

Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?

The Effect of U.S. Immigration Policy On Latino Social Capital

John Herrick

Department of Political Science Honors Thesis

University of Vermont

May 2013

Advisors:

Frank M. Bryan Ph. D., University of Connecticut
John Aleong Ph. D., Iowa State University
Caroline Beer Ph. D., University of Mexico

ABSTRACT

I measure the effect of U.S. immigration policies on the level of Latino social capital. I use Putnam's measure of social capital from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey of 2000 and the Social Capital Community Survey of 2006. I compare this measure of Latino social capital (i.e., an involvement in social organizations, a public spiritedness and active participation in public affairs) with various measures of immigration policies and enforcement across 11 U.S. communities. The threat of these immigration policies has a polarizing effect for both documented and undocumented Latinos alike: some policies cause Latinos to withdraw from the community due to a fear of legal consequences and others catalyzed a political behavior aimed at counteracting such threatening policies. By deepening our understanding of social capital, I use these findings to project a changing democratic culture of America's fastest growing minority.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction	4
II. Literature Review	6
Community-level Social Capital	
Explaining Latino Social Capital: Immigration Policies	
Immigration Policies in the United States	
Threat Gives Way to Fear	
Threat Gives Way to Backlash	
Conclusion	
III. Theoretical Expectations	24
IV. Cultural Profile of Latinos	25
Latino Social Capital by Nationality	
V. Data and Measurements	30
Dependent Variable	
Independent Variables	
Controls	
VI. Analysis and Findings	38
Discussion	
VII. Conclusion	4
VIII. References	50
IX. Appendices	53
Appendix A: Demographic Profile of U.S. Latinos	
Appendix B: Communities, Table 2	
Appendix C: Components of Social Capital Index	
Appendix D: Description of Independent Variables	
Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics, Table 3	
Appendix F: Correlation Matrix, Table 4	
Appendix G: Stepwise Regression Model Without Controls, Table 7	
Appendix H: Least Squares Mean of Latino Social Capital, Figures 1 and 2	
Appendix I: Model's Tests, Figures 3 and 4	

INTRODUCTION

The system isn't working when 12 million people live in hiding, and hundreds of thousands cross our borders illegally each year; when companies hire undocumented immigrants instead of legal citizens to avoid paying overtime or to avoid a union; when communities are terrorized by ICE immigration raids – when nursing mothers are torn from their babies, when children come home from school to find their parents missing, when people are detained without access to legal counsel. When all that's happening, the system just isn't working

- Barack Obama, July 13, 2008

This epigraph was addressed to the Latino community at the annual conference for the National Council of La Raza during Obama's 2008 presidential campaign. The speech transcends the urgency of immigration reform and details the relationship between recent immigration policies and the effect such policies have on the well-being of U.S. Latinos. However, my goal is not to detail the American experience of Latinos. I accept the premise that the details referred to above are real and will proceed to measure their consequences on the behavior of U.S. Latinos.

I will explain the level of Latino social capital – a behavior characterized by social organization, public spiritedness and active participation in public affairs – as it is shaped by immigration policies in communities across the United States. Immigration law enforcement is defined as the act of enforcing federal, state and local immigration laws – such as the arrest and deportation of immigrants – and immigration policies are

defined as the legislative initiatives aimed at changing the status quo on immigration in a community, either for or against immigration.¹

This research is important for two reasons. First, it addresses a gap in our understanding of Latino social capital, particularly competing theories on the effect that immigration policies have on such behavior. I use the nation's leading survey on social capital – crafted by Putnam – to gauge its relationship with immigration policies. I find that these policies do affect Latino level of social capital. The threat of some of these policies causes Latinos – undocumented and documented Latinos alike – to hide in fear of legal consequences. However, other policies have the opposite effect of motivating Latinos to push back and consequently build their social capital. This research is also important because I provide insight into the prospects of U.S. democracy. Social capital forms the foundation of a democratic culture characterized by institutional health and civility. Therefore, these policies have the potential to affect Latino democratic potential in the United States.

¹ Immigration enforcement and immigration policy are terms that can be used interchangeably because policies are a precondition for the enforcement of most immigration law. All the law enforcement practices considered in this project are preceded by policy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing research on Latino social capital in the United States demonstrates that immigration policies do affect the behavior of Latinos, particularly components of social capital, such as trust in others, political mobilization and protest. The threat of these policies either causes Latinos to retreat from public life and hide in their homes or form issue-based associations and adopt politically active behavior. Such behaviors are theoretically consistent with components of social capital.

I will begin with an assessment of social capital in a variety of contexts (e.g., countries, U.S. states and communities) with varying degrees of immigration. Next, the effect that immigration policies have on various components of a Latino's social capital. This provides the groundwork for an analysis explaining Latino social capital in the contexts of differing immigration policies.

De Tocqueville (1839) pioneered early conceptions of social capital in the United States. He found that gathering in religious groups taught citizens to deliberate in the private realm, thus preparing them for the democratic decision-making process. He suggested that the associations that Americans form with one another serve to make democracy function better. Later, Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti (1993) wrote that social capital in the U.S. is a precondition for civil democratic procedure – that which builds trust in others and fosters cooperation skills for decision making. Putnam (1995) defined social capital as the social, political, civic and associational life that produces the networks, norms and trust to foster coordination and cooperation in the democratic decision-making process. Furthermore, a civic community characterized by a healthy social capital is a key component of institutional performance, as indicated by a

government that serves the most amount people the most amount of the time (Putnam et al., 1993). My purpose, however, is to investigate the variables that might change these attitudes and behaviors.

Putnam (2007) later found that general trust in others is more robust in settings of racial and ethnic homogeneity. He found that diversity conflicts with shared values defined by historical, traditional and cultural commonality. This lack of similarity forms the basis for distrust in others. New immigrants' incompatibility with U.S. identity is a growing concern for immigration in the United States (Ginsberg, Lowi, Weir & Spitzer, 2009; Parrillo, 2012, 2013). From a sociological perspective, immigration anxiety in the U.S. is due to a concern for one's job security and economic well-being (Parrillo, 2012, 2013). Furthermore, the stereotype of the free-riding, undocumented immigrant benefiting from social and health services funded by tax-paying citizens poses a problem for new immigrants arriving to the U.S. Communitarian theory on democracy predicts a similar anxiety. Dahl (1989) wrote that the common good is best obtained in a small and homogenous community of like-minded individuals. However, immigrants are not always received as like-minded individuals. In fact, they are often considered a threat to personal well-being and community cohesion (Dahl, 1992; Parrillo 2012, 2013; Putnam, 2007). However, this attitude may be a changing given that a recent poll found that 54 percent of Americans believe that immigrants strengthen U.S. society (Public Religion Research Institute & Brookings Institution, 2013). This perception is divided along political orientation: 68 percent of Republicans agreed that the American way of life needed to be protected whereas 45 percent of Democrats and 51 percent of Independents said the same.

In 2011, there were 18.8 million foreign born Latinos in the U.S., approximately 36 percent of the Latino population (Pew Hispanic Center, 2011). Like many other immigrants, many Latino immigrants have not been able to fully participate in American life, largely because of limited English language proficiency (Ginsberg et al. 2007). But these are not the only challenges for new Latino immigrants. Anti-immigration policies that increase the likelihood of being deported threaten their security. This is also threatening for documented Latinos who have close friends and family members who are undocumented.

In his dissenting opinion in *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court William Douglas said “banishment is punishment in the practical sense” (William O. Douglas, 1952). Immigration control has evolved to an instrument of social control whereby “deportation policy, in particular, has aimed increasingly at permanently cleansing our society of those with undesirable qualities” (Kanstroom, 2000: 1892). These undesirable qualities are the criminal activities and behaviors assigned to many recent immigrants, including some Latino subgroups. Furthermore, these policies often propagate further anti-immigration sentiments and discrimination directed toward those who appear foreign, particularly by employers who may suffer sanctions if they employ undocumented workers (Kirschten, 1991).

In short, new immigrants are not always well received in democratic societies (Dahl, 1992; Putnam, 2007). This has been the case in United States for many Latino immigrants (Ginsberg et al. 2007; Parrillo 2012, 2013; Putnam, 2007). Many Latinos, already marginalized by language barriers, now face an U.S. society hostile to their arrival. Such hostility is manifested in the historical anti-immigration policies in the

United States. Because this is a growing concern for many Latinos, I will determine if these policies inhibit their participation in American society by reducing their social capital.

This question is pertinent given the importance social capital has on the historical health of American democracy (De Tocqueville, 1839; Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam 1995, 2007). The democratic implications are particularly pressing given that in 2012 there were 21.5 million eligible Latino voters, 42 percent of which are registered to vote (Pew Hispanic Center, 2013). Furthermore, social capital helps assist Latinos in their integration into U.S. society (Parrillo, 2012). The networks, connections and institutions function as a support system for new immigrants. Parrillo considers social capital to be a crutch for new immigrants that offers them “informal sources of credit, insurance, child support, English language training educational assistance, and job referrals” (Parrillo, 2012: 404). In undertaking this analysis, I will answer an important question concerning the health of an American democracy faced with a growing immigrant population.

Community-level Social Capital

Before we consider the social capital for Latinos, we must first understand social capital relative to the immigrant composition of a community. Putnam (2007) found that racial and ethnic heterogeneity is associated with less trust in other people. Using the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey from the year 2000, he found that sites with less diversity (e.g. North and South Dakota) have high rates of interpersonal trust. About 80 percent of the respondents say that they trust their neighbors “a lot” (Putnam,

2007:12). Less than 30 percent say the same in communities with high rates of diversity (e.g. Los Angeles and San Francisco). Putnam's regression analysis of 23,250 individuals demonstrated that the census tract Herfindahl Index of Ethnic Homogeneity is positively associated with the respondent's trust in their neighbors ($r = 0.18$, $p < 0.000$).² Furthermore, Putnam found that ethnic diversity also correlates with lower levels of trust towards members of their own race, claiming that ethnic diversity triggered social isolation. This caused people to "pull in like a turtle" (151). These neighborhoods have lower confidence in government, local news, leadership and their political influence. The respondents also exhibited lower registration rates, less cooperation, less volunteerism and spent more time watching television. In short, communities with high rates of diversity appeared to be more estranged from public and collective life altogether.

Building on this observation, Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer and Scheepers (2009) test the hypothesis that immigration leads to less trust in others, resulting in less social capital. Their investigation of social capital used immigration as a measure of diversity instead of migrant stock and found that ethnic fractionalization over time is not significantly correlated with social capital across 28 European countries, totaling 21,428 individual cases.³ At the county-level, they found that immigration increased membership and participation in voluntary organizations ($r = 0.467$, $p < 0.05$ and $r = 0.462$, $p < 0.05$, respectively). At the individual-level, they found that immigration reduced interpersonal

² The Herfindahl Index of Ethnic Homogeneity is a standard index that can be interpreted as the possibility that two randomly selected individuals from a given census tract will be of the same four basic ethnic categories. It is important to note that this variable used the census tract data as an adaptation of the neighborhood. However, these data are the most detailed empirical options available.

³ Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that two randomly selected people from one country will be of a different race. To measure social capital, they used the Eurobarometer 62.2 from the years 2003 to 2004 to test both individual and country-level measures of interpersonal trust, meeting with friends, meeting with colleges, meeting with neighbors, giving informal help, donating to organizations, membership in organizations and participation in organizations.

trust after controlling for other individual-level variables such as education, gender, age, employment and marital status. In short, they found that a dynamic aspect of diversity (i.e. net migration) has a negative effect on interpersonal trust.

Other research claims that low levels of social capital is caused by new immigrants joining ethnic enclaves (e.g., Miami's Little Havana) to find the social and emotional support offered by like-ethnicities (Parrillo, 2013). While Parrillo suggested that these enclaves provide a beneficial support system, such patterns of residential segregation may also reduce civic participation for Latinos in the long term (Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012). Pearson-Merkowitz compared Latino residential segregation patterns and civic engagement and participation. Using a regression analysis, she found that community-building activities – such as participation in community projects and working to solve neighborhood problems – was negatively correlated with neighborhood segregation ($r = - 0.83, p > 0.05$). The Latino population was therefore handicapped by the residential and social context of their living conditions, thereby stunting their civic and community-based participatory potential. She concludes that this is a growing problem because Latinos are hyper-segregated relative to other minority groups.

The literature above addresses several components of social capital linked to patterns of immigration. This is important for our understanding of Latino social capital because it forms the basis for understanding the social capital of Latinos who either identify with immigrants or are foreign born. In the following sections, I transition to a micro-level review of Latino social capital beyond the effects of diversity and toward the effects of differing immigration policies.

Explaining Latino Social Capital: Immigration Policies

Aside from finding that there is an associated decline in social capital with respect to one's Latino ethnicity ($r = -0.24, p < 0.000$), Putnam's analysis did not narrow its focus to the Latino population. Instead, it treated the ethnic composition of several communities as a whole, as noted above. The next section of this review will consider both anecdotal and empirical evidence explaining the level of a Latino's social capital with respect to immigration policies in the U.S. Throughout the following review, social capital will be defined in general terms (e.g. general trust in others, community activity, political participation, protest, etc.) and will not necessarily adhere specifically to Putnam's definition nor his survey data.

Some Latinos are threatened by immigration policies (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez & Rim, 2008; Ginsberg et al. 2007). Enhancing the criminal penalty for improper status and the amount of law enforcement increase the likelihood that an immigrant, or perhaps their friends or family members, will be deported. This is threatening to one's personal security. The literature below, however, diverges on how Latinos respond: fearful Latinos withdraw from public life and others join together to fight against such policies. I will begin by reviewing literature that suggests that threatened Latinos become fearful and withdraw from public life (Hacker et al., 2011). I will then consider another body of work that suggests the opposite; they take to the streets (Alvarado Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio, & Montoya, 2008; Barreto et al., 2009; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Rodriguez & Rouse, 2012).

Immigration Policies in the United States

Because this analysis concerns the implications of Latino social capital as it relates to immigration policies, it is necessary to survey recent changes in U.S immigration policy. There are two key changes in immigration policies that this project will consider: a recent growth in the amount of immigration enforcement and policies in the U.S. and a transition from federally to locally enforced immigration law.

According to the 2012 Immigration Policy Project report by the National Conference of State Legislatures, there were 300 bills related to immigration introduced in 2005 in statehouses, 39 of which were enacted. In 2011 that number rose to 1,607 bills introduced and 197 laws enacted. However, this number declined to 983 bills introduced and 150 laws enacted in 2012. According to the U.S Department of Homeland Security, 245,601 individuals were removed from the U.S. in 2007, that number grew to 409,849 in 2012. Fifty-five percent of these removals were of convicted criminals, a 22 percent increase from fiscal year 2008. This statistic is misleading, however. The increase was due to the fact that many undocumented immigrants are located only after they have committed a crime. This marks a “new penology” in immigration law enforcement (Miller, 2005: 98). For example, the Secure Communities program initiated in 2008 allowed participating jurisdictions to send arrestees’ fingerprints to immigration databases, thereby allowing immigration authorities to check the legal status of detainees and decide further enforcement actions (Immigration Policy Center, 2011). While the program is not a direct partnership with local law enforcement, it does provide Immigration and Customs Enforcement with information otherwise not readily available to arrest undocumented immigrants predisposed to criminal offences.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 added Section 287 (g) – a program whereby Immigration and Customs Enforcement partners with federal, state and local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws – to the Immigration and Nationality Act. This marks a transition from a federally controlled management of immigration to a local control of immigration enforcement (Miller, 2005). Many communities were initially concerned that the deputizing of local police to assist Immigration and Customs Enforcement in their mission to enforce immigration law would erode trust in local police by immigrant communities. In August 2002, Florida became the first state to sign on to this program to enforce federal immigration laws. As of December 31, 2012, there were 39 local law enforcement agencies across 19 states that participate in this program (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2012).

The survey above details two changes in immigration policy. One, immigration law enforcement is growing. Two, enforcement is shifting from the nation's borders and into its localities. The literature below will discuss the effect that this change has on the behavior of Latinos.

Threat Gives Way to Fear

Studies have found that Latino populations become socially isolated because of deportation-related fear associated with strict immigration policies (Hacker et al., 2011; Kittrie, 2006). That is, Latinos respond to anti-immigration policies, such as those that aim to strengthen the enforcement of immigration law, by hiding. Such isolated and timid behavior is the opposite of active community engagement, that which defines one's social

capital. Furthermore, the production of fear is important in understanding social capital because fear can reduce community-based participation and activity, which are key components of social capital (Mansbridge, 1983). Mansbridge studied democracy in the town meetings of Selby, Vermont. In her discussion of fear as it relates to participation in town meeting, she observed that the newcomers and locals of low socioeconomic status often did not speak at town meetings because they feared criticism. This same logic applies to other contexts. For example, Skogan (2006) discusses the impact of crime-related fear on social behavior in the city of Chicago. He states that “fear leads to withdrawal from public life,” (Skogan, 2006: 255).

Hacker et al. (2011) surveyed the foreign born residence of Everett, Massachusetts, 63 percent of which were undocumented, and found that the fear of deportation affected many of the participants, including those who were legally documented because of the possibility of mistaken identity. The study also found that the participants’ lifestyle patterns changed as a result of this fear. One English-speaking participant said:

I want to feel safe but I cannot. Sometimes I want to go somewhere but I am afraid, if they take me while I am away, I couldn’t forgive myself because I would leave my son and husband. It changes the way I live (Hacker et al., 2011: 8).

The authors concluded that this fear is undermining the trust in the community and that growing mistrust might further isolate these populations because it inhibits the construction of social capital between groups within a community. Additionally, it has been found that many immigrants who experienced distress in the home were reluctant to

go to the police for help because they feared possible deportation (Kittrie, 2006). This contextual factor is important because these policies are gaining an unprecedented presence in many immigrant host communities, as noted above (Miller, 2005).

In short, Putnam found that Latinos have relatively less social capital than non-Latinos (Putnam, 2007). There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that an increase in immigration law enforcement in localities is causing Latinos to withdraw from public life (Kittrie, 2006; Hacker et al, 2011). Such an assumption is not surprising given that previous research found that fear in other settings has had similar effects (Mansbridge, 1983 & Skogan, 2006). However, below I present research that suggests that the opposite might be true.

Threat Gives Way to Backlash

Another body of research suggests immigration policies may serve as a catalyst for unconventional political participation, another general component of social capital. The following body of research suggests that immigration policies that threaten the security of Latinos leads to political mobilization and unconventional participation, such as protests. Instead of staying off of the streets and in the home, Latinos take to the streets.

The term Chicano was once considered a racial slander against Mexican Americans, namely lower-class Mexican Indians (Parrillo, 2012). However, the term now refers to a political activism that many Latinos adopt proudly. It is not a coincidence that a label of discrimination came to embody a political movement. It was such discrimination that sparked the movement. During the mid-20th century, a rapid urban

expansion into the Sunbelt pervaded the barrios occupied by Mexican immigrants. This inspired Latino community groups to fight back. These were the protests and neighborhood organizations that formed the roots of the Chicano movement. Now, civil rights groups, such as the National Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), aim to address not only discrimination, but also issues of segregation, bilingualism, employment, education and general immigration reform (Barreto et al., 2009; Parrillo, 2012).

The Chicano movement is a story whereby discrimination led to backlash from the Latino community. Latinos have exhibited a similar response to anti-immigration policies. However, the response to such policies was not limited to the formation of advocacy and interest groups, as observed during the Chicano movement. Often it was characterized by several of Putnam's components of social capital: participation in neighborhood associations, participation in protest, rallies and marches, and joining organizations that defend the rights of minorities. The research below suggests that anti-immigration policies in the U.S. have fostered such components of social capital.

Rodriguez and Rouse (2012) found that the saliency of immigration laws affected political participation and mobilization for Latinos. They used data from the 2010 Pew Hispanic National Survey of Latinos – a national sample of 13,075 Latinos conducted in 2012 – to test the relationship between immigration and in-group bonding, mobilization and forms of political participation. They found that self-interested mobilization is a common response to immigration policies for Latinos. Latinos affected by immigration policies were 13 percent more likely to discuss such issues within their social networks than those who did not consider such policies as important. This confirms that the

saliency of immigration laws can impact the nature of one's interaction with their social network, generally. Additionally, immigrants who had a friend or relative deported were 12 percent more likely to discuss issues of immigration than those who did not have such an experience. The authors found that there was also a statistically significant relationship between having participated in an immigrant rights march and having had a friend or relative who was deported ($r = 0.38, p < 0.01$). Furthermore, fear of having a friend deported increased participation in marches ($r = 0.12, p < 0.05$). In short, Latinos impacted by issues of immigration policies were likely to discuss such issues with their friends and family. Furthermore, this concern and discussion led to unconventional political participation. The authors concluded that the longer time passes without pro-immigration reform, the more Latinos will express their dissatisfaction through political mobilization and participation.

Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez and Rim (2009) used a regression analysis to compare support for Latino rallies and individual-level characteristics and attitudes. They used two national surveys across 22 states crafted by the Latino Policy Coalition in 2006, one taken April 20-26, just weeks after several immigration rallies, and another taken June 11-22, shortly after another wave of immigration rallies that same year. They concluded that the political threat of immigration policies aimed at criminalizing Latinos mobilized the Latino constituency in response. They found that support for the rallies from March to May in 2006 was correlated significantly with viewing immigration as an important issue ($r = 0.18, p < 0.05$). In short, they concluded that strict immigration policies and increased border security posed threats to Latinos. Latinos responded to these threats by developing and supporting a politics of protest. That is, Latinos who view

policies as threatening respond through political activism and the support thereof (Barreto et al., 2009; Ramakrishnan, 2005)

These findings are consistent with social movement theory. Alvarado Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio, & Montoya (2008) found that national anti-immigration sentiments manifested in the criminalization provisions in H.R. 4437 – a bill introduced in the U.S. Congress by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. on December 6, 2005 that sought to enhance criminal penalties for unauthorized status – created an ethnic immigrant identity that inspired local debate and a civil society that was composed of immigrant organizations. They wrote that the Nebraska marches that took place following anti-immigration legal provisions are a testament to the catalyzing effect of these policies. In fact, in the absence of such national anti-immigration legislation, there seemed to be a reduction in political activism and organizational involvement as indicated by the number of protests in cities across the United States.

Benjamin-Alvarado et al. noted several interesting fallouts of these protests, namely the institutions and associations designed for the Nebraskan Latino population. They cited a voter registration day in Omaha's Plaza de la Raza, a Latin American summer picnic, naturalization workshops, a growing civil rights advocacy network, legal services for Latinos, new immigrant refugee centers and so on. Furthermore, they found that these anti-immigration policies served to unify a diverse group of Latinos composed of various nationalities. Benjamin-Alvarado et al. wrote that, "ironically...the outcome of this anti-immigration backlash may serve to unify the Latino community and its larger advocacy coalition in the long term" (Benjamin-Alvarado et al., 2008: 731). This unity gives Latinos a political capital suited to change policies.

The Spring 2006 marches and activism subsided when the House did not pass H.R. 4437. However, Benjamin-Alvarado et al. predicted that many states would begin to pass their own legislation as a result. States and localities initiated their own immigration enforcement standards (Miller, 2005). The Arizona law of 2010, SB 1070, is a testament to the growing charge of state-lead immigration reform. However, in *Arizona v. United States*, the Supreme Court struck down all but one section of the law.⁴ According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina and Utah passed similarly strict immigration legislation in 2011. At last check, however, most of these laws have been partially or wholly stopped from implementation due to legal civil rights backlash.

Aside from crafting their own policies on immigration, some states have attempted to limit the ability of the federal government to monitor local immigration enforcement practices. A bill sponsored by Senate Republicans, S.1856, proposed prohibiting federal funding for lawsuits seeking to invalidate specific state laws that support the enforcement of immigration law.⁵ Introduced in November 2011, it died in committee.

Such a transition toward state and local control on immigration turned Latinos' attention to state and local immigration issues (Ramakrishnan, 2005). In California, Ramakrishnan wrote that many propositions that impacted the Latino population inspired a political response characterized by a greater attention to politics, higher voter turnout,

⁴ Section 2B was upheld, requiring law enforcement officers to determine status during a lawful stop. There were several sections that were struck down, however: Section 3 that made it a crime to carry federally issued alien registration paper, Section 5 that made it unlawful for an alien to perform work and Section 6 authorized the warrantless arrest of a person with probable cause that they committed a public offense, thereby subjecting the person for removal from the U.S.

⁵ S. 1856--112th Congress: A bill to prohibit Federal funding for lawsuits seeking to invalidate specific State laws that support the enforcement of Federal immigration laws. (2011). August 27, 2012, from <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1>

and an increase in protests, mobilizations and immigrant marches.⁶ This movement also used protests and manifestations as a medium for Latino political participation because, unlike voting, there are not citizenship or residency requirements for unconventional participation, and thereby allowing undocumented Latinos to participate (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez & Rim, 2008). This sort of political participation is that which builds a politically oriented social capital.

Benjamin-Alvarado et al. (2009) claimed that local mobilization is less robust than the civic activism that responded to national legislative issues. However, other forms of political change are taking root through the composition of state and local legislature. As of the 2012 general election, there are 77 Latinos in state Senates, an increase from 67 the previous election cycle (NALEO, 2012). Also, there are 217 Latinos in state and lower Houses, up from 190 the previous cycle. Aside from changing the composition of state and local legislatures, some localities are creating laws that prohibit the enforcement of national and state immigration policies (Sullivan, 2009). This includes local ordinances that establish a sanctuary city that prevents local police from enforcing immigration laws, vowing to not determine immigration status nor make arrest if undocumented status is discovered.

In short, at the national, state and local level, anti-immigration policies aimed at Latinos seem to function as both a catalyst for political action (i.e., through protest, rallies, voting, marches, etc.) and a source of new institutional infrastructure (e.g., naturalization workshops, advocacy groups, etc.) that could support the production of a Latino's social capital. At the very least, it forms an in-group solidarity between Latinos, developing a

⁶ Ramakrishnan, K. 2005. *Democracy in immigrant America: Changing demographics and political participation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

social capital of the bonding variety. This research suggests that these policies increase Latino social capital.

Conclusion

This review concludes by asking the following question: what is the effect of immigration policies on Latino social capital as defined by Putnam? Both the anecdotal and empirical research reviewed above measure several components of social capital. However, they do not rely on Putnam's survey data nor do they represent a complete index of social capital. Instead, the empirical work used other data sets that measure participation in rallies, marches, manifestations, protests, and neighborhood organizations. The anecdotal research measured perceived security and trust in others, the community, and local police. Furthermore, the body of work above presents two competing theories on the effect that such police have on a Latino's social capital. One theory claims that these policies reduce a Latino's social capital. The other theory claims that Latinos rebel against these policies and build social capital.

My work will use the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey from 2000 and the Social Capital Community Survey from 2006 to measure the effect that both immigration policies and individual attitudes towards local law enforcement and the rights of immigrants has on a Latino's level of Putnam's social capital. This work will tie all the components above into a single measure of Putnam's social capital, thereby informing our understanding of the democratic potential in a country with a growing Latino population receptive to these policies. It will also inform our understanding of the

ability for Latinos to fully enjoy and participate in American life in the growing presence of such policies.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

Given the body of work above, I propose two distinct hypotheses on the effect that immigration policies will have on a Latinos social capital. I present these hypotheses with several assumptions.⁷

H1: The threat of anti-immigration policies causes Latinos to withdraw from public life and distrust local police. Such behaviors are not characteristic of good social capital. Therefore, it is likely that the threat of anti-immigration policies will result in less social capital for some Latinos.

H2: The threat of anti-immigration policies leads to the formation of solidarity, community organization and political activism. Such behaviors are characteristic of more social capital. Therefore, the threat of anti-immigration policies will result in more social capital for Latinos.

⁷ It is important to note that we are assuming that participation in public life, trust and political activism and participation are correlates of social capital. Though previous research used different measures of these variables, the social capital surveys suggest that these attitudes, perceptions and behaviors are components of Putnam's measure of social capital.

The theoretical framework that supports *H2* relates to anti-immigration policies. Unfortunately, it is difficult to use Putnam's surveys to measure a Latino's social capital with respect to anti-immigration policies (e.g. laws, bills introduced, resolutions, local ordinances, etc.) given that states and localities did not adopt many high-profile policies prior to 2005, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. There would be no measurable difference to permit an accurate cross-national, county-level regression analysis of state and local legislation and its effect on Latino social capital in the year 2000. Instead, we must use the data that was available on immigration law enforcement as collected by the federal district courts and the Department of Homeland Security. I am making the assumption that both immigration policies and the enforcement thereof have on Latino social capital are the same, given that it's reasonable to assume that action on immigration is preceded by policy.

CULTURAL PROFILE OF U.S. LATINOS

Distinctions between Latinos by nationality are important in understanding Latino social capital in the aggregate. The following profile of U.S. Latinos highlights the historical and social differences of Latino subgroups. I use the following analysis to inform our understanding of each groups' affinity to form social capital in the United States because there is profound variation between each Latino in regard to their country of origin.

La Raza Comica – or the Cosmic Race – refers to the possibility that all Latinos share a commonality. However, Latinos of various nationalities have distinct cultural and historical origins, even though they share common language and heritage (Parillo, 2012). The U.S. Census defines a Hispanic as a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American or Spanish cultural or national origin. I use the label Latino interchangeably with Hispanic.

In 2011, Latinos composed more than 16.7 percent of the U.S. population, totaling approximately 52 million (U.S. Census, 2011). Approximately 36 percent of this population is foreign born. Of those who are foreign born, 5.7 million are U.S citizens, approximately 30 percent of the foreign born Latino population. Therefore, the majority of the U.S. Latino population is native born, however, nearly 70 percent of the foreign born Latino population are not U.S. citizens. Some of these Latinos are permanent residents with visas and others are undocumented. In my analysis, I use a total sample of 752 Latinos, of which 289 are not U.S. citizens, approximately 38 percent. There was no additional available data on the documentation or status of this sample.

Some Latino immigrants left the poor living conditions and high unemployment in their home country to find better employment and living opportunities in the U.S. Some Latinos are immigrants, arriving into the U.S. both with and without documentation, seeking jobs or refuge. Other Latinos were either born in the U.S. or are U.S. nationals, such as Puerto Ricans. Mexicans and Central and South Americans have historically served as a low-skilled agricultural labor force whereas Puerto Ricans and Cubans initially formed part of the urban industrial workforce in the U.S. Additionally, the urban life of Latinos varies from an isolated residence in the barrios of East Los Angeles to high rates of intermarriage and integration in the middle-class suburbs. These residential patterns have contributed the cultural differences within the Latino ethnicity.

Given that each group maintains a distinct culture and history, the following analysis aims to use levels of social capital as a lens to view these diverse national origins.⁸

Latino Social Capital by Nationality

Given Latinos' diverse cultural, historical and socioeconomic background, it is reasonable to assume that Latino subgroups will have significantly different levels of social capital. The following analysis will test the mean social capital level between each Latino group by national origin. Each group is defined by the respondents' answer the survey's question that asked what was their country of national origin. It is important to

⁸ See Appendix A for demographic profile of Latino nationalities.

note that I used two surveys that had different response options. I recoded the responses for consistency between the two surveys.⁹

TABLE 1
Latino Social Capital Means by National Origin

National Origin	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Cuban	2.21	0.67	77
Dominican	2.17	0.62	13
Colombian	2.11	0.63	13
Other	2.07	0.71	796
Puerto Rican	1.99	0.66	460
Don't know	1.98	0.65	14
Refused	1.94	0.55	17
Mexican	1.85	0.66	2011
El Salvadoran	1.81	0.61	30
Guatemalan	1.55	0.62	11
Honduran	1.50	0.70	10

The mean social capital level by national origin is useful in understanding a disaggregated Latino social capital. However, the Table 1 above does not include the mean social capital for nationalities that did not have a sample size of at least 10. Additionally, not all means are significantly different from the others. Using Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) tests of the statistical difference of the means, I find that only are Mexicans significantly different from Other, Cubans and Puerto Ricans

⁹ The 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey asks the question "if you consider yourself Hispanic or Latino, what is your nationality background?" The response options are Mexican (1), Puerto Rican (2), Cuban (3), Other (4), Don't know (8) and Refused (9). The 2006 Social Capital Community Survey asked the same question. However, it provided a more detailed response list, including Mexican (1), Puerto Rican (2), Cuban (3), Dominican (4), El Salvadoran (5), Guatemalan (6), Colombian (7), Venezuelan (8), Honduran (11), Brazilian (12), Other (13), Don't know (98) and Refused (99). Therefore, I recoded the first survey so that "Other" was "13" instead of "4," so as to not confound the "Dominican" response in the 2006 survey. Furthermore, I recoded "Don't know" as "98" so as to not conflict with the "Venezuelan" response in the 2006 survey. Lastly, I recoded "Refused" as "99" to aggregate the two datasets.

with 95 percent confidence. However, the ordering of these means still adds to our understanding of a Latino's social capital.

The three Latino subgroups with the largest samples were Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans with a mean social capital level of 2.21, 1.99 and 1.85, respectively. As noted above, all these groups have a significantly different mean social capital. These groups are distinct in several ways. Nearly all Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens. The majority of Cubans are foreign born and their socioeconomic status is relatively high as compared with other Latino subgroups. Mexicans represent the largest Latino subgroup in the U.S. Eleven million Mexicans are foreign born, approximately 35 percent of the Mexican population (Pew Hispanic Research Center, 2011). However, relative to other Latino subgroups, this percentage is small.

Cubans, Dominicans, and Colombians have the highest level of social capital, with the means of 2.21, 2.17 and 2.11, respectively. Parrillo (2013) claimed that Cubans have historically settled into ethnic enclaves and have found casual activities that form an ethnic solidarity and sociability. The sample size for Dominicans and Colombians was too small to draw conclusions.

Central American nationalities tend to have the lowest levels of social capital (e.g. El Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Honduran). The largest sample from this bottom tier is El Salvadorans. These Latinos came to the U.S to seek refuge from their home country during the Salvadoran Civil War (Gzesh, 2006). In both El Salvador and Guatemala, civil war had been tragic; the violence resulted in assassinations, murders, disappearances and many violations of international human rights. Many of the asylum seekers from these Central American countries were arrested at the border of U.S. and Mexico and detained

before being they were requested to voluntarily return to their war-torn country of origin. In the 1980s, many members of Congress asked that the Department of State grant a temporary refuge in the U.S. This request was denied. Additionally, many bills were passed in the House to suspend the deportation of these nationalities, however they failed in the Senate. Following this hostility to grant relief from deportation was a sanctuary movement driven by more than 150 congregations that counteracted the U.S. government's unwillingness to grant asylum. The Catholic Church has thus been one of the more accepting institutions in the U.S. for asylum seekers (Parrillo, 2013 and Gzesh, 2006).

I will not detail the reasons for each Latino nationality's level of social capital. Instead, I want to briefly highlight the complexity of the Latino population. Though I control for Latino nationality in the regression analysis, it is not a significant variable in the model. However, a brief ordered analysis of the mean social capital and a socio-historical survey of U.S. Latinos by nationality add value to my analysis of the behavior of Latinos in the aggregate.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The following section is my analysis on the effect of U.S. immigration policies on Latino social capital. I use a standard least squares regression analysis to test this relationship across 10 U.S. communities, either a city or county.¹⁰ The units of analysis are 763 Latino individuals who participated in the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey from the year 2000 (n = 29,233) and the Social Capital Community Survey from the year 2006 (n = 9,745).¹¹ The character of these sites is both metropolitan (e.g. Chicago, IL and San Diego, CA) and rural (e.g. Yakima, WA and Cheshire, NH). The respondents' answers to several of the questions operationally define social capital, the dependent variable in this analysis. I am assuming that the data I use is reliable; though there is a sample bias of having used only landline telephones in the survey, I am assuming that this survey methodology passes the basic conditions of representativeness and randomness.¹² The 2000 social capital survey was conducted by telephone using random-digit-dialing, averaging 26 minutes per interview. An international survey firm,

¹⁰ Roper Center Public Opinion Data Archives. 2013. Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000 and Social Capital Community Survey, 2006. University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/dataset_collection.html. Accessed March 20, 2013.

¹¹ See Appendix B, Table 2 for details on the communities used in the analysis.

¹² The fraction of the sample size relative to the population does not matter so much as conformity to the following conditions of a sample: a.) the 10 percent condition (i.e. the sample must be no more than 10 percent of the population), b.) the sample is random and representative of an entire population, and c.) must pass the success/failure condition that states that there are at least 10 successes (i.e. the probability of success times the number of the sample) and 10 failures. The 10 percent is satisfied given the sample size of each community, as described below. The success/failure condition is satisfied given the normal and continuous nature of the distribution of Latino social capital. I also excluded all outliers that fell outside three standard deviations of the mean. However, the randomness of the sample is questionable because there is an under-coverage bias with the use of just landline telephones. This would have omitted those who only use cell phones. Because samples have to be representative of a population, the selection for the sample must be random. This bias would have been negligible in the year 2000, but possibly influential in the 2006 survey given the growth of cell phone usage. I must preface this analysis by addressing this possible bias in this survey methodology. Given that these are the data we will be using in this analysis, we must accept that this survey method is nearly random and representative.

TNS Intersearch, conducted most of the interviewing and preparation of the data. The same methods were used in the 2006 survey, averaging 32 minutes per interview.

I compare these individuals' social capital with my independent variables: the degree of immigration law enforcement and policies at the community-level and individual-level attitudes towards the rights of immigrants and trust in local police. I use data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse database on the number of government filings of immigration-related charges as my community-level independent variables.¹³ Under the Freedom of Information Act, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse has begun to create a searchable database of the government filings of immigration related charges. I assume that this data is independent of error. I also use data from the Department of Homeland Security's Yearbook of Immigration Statistics on the number of arrests made by the department as a community-level independent variable.¹⁴ I am also assuming that the data collected by the Department of Homeland Security is reliable. No other organizations collect similar data on immigration law enforcement accessible to the public. Therefore, my findings depend on the reliability of this limited data. My individual-level independent variables include answers to questions asked in the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey of 2000 and the Social Capital Community Survey from 2006.

¹³ The variables U.S. Deportation Proceedings per Capita, Ordered Deportations per Capita, Criminal Referrals per Capita, Criminal Convictions per Capita, and Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita were obtained by using an online database. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse has created a detailed record of the government filings of immigration-related charges in both federal district courts and the immigration courts initiated by the Department of Homeland Security. These records span from 1992 to the present. The organization had received the data under the Freedom of Information Act. The data includes published government reports and information gathered by the Department of Homeland Security.

¹⁴ Source: United States Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010. Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2011. Accessed on Feb. 03, 2012.

Again, my dependent variable is Latino social capital. My independent variables are community-level immigration policies and individual-level attitudes toward such policies. Below is a detailed description of the variables.¹⁵

Dependent Variables

Latino Social Capital is defined as a behavior characterized by trust in others, associational activity and involvement in the community. To operationalize this definition, I use coded responses to questions asked in the social capital surveys. My index of social capital is composed of several factors: Attention to Current Affairs, Friendship, Neighborhood Involvement, Interracial Marriage Attitudes, Associational Involvement, Informal Associational Life, Political Interest, Employment Status, Faith-based Community Involvement, Marital Status, Organized Activism and Protest, Trust, and Interracial Trust.¹⁶ All these components are measured by the response to several questions in the survey.¹⁷

Even though two distinct data sets were used, nearly identical questions were asked of the participants.¹⁸ Some textual answers were coded on an ordinal scale such

¹⁵ See Appendix F, Table 3 for descriptive statistics of the variables.

¹⁶ I weighted by a factor of two several of the more distinguishing characteristics of social capital. These include: Political Interest, Informal Association Life, Trust, Associational Involvement, Organization Activism and Protest. I reduced by a factor of ½ the components Faith-Based Community Involvement and Employment Status. Some of the components of this index required a transformation for the construction of an index. Therefore, I used the log to the base 10 of Associational Involvement, Attention to Current Affairs, Friendship, and I used the square root of Informal Associational Life.

¹⁷ See Appendix C for detailed description of each component of Latino Social Capital.

¹⁸ Some questions in the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey from 2000 and the Social Capital Community Survey from 2006 were slightly different. However, both surveys produced similar, slightly bimodal, centered distributions. Judgment calls were made when sorting the components of each factor of social capital between each survey. Some questions are worded slightly differently but aim to measure the same character of social capital. For example, 33 A in the 2000 survey states “In the past 12 months, have you participated in an ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organization?” In the 2006 survey, the same question states: “In the past 12 months have you participated in any ethnic, nationality, or civil rights

that numerically low equated to a low theoretical level of social capital.¹⁹ Other variables were continuous. Only communities were used in the regression analysis, not states.

Independent Variables

Community-level immigration law enforcement. Many community-level immigration law variables were matched to the sites used in the social capital surveys. This approach therefore measures the context of one's living conditions relative to the county they live in. Even though the character of a neighborhood may vary within the census tracts, there are no empirical data that define the personality of these neighborhoods relative to immigration law enforcement in such readily available detail. Putnam (2007) found that using variables at the county-level produced nearly identical results to the "finer grain" of a census tract level contextual variable (Putnam, 2007: 155). Therefore, I assume that a model that uses county-level variables of immigration law will not critically alter the findings. The community-level variables used were the following: U.S. Deportation Proceedings per Capita, Ordered Deportations per Capita, Immigration

organizations, such as the National Organization for Women, the Mexican American Legal Defense or the NAACP?"

¹⁹ Note that all the trust indices were coded opposite ordinal direction in each survey. The 2000 survey coded high trust as "1" whereas the 2006 survey coded high trust as "4." I recoded the 2000 survey data for all components of trust where ordinal form 1 to 4, low trust to high trust. Also, often indices were recoded to not include those who either "refused" to answer questions or "don't know." Their responses that were previously coded as "8" or "9" were removed from the dataset. For example, 37A asks the question: "People and families contribute money, property or other assets for a wide variety of charitable purposes. During the past twelve months, approximately how much money did you and the other family members in your household contribute to all religious causes." The responses were 1 through 7 on an ordinal scale increasing in donation amounts. "8" and "9" were removed to not conflate non-response and uncertainty with the scale.

Criminal Referrals per Capita, Immigration Criminal Convictions per Capita, Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita and Arrests per Capita.²⁰

Individual-level attitudes.²¹ Immigrant Rights Intolerance is an individual-level measure on one's tolerance towards the rights of immigrants. The survey question asks if the individual agrees that "immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights." The responses are ordinal: disagree strongly, disagree somewhat, depends, agree somewhat, and agree strongly. One that ranks high on this ordinal scale (i.e. agrees strongly) is expected to have less social capital given that they have intolerant attitudes towards new groups of people. Furthermore, those on the low end of the spectrum (i.e. those that say they disagree that immigrants are too demanding in their push for equal rights) are expected to have higher levels of social capital given the indirect importance they prescribe to political reform and their relatively higher level of tolerance towards new groups of people.

Trust in Local Police is an ordinal measures one's attitude towards local police. The response options to the question how much one trusts the local police in their community include: not at all, a little, some and a lot. This variable is important for this analysis because it is an individual-level measure of a Latino's perception of local law enforcement. Aside from local law enforcement agencies that participate with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency under the 287(g) program of 1996, many immigrants distrust local police because of their perceived relationship with immigration authorities:

²⁰ See Appendix D for description of county-level independent variables.

²¹ Immigrant Rights Intolerance and Trust in Local Police were individual-level variables obtained from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey from 2000 and the Social Capital Community Survey from 2006.

This perceived connection between ICE and police only serves to increase fear as many immigrants discussed being targeted and stopped by police for no particular reason and assumed that the next step would be deportation (Hacker et al., 2011: 8)

Therefore, this variable fits the theoretical framework of the model because such trust – or distrust – may be a function of the perceived connection that these police officers have with the enforcement of immigration law. This assumption is based on the work of Hacker et al (2011) and Miller (2005). This variable only informs our understanding of Latino social capital as it relates to immigration polices insomuch as this assumption is true.

Controls

Citizenship status. Individual-level citizenship data are the coded responses taken from the two surveys. Citizenship is an important control because those who do not have legal status are more likely to be deported than those who are U.S. citizens. Therefore, the threat to this population is greater.

Community-level crime. This variable uses the City-data.com crime index.²² It includes murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglaries, thefts, auto thefts and arsons per 100,000 population, weighting serious and violent crimes more heavily and adjusting for the number of people who commute or visit the community. If crime is high, immigration-related referrals, arrests, convictions, and deportation proceedings ought to

²² <http://www.city-data.com/crime>

be high. That is, the more criminal activity there is, the more potential there is that an immigrant will be detained and that their legal status will then be questioned.

Furthermore, crime is related to low social capital levels. Therefore, this variable may confound the relationship between immigration law enforcement and Latino social capital.

Education. I controlled for individual-level education. According to Putnam (2000), less educated individuals have less social capital. Also, I have reason to suspect that less educated individuals may be less familiar with the legal options they have in disputing the charges against them. This is simply a reasonable hypothesis. Therefore, these individuals may be more likely to be convicted in an immigration court.²³

Income. I controlled for individual-level income. Lower income individuals tend to have less of a support network than higher income individuals (Parrillo, 2012). In fact, sociologists consider education and income a part of social capital. Furthermore, immigration authorities might target immigrants with less of an income, given the nature of the communities they live in and the relationship between crime and income. Also, those who earn less are also prone to being convicted because they may not be considered contributing members of society from the perspective of the immigration authorities. Furthermore, these individuals may not have the resources to take full advantage of the legal process.²⁴

²³ Because the two surveys used different ordinal values, I standardized the education level. The 2000 survey asked the question what the highest education level was completed for the individual. The responses included: Less than high school, 0, high school, 1, some college, 2, graduated from college, 3, and post graduate studies, 4. The 2006 survey include more response options: Less than high school (Grade 11 or less), 1, high school diploma (including GED), 2, some college, 3, associates degree (2 year) or specialized technical training, 4, bachelor's degree, 5, and some graduate training, 6. Therefore, for education, I consolidated the ordinal coding. For example, the 2006 survey has both associates degree (4) and bachelor's degree (5) and I coded these responses consistent with the 2000 survey response option of college education (3).

²⁴ The 2000 survey asked what the 1999 household income was and the response options included: 0 = < \$30,000, 1 = > \$30,000 < \$50,000, 2 = > \$50,000 < \$75,000, and 3 = > \$75,000. The 2006 survey asked

Year. Because I use two surveys on social capital, I coded for the year of the survey. This might be a significant variable given that immigration law policies changed considerably after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. It also filters any differences in methodology and experimental bias between the two surveys.

National origin. Each group is defined by the respondents' answer the surveys' questions asking what their country of national origin was. I used two surveys that had different response options and recoded the responses for consistency between the two surveys.²⁵ Given the diverse cultural, historical and socioeconomic background described above, it is reasonable to assume that individual Latinos will have significantly different levels of social capital. Furthermore, each group of Latinos came to the U.S. under very different circumstance. Some were granted refugee status and others were not. I control for nationality in an attempt to remove any differences of immunity that certain Latino groups have with respect to the enforcement of immigration law.

Region of U.S. I have reason to suspect that U.S. southern border with Mexico will impact the degree of immigration law in these communities. This will therefore have an effect on the Latino population's response to these policies and enforcement practices.

what the 2005 total household income was and the response options included the following: 1 = \$20,000 or less, 2 = Over \$20,000 but less than \$30,000, 3 = Less than \$30,000, unspecified, 4 = More than \$30,000 but less than \$50,000, 5 = More than \$50,000 but less than \$75,000, 6 = More than \$75,000 but less than \$100,000, 7 = \$100,000 or more, and 8 = Over \$30,000 or unspecified. Therefore, I combined the 2006 results to be consistent with the ordinal scale in the 2000 survey. For example, I coded 1, 2, 3, as 0. That is because all of these integers are less than \$30,000.

²⁵ The 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey asks the question, "if you consider yourself Hispanic or Latino, What is you nationality background?" The response options are Mexican (1), Puerto Rican (2), Cuban (3), Other (4), Don't know (8) and Refused (9). The 2006 Social Capital Community Survey asked the same question. However, it provided a more detailed response list, including Mexican (1), Puerto Rican (2), Cuban (3), Dominican (4), El Salvadoran (5), Guatemalan (6), Colombian (7), Venezuelan (8), Honduran (11), Brazilian (12), Other (13), Don't know (98) and Refused (99). Therefore, I recoded the first survey so that "Other" was "13" instead of "4," so as to not confound the "Dominican" response in the 2006 survey. Further, I recoded "Don't know" as "98" so as to not conflict with the responded "Venezuelan" in the 2006 survey. Lastly, I recoded "Refused" as "99" to aggregate the two datasets.

Furthermore, as discussed above, there are different settlement patterns based on the nationality of the U.S. Latino population. Therefore, this is an important variable to consider in my analysis. The control includes: Northeast, Midwest, South and West.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Here I measure the effect that community-level immigration law enforcement, individual-level attitudes toward immigration rights and local law enforcement have on a Latino's social capital level. I use regression analysis to test two hypotheses: *H1* states that threat associated with these policies will cause Latinos to withdraw from public life and exhibit less trust in their surrounding community. This will result in less social capital. *H2* states that these policies form solidarity, community building and political activism as a means to counteract the threat of these policies. Therefore, the threat of anti-immigration policies and immigration law enforcement practices will result in more social capital for Latinos.

Because there are several covariates, not all variables were used in the following model.²⁶ In the regression model, Arrests and Immigration Criminal Investigators were the only two community-level variables used because after controlling for categorical variables, other variables lacked significance or were covariates of stronger variables.²⁷

²⁶ See Appendix F, Table 4 for correlation matrix of independent variables.

²⁷ U.S. Deportation Proceedings per Capita and Ordered Deportations per Capita are clearly correlated given that one is a procedural predecessor to the other. I therefore excluded the less significant variable for the regression analysis with p-values of less than 95 percent. However, Arrests per Capita was then significantly correlated with U.S. Deportation Proceedings per Capita. I then chose to just use Arrests per Capita because it explained more of the variation in Latino social capital. Therefore, after I constructed a stepwise model, I found that Arrests per Capita was the strongest community-level variable.

TABLE 5
Regression Results: Latino Social Capital Controlling for categorical variables

Term	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	P Values	Std Beta
Intercept	0.41	0.20	2.05	0.04	0.00
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (2-1)	-0.09	0.06	-1.48	0.14	-0.06
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (3-2)	-0.26	0.13	-1.99	0.0473*	-0.19
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (4-3)	0.15	0.13	1.15	0.25	0.11
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (5-4)	0.02	0.05	0.30	0.77	0.01
Trust in Local Police (1-0)	0.01	0.08	0.10	0.92	0.00
Trust in Local Police (2-1)	0.08	0.06	1.42	0.16	0.05
Trust in Local Police (3-2)	0.11	0.04	2.56	0.0107*	0.08
Arrests per Capita	0.29	0.10	2.80	0.0052**	0.44
Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita	-0.13	0.06	-2.03	0.0427*	-0.17
Citizenship Status (0)	-0.13	0.02	-5.78	0.000***	-0.19
Education (1-0)	0.16	0.05	3.19	0.0015**	0.11
Education (2-1)	0.25	0.06	4.44	0.000***	0.18
Education (3-2)	0.06	0.07	0.86	0.39	0.04
Education (4-3)	0.01	0.09	0.09	0.92	0.00
Income (1-0)	0.17	0.05	3.36	0.0008***	0.13
Income (2-1)	0.07	0.07	1.12	0.26	0.05
Income (3-2)	0.13	0.07	1.73	0.0849†	0.07
Year	0.33	0.11	3.02	0.0026**	0.33
Crime	0.00	0.00	0.52	0.60	0.03
Region of U.S. (Northeast)	-0.04	0.05	-0.76	0.44	-0.04
Region of U.S. (South)	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.98	0.00
National Origin (Mexican)	-0.13	0.12	-1.02	0.31	-0.08
National Origin (Other)	-0.11	0.13	-0.88	0.38	-0.07
National Origin (Puerto Rican)	-0.10	0.14	-0.72	0.47	-0.03
National Origin (Cuban)	0.09	0.20	0.48	0.63	0.02
National Origin (Columbian)	-0.29	0.46	-0.62	0.53	-0.02
National Origin (Don't Know)	0.27	0.34	0.81	0.42	0.03
R-Square	0.43				
Adjusted R-Square	0.41				
Root Mean Square Error	0.51				
Mean of Response	0.93				
Observations	752				

†, *, ** and *** indicates significance at alpha equals 0.10, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01 respectively.

Again, my individual-level variables are Immigrant Rights Intolerance and Trust in Local Police. My two community-level variables are Arrests Per Capita and Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita. My categorical controls are Citizenship, Education, Income, Survey Year, Crime, Region of the U.S, and Latino Nationality. The regression model predicts 43 percent of the variation in Latino social capital using these explanatory variables.

Table 5 illustrates that Arrests per Capita was positively associated with Latino social capital, $r = 0.29$ ($p < 0.01$). Latino social capital will increase by 0.29 standard units for every standard unit increase in the number of arrests per capita that occur in a community. Unlike Arrests per Capita, the number of Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita is negatively associated with the level of Latino social capital ($r = -0.13$, $p < 0.05$). Latino social capital will decrease by 0.11 standard units for every one standard unit increase in the number of immigration criminal investigators present in a community.

Immigrant Rights Intolerance in the aggregate is significant, however, it is more useful to measure the change in each categorical level of this variable.²⁸ Using Tukey's HSD test of the means in Table 8, only the differences between level 1 and 4, 5 and 9 are significant.²⁹ The difference between "strongly disagree" and "somewhat agree" is the difference between a loss of social capital by 0.20 standard units and between "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" equates to a loss of social capital in 0.18 standard units. This is a loss in social capital of approximately five percent. With 95 percent confidence, we can say that those who are tolerant toward the rights of immigrants will have

²⁸ In the aggregate model illustrated in Table 5, the only significant difference between levels occurs between level 2 and 3 – or "disagree somewhat" and "depends" that "immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights." There is a significant decline in Latino social capital between this interval ($r = -0.26$, $p < 0.05$).

²⁹ See Appendix H for graphs of Latino Social Capital mean vs. categorical independent variables.

significantly more social capital than those who are not. Therefore, as Immigrant Rights Intolerance increase, Latino Social Capital significantly decreases.

TABLE 8
Tukey HSD Tests of Latino Social Capital Means Between Each Categorical Level of Immigrant Rights Intolerance

Level A	Level B	Difference	Std Err Dif	L.CL	U. CL	P Values
Disagree Strongly	Neither/depends	0.35	0.13	0.00	0.70	0.0517†
Disagree Somewhat	Neither/depends	0.26	0.13	-0.10	0.62	0.27
Disagree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	0.20	0.06	0.04	0.35	0.0049**
Disagree Strongly	Agree Strongly	0.18	0.06	0.02	0.34	0.0153*
Agree Strongly	Neither/depends	0.16	0.13	-0.19	0.51	0.70
Agree Somewhat	Neither/depends	0.15	0.13	-0.20	0.50	0.77
Disagree Somewhat	Agree Somewhat	0.11	0.06	-0.05	0.27	0.33
Disagree Somewhat	Agree Strongly	0.10	0.06	-0.07	0.27	0.52
Disagree Strongly	Disagree	0.09	0.06	-0.08	0.25	0.58
Agree Strongly	Somewhat	0.09	0.06	-0.08	0.25	0.58
Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	0.01	0.05	-0.13	0.16	1.00

†, *, ** and *** indicates significance at alpha equals 0.10, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01 respectively.

As Table 5 illustrates, Trust in Local Police was a significant individual-level variable in the aggregate ($p < 0.000$). As the Trust in Local Police increases, so does Latino Social Capital. Particularly, as trust in local police increases from “some” to “a lot,” Latino social capital increases significantly ($r = 0.11$, $p < .01$).

TABLE 9
 Tukey HSD Tests of Latino Social Capital Means Between Each Categorical Level of
 Trust in Local Police

Level A	Level B	Difference	Std Err Dif	Lower CL	Upper CL	P Values
A Lot	Not at All	0.21	0.07	0.02	0.39	0.0191*
A Lot	A Little	0.20	0.06	0.05	0.35	0.0036**
A Lot	Some	0.11	0.04	0.00	0.23	0.0483*
Some	Not at All	0.09	0.07	-0.09	0.28	0.58
Some	A Little	0.08	0.06	-0.07	0.23	0.47
A Little	Not at All	0.01	0.08	-0.20	0.21	1.00

†, *, ** and *** indicates significance at alpha equals 0.10, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01 respectively.

Using Tukey’s HSD Method of Multiple Comparisons of the means, I find that the difference in Latino social capital relative to trust in local police is significant between trusting police “a lot” and all other levels. However, there is no significant difference between the lower levels of trust in local police on the level of Latino social capital. The difference between trusting police “not at all” and “a lot” is a significant difference in social capital of 0.21 standard units, approximately five percent. Therefore, we can conclude that as trust in local police increases, so does a Latino’s level of social capital with at least 95 percent confidence.

TABLE 6
Stepwise Regression Model of Increase in Latino Social Capital Explained by Significant Independent Variables

Term	Estimate	P Values	R Square	R Square Increase
Education (0-1)	0.07	<0.000***	0.2649	0.27
Income (1&2-3)	0.12	<0.000***	0.3241	0.0592
Trust in Local Police (2-3)	0.07	<0.000***	0.3717	0.0476
Citizenship Status (0-1)	0.14	<0.000***	0.4111	0.0394
Arrests per Capita	0.29	0.0004***	0.4207	0.0096
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (1&2-3&4&5)	-0.07	0.0021**	0.4281	0.0074
Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita	-0.12	0.0071**	0.4338	0.0057

†, *, ** and *** indicates significance at alpha equals 0.10, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01 respectively.

The stepwise regression model in Table 6 ranks the percent of Latino Social Capital explained by each of the significant independent variables and controls. Education and Income explain 33 percent of the variability in Latino Social Capital. The other controls (i.e., Citizenship Status and Region in U.S.) explain a total of about 4 percent of the variability. It's important to note that without controlling for any other variables, Trust in Local Police, Immigrant Rights Intolerance, Arrests per Capita, and Immigration Criminal Referrals per Capita explain about 20 percent of the variability in Latino Social Capital, as indicated in Table 7.³⁰ However, after including several controls in the model, many of the variables lose significance. This leaves Immigration Rights Intolerance, Trust in Local Police, Arrests per Capita and Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita to explain approximately seven percent of the variance in Latino Social Capital when controls are applied.

In short, I describe the relationships between immigration policies and the attitudes towards such polices on the level of a Latino's social capital independent of

³⁰ See Appendix G, Table 7 for stepwise regression model without controls.

citizenship status, education, income, year, crime, region of the U.S. and national origin. The two controls that were not significant were the region of the U.S. from which the respondent was situated, community-level crime and the nationality of the respondent. The model satisfies the conditions of linearity, normality and equal variance.³¹

Discussion

The effect that these variables have on the level of Latino social capital is mixed. To understand the model, it is necessary to explain the influence of each variable by itself given that the causal relationship is neither simply positive nor negative in the aggregate.

For every incremental increase in one's intolerance towards the rights of immigrants, there is a reduction in social capital. This variable is possibly a proxy for political activism. This finding supports that claim that those who support the rights of other immigrants are more likely to build social capital than those who do not. Rodriguez and Rouse (2012) found that Latinos who have an interest in immigration policies often support political manifestations and discuss such activities and issues of immigration with those in their social networks. At the very least, this finding supports their research given that political discourse and participation are facets of my index of social capital. If we assume that support for the rights of other immigrants leads to political participation and discussion, then this finding supports my first hypothesis that anti-immigration policies enhance a Latino's social capital via reactionary behavior characterized by political participation and mobilization. The same is true in the opposite: those who do not support the rights of immigrants will exhibit apolitical and perhaps apathetic behavior.

³¹ See Appendix I for model's tests.

However, my findings only confirm that there is a significant decline in Latino social capital with intolerant attitude toward the rights of other immigrants.

As trust in local police increases, so does a Latino's social capital. This variable does not directly measure the presence of immigration law. In fact, its only contribution to our understanding of Latino social capital is that it is increased when police are trustworthy. However, Hacker et al. (2011) found that some immigrants distrusted local police because of their perceived relationship with the Immigration Customs Enforcement. Therefore, perhaps this variable indirectly measures the presence of local immigration law enforcement via a Latino's perceived trust in local police. Furthermore, the deputizing of local police to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Services in their mission to enforce immigration law was expected to erode trust in local police by immigrant communities (Miller, 2005). This is especially interesting given that I control for citizenship. There are, of course, many reasons why a Latino would distrust a local police officer. I do not control for these other possible reasons as to why Latinos might distrust local law enforcement, such as a history of racial profiling and discrimination or stop-and-frisk procedural policy. Therefore, this finding is only speculative in its contribution to this area of research. However, if we accept the assumption that distrust of local police is a function of their perceived threat to Latinos as an authority set to enforce immigration law, then such immigration policies will cause a decrease in a Latino's level of social capital. This is an assumption that would support the theoretical framework of the model and previous research on the behavior of Latinos relative to immigration polices and enforcement.

The other two continuous independent variables used in the model had opposite effects on Latino social capital, thereby confirming both hypotheses *H1* and *H2*. It appears that the presence of immigration criminal investigators causes a withdrawal from public life, whereas arrests made by immigration law authorities cause a sort of backlash that develops a Latino's social capital.

The number of arrests per capita made in a community increased a Latino's social capital. This confirms political movement theory whereby Latinos react to the threat of deportation by protesting, marching, forming social networks and working together in participatory communities to counteract these policies. However, the number of immigration criminal investigators per capita in a community led to a decrease in social capital. Perhaps the former does not present itself as the same sort of threat. That is, the Latino community may not perceive an arrest in the same manner as it might a presence of immigration criminal investigators: perhaps Latinos fight back when acquaintances are arrested and hide when the threat is personified in uniform. In short, the presence of immigration personnel has a distinct effect from the enforcement itself. This finding informs our understanding of the complexities of immigration law enforcement and it is a testament to the competing theories on the subject.

CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS

The current debate on immigration reform in the U.S. must consider the effect that immigration policies have on the behavior of immigrants. Policies on immigration can sway an immigrant's ability to integrate into American society. This shapes their experience of American life. I find that these policies transcend the function of territorial security and border management: they affect the behavior of Latinos as measured by their social capital. My work demonstrates that immigration policies, enforcement, and attitudes partly explain a measure of Robert Putnam's social capital. Given my measure of immigration policy, the effect is not uniform. At the individual-level, trust in local police increases Latino social capital whereas immigration rights intolerance has the opposite effect. At the county-level, the number of arrests increases Latino social capital whereas the number of immigration criminal investigators has the opposite effect. All these relationships are independent of educational attainment, income, citizenship status, the survey year, crime in the community, region of U.S. and Latino national origin.

I began by stating that democratic implications exist with regard to the effect of these policies. These policies have catalyzed community building activities, public engagement and activism. Such characteristics of American society provide Latinos with a culture and support system conducive to democratic participation. However, the effect is two-sided. The lack of trust in local police and the presence of immigration enforcement personnel are associated with a decline in social capital, thereby eroding the democratic potential of Latinos. Therefore, the effects of these policies as they relate to a democratic Latino culture vary inasmuch as these policies are represented in a community.

Latinos are nearly twice as aware of these immigration policies than white Americans. According to a recent survey by Public Religion Research Institute & Brookings Institution (2013), 46 percent of Latinos correctly perceived that the deportation of undocumented immigrants has increased over the past six years, as compared with 24 percent of white Americans who believe the same. Adding to this perceived reality, I demonstrate that these policies have affected their behavior during the early millennial era.

Perhaps the Latino vote was a driving force for recent immigration reform. However, given the findings of this project and the democratic implications of social capital, one cannot discount the possibility that these policies have provided Latinos with a social capital used to voice their concerns in concert to elected officials. Social capital is a tool. Immigration policies have helped to craft this tool that will soon be used to craft prospective policies on immigration. This feedback drives the democratic process. A testament to this democratic consequence is noted in the Republican National Committee's 2013 report, which states the following:

In essence, Hispanic voters tell us our Party's position on immigration has become a litmus test, measuring whether we are meeting them with a welcome mat or a closed door (Growth & Opportunity Project, 2013: 15)

The role of these immigration policies transcends electoral preference, however. These policies have affected the democratic culture of Latinos. Future research must investigate how this culture manifests into future democratic procedure and campaign strategy.

Latinos are reluctant to participate in a public where immigration law enforcement is physically present and distrusted. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of immigration law enforcement threatens Latinos' security

and reduces their social capital. However, Latinos who live in a context where their friends and neighbors are arrested will have higher levels of social capital than those who do not experience this situation. This supports the hypothesis that Latinos respond to the threat of immigration law enforcement by mobilizing, organizing, and becoming publically engaged, thereby increasing their social capital. Therefore, a balance exists between the effect of an oppressive threat and a threat worth combating. I suggest that to best enhance the democratic potential of this new population, policy must gain the trust of Latinos.

In conclusion, Latinos have the ability to be active, publicly engaged citizens. This behavior is not limited to such threatening circumstances of deportation. If Latinos are free from this threat, their reaction to less unforgiving policies will surely cultivate a comparable stock of social capital, thereby securing the health of American democracy.

REFERENCES

Balderrama, F. E. & Rodríguez, R. 2006. *Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s*, revised edition. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Barreto, M. A., Manzano, S., Ramirez, R. & K. Rim, K. 2009. Mobilization, Participation, and Solidaridad: Latino Participation in the 2006 Immigration Protest Rallies. *Urban Affairs Review* 44, (5): 736–764

- Benjamin-Alvarado, J., DeSipio, L., & Montoya, C. 2008. Latino Mobilization in New Immigrant Destinations: The Anti--H.R. 4437 Protest in Nebraska's Cities. *Urban Affairs Review* 44 (5): 718–735.
- City Data Crime Index. 2010. <http://www.city-data.com/crime>
- Dahl, R. A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- De Tocqueville, A. 1839. *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969
- Gesthuizen, M., Van Der Meer, T., & Scheepers, P. 2009. Ethnic Diversity and Social Capital in Europe: Tests of Putnam's Thesis in European Countries. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 32 (2): 121–142.
- Ginsberg, B., Lowi, T., Weir, M., & Spitzer, R. 2009. *We the People*. W. W. Norton & Company Seventh Essentials Ed.
- Glazer, N. & Moynihan, D. P. 1970. *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 104.
- Gzesh, S. 2006. Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era. Migration Information Source. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=384>. Accessed March 9, 2013.
- Hacker, K., Chu, J. Leung, C., Marra, R., Pirie, A., Brahim, M., English, M., Beckmann, J., Acevedo-Garcia, D. & Marlin, R. P. 2011. The Impact of Immigration and Customs Enforcement on Immigrant Health: Perceptions of Immigrants in Everett, Massachusetts, USA. *Social Science & Medicine* 73 (4): 586–594.
- Harisiades v. Shaughnessy & Mascitti, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952). Dissent. Wikisource, *The Free Library*. Wikisource, The Free Library, 27 Jul. 2011. http://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Harisiades_v._Shaughnessy_%26_Mascitti/Dissent_Douglas&oldid=3225712. Accessed March 13, 2013.
- Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2012. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act. <http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm>. Accessed on April 3, 2013.
- Immigration Policy Center. 2011. The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions and Continuing Concerns. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf. Accessed March 12, 2013.
- Kanstroom, D. 2000. Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases. *Harvard Law Review*, 113: 1890-1935.
- Kirschten, D. 1991. Not Black-and-White. *National Journal*, March 2: 496–500
- Kittrie, Orde F. 2006. Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police. *Iowa Law Review*, 91 (1449, 1455).
- Mansbridge, J. 1983. *Beyond Adversary Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Miller, T. A. 2005. Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th. *Boston College Third World Law Journal*, 25(81).
- National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) Education Fund 2012 Election Profile - State Legislative Opportunities. <http://www.naleo.org/downloads/2012StateLegElectionProfile.pdf>. Accessed Feb. 20, 2013.

- National Conference of State Legislatures. 2012. U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Arizona's Immigration Enforcement Law. <http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/us-supreme-court-rules-on-arizona-immigration-laws.aspx>. Accessed March 21, 2013.
- National Conference of State Legislatures. 2013. 2012 Immigration Report. <http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2012-immigration-related-laws-jan-december-2012.aspx>. Accessed February 28, 2013.
- Obama, B. July 13, 2008. Speech addressed to the National Council of La Raza.
- Parrillo, V. N. 2012. *Strangers to These Shores: Race and Ethnic Relations in the United States* (10th ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson.
- Parrillo, V. N. 2013. *Diversity in America*. (4th ed.). Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Pearson-Merkowitz, S. 2012. The Limits of the Homogeneity Model: Segregation and Civic Engagement in Latino Communities. *American Politics Research*.
- Pew Hispanic Center. 2012. Latino Voters in the 2012 Election. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election/> Accessed February 28, 2013.
- Pew Hispanic Center. 2011. Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/02/15/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-2011/#1> Accessed April 15, 2013.
- Public Religion Research Institute/The Brookings Institution Citizenship, Values and Cultural Concerns: What Americans Want From Immigration Reform survey, March 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2013/03/21%20immigration%20survey%20jones%20dionne%20galston/2013_immigration_report_layout_for_web.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2013.
- Putnam, R. D. 1995. *Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital*. *Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 65-78.
- Putnam, R. D. 2007. E pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century the 2006 Johan Skytte prize lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30, 137-174.
- Putnam, R.D., Leonardi, R. & Nanetti, R. Y. 1993 *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ramakrishnan, K. 2005. *Democracy in immigrant America: Changing demographics and political participation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Republican National Committee. 2013. Growth & Opportunity Project Report. <http://growthopp.gop.com/default.aspx>. Accessed March 29, 2013.
- Rodriguez, A. & Rouse, S. M. 2012. Look Who's Talking Now! Solidarity, Social Networks and Latino Political Participation. https://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/apworkshop/papers_spring12/Rodriguez%20and%20Rouse%20APW%204-27-12.pdf.
- Roper Center Public Opinion Data Archives. 2013. Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000 and Social Capital Community Survey, 2006. University of Connecticut. http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/dataset_collection.html. Accessed March 20, 2013.
- Skogan, W. 2006. *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*. Oxford: *Oxford University Press*.

Sullivan, L. 2009. Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information Center Database. *California Law Review* 97 (567).

U.S. Census Bureau 2011. Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2010. Census Summary File, The Hispanic Population.

United States Department of Homeland Security 2013. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Removal Statistics. <http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/#>. Accessed March 12, 2013.

APPENDIX A

Demographic Profile of U.S. Latinos

An understanding of Latino social capital in the aggregate requires a demographic survey of their history, culture and socioeconomic condition.

Mexican Americans. In 2010, there were more than 31 million Mexicans in the U.S., nearly 50 percent in the West and 34 percent in the South (U.S. Census, 2010). The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican-American war in 1848 annexed the current states of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California. Along with this geographic territory came 75,000 Mexican nationals. This created a deep-rooted interethnic tension between Anglos and Mexican Americans (Parrillo, 2012). In fact, between 1850 and 1930, it is believed that there were more Mexican Americans killed than African Americans lynched. Later, during the 19th century, many Mexicans were utilized as a valuable labor force for the American agriculture industry. Though many federal immigration laws (e.g. the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924) limited the flow of immigration into the United States, temporary contract laborers came to the United States through the Bracero program – a program that granted temporary visas to agricultural workers. This allowed Mexicans to come to the country temporarily without placing a burden on social service programs and healthcare. This program lasted from 1942 to 1964.

However, many Mexicans were unwelcome during economic hard times (Parrillo, 2012). In the 1930s, those who did not leave voluntarily were forcefully deported. Balderrama and Rodríguez (2006) wrote that trucks would dive into the Mexican barrios – districts composed of a predominately Spanish-speaking population – to gather Mexican Americans, regardless of their citizenship status. Often families were divided because these workers were not allowed to bring anything with them. Furthermore,

during the 1950s, the federal government began “Operation Wetback,” which aimed to send all undocumented immigrants back to their home country (Parrillo, 2012). During this time, 3.8 million were removed from U.S. territory and less than 64,000 were granted a formal hearing.

Historically, Mexicans were not well-received in the U.S (Parrillo, 2012). One example of prejudice was the Zoot Suit Riot of 1943 in Los Angeles – a violent act of interracial tensions. It is understood that several non-Mexicans attacked a group of Mexican boys. The same night that this occurred, several Mexican boys attacked 11 sailors. The police did not find anyone to arrest. Later, approximately 200 sailors went into a Mexican neighborhood and assaulted nearly everyone they found.

Cubans. In 2010, there were 1.7 million Cubans in the U.S., 77 percent of which live in the South (U.S. Census, 2010). Two-thirds of Cubans live in Florida where they have left cultural footprints, such as “Little Havana” with more than 30,000 Cuban-owned businesses in a 600-block area.

Since the 1960s, more than one million Cubans have arrived in the U.S. However, this number is difficult to trace further because the U.S. government did not distinguish Cuban immigrants from other immigrants from the West Indies (Parrillo, 2012). Many came after the Cuban revolutions and the rise of Fidel Castro in the second half of the 20th century, bringing a wave of refugees in the 1960s and 1970s. These were largely displaced, well-educated and middle to upper-class professionals. Many of these immigrants concentrated in New York and Florida. There was another wave of refugees that came to the U.S. in the 1980s, labeled Marielitos because they left from the port of Mariel, Cuba.

Cubans are known for having brought color to many dim communities throughout the southern U.S. (Parrillo, 2013). For example, Cubans brought cigar manufacturers, mills, restaurants and nightclubs to Miami, Florida. However, many Cubans retreated into ethnic enclaves after discrimination and resentment became prevalent. However, in places like Miami's "Little Havana," many first-generation immigrants formed an ethnic solidarity through simple activities such as card games and smoking cigars. First-generation Cubans have an ethno-cultural identity that is politically active and invested in community well-being. The second generation is categorized as being more interested in popular culture, less civically oriented and better connected to young people of different races. Some of the cultural values of Cubans include intellectual pursuits, warm and open personality and personable. Many detest the *tacaño*, one who does not show friendliness and hospitality.

Puerto Ricans. In 2010, there were 4.6 million Puerto Ricans in the U.S., more than 50 percent reside in the Northeast, one-third in New York (U.S. Census, 2010). Puerto Ricans have relatively higher educational attainment than Central Americans and Mexicans.

Puerto Ricans became U.S. nationals after the Treaty of Paris in 1898, which ended the Spanish American War (Parrillo, 2012). Before the Spanish controlled the territory in 1493, Arawak and Carib tribes occupied Puerto Rico. The Spanish largely replaced the natives with African American slaves. As a result, miscegenation was common for the population. The result of this process was a society that did not view race as a distinctive feature of one's character. The color gradation and racial integration in Puerto Rico is vast (e.g. *moreno*, *mulato*, *pardo*, *trigueño*, etc.).

In the 1980s, the expiration of Operation Bootstrap, a program in 1945 that granted tax subsidies for businesses in Puerto Rico, led to an increase in unemployment and a push of migration from Puerto Rico to mainland U.S. (Parrillo, 2012). More importantly, in the 1950s, the collapse of the sugar industry pulled one out of every six Puerto Ricans to the mainland. After the economy in the urban centers began to decline and the sugar industry rebounded, many returned home and the migration slowed. In fact, many Puerto Ricans retired back home to avoid discrimination and enjoy the rich family values of the island.

One-fourth of all Puerto Ricans migrate to New York City, namely Brooklyn or the Bronx. The frequent shuttle and circular migration prevented ethnic communities from developing. Furthermore, Puerto Ricans did not find a significant cultural refuge with the Catholic Church as previous immigrants had (e.g. the Polish, French, Italians, Irish, and many others). Glazer and Moynihan (1970) wrote, “most of the Puerto Ricans in the city are Catholic, but their participation in Catholic life is small” (104). Therefore, there are few social institutions for Puerto Ricans, save hometown clubs for family reunions and weddings and first communions. However, in 1958, the Puerto Rican Day Parade began to establish a cohesive sense of solidarity among the group (Parrillo, 2012). Other social gathering places include the *bodega* – a grocery store that sells Latino foods. This is an important community center that fosters social interactions and a sense of group cohesion and neighborliness. Another institution that forms part of the community infrastructure is the *Aspira* – an organization that develops cultural pride for youths and provides assistance for upward mobility.

Caribbean, Central, and South Americans. In 2010, there were 7.8 million Caribbean in the U.S. (U.S. Census, 2010). This includes Cubans, Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. The Dominican Republic brought 329,000 immigrants between 2000 and 2010. Two-thirds live in New York. These numbers have allowed them to establish neighborhoods, which are often adjacent to Puerto Ricans. Parrillo (2012) writes that these two neighboring groups often keep to themselves. In 2010, there were 35.7 million Central Americans in the U.S. This includes Mexicans, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Costa Ricans, Hondurans, Nicaraguans, Panamanians, Central American Indian groups and others.

Migration to the United States was largely a result of political turmoil, economic hardships and overpopulation in the home county (Parrillo, 2012). Dominicans are considered to be relatively ethnically isolated, living in ethnic enclaves rather than integrating into broader racially composed neighborhoods. If there is one group that this nationality coexists with, it is Puerto Ricans. However, Puerto Ricans are slowly migrating to the suburbs and leaving these neighborhood segregated. Dominicans tend to be one of the less educated and employed Latino groups, however, second-generation Dominicans fair better.

Salvadoran-Americans came to the United States after the agricultural industry was largely industrialized in their home country (Parrillo, 2012). The peasant-lead protest caused the government to target this group, forcing them to seek refuge in the U.S. These immigrants were not given refugee status and were targeted by immigration agents in the U.S. Many found sanctuary in churches, forming a secret population of approximately

143,000. As conditions improved in El Salvador, many remained in the U.S. because they had found tight-knit support systems.

Nicaraguan Americans came to the United States as asylum seekers and refugees after the Sandinistas came to power and war broke out in their home country. Many returned home after the Contra War ended, but many still reside in Florida and California.

Columbian Americans came to the United States because of overpopulation. Their socioeconomic conditions vary and they live largely in urban areas. Many preserve the cultural traditions in social clubs and institutions.

APPENDIX B

TABLE 2
Communities Used for the Analysis: Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey
(2000) and Social Capital Community Survey (2006) sites

Community	State	N	Year 2006	State	N
Year 2000			Year 2006		
Atlanta Metro ^a	GE	510	Arkansas	AR	400
Baton Rouge	LA	500	Baton Rouge	LA	400
Birmingham Metro	AL	500	Duluth Area	MN/WI	500
Bismarck	ND	506	Greater Greensboro	NC	450
Boston	MA	604	Greater Houston	TX	400
Boulder	CO	500	Kalamazoo	MI	500
Central Oregon	OR	500	Kansas sample	KS	2455
Charlotte region	NC	1500	Lewiston/Auburn	ME	500
Chicago Metro	IL	750	National U.S Sample	N/A	2741
Cincinnati Metro	OH	1001	New Hampshire	NH	500
Cleveland/Cuyahoga County	OH	1100	Cheshire	NH	200
Delaware	DE	1383	I-93 Corridor	NH	201
Denver	CO	501	Rochester Area ^b	NY	200
Detroit	MI	501	Rochester Area	NY	500
East Tennessee	TN	500	San Diego	CA	501
Fremont/Newaygo County	MI	753	Sarasota County	FL	500
Grand Rapids	MI	502	Winston-Salem	NC	750
Greensboro/Guilford County	SC	752	Yakima	WA	402
Houston/Harris County	TX	500			
Indiana	IN	1001			
Kalamazoo County	MI	500			
Kanawha Valley	WV	500			
Lewiston/Auburn	ME	523			
Los Angeles County	CA	515			
Minneapolis	MN	501			
Montana	MT	502			
National U.S. Sample	N/A	3003			
New Hampshire	NH	711			
North Minneapolis	MN	452			
Peninsula-Silicon Valley	CA	1505			
Phoenix/Maricopa County	AZ	501			
Rochester	NY	988			
Rural SE South Dakota	SD	368			
San Diego County	CA	504			
San Francisco	CA	500			

Seattle	WA	502	
St. Paul	MN	503	
Syracuse/Onondaga County	NY	541	
Winston-Salem/Forsyth County	NC	750	
Yakima	WA	500	
York	PA	500	
Total		29233	12100

- a. Emboldened communities were used in the regression analysis.
- b. In Rochester, NY, there was an oversampling of African-Americans and Latinos.
- c. There were originally a total of 41,333 individuals in the analysis. After controlling for the Latino population, there remained 3,981. I then removed any outliers, thereby reducing the sample even more. Greater Houston, TX (2006), San Diego County, CA (2006) and Baton Rouge, LA (2000 and 2006) were not included in the analysis because they were outliers with respect to their data on immigration policies. Also, Boston, MA (2000) was excluded because it serves as a regional immigration court for many states, including New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine. Therefore, the data for this community was not trustworthy. After these changes, 752 individual units of analysis were left in the model. This number is largely a function of the available corresponding data on immigration policies across U.S. communities.

APPENDIX C

Components of Social Capital Index

Attention to Current Affairs included how many days in the past month the respondent had read the newspaper, how many hours per day they watch T.V., and how many hours they spend on the Internet reading.

Friendship included the standardized value of how many friends one had, how many confidants, if the respondent had a friend who owned their own business, was a manual worker, had been on welfare, had a vacation home, was of a different religion or race, or was a community leader. All the responses were coded and then standardized to compose the factor.

Neighborhood Involvement included answers to the questions asking the respondent if they had interacted with their immediate neighbors or had worked together to fix or improve something in the neighborhoods. The factor of community involvement included answers to questions that probed self-perceived community health, such as perceived care from others in the community, feeling of belonging associated with religion, other races, or one's own ethnic background, and how long one has lived in the community, if they rent or own a home, and their anticipated time of living in the community. Lastly, I included a response to a question that asked how much influence the individual felt that they have on the community.

Interracial Marriage Attitudes coded is coded as whether or not the respondent favored or opposed a family member marrying an Asian, black, white, or Latino person.

Associational Involvement gauges the respondents involvement in any organization, an adult sports club or league, or an outdoor activity club, a youth

organization like youth sports leagues, the scouts, 4-H clubs, and Boys & Girls Clubs, a parents' association, such as the PTA or PTO, or other school support or service groups, a veterans group, a neighborhood association, like a block association, a homeowner or tenant association, or a crime watch group, clubs or organizations for senior citizens or older people, a charity or social welfare organization that provides services in such fields as health or service to the needy, a labor union, a professional, trade, farm, or business association, a service clubs or fraternal organizations such as the Lions or Kiwanis or a local women's club or a college fraternity or sorority, any ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organizations, such as the National Organization for Women, the Mexican American Legal Defense or the NAACP, other public interest groups, political action groups, political clubs, or party committees, or a literary, art, discussion or study group or a musical, dancing, or singing group, any other hobby, investment, or garden clubs or societies, a support group or self-help program for people with specific illnesses, disabilities, problems, or addictions, or for their families.

Informal Associational Life asked how many time in the past 12 months the respondent had taken part in artistic activities with others such as singing, dancing, or acting with a group, played cards or board games with others, visited relatives in person or had them visit you, attended a club meeting, had friends over to your home, been in the home of a friend of a different race or had them in your home, socialized with coworkers outside of work, hung out with friends at a park, shopping mall, or other public place, played a team sport, attended any public meeting in which there was discussion of town or school affairs, or attended any public meeting in which there was discussion of town or school affairs.

Political Interest included a response to the question of how interested the respondent was in political and national affairs, if the respondent was registered to vote, and if they had voted in the previous general election.

Employment Status included a response to the questions about one's current employment status, if they were working at the present time, and how many hours they spent working per week.

Faith-based Community Involvement included in the respondent was a member of a local church, synagogue, or other spiritual community, how often they attend religious services, and in the past year if they had participated in religious activities (i.e., teaching Sunday school or serving on a committee.)

Marital Status include a response to what their current marital status was, (i.e., married, relationship, single, etc.).

Organized Activism and Protest included responses to the following questions: "Which of the following things have you done in the past twelve months: a. Have you signed a petition? b. Attended a political meeting or rally? c. Worked on a community project? d. Participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches?"

Trust included both *Interracial Trust* (i.e., trust in whites, Asians, Latinos, or black) and excluded *Institutional Trust* (i.e., trust in local police, local government, and federal government). The components include coded responses to the following: trust co-workers, trust co-religionists, and trust in shop clerks. I excluded institutional trust because trust in local police is an independent variable and I did not want to bias the regression model.

APPENDIX D

Description of Independent Variables

U.S. Deportation Proceedings per Capita is measured as the number of all immigration-related referrals to an immigration court. These are deportation proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement files a charge –or notice to appear- to an immigration court. This is when someone violates an immigration law. The counts of “deportation proceedings” are government filings that begin the process of deportation. Unfortunately, some cases initiated in states distinct from where the person had their hearing. For this reason, this variable is not as accurate as others and required that some communities not be used in the analysis.

Ordered Deportations per Capita is measured as the number of people deported from the immigration court in each community. Deportation outcomes are based on cases completed in an immigration court. Deportation, unlike voluntary departure, is associated with the penalty of denied re-entry into the United States. This term is used as interchangeable with removal or expulsion based on grounds of inadmissibility. Cases are not counted twice when a case is transferred to another court. As noted above, it is possible that cases had initiated in different communities from where the hearing was held.

Criminal Referrals per Capita counts the number of immigration criminal referrals to one of the 90 Federal District Courts. These are referrals made by the immigration agencies under the Immigration and Naturalization Services (until March, 2003) and later the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agencies under the Department of Homeland Security when immigration personnel find a person in violation

of immigration law. For example, a crime might include a violation of code 08 USC 1326 – or re-entry of deported alien – or 18 USC 1546 – fraud and misuse of visas, permits, or other documents. For this reason, they would be referred.

Immigration Criminal Convictions per Capita counts cases in which a defendant pled guilty, pled no contest, or had been convicted after a trial that accused an immigrant of a criminal offence. The results of this case do not lead to deportation because a federal district court does not have such authority. The order of deportation made by the Department of Homeland Security in an immigration court is a procedure that could follow this outcome.

Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita is a measure of the number of immigration enforcement officers that are employed in the district. These are personnel that operate under the Department of Homeland Security. These personnel are responsible for bringing cases against undocumented immigrants and smugglers. It is important to note that this does not include border patrol agents, immigration inspectors (i.e., those which check travel documents), or detention enforcement officers (i.e., those who operate where individuals are detained or held), for example.

Arrests per Capita – or undocumented immigrants located by immigration authorities – is a variable that counts the number of immigrants arrested and is reported in the Department of Homeland Security's database. It counts the number of deportable aliens located by the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Homeland Security Investigations, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Removal Operations. These arrests include those performed under the 287 (g) program and arrests of fugitive and non-fugitive aliens under the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations National Fugitive Operations

Program. It includes arrests by the Border Patrol Sector and Investigations Special Agent in Charge from the fiscal years of 2001 to 2010. I used data from 2001 and 2006 to align with the survey years.³²

APPENDIX E

TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

³² The variable Arrests per Capita was a variable collected by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Border Patrol (OBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). Data.gov and the Federal Government cannot vouch for the data or analyses derived from these data after the data have been retrieved from Data.gov, as reported on their website.

Variables ^a	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	N ^b
Independent Variables				
<i>Individual-level attitudes</i>				
Immigrant rights tolerance	1.00	5.00	3.06	3407
Trust in local police	0.00	3.00	2.09	3530
<i>Community-level immigration law enforcement</i>				
U.S. Deportation Proceedings per Capita	-1.08	2.09	0.00	1249
Ordered Deportations per Capita	-1.05	2.24	0.00	1161
Criminal Convictions per Capita	-0.77	2.84	0.01	1394
Criminal Referrals per Capita	-0.85	2.64	0.01	1394
Immigration Criminal Investigators per Capita	-1.38	2.23	0.00	1394
Arrests	-1.10	2.24	0.00	952
Sanctuary City	0.00	1.00	0.53	1850
<i>Controls</i>				
Citizenship Status	0.00	1.00	0.69	3325
Year	0.00	1.00	0.26	3615
Education	0.00	4.00	1.39	3292
Income	0.00	3.00	0.88	2924
National origin	1.00	99.00	4.89	3127
Region of U.S.	1.00	4.00	2.83	3615
County-Level Crime	156.80	1246.70	592.38	1305
Dependent Variables				
Latino Social Capital ^c	0.00	3.89	2.04	3612
Attention to Current Affairs	0.00	5.26	2.57	3515
Friendship	0.00	8.28	4.59	1307
Neighborhood Involvement	0.00	7.73	4.23	3615
Interracial Marriage Attitudes	0.00	4.27	2.87	1692
Associational Involvement	0.00	7.99	2.91	2181
Informal Associational Life	0.00	10.78	3.92	3450
Political Interest	0.00	13.88	5.34	3615
Employment Status	0.00	2.68	0.91	3611
Faith-based Community Involvement	0.00	1.53	0.73	3115
Marital Status	0.00	2.39	1.47	3561
Organized Activism and Protest	0.00	7.54	1.49	3614
Trust	0.00	4.72	2.46	3610
Interracial Trust	0.00	4.64	2.80	3370

a. Though not all these variables were used in the regression analysis, I present them for consideration in future research.

b. The sample size for the variables varies considerably. This is due to the lack of data on several of the communities. The community-level immigration law variables were not available for every community used in the survey. Furthermore, after recoding for non-response and other confounding responses, the sample size for the components of social capital varies as well.

c. The mean Latino social capital does not exactly equal the mean of all the components displayed in the descriptive statistics because the index was transformed slightly to better fit linear the model. The

transformation was the following: (Latino Social Capital)^{0.8} / (0.70). Additionally, aggregate outliers were excluded.

APPENDIX F

TABLE 4
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	Imm. Rights Intol.	Trust in Local Police	Dep. Proc. per Capita	Ordered Dep. per Capita	Arrests per Capita	Criminal Con. per Capita	Criminal Referrals per Capita	Imm.Crim. Inv. per Capita
Imm. Rights Intol.	1.00							
Trust in Local Police	-0.01	1.00						
Dep. Proc. per Capita	-0.05	0.04	1.00					
Ordered Dep. per Capita	-0.04	0.06	0.97	1.00				
Arrests per Capita	-0.02	0.03	0.79	0.85	1.00			
Criminal Con. per Capita	0.08	0.11	0.29	0.42	0.62	1.00		
Criminal Referrals per Capita	0.08	0.11	0.24	0.39	0.54	0.99	1.00	
Imm. Crim. Inv. per Capita	-0.05	0.03	0.94	0.89	0.68	0.24	0.22	1.00

Note: Emboldened values indicate significance at alpha less than 0.09

APPENDIX G

TABLE 7
Regression Model Explaining Latino Social Capital Without Controls

Term	Estimate	Std Error	P Values	Std Beta
Intercept	2.03	0.02	<0.0001***	0.00
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (1&2-3&4&5)	-0.19	0.02	<0.0001***	0.29
Immigrant Rights Intolerance (1-2)	-0.08	0.03	0.0063**	0.08
Trust in Local Police (0&1&2-3)	0.15	0.02	<0.0001***	-0.23
Trust in Local Police (0&1-2)	0.12	0.03	<0.0001***	-0.14
Arrests per Capita	0.13	0.02	<0.0001***	0.20
Immigration Criminal Convictions per Capita	-0.04	0.02	0.0613†	-0.07
R Square	0.20			
R Square Adj.	0.20			
Observations	885			

†, *, ** and *** indicates significance at alpha equals 0.10, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.01 respectively.

Least squares mean of Latino Social Capital Figure

The following is a report on the ordered difference of Latino social capital means within each tier of the categorical variables of immigration rights intolerance and trust in local police.

Figure 1 illustrates the negative relationship between Latino social capital and immigration rights intolerance. For every incremental increase in immigration rights intolerance, there is an associated decline in Latino social capital.

FIGURE 1
Least Squares Mean of Latino Social Capital vs. Level of Immigration Rights Intolerance





Figure 2 illustrates the positive relationship between trust in local police and Latino social capital. As trust in local police increases, there is an associated increase in Latino social capital.

FIGURE 2
Least Squares Mean of Latino Social Capital vs. Level of Trust in Local Police



Model's tests

In order to test the integrality of the model, I confirm its linearity and I test its normality and equal variance. For any regression analysis, these are necessary conditions to confirm.

Figure 3 is an illustration of the model's residuals when including controls. A test of normality confirms the goodness of the model's fit to the data. The histogram appears to be unimodal, and therefore normal. Additionally, the normal quantile plot illustrates that the model's residual values of social capital fall within 95 percent of the mean. Therefore, we can conclude that the model satisfies the condition of normality and that there are no outliers in the data. Figure 3 shows by the normal quantile plot that the residuals are nearly normal.

FIGURE 3
Test of normality: distribution of model's residuals




Figure 4 is a plot of the model's predictions against the residuals to test for equal variance. Figure 4 illustrates that the scatter appears to be random and there is no pattern. Therefore, we can conclude that the model does not necessitate any further transformations nor are there any patterns within the data that have been ignored.

FIGURE 4

Test of Constant Variance: Scatter Plot of Predicted Latino Social Capital vs. Model Residuals

