational deterrent," the emphasis of Taipei's activities in the international arms market has shifted from military readiness to political-strategic deterrence and to the broader goals of diplomatic legitimacy. This set of policies has served Taiwan well in the 1980s and early 1990s, but the current highly favorable circumstances will not last. Taiwan's evolving democracy will complicate matters. Opposition politicians will demand still more open weapons acquisition procedures, which may increase the fairness of domestic business, but will make it much harder to manipulate the international arms market through secret negotiations. As in other industrialized democracies, opposition politicians and the free press will insist upon more technology transfers, coproduction deals, and offset arrangements--not only out of economic need, but also from nationalistic pride. 
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13-273/Harlan W. Jencks, Research associate with the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market ," edited by Robert G. Sutter and W illi am R. Johnson, p. 95; ANA VT96
	 To date, Taiwan has been a somewhat atypical buyer in the international arms market, and consequently a particularly attractive one. Taipei generally has not demanded the offsets and technology transfers demanded by most countries. Moreover, it recently has been able to offer aid, loans, and "reverse offsets" in the form of access to the Taiwan market--especially to the lucrative contracts and package deals involved with its ongoing National Infrastructure Program. In part, it makes these concessions because its primary goals in the arms market are neither military, technological, nor economic, but political. In addition to weapons and technologies, Taiwan enters the arms market seeking friends, influence, and international legitimacy--all of which provide "situational deterrence."
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13-274/Harlan W. Jencks, Research associate with the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Cal i fornia-Berkeley, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 79;ANA VT96
	 Recent ROC arms purchases have been more important "politically]/' (e.g., improving Taiwan's international contacts and influence) than militarily. That helps explain why Taiwan is simultaneously negotiating for fighter planes from the United States, France, and Israel; frigates from the United States, France, and Germany; and submarines from Germany and Holland. In purely military terms, the training and logistical complications of military equipment from so many different countries cause inefficiency. It is strategically advantageous, however, to be purchasing state-of-the-art equipment in as many different countries as possible. 
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13-275 / VLADIMIR FEDORUK ITAR-TASS CORRESPONDENTThe Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union TASS February 17, 1994, HEADLINE: CHINA WARNS UNITED STATES ON ARMS SALE TO TAIWAN //MDS-VT96
	 BY ACCORDING THAT "ACT" MORE IMPORTANCE THAN THE US-CHINESE COMMUNIQUE, THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO LEGALIZE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE FIRMLY PROTEST SUCH ATTEMPTS, THE OFFICIAL SAID. 
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13-276 / Agence France Presse September 4, 1993 HEADLINE: China protests new U.S. arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 The United States decided last year to sell 150 advanced F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province. At the time, China threatened to retaliate over the F-16 deal, but has not done so. The new protest added further tension to a relationship that is already under increasing strain. 
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13-277 / Japan Economic Newswire SEPTEMBER 4, 1993, HEADLINE: China protests U.S. arms sales to Taiwan//MDS-VT96
	 'The U.S. conduct of supplying large amounts of up-to-date advanced weapons and military technology to Taiwan has seriously violated the August 17 Communique of 1982 on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and grossly interfered with China's internal affairs,' the Xinhua report said. 
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13-278 / Agence France Presse July 20, 1993 HEADLINE: U.S. Senate panel votes to lift limit on arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 WASHINGTON, July 20 (AFP) - A Senate panel has voted to lift a limit on arms sales to Taiwan established in an agreement with China 11 years ago. China is likely to be disturbed by the measure since Beijing claims Taiwan as part of its territory. Defense analysts estimated that lifting the limit would mean hundreds of millions of additional U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan annually. 
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13-279 / Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "U.S. misperceptions lead to disputes: Asia Society head" ACS VT96
	 Regarding China, Levin [Burton Levin, director of the Asia Society in Hong Kong] said the U.S. press had a remarkably short memory in failing to make connections between, for example, U.S. sales of F-16s to Taiwan and Chinese sales of missiles to Pakistan.
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13-280 / Aerospace Daily February 4, 1994Vol. 169, No. 24; Pg. 186 HEADLINE: Move is on to break the logjam in arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 Asked to describe his understanding of limitations on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Pell replied that arms sales are limited to maintaining Taiwan's defensive needs. He said there were two factors to be considered: Taiwan's defensive needs and China's intentions toward Taiwan. 
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13-281 / Central News Agency January 14, 1994, HEADLINE: HALT OF FRENCH ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN SAID 'UNINTELLIGENT' //MDS-VT96
	 Quoting former PM Michel Rocard, the paper said the United States sold arms to both mainland China and Taiwan with impunity. "The essential issue is preserving world peace. China must be kept under some constraint to move towards democracy and be prevented from one day having a go at Taiwan," Rocard said. "The big Chinese cat could very easily use its paw against the little Taiwanese mouse unless it is able to hit back painfully," he added. 
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13-282/Harlan W. Jencks, Research associate with the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.99 ;ANA VT96
	 Taiwan's military forces are modernizing rapidly with weapons and equipment that are imported and others that are domestically manufactured using imported technology. ROC leaders are adroitly using the current international "buyer's market" to acquire these weapons and technologies, diversifying their overseas sources and increasing Taiwan's military-industrial self-sufficiency. More importantly, arms market activity is integral to Taipei's "flexible diplomacy"--the use of its economic clout as a diplomatic tool. A web of relationships and situations--including arms transactions-constitute a political-economic "situational deterrent," which renders military attack by the PRC increasingly unlikely. 
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 13-283/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins Univ., 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan-PRC Relations," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p.227; ANA VT96
	 Since 1950 Taiwan has relied on the United States for its security against the PRC's threat of military force to reunify Taiwan with mainland China. Even though the mutual defense treaty was abrogated by the United States in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States to supply defensive weapons to Taiwan and declares that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would be of grave concern to the United States. Restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan agreed to between the United States and the PRC in August 1982 have not prevented the United States from supplying weapons needed for a strong defense of Taiwan, as demonstrated by President Bush's approval of the F-16 sale in September 1992. Although Beijing denounced the U.S. sale as a violation of the 1982joint communique, it did not criticize Taiwan's authorities for having bought the weapons. The sale seems to have had no significant adverse effect on the continuing expansion of people-to-people relations between Taiwan and mainland China. On the contrary, Taiwan's demonstrated ability to acquire advanced weapons contributes to a feeling of confidence on the part of the authorities there that helps them work toward a sustainable state of peaceful coexistence with their giant neighbor. 
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13-284 / Aerospace Daily February 4, 1994Vol. 169, No. 24; Pg. 186 HEADLINE: Move is on to break the logjam in arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 A prospective $ 2.5 billion sale of frigates to Taiwan was lost when Taiwan apparently got tired of the wait and turned to France as its supplier. 
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13-285 / Agence France Presse July 20, 1993 HEADLINE: U.S. Senate panel votes to lift limit on arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 U.S. defense contractors have complained that the agreement has not prevented Taiwan from buying weapons but has prevented Taiwan from buying U.S. weapons. France has become a primary supplier. 
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13-286 / Defense Daily September 13, 1993 Vol. 180 ; No. 51 ; Pg. 400; ISSN: 0889-0404 HEADLINE: Taiwan, Korea, Turkey request $ 314 million in arms sales. //MDS-VT96
	 In addition to the AMRAAMs, worth an estimated $ 47 million, Taiwan has requested logistics and support equipment for a $ 175 million Modified Air Defense System, which replaces a Nike/Hercules system, DoD said. South Korea has also requested spare parts to support F-4, F-5, T-37, C-130, and F-16 aircraft and the AN/FPS-117 radar and the AN/FRN-45 TACAN navigation system. Its request is worth an estimated $ 92 million. 
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13-287 / Aerospace Daily February 4, 1994Vol. 169, No. 24; Pg. 186 HEADLINE: Move is on to break the logjam in arms sales to Taiwan //MDS-VT96
	 Remember the F-16 sale to Taiwan that President Bush announced in the heat of his presidential campaign in October 1992? It's still awaiting an export license. 
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13-288/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUtLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 23; CJJ VT96
	 When Bush announced the sale of F-16AB fighter jets to Taiwan, many regarded this as his administration's ploy to counter-balance Communist China. Others saw the proposed military sale as a two-China scheme engineered by James Liley in the Pentagon. For their part, the Chinese Communists loathe James Liley as a supporter of Taiwan independence movement. As for myself, I am aware Bush approved the sale of 150 F-I6AB fighters to the Republic of China mainly for economic recession at home and to please his constituents in the state of Texas. 
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 13-289 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 2-2-95, News Global; ACS VT96
	 Jiang Zemin, China's President and the General-Secretary of the party, in his speech entitled "Continuing to Promote Reunification" cited by Central Television and Broadcasting Station, vowed that China will not use force against "compatriot" Taiwanese "people", a conciliatory message heard from Beijing for the first time in 45 years.
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13-290/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p.44 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 This brings us to another question: Are the advantages the PRC hopes to gain--the acceptance by Taiwan of its unification plan-worth the military, economic, and political price of such an undertaking? Though it is clear that Taiwan cannot win a war against mainland China, we can assume that the damage it can inflict on the PLA would probably deter Beijing from taking such an initiative.More generally, the CCP is in a quandary: it can either stick to its opening-up policy and continue to concentrate its efforts on economic development with the assistance of the West and Japan--in which case it cannot adopt an aggressive and threatening attitude toward the outside world and its immediate environment--or it can opt to rely more on its growing military strength to achieve some international goals but as a result jeopardize its relations not only with the West but with most of its neighbors, including Russia.
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 13-291/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 44 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 For all these reasons, although the PRC will continue to improve gradually its force projection capability and will probably keep up pressure on the ROC with threatening statements (though less frequent since 1992) and military gestures (in spite of "trust-building" withdrawal of military units from Fujian), any use by Beijing of its military fist against Taiwan remains unlikely.
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13-292/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 88; ANA VT96
	 There are additional reasons why invasion may not be in the mainland's best interest. First, the PRC's four modernization initiatives would be severely disrupted should the mainland launch an offensive. Second, an offensive would damage Hong Kong's economy, which operates on the principle of confidence. Third, a military takeover would alienate the people of Taiwan, and without their cooperation nation-building would be extremely difficult. Fourth, the PRC would gain little from Taiwan if the economy and infrastructure were destroyed in any military takeover. And finally, a full-scale assault would raise antimainland feelings in the United States even if not a direct military response. For all these reasons the PRC has no rational reason for full/-scale assault on Taiwan.
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 13-293/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 41 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 First of all, the PRC would probably not use its nuclear force against what it considers to be pan of the motherland (besides, it has a propaganda commitment not to use nuclear arms first or against nonnuclear states). 
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13-294/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 148; VT96
	 In counterpoint, Chinese leaders (including all factions) say China does not want Taiwan destroyed. Furthermore, they have promised (though not in writing or formally) not to use nuclear weapons against Taiwan. Thus, a nuclear attack on Taiwan does not appear highly probable.
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13-295 / Washington Post, February 05, 1995, A Section; Pg. A01, HEADLINE: American-Chinese Relations Worsen; Transition Makes Beijing Less Responsive; ACS VT96
	 "One has to take seriously the threat that if Taiwan declared independence, the mainland could invade," another official said. Last year, China sent Taiwan a signal by holding unusually large military exercises close to Taiwan, and even practiced landing on nearby islands, the official added.
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13-296 / ROBERT A. KAPP, The China Business Review, January, 1995 ; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: New year, old story; US-Chinese relations; ACS VT96
	 Whether Taiwan's own policies will draw Congress into the fray remains to be seen. In a worst-care scenario, Taiwan politicians, driven principally by internal demands from an increasingly successful opposition party, would declare independence from the mainland, prompting a military reaction from the PRC. Obviously, this would be an extreme case; but the fact that it is a plausible scenario reinforces the necessity of maintaining a delicate balance in the relationships among the United States, Taiwan, and China.
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13-297/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; Taiwan AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 84; ANA VT96
	 The People's Republic of China has six options for military action against Taiwan: (1) military exercises in the Taiwan Strait including a display of nuclear force capability; (2) shelling of Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu islands; (3) a naval blockade of the Taiwan Strait; (4) takeover of Penghu Island and isolation of Quemoy, Matsu, and Taiwan; (5) a single massive offensive against Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu islands; and (6) an offensive against Matsu and Quemoy, followed by an attack on Taiwan.
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13-298/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 147; ANA VT96
	 The worst-case scenario for' Taiwan is an armed attack by Beijing. Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders in Beijing have stated repeatedly that China will attack Taiwan under certain circumstances. Moreover, considering the fact that the People's Republic of China has experienced frequent political instability during its short history and even quite recently (during Secretary-General Hu Yaobang's fall from power in 1987, and during the massacre of students and the purge of Hu's successor Zhao Ziyang in 1989), the use of military force against Taiwan cannot be ruled out.
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 13-299/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 155; THR VT96
	 Lending color to these concerns, Deng has unwaveringly maintained the second prong of his strategy, which is the threat of military force if Taiwan declares independence, obtains nuclear weapons, suffers from domestic insurrection, is subjected to foreign military intervention, or delays reunification beyond Beijing's abil- ity to be patient. The CCP leaders have been challenged over and over again, by the U.S., by overseas Chinese journalists, and by the leaders of Taiwan to abandon this threat, and they have always refused.
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 13-300/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 148; ANA VT96
	 The PRC's refusal to renounce the use of military force cuts two ways, On the one hand, it preserves the ultimate weapon as a deterrent to a formal decla- ration of independence. On the other hand, it serves as a justification for the ROC to maintain strong military forces, to refuse to negotiate under the threat of force, and to maintain skepticism and suspicion among the people of Taiwan as to PRC objectives. The growing people-to-people links create interest groups on both sides of the Strait with a stake in preserving peace in the area that increases daily. The stronger such ties become, the less credible is Beijing's threat that it might resort to force.
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 13-301/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 128; ANA VT96
	 Threat of Force. PRC authorities have time and again declared that they might under certain conditions be compelled to use force to unify Taiwan with the mainland. When tension was high between Beijing and Moscow, they warned that the development of ties between Taiwan and the Soviet Union could trigger the use of force. When they were worried that the death of Chiang Ching-kuo might produce chaos in Taiwan, they cautioned that the People's Liberation Army might have to intervene to restore order. Occasionally, a PRC leader has stated that prolonged failure to resolve the reunification issue would lead to the use of force.4 The most frequently cited circumstance, however, in which the PRC authorities have declared that they would resort to force is a declaration of independence by Taiwan.
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13-302/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 148; ANA VT96
	 Certainly a more likely scenario, and one Beijing has literally promised (if Taipei refuses to negotiate), is a conventional assault. This would take the form of Beijing's military forces first attempting to destroy the Republic of China Air Force and Navy. Then it would launch large numbers of small boats carrying soldiers, together with landing craft. In this event the U.S. would surely have considerable warning. While China has a considerable portion of its forces in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, it would have to assemble them and make special preparations for such an' attack. This could not be done without U.S. knowledge. U.S. threats or actions could probably delay or stop such an operation. Putting the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait would doubtless have a sobering effect on the Chinese military leaders and/or the party's left. The defense provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act would justify such action; most, in fact, would interpret the TRA to require it. The U.S. is also obligated to maintain its military forces in the area to uphold the TRA. They must be there for a reason. Moral justification would be the saving of two million or more lives that might be lost during such an invasion. The U.S. would also be justified politically--inasmuch as such an action by Beijing would undermine the goodwill it has built in the U.S., not to mention the anti-Soviet basis of U.S.-Chinese relations (in that Beijing would expend much of its military capabilities in such a situation and would not be able to act as a counterweight to Soviet military expansion in the region). Congress would most likely invoke the TRA, with the support of public opinion..
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13-303/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 145; ANA VT96
	 DEng may feel that Taiwan needs to be recovered in the long run--that it is Chinese territory and should not be permanently forsaken. He may not see it as a problem relevant 10 himself; he will not live long enough 10 see the day when that should be done. But he wants to ensure that another nation, namely the Soviet Union or Japan, does not get Taiwan. Thus he may use force ifTaiwan allows another country military bases there. Such bases could indeed threaten China and would affect any desire it has to project its military power and become a regional actor in the future. 
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 13-304/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 128; ANA VT96
	 ROC authorities have called the threat of force a major obstacle to entering into negotiations on reunification. Prominent visitors to Beijing from Taiwan have frequently raised this issue with high-level PRC officials. The latter have taken the position that no sovereign government could give up the right to use military force within its own territory, but in recent years they have tried to soften the adverse impact of the threat in Taiwan by asserting that it is not aimed at the people of Taiwan, but at foreign countries. Yang Shangkun asserted that Taiwan's position was untenable internationally, as Taiwan had no status in international law. "There is a danger of its being taken over by others," he said; "thus, we cannot promise to forego the use of military force in order to prevent Taiwan splitting off from China. This doesn't mean we intend to attack Taiwan. The Taiwan people are our compatriots. How can we attack our compatriots? Our possible use of military force is mainly aimed at foreign countries, countries which want to take Taiwan away from China." Yang also pointed out that the PRC had cut down the size of the People's Liberation Army by 1 million and had abolished the Fuzhou Military Region Command. If the mainland planned to use force, Yang said, it would have to deploy in Fujian "two to three, or even ten times" the number of forces presently deployed there. 
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 13-305/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 42, ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	First, are the PLA Navy and Air Force capable of imposing such a blockade on Taiwan? The PLA's 18 destroyers and 38 frigates are out of date by modern naval standards and are not so very superior in number to the ROC's principal surface combatants (22 destroyers and 11 frigates, not counting the 6 French-made Lafayette frigates now on order). Besides, most of the PLA Navy's 47 operational submarines have not yet been upgraded and can easily be detected by the ROC Navy? The PLA Air Force is also twenty years out of date. Most of its aircraft are outdated MiG-19 type J-6s (around 3,000). True, since the beginning of the 19905, the PRC has purchased 24 SU-27 aircraft from Russia (delivery started in 1993) and may obtain a further 48 by the end of the decade. Some reports indicate that it will manufacture around 300 MiG-31 aircraft under license. But these efforts will be compensated by the ROC's acquisition of 150 American F-16s and 60 French Mirages (delivery will start in 1996). Thus, after 1996, the PLA Air Force will have great difficulty achieving air superiority over the Strait in the event of a blockade of Taiwan.
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 13-306/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 41 ,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 The third weakness is a military one. Of course, any comparison of the PRC and the ROC armies in terms of size {3 million soldiers against 442,000, 9,200 tanks against 539, 5,830 combat aircraft against/A- ) 516, and 56 principal surface ships against 33) incites the observer to jump to the conclusion that the Nationalist forces have little chance of resisting any attack launched by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) or any blockade installed by the PLA Navy. Moreover, the PRC possesses nuclear arms and the ROC probably does not.
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 13-307/Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Commentary, edited by Robert G. Sutter and WiIIiam R. Johnson, p. 103; ANA VT96
	 In effect Taiwan had a window within which it could take steps to develop new military capabilities that would enable it to maintain its overall deterrent. Political, economic, diplomatic, and other means would be used to garner broad external support and reduce the likelihood of military conflict. Implementing this aspect of the strategy required that Taipei immediately take all steps necessary to redress the perceived imbalances and asymmetries in its military force structure. That process began in the 1980s and continues to develop through the present day. In response to this challenge, Taiwan's authorities immediately implemented new plans for upgrading equipment, increased the pace and scope of other programs that were already in place, and laid plans for acquiring new systems, either by outright purchase or by development in Taiwan. The ground forces focused upon improvement and modernization programs involving tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. In most cases, this involved upgrading equipment already in place rather than developing or acquiring new systems. The ground forces component of the force improvement program was largely completed by the late 1980s, essentially with the United States as the major external source of support. 
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13-308/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.427; THR VT96
	 Should the mainland be tempted to use force against Taiwan (as it has long maintained it will if there is any movement toward independence), Taiwan's forces could inflict heavy losses if not repel the attack. Taiwan's antisubmarine warfare capability appears sufficient to cope with a submarine blockade, and its new class of 4,200-ton frigates armed withHarpoon antiship missiles (recently purchased. from the United States) could most likely break a surface blockade. Nonetheless, a naval blockade (whether submarine and/or surface) would undoubtedly undermine confidence on the island and among commercial shippers. (The Democratic Peoples' Party on Taiwan has recently softened its stance on independence to take account of this possibility.)
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 13-309/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 85; ANA VT96
	 It is clear that the PRC has considerable capability for conducting large-scale military exercises at sea and in the air as well as amphibious assaults (Marks 1989). However, at the present time the ROC military is capable only of performing exercises for national defense. The ROC is greatly outnumbered in army, navy, and air forces. Of Taiwan's total army troops of 290,000, some 55,000 are ground troops stationed on Quemoy. Given the island's proximity to the mainland, large-scale maneuvers would be vulnerable to mainland assault. Likewise, the ROC's navy is greatly outnumbered and is limited to coastal waters and a weekly patrol to Quemoy (Dreyer and Ross 1986).
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: 13-310/ Julian Baum, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Taipei planners debate chances of a Chinese attack," p. 29; MDS VT96
	 Indeed, many Taiwan- observers believe the invasion menace has re- ceded sharply in recent years as Beijing's strategy of "peaceful evolution" of commercial and cultural ties seems to be gradually having the desired effect. It is pulling Taiwan into an interdependent relation- ship with the Chinese mainland -- which could weaken Taipei's ability to resist Beijing's claim over it.
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 13-311 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Taiwan independence move, Japan rearmament linked; ACS VT96
	 The historical relationship between Japan and Taiwan rests on Taiwan's strategic importance to Japan, as well as on human links, Freeman said. Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui ''speaks better Japanese than he does Mandarin,'' Freeman said, noting that there was a ''special feeling'' between the two societies.
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13-312 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Taiwan independence move, Japan rearmament linked; ACS VT96
	 Japan relies on the U.S. to defend its overseas interests, but if Washington refuses to intervene on Taiwan's behalf following a possible Chinese invasion, Japan might well pursue its defense interests unilaterally, he said. If the U.S. does intervene to help Taiwan, then Japan faces a choice between maintaining friendly relations with China and sacrificing its alliance with the U.S. along with its strategic interests in Taiwan.
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13-313/Nayan Chanda, April 13, 1995; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "Fear of the Dragon," p. 28 ; MDS VT96
	 Chinese military officers told Swaine that they did not need massive military power to reunify Taiwan. All Beijing needs to do is to announce a sUbmarine blockade around the island. Whether the blockade is effective or not, the officials told Swaine, a large number of Taiwanese business people will immediately flee the country. Then if the government does not come around and negotiate, China could fire one or two,' precision missiles at high-visibility targets, such as offshore military, installations, to get Taiwan to the table.
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13-314/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 87; ANA VT96
	 Although a blockade would be relatively easy for Beijing to declare in effect, and the deployment of submarines to demonstrate a determination to enforce the blockade would unquestionably be within the capabilities of the PRC, a successful sustained blockade might be very difficult to execute without enormous expenditure of resources. For one thing, the ROC plans to respond to a high intensity blockade... with an immediate escalation of the conflict. This would include the use of Taiwan's air force against mainland shipping and port targets, as well as the mining of PRC ports such as Shanghai. Lasater 1988:14)
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 In other words, while the PRC has the material resources for conducting a blockade, it must be aware that such a strategy could quickly lead to an escalating conflict and counterattack on mainland targets.
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13-315/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of Chins army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 86 ; ANA VT96
	 Aside from the issue of capability, the PRC must consider the likely response from Tokyo and Washington before proceeding with a naval blockade. It is possible that neither Japan nor America would take action if the PRC restricted the geographic scale and time frame of the blockade and prevented major civilian destruction. However, the PRC would have to expect a military response from the ROC in the Taiwan Strait. In 1984 the ROC responded to Deng Xiaoping's threats of a blockade by claiming that such tactics would not only lead to a Nationalist response but also a "reluctant" response from the United States. According to a 1984 official report from Taipei:
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 [A naval blockade] would mean war, for the Republic of China will under no circumstances accept Communist rule. A war in the Taiwan Strait will have such serious consequences that the U.S. will have to intervene reluctantly. So the best way to prevent such an eventuality is for the U.S. to fully live up to its commitments to the Republic of China as stated in the TRA. (Central Daily News [Taipei], October 17, 1984).
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13-316/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 86 ; ANA VT96
	 Clearly, the survival of Taiwan depends on access to sea lanes, and the ROC has done everything in its power to make Taiwan's security a concern of all East Asian nations. Because of this it is unlikely that a PRC blockade could be achieved without intervention by other powers. 
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13-317/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 149; ANA VT96
	 The Taiwan Relations Act would certainly be a factor in the event of either a paper or real blockade--since it specifically mentions this. Congress would most likely act to end such an action through negotiations, or pressure, or direct measures to weaken or destroy the blockade. Public opinion would most likely support this, as would the international community, especially the nations in the region, since it would disrupt commerce there and because paper blockades are considered illegal according to international law. Japan's and South Korea's oil lifeline would be affected, thus bringing them into the fray. 
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 13-318/ Jean-Pierre Cabestan, National Center for scientific research (France), Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 43-44,"The cross strait relationship in the post cold war era;" MDS VT96
	 Given the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), it is probable that the United States would provide military support. And although Taiwan is not as strategically important as, say, Kuwait, its economic role, particularly in East Asia, could compel other countries (Japan, ASEAN, Russia, and even some West European governments) to take sides, at least diplomatically, and condemn this coup de force and probably to impose sanctions on mainland China much stricter than after Tiananmen.39 Moreover, considering the West's current emphasis on the values of democracy and self-determination, it could hardly sit idly by while an authoritarian PRC attacked a democratic Taiwan. In other words, though it would be seen as an "internal affair" by the CCP, a blockade of Taiwan could cause a major international crisis in which global interests .would supersede the preservation of good trade relations with the PRC.
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13-319/John F. Cooper, Stanley J. Buckman Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Rhodes College, 1992; CHINA DIPLOMACY , p. 148; ANA VT96
	 Another likely scenario is an economic attack--a boycott of Taiwan. In fact, many consider it the most likely option. Deng specifically mentioned it in October 1984. It has been broached on other occasions since by Chinese leaders. Beijing could simply threaten nations or transport companies dealing with Taiwan, thus applying a paper blockade. Some of Taiwan's trading partners would be scared off. Shipping or insurance rates would surely skyrocket. Hence Beijing could fulfill its threat to take action against Taiwan without risking much in terms of responses by other nations. It could stop such an action and try again later. Taipei, however, has taken measures to make sure that a blockade could not succeed immediately. It has increased stockpiles of oil, and it has expanded its merchant fleet so that it can maintain foreign commerce if other countries opt not to enter the waters near Taiwan. Taiwan's military is trained to be able to cope with a threat of blockade by offering protection to shipping, and if Taiwan's planes can fly in the area, they can help keep enemy submarines away because of their sophisticated anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Beijing would thus have to clear the skies, thus escalating the conflict, or take considerable time and use considerable political capital to make a paper blockade effective.
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13-320/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China Army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 86; ANA VT96
	 In considering possible military actions against Taiwan, the PRC leadership has given most frequent and serious consideration to a naval blockade. As mentioned above, Deng Xiaoping has publicly stated the viability of this option and it does appear to be within the PRC's naval capability. A number of outside political analysts have agreed that this represents the most likely option for any PRC armed offensive (Esposito 1976; Linder 1980; Wortzel 1988). According to naval expert David Muller (1984:53), there are several reasons why the PRC is likely to choose a naval blockade over other strategies: 1. A blockade would exploit Taiwan's weakness (naval defense) while rendering Taiwan's ground forces useless. 2. It would quickly bring Taiwan's economy to a standstill, since it depends on the import of raw material and energy and the export of finished goods. 3. It would use less equipment and operating funds than an invasion and would not weaken defenses against Soviets and Vietnamese. 4. It would entail little loss of life, decreasing the likelihood of public outcry and third-party intervention.
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13-321/Michael Hindiey and James Bridge, June 1994; THE WORLD TODAY, "South China Sea: the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute," p.111 ; CJJ VT96
	 Beijing's difficult relations with Taiwan play a key role. In principle, Beijing objects to negotiations involving Taiwan. Taiwan, however, claims the Spratly Islands on the same historical basis as the PRC. To all intents and purposes, Taiwan's and the PRC's claims are the same because they are in the name of 'China'. This mutually supportive claim has been given recent concrete expression by the conclusion of a deal between the PRC's China National Offshore Oil, Taiwan's China Petroleum and Chevron of the United States to form a joint venture for oil exploration in the area. While this agreement may lessen tension between Taiwan the PRC, it does not alter the force of 'China's' claim.
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13-322/Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1995; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "The Pacific Way," p.109; CJJ VT96
	 The discomfort between China and Taiwan has risen in the past few months. The potential for misunderstanding is always there. But this has to be balanced against the dramatic growth of trade, investment, and human contact across the Taiwan Straits. The chemistry of the China-Taiwan relationship has changed irrevocably. Similarly, while the territorial issues in the Spratly Islands will not be resolved easily, there is virtually no danger of a military conflict there.
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 13-323/Harlan W. Jencks, Research associate with the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California-Berkeley, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan in the International Arms Market," edited by Robert G. Sutter and Will am R. Johnson, p. 94;ANA VT96
	 In June 1991, the ROC government began talks with the United States on the issues of nuclear, missile, and chemical warfare proliferation.94 The ROC is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although its anomalous diplomatic status so far has prevented Taipei from signing the Chemical Warfare Convention (CWC) or the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it has indicated its willingness to adhere to both, informally.
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13-324/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-5-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama calls for future-oriented relations with China; ACS VT96
	 Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama reaffirmed the importance of ''future-oriented'' bilateral ties with China 50 years after the end of World War II in a meeting Wednesday with Chinese Premier Li Peng. Murayama expressed regrets over the failure of the Japanese Diet to adopt a ''no-war resolution'' before his trip to China and reiterated Tokyo's commitment to world peace based on repentance for its wartime victimization of China and other Asian countries.
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13-325/ Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 In contrast to the Pacific War period, the military is a low-status occupation in Japan today. The Japanese also continue to support strongly the "peace constitution" forbidding armed forces (now interpreted to mean forces capable of threatening neighbouring countries). They lack a strong commitment even to taking up arms in defence of the Japanese home islands, let alone campaigns of conquest overseas. 
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13-326/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-3-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama reiterates Japan's remorse for wartime actions; ACS VT96
	 Murayama, who arrived in Beijing on Tuesday on a five-day official visit, also reiterated that Japan will never become a military power and hoped sound Japan-China relations will contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and the world.
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13-327 / Kyodo News Service, San Jose Mercury News, 4-27-95; MURAYAMA EXPECTS DIET RESOLUTION ON JAPANESE AGGRESSION; ACS VT96
	 The three parties in the coalition -- Murayama's Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Party Sakigake -- have agreed to adopt a war-denouncing Diet resolution.
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13-328/ Kyodo News Service, San Jose Mercury News, 4-27-95; MURAYAMA EXPECTS DIET RESOLUTION ON JAPANESE AGGRESSION; ACS VT96
	 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama said Thursday he expects a proposed antiwar Diet resolution to refer to Japanese colonial rule and aggression during World War II. Murayama made the remark when he met coalition officials on a special panel discussing issues related to the 50th anniversary of the war's end, participants in the meeting said.
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13-329/ Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 Even more daunting are the political obstacles, both inside Japan and elsewhere in the region, to major Japanese military power. The great majority of Japanese still oppose an increase in either the size or role of their armed forces. 
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13-330 / Kohei Murayama , KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; KONO TRIES TO BOOST JAPAN'S ROLE IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; ACS VT96
	 Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono strove to promote Japan's role in international efforts for nuclear disarmament during his three-day stay in New York. In a statement issued in January, Kono said that he rates nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation as one of the major diplomatic issues this year.
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13-331 / Kohei Murayama , KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; KONO TRIES TO BOOST JAPAN'S ROLE IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; ACS VT96
	 ''In view of the tragic experiences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan pursues the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and has clearly forsworn possessing them,'' Kono said in his speech Tuesday.
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13-332 / Kyodo News Service, 5-11-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan hails accord on NPT's indefinite extension; ACS VT96
	 Japan welcomed the accord at a U.N. conference on the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and vowed continued efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and promote nuclear disarmament. ''We welcome the fact the indefinite extension of the NPT was approved by consensus,'' Foreign Minister Yohei Kono said.
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13-333 / Agence France Presse, January 24, 1995, HEADLINE: Japan to pursue "more proactive foreign policy" : official; ACS VT96
	 Apart from promoting the integration of East Asian markets with the rest of the world, Japan would also "play a leading role" in cooperation with the United States, China, Korea and Southeast Asia on security issues, Owada said. Speaking at a university here, Owada cited "a new factor of concern" over North Korea's nuclear development program for regional security in East Asia. Japan would work with the United States and South Korea to ensure the successful implementation of the US-North Korean nuclear agreement signed in October "for the sake of stability in the region," he said.
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13-334/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-1-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Tamazawa discusses Asian security with presidential aide; ACS VT96
	 He (Japan's Defense Agency head) added that Japan will make its utmost efforts to promote confidence-building measures through security talks with China and Russia.
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13-335/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.425.; THR VT96
	 The main manifestation of Japan's new consciousness and confidence is the emerging consensus on conducting a more activist foreign policy, maintaining a strong defense, and increasing Japan's international stature. This consensus was forged under Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, and does not appear to have fractured with the election of Murayama's Socialist-led government. To some extent the new confidence represents a rising nationalism and declining pacifism among Japanese politicians and intellectuals, although it must not be mistaken for a new militarism or revanchism. The rationale has been simply to bring Japan's global political and--to a lesser extent-military clout in line with its economic power. This has resulted in Japan's decision to contribute troops to international peacekeeping forces and to play a role in brokering conflicts (such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina); to seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and to increase military spending and provide the Japanese Self-Defense Forces with state-of-the-art equipment (perhaps including an antiballistic missile system. 
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13-336/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-3-95; JAPANESE PM VOWS PEACE EFFORTS WITH ASIAN NEIGHBORS; ACS VT96
	 Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama expressed determination Thursday for Japan to strive toward peace and prosperity in Asia in cooperation with China and other neighbors in the region. Speaking at a joint news conference with Chinese Premier Li Peng, Murayama spoke of the need for Asian countries to push for bilateral and multilateral efforts to help tackle problems of regional concern.
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13-337/ Kyodo News Service, 5-16-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan's aid policy toward China unchanged: Igarashi; ACS VT96
	 Japan has no intention of freezing its economic aid to China in retaliation for that country's continued testing of nuclear weapons, a government spokesman said Tuesday. ''We do feel China's nuclear test was quite regrettable and lodged a strong protest with the Chinese side in this regard,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi told a news conference. ''As far as the issue of economic cooperation is concerned, we cannot help maintaining our policy along the line of our past talks with them,'' the top government spokesman said.
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13-338/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 8, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Frank LING, Daluo JIA, Jian LIU [CND, 05/07/95] BEIJING - A stronger "future-oriented" tie is to be forged between China and Japan, JEN and Reuter reported after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Beijing summit between Tomiichi Murayama and JIANG Zemin, LI Peng, and QIAO Shi. On Wednesday Murayama and JIANG talked for about an hour. JIANG condemned the Japanese invasion of China in the Second World War, but he said that Chinese people are generous. By pointing out the timing of his journey, which coincides with the 50th anniversary of the end of the War, Murayama reiterated that Japan will not become militarizied to invade other countries again and that his visit to Lu Gou Qiao (the Marco Polo bridge) earlier during the day re-affirmed his will of forever-peace between the two nations.
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13-339/ Kyodo News Service, 5-17-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan negative on review of aid policy toward China; ACS VT96
	 Japan on Wednesday reiterated its reluctance to freeze its economic aid to China in retaliation for the neighboring country's unchanged nuclear testing program. ''We believe it is necessary to consider this issue in the perspective of overall Japan-China relations, while making clear our displeasure,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi told a news conference.
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13-340/ Kohei Murayama , KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-19-95; KONO TRIES TO BOOST JAPAN'S ROLE IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; ACS VT96
	 Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen gave high marks to Kono's speech, which emphasized Japan's desire for total disarmament as a nation hit by atomic bombs, a Japanese official said in briefing reporters on a meeting between Kono and Qian.
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13-341/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.426 THR VT96
	 Japan's ties with China are, by contrast, more solid. The two governments watch each other's military capabilities warily and each is mindful of the legacy of the Second World War, but their commercial and cultural linkages are particularly strong. Trade and Japanese investment in China have shot up in recent years. Since the 1960s Japan has been China's largest trading partner. In fact, Japan trades more with China than with any other country except the United States. Bilateral Sino-Japanese trade increased from $19.7 billion to nearly $35 billion between 1989 and 1993. Japanese investment in China more than quintupled during the same period, from $438 million to approximately $2.5 billion. The dramatic increase in Japanese investment is particularly noteworthy, since Japanese businessmen have always been more willing to trade with than invest in China.
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 13-342/ Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 Without power projection capability, the Japanese lack the means to protect their far-flung economic interests or to exercise decisive political influence overseas. An underarmed Japan will never achieve hegemony. Despite having massive wealth, Japan's well-being remains the perquisite of its militarily more powerful neighbours. 
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13-343 / Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 At the same time, formidable barriers block a large-scale Japanese military buildup. The first is economic: increased military spending would erode some of Japan's economic strength. Japan would begin to suffer the financial drain that it largely (and intentionally) avoided during the Cold War by relying on US protection. 
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 13-344/ Bruce Cummings, Prof. IntI History at Northwestern, Dec., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "What is a Pacific century -- and how will we know when it begins?" p. 406 ;SEG VT96
	 Has something momentous happened in East Asian security? Is Betts correct in saying that "the [East Asian] balance of power...is up for grabs"? Looking solely at defense budgets to gauge changes after the cold war, Japan would seem to be the most menacing state in East Asia, since its spending in this category increased by more than 38 percent between 1990 and 1993. But that figure ignores the trend over the past 25 years, .with Japan consistently spending less than 1 percent of GNP on defense, while West Germany hovered at around 3 percent and the United States at around 6 percent; it also ignores Japan's continuing inability to agree on a post-cold war defense strategy. Furthermore, by the same measure "renegade" North Korea is the least menacing state in the region, since its military spending fell more than 58 percent over the same period. The security experts seem able only to come up with arguments justifying more of the same in East Asia, as if evidence counted little and the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet bloc were essentially irrelevant to the security of the region. 
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13-345/ Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 Neither should continued Japanese economic strength be taken for granted. Japan's current prosperity belies its fundamental, eternal weaknesses. It is an overcrowded, resource-poor island nation that depends largely on the outside world for food, energy, raw materials, and markets. 
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13-346/ Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 Domestic opposition to large military forces and involvement in overseas military operations is largely based on Japanese realisation that a militarily resurgent Japan would provoke other Asia-Pacific countries to form an anti-Tokyo coalition that might eventually strangle Japan. This sentiment is supported by historical evidence. When a strong, threatening country emerges, neighbouring countries tend to "balance" or band together in an alliance, against it. While each of the balancing states may be weaker than the threatening state, their collective strength is overwhelming. Because of Japan's record of aggression in the recent past, neighbouring countries such as China, (soon-to-be-reunified) Korea, Taiwan, Russia, and perhaps even Asean, the US and Australia would be quick to form an unbeatable anti-Japan alliance. Consequently, there are serious doubts about the feasibility of Japan deploying military forces commensurate with its economic strength. 
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13-347 / Hidenaka Kato, reprinted from The Nikkei Weekly, Jan 9, 1995 , World Press Review, April, 1995; Pg. 52; HEADLINE: Can Japan learn to lead? Japanese foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 Yet so far, the nation has managed to hold off the inevitable. Although Japan has transformed its economy into a global power since i945, its foreign policy is still largely anchored in the postwar era. As a result, Tokyo has responded to the pressure to become a leader with so much tentativeness and vacillation that, for the foreseeable future, it seems bound to disappoint those seeking a counterweight to China and the United States, analysts say.
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13-348/ Hidenaka Kato, reprinted from The Nikkei Weekly, Jan 9, 1995 , World Press Review, April, 1995; Pg. 52; HEADLINE: Can Japan learn to lead? Japanese foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 Why the hesitation to chart its own way and go it alone? For one thing, when Japan is pressed to assume a greater political role in the region, it is often uncomfortably called on to choose between Asia and the West. But the U.S. is still by far Japan's most important trading partner, and many Japanese are unwilling to do anything to offend Washington.
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13-349/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan may be drawn into S. China Sea dispute; ACS VT96
	 In a paper presented during the two-day conference of the ASEAN Defense Technology Exchange in Manila, Abod (Malaysian defense undersecretary Siti Azizah Abod) also said that Japan's growing trade frictions with the United States and the possibility of the U.S. overshadowing Tokyo in both economic and military terms in the future will also force Japan to develop a ''comprehensive military power, including nuclear capability.'' ''Geopolitics and Japanese past record of militarism and aggression suggest that a Japan armed to the teeth will be a grave security threat to Southeast Asia,'' she said. ''This security concern has been further exacerbated by potential threat from China and a reunified Korea,'' she said.
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13-350/Douglas Stuart, Assoc. prof. of political science and director of international studies at Dickinson College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Determinants of PRC Arms Control: Policies in the 1990s," edited by William T. Tow, p.304; THR VT96
	 The PRC leadership may also recognize a greater stake in controlling the pace and scope of Japanese militarization in the 1990s. But Beijing will discover that its influence over Tokyo is fairly limited. Japan's decisions about the nature and size of its armed forces will continue to be determined largely by internal Japanese developments and by the actions of the two superpowers. The PRC may be able to fuel Japanese militarization, or provide Tokyo with a pretext for such militarization, if it engages in actions at home and abroad which can be interpreted as threats by Japan. But Beijing can do little directly to encourage restraint and moderation in Japanese military programs.
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 13-351/Takashi Inoguchi, Prof. political science at the Institute of Oriental Culture, Univ. of Tokyo, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "Dialectics of World Order: A View from Pacific Asia," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 134; THR VT96
	Japan's regional security role is expected to grow steadily to cope with the uncertain vigor of Pacific Asia and the rest of the world. The sophistication of technology in' many civilian areas enables Japan to acquire and apply many high-tech items for military purpose. Despite x 993 's lowest level of defense spending in relation to total government expenditure since 1960, two areas are given priority: First, the conventional area-defense capability has been armed with Air Warning and Air Command System-equipped aircraft and various missile defense systems. These weapons have been purchased from the United States in response to the growing force-projection capability of North Korea in recent years. Second, the capability to undertake transportation of forces has been enhanced in light of the need to send personnel and extend logistic support to UN peacekeeping and other kinds of operations abroad, most recently in Cambodia and Mozambique. They include medium-sized transport ships and transport aircraft. None of them can be characterized as "normal" aircraft carriers or "normal" transport aircraft. They do enable the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate independently abroad, albeit on a relatively small scale.
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13-352 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-21-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan may be drawn into S. China Sea dispute; ACS VT96
	 Security experts in Southeast Asia have warned that an armed Japan might be drawn into the Spratly dispute in the South China Sea because of its vast investment and trading interests in Southeast Asia. ''Conflicts in the South China Sea have added a new complexity to Southeast Asian defense by bringing upon the scene a potential military giant,'' Malaysian defense undersecretary Siti Azizah Abod said Friday. She said Japan considers the sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea vital to its economic survival. Already Japan has raised concern that the tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands could disrupt maritime trade. Much of Japan's trade in the Indian Ocean and Middle East passes through the South China Sea.
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13-353 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-1-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Tamazawa discusses Asian security with presidential aide; ACS VT96
	 (Japan's Defense Agency head) Tamazawa expressed his concern over China's military build-up, saying that Beijing's intention is unclear. He also noted that China continues to test nuclear devices, the officials said. They said the Defense Agency head also said that if a conservative takes power in Russia, it could pose a big threat to Japan as much of Russia's military power is based in its Far East.
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13-354 / Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japan closely watching China's military moves" ACS VT96
	 Japan is closely monitoring China's military moves as a key factor in decisions on its economic cooperation with China, a government spokesman said Wednesday. ''In line with our official development assistance (ODA) charter, we are watching the moves very closely,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi said at a news conference, touching on China's test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile earlier this week.
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13-355 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-1-95; NEW VICE MINISTER CALLS FOR IMPROVING DEFENSE QUALITY; ACS VT96
	 He [New Vice Defense Minister Naoaki Murata] said North Korea's suspected nuclear program would have no special effect on Japan's defense plan, with the exception of concerns over its ballistic missiles. But Murata said Japan should maintain its surveillance of other neighboring countries as well, including China and Russia.
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13-356 / Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japan closely watching China's military moves" ACS VT96
	 ''We will extend our economic cooperation with China within the scope of our ODA charter,'' he [Chief Cabinet Secretary Kozo Igarashi] said, sidestepping a question on whether Tokyo will lodge a protest over the missile test or alter its aid policy toward Beijing. Japan's rules on extending ODA call for taking into account the military spending, possession of weapons of mass destruction and arms exports of the recipient nation.
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13-357/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific century," p. 426; THR VT96
	 Tokyo is particularly concerned about China's rapidly growing military budget, its force modernization program, and new military doctrine emphasizing rapid deployment and peripheral defense. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has received five consecutive years of double-digit budget increases and is buying a range of sophisticated weaponry from Russia. It is also building a blue water navy and modern air force, upgrading its nuclear weapons arsenal, and developing a force projection ability. All of this greatly concerns China's neighbors, especially since Beijing has shown a willingness to use force in the past and has a number of territorial claims in the region.
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13-358 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-26-95; 1ST GROUP OF CHINESE WAR VICTIMS TO SEEK COMPENSATION; ACS VT96
	 China watchers are concerned that the expected first Chinese compensation suit could trigger a host of lawsuits by other war victims against the Japanese government, thus straining bilateral relations.
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13-359/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p. 426; THR VT96
	 While the United States has generally welcomed-and indeed has encouraged--Japan's new international activism, China has not. Like many other Asians, the Chinese remain highly skeptical of any increase in Japan's international or regional political or military roles. This partly stems from the legacy of World War I1 and Beijing's long-standing fears of revived Japanese militarism, but it is also related to China's own aspirations to become the dominant power in the Asia Pacific region. Sino-Japanese relations have been strengthened following a brief interlude after 1989, when Tokyo had to acquiesce to Western sanctions against Beijing. However, political disputes over Taiwan, mutual fears about the growing strength of each other's military, and lingering distrust stemming from World War 1I plague the Sino-Japanese relationship and are beginning to surface. Frictions between the two have intensified, and the constituencies in each country that advocate a "get tough" policy with the other have grown. One senses that perceptions are shifting and a long-term strategic rivalry is brewing. 
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 13-360 / PETER LANDERS, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-1-95; WAR ISSUES, HIGH YEN DOG JAPANESE LEADER'S CHINA VISIT; ACS VT96
	 Any sign of Japan playing down its wartime actions draws a heated reaction in China, which suffered a brutal invasion and occupation by the Japanese Imperial Army from 1937 to 1945. Mindful of its $7 billion in outstanding Japanese loans and the grants Japan has given it, Beijing has kept a lid on anti-Japanese sentiment, but that may be changing.
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 13-361/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 262; MDS VT96
	 Given their country's experience of Japanese invasion during the Pacific War, China's leaders remain suspicious of Japanese motives, in spite of Japan's extensive trade and investment in China. As Japan takes on erstwhile American responsibilities in the region, Chinese sources speak of accelerated Japanese conventional weapons development, both quantitatively and qualitatively, allegedly over and above Japan's purely national defense needs. In addition, given Japan's growing economic stake in Southeast Asia, the Chinese fear future Japanese hegemony in the region, regarded for centuries as a traditional Chinese sphere of influence.
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13-362/P. Parameswaran, Staff Writer, January 24, 1994; Agence France Presse, "Clash between China and Japan on the cards, Asian conference told", SECTION: Financial pages; PMS VT96
	 The economic leap forwards in China could lead to a clash between it and Japan which would have global implications, a conference on Asia's future was told on Monday. "The most serious consequence of China's growth will be the inescapable clash between Japan and China, " said Lee Su-Hoon of South Korea's Kyungnan University. Lee, the director of planning at the Seoul-based university's institute for Far Eastern studies, said the two powers would be at loggerheads because of their economic ambitions. "This (the clash) will result from the fact that the "Asianising" Japanese economy has to further expand into the Asian continent on the one hand, and the Chinese economy ultimately will have to expand towards the Pacific on the other," Lee said. "By then China, not Japan, may be the centre of the East Asian economic bloc," Lee forecast at a regional symposium on "Asia in the 21st century" organised by the National Writers' Association of Malaysia. 
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13-363/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p. 424; THR VT96
	 In the medium term, stability and security in Asia are likely to revolve around relations among the larger regional powers and the United states and the growing strength of certain Asian nations. The shifts in the established balance of power caused by China's emergence as an economic and military power will be a central challenge to the region and the world in the years to come. Japan's growing assertiveness in regional and international affairs is also changing the strategic landscape.
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 13-364/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p.29; THR VT96
	 Diminished Sino-American economic relations will also affect China's relations with other countries. In particular, Japan will likely play an increasingly important role in Chinese economic development. Compared to the United States, Japan has greater interests in Asia, and partly for this reason it accords relatively less attention to human rights considerations in its China policy. Thus, as the United States reduces its economic relationship with China, Japan's stake in the Chinese economy will likely expand propor- tionately. Indeed, Japan has granted China its third yen loan, and Japanese business interests are apt to follow Tokyo's lead and expand their activities in China. Given China's ambivalence re- garding Japanese economic capability and its political ramifica- tions, Chinese reliance on Japan may create additional friction in Sino-Japanese relations with implications for the stability of Wash- ington's interests in Asia. 
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13-365/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Japan, too, is moderately concerned that revived Chinese nationalism could lead to territorial disputes with the PRC over the Senkaku Islands. 
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13-366 / Manning, The Washington Quarterly. 1994, [Robert A., The Center for Strategic' and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Burdens of the Past Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International System," Winter-Jan; JEH VT96
	 The PRC's passage of a new law in February 1992 proclaiming sovereignty overseas territories was, however, viewed as emblematic of a new Chinese assertiveness Although widespread Asian concern focused on the disputed Spratly islands in the South China Sea. Japan also saw implications for the disputed Senkaku Islands. which the PRC and Japan agreed to shelve The Senkakus are a potential if unlikely, source of tension.
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 13-367 / NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, former Beijing Bureau Chief for the New York Times, NOV/DEC 1993, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "The Rise of China"; MDS, VT96
	 The other possibilities for war seem much more remote. China and Japan, for example, quarrel over ownership of a group of islands to the northeast of Taiwan. Indeed, there is not even agreement on what to call the islands. China calls them the Diaoyudao, Taiwan says they are the Diaoyutai, and Japan calls them the Senkakus. For now, cool heads are prevailing on all sides, but Japanese and Chinese nationalists may try to force the issue.
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13-368 / Richard Grant , Royal Institute of International Affairs for the Pacific Forum / CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century; MDS; VT96
	 Japan, too, is moderately concerned that revived Chinese nationalism could lead to territorial disputes with the PRC over the Senkaku Islands.
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 13-369/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-21-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 China Faces Difficulties in Foreign Loans Repayment [BEIJING, 01/20/95] Due to volatile currency exchange rates and some improper use of the funds, China may have difficulties in repaying foreign loans. The cost of repaying outstanding loans to Japan alone has risen by more than five billion dollars because of the yen's appreciation. However, the government will take steps to ensure the payments and maintain China's creditworthiness. Foreign loans are often used for infrastructure or environmental protection projects, which yield social impact rather than economic benefits. (Jane ZHANG, Daluo JIA)
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13-370/Feng ZHANG, Daluo JIA, Jian LIU, CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 5, 1995; ACS VT96
	 TOKYO - With the dollar's plunge against the yen, China is struggling with a near three-fold increase in its debts from Japan. Moreover, it's unlikely that there would be any hope of renegotiation even during present visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, AFP and AP reported.
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13-371/Feng ZHANG, Daluo JIA, Jian LIU, CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 5, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Japan has rejected China's requests for debt relief, which has been offered to some poor developing nations before. Japan argued that China had 60% growth in its foreign reserves last year to more than 51 billion dollars and should be able to repay the debt.
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13-372/Feng ZHANG, Daluo JIA, Jian LIU, CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 5, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Although Japanese sympathy has been voiced for China's predicament, analysts here say Murayama, who is visiting China presently, will stick to Tokyo's hard line on Beijing's debt repayment problems.
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13-373/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-17-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 China to Receive More Japanese Loans [CND, 01/16/95] BEIJING -- The Xinhua news agency reported that an agreement on the third group of Japanses loans to China for 1994, totalling 140.342 billion Japanese Yen, was signed on January 13, 1995. Michihiko Kunihiro, Japanese Ambassador to China and Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister signed documents on behalf of their respective governments. The Japanese loans will provide fund for 15 projects in communications, power industry and agriculture. Japan started providing loans for China in 1979 through its Overseas Economics Cooperation Fund. So far, the Japanese government has committed up to 1.681 trillion Japanese yen. (Jane ZHANG, Daluo JIA)
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13-374/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-26-95; 1ST GROUP OF CHINESE WAR VICTIMS TO SEEK COMPENSATION; ACS VT96
	 In the first set of individual claims of their kind, a group of Chinese war victims and bereaved families decided Wednesday to demand a formal apology and compensation of 20 million yen each from Japan for suffering inflicted by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II, the group's lawyers said. The Chinese claimants include women who were forced into Japanese military brothels, people who were used as guinea pigs by the notorious germ warfare Unit 731, former forced laborers, victims of the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and other war victims. It will be the first time that Chinese war victims will file demands for compensation directly with the Japanese government, but, since Tokyo is unlikely to recognize them, it appears almost certain that the group will take their demands to court, the lawyers said.
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13-375/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 8, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Government Supports War Compensation Efforts [CND, 05/04/95] BEIJING -- Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman SHEN Guofang told JEN that Beijing thinks that Japan ought to compensate "a part" of the Chinese war victims. This is the first time a government official expli- citly made such a statement. The first batch of claims came from 41 Chinese who were held in Japanese military brothels and labor camps against their wills, victims of the Nanking (Nanjing) Massacre, or guinea pigs in germ warfare experiments. SHEN re-assured that the Chinese government will not deviate from the 1972 Sino-Japnese agreement to formally seek war compensa- tion. (Frank LING, Daluo JIA) 
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13-376/ DAVID BRISCOE, Associated Press Writer, 4-25-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Human Rights Groups Rally to Help World War II Sex Slaves; ACS VT96
	 ``The money paid cannot possibly make up for the indignities and humiliations that were inflicted,'' said Drinan, now a law professor at Georgetown University, ``but money damages at least show the sincere repentance and good faith of those who inflicted the harm.''
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13-377/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-26-95; 1ST GROUP OF CHINESE WAR VICTIMS TO SEEK COMPENSATION; ACS VT96
	 China waived its claims to government compensation for World War II when establishing diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972 in exchange for the Japanese government's ''deep remorse and full realization of its (war) responsibility.'' Chinese leaders have stressed that Japan should recognize individual compensation claims, although they are eager to keep the growing civic movement for war compensation under control for fear it may affect important economic relations with Japan and lead to a tie-up with pro-democracy groups.
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13-378 / ELAINE KURTENBACH, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 5-3-95; VISIT BY JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER EXPECTED TO RESURRECT WAR MEMORIES; ACS VT96
	 While urging Japan to formally acknowledge the hardships its army caused, China has tended to discourage protests by war victims and their families.
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13-379/ Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 Hence China is more free than Japan from international constraints against assertive behaviour. This explains why a Chinese defence buildup, while not welcomed, is acceptable, but a Japanese defence buildup is not. 
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13-380 / Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 China also has an important political edge over Japan: the Chinese are perceived as less threatening than the Japanese. While China's foreign policy has hardly been pacific, China's record of aggression this century pales in comparison with that of Japan. 
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13-381 / Denny Roy lecturer in the Department of Political Science, National University of SingaporeThe Straits Times September 21, 1993 Pg. 26 HEADLINE: Will Japan or China dominate East Asia in the next century? //MDS-VT96
	 Beijing is accountable for intervention in the Korean War, border battles with India and the Soviet Union, and incursions into Vietnam, but Japan bears the burden of its massacres and economic exploitation from Manchuria to Indonesia. This means other nations in the region would be relatively slow to build a coalition to balance against Chinese power. 
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13-382/ Hidenaka Kato, reprinted from The Nikkei Weekly, Jan 9, 1995 , World Press Review, April, 1995; Pg. 52; HEADLINE: Can Japan learn to lead? Japanese foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 This is not to say, of course, that all Asia is clamoring for Japanese leadership. Deep, historic suspicions about Tokyo's intentions permeate China, the Koreas, and even great admirers of Japan such as Singapore. And tenacious memories of World War II serve as a constant brake to any forward momentum by Japan. Indeed, it is a measure of the lingering shadow of that conflict that Japan seemingly spends more time these days worrying about redressing the wartime grievances of its Asian neighbors than it does on how to lead them [.]
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13-383/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-2-95; JAPAN SHOULD FACE UP TO WARTIME HISTORY, MURAYAMA SAYS; ACS VT95 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, ahead of his first visit to China as prime minister, stressed Tuesday the importance of Japan's making efforts toward peace by reflecting on its history of waging war. ''It is important to make efforts toward peace by facing up to the history that Japan's aggressive actions and colonial rule caused unbearable pain and sorrow to many people,'' Murayama said in an interview with reporters at his official residence.
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13-384/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-10-95; JAPAN-CHINA TIES VITAL FOR ASIA, PACIFIC, MURAYAMA SAYS; ACS VT96
	 Murayama also reiterated his remarks during his Chinese visit that Japan should face up to history and feel remorse for its victimization of China before and during World War II so as to further promote friendly bilateral ties, the official said.
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13-385/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-3-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama reiterates Japan's remorse for wartime actions; ACS VT96
	 Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on Wednesday reiterated his remorse over Japan's victimization of China and other Asian countries on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. In a meeting with Premier Li Peng, Murayama said, ''I recognize anew that Japan's actions at one time in our past history, including aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for many people in your country and other Asian neighbors.'' ''I intend to make every effort to build world peace,'' Japan's Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Sonoda quoted Murayama as saying in the talks that lasted for nearly three hours.
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13-386/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-6-95, SAN KOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan's Murayama seeks peace drive with Asian neighbors; ACS VT96
	 Japan is resolved to joining forces with its Asian neighbors to ensure the future peace and prosperity in the region, Japan's Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama said Thursday. ''I think, in order to build mutual trust with neighboring Asia and elsewhere, it is imperative for us, Japanese people, to look squarely at the history of our relationship with them and realize it correctly,'' he told a news conference. ''Japan has thus been working to forge bonds of mutual understanding and confidence with other Asian peoples, based on the profound remorse for its acts of aggression and colonial rule of the past.''
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13-387/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), January 11, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Japan to Dismantle World War II Poison-Gas Shells Left in China [Tokyo, 01/05/95] Japan will send specialists to China to deal with two million or so poison-gas shells abandoned by the Imperial Army after World War II and the trip might lead to a dismantling operation next year, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported. According to the Chinese government, the leakage of these poison shells has caused injuries of around 2,000 people living in the Northeast China. (Zhiping YU, Daluo JIA) 
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13-388 / Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-3-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama reiterates Japan's remorse for wartime actions; ACS VT96
	 The Japanese premier assured his Chinese counterpart that Tokyo will dispose of the chemical weapons the Japanese Imperial Army left in China during the war and sought Beijing's cooperation in Japan's planned on-the-spot inspections, especially in northeastern China. Li responded with a call for Japan to dispose of the weapons as soon as possible, adding China is ready to help, Sonoda said.
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13-389 / Kyodo News Service, 5-19-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mission to study chemical weapons left in China; ACS VT96
	 Japan will send a government mission to the northeastern Chinese province of Jilin from May 23 to June 6 to survey poison gas shells believed to have been left there by the Japanese army at the end of World War II, the Foreign Ministry said Friday. The team will visit Dunhua and Meihekou in Jilin Province, where some 1.8 million gas shells are said to have been left behind, the ministry said. The members are scheduled to collect information on the size and condition of the buried chemical weapons, and also hold talks with Chinese officials. The mission is the second fact-finding team sent to China this year to study toxic shells believed left behind by the Japanese Imperial Army.
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13-390/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-2-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan to help China improve intellectual property system; ACS VT96
	 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama will tell Chinese Premier Li Peng on Wednesday of Japan's decision to help the country improve its system for protection of intellectual property rights, Japanese officials said Tuesday. China has experienced a series of troubles with the United States, Japan and other countries over intellectual property rights.
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13-391/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-2-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan to help China improve intellectual property system; ACS VT96
	 Japan intends to help China improve its intellectual property rights system as part of efforts to help the country gain membership in the new World Trade Organization, the officials said. China is flooded with imitations of Japanese consumer electronics and video game products, and officials of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry visited Beijing in April to demand that such products be removed from the market. Japan now seeks to help China solve the problem by offering know-how for the protection of intellectual property, instead of making protests or demands, the officials said.
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13-392 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-25-95; MURAYAMA TO OFFER GREEN AID TO CHINA DURING MAY VISIT; ACS VT96
	 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama will promise a package of environmental assistance to China when he visits the country May 2-6, government officials said Tuesday. Japan will pledge to dispatch researchers and provide the latest pollution prevention techniques to promote cooperation on the environment. The assistance will be offered through an environmental conservation institute to be completed in Beijing this fall with full assistance from Tokyo, they said. The institute aims to gather and analyze environmental data, research and develop pollution prevention techniques and train personnel, and is expected to be a national hub of an environmental observation network covering the whole of China.
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13-393/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-27-95; JAPAN TO SEND ENVIRONMENT MISSION TO CHINA IN LATE JUNE ; ACS VT96
	 Japan will send a mission to China in late June for talks with Chinese officials on how to protect the environment in that country, a Foreign Ministry official said Thursday. The mission will be headed by Hiroshi Hashimoto, former ambassador to China, and will comprise officials from the ministry, the Environment Agency, local governments, and other public and private organizations, including the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), the official said.
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13-394 / Greenwire December 6, 1993 SECTION: WORLDVIEW HEADLINE: ACID RAIN: CHINA, JAPAN TO SIGN ENVIRO AGREEMENT//MDS-VT96
	 Japan and China will conclude a bilateral enviro agreement to check acid rain, Tokyo government sources said. The agreement is expected to be signed when a top Japanese leader visits China; the date has not been set. "Rapidly industrializing" China and its fossil fuel-burning plants are partially blamed for acid rain in East Asia. 
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13-395/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-2-95; JAPAN SHOULD FACE UP TO WARTIME HISTORY, MURAYAMA SAYS; ACS VT95 ''The Japan-China relationship is quite important to help develop the Asia-Pacific region, to which the world pays the most attention,'' Murayama said hours before departure for China on a five-day visit through Saturday. ''It is important for world peace to strengthen relations by frankly recognizing the past history of each other at this turning point, the 50th year since the end of World War II, and by mutual understanding,'' he added.
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13-396/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-6-95, SAN KOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan's 'future-oriented' ties with China still unclear; ACS VT96
	 ''We (Japan and China) have not yet reached the point where we can say to each other what we really want to,'' acknowledged a senior Japanese official traveling with Murayama. ''We are only just beginning to move ahead.''
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13-397 / Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-29-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan to reaffirm 'future-oriented' ties with China; ACS VT96
	 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama will travel to China on Tuesday to reinforce the importance of ''future-oriented'' bilateral relations in a year that marks the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. Murayama will seize the opportunity to restate Tokyo's commitment to world peace based on remorse for its wartime wrongs in China and other Asian neighbors, Foreign Ministry officials said. ''Speaking from experience, I can say there is no other country that gives priority to high-level contacts than China. In that sense, I expect the premier's journey to help further a relationship of mutual trust between the leaders of the two nations," one official said.
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13-398 / Kyodo News Service, 6-2-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Chinese leader urges 'correct' recognition of past" ACS VT96
	 Chinese State Councillor Li Tieying urged Japan on Friday to ''correctly'' acknowledge its militaristic past for the sake of friendly bilateral relations with China, government officials said. ''We hope to develop Sino-Japanese ties for the future, based on the correct recognition of the past,'' Li told Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama at a meeting at his official residence, in comments on this year's 50th anniversary of the end of World War II.
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13-399/ Kyodo News Service, San Jose Mercury News, 5-1-95; MURAYAMA SEEKS 'FUTURE-ORIENTED' JAPAN-CHINA TIES; ACS VT96
	 Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama expressed hope Monday to foresee ''future-oriented'' relations with China, based on remorse for its wrongs before and during World War II, a Foreign Ministry official said. ''I wish to take the opportunity to foresee future-oriented Japan-China ties based on sincere repentance for our past,'' he said in a joint interview with six Chinese news organizations. Xinhua News Agency and the China Daily newspaper are among them. ''I want to make every effort to go hand in hand with Chinese leaders so we can make our relations as stable and cooperative as possible,'' the official quoted the premier as saying.
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 13-401/ Bruce Cummings, Prof. IntI History at Northwestern, Dec., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "What is a Pacific century -- and how will we know when it begins?" p. 406 ;SEG VT96
	 This is evident in Richard Bett's condescending question, "So should we want China to get rich or not?" and his frank recommendation that Americans continue serving as "voluntary Hessians" for Japan for as long as possible, since the only alternative is for Tokyo to "start spending blood as well as its treasure to support international order," at which time Japan "will justifiably become interested in much more control over that order." Better Americans police the world and let Japan remain what Betts terms "a uni dimensional superpower"; otherwise, Betts warns, mixing metaphors, "a truncated End of History in East Asia could be de stabilizing rather than pacifying." Stability is equated with a revived American hegemony. The piece de resistance, though, is Bett's assertion that "a China, Japan, or Russian that grows strong enough to overturn a regional balance of power would necessarily also be a global power that would reestablish bipolarity on the highest level' '--so no matter which of the three gained power commensurate with the United States, it would be America's enemy. 
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13-402 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Maintaining the zone of peace requires, first and foremost, avoiding conditions that can lead to renationalization of security policies in key allied countries such as Japan and Germany. The members of the zone of peace are in basic agreement and prefer not to compete with each other in realpolitik terms. But this general agreement still requires U.S. leadership. At present there is greater nervousness in Japan than in Germany about future ties with Washington, but U.S. credibility remains strong in both countries. The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies such as Germany and Japan believe that the current arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as either lacking the will or the capability to lead in protecting their interests.
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13-403/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," P. 427; THR VT96
	 The challenge that China poses to American Japanese relations will be considerable in years to come. Before Tiananmen, Washington and Tokyo shared the same views and policies toward China, but since then they have diverged somewhat. The major division is over how to handle the human rights issue and, relatedly, how to press for political change in China. The Japanese prefer gradual modification and quiet diplomacy, while Washington seeks rapid progress and tends toward public diplomacy. On other issues-particularly military and economics-the two sides continue to maintain similar interests. There is little doubt, however, that coordinating China policy will be one of the principal challenges the United States and Japan will face in coming years.
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13-404/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," P-426; THR VT96
	 Washington and Tokyo have overlapping but also divergent interests in, and policies toward, China. The essential difference is political. Japan's highest priority is that China remain 'socially and politically stable, whereas the United States favors--and even hopes to foster--social and political change in China. The greatest fear of the Japanese government and people is that China will become convulsed in civil conflict that would splinter the nation and bring a massive refugee exodus to Japan's shores. Unlike Washington, human rights concerns rank relatively low on Tokyo's agenda with Beijing. This was evident during Prime Minister Hosokawa's visit to Beijing this March. The Japanese leader pleased his hosts by publicly stating that human rights were relative to each nation, and that governments should not impose their definitions of human rights on one another. Hosokawa concentrated on economic, security, and military issues during his visit..
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13-405 / Suvendrini Kakuchi, Inter Press Service, May 2, 1995, HEADLINE: JAPAN: CHINA'S GROWING STATURE DEMANDS NEW APPROACH IN DIPLOMACY; ACS VT96
	 But that task is proving to be a big headache for Japan. Security experts say that in the case of China, Japan cannot resume its Cold War role as a close ally of the United States in promoting anti-communism in the world. The two countries' long historical ties, geographical proximity, Japan's harsh colonization of China and China's growing economic importance have made it a whole new diplomatic test for Japan.
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13-406/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Taiwan independence move, Japan rearmament linked; ACS VT96
	 Despite Japan no longer being an imperialist power filled with the ''bushido'' or samurai spirit, Freeman [Chas Freeman, former assistant defense secretary] said, developments in North Korea, strains in the Japanese relationship with the U.S., and uncertainty over Chinese policy in the South China Sea are causing Japan to reconsider its reliance on the U.S. for defense purposes.
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13-406A / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-22-95; JAPANESE SEE CHINA AS MOST IMPORTANT PARTNER IN FUTURE; ACS VT96
	 A majority of Japanese expect neighbor China to become Japan's most important political and economic partner in the future, while U.S. citizens pin their hopes more on Europe and Russia, according to a poll published Sunday. About 1,500 randomly selected people in Japan and 1,500 in the United States responded to a survey conducted by telephone in March for the major economic dailies Nihon Keizai Shimbun and Wall Street Journal. While 55.1% of the Japanese respondents believe that China will be the strongest economic power worldwide in 10 years, only 10.7% of people surveyed in the U.S. shared that view, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported in its Sunday edition.
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13-407 / Suvendrini Kakuchi, Inter Press Service, May 2, 1995, HEADLINE: JAPAN: CHINA'S GROWING STATURE DEMANDS NEW APPROACH IN DIPLOMACY; ACS VT96
	 Comments Shimizu: "In its dealings with the former Soviet Union, Japan was content to follow the United States. But with China, Japan needs to tread carefully."
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13-408/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.426; THR VT96
	 The principal problem facing Washington and Tokyo in the coming years will not be each other, but China. The challenges posed to both by China's economic dynamism, modernizing military, and authoritarian political system will cement the United States-Japan relationship and breathe new life into the bilateral alliance." 
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13-409/ Mary Kwang, The Straits Times (Singapore), February 17, 1995; Pg. 9, HEADLINE: Post-Deng China: Grim scenario painted; ACS VT96
	 A Japan that would become increasingly fearful of a powerful and vengeful China would be likely to seek closer relations with the US and other maritime states in East Asia. The risks will then increase of the emergence of a maritime coalition determined to limit Chinese influence. [Professor David Goodman, director of the Institute for International Studies of the University of Technology in Sydney, and Dr Gerald Segal, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London] 
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13-410/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S.-Japan alliance called 'irrelevant'; ACS VT96
	 The U.S.-Japan alliance is ''irrelevant'' in the post-Cold War world, according to an opinion piece in Tuesday's edition of the New York Times that urges the United States to make Asia the focus of future foreign policy considerations. Harper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind questioned the wisdom of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, saying they should be removed with the current security treaty being replaced by more flexible agreements.
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13-411/ KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S.-Japan alliance called 'irrelevant'; ACS VT96
	 Tokyo should be responsible for its own security while Japan and the U.S. should cooperate with other nations in regional security arrangements, Lind suggested. ''Treating Japan as an equal, not a dependent, may also mean pushing for it to be given a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and allowing it to develop a nuclear weapons program if it seeks one,'' (Harper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind) Lind wrote.
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13-412 / Michael Zielenziger, Mercury News Staff Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Trade clash moves onto global stage; Analysis: The U.S.-Japan dispute over autos has far-reaching implications; ACS VT96
	 Japanese officials are convinced that once the United States imposes punitive tariffs, they can win the right from the WTO to impose countervailing tariffs on U.S. goods. This, in turn, analysts say, could threaten the very existence of the new trade body, since it has no legacy of accomplishments and many members of the new Republican-controlled Congress vehemently oppose it. ``There's no question the Japanese would win in Geneva,'' Hellman said. ``These trade sanctions are a flagrant violation'' of free-trade rules, he said. ``The question is, if you send the WTO down the tubes, then what?''
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13-413/ Michael Zielenziger, Mercury News Staff Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Trade clash moves onto global stage; Analysis: The U.S.-Japan dispute over autos has far-reaching implications; ACS VT96
	 Just as a wary world begins to find its sea legs in the storm-tossed currents of global free trade, a roiling dispute between Washington and Tokyo over automobiles, which intensified Saturday, threatens to shatter the fragile new system.
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13-414 / David Friedman is a visiting fellow at the MIT Japan program.November 21, 1993, Los Angeles Times p. m1 HEADLINE: TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC BULLIES THAT AMERICA REFUSES TO FACE UP TO; COMMERCE: WHILE JAPAN -- AND NOW CHINA -- RUN UP HUGE SURPLUSES, THE U.S. FRETS OVER GEOPOLITICS AND MOUTHS FREE-TRADE PRINCIPLES. //MDS-VT96
	 Despite years of empty gestures, mind-numbing negotiations and the devaluation of the dollar to make U.S. products cheaper for Japanese consumers, America's $50-billion trade deficit with Japan has hardly budged.
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13-415/ DAVE ZIELENZIGER, 4-30-95, San Jose Mercury News, Tales of Japan's demise may be a bit premature; ACS VT96
	 Yet recent evidence suggests that America's complacent attitude toward Japan is wholly misguided. Only last week the American Electronics Association, in a little-noticed press release, calculated that the U.S. electronics industry's trade deficit with Japan grew by 11 percent last year to $28.6 billion, despite the growing strength of the yen. Meanwhile, the nation's trade deficit with the rest of Asia -- where many Japanese firms are now establishing branch manufacturers -- grew a mammoth 35 percent to $31.3 billion.
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13-416 / Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 A new realism in our Asian policy would mean rejecting the counsel of those who would continue to appease Japanese mercantilism on the theories that an overvalued yen or a domestic consumer revolt will soon eliminate its trade surplus. 
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13-417/ DAVE ZIELENZIGER, 4-30-95, San Jose Mercury News, Tales of Japan's demise may be a bit premature; ACS VT96
	 From the days of ``Japan bashing,'' we've entered a period of ``Japan passing'' as an important force. Policy-makers in Washington speak openly of ``Japan fatigue.'' U.S. firms are taking themselves off the Tokyo stock exchange. And electronics executives are saluting themselves over their recent successes.
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13-418 / DAVE ZIELENZIGER, 4-30-95, San Jose Mercury News, Tales of Japan's demise may be a bit premature; ACS VT96
	 ``No one cares about Japan anymore.'' says Dan Hutcheson, president of VLSI Research, the respected market research firm. ``We are back into our lax attitude that Japan is not a worry, not an issue. . . . We are patting ourselves on the backs as to how well we're doing, competing effectively against the Japanese.''
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13-419/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Keating urges Japanese leadership in APEC action plan"; ACS VT96
	 Murayama told Keating that Japan and the U.S. have agreed that the auto dispute should not affect the overall bilateral ties, the official said.
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13-420/ Patrick J. Buchanan, Presidential candidate, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Enough is enough; ACS VT96
	 ``We are being played for fools,'' writes Thomas Friedman of the New York Times. ``Japan will only change when we use the full strategic and economic weight of the U.S. to make clear to Tokyo that a failure to open all its markets, with concrete results, will lead to a crisis in the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship -- not just the economic one -- and specific retaliations against Japanese exports.''
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13-421/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p. 425; THR VT96
	 Japan is displaying a new self-confidence in a variety international arenas, which has caused some concern in the Asia Pacific. With respect to the United States this has meant not only a tougher response to trade disputes, but a quiet reexamination of the terms of the alliance. Since it entered office earlier this year, Prime Minister Tomichi Murayama's government has backtracked on the Socialist Party's long-standing opposition to Japan's alliance with the United States, the stationing of American troops on the home islands and Okinawa, and sharing costs associated with the maintenance of United States forces. But at the same time, the Murayama administration is forcing a careful rethinking of these sensitive issues. There is also a growing number of voices in Japan for a greater assertiveness toward China, with many intellectuals and politicians openly expressing concern about the prospects of a strong and powerful China. 
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 13-422/ Agence France Presse, January 24, 1995, HEADLINE: Japan to pursue "more proactive foreign policy" : official; ACS VT96
	 Japan will pursue a "more proactive foreign policy" in promoting peace and prosperity in East Asia, Hisashi Owada, Japan's permanent representative to the United Nations said here Tuesday. "Japan's foreign policy is at a major turning point," he said, adding that its global influence, largely economic up to the late 1980s, was "changing dramatically as a result of its increased standing in the international [community]."
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13-423 / Clare Hollingworth International Herald Tribune, January 15, 1994, HEADLINE: The Uncertainty in China Leaves Japanese on Edge//MDS-VT96
	 It will not be easy for Japan to formulate a new policy, however, until the succession to China's ailing leader, Deng Xiaoping, is firmly established. The Japanese generally believe that economic and political reformists will prevail in China, but they don't rule out the possibility that a hard-line Communist general might take power. Some Japanese businessmen fear that the prosperous southern provinces might break away from the heavy-handed Beijing government. 
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13-424/ Takehiko Kajita, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 5-6-95, SAN KOSE MERCURY NEWS, Japan's 'future-oriented' ties with China still unclear; ACS VT96
	 Japan's Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama may have achieved some success during his China trip in reinforcing the importance of ''future-oriented'' bilateral ties based on his country's deep remorse for its wartime past. But he apparently fell far short of delineating Tokyo's new diplomacy vis-a-vis China and other Asian countries toward the 21st century.
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13-425 / Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Besides, in the event of American-Chinese conflict, Japan is more likely to act as an opportunistic intermediary than a local ally, if its recent record of undercutting U.S. positions on human rights and arms proliferation in China and North Korea is any indication.
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13-426 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, U.S.-Japan alliance called 'irrelevant'; ACS VT96
	 Lind (Harper's Magazine senior editor Michael Lind) also accused Japan of ''undercutting U.S. positions on human rights and arms proliferation in China and North Korea,'' and reasoned that Japan ''is more likely to act as an opportunistic intermediary than a local ally'' in the event of a U.S.-China conflict.
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13-427/ Kyodo News Service, 6-2-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Kono urges China to stop nuclear tests" ACS VT96
	 According to a senior ministry official, there are strong voices within the ruling coalition government that Japan should take tougher actions against China in connection with the nuclear experiment.
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13-428 / Kyodo News Service, 5-31-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japan closely watching China's military moves" ACS VT96
	 Japan decided last week to reduce its grant aid to China as a way of registering its disapproval of the neighboring country's continued nuclear testing. At the time, however, Japan made clear it will not freeze its ODA to China in retaliation despite its ODA guidelines.
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13-429 / Kyodo News Service, 6-2-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Kono urges China to stop nuclear tests" ACS VT96
	 Following China's latest nuclear testing, Japan has indicated it will reduce its grants-in-aid to the country as a means to express its strong disapproval of the act.
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 13-430/Erland Heginbotham, Senior fellow at the National Planning Association in Washington, DC, 1994; TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS, "Taiwan's Economic Role in East Asian Development," edited by Robert G. Sutter and William R. Johnson, p. 51 ; ANA VT96
	 Taiwan continues to be highly attractive for direct investments from Japan. It offers an excellent investment climate with a broad and highly qualified managerial base and a highly educated and skilled work force. It provides Japanese manufacturers a familiar environment, competitive potential for producing medium- to advanced-technology components, subsystems, and final products for re export, particularly in electronic and automotive sectors. Metal fabrication and chemical industries have also attracted heavy investments. Japan has been the leading foreign investor in Taiwan since 1988, and has accounted for over a third of inward direct investment since 1987.
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13-431 / Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Taiwan independence move, Japan rearmament linked; ACS VT96
	 ''No Japanese government would be comfortable with a foreign government posing such a dilemma for it, and while I think Japan would side with the U.S. in such a decision, they would also seek to develop their own independent military capabilities to ensure this dilemma does not recur,'' Freeman said. [Chas Freeman, former assistant defense secretary]
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13-432/ Hidenaka Kato, reprinted from The Nikkei Weekly, Jan 9, 1995 , World Press Review, April, 1995; Pg. 52; HEADLINE: Can Japan learn to lead? Japanese foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 To be certain, Tokyo played a key role in brokering a peace settlement in Cambodia, and it is already involving itself more elsewhere in Asia. And after years of fence sitting, it has stated its desire to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
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13-433/ Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China might also be willing to see Japan adopt a larger regional security role in response to a decline in the U.S. presence, but only within the framework of the United Nations (UN). 
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13-434/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-24-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 "This administration has placed Asia at the core of our long-term foreign policy approach," the chief U.S. diplomat said. "Realizing President Clinton's vision of a stable and prosperous Pacific Community will continue to be a top priority." Christopher called Washington's ties to Japan the linchpin of its Asian policy and said "it is imperative that we reinforce our security and political ties with Japan as well as with South Korea and our other treaty allies." (Luchen LI, Daluo JIA)
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13-435/Lauren Fredman, Staff Writer, January 31, 1994; The Nikkei Weekly, "Global realities dictate closer ties among China, Japan and the U.S. Power Balance Vital To Stability, Expert Says", SECTION: EDITORIAL & COMMENTARY; Pg. 7; PMS VT96
	 Q:U.S. officials have described ties with Japan as the most important bilateral relationship. As China grows stronger economically and becomes more assertive internationally, will this change? A:No. I think it will be even more important. The U.S. and Japan need to balance the power of China. Already you can hear Southeast Asian leaders expressing these kinds of views - inviting the U.S. to remain. China is important, but the U.S.-Japan partnership is the key to peace and stability.
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13-436/ Vikram Khanna in HONGKONGBusiness Times October 16, 1993, Pg. 2 HEADLINE: US- Japan-China ties key to Asia-Pacific security: Kan Seng //MDS-VT96
	 Mr Wong[Singapore Foreign Minister] sees a continued US-Japan partnership as critical for the region's future. China's emergence as a great power also presents a challenge, Mr Wong observed. To develop, it needs a peaceful global climate. But it now has more resources to protect its interests. 
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13-437/ The Xinhua General Overseas News Service NOVEMBER 15, 1993, HEADLINE: lee: us- japan-china kept in balance, stability prevail ITEM NO: 1115133//MDS-VT96
	 singapore senior minister lee kuan yew said here today that so long as the us-japan-china relationships are kept in balance, stability will prevail. both japan and china stand to benefit from good relations with the us, and good relations between the three will make for easy relations with the countries of the region, lee said. 
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13-438/ Kyodo News Service, 6-2-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Chinese leader urges 'correct' recognition of past" ACS VT96
	 Murayama also told Li that close relations between Japan and China play an important role in ensuring stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region, the officials said.
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13-439/ Vikram Khanna in HONGKONGBusiness Times October 16, 1993, Pg. 2 HEADLINE: US- Japan-China ties key to Asia-Pacific security: Kan Seng //MDS-VT96
	 THE triangular relationship between the United States, Japan and China is emerging as the main focus of Asia-Pacific international relations in the 1990s and beyond, says Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng. 
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13-440/ DORIAN BENKOIL, Associated Press Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, A `Hollowed-Out' Japanese Industrial Base: Reality or Hype?; ACS VT96
	 `Hollowing'' fears are compounded by concerns that the high yen is hampering Japan's recovery from a bruising three-year recession. The high yen cuts into export earnings of powerhouse industries like cars and consumer electronics that helped build Japan into an economic power.
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13-441 / DAVE ZIELENZIGER, 4-30-95, San Jose Mercury News, Tales of Japan's demise may be a bit premature; ACS VT96
	 The country you almost never hear mentioned is Japan. It's too expensive to do business there, business leaders complain -- especially with the yen gaining ever more strength against the U.S. dollar. Their markets are too closed. The politics too uncertain. And besides, American domination of microprocessors and multimedia mean Japan's days in the sun are ending.
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13-442 / Patrick J. Buchanan, Presidential candidate, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Enough is enough; ACS VT96
	 Japan is the aggressor here. But Japan cannot win a trade war with America. Japan would be putting at risk $125 billion in exports, while we would risk but $60 billion in exports.
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13-443/ DORIAN BENKOIL, Associated Press Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, A `Hollowed-Out' Japanese Industrial Base: Reality or Hype?; ACS VT96
	 The worst-case scenario goes like this: With costs soaring due to the skyrocketing yen, Japanese companies rush to move production overseas. And they move so much of it that the country loses its manufacturing base. Unemployment soars. A fragile economic recovery is cut short, plunging the country back into recession. The Japanese call it ``kudoka'' -- hollowing out. The phenomenon has been talked about for years, but the yen's march to new highs has rekindled worries.
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13-444/ DAVE ZIELENZIGER, 4-30-95, San Jose Mercury News, Tales of Japan's demise may be a bit premature; ACS VT96
	 Already, Fingleton argues, the Japanese have made powerful strides: -- Measured by current exchange rates, Japan surpassed the U.S. in 1993 to become the world's largest manufacturing economy. -- Between 1989 and 1993, Japan jumped from sixth to second place in per capita income. -- According to figures compiled by the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Japan held 56 percent of the industrialized world's net savings, about $819 billion in 1993. U.S. savings, by contrast, amounted to $75 billion, or 5 percent of the industrialized world's total.
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13-445/ DAVE ZIELENZIGER, 4-30-95, San Jose Mercury News, Tales of Japan's demise may be a bit premature; ACS VT96
	 So amid this dissonance -- an emotional confidence in America seemingly unsupported by facts -- comes a provocative new book by a European journalist who argues that America is being suckered by signs of Japan's weakness. In ``Blindside,'' author Eamonn Fingleton argues persuasively that Japan is poised to overtake the United States by the year 2000, powered by a distinctive and powerful form of capitalism that leaves us in the dust.
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13-446/ DORIAN BENKOIL, Associated Press Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, A `Hollowed-Out' Japanese Industrial Base: Reality or Hype?; ACS VT96
	 Some observers, though, believe the fears are exaggerated. Debunkers of ``hollowing'' say Japan's industrial base is very much intact. ``I think it's a big media hype,'' said Ron Bevacqua, an economist with Merrill Lynch. Even with the trend toward moving production offshore, Japan's rate of overseas manufacturing remains low compared with those of other industrialized countries, Bevacqua and others said.
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13-447 / DORIAN BENKOIL, Associated Press Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, A `Hollowed-Out' Japanese Industrial Base: Reality or Hype?; ACS VT96
	 Since the start of the year, the yen has gained nearly 20 percent in value against the dollar and many other currencies roughly pegged to the dollar, such as those of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. That makes Japanese labor and goods relatively more expensive. That, in turn, has spurred movement of more production overseas, especially to China and Southeast Asia.
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13-448/ DORIAN BENKOIL, Associated Press Writer, 5-7-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, A `Hollowed-Out' Japanese Industrial Base: Reality or Hype?; ACS VT96
	 But some analysts say moving manufacturing overseas actually could help the economy rather than hurt it. In surveys, Japanese business leaders say their moves overseas are meant to capitalize on booming markets in Asia.
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13-449/ CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-30-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 "Sino-Russian relations over the last year have maintained a positive trend of steady development," Wu quoted Qian as saying. The over 20 agreements reached during a visit by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in December 1992 "are being implemented now," he added. According to a Itar-Tass News Agency report, both foreign ministers basically agreed that Chinese President Jiang Zemin will visit Moscow between July and September this year. Sometime before Jiang's trip, Qian, also a vice premier, will visit Moscow, while Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will make a trip to Beijing, the report said.
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13-450 / CHINA NEWS DIGEST, 1-30-95; News Global; ACS VT96
	 According to Wu, Kozyrev said "Further development of Russian-Chinese ties enjoys priority in Russia's foreign policy and will not be affected by domestic political changes in Russia." Kozyrev expressed hopes for Russian-Chinese cooperation in large projects like China's Three-Gorges Dam project, Wu said, but did not elaborate on whether cooperation in the construction of nuclear power plants or military affairs was discussed.
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 13-451/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND Sit[DIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 44; MDS VT96
	 Interestingly enough, many Russian analysts consider the PRC to be perhaps the only mighty country on which Russia can rely in trying to strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific region. Neither the United States nor Japan would support such Russian activity, because doing so would narrow their own spheres of influence. For the PRC, according to this assumption, regional cooperation with Russia can help to preserve the balance of power in the region and to counterbalance American and Japanese influence.
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13-452/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, p. 223; THR VT96
	 The major. fact behind the unexpected improvement in China's relations with Russia and the Central Asian states was that Russia no longer constituted a threat to China. Not only did the Western section of China's boundaries with what had been the Soviet Union now border its weak but apparently friendly Central Asian successor states, but Russia itself was still in serious decline economically and in no position to threaten China. If anything, the potential for threat lay the other way round. The new threat to China in the form of ethnic tensions and Islamic revival in the newly independent Central Asian states could hardly be serious for some time to come in view of the political divisions still afflicting those countries and their willingness to be friendly to China, and at the same time both Russia and China had a strong interest in trying to prevent such tensions from getting out of hand or spreading to either country.
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13-453/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND Sit[DIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 47; MDS VT96
	 From the Russian point of view, friendly ties with the PRC are a way to secure the rear in maintaining ties with Western countries. To achieve this goal, Russia needs a balanced approach. In case the PRC clashes with the West, Russia will need to maintain a close relationship with both sides.
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13-454/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 262; MDS VT96
	 The other major power in the region, Russia, is said to have modified its objectives in seeking a peaceful environment for the economic development of its Far East and to further cooperation in Northeast Asia as a whole through closer relations with the United States, China and the Republic of Korea. 
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13-455 / Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 63; ANA VT96
	 While the PRC and the Soviet Union each pretend to be indifferent to the other, secretly they are mutually attracted. The future relationship between the PRC and the Soviet Union is unclear but a number of scenarios are possible. Following the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, there seems likely to be greater economic and technological cooperation and intensified cultural, educational, sporting, and personnel exchanges. As a result of attempts to institute economic reforms, both sides will have an advantage in improving substantive relations as a basic policy (Pi 1989b). With regard to political relations, the PRC remains aware of its dependence on the United States, Japan, and other Western countries for capital and technology in military and economic projects. In fear that any inordinate intimacy with the Soviet Union might arouse suspicion on the part of these countries, they are likely to stick to their "small-step" policy in increasing their political contact with the Soviet Union (Harding 1987). On the other hand, following the June 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and Western sanctions, the PRC may now be more willing to improve political relations with the Soviet Union--a fear that the Bush administration clearly recognizes. Finally, with regard to Communist party relations, no great breakthrough is likely in the near future because of the many unresolved differences and doubts. Party relations have been strained by the moves of Gorbachev toward reform and Deng in the opposite direction. Therefore, even if overall relations improve it is not likely that the two nations will pursue unified policy or actions.
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13-456/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 62; ANA VT96
	 The PRC and the Soviet Union held their first summit meeting since 1959 in Beijing on May 15-18, 1989, and agreed to re-establish fun relations (Pi 1989b).4 The summit raised the prospect of a new era of bilateral cooperation between the two communist giants. Expanded economic and technological cooperation and intensified cultural, educational, sporting, and personnel exchanges indicated that both sides now regarded the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations a primary policy objective. Given the economic, geographic, historic, and administrative circumstances, it is possible that normalization and cooperation will result in greater economic development in the Soviet Far East and eastern Siberian (Kirby 1987:193-201).
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13-457/June Dreyer, Prof. of politics at Univ. of Miami, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Military Relations: Sanctions or Rapprochement?" edited by William T Tow p. 214; THR VT96
	 In June 1990, the first Soviet military delegation in thirty years visited China for what was described as "a seven-day formal friendly visit." A Beijing publication reported that the two parties would discuss expanding contacts and cooperation? Shortly thereafter, a Chinese delegation led by powerful Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing and including the head of the PRC's Ministry of Aerospace Industries, visited the USSR. Jane's Defense Weekly and a respected Hong Kong newspaper stated that a major topic of negotiations was combat aircraft. China was reportedly seeking to obtain licenses to build the MiG-29 fighter and the Su-24 ground attack planes. Both sources specifically linked China's interest in the two Soviet planes to the cancellation of the PRC's contract with the United States.
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13-458/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 51 ; MDS VT96
	 In desperate economic circumstances and trying to earn hard currency, Russia and the other former republics of the Soviet Union are selling arms and technology to Iran, Cuba, the PRC, and other countries, causing great concern in the West. 
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13-459/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 19, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Meanwhile, China is continuing the development of military ties with Russia. General Pavel Grachev, Russian Defence Minister, is paying a five-day official visit to Beijing starting on Monday, AFP reported. This is Grachev's second visit to Beijing in less than two years. He is going to discuss military cooperation and arms deals with China. But Russia's embassy in Beijing denied the latter, saying that arms deals belong to the Russia's official state arms company Rosvoruzhenya only.
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 13-460/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 379; THR VT 96 Nevertheless, as reductions along the Sino-Soviet frontier have made clear, there is real arms control in Asia. In fact, the Euro-Atlantic obsession with de jure arms control has never been accepted in the East Asian context of more pragmatic politics. De facto arms control along the Sino-Soviet frontier was far more impressive than anything seen in the pre-1990 European theater. China began the process in the early stages of its reforms by unilaterally pulling back its forces from the frontier to allow for a more mobile defense doctrine to be put into operation. 123 The Soviet Union, in the unreformed old days of Brezhnev, decided that the deployments in the Soviet Far East were sufficient to deter a Chinese threat. Divisions were unofficially "thinned out" by reducing the category of readiness. More than eighty thousand troops were taken off the frontier before Gorbachev came to power. China responded, albeit tacitly, by reducing its armed forces by some 1 million men in 1985-87. About ninety thousand troops were removed from the Sin. o-Soviet frontier.
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13-461 / Evelyn Tan Powers, USA TODAY, March 3, 1995, Pg. 5A, HEADLINE: Human rights to stay part of U.S. policy; ACS VT96
	 CHINA AND INDIA: Chinese Foreign Ministry official Wang Chengui and his Indian counterpart Shiv Shankar Menon are leading bilateral talks in New Delhi to help end tensions between troops on the Himalayan border. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev assured China that Moscow will abide by a border treaty, calming fears aroused by Yevgeny Nazdratenko, governor of Russia's Maritime region bordering China, who said the 1991 treaty was unjust and should be scrapped.
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13-462/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), April 28, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Russian Governor Opposes Border Pact with China [CND, 04/25/95] MOSCOW -- Yevgeny Nazdratenko, governor of the Maritime region in Russia's Far East, will refuse to comply with a border pact signed in 1991 to cede 15 square km of territory to China. During a visit to Beijing last month, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev told Chinese Foreign Minister QIAN Qichen that Moscow would stand by the pact under which China claimed back three tiny strips of land located at the tip where Russia meets China and North Korea. (Ming TIAN, Jian LIU) 
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13-463 / McNaugher, September 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 Ironically, Russians are among those most worried. Russia's vastly underpopulated Far East has always been a logistics nightmare for Russian forces. Against a strong China, Russians worry that their Far Eastern border is almost indefensible. That problem helps explain the conspicuous absence of a nuclear "no-first-use" pledge from Russia's new military doctrine. Like NATO during the Cold War, Russians think they may have to rely on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional force inferiority. 
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13-465/ JOHN DIAMOND, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; RUSSIAN MILITARY RETURNING TO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUNN SAYS; ACS VT96
	 Nunn, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, stopped short of warning of a renewed Cold War. But he said that in terms of military policy and technology, the Russian move was ``a step backwards.'' ``Their demoralized military and conventional forces having gone down very, very substantially, I think they're going to move to rely almost predictably, more and more on nuclear weapons,'' Nunn said at a hearing on future U.S. military strategy and planning. ``I believe a few months from now our intelligence community will be reporting to us ... (that) their doctrine is going to be changing because of the weakness in (Russian) conventional forces,'' Nunn said.
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13-464/ JOHN DIAMOND, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; RUSSIAN MILITARY RETURNING TO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUNN SAYS; ACS VT96
	 Pentagon officials have been watching Russian nuclear policy closely for more than a year. In November 1993 Russian President Boris Yeltsin adopted a new military doctrine that, for the first time, declared his willingness to use nuclear weapons if Russia or its allies were attacked with conventional weapons. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's top official in charge of military force assessment, said in a brief interview after the hearing that the new Russian doctrine ``showed, I think, some retreat at least on the part of the military, arguing that they could not give up first use and that sort of thing.''
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13-466/ JOHN DIAMOND, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; RUSSIAN MILITARY RETURNING TO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUNN SAYS; ACS VT96
	 Russia is turning back to nuclear weapons as the backbone of its military force and strategy, Sen. Sam Nunn said Friday on the eve of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Moscow. A top Pentagon strategist, too, said such a change is under way -- a development he dates to 1993.
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13-467/ JOHN DIAMOND, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; RUSSIAN MILITARY RETURNING TO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUNN SAYS; ACS VT96
	 Sen. Bob Smith, R-N.H., chairman of the hearing, said he agreed with the caution raised by Nunn but added that the debate within Russia has not yet been resolved. A trend toward reliance on nuclear weapons by Russia, Smith said, may provide another argument for revival of a national missile defense system being pushed by some Republican lawmakers.
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13-468 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 To avoid Russian hegemony over the near abroad, to say nothing of creating the groundwork for future cooperation on a whole range of international matters, the United States and the other members of the democratic zone of peace have a substantial interest in helping Russia become a "normal" country, that is, a country that does not hanker for an empire and whose domestic life is not distorted by overmilitarization. Ideally, it would become a prosperous, free market, Western-style democracy. Whether Russia will succeed in becoming a normal state is difficult to predict, but the stakes justify a major Western effort. 
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13-469 / FRANK GAFFNEY; director of the Center for Security Policy in Washington, Defense News, April 3, 1995 / April 9, 1995; Pg. 19. HEADLINE: U.S. Leadership Must Awaken To Onrushing Tide of Crises; ACS VT96
	 The following are among the dynamic conditions in play today that could produce the next international cataclysm, possibly on a global scale: The intensifying leadership crisis in Russia augurs ill for democratic reform there and for the emergence of a reliable U.S. partner in international affairs. Continued production of nuclear forces and submarines, the genocidal campaign in Chechnya, the hemorrhage of advanced Russian weapon systems and nuclear materials, the re-emergence of the old KGB and the ever-more assertive pursuit of foreign policies incompatible with U.S. interests ought to tell us something. Of those in Congress and elsewhere who used to claim that the United States would have years of warning before it faced a renewed threat from Russia it must be asked: Are these not the sort of alarming indicators that we would expect to see early on?
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13-470 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Russia is still trying to find a place for itself in the world. Although still weakening militarily and economically, as heir to the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal it is capable of conducting an all-out nuclear attack on the United States. Consequently, it requires special attention under any circumstances. In the near term -- 10 years -- Moscow is unlikely to pose a global challenge. Even in its current weakened condition, however, Russia can pose a major regional threat if it moves toward reimperialization. This scenario has been dubbed "Weimar Russia," denoting the possibility that, embittered by its economic and political troubles and humiliations, Russia may attempt to recover [...] reincorporation of -- or hegemony over -- part or all of the old "internal" empire. In the aftermath of the December 1993 parliamentary elections and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's strong showing in them, many Russians indicated a strong preference for reincorporation of the so-called near abroad -- the states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. But, more recently, concerns about costs and negative international reaction have resulted in a shift in favor of hegemony -- Russian geopolitical and economic domination of weak but nominally independent states.
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13-472 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 Russians feel humiliated and despondent. They have lost their empire and their great-power status; their economy is in an appalling mess; and the social-safety net -- the one good thing they could count on during the Communist years -- is disintegrating. This is fertile ground for extreme nationalists. Yet they have been surprisingly ineffectual in parliament, largely because of the buffoonery of their leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and because their actions have been blocked by a large group of pro-reform legislators.
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13-471/ Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 Yeltsin and his foreign policy team are increasingly hostile towards the West. Russia has refused to join the U.S.-sponsored "Partnership for Peace" that is supposed to provide Eastern European nations with a way station to membership in NATO, and at the recent meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Yeltsin spoke darkly of slippage towards a "cold peace" between the great powers. Political and economic reform in Russia will take a long time, and nationalists will have ample opportunities to engage in incendiary politics -- especially if breakaway movements contribute to more crises like the one in Chechnya. Even if reformers hold on to power, they will shift their foreign policies to the fight to protect themselves from nationalist attacks. 
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13-473/ JOHN DIAMOND, Associated Press Writer, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-6-95; RUSSIAN MILITARY RETURNING TO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUNN SAYS; ACS VT96
	 Dunbar Lockwood, a researcher at the Arms Control Association, a private non-profit group, said the expected Senate ratification of the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may not be matched by ratification in the Russian Duma, or legislature. Hard-line elements in the military and the Duma argue that with NATO likely to expand toward its borders and with an economically vibrant China modernizing its military, this is no time to further disarm.
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13-474/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russia Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 50; MDS VT96
	 The task now is to disassemble the confrontational structures existing in both countries and to bolster free trade and various forms of exchanges which will foster "special relationships." American aid is not only the key to ensuring future American interests but also the new basis for a relationship between the two countries. If Clinton fails to obtain the extra US$1 billion-plus in aid for Russia from Congress, insists on being tough on Russian arms sales, and shows an unwillingness to lift Cold War restrictions on trade, the renewal of the PRC's MFN status will damage Russian-American relations in the long run. Russia will not forget how other great powers treated it during its present time of troubles. The survival of the Russian reform process and the restructuring of the Russian economy will eventually force the fragile Russian-American strategic alliance toward a more stable relationship. 
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13-475 / Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 The changed international environment has, however, raised new security considerations in Beijing. There is some concern that ethnic tensions in the former Soviet republics along China's border could spill over into China. There is some fear, as well, that trouble could be fomented among China's own ethnic minorities that have links to groups in the former Soviet republics. 
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13-476/Robert Sutter, Senior specialist in international politics, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "China and the U.S. Congress: Policy Determinants and Constraints," edited by William T. Tow, p. 40; THR VT96
	 The dramatic changes in the Soviet bloc had an obvious "ripple effect" in China, encouraging pro-democracy forces and alarming Chinese leaders, who grew even more determined to maintain the party's monopoly on power. In addition, developments in the Soviet bloc abruptly ended Chinese leaders' hopes that they could avoid the "spiritual pollution" of pro-democracy ideals by expanding economic-technical contacts with communist-ruled European countries. By 1990, political ideas coming from Eastern Europe appeared perhaps more directly challenging to the political status quo in China than were the ideas from the West. 
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 13-477/ Dr. Chao Tze-chi, Pres. World League for Freedom & Democracy, Sept.-Oct., 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "ROC flag flutters in Moscow again" p. 6; SEG VT96
	 Moreover, despite half century of inseparable close ties between Communist China and the USSR, things are quite different nowadays. Notwithstanding diplomatic, trade and economic ties still binding Moscow and Beijing, my personal observation is that the Chinese Communists cannot sway Russia to any large extent. Therefore, it behooves the ROC to take the initiative, at this current state of near vacuum, to pursue ties with diverse CIS states from which substantive results can be anticipated.
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13-478/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 253; THR VT96
	 One very major difference between China and the Soviet Union is in the state of the economy. Whereas the Soviet economy was in decline for years before the Party was overthrown in 1991, and resisted all of Gorbachev's attempts to try to improve the situation, that of China has generally been doing very well since the late 1970s, with an impressive rate of growth. It has scored notable success in moving 'into a competitive, highly-productive free market economic system'. It is never possible to predict just how long economic growth will last, but unless civil war breaks out, the chances appear very good that, for the rest of the twentieth century, China will be able to avoid depression on the scale which accompanied and to a large extent brought about the end of the Soviet Union.
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13-479 / Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 Yet it is in America's interest for there to be a moderately strong Russia to act as a military counterweight in Asia to Japan and China. We should continue to support Russia's territorial integrity and give it economic aid.
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13-480/Jen-kun Fu, Colonel in the Republic of China army and senior research fellow of that country's National Security Council, 1992; TAIWAN AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE ASIAN-AMERICAN DILEMMA, p. 62; ANA VT96
	 The strategic implications of the new Moscow-Beijing ties are difficult to assess. Their relationship swung from one of dose allies to one of sworn enemies. The late 1980s saw the swing of the pendulum back to friendly relations. These dramatic shifts have naturally disrupted and destabilized the international system (Swearingen 1987). In the triangular relationship formed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic Community (on which the fortunes of Europe hang), the United States and Western Europe have been able to gain a position of strength over the Soviet Union owing to the former's economic technological and political advantages (Chou 1987). On the other hand, in the triangular relationship formed in Asia by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC (on which the fortunes of Asia hang), the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union have the potential to gain superiority over the United States owing to the former's ideological and institutional similarities and geopolitical advantages (Lapidus 1986). This potential was manifested in Gorbachev's Soviet Asia policy outlined in his 1986 Vladivostok speech. In short, the United States has a stronger hand in Europe while the Soviet Union has an increasingly strong hand in Asia. 
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 13-481/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 34 THR VT96
	 To China's southwest, Beijing is seeking to improve relations with New Delhi while maintaining its traditionally warm ties to Islamabad. China's apparent nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and recurring reports of pending and/or actual missile technology sales to Islamabad are contrary to U.S. interests and are regionally destabilizing. Nonetheless closer Sino-Indian relations are, a trend very much in the U.S. interest.
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13-482 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 For the foreseeable future, China will be a permanent factor in Indian strategic planning, even though Sino-Indian diplomatic relations are much less tense these days. Troops have been withdrawn by both sides in the Himalayas, and border trade has opened up.
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 13-483/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, ' p. 238; THR VT96
	 On several other issues, however, China and India seem to have found a common position. In a joint communique issued at the end of Li's visit to India, the two countries expressed their disagreement With the Western position on the issue of human rights, instead describing the 'right to subsistence and development' as a basic human right. Given India's pride in its open political system and independent judiciary, it was perhaps surprising to see India allow itself to be seen in the same category as China on the subject of human rights. 
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13-484 / Agence France Presse, December 28, 1994 HEADLINE: Li Peng winds up visit to Burma//MDS-VT96
	 China's traditional rival in the region, India, is worried about what it sees as the Chinese navy's push toward the Indian Ocean, diplomats say, adding that the Burmese army and air force have been revamped since 1990 with Chinese equipment. 
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13-485 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 A well-informed U.S. study also points to the possibility that China may deploy its nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. According to a 1993 article by Marcus B. Zinger, a naval attache in the U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh: " China is both a land and sea power, Pakistan's most powerful ally, and India's chief competitor for leadership of the non-aligned movement. China also poses the principal nuclear threat against India.... As Russia continues to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal and its conventional forces, the Chinese will be free to rethink their strategic imperatives. They intend to continue developing their nuclear submarine force as well as their surface fleet. With the absence of a Russian threat, China will redirect its naval focus towards the east and south. While Japan seems to present the obvious target for China's new military focus, because of its growing influence in East Asia, for several reasons I feel it will probably be India instead."
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13-486/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 262 MDS VT96
	 In the Chinese view another potential rival is India with which China has been engaged in periodic border disputes since the late 1950s; this perception is now colored by greater Indian openness to foreign investment and a considerable nuclear capacity.
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13-487 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 Pakistanis speak of "Indian hegemony." Indians complain of "Pakistani interference" in the border provinces, especially Kashmir. Meanwhile, India keeps a wary eye on China, its principal Asian rival.
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13-488 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 Given these circumstances, Indian planners do not accept the American view that China is not a strategic problem for India, and therefore India should concentrate on improving its relations with Pakistan. Surprisingly, even Chinese experts see potential problems in Sino-Indian relations. 
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13-489 / ASHOK KAPUR, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1995 ; Pg. 38; HEADLINE: Western biases; nuclear arms race in South Asia; ACS VT96
	 Further, since 1988 China has developed a commercial and political position with Myanmar (Burma), which faces India across the Bay of Bengal. The new relationship involves Chinese aid to rebuild World War II-era roads constructed in the Burmese theater, and to develop a radar facility in the Coco Islands, which would be about 15 miles from the major Indian naval station in the Andaman Islands. 
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13-490 / CLARENCE FERNANDEZ, Reuters News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, India sticks to outsider nuclear policy; ACS VT96
	 Last year, a U.S. Congressional Research Service report said India could build fission and hydrogen bombs. It put India's plutonium stocks at about 300 kgs, enough for about 50 nuclear weapons. India could deliver a nuclear bomb with aircraft or short-range Prithvi or intermediate-range Agni missiles, it said. Those missiles would be powerful enough to strike China, which has nuclear weapons, or Pakistan. Since independence in 1947, India has fought three wars with Pakistan and a brief one in 1962 against China.
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13-491 / CLARENCE FERNANDEZ, Reuters News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, India sticks to outsider nuclear policy; ACS VT96
	 India tested a nuclear device in 1974. New Delhi says it has no atomic bomb but foreign experts believe both Indian and Pakistan could quickly build such weapons.
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13-492 / The Tampa Tribune, March 13, 1995, Pg. 8, HEADLINE: How U.S. might send a message to itchy nations with nuclear arms; ACS VT96
	 Others, such as Israel and India, already have. India explains that it cannot trust China, and Israel cannot trust Iran and Iraq. The collapse of the Soviet Union unlocked the doors of the nuclear barn, and now nuclear materials and expertise are believed to be available on world markets. And, Mandelbaum observes, secret ambitions for those arms have been brought into the open.
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13-493/Douglas Stuart, Assoc. prof. of political science and director of international studies at Dickinson College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Determinants of PRC Arms Control: Policies in the 1990s," edited by William T. Tow, p.305; THR VT96
	 China could also choose to reduce the dangers of war along its western border. Here, Beijing must weigh the risks of a nuclear and conventional arms race against the costs of contributing to an atmosphere of restraint. The PRC recognizes a stake in convincing India not to develop its armed forces in general and its nuclear ballistic missile delivery capability in particular. But the triangular nature of the regional balance means that Pakistan and China must jointly offer inducements to India if this trend is to be slowed or reversed. If, for example, the PRC wishes to see more progress toward a South Asian nuclear-free zone, it will not be sufficient for Beijing to press Islamabad to be more forthcoming in its offers to New Dehli. China itself will have to become directly engaged in the talks. And the PRC will have to offer India more than a commitment not to deploy its nuclear systems south or west of an agreed upon line, in light of the fact that China is working to enhance the mobility of its shorter-range systems. Under these circumstances, Beijing is likely to conclude that the costs of moving its South Asian neighbors toward arms restraint are simply too high. 
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13-494/Evan S. Medeiros, Project Assistant on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 1994; The Christian Science Monitor, "China and the Test Ban: Clinton's Dilemma", SECTION: OPINION /ESSAYS; Pg. 22; PMS VT96
	 Finally, a Chinese program to augment and upgrade its missiles to such an extent that Beijing could more accurately target military and civilian sites in India with multiple warheads would remove any incentive for India to halt or roll back its long-range missile and nuclear-weapons programs. Indeed, the best way to get India into a test ban is to ensure that China is there first.
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13-495 / CLARENCE FERNANDEZ, Reuters News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, India sticks to outsider nuclear policy; ACS VT96
	 By In ignoring the concerns of major powers over an arms race in South Asia, India has reaffirmed its long-standing refusal to stay out of the world's foremost treaty for the control of nuclear weapons. Indian says the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by 178 nations last week legitimised the threat of nuclear weapons because it is discriminatory and does not provide for their elimination.
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13-496 / CLARENCE FERNANDEZ, Reuters News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, India sticks to outsider nuclear policy; ACS VT96
	 On Tuesday, when Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao publicly condemned the pact, he was hewing to a foreign policy that dates back to the height of the Cold War. ``The NPT, as it was drafted, is discriminatory,'' Rao told parliament. ``It divides the world into haves and have nots and in effect works against the have nots. I fail to see why a treaty like this is being continued,'' he said. ``It goes against the grain of our policy and we do not accept it.''
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13-497 / CLARENCE FERNANDEZ, Reuters News Service, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, India sticks to outsider nuclear policy; ACS VT96
	 ``The nuclear weapons states pulled out all the stops to ensure the review process would not lead to any commitment higher than the non-binding one that has existed in the NPT itself, or any time-frames for disarmament,'' said Jasjit Singh, head the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses. With no commitment to disarmament, the NPT was even more irrelevant than before, he said. ``It has become more important than ever before that we construct our own security on the assumption that nuclear weapons will remain in the arsenals of nuclear states.''
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13-498 / JONATHAN MANTHORPE; SOUTHAM NEWS The Ottawa Citizen, October 9, 1994, Pg. D10, HEADLINE: INDIA: China, Pakistan boost naval activity near India; Aging fleet, more competition threaten Indian domination of regional waters//MDS-VT96
	 India has by far the largest navy in the region, matched only by visiting fleets from Russia and the United States. But western military observers say the Indian fleets are not as effective as they look on paper. "The Indian navy is not a potent force, said one military observer. "It is probably about right if they have to fight the Pakistan Navy and defend their coastline, but that's about it. 
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13-499 / Herve Clerc Agence France Presse, September 21, 1994 HEADLINE: Pakistan buys French submarines in billion-dollar deal//MDS-VT96
	 But experts said the Agosta submarines were capable of firing missiles at vessels entering or leaving Bombay port. The missiles are capable of being launched at a depth of 20 to 30 metres (70 to 100 feet), thus making the submarine virtually undetectable. 
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13-500 / Herve Clerc Agence France Presse, September 21, 1994 HEADLINE: Pakistan buys French submarines in billion-dollar deal//MDS-VT96
	 Pakistan agreed Wednesday to buy three French submarines and a batch of hi-technology anti-ship missiles in a billion-dollar deal that India attacked as a further incitement to the South Asia arms race. 
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13-501/Michele Ledic, Researcher of China's foreign trade and energy Brikbeck College, University of London, 1991; CHINA THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 27; THR VT96
	 However, given the close links at present between China and Hong Kong, and the likely strengthening of these links, in spite of the events of June 1989, it seems probable that 1997 itself will not be of great economic significance for either China or Hong Kong. Anticipation of 1997, together with strong economic forces in both China and Hong Kong, are bringing the two economies closer together. It seems likely also that Hong Kong's great importance to China as an entrepot, as a financial center, and as a window to the rest of the world, will help to ensure Hong Kong's future economic independence, despite (as far as can be foreseen) political to the contrary. 
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13-502 / JOHN LEICESTER, Associated Press Writer, 5-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Chinese Official Promises All Will Be Well for Hong Kong; ACS VT96
	 China assured Hong Kong on Thursday that it would not do away with its civil service, capitalist system and freedom of travel after the British colony reverts to Chinese rule in 1997. Lu Ping, Beijing's top official for Hong Kong affairs, gave the reassurances at a seminar highlighting the quickening pace of Chinese preparations for the handover.
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13-503/Michele Ledic, Researcher of China's foreign trade and energy Brikbeck College, University of London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.216; THR VT96
	 The Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was ratified in 1985, guarantees the continuation of Hong Kong's present rights and freedoms for a period of fifty years after 1997. Hong Kong will retain its capitalist system, its freely convertible currency, its status as a free port, and its own customs territory. It will conduct its own economic and cultural relations, and continue to participate in international organizations. The Basic Law, embodying these principles, was approved by the Chinese authorities in April 1990. 
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13-504/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), May 15, 1995; ACS VT96
	 Hong Kong Police Urged to Stay after 1997 [CND, 05/12/94] BEIJING -- A high ranking official urged police officers in Hong Kong to remain in their jobs after China takes over in 1997. Tian Qiyu, China's deputy minister of public security, promised that "China will not interfere in the internal affairs" of police officers after the handover. Tian made such comment in a meeting organized by a division of the Prepara- tory Working Committees (PWC), an organization set up to prepare for Hong Kong's transition. (Zhiping YU, Dalou JIA)
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13-505 / Rob Tucker, The News Tribune, Tacoma, Wash. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Won't Interfere with Hong Kong Economy, Beijing Banker Says; ACS VT96
	 As part of the 1984 transition treaty with Great Britain, China with its controlled economy agreed to tolerate Hong Kong's free market system for 50 years. Since then, Chinese reforms have made the People's Republic the fastest developing economic system in Asia.
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13-506 / Rob Tucker, The News Tribune, Tacoma, Wash. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Won't Interfere with Hong Kong Economy, Beijing Banker Says; ACS VT96
	 The only visible changes that will occur are that China will represent Hong Kong in diplomatic relations and ``the flag and national anthem will change,'' he said. [Zhou Xiao Chuan, a leading Beijing banker]
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13-507 / Rob Tucker, The News Tribune, Tacoma, Wash. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Won't Interfere with Hong Kong Economy, Beijing Banker Says; ACS VT96
	 Despite its own rapid development in recent years, China won't interfere with Hong Kong's capitalist economy for the next five decades, a leading Beijing banker said Thursday. Zhou Xiao Chuan's reassurances came in response to questions from members of a Seattle audience.
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13-508/Martin Lee, Elected member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, and Chairman of the newly-formed Democratic Party, Feb 1995; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Hong Kong's 1000 Days," p. 3; MDS VT96
	 In fewer than 1000 days Hong Kong will become part of China and the basic freedoms now enjoyed by its six million people, exercised daily in the press and radio, education, religion and the law, may be seen in a very different, 'counter-revolutionary' light. Already China has promised to abolish the Hong Kong Bill of Rights that became law in 1991. Now we are told that when Beijing takes over Hong Kong at midnight on June 30, 1997, the first official act of the new sovereign will be to scrap Hong Kong's Legislative Council and the other layers of local government. China's own hardly democratic National People's Congress (NPC) issued the death warrant for our legislature in early September 1994, decreeing that "the Legislative Council, city government, district government, and district boards will be terminated on June 30, 1997. 
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13-509 / Rob Tucker, The News Tribune, Tacoma, Wash. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Won't Interfere with Hong Kong Economy, Beijing Banker Says; ACS VT96
	 There will be Chinese troops in Hong Kong and if things grow tense or the political environment deteriorates, Hong Kong could disappear as an international banking center. The international finance community could leave just like they left Beijing in 1989 when the Tiananmen Square uprising occurred, he [Bachman is chairman of the Chinese studies program at the University of Washington] said.
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13-510 / Rob Tucker, The News Tribune, Tacoma, Wash. Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 5-12-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, China Won't Interfere with Hong Kong Economy, Beijing Banker Says; ACS VT96
	 China expert David Bachman remains skeptical about China's intentions toward Hong Kong. Bachman is chairman of the Chinese studies program at the University of Washington's Henry M. Jackson school of international relations. ``The Chinese have come to appreciate Hong Kong's economic side, but there's not enough appreciation of the political system that allows the economic activity,'' he said.
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 13-512 / Suzanna Pepper, Hong Kong journalist, Jan., 1995; ASIAN SURVEY, "Hong Kong in 1994" p.54 ;SEG VT96
	 Lu Ping, the senior Chinese official responsible for Hong Kong affairs, made his first trip to the territory since the Patten reforms were unveiled to deliver China's response personally--and in language as frank as the FAC report he was answering. The historical background giving force to his argu- ment was as usual assumed, but the reasoning drawn from it was otherwise explicit. He acknowledged that some believed Hong Kong's capitalist sys- tem could only be guaranteed if China turned capitalist. Chinese leaders were dead set against such a course, he said, for fear of "chaos and disruption to the Chinese economy," which would mean disaster for Hong Kong as well. "Hence, any foreign government of Hong Kong people trying to exert pres- sure on the Chinese Government will not succeed .... I would like to stress that the value of Hong Kong to China has been and will be its economic value. Hong Kong has always been an economic city, never a political city." Declaring that 90% of Hong Kong's people would probably agree that their livelihood was more important than politics, Lu Ping said "there are always a handful who are so naive as to think that they can turn Hong Kong into a political city in order to influence the mainland in the sense of politics. If that were the case, Hong Kong would be of negative value instead of positive value to China. This is disastrous for Hong Kong." 
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13-513 / EDWARD A. GARGAN, New York Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; HONG KONG WORRIES ABOUT FATE OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM; ACS VT96
	 When Britain agreed to Chinese demands that it assume sovereignty and governance of Hong Kong in 1997, the Chinese signed a broad treaty indicating that the territory's way of life would remain ``essentially'' unchanged, including its economic, political and judicial systems. Already, however, China has vowed to abolish Hong Kong's political system and install one more to its liking, a promise that provoked outrage among local pro-democracy leaders but was largely greeted with indifference by local and foreign business leaders.
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13-514 / EDWARD A. GARGAN, New York Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; HONG KONG WORRIES ABOUT FATE OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM; ACS VT96
	 For human rights advocates here, the failure to establish an independent court of appeal is awaited with considerable apprehension. ``We can take as a given that the Chinese will interfere,'' said Robin Munro, the Hong Kong director of Human Rights Watch Asia. ``They will want a docile Court of Final Appeal. They do not want a strong and independent Court of Final Appeal.''
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13-515 / EDWARD A. GARGAN, New York Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; HONG KONG WORRIES ABOUT FATE OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM; ACS VT96
	 As Hong Kong hurtles toward reunification with China two years from now, a central pillar of this territory's vibrancy -- its vigorous legal system and independent judiciary -- is under threat, leading business figures, lawyers and legislators here say. At stake in the preservation of the territory's legal system and the rule of law is, in the view of many here, the very survival of Hong Kong as Asia's pre-eminent financial and business center.
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13-516 / EDWARD A. GARGAN, New York Times, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 4-21-95; HONG KONG WORRIES ABOUT FATE OF ITS LEGAL SYSTEM; ACS VT96
	 Although Chinese spokesmen have promised to retain Hong Kong's system of laws and adjudication after 1997, when the colony reverts to Chinese sovereignty, faith that China will honor its word when it absorbs the territory is increasingly fragile. ``Without the rule of law,'' said Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten in a speech last month in Singapore, ``what is there? The law of club and fang. Without it, no market economy but a jungle economy -- dog eat dog, might makes right, every man for himself. A place, perhaps, for the Hobbesian brave, but not I fancy a place where most of us would want to invest our pension fund. Or -- more important -- to bring up a family.''
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 13-517/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 240; THR VT96
	 In 1992, Chris Patten, a distinguished Conservative Party member who had been defeated in the April 1992 British elections; replaced Sinologist David Wilson as Governor of Hong Kong. His more assertive style against the Chinese, and especially his demand for a greater degree of elective and democratic power for the people of Hong Kong, raised considerable anxiety and even ire in Beijing. Patten visited Beijing in October 1992, gaining only a frosty reception there, with Chinese authorities stating simply that they would reverse Patten's democratic measures after the 1997 transfer. Patten appeared more determined than ever to push ahead with the airport, no matter what the misgivings or objections of the Chinese. While Patten's new policies won initial strong support from the people of Hong Kong and especially from the West, it remains to be seen how effectively they contribute to a smooth transition of power in 1997. 
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13-518/Michele Ledic, Researcher of China's foreign trade and energy Brikbeck College, University of London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.215; THR VT96
	 An important recent development has been an attempt by the Chinese authorities to influence investment projects in Hong Kong, on the grounds that they will only become fully operational after 1997, when China assumes sovereignty over Hong Kong. This has been most evident in the proposed HK $127 billion airport and container port project, on which China ordered an urgent report in April 1990. This was possibly because of fears that the projects would not be viable after 1997, and China would be left with some liability. China's attitude has forced the Hong Kong government to abandon its earlier insistence that there was no need to consult Beijing, because the territory was currently under British sovereignty, and had been promised a high degree of autonomy in economic and other matters after 1997. 
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13-519/Martin Lee, Elected member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, and Chairman of the newly-formed Democratic Party, Feb 1995; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Hong Kong's 1000 Days," p. 5; MDS VT96
	 Beijing's goal has been to control Hong Kong during the transition period so that China will have total control after 1997. A desire for control is certainly behind Beijing's harsh opposition to Governor Patten's modest reforms to broaden the franchise for Hong Kong's last elections under British rule. Control is also the reason the Chinese authorities recently announced that our legislature and the two lower tiers of elected bodies will be axed when Beijing takes over. 
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 13-520/ Suzanna Pepper, Hong Kong journalist, Jan., 1995; ASIAN SURVEY, "Hong Kong in 1994" p.56 ;SEG VT96
	 To date, Hong Kong has responded to the political crisis with relative equanimity. One reason undoubtedly is that, despite China's fears, Hong Kong is still basically an economic city and the economy has continued to prosper. After the initial shock upon learning their fate in the early 1980s, Hong Kong's citizens took what precautions they could. During the ten years since the 1984 agreement was concluded on China's resumption of sovereignty, the economy has continued to grow an average of 5.5% a year, down from an annual average of 8.5% during the preceding decade, but respectable nonetheless. It is generally agreed, moreover, that the territory has been able to maintain this record because of the new opportunities for trade and investment in China, which have been reaffirmed since the political uncertainties of 1989. If the economy now seems undaunted at the approach of communist rule, then it is because the integration of the two economies is already well underway, with each having become the other's biggest investor and trading partner. 
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13-521/Michele Ledic, Researcher of China's foreign trade and energy Brikbeck College, University of London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 217 ; THR VT96
	 Nevertheless, influential groups in Hong Kong are anxious to avoid confrontation with China. Among these are the Group of 89, which contains most top entrepreneurs and businessmen in the colony. They are forming a political party which is not in favor of speeding up plans for direct elections in Hong Kong, and wants to focus on economic and other policies, aimed at maintaining Hong Kong's stability and economic success. 
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 13-522/ Suzanna Pepper, Hong Kong journalist, Jan., 1995; ASIAN SURVEY, "Hong Kong in 1994" .p. 48 ;SEG VT96
	 Everyone has also been very clear about the circumstances of its protection and the costs and benefits of life in this particular colonial backwater. Independence was never an option because the territory was never regarded as anything but Chinese. Yet, without Britain's presence, China's communist armies would not have halted their southward march at the Shenzhen River. Any sympathy Hong Kong may have felt for the revolution on the mainland was diluted over time by the generations of political and economic migrants who arrived after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won power in 1949. Thus, accommodation, apolitical pragmatism, and a thriving capitalist economy became the hallmarks of Hong Kong life.
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13-523/Martin Lee, Elected member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, and Chairman of the newly-formed Democratic Party, Feb 1995; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Hong Kong's 1000 Days," p. 6 ; MDS VT96
	 With fewer than one thousand days until the transfer of sovereignty to China, Governor Patten must not step on the brakes, but on the accelerator in undertaking these reforms. The six million people of Hong Kong desperately need institutions to protect our way of life and preserve our freedoms. If China can be persuaded to accept these reforms, all well and good. But if not, Britain must abandon the negotiating table and let Hong Kong people decide these matters on their own. If Beijing wishes to scrap Hong Kong's free society and democratic institutions after 1997, Chinese leaders should at least be forced to do so in full view of the international community. 
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13-524 /Asiaweek, January 27, 1994; Asiaweek, "On to 1997; China May Adopt a More Pragmatic Approach to Hong Kong", SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 24; PMS VT96
	 The potential rapprochement does not mean China is about to accept a British fait accompli on political reform in the territory. On the contrary, Mr. Qian told his guests that "the situation is now fixed." That means Beijing has fully accepted last year's parting of ways: the British will hold elections in Hong Kong under their rules this year, and the Chinese will remake the resulting institutions when they take over. But his trip to Britain implies that rather than continue to sulk, China has decided to smooth relations with London to minimize disruption to the territory over the next couple of years.
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 13-525/ Suzanna Pepper, Hong Kong journalist, Jan., 1995;-ASIAN SURVEY, "Hong Kong in 1994" p. 49 ';SEG VT96
	 As the final lines were being drawn between them in early 1994, Britain and China articulated their respective positions with unaccustomed clarity. However different their systems, both are equally adept in the arts of political presentation. Hence, even as their argument degenerated into acrimonious outbursts and sardonic retorts, each side continued to profess itself perplexed at the motivations of the other. Dark rumors were put about of a conspiracy by Britain and the West to use Hong Kong as a base for subverting the communist regime and dismembering China British spokesmen, in turn, wondered how their "modest" proposals could be so grievously misconstrued. The spring 1994 statements aimed to minimize such gaps between public discourse and political realities. 
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13-526/Asiaweek, January 27, 1994; Asiaweek, "On to 1997; China May Adopt a More Pragmatic Approach to Hong Kong", SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. 24; PMS VT96
	 The gloom may be misplaced. The signs, in fact, are that Sino-British relations will stabilize, if not improve, in 1995. An early token came in November, when the two governments concluded a long-delayed accord over the financing of Hong Kong's new airport. December brought an even more portentous signpost. Mr. Qian Qichen, China's vice-premier and foreign minister, told visiting Hong Kong politicians that he had accepted an invitation to go to Britain. A major gesture to the British, whom the Chinese have contemptuously ignored for more than a year, the move signals a more pragmatic approach by Beijing to the Hong Kong question.
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 13-527/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U.S. State Dept., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Re ations, edited by William T. Tow, p.259; THR VT96
	 Hong Kong was supposed to be the one place where the PRC would place economics rather than politics in command. But given the most recent pattern of behavior, there is little reason to hold to the earlier belief that Beijing will rule Hong Kong with a light, even deft hand. Unless the reformers come back to power in China, we can expect continuing interference before 1997 and serious mismanagement after that date. If that is the case, substantial American economic interests in Hong Kong will be damaged, and this too will become a cause of tension in Sino-American relations.
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13-528/Michele Ledic, Researcher of China's foreign trade and energy Brikbeck College, University of London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Hong Kong and China: Economic Interdependence," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.218; THR VT96
	 If financial stability cannot be achieved, other centers, such as Singapore, will gradually take over Hong Kong's role as a financial center, and also some of its entrepot activities. The future economic well-being of Hong Kong after 1997 was always in some doubt. Now these doubts must be stronger. In the end, a great deal will depend on what happens in mainland China. This is impossible to predict, as recent events have shown. 
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13-529/ ULI SCHMETZER, of Chicago Tribune, 5-30-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Laws are the key to Hong Kong's future"; ACS VT96
	 And many of those left behind to face the uncertainty of Chinese dominance have become disgruntled with their British masters of 145 years, who annoy Beijing with squabbles over how much democracy and cash in the treasury can be left as a legacy while maintaining anachronistic and undemocratic colonial ordinances.
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13-530/Andrew J. Nathan, Well-written author on Chinese Politics, 1990; CHINA'S CRISIS: DILEMMAS OF REFORM AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, p. 211;THR VT96
	 The international stake in China's course of development is large. In both Cambodia and Korea, the danger of war is substantial if China fails to play a constructive role, and war in either place, especially Korea, could involve other powers including the Soviet Union and the U.S. As one of the world's nuclear powers and a major arms supplier, China must participate in any successful disarmament arrangements. With one-quarter of the world's population, China has an enormous potential impact on world food markets, on the population problem, and on the environment. If China does well, it can make a large positive contribution to world prosperity both as a producer and as a market. Otherwise, China will continue to pollute the earth and the atmosphere, will stunt the development of a quarter of humankind, and will be an unreliable partner in world security issues. 
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13-531 / Irene Kuni Reuters, Limited November 20, 1993, HEADLINE: JAPAN URGES CHINA TO MEDIATE ON N.KOREA NUKE ISSUE //MDS-VT96
	 "China has significant influence over North Korea," Hosokawa was quoted as telling Jiang by a senior Japanese official. "We have great expectations that the situation in North Korea can be resolved through political dialogue (with China's help)." 
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13-532 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Both North and South Korea believe that China will be crucial to the evolution of the Korean peninsula. Although China may be of two minds on the subject of Korean unification, it has no desire to see the eruption of chaos or war. It can be assumed that the leadership in Beijing, in consultation with Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, will use whatever leverage it has with its counterparts in Pyongyang to make them behave responsibly. 
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13-533/ Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 Li Peng's trip to Seoul, as the first visit by a Chinese leader to that country, was in fact an announcement to the world that China has reaped fruitful results in its diplomatic endeavours on the Korean Peninsula. On the agreement between the United States and North Korea on the situation on the Korean Peninsula, China believed that by changing its tough stance on sanctions against North Korea, the United States made it possible for the principle of dialogue advocated by China to bear fruit to some extent.
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13-534 / KYODO NEWS SERVICE, 4-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Murayama to urge China to use influence on N. Korea; ACS VT96
	 Murayama will urge Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng, with whom he is slated to meet separately May 3, to use their influence with longtime ally North Korea to promote continued negotiations, the sources said. If North Korea makes good its threat to lift the nuclear freeze, debate about imposition of economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council could be revived, heightening tension on the Korean Peninsula. Murayama will argue that such a situation must be avoided and call on Beijing to assume a more active role in promoting the negotiations, the sources said.
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13-535/Gerald Segal, Senior fellow in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "Openness: Linking Domestic and Foreign Policy Reform," edited by GiIbert Rozman, p.378; THR VT96
	 Yet China's policies are patchy. Perhaps its most positive approach to regional security has been its pressure on North Korea to desist from destabilizing the booming northeast Asian economy. When China decided to open economic contacts with South Korea, it had to ensure that the North did not disrupt the new lucrative relations. China had traditionally' been more a supporter of Kim il Sung's harder line on negotiations with South Korea, and the Soviet Union always feared that if it pushed Kim too hard to the negotiating table, he might take China's side in the Sino-Soviet split. But with growing detente in Sino-Soviet relations, it was far easier for both China and the Soviet Union to tacitly' cooperate in limiting the risks of conflict on the Korean peninsula. This arrangement was apparently not negotiated, but it evolved as China demonstrated by deeds that communist states could do business with South Korea and need not bother much with North Korea. Moscow joined in the new strategy and encouraged the Hungarians to be the first to establish formal diplomatic relations with South Korea. All states, except North Korea, wanted to attend the Seoul Olympiad in 1988. Therefore, Pyongyang was told by China and the Soviet Union to refrain from dangerous military action. Considering the growing importance of the northeast Asian region for the global economy', this was particularly important evidence of a positive approach to regional security. 
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13-536 / Irene Kuni Reuters, Limited November 20, 1993, HEADLINE: JAPAN URGES CHINA TO MEDIATE ON N.KOREA NUKE ISSUE //MDS-VT96
	 Jiang, who also discussed the issue with President Clinton, said his government supported a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and would make efforts to woo North Korea back to the negotiating table. 
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13-537 / Journal Graphics Transcripts, SHOW: Charlie Rose, February 16, 1995, Transcript # 1315-2, HEADLINE: A Group Discuss the Future for China; ACS VT96
	 WINSTON LORD: North Korea, China, as elsewhere, acts in its own self-interest. It does not want to see its neighbor, North Korea, get nuclear weapons. It doesn't want to see a united Korea threatening it with nuclear weapons in the future. Above all, it doesn't want to see Japan reacting by going nuclear. So it's got a self-interest in North Korea not being nuclear, plus it has economic interests with South Korea. Having said that, it's sort of straddled and has not been anti-North Korean. It tries to maintain some influence. 
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13-538 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 The reality is that North Korea can't stand alone. And with the fall of communism in eastern Europe, it has lost friends and trading partners. North Korea is increasingly isolated and dependent on China, both politically and financially. But Beijing realizes the difficulties of standing too close to what much of the West views as an unpredictable renegade state.
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13-539 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 China's steadily improving relations with South Korea may be simple pragmatism. But the warming trend also could reflect a drift away from longtime ally North Korea. Beijing seems to be satisfied to see the Korean peninsula remain divided, rather than deal with a unified Korea on its flank, so it quite probably will continue to play both sides off the other.
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13-540 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 The North has used crises and brinksmanship in negotiations with the United States over the dismantling of a nuclear program suspected of weapons production. It has resisted any rapprochement with capitalist rival South Korea. The recalcitrance has put increasing pressure on China. It has supported the North so far, but the breadth of that backing appears to have become increasingly conditional.
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13-541 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 But Chinese leaders increasingly have cozied up to South Korea, seeing more to gain from its industrial dynamo than from North Korea's floundering economy, which has been reduced to barter with its trading partners. The North's politics also are getting harder for China to swallow. ``The Chinese clearly are sending signals to North Korea,'' Nicholas Platt, president of the Asia Society, said Friday. ``It does not signal a split, but it's a warning to be careful. ``They are saying we have plenty of other fish to fry with South Korea.''
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13-542 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 ``China, ending its pro-North Korean policy, which was a legacy of the Cold War, is at the stage where it conducts an equidistant policy (toward the two Koreas,'' Lee said Friday. ``I have confirmed that in bilateral relations, this year will mark a turning point.''
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13-543 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 North Korea has reason to worry. The loss of its main, and just about only, trading partner could cripple the country, described by defectors as suffering from serious food and fuel shortages. Beijing and Pyongyang were nearly ideological twins for decades, each relying on a strong leader while practicing hard-line communism and tight control on dissent. However, while China has gradually opened to the outside in recent years, North Korea has remained reclusive, resolutely opposed to the taint of foreign influence on a system that preaches self-reliance.
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13-544/ Associated Press News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japanese Rice Aid Will Not Help South-North Korea Relations, Seoul Says"; ACS VT96
	 Since the collapse of its East Bloc allies, North Korea has been short of cash and what little it has is largely spent to keep its military in fighting shape, according to outside analysts.
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15-545/ Associated Press News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japanese Rice Aid Will Not Help South-North Korea Relations, Seoul Says"; ACS VT96
	 Defectors from North Korea have reported severe food shortages, especially in the countryside, and in February North Korea quietly agreed to buy 300,000 tons of low-quality rice from a Thai company.
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15-546/ Associated Press News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japanese Rice Aid Will Not Help South-North Korea Relations, Seoul Says"; ACS VT96
	 Li Song Rok, chairman of North Korea's International Trade Promotion Committee, blamed the shortage on bad weather and said he had been directed by North Korea's prime minister to ask Japan for aid. Li was also quoted as saying that his country would consider accepting rice directly from South Korea if no conditions were attached.
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15-547/ Associated Press News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japanese Rice Aid Will Not Help South-North Korea Relations, Seoul Says"; ACS VT96
	 According to South Korean officials, North Korea has been hit especially hard by the cutoff of most food aid from China, a Communist ally that is increasingly demanding full payment for food.
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13-548/ Associated Press News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japanese Rice Aid Will Not Help South-North Korea Relations, Seoul Says"; ACS VT96
	 South Korea urged Japan on Saturday to delay its planned rice shipments to North Korea until after the communist state discusses food aid from its southern capitalist rival. The North acknowledged for the first time Friday that it suffers from a grave food shortage and, in a humbling request to a longtime enemy, pleaded with Japan for emergency rice aid. Seoul later said it was willing to send rice to North Korea without conditions. The North has not yet responded to the offer.
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13-549/ Associated Press News Service, 5-27-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Japanese Rice Aid Will Not Help South-North Korea Relations, Seoul Says"; ACS VT96
	 South Korea concluded after a Cabinet meeting on Saturday that any shipment of Japanese rice aid to the North would not help improve relations between the two Koreas. If, however, the rice came from South Korea, Seoul believes the North might be persuaded to start peace talks.
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13-550/Kishore Mabubani, Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1995; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "The Pacific Way," p. 109; CJJ VT96
	 Fortunately, the threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region is receding. The North Korean nuclear crisis has been defused for now. Longer term, it is inevitable that the region will draw North Korea away from its Stalinist isolation to become more like China or Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge have not disappeared, but they stand out more and more like debris left behind on a beach by the ebbing tide. Their moment has come and gone. 
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13-551 / LORETTA TOFANI, Knight-Ridder News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-10-95, Refusal to accept nuclear reactors generates war talk; ACS VT96
	 ``In South Korea, 40,000 U.S. troops are stationed and more than 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed to attack the north,'' said an army officer. ``And every year the Team Spirit joint military exercise is conducted by 200,000 U.S. troops and South Korean puppet troops.''
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13-552 / LORETTA TOFANI, Knight-Ridder News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-10-95, Refusal to accept nuclear reactors generates war talk; ACS VT96
	 In North Korea, it is both official and popular belief that Americans and South Koreans want to invade and occupy the country.
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 13-553 / Jane Teufel Dreyer, Prof. Politics at Miami, Sept., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "The People's Army: serving whose interests?" p. 266 ;SEG VT96
	 North Korea, an international pariah because of its apparent violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has also been the recipient of Chinese military technology. The United States Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that China had collaborated with North Korea in the development of a new long-range missile. Other sources confirmed that two of China's major arms importer-exporters, China North Industries and Poly Technologies, were working with North Korean weapons scientists. The quid pro quo was thought to be Pyongyang's agreement to allow China to export missiles and other arms to the Middle East via North Korean ports. This may also explain China's reluctance to support United Nations sanctions against North Korea for Pyongyang's unwillingness to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities. 
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13-554 / LORETTA TOFANI, Knight-Ridder News Service, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-10-95, Refusal to accept nuclear reactors generates war talk; ACS VT96
	 With the apparent collapse of the reactor deal, the possibility of war is again on the minds of North Koreans. The country did agree last week to new talks on the reactor issue, but people here did not sound hopeful. ``Of course we don't want a war,'' said a guide who gave journalists a tour last week after an international festival here. ``But we don't want a South Korean reactor. South Korea is the enemy.''
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13-555 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Of the three, North Korea constitutes the most immediate and direct challenge to the PRC. Although determined not to see Pyongyang completely isolated, normalization of relations between Seoul and Beijing greatly weakened the PRC's relationship with North Korea. 
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13-556 / Paul Alexander, Associated Press bureau chief in Seoul, 5-13-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Does China's Warming to South Korea Mean Drift from North? ACS VT96
	 China has indicated that if the U.N. Security Council decides to impose sanctions on the North over the nuclear issue, it won't vote for them, but it won't oppose them, either.
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13-557/ Lincoln Kaye, staff writer, 3-24-95; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, p. 16 ,"Don't tread on us;" PMS VT96
	 Beijing has quietly sat on the fence on the question of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. With its abstentions on censure resolutions and its sparing use of diplomatic pressure on its ally, China raises doubts about its reliability in enforcing any sanctions against Pyongyang, if it comes to that.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICA
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Editor: Andrea Looby
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A. Isolationism is Good.
1.	The US should distance itself from China. (1-5)
2.	The US could solve domestic problems. (6)
3. 	The US could decrease military spending. (7)
4.	The US could be isolationist and still balance. (8)
5.	The US should be isolationist and facilitate other powers. (9)
6.	The US doesn't play the proper role as a world leader. (10)
7.	Americans actions have become hollow. (11)
8.	The US doesn't have to get militarily involved in conflicts. (12)
9.	The US could rely on Iraq and Iran to balance each other as hegemons.
10. 	The US could slowly become isolationist. (14)
11. 	People are split about isolationism. (15-16)
12.	Asians see US pulling out of region. (17)
B. Isolationism is Bad.
1.	Without the US, war could result. (18-21)
2.	Without the US, proliferation could occur. (22-24)
3.	The US must maintain credible leadership. (25-26)
4.	Global involvement helps the US. (27-29)
5.	Balance of power would lead to destruction. (30-31)
6.	Isolation would hurt economies. (32-33)
7.	If the US was isolationist, the wrong nations could fill the vacuum. (34-35)
8.	Isolationism must be avoided. (36-37)
9.	The US is in good shape to keep global leadership. (38)
10.	The US must be engaged in Asia. (39-41)
11. 	US isolationism would hurt Europe. (42-43)
12.	The public supports global involvement. (44)
13.	The US could de facto become isolationist. (45-47)
C. China and Isolationism.
1.	China needs to look inward. (48-49)
2.	China lack resources for foreign policy. (50)
3.	China should be involved in the global community. (51-58)
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14-1/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p.30; THR VT96
	 In these circumstances, the challenge to American policy makers is to formulate a China policy that permits the development of a working relationship enabling the two sides to cooperate when their interests intersect but that also allows the United States to respond to Chinese actions which violate American standards of human decency or undermine the United States' international interests. This will allow Washington to weather the coming storm of Chinese succession politics. The basis of such a policy must be the establishment of greater distance in relations with the Chinese so that the United States will be able to withstand repeated challenges to American interests which do not threaten the basic assumptions and expectations underlying the United States' policy toward China.
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14-2/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p. 16 ; THR VT96
	 Under such circumstances, American policy toward China must develop a new character reflecting the United States' reduced need for Sino-American strategic cooperation, Beijing's inability to reform its political system, the likelihood of recurring conflicts of interest, and American interest in maintaining domestic support for its China policy. At a minimum, this policy must have a high-profile human rights component. This will enable it to both express American interest in Chinese political reform and establish the domestic consensus necessary., for pursuing, when necessary and possible, cooperative relations with the Chinese leadership.
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 14-3/ Bruce Cummings, Prof. IntI History at Northwestern, Dec., 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "What is a Pacific century -- and how will we know when it begins" p. 406 ;SEG VT96
	 But simply because American hegemony has defined the region since 1945 does not mean it will continue to do so indefinitely. Many American analysts see an impending shift in the balance of power in East Asia, which almost all of them lament--because they are Americans. An ineffable triumphalism affects almost everyone in America, beginning with superficial judgments about how the cold war was won and what it means for an American liberalism now said to be the solution to all problems worldwide. In many ways the cold war ended in East Asia a generation ago (except for Korea), and tendencies already well under way for decades have merely deepened in the 1990s. But that does not guard against American smugness with regard to this region, either.
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 14-4/David Zweig, Prof. International Relations Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Spring 1993; CURRENT HISTORY, "Clinton and China," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.130; THR VT96
	 The end of the cold war has diminished the need for the,, United States to maintain a strategic alliance with China; for China, it means that it no longer needs a security understanding with the United States since the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to it. Thus, China does not have to make major concessions in its dealings with the United States. However, less strategic dependence has not translated into a loss of United States leverage over China on other policy issues. Since 1979, China, too, has responded to the increased global salience of economics, and as it presses its agenda of growth and development, it finds itself again vulnerable to United States foreign policy pressures, some of which directly challenge its sovereignty.
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 14-5/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 106; THR VT96
	 Finally, as Harry Harding Jr. of The Brookings Institution has noted, there is also clear evidence that China's policy toward the United States is vulnerable to shifting divisions at the leadership apex. Although all Chinese leaders seem to harbor ambivalent attitudes toward the United States, some among the elite (for example, Chen Yun or Wang Zhen) have stressed the ominous side of their country's policy toward America in order to argue against the reformers and to promote their own policies and organizations. Their vision of a more-orthodox Communist domestic policy almost requires a weaker relationship with the United States.
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14-6/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 In the short run, abandoning global leadership and turning inward could be an attractive option. It would result in a significant reduction in defense expenditures -- although how much money the United States would really save over either the short or the long run should it adopt such a strategy has not been seriously studied. n3 Such a policy would also mean that U.S. servicemen and servicewomen would be less likely to be put in harm's way in places like Bosnia or Iraq, Haiti or Somalia. The reduction in defense burden could help deal with the budget deficit and improve U.S. economic competitiveness, especially because, at the same time, many foreign competitors would have to increase their defense expenditures. Ignoring foreign issues would enable the United States to concentrate on and solve its many domestic problems [.]
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14-7 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Aside from the question of inevitability, a balance of power system would have certain advantages for the United States. First, the U.S. government could reduce defense expenditures (probably not by as much as with a neo-isolationist strategy) and deploy U.S. military force less often to world hot spots, because it would let other great powers take the lead in dealing with problems in their regions. Second, the United States would be freer to pursue its economic interests, even when they damaged its political relations with countries that had been, but were no longer, allies; only in the particular case that required the United States to ally with another great power to ward off a specific threat would it be constrained.
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14-8 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 In East Asia, the United States would similarly become a balancer against either China or a Japan that had built up its military capability. In the event of a serious imbalance between Japan and China, the United States could play a balancing role with forces based in the United States or possibly in some of the smaller states in the region. As in the case of Europe, the United States would seek to prevent the emergence of regional hegemony by shifting alliances; it would cooperate with other powers to protect common interests and be prepared to protect specific interests in the region, such as the lives and property of U.S. citizens. [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] 
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14-9 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Some argue that the world is inevitably heading toward a multiplicity of roughly equal great powers and that the United States should facilitate such a development. This approach starts from the assertion that, based on economic indices, the world already consists of several great powers and assumes that the diffusion of wealth and technology will continue. It is further assumed that, over time, the current economic powers will become political and military powers commensurate with their economic strength; they will be obliged to do so because, in the post-cold war world, others will not perceive threats in the same way and so will not be willing to run risks for them. n4 [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] 
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14-10 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 Yet, there are ominous trends, too. The United States seems unwilling or unable to play its proper role as a great power. Many of the international organizations needed to fill the void left by the United States are enfeebled. Belligerent nationalisms and religious fundamentalisms have captured people's minds in Eastern Europe and North Africa. Ecological and population stresses tear at the social fabric of poor societies. These positive and negative trends intersect in complex ways in different parts of the world. 
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14-11 / Jonathan Clarke, a former member of the British diplomatic service, now with the Cato Institute, The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), April 16, 1995, SECTION: VIEWPOINT, Pg. 3B, HEADLINE: Uncle Sam can't afford to be world's leader; ACS VT96
	 In their attacks on the military policy of the Carter period, Republicans rightly criticized the ''hollow'' force structure that could not carry out its assigned missions. They may now be falling into the same trap. Unless they have found some magic elixir for obtaining more money for the tasks that Dole's article recommends - on the order of, say, $ 450 billion per year for a true two-war capability, the expansion of NATO and recapturing the lead in foreign aid - the resources for compelling or persuading foreigners to fall into line will simply not be available. American assertions of foreign-policy leadership will then be revealed as similarly hollow.
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14-12 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 For such a balance of power system to work, either Germany would have to substantially increase its military power or the EU would have to strengthen its internal unity and become a kind of superstate. The United States would continue to have a vital interest in preventing the domination of Europe -- including Russia -- by a single power. So, if the Germans decided to build up militarily to a force that appeared to threaten the rest of Europe, the United States could play its part by forming alliances with any European country or countries that sought to prevent German hegemony and by maintaining adequate forces in the United States and perhaps in Great Britain. Problems unrelated to any attempt to establish hegemony over Europe, however, such as instability in the Balkans, East-Central Europe, or North Africa, would be the responsibility of the Europeans alone and the United States would not get militarily involved in conflicts in these regions. [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] 
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14-13 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 In the Persian Gulf, in this framework [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] , the United States and other major powers would oppose the domination of the region by any one power, because such a power would acquire enormous leverage over states that depend on the region's oil. At the regional level, the United States and other major powers could rely on a balance between Iran and Iraq to prevent regional hegemony. 
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14-14 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 As the victor in the Cold War, the United States can choose among several strategic visions and grand strategies. It could abandon global leadership and turn inward. Alternatively, it could seek to give up leadership gradually by reducing the U.S. global role and encouraging the emergence of a seventeenth- to nineteenth-century style balance of power structure with spheres of influence. Third, it could seek, as its central strategic objective, to consolidate its global leadership and preclude the rise of a global rival.
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14-15 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 WILL THE UNITED STATES INCREASINGLY ISOLATE ITSELF FROM THE WORLD? Since the early days of the republic, U.S. foreign policy has oscillated between isolationism and engagement -- a tension that persists today. Some commentators, especially on the political right, want the United States to withdraw within its borders, reduce its commitment to international organizations and peacekeeping, and retain only minimal commitments to the defence of Europe. Others argue for a continued strong presence on the international stage. These people, in turn, fall into two camps: some want the United States to act as a traditional great power and use its military and economic capability, when necessary, to sustain global order; others believe it should facilitate the development of the international institutions and laws needed to solve global problems.
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14-16 / Jonathan Clarke, a former member of the British diplomatic service, now with the Cato Institute, The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), April 16, 1995, SECTION: VIEWPOINT, Pg. 3B, HEADLINE: Uncle Sam can't afford to be world's leader; ACS VT96
	 Leadership presupposes a cheerful willingness to bear costs beyond what is strictly fair. Luckily for the course of human liberty, this corresponded exactly with the American mood of instinctive generosity during the postwar period. Today, however, Americans are reluctant to shoulder unequal burdens. As a result, in key areas of the world, others are having to lead.
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14-17/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific century," p. 424 THR VT96
	 The role of the United States is also in doubt. Throughout Asia one encounters the perception that Washington is pulling out of the region. Whether or not this is true (American officials hotly deny it and tangible evidence contradicts it), Asians increasingly see the United States as pulling back.
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11-18 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last.
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14-19/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 U.S. power and willingness to lead in protecting vital joint interests in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East are necessary to preserve the zone of peace. In Europe these interests can be best served if NATO remains the primary entity to deal with the security challenge from instability and conflict to the south and the east and a possible revanchism in Russia. To perform this role, NATO must adapt by maintaining a robust military capability as a hedge against Russia's going bad; by preparing for the eventual membership of the nations of East-Central Europe in the alliance in coordination with EU expansion; and by developing the capability to deter and defeat threats from the south. NATO allies need to increase their ability to project power to perform these tasks. West Europeans have ample capability for self-defense but their capability for projecting power eastward or southward is far more limited. Even with increased European power projection capabilities, the United States would need to maintain a significant military force on the continent for an indefinite period -- both because of military needs and to demonstrate its commitment and resolve.
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14-20 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 To succeed in the long term in realizing this vision, the United States should adhere to the following principles as guidelines for its policies. It must: 
* maintain and strengthen the "zone of peace" n6 and incrementally extend it; 
* preclude hostile hegemony over critical regions; 
* hedge against reimperialization by Russia and expansion by China while promoting cooperation with both countries; 
* preserve U.S. military preeminence; maintain U.S. economic strength and an open international economic system; 
* obtain and maintain domestic support for U.S. global leadership and these principles.
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14-21 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [Global Leadership] enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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14-22 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Under the third option [Global Leadership] , the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts.
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14-23 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.
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14-24 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and [...] the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces.
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14-25 / Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 WARREN CHRISTOPHER, US Secretary of State: - The United States must lead. If we do not, no one else will. We must back persistent diplomacy with the "credible threat of force" and "act alone when necessary to defend our interests." But we also must "galvanize the support of allies, friends and international institutions in achieving common objectives" because "we cannot build a more secure and prosperous world by [ourselves]
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14-26 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen.
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14-27 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 But there are also several serious problems with this approach [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] . First, there is a real question whether the major powers will behave as they should under the logic of a balance of power framework. For example, would the West European powers respond appropriately to a resurgent Russian threat, or would they behave as the European democracies did in the 1930s? The logic of a balance of power system might well require the United States to support a non-democratic state against a democratic one, or to work with one undesirable state against another. For example, to contain the power of an increasingly powerful Iran, the United States would have to strengthen Iraq. The United States may, however, be politically unable to behave in this fashion. 
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14-28 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 The members of the zone of peace have a common interest in the stability of Europe, North America, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Japan, for example, imports oil from the Gulf and exports to and invests in the other critical regions. The same is true of Europe. The U.S. global role benefits these other members as well as the United States. 
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14-29 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Moreover, a global leadership role serves the economic interests of the United States. For example, it can facilitate U.S. exports, as recently seen in U.S. contracts with Saudi Arabia for the sale of aircraft and the modernization of Saudi telecommunication systems. As discussed earlier, the costs of alternative approaches to U.S. global leadership can ultimately be higher. Rather than undermining domestic prosperity, such a role can in fact facilitate it. 
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14-31 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] will succeed in its own terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. 
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14-30 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future -- and war among major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating.
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14-32/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Second, this system [Return to Multipolarity and Balance of Power] implies that the major industrial democracies will no longer see themselves as allies. Instead, political, and possibly even military, struggle among them will become not only thinkable but legitimate. n5 Each will pursue its own economic interest much more vigorously, thereby weakening such multilateral economic institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the liberal world trading order in general. This would increase the likelihood of major economic depressions and dislocations.
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14-33 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. 
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14-34 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum.
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14-35 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. [..] If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oilimporting nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.
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14-36/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neo-isolationist approach might well increase the danger of major conflict, require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the institutions and solidarity of the world's community of democratic powers and so establishing favorable conditions for the spread of disorder and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century.
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14-37 / Ben Barber; THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 11, 1995, Pg. A13, HEADLINE: Baker cites ruddeless foreign policy ; Rejects isolationism; says middle ground exists in dealing with China; ACS VT96
	 "America's urge to turn inward is strong today - you see it in both political parties," he said. "That urge is foolhardy and needs to be reversed." His apparent reference was to isolationists in the United States who want to limit U.S. involvement in the United Nations and reject the concept of the "new world order" that Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker advanced at the end of the Cold War. [Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III ] 
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14-38 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 As a nation, the United States is in a position of unprecedented military and political power and enjoys a unique leadership role in the world. Maintaining this position and precluding the rise of another global rival for the indefinite future is the best longterm objective for the United States. It is an opportunity the United States may never see again.
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14-39 / Clayton Jones, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor The Christian Science Monitor December 1, 1993, Pg. 11HEADLINE: Japan Dominates Region's Economy, But China Is Awake//MDS VT96
	 ''The US can't repair its economy by itself,'' says Bilahari Kausikan, director of Singapore's East Asia and Pacific bureau. ''It must remain engaged in East Asia.'' 
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 14-40/Karl Jackson, Hudson Inst., 1995; ORBIS, Winter, "How to rebuild America's stature in Asia", p. 17 ;SEG VT96
	 In sum, we must stop preaching and return to leading by example, by the example of what the most powerful, productive, and benevolent society in the world can become in the twenty-first century. For the alternative is simply that there will be no "Pacific century"; there will be only an "Asian century."
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 14-41/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 93; THR VT96
	 Those who opposed withholding MFN status doubted that such pressure would work and argued that it might actually run counter to certain other American interests. Many noted that if Chinese imports were limited, this would increase the cost of items ranging from clothing to electrical goods to shoes for American consumers. Moreover, Chinese retalia- tion by further limiting American imports would result in lost export sales of grain, aircraft and fertilizer. Restricting exports of Chinese origin to the United States would hurt precisely those forces that were continuing the drive toward a market economy in China--the joint ventures and small cooperative firms in the south--as well as innocent victims in the entrepot of Hong Kong. By undermining these forces, the United States would actually be doing the work of those who sought to slow reform in China.
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14-42/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power.
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14-43 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 [ What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward?] Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy.
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14-44/ Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 According to a recent poll, however, Americans support both U.S. involvement in world affairs (90 percent) and also want more attention to domestic issues (84 percent). A majority of Americans support peace "through strength." n9 Whether the public would in fact support a global leadership strategy as outlined here is not known. Such a role is indeed not without costs. The cost of sustaining U.S. leadership is, however, affordable. At present the burden imposed by U.S. defense efforts, approximately 4 percent of GNR is lighter than at any time since before the Korean War. The burden will shrink further as the economy expands, and the costs of leadership can be kept at a sustainable level by avoiding overextension and by more effective burden sharing among the members of the zone of peace.
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14-45/ Peter Van Ness, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, , Business Times, February 25, 1995, Pg. 1, HEADLINE: Holding Beijing accountable; ACS VT96
	 The US must avoid two pitfalls: isolationism, on the one hand, and making an enemy of China, on the other. With the Republicans in control of Congress and isolationist sentiment once again running through the land, the US might become so preoccupied with its own domestic problems that it would de facto withdraw its commitment to East Asia. Bill Clinton is a good example of how preoccupation with America's serious problems of inadequate health care, budget and trade deficits, crime rates, rampant drug addiction, and so forth, can lead a president to become vacillating and indecisive in his foreign policy.
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14-46 / Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corporation, The Washington Quarterly, 1995 Spring; Pg. 84, HEADLINE: Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War; ACS VT96
	 At present, mainstream sentiment in the two major U.S. political parties rejects isolationism as a national strategy, even though both have elements favoring it. It is possible, however, that without a vision and grand strategy, the United States might follow policies that result in at least some of the consequences of a neo-isolationist strategy.
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14-47 / Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 Domestic political crises have also gravely wounded Clinton. Whitewater, the failure of health-care reform, the Republican successes in November's congressional elections, and a persistent sense of economic insecurity are causing Americans to look inward. The President is seen as a weak leader, and he has not presented a clear vision of why the United States should be engaged with the rest of the world. During the next year, look for congressional Republicans to launch a broad attack on many of the pillars of engagement, including the American foreign aid budget and support for the United Nations. Isolationism will gain strength.
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 14-48/Dorothy Solinger, Assoc. prof. of political science at Univ. of California-Irvine 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Future of China's Industrialization Program: Why Should the United States Care," edited by Will am T. Tow, p. 96; THR VT96
	 This threat perception, along with anxieties about the inevitable negative offshoots of any serious economic reform program (which many in China thought was pressed far too rapidly, causing inflation, uncontrolled foreign trade activity in some localities, and an excess of processing ventures along the Chinese coast as some of the undesirable byproducts of accelerated reform) produced an isolationist backlash. Indeed, there arose a desire to punish the part of China that had experimented most with market practices and was most linked to international markets, particularly the southeastern part of the country. The Eighth Five-Year Plan, published in the autumn of 1990, is predicated on the notion that China must bolster its domestic capital goods, raw material, and infrastructural sectors to ensure its very viability against these threats.
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14-49/Gerald Segal, Research Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Foreign Policy," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 177; THR VT96
	 This concern to avoid new international humiliation involves a basic desire to build up China's internal strength through modernization. But it also seems likely that this desire for a breathing space to develop internally will not result in a new isolationism if modernization should be achieved. Internationalism is not merely a tactic, it is a strategy for the continuing development of China.
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14-50/Lawrence R. Sullivan, Political Studies Adelphi University, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Beijing Massacre: The Crisis in Authority," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p. 178; THR VT96
	 Other motives for more Chinese isolation are derived from the economic backwardness of China. Some have argued that excessive concern with external relations only saps China's ability to deal with domestic problems. China lacks the basic resources for a global foreign policy. While it might some day seek a more international role, in the short term it must concentrate on its own affairs. In a country as poor as China, these arguments can be persuasive.]
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 14-51/Thomas Bernstein, Prof. of political science at Columbia Univ., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMER CAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Domestic Responses to Retreat and Setbacks in the Soviet Union and China," edited by William T. Tow, P.243; THR VT96
	 China's pursuit of normal relations was the product of a decision by Deng Xiaoping after the Tiananmen massacre to combat counterrevolution yet carry on with both internal reform and external opening up (kaifang). Suppression of counterrevolutionaries thought to be linked to foreign powers could easily have given rise to an isolationist response. Deng sought to nip such possibilities in the bud by putting the weight of his authority behind the continuation of kaifang immediately after June 4. Deng had pioneered the PRC's open door policies with the West. He believed that China had made a historic mistake when it had isolated itself in the eighteenth century, thereby excluding itself from the industrial revolution, and that China's modernization required foreign technology and knowledge.
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14-52/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 99 ;THR VT96
	 In a process of redistributing the balance of power in the region following the end of the Cold War, China is one of the most important actors. China has the geographical advantage of being the largest country in the region in terms of territory and population. Economically, although China is still a developing country, its potentials and fast development are increasingly recognized. Politically, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, China has a special influence. Furthermore, China also enjoys a cultural advantage, since Chinese culture, known as Confucianism, has a strong impact on not only ideology and politics but also the economies of the other countries. In sum, without China's participation almost no im- portant action can be taken now concerning regional affairs; China's posi- tion is often decisive. Yet although China is a strong regional power, it is not yet a world power and should not attempt to play the role of a superpower in regional affairs.
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14-53/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p.97 ; THR VT96
	 The collapse of the Soviet Union meant a serious challenge to China, since it left very few countries, actually only one big country, insisting on the leadership of the Communist Party. It was argued that China's position in world politics would decline because the "China card" could no longer be played. Nevertheless, the changes imply opportunities. No longer having to maneuver inside the narrow space of superpower confrontation, China may have more options in handling international relations. As a big country with in- creasing influence through its reform and open-door policy, China can play • a more important role not only in the region but also in the world.
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14-54/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 68; THR VT96
	 Neither would there be a return to Maoist policies of economic isolation or confrontation with those powers which opposed China. In the months after the Tiananmen Square crisis, some more-conservative Chinese leaders may have argued for a limiting of contacts with the West. However, Deng Xiaoping himself took every occasion to stress that China's economic opening to the world would continue. Although at home one heard the Marxist rhetoric of class struggle, abroad Chinese diplomats used the well-established and universal principle of national sovereignty to defend their actions. China, Deng argued, would brook no foreign interference in the management of its domestic relations, but it would not be provocative. Diplomats and business people who respected China's sovereignty would be warmly welcomed in Beijing. As for the others, Deng counseled patience: he confidently predicted that they would eventually change their view if the nation remained stable. In the end, his more moderate approach prevailed.
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14-55/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 69; THR VT96
	 Looking back over the year following the Tiananmen Square crackdown Deng and his colleagues could thus feel some satisfaction. Although they had made occasional con- cessions to world public opinion, such as the suspension of martial law in Tibet and Beijing, as well as the release of some dissidents, China had held its ground in the face of enormous global pressure. In the summer of 1990, one offi- cial journal drew the following conclusion from the events of the past year: "China cannot do without the world, neither can the world do without China." It may well have been this minimal confidence that, according to a Hong Kong source, prompted the Communist party foreign policy group to rec- ommend replacing the reactive foreign policy that had pre- vailed since the Tiananmen Square crisis with one that took the initiative in foreign affairs.
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14-56/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen," p. 71 ; THR VT96
	 The specter of a post-Tiananmen-crisis China, isolated or shunned by the world, thus never really materialized. Beijing's diplomatic line of yielding only marginally to external pressure while maintaining openness to the international system seemed to have paid off handsomely--and Deng and his colleagues used this success to bolster the regime's position at home. China's diplomatic victories, the nation was told, were the result of the political stability that had followed the "turmoil" of Tiananmen Square. A "new situation" in the world favorable to reform and the building of communism in China had developed. Indeed, not only was China's strategic environment more benign than it had been in more than four decades, but economic ties with the world were accelerating. The Chinese government reported that foreign trade in 1991 had grown by nearly 18 percent and the value of foreign investment contracts by 68 percent over the previous year.
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14-57/Steven Goldstein, Prof. of government at Smith College, 1992; HEADLINE SERIES, "China at the Crossroads: Reform after Tiananmen, p. 80; THR VT96
	 Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand;while no less con- cerned about the ideological and economic dangers of in- creased global involvement, seems convinced that China must take the risk if it is to have the technology needed to survive in a new world. In the post-Tiananmen period he has consistently tried to temper the warnings against "peaceful evolution" with calls to continue the open door. During the months that followed the failed Soviet coup of August 1991, it was his decisive intervention that blunted the efforts of more-conservative elements to present a more-belligerent face to the world and limit the scope of global involvement. Under his prodding, China has opened its economic door even wider to the world and has maintained its vigorous diplo- matic campaign.
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14-58/Gerald Segal, Research Fellow International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1991; CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND, "Foreign Policy," Edited by David S.G. Goodman and George Segal, p.177; THR VT96
	 Lastly, China has an acute sensitivity to what may happen if it ignores the outside world. The legacy of the imperialist's rape of China taught many Chinese leaders that they cannot ignore the outside world and close China's gates. In the end, a closed China is a weak China. Modern communications, and more effective military power deployed at a distance from the home base, make China potentially more vulnerable than in the nineteenth century. The solution to such weakness is seen in part as learning what is best from the outside, and creating alliances to deflect or reduce external threat.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
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Editor: Steve Woods
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A. ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]
	1. Members 1
	2. ARF critical 2-3
	3. PRC critical to ARF 4
	4. PRC ambivalent about ARF 5-9
	5. ARF address Spratly problem 10-11
	6. UN better than ARF on Spratlys 12
	7. ARF important 13-14
	8. PRC supports ARF 15
	9. European Union supports ARF 16
	10. ASEAN wants US there 17-18
B. Regional organizations good for Asia 19-23
C. APEC
	1. Japan leads APEC 24-25
	2. PRC serious about APEC 26
	3. APEC increases US-PRC economies 27
	4. ROC participates in APEC 28
D. Implications to US
	1. US helps ARF 29
	2. US benefits from collective security 30
	3. US benefits from PRC participation 31
	4. US should lead 32
	5. US must be flexible to maintain PRC cooperation in UN 33
E. UN
	1. Not effective toward PRC 34-35
	2. UN working groups get human rights action 36
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15-1 / Kyodo News Service, 5-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN security forum proposal meets favorable response; ACS VT96
	 ASEAN, which groups Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, launched the ARF in Bangkok last year. Other members of the ARF are Japan, the United States, Canada, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea. Cambodia will become a member this year.
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15-2 / Kyodo News Service, 5-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN security forum proposal meets favorable response; ACS VT96
	 The officials, who are here to prepare for the second ministerial meeting of the ARF in the Brunei capital this August, also exchanged views on the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, North Korea's nuclear development and the latest political situation in Myanmar and Cambodia. The officials said ASEAN's concept paper, which envisions ARF evolving gradually from a forum for confidence building and preventive diplomacy into one for actual conflict resolution, was favourably received by all the ARF members.
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15-3 / Kyodo News Service, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN security forum proposal finds favor; ACS VT96
	 The officials said ASEAN's concept paper, which envisions ARF evolving gradually from a forum for confidence building and preventive diplomacy into one for actual conflict resolution, was favorably received by all the ARF members.
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15-4 / Kyodo News Service, 5-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN security forum proposal meets favorable response; ACS VT96
	 ASEAN senior officials had agreed earlier not to antagonize China during the meeting by raising the South China Sea dispute, because ASEAN regards China's participation in the ARF as crucial.
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15-5 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 China has demonstrated ambivalence toward the emerging multilateral framework for dialogue on regional security issues. Although the PRC will participate in the new ASEAN Regional Forum created at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in July 1993, Beijing has been reluctant to discuss bilateral issues with nations that are not directly involved. The Chinese leadership has rejected calls for six-party (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) discussions on the Korean peninsula, arguing that Pyongyang would feel threatened and isolated in such a setting. Similarly, Beijing has stated quite firmly that its territorial claims in the South China Sea can only appropriately be addressed in direct bilateral negotiations with each nation also making claims in the area. 
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15-6 / Kyodo News Service, 5-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ARF officials disagree over forum's future role; ACS VT96
	 Senior officials of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on Tuesday disagreed over the role and activities of the forum, which was launched last year to address security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, ARF officials said. The ARF senior officials aimed to hammer out a draft of the chairman's report during their meeting ahead of the second gathering of the ARF foreign ministers in August. However, participants from China and some Western countries, including Australia and the United States, differed over a proposal in the drafting on whether ARF should ultimately evolve into a forum for conflict resolution.
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15-7 / Kyodo News Service, 5-23-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ARF officials disagree over forum's future role; ACS VT96
	 ASEAN officials said China rapped the move to give ARF a role in resolving conflicts, saying it could ''institutionalize'' the body and turn it into a ''mini United Nations.'' China, which claims sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is concerned that if ARF takes on the role, it could be forced into negotiating over the Spratly row in a multinational forum.
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15-8 / Siti Rahil, Kyodo News Service, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN Regional Forum reaches agreement on group's role; ACS VT96
	 The original draft had envisioned that the forum would evolve through a three-stage process from (1) promotion of confidence-building measures and (2) development of preventive diplomacy to (3) development of conflict-resolution mechanisms. But in the final report, the ARF officials deleted words such as ''measures'' and ''mechanisms.'' And in a bid not to antagonize China, which had expressed reservations about the idea of eventually giving the forum a conflict-resolution role, the officials scrapped the term ''conflict resolution'' and replaced it with a vaguer phrase.
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15-10 / Brett C. Lippencott, Policy Analyst, Heritage Foundation Reports, March 29, 1995, SECTION: No. 243, HEADLINE: CHINA SHOULD ADHERE TO RULES OF THE ROAD; ACS VT96
	 Thus, the U.S. should: Support the establishment of an official forum to deal with disputes on the South China Sea. The Chinese should be urged to support the transformation of informal South China Sea workshops set up by Indonesia into an official negotiating forum under the auspices of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which was created expressly to deal with security disputes in Southeast Asia. These talks would expand upon the Chinese position of deferring claims to sovereignty and jointly developing resources in the region.
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15-11 / Siti Rahil, Kyodo News Service, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN Regional Forum reaches agreement on group's role; ACS VT96
	 Delegates also said the South China Sea territorial dispute was not mentioned in the finalized chairman's report at China's insistence. But one delegate said its exclusion did not matter much because ARF members were mostly satisfied with the fact that there was at least a general exchange of views on the issue.
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15-12 / Johanna Son Inter Press Service, September 1, 1994, HEADLINE: ASIA: HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE CHINA?//MDS-VT96
	 The United Nations may be better able to address the joint development of the South China Sea's resources since Vietnam's imminent entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is unlikely to make China warm to a solution by a group that counts four Spratly claimants as members. 
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15-13/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.428; THR VT96
	 , Potentially the most important multilateral forum is ARF. Established in 1993, ARF's discussions focus on regional security issues. ARF meetings are held every year in conjunction with the AMM and ASEAN-PMC meetings. However, in , two years of meetings (which only last for one day and 'are reportedly consumed by pleasantries and proce- dural matters) nothing of substance has been established. It has been difficult for ARF members even to agree on an agenda of what constitutes regional security "problems" that should be addressed multilaterally. For example, China is proving a stubborn player because it refuses to discuss either the Taiwan or South China Sea problems or its own military; Beijing claims these are "internal affairs. " China also refuses to allow Taiwan's participation in the forum.
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15-14/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.428; THR VT96
	 Ultimately the goal should be the creation of an Asian version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce), or even an institutionalized regional collective security regime. Since the collapse of the system set up at the 1922 Washington Naval Conference, Asia has not had a region wide collective security regime. Several have been proposed and tried, but none have taken root. Those imposed by external powers--such as the United States-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization--have been limited in their scope or duration. Only the Five Power Defense Arrangement (which binds together Malaysia, Singapore, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) has demonstrated endurance. To be sure, the bilateral security treaties the United States maintains with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand have survived the cold war. The United States is also committed to maintaining 100,000 forward-positioned troops in East Asia for the foreseeable future, backed by the Seventh Fleet and further deployments in Guam, Hawaii, and California.
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15-15 / Siti Rahil, Kyodo News Service, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN Regional Forum reaches agreement on group's role; ACS VT96
	 Senior officials of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have endorsed its chairman's report on the role of the fledgling group, clearing the way to establishing a new framework for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, ARF officials said Wednesday. Two working-level governmental groups will be established within the forum, in line with the report's recommendations. The report, which has gained the full support of China, marks the first step forward for the 18-member forum, which was launched last year in Bangkok. The report had been modified in a bid to overcome China's fear that the ASEAN Regional Forum would be institutionalized, and also to engage China in the forum.
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15-16 / Kyodo News Service, 5-24-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, ASEAN security forum proposal finds favor; ACS VT96
	 Senior officials from 17 Asia-Pacific countries and the European Union reacted favorably to an ASEAN concept paper mapping out its vision for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a consultative body for security in the Asia-Pacific region.
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15-17 / Richard L. Grant Royal Institute of International Affairs or the Pacific Forum/CSIS 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 59 HEADLINE: China and Its Asian Neighbors: Looking Toward the Twenty-First Century//MDS-VT96
	 Although six of these countries are grouped together under the ASEAN umbrella, all fear that they are unable to influence China, either singly or collectively in any truly significant fashion. Whatever course China takes in the future, the countries of Southeast Asia look to outside powers, particularly but not exclusively the United States and Japan, to help balance China's regional influence. 
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15-18 / McNaugher, September 22 1994(Thomas L. McNaugher is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program. Brookings Review, September 22, 1994, SECTION: Vol. 12 ; No. 4 ; Pg. 14; ISSN: 0745-1253, HEADLINE: A strong China: is the United States ready?)//MDS-VT96
	 The Southeast Asians have ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, embracing Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei), which, since its rounding in 1967, has gradually expanded both the range of issues it can discuss and the outsiders it includes. But the expansion process has been painfully slow and could easily fail to keep up with serious regional security problems. Besides, ASEAN scarcely controls the major power relationships around it. Its members work to keep the United States engaged in the region partly to sustain a stable balance within which they can operate with some freedom. 
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15-19/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p .429; THR VT96
	 If a regional security regime is to evolve in Asia, it will have to do so indigenously. It will also have to take into account United States national security interests and commitments in the region. One model may be to build on ASEAN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Both possess shared security components, although neither is a mutual defense pact per se. If the countries of Northeast Asia could form an equivalent body, there may exist the potential to integrate the three sub regional organizations. Regional security cooperation and regime building will be one of the pressing requirements and challenges of the Pacific Century. 
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15-20/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p. 428; THR VT96
	 Regional security dialogues have proved to be an important channel of communication, even though little of significance has resulted to date. They are especially important for articulating perceptions, voicing concerns, seeking clarification, and building confidence.
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15-21/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.428; THR VT96
	 Having initiated regional security dialogues at the governmental and non governmental levels, the future task will be to improve the substantive interaction. The dialogues reduce misperception, improve understanding, and institute confidence-building and security measures. In so doing they enhance regional security and provide a forum where serious disputes can be resolved. But to be successful, all nations in the region must be represented at the table (including Taiwan, North Korea, and Myanmar) and all regional security issues must be open for discussion.
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 15-22/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 42; MDS VT96
	 However, there is no clear system of alliances in Asia like that which still exists in Europe. Though countries in Asia have economic reasons to avoid conflicts, they lack the agreements and diplomatic means that can aid in resolving future confrontations. Finally, these countries simply do not possess any methodology and do not know how to deal with each other on a multilateral level.
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 15-23/David Shambaugh, Senior Lecturer Chinese Politics School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, December 1994; CURRENT HISTORY, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p.423; THR VT96
	 Doubts about the future of regional security are fueled by the uncertain roles that Russia and the United States will play. Neither commands the respect or power it had five years ago. Further compounding this fluidity is the absence of any regional collective security regime to deter or contain conflicts. Security dialogues are under way at the governmental and non governmental levels, but impediments to implementing confidence building measures and establishing a collective security framework remain.
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15-24/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Keating urges Japanese leadership in APEC action plan"; ACS VT96
	 Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating urged Japan on Friday to lead the way at a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Osaka in November in drawing up an action plan for liberalizing regional trade and investment. Japan has an important responsibility and should exercise strong leadership, and Australia will fully cooperate with Japan in successfully holding the Osaka meeting, Keating was quoted as saying.
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15-25/ Kyodo News Service, 5-26-95; SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS; "Keating urges Japanese leadership in APEC action plan"; ACS VT96
	 Japan hopes to continue cooperating with Australia in leading the 18-member APEC forum, Murayama was quoted as saying.
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 15-26/Margaret M. Pearson, Prof. Government Dartmouth College, 1994; CHINA BRIEFING, 1994, "Foreign Investment and Trade," Edited by William A. Joseph, p.71; THR VT96
	 The South China-Hong Kong-Taiwan linkage is not the only set of regional economic ties on the horizon; the PRC leadership is exploring closer economic links to other Asian countries through a number of additional routes. Since the mid-1980s, China has increasingly partici- pated in multilateral Asia-Pacific economic organizations. The govern- ment's goals have been to avoid subjugation to U.S. and Japanese economic dominance of the region and potentially to assume a leader- ship role itself in the regional economy. These goals have led China to take much more seriously participation in the U.S.-Japan dominated Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which it was allowed to join jointly with Hong Kong and Taiwan in late 1991. China has also expressed interest in the formation of a number of subregional (North- east Asian) economic groupings that would exclude the United States..
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 15-27/Robert Ash, Prof. Economics, Univ. of London, Jan., 1995; ISSUES & STUDIES, p. 25 ,"Mainland China's emerging role in the world economy;" MDS VT96
	 It is true that the emergence of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as a significant new economic force may offer a context in which American economic involvement with mainland China can be strengthened. 
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15-28/Ralph N. Clough, Prof. lecturer and coordinator of the SAIS China Forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1993; REACHING ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT, p. 111 ; ANA VT96
	 In November 1991 the ROC scored a success by gaining admission to the annual meetings of government ministers from the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the six countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) known as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings. The group wished to invite the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan to join because of their economic importance in the region, but the PRC had opposed the presence of ROC officials. Eventually, a compromise was worked out by which the ROC agreed to attend under the name "Chinese Taipei" and to be represented by its economics minister rather than its foreign minister. The three new members attended the APEC meeting in Seoul in November 1991. Although not an ideal arrangement from the ROC viewpoint, it enabled Taipei to participate in yet another important intergovernmental organization. 
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15-29 / Leon Hadar, Business Times, March 10, 1995; Pg. 17, HEADLINE: Here's looking at you, China -ambivalently; ACS VT96
	 Multilateral arrangements like the ARF "will complement, but not supplant, United States bilateral ties in the region". US interest in developing "layers of multilateral ties" in the region "will not undermine the significance of core bilateral ties".
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15-30 / RANDOLPH RYAN, Boston Globe, 4-26-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, McNamara Urges Foreign Policy Based On Cooperation; ACS VT96
	 Instead of unilateral decisions on how to deal with or dodge crises such as the war in Bosnia, McNamara said in a meeting with Boston Globe editors, US leaders should make a greater commitment to ``collective security'' policy, supporting organizations such as the United Nations. ``Except in defense of our shores narrowly defined, we should never use our military unilaterally,'' McNamara said, citing one of the conclusions contained in his controversial book, ``In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.'' ``We should have a collective security foreign policy instead of a balance of power policy. As a nation we haven't debated that,'' he said.
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15-31 / JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995, SECTION: Part A; Page 1; HEADLINE: U.S. STARTING TO VIEW CHINA AS POTENTIAL ENEMY; ACS VT96
	 The main thrust of American strategy is to try to bring China into international organizations now and to try to make sure that the Chinese leadership agrees to play by the same rules as everyone else -- so that it will not be necessary to try to contain a renegade Chinese superpower later on.
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15-32 / DONALD M. ROTHBERG, AP Diplomatic Writer, 4-18-95, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Administration Stung by China, Russia Rebuffs; ACS VT96
	 ``It's not enough for the United States to stand up and shout that these countries (Iran, Iraq, North Korea) are big threats and we need to embargo them,'' said Haass. ``What you need is U.S. leadership to try and come up with a policy that others might join, that at the end of the day would be less than we would perhaps want in the degree of economic isolation, but is preferable to the status quo,'' he said.
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15-33/Barber B. Conable, Jr., Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations and David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Spring 1992/1993; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "China: The Coming Power," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.32; THR VT96
	 Globally an increasing role will be played by multilateral organizations, with the United Nations most prominent among them. Given China's veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council, Beijing must be part of a consensus for the United Nations to be effective. Therefore U.S. policy must seek common ground where possible with China's leadership, while simultaneously criticizing its behavior in human rights, weapons proliferation and certain trade practices. The United States would not have forged an internationally sanctioned coalition during the Gulf War had China sought to obstruct the Security Council's actions in early 1991, nor would subsequent U.N. actions concerning Libya, the Balkans, Iraq or Cambodia have been feasible.
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15-34/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 Of course, China' s central role in the United Nations makes raising Beijing's human rights record through UN mechanisms particularly diffi- cult. Furthermore, the UN human rights bodies are underfunded, sometimes bureaucratic and often unable to act immediately, with the exception of some emergency procedures such as those used by the Disappearances Working Group. 
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15-35/Christopher P. Carney, Instructor Pennsylvania State University-Scranton, FALL 1992; ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, "Human Rights, China, and U.S. Foreign Policy," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p.176; THR VT96
	 Second, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, the PRC is in a position to block U.S. initiatives for global policy, especially sanctioning rogue states. The "new world order" envisioned by the United States could be profoundly altered by Chinese resistance in the United Nations. Moreover, normalized diplomatic relations might enable the United States to persuade the Chinese to halt or reduce arms sales and nuclear weapons technology transfers to unstable third world nations. In the same vein, concerted U.S.-Sino pressure might also persuade the North Korean regime to cease its quest for a nuclear capability and stop exporting ballistic missiles to regions of the world already beset by high tension.
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15-36/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 The micro approach of using United Nations monitoring mechanisms Once China recognizes certain international standards, NGOs must monitor the government's actions and hold it to the standards contained in these treaties. The Human Rights Commission already has a series of mechanisms which can be applied in this way. For example, China has already signed the CAT and HRIC is currently preparing a report to present to the appro- priate UN working groups and committees regarding Chinese government practices in the areas covered by the Convention. Besides monitoring through treaty bodies, individual cases can be brought to the various special rapporteurs and working groups.
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15-37/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 None of these mechanisms can function without information. HRIC is trying to fill this gap, particularly focussing on providing families and acti- vists in China with details of what information is needed to submit a case and collecting and collating such information. Since the beginning of 1994, we have documented over 30 cases, including 14 cases involving disappearances. In July 1994, HRIC submitted detailed information about the individuals concerned to the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involun- tary Disappearances. The Working Group issued urgent actions on four of the cases and passed some of the other cases on to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
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15-38/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 HRIC has produced and sent to China brochures, handbooks, the journal China Rights Forum and reports on a variety of topics. These include the history and current development of the international human rights move- ment, human rights treaties, the United Nations human rights mechanisms, human rights movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, women's rights, how to conduct human rights investigations and so on. We have found that information sheets of one or two pages are the most effe- ctive way of reaching people since they can be quickly disseminated by anyone in China with access to a copy machine or fax, or simply passed around from hand to hand. For example, we have an instruction sheet on How to Collect Human Rights Information that has proved especially useful. It includes a form for recording information on specific incidents of human rights abuse, making sure people know what kind of information is needed to present cases to UN working groups. Many completed forms have been returned to us, filled out by people throughout China. As technology spreads in China, increasingly it will also be possible to circulate information through such things as computer disks and audio- and video- tapes.
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15-39/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 The effectiveness of such actions is demonstrated by the case of Liu Nianchun, who RdisappearedS in May 1994. Despite repeated inquiries from his wife, Chu Hailan, and statements from neighbors who witnessed his arrest, the authorities refused to acknowledge that he was in custody for over two months. Upon receipt of HRIC's communication, the Disappearances Working Group issued an urgent inquiry about Liu. On September 7, the Chinese authorities replied to the Working Group that Liu Nianchun was under residential surveillanceS and had never been detained. When Chu took the Working GroupUs report to the police they finally admitted that Liu Nianchun was in their custody, but still refused to give her any further details since the case was confidential. Chu told Hong Kong newspapers that the Chinese government had lied to the UN in stating that Liu was never detained, thereby increasing the pressure on the Chinese authorities. Four weeks later, Liu was released and the police told him that their investigation was complete. You are not guilty, they said to him. Unfortunately, such releases have not been common, but in a number of other cases, responses to working groups have established the where- abouts of detainees and the charges under which they are being held for the first time.
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15-40/DIGNITY , May 7, 1995 (No. 9511); Electronic magazine published by Freedom Network Holding China Accountable Through United Nations System (II) Written by: Xiao Qiang, Executive Director, Human Rights in China ; ACS VT96
	 Decisions by working groups also serve to assess measures the Chinese authorities use against their critics. For example, in 1993, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention determined, after a lengthy investigation, that Reeducation Through Labor, under which individuals can be sent to labor camps without trial for offenses not listed in the Criminal Code, was among types of detention under which the measure of deprivation of freedom is inherently arbitrary in character. This set an important stan- dard, providing leverage to press the Chinese government for specific legislative change and contributing to awareness within China of the issues raised by measures such as Reeducation.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
DEFENSE OF THE STATUS QUO
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Editor: Andrea Looby
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A. China is peaceful and without conflict. (1-10)
B. Positive reform is occurring in China. (11-14)
C. China is moving in a positive direction. (15-16)
D. United States relations with China are good.
	1. US relations with China are positive. (17-22)
	2. The US has leverage over China. (23)
	3. The Us needs to be patient with China. (24)
	4. The US should work on negotiations with China. (25-26)
	5. Some disagreements will always occur between the US and China. (27)
	6. The US should keep its distance from China. (28)
	7. The US needs to maintain a balance in Asia. (29)
	8. The US should focus inward for better Sino-American relations. (30)
	9. US foreign affairs haven't changed a lot. (31)
E. China's economic situation is good.
	1. Sino-American economic relations are good. (32-33)
	2. China is becoming more global because of its economy. (34-39)
	3. China's economy is healthy. (40)
	4. China is slowly moving to a market economy. (41-43)
F. The Tiananmen coverage was actually misleading. (44-45)
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 16-1/David Shambaugh, Prof, Chinese Politics, Univ. of London, 1994; WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall, "China's fragile future" p. 45 ;SEG VT96
	 For the first time in the history of the People's Republic, China knows no pressing threat to its national security. Of course, the crisis over North Korea is of concern to China, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and elsewhere have potential to flare up, but on the whole adroit Chinese di- plomacy should be credited with pacifying China's borders and normalizing relations with numerous former adversaries and neighbors. 
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16-2/Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja, and Graham Young, Authors of history, political economy, and political science, 1994; CHINA SINCE 1978: REFORM, MODERNIZATION AND 'SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS,' p. 241; THR VT96
	 In the post-Cold War era,' China finds itself moving towards a new role in the world and in its own region. The United States, which has emerged as the only superpower, has no further need for the 'China card', while the Soviet Union no longer exists as a political entity, with the successor states being only too willing to follow the American line. As the United States gradually reduces its presence in the Pacific, smaller and less powerful countries in Asia are beginning to worry about the future power structure of the region. A question to the fore in the minds of their leaders is whether China can or will fill the power vacuum that might be created in the event of a full-scale American pullback, or whether it wants to do so anyway. With the signing of the Cambodian agreement in 1991, the region of Northeast and Southeast Asia is notable for its relative lack of trouble spots. This is in sharp contrast not only to the past few decades, but also to quite a few other parts of the world. As the largest and militarily most powerful player in the region of Eastern Asia, China is especially well placed to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability there.
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16-3/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 26O; MDS VT96
	 The Asia-Pacific is, of course, the world's fastest growing economic region. Importantly, a stable and economically pros- perous China is said to be crucial to the maintenance of peace and stabil- ity in the region. In turn, the attainment of China's goal of building socialism with Chinese characteristics - the full utilization of market forces while retaining the hegemony of the CCP - requires a long period of peace and stability both at home and abroad; thus there is Chinese com- mitment to equality among states and mutual non-interference in internal affairs. Therefore the Chinese leaders seek trade and economic coopera- tion with all countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific and regardless of political complexion; human rights, where China has been especially vul- nerable to criticism by Western powers, are seen in terms of national prosperity rather than the rights of the individual.
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16-4/ Thomas Homer-Dixon, director of the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto, Maclean's, January 9, 1995; Pg. 19, HEADLINE: War And Peace; ACS VT96
	 The answer is yes. But we have to place the cacophony of current events in the context of deeper, underlying trends affecting world order and human development. Some of these are undeniably positive. The threat of nuclear Armageddon has all but vanished. America and Russia no longer wage proxy wars in far comers of the world. Barriers to international trade are tumbling, and throughout the former Soviet Bloc and the developing world, national economic managers are laying the foundations for free markets. Democratic institutions are taking root in much of Eastern Europe. A truly miraculous transformation has occurred in South Africa, while the weary combatants in the conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Angola have turned from war to negotiation.
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16-5 / Nan Shi-yin, Hong Kong monthly 'Kuang Chiao Ching', January 11, 1995, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, SECTION: Part 3 Asia - Pacific; CHINA; internal affairs; FE/2198/G, HEADLINE: policy; Hong Kong journal outlines Beijing's policy priorities; ACS VT96
	 The "last performance" of China's diplomatic offensives at the end of 1994 looked somewhat like a "two-man show" by strategists and businessmen. In essence, it laid the cornerstone for China's economic development... Stabilize the Northeast Asian situation, seek cooperation and coexistence
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16-6 / Funabashi, 1994(Yoichi, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun. Current, February, 1994 No. 360 ; Pg. 32; ISSN: 0011-3131 HEADLINE: The Asianization of Asia: Asia defines itself.)//MDS-VT96
	 The new regional consciousness in Asia also stems from changes in traditional security attitudes and frameworks. Since 1990 diplomatic ties have been established between Russia and South Korea, and China and South Korea, and China has entered into diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. India has strengthened ties with Southeast Asia. Japan now funnels financial assistance to Russia. The civil war ended in Cambodia and nation-building efforts have begun. The visit of the Japanese emperor Akihito to China in the fall of 1992 would not have been possible without this newly created political and diplomatic context. 
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16-7 / Marilyn Greene, USA TODAY, February 10, 1995, Pg. 5A, HEADLINE: U.S. calls Asia 'most hopeful' region; ACS VT96
	 U.S. officials describe Asia as the world's "most hopeful region" in terms of global security, but caution that unresolved issues could destabilize the calm. "Compared to the Bosnias, the Haitis and the Somalias, Asia is perhaps the most hopeful environment this century," Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord [said] 
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16-8 / Marilyn Greene, USA TODAY, February 10, 1995, Pg. 5A, HEADLINE: U.S. calls Asia 'most hopeful' region; ACS VT96
	 Lord pointed to progress toward peace in Cambodia, developing diplomatic ties between the USA and Vietnam, cooperation with China and Japan and a pending nuclear agreement with North Korea as examples of the region's increasing stability.
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16-9/Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1995; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "The Pacific Way," P.103; CJJ VT96
	 It cannot be an accident that the Pacific region, which has experienced some of the greatest wars of the twentieth century, is now the most peaceful. Deeper forces must be at work. The most important is the growing realization of East Asians that their moment in history has come; they can finally join the league of developed societies. They also know that, having missed this boat before, they could well do so again if they get entangled in war or conflict. 
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16-10/Roger W. Sullivan, Former President of the US-China Business Council, Spring 1992; FOREIGN POLICY, "Discarding the China Card," Reprinted in CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE REFERENCE SHELF VOL. 66 NUM. 3, Edited by Donald Altschiller, p. 151; THR VT96
	 In Cambodia as well, China's active cooperation is not needed: China remains important in both Korea and Cambodia only to the extent that it chooses to pursue an active spoiler role. China's policies in Asia are intended to advance its own national interests; and the nature of the Chinese-U.S. relationship-whether friendly or cool--is unlikely to change that fact or prevent any mischief making if the Chinese are so inclined. 
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16-11/ REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, 5-3-95; CHINA SHIFTS TO 40-HOUR WEEK; ACS VT96
	 The People's Daily praised the move as giving ``concrete substance'' to socialism. ``The broad masses of workers and staff believe that the further reduction in work time reveals the deepening of reform in our country,'' an article in the flagship organ of the Chinese Communist Party said.
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 16-12/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p.412; THR VT96
	 While China was still far from a model of participatory democracy, in certain notable respects society had become more relaxed and open than at any time since "liberation" in 1949. A combination of freedom in the marketplace and response to foreign pressure made it possible for Chinese to buy what they wanted, enjoy private lives, speak more openly, and even to travel abroad more freely than ever before. At the end of 1993 the American ambassador to Beijing, Stapleton Roy, went so far as to say that "the last fifteen years are the best fifteen years in China's modern history" and that the last two years were "the best in terms of prosperity, individual choice, access to outside sources of information, freedom of movement within the country, and stable domestic conditions." The expansion of new fields of openness and the country's new prosperity did much to relieve the sense of despair that had characterized the post-June 4 period.
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 16-13 / Gerrit W. Gong CSIS Asian Studies Program 1994 Winter The Washington Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 1; Pg. 26 HEADLINE: China's Fourth Revolution Gerrit W. Gong //MDS-VT96
	 This fourth revolution is not the result of dramatic social upheaval, sudden replacement of political system or leadership, or abrupt change of ideology or approach. In contrast to earlier periods of revolutionary fervor, this fourth period of transformation is marked, not by revolutionary rhetoric and methods, but by gradualist and incremental policy changes. 
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 16-14/Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Prof. at the Univ. of California, Santa Barbara, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Connection Between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes," edited by Gi Ibert Rozman, p. 113; THR VT 96 Fourth, this point also raises a question: is it possible for the communist system to make the transition at all? China and the Soviet Union seem to present two extreme prototypes. One may be able to argue that despite the Tiananmen massacre and its aftershock, China seems to be ahead of the transition game. It has managed to accomplish the decentralization process, and the retrenchment that followed Tiananmen Square has not undone the gains of decentralization. Economically as well as politically, China remains more stable than the Soviet Union. But by choosing too hasty political reform without the benefits of economic reform, the Soviet Union ended up destroying itself. With severe instability it is impossible to play the transition game.
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16-15/Paul J.C. Yang, Staff Writer, March 26, 1994; Northwest Asian Week, "China has a right to self determination", Volume & Number: V.13; N.12, Page: p. 2; PMS VT96
	 In December, a New Jersey company sent a Ukraine-born American with me [Paul J.C. Yang, Staff Writer for Northwest Asian Week] on his visit to China. He was astounded at what he saw. The Chinese people were so much better off than the Ukrainians. In Beijing, people are well-dressed and well-fed. The city is clean and orderly. The stores and street makers overflow with merchandise and fresh produce. More important, the Chinese are better off in some ways than Americans. Nobody sleeps in the streets; nobody is afraid to walk around the city late at night.
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16-16/Orville Schell, well-written author on Chinese affairs, 1994; MANDATE OF HEAVEN: A NEW GENERATION OF ENTREPRENEURS, DISSIDENTS, BOHEMIANS, AND TECHNOCRATS LAYS CLAIM TO CHINA'S FUTURE, p.408; THR VT96
	 The government's attitude toward dissident students in exile also changed. With economic-development plans in high gear, China needed its trained professionals more than ever. Unfortunately, Party sponsored repression had created a serious brain drain by making many of the more than 150,000 students who had gone abroad for study and work reluctant to return home. "We must rely on science, technology, and education," said Deng on his nanxun. "It is hoped that all people studying abroad will return to China. They can all come back no matter what political attitudes they held."
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16-17 /Xinhua News Agency, January 24, 1994; Xinhua News Agency, "qian, christopher meet in paris"; PMS VT96
	 chinese vice premier and foreign minister qian qichen and u.s. secretary of state warren christopher met here today with the two sides exchanging views on bilateral relations, disarmament, the prevention of proliferation of weapons, human rights and other issues of common concern. after his meeting with christopher at the chinese embassy in paris, qian told reporters that the meeting was 'positive' and 'constructive'. the two foreign ministers said that although the global situation has changed dramatically, they believed china and the united states are important and influential countries in the world. They still have many common interests and bear significant responsibilities in a broad field, including safeguarding international peace and security. the two sides agreed that the economies of the two countries have their own merits and advantages and that there is great potential in bilateral economic and trade cooperation. they said that chinese president jiang zemin's meeting with u.s. president bill clinton in seattle last november marked a good beginning for sino-u.s. relations.
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16-18/St. Petersburg Times, January 23, 1994; St. Petersburg Times, "China's new diplomacy", SECTION: PERSPECTIVE; EDITORIALS; Pg. 2D; PMS VT96
	 However, there is no denying that the tenor of U.S.-Chinese relations already has undergone an important transformation. Until now, China has reacted with rhetorical fury to any effort at intervention in what it considered its purely internal affairs. In its recent dealings with Clinton administration officials, though, Beijing has spoken and acted with unprecedented diplomacy. Any final judgment should wait at least until June, but the evidence suggests that both sides are behaving more responsibly than they did throughout the Bush presidency.
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16-19/Lauren Fredman, Staff Writer, January 31, 1994; The Nikkei Weekly, "Global realities dictate closer ties among China, Japan and the U.S. Power Balance Vital To Stability, Expert Says", SECTION: EDITORIAL & COMMENTARY; Pg. 7; PMS VT96
	 Q:How do you assess U.S.-China relations? A:I think the Clinton administration has come up with a very clever plan. It is breaking down the relationship into component parts and trying to work with the Chinese where it can and then confronting them where it needs to. You can see it on textiles - the U.S. has cut back purchases from China. At the same time, it has released satellite technology to the Chinese. It's a very sophisticated policy, and it's by no means clear that it will work. But it seems to me that it's right. The administration has also changed on North Korea. The statement earlier by Secretary (of State Warren) Christopher was, "North Korea must not have nuclear weapons." Now, the administration is saying, "We can live with nuclear weapons." This change was brought about by consultations with China, South Korea and Japan. All three said not to do anything like sanctions that could possibly set off a war.
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 16-20/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 48; MDS VT96
	 In this sense, a new consensus on the U.S. policy toward mainland 'China has been reached: not to ignore or isolate mainland China but to support mainland China's move toward economic freedom, hoping that this will lead to the introduction of political democracy there. 
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 16-21/Robert S. Ross, Assist. Prof. of political science, Boston College, 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "The Bush Administration and China: The Development of a Post-Cold War China Policy," edited by William T. Tow, p. 23 ; THR VT96
	 In the first half of 1990 China ended martial law, released numerous political prisoners, resumed cooperation with the United States on the Fulbright and Peace Corps programs, eased its jamming of the Voice of America, and permitted the dissident Fang Lizhi to leave China. These developments, as well as the importance of trade with China for American commercial/industrial interests, facilitated the Bush administration's effort to sustain MFN treatment for China. Thus, by the end of 1990 the agenda was clear of immediate issues requiring negotiation between the United States and the PRC.
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 16-22/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 1 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Finally, a nuanced foreign policy by the United States will give the PRC's leaders time and space to build a new economic and ideological marketplace that will facilitate East Asia's prosperity and stability. The PRC will then develop along the same trajectory as did its counterpart, the Republic of China on Taiwan, several decades ago.
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 16-23 / David M. Lampton; president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1995, Pg. 19, HEADLINE: Marred Visions of US, China; ACS VT96
	 Some of the central elements of widely shared views of China among American opinion-leaders are scarcely less flattering or balanced. Among these: China's leadership lacks legitimacy and wins popular compliance simply through coercion; unemployment, inflation, and the succession to Deng could well produce social and/or political breakdown; to survive, China's leaders must have access to American markets, capital, and technology, and this dependence provides Washington with enormous leverage.
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 16-24/RAMON MYERS, St. fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p.4, THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 These new directions now under way in the PRC are best understood by comparing the PRC with the smaller Chinese state across the Taiwan Straits, the ROC. Such a comparison strongly suggests that time is on the side of the United States if its leaders and Congress can be more patient while adopting the negotiation strategy suggested above.
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 16-25/ RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 1 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 Second, three broad areas--economic relations, human rights, and weapons proliferation--are equally important for U.S.- PRC relations and deserve serious negotiations on an issue-by-issue basis, not through linkage.
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 16-26/RAMON MYERS, St. Fellow Hoover Inst., Stanford, 1994; p. 3 THOUGHTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Essays in Public Policy; ACS VT96
	 The United States might adopt a nuanced policy, striving to achieve a number of foreign policy objectives simultaneously making economic reform in the PRC and improving trade and investment relations with the United States a major concern for both countries; creating an Asia-Pacific regional security system based on sharing defense and weapons information and on adherence to international agreements that limit weapons proliferation; and improving human rights, with accountability being established through private or third-party inspections. While pressing hard to liberalize economic relations, the United States should continue to negotiate separately on the other two objectives as well. The subtle connections that link all three areas together will invariably be strengthened.
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16-27/Harvey Feldman, Thirty-year veteran of service with the U.S. State Dept., 1991; BUILDING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS FOR THE 1990s, "Taiwan and Future Sino-American Relations," edited by William T. Tow, p. 259; THR VT96
	 All in all, it appears the 1990s will not be a decade of particular closeness between the United States and China. Arguments on trade matters will persist, and the divergence in policy on Southeast Asian issues will continue. And as has happened in the past each time relations between the United States and the PRC become strained, the Taiwan issue is likely once again to come to the fore.
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16-28 / Michael Lind; senior editor of Harper's Magazine, The New York Times, April 18, 1995, SECTION: Section A; Page 25; HEADLINE: Asia First: A Foreign Policy; ACS VT96
	 It is too early to tell whether Japan or China will be a greater challenge. The most prudent policy would be for the U.S. to keep its distance from both, weighing in on the side of the weaker whenever one grows overly strong.
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16-29/ Frank Wright; Staff Writer, Star Tribune, March 27, 1995; Pg. 6, HEADLINE: After the Cold War; U.S. dominance raises question: What next? ACS VT96
	 BOB DOLE: - The successful end of the Cold War has not changed the core interests of the United States: preventing the domination of Europe by a single power; maintaining a balance of power in East Asia; promoting security and stability in our hemisphere; preserving access to natural resources, especially in the energy heartland of the Persian Gulf; strengthening international free trade and expanding U.S. access to global markets, and protecting U.S. citizens [.]
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16-30 / ROBERT A. KAPP, The China Business Review, January, 1995 ; Pg. 6; HEADLINE: New year, old story; US-Chinese relations; ACS VT96
	 So much for the bad news. Here's the good news. The new Congress--leaders and the Republican leadership will focus on domestic issues. I have argued for some time that the last thing the US- China relationship needs these days is to be placed front and center in US political discourse. If Congress carries through on its leaders' professed determination to concentrate on the home front, many of the concerns I have described may not materialize.
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16-31 / Stephen Wrage, National University of Singapore, The Straits Times (Singapore), January 15, 1995; Pg. 28, HEADLINE: Little change likely in US foreign policy; ACS VT96
	 As Messrs Gingrich, Dole and Helms learn new roles or are replaced by others who learn more quickly, much of the current uncertainty and expectation of major change will evaporate. Two years from now, when the newly-elected representatives are completing their first term in office, they will look back and see that the basic direction of American foreign policy changed little. 
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16-32/Dr. Chen Yu-chun, Director of the Graduate School of American Studies, Chinese Culture University, May/June 1994; WORLD OUTLOOK, "A Taipei Scholar's View of Clinton Administration's Policy Toward China," p. 24; CJJ VT96
	 On December 22, he [Clinton] spoke at Little Rock, Arkansas--he had already nominated Warren Christopher as his Secretary of State. In that speech once again he expressed his attitude toward China, giving support to the consistent policy mapped out during the Carter administration in which Christopher served. "To reach out to China we could bring it into the world community," he stated, a sign that his foreign policy has been injected with a large dose of realism. "Mainland China's market economy is forging ahead and that is encouraging. U.S.-China trade issue is very important," he added. 
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16-34/Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Prof. at the Univ. of California, Santa Barbara, 1992; DISMANTLING COMMUNISM: COMMON CAUSES AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS, "The Connection Between Political and Economic Reform in Communist Regimes, edited by GiIbert Rozman, p. 76; THR VT96
	 Nevertheless, by 1987 a number of significant changes had taken place in industry as well. First, de-etatization of property had begun. By 1987 property occupied by the state had been reduced from 80.8 percent to 69.7 percent, while collective and private property had increased from 19.2 percent to 27.1 percent and from zero to 2.4 percent respectively. Second, enterprises were given the expanded right of self-determination in economic decisions, including sales and prices of products (within 20 percent of the fixed price). Third, at least in principle, the market was recognized as the primary economic mechanism, and central planning was given a subordinate role. The Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 adopted a resolution stating that "the state controls the market, and the market guides enterprises.'' Fourth, the Chinese economy was opened to international capitalism through joint ventures, free economic zones, and foreign investments. Of the conditions for decentralization, China satisfied one subjective condition (the leadership was definitely committed to introduce the market mechanism) and four objective conditions. By 1987 China had accomplished decentralization, and the Chinese economy had entered the stage of a mixed command economy.
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16-35/Dr. R. I. D. Taylor, Director of Chinese Studies in the School of East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, October 1994; ASIAN AFFAIRS, "Chinese Policy Towards the Asia-Pacific Region: Contemporary Perspectives," p. 259; MDS VT96
	 Since the institution of the economic open-door policy in 1978, however, and especially since the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese foreign policy has been omni directional and issue-oriented, with a stress on multilateral diplomacy designed to establish and improve relations with both developed and developing countries and emphasizing practicality rather than dogma. 
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16-36/CHINA NEWS DIGEST (News Global), March 31-April 1, 1995; ACS VT96
	 China Opens 219 Ports of Entry [CND, 03/30/95] BEIJING - China will open 116 ports for water transportation, 55 for land crossings, and 48 airports, Reuter quoted Xinhua News Agency in a report late Friday. Last year, China opened 18 new ports of entry as part of its efforts to open its economy and promote international exchanges. The 18 new openings to the outside world include eight coastal ports, three railroad ports and two airports. Last year, 330 million tons of foreign goods and 101.22 million passengers--up 7.9% and 5.85% respectfully from the previous year, passed through Chinese international ports. (Ke WEI, Jian LIU) 
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16-37/Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1995; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "The Pacific Way," p. 111; CJJ VT96
	 THE ROAD ahead may not be smooth. No historical road has ever been. There will be many a stumble before the Pacific community is perceived to have arrived, and each stumble will bring out a chorus of skeptics. But the long-term direction has been set. Across the Pacific, the traffic on trade, investment, information, aviation, cultural, and educational highways is increasing by leaps and bounds. The growing interest in sustaining this economic boom is sweeping aside intractable problems like Chinas most-favored-nation status, and it is forcing Beijing and Washington to behave rationally toward each other.
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16-38/ Newsday, May 25, 1995, Pg. A46, HEADLINE: China Syndrome; ACS VT96
	 If China retaliates, Beijing's old men ought to be reminded that the sixth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre is coming up June 6, and with it the festering issue of China's continued repression of all who promote democracy. China is a potentially valuable trading partner and there's strategic value for the U.S. in stable ties, but Beijing must understand it can't stick its collective finger in Uncle Sam's eye. There must be limits. Clinton has begun to draw that line. It's about time.
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 16-39/Alexei D. Voskressenski, Institute of Far Eastern Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Feb 1995; ISSUES AND STUDIES, "New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRC-American Relationship," p. 40; MDS VT96
	 The PRC is attempting to become a role model for former colonial and developing countries. These states see in the PRC a formerly poor country that is overcoming backwardness while preserving political stability. 
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16-40/ John Zarocostas, The Journal of Commerce, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-7-95; CHINESE OFFICIAL SEES TRADE NEARLY DOUBLING BY YEAR 2000; ACS VT96
	 China's foreign trade will nearly double by the year 2000, to $400 billion, the country's top trade official forecast Friday. By the turn of the century, imports and exports would each ``be hitting $200 billion,'' Trade Minister Wu Yi told business and finance executives attending an international conference here. Ms. Wu said that since China launched its reform program 1978, the outcome has been rapid and healthy development of China's foreign trade.
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16-41/Reuter News Service - Far East, January 24, 1994; Reuter News Service - Far East, "HONG KONG: CHINA'S ZHU OUTLINES ASPIRATIONS FOR MARKET REFORM"; PMS VT96
	 China's "economic tzar" Zhu Rongji said the three-pronged reforms designed to transform a socialist centrally-planned economy into publicly-owned market economy had encountered no major problems so far. In a two-hour interview with the U.S. magazine Business Week, Zhu said China planned to achieve a market economy, based on public rather than private ownership. "Next year we will see to it that people become more familiar with the reform measures. And the year after that, we will see China embarking on the path to a market economy," Zhu said. Reforms concentrate on three main areas. Fiscal policy, the banking system and state-owned enterprises. "Fiscal reform will mainly be aimed at adjusting the relationships between the central and local governments," he said. "Now we have a new system under which tax revenues are shared between the central and local governments. "The aim of banking reform is to establish an independent financial system. Lastly we will change the relationship between the state and its enterprises."
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16-42/ John Zarocostas, The Journal of Commerce, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 5-7-95; CHINESE OFFICIAL SEES TRADE NEARLY DOUBLING BY YEAR 2000; ACS VT96
	 Ms. Wu said the market mechanism in China is being ``gradually established'' and outlined the efforts under way to bring China's trade rules and regulations in line with international norms.
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16-43/Zhang Yunling, Director of Institute of Pacific Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1995; WHOSE WORLD ORDER?, "China in the Post-Cold War Era," edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorenson, p. 96 ;THR VT96
	 The reform started with the family contract system in the rural areas, from where it expanded to other regions. The core of the reform is to move the basic economic mechanism away from central planning toward a market economy. Dramatic changes can be seen in three dimensions. The first is the structure of the economy. State-owned enterprises now coexist with collectively and privately owned companies, with a majority of non state-owned units. For example, 55 percent of industries are now owned by collectives or private entities (both are known as township industries). The remaining state-owned industries will have to change according to the requirements of market competition. At the same time, the private share holding system is going to expand further.
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16-44/Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Specialist in the social and cultural history of the Chinese Revolution, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Afterward: History, Myth, and the Tales of Tiananmen," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 245; THR VT96
	 In retrospect, it has also become obvious that the Chinese authorities were not the only ones to distort or mythologize history in 1989. Western journalists played a key role in getting accurate information out of and back into China, for example, but (as many scholars before me have noted) they also created their own share of myths. Although MacKinnon is right in his chapter to draw attention to the academic training and experience miters like Orville Schell brought to their coverage of the protests, many members of the foreign press corps had only a limited familiarity with the Chinese context and at best a passing knowledge of Chinese history. Western journalists also had limited access to certain kinds of data and locales (even the best were seldom able to develop extensive contacts outside of Beijing), and were hindered by the constraints of time (in the case of broadcasters) and space (in the case of print journalists) that their media imposed. These factors, coupled with a ' desire to make the situation in China readily intelligible to a mass audience at home, resulted in coverage that was often misleading. 
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16-45/Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, Specialist in the social and cultural history of the Chinese Revolution, 1992; POPULAR PROTEST AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN MODERN CHINA, "Afterward: History, Myth, and the Tales of Tiananmen," edited by Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, p. 259;THR VT96
	 The last kind of romantic myth that deserves consideration is the official account of the protests as counterrevolutionary riots. The hard-line story draws in one way or another from each of the preceding three versions of events but ultimately reverses the implications of each by inverting the positions of heroes and villains. Like New May Fourth accounts, official propaganda argues that in 1989 China faced the same threat it had faced in 1919. The difference is that, for the officials, the familiar danger was not government corruption but foreign attempts to subjugate China. Like the proponents of the end-of-history myth, official propaganda argues that the protests were inspired by anti-Communist forces seeking to overthrow the CCP and turn China into a capitalist country. But according to the official literature, this would have destroyed rather than saved the nation.
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