

PLUS ÇA CHANGE?¹ EVIDENCE ON GLOBAL TRENDS IN GENDER NORMS AND STEREOTYPES

Stephanie Seguino

ABSTRACT

Gender norms and stereotypes that perpetuate inequality are deeply embedded in social and individual consciousness and, as a result, are resistant to change. Gender stratification theories propose that women's control over material resources can increase bargaining power to leverage change in key institutions, prompting a shift to more equitable norms. By extension, policies that promote women's paid employment should serve as a fulcrum for gender equitable change. Is there any evidence to support this hypothesis? Investigating this requires a means to capture gender norms and stereotypes. The World Values Survey provides just such a mechanism because it contains a series of gender questions that span a twenty-year period and includes respondents from more than seventy countries. This paper uses that survey's data to analyze determinants of trends in norms and stereotypes over time and across countries, and finds evidence that increases in women's paid employment promotes gender equitable norms and stereotypes.

KEYWORDS

Economic growth, employment, gender ideology, gender norms and stereotypes, gender roles, globalization

JEL Codes: A14, J16, J21

INTRODUCTION

Inequitable gender norms and stereotypes are embedded in political, legal, cultural, and economic domains. Because these domains structure access to and control over resources, they also reproduce, strengthen, and legitimate unequal gender systems. Thus gender inequality has both material and psychological/social dimensions. This prompts the question: what is the relationship between these two dimensions?

Macrostructural theories of gender stratification, which are systemic in nature, link the level of gender inequality to factors influencing women's bargaining power (Rae L. Blumberg 1984, 1988; Janet Saltzman Chafetz

1989). The degree of gender stratification has been argued to be inversely linked to the level of women's economic power and the control over the material resources this stratification generates. Increases in women's ability to participate in economic production and to control the distribution of their production then can enhance their status and reduce physical, political, and ideological oppression.

Gender systems are undergirded by attitudes and behaviors that legitimize male control and undervalue women. Thus gender social definitions – ideology, norms, and stereotypes – are a critical link in a gender-stratified system. Most feminist theorists agree that the cultural domain in which institutions reproduce beliefs and attitudes that shape female and male behavior is a key component of a gender-stratified system. The perpetuation of gender norms and stereotypes that cause women and men to internalize as legitimate the current system of inequality results in a perception that the gender order is “natural” – or, as some claim, “hardwired” – rather than socially constructed to benefit males.

If macrostructural theories have merit, it follows that the expansion of women's access to resources may be a vehicle for transforming an unequal gender system. In economies with well-developed labor markets, an increase in women's share of employment, for example, may provide them with the power to promote change at multiple levels – in the household and in institutional domains that create and reinforce gender norms and stereotypes. Numerous factors might stimulate increases in women's share of economic activity: rapid economic growth, structural change in the economy, or even economic crisis that reduces men's access to income. We can hypothesize that women's increased economic activity is likely to exert a positive effect on gender equality and should produce changes in gender norms and stereotypes, although with a lag. This paper tests that hypothesis using data from the World Values Survey (various years). In particular, it assesses the effect of changes in women's economic activity on trends in gender norms and stereotypes to determine if there is a significant causal relationship.

THE LINK BETWEEN WOMEN'S RELATIVE ECONOMIC POWER AND GENDER NORMS AND STEREOTYPES

The stratified gender system that results in material inequality between women and men is buttressed by social definitions – that is, a set of gender ideology, norms, and stereotypes. These serve to devalue women and support traits and behaviors for men and women that reinforce the gender division of labor and male power. Gender ideologies justify the gender imbalance in power and resources. Gender stereotypes describe the manner in which men and women presumably differ, usually in ways that justify to some extent the gender division of labor. And finally, gender

norms specify acceptable behavioral boundaries for women and men, congruent with the gender division of labor and male power. Inculcation of these norms results in negative consequences attached to acts that transgress defined gender boundaries. Those consequences may be in the form of social stigma, with violation of one's gender identity boundaries often leading to anxiety and distress.²

Social definitions, thus, play an important role in reducing resistance to gender inequality in favor of men. To the extent that social definitions instill an acceptability of gender gaps in everyday behavior, there is less need to employ overt forms of power to maintain gender hierarchies. Such norms and stereotypes affect not only adults, but perhaps more importantly, also children's socialization, with children internalizing the boundaries placed on their behavior and the behavioral expectations they learn.³

What, then, are the pivotal targets that will leverage change for greater gender equality? Two important targets stand out: the gender division of labor that structures control over material resources and the psychological/social system that creates gendered personalities and behavior with the use of social definitions that legitimate the status quo. In the former, the target variables to leverage change are women's access to paid employment and equal pay, thus contributing to greater gender income equality. In the latter case, a remedy is the acceptance of a set of feminist social definitions, facilitated by women's entrance into high-status positions in institutions. Women's representation in academia, religious organizations, leadership roles, and legislative positions can act as an impetus for change.

Some have raised doubts about relying on increasing women's representation in key institutions as a strategy for success. Chafetz (1989) argues, for example, that engendered personalities and behavior are set in childhood. Increasing women's access to institutions that mold social definitions may eventually have an effect on women and men, such that children might observe more gender-equitable behavior in the household, but this process may take a very long time. Further, even if social definitions change (leading to a gender-equitable transformation of children's socialization), men's power over resources will inhibit progress in material equality between men and women. Increasing women's access to income is therefore likely to yield more immediate results in improving women's economic empowerment, hastening the alteration of power dynamics within the household that shape children's perceptions.

This is not to suggest that simultaneous efforts to change norms and stereotypes should be eschewed, as norms themselves inhibit the effectiveness of women's access to income. For example, Barbara Burnell and Johanna Ratzel (2005) find evidence that cultural norms that shape women's sense of agency mediate the effect of wages on bargaining in

India. Nevertheless, it is important for economists to understand the effect that women's access to income can have on gender norms and stereotypes, since this has implications for the effects of employment-stimulating macroeconomic policies.

Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth (2005) link the relative strength of patriarchal norms to the relationship between the mobility of male economic assets to the mobility of female economic assets, with mobility a function of the structure of the economy and the gender division of labor. Thus modes of production shape intrahousehold bargaining power. For example, in labor-intensive agricultural systems, the requirement of physical strength as an agricultural input encourages a gender division of labor that gives men command over assets that are more mobile than women's household labor-specific assets.⁴ Iversen and Rosenbluth argue that in post-industrial economies where brawn matters less, gender norms and attitudes are more egalitarian because families in such societies choose to socialize their daughters in more gender-neutral ways to assist them in securing a stable livelihood. Subsistence in such a scenario, as well as specialization in unpaid caring labor, would be economically costly. Their key point is that the structure of the economy has a powerful influence on gender norms and stereotypes.

While the structure of the economy is a slow-changing variable, even in the short run, some argue, the state of the macroeconomy may also exert an independent effect on trends in gender norms and stereotypes. One view is that economic growth may facilitate a positive change in women's well-being and gender roles (David Dollar and Roberta Gatti 1999; World Bank 2001). Empirically, this argument is based on regressions of gender gaps in educational attainment on levels of development (measured as per capita income). The reasoning behind this correlation asserts that in low-income, gender-stratified societies, women are at the back of the queue for economic resources. With higher per capita incomes, proportionally more resources reach the back of the line and lead to changed perceptions about gender roles. This view suggests that growth is itself sufficient to improve gender equity (World Bank 2001).

In principle, periods of economic expansion can result in increased income to fund social spending and safety nets and permit women to enlarge their share of employment and managerial slots. Such conditions can promote gender equity without a frontal assault on norms and stereotypes that might provoke male resistance and backlash. Whether or not women benefit from economic growth, however, depends on the distributional effects of growth in three areas: within the household, in labor markets, and at the level of the state. That is, women benefit only if the net distributional effect, via these three pathways, is positive. It is an empirical question as to whether growth yields such results, particularly in the current context of liberalization.

A growth process that increases gender inequality by marginalizing women from paid employment, or in which inequality grows due to women's segregation in the lowest wage jobs, may not facilitate a revision of gender ideology in favor of women. Numerous scholars argue that the current era of globalization-*cum*-economic liberalization has indeed had a deleterious effect on women's income opportunities and conditions of work in both developed and developing economies (Lourdes Benería 2003; V. Spike Peterson 2003; Stephanie Seguino 2006). There is, for example, an increased use of home workers, primarily women, as a response to greater competitive pressures on firms to reduce costs (Ping-Chun Hsiung 1996; Elisabeth Prügl 1999; Peterson 2003). The lower wages paid to home workers and the reduction in overhead costs, while beneficial to firms, reinforce gender norms and stereotypes that link women to the home and to their role as caretakers, and perpetuate their designation as secondary wage earners. This type of work also limits women's ability to bargain for a better distribution of work and labor in the household. These factors suggest that economic growth in the current period of globalization may not promote a movement to more equitable gender norms and stereotypes.

Further, economic crisis – measured as negative growth rates of GDP – may itself provoke a return to norms and stereotypes that undermine gender equality. Diane Elson (1991, 2002) has provided a trenchant analysis of structural adjustment programs in developing economies, which, by contributing to economic stagnation and cuts in public expenditures on health, education, and food subsidies, have negatively affected women's well-being. She argues that women bear an undue burden of stimulating growth in liberalized economies where the role of the state is reduced and macroeconomic volatility is heightened.

Such economic crises have led, in many cases, not only to increases in women's unpaid labor burden but also to their "distress" sales of labor in the informal sector to replace income lost from male wage cuts or job losses (Nilufer Cagatay and Sule Ozler 1995; Maria S. Floro 1995; Joseph Lim 2000).⁵ Periods of economic crisis may in fact exacerbate gender tensions because they can have negative effects on men's income-generating possibilities, undermining masculine "male breadwinner" norms (Sylvia Chant 2002).⁶

In some cases, women who take on paid employment during economic crises feel even more pressure to accede to male-dominant norms in the household as a way to assuage men's perceptions of their diminished status in the workplace (Naila Kabeer 2000). Evidence from Latin America links the growth of inequality in that region – due in part to economic liberalization and associated structural adjustment policies – to increases in domestic violence, precisely because of the negative effect of such policies on male income and their loss of status (Soledad Larraín 1999).

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003) take a different approach to gender inequality, attributing what they call the “rising tide of gender equality” to the process of modernization, with agricultural societies reflecting traditional values that undermine women’s choices and power and post-industrial societies reflecting the most gender egalitarian attitudes. They note that growth alone is insufficient to ensure gender equity, citing the examples of high per capita income countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. What is it then about modernization that can promote gender equity? The authors have linked this to changes in cultural legacies and religious traditions and also to the role of the state in post-industrial societies in expanding women’s agency via affirmative action, equal pay, and other forms of legislation and social protections.⁷

Some authors suggest that changes in social institutions that embody and perpetuate social definitions of female subservience will influence women’s access to income-generating opportunities, such as employment. To test this hypothesis, Christian Morrison and Johannes Jütting (2005) use regression analysis on a new and unique database to evaluate the effect on female employment of a variety of institutional characteristics proxied by polygamy, female genital mutilation, percentage of 15 to 19 year olds ever married, and access to capital. They find evidence that education and growth have little effect on women’s employment and instead observe that social institutions are a major determinant of female employment. There is, however, an issue of causality: are the institutions causing female employment or is it the reverse? Unfortunately, the paper does not address this question since it is a purely cross-sectional analysis.⁸ More importantly, their study does not take up what causes social definitions to change.

To summarize, for the purposes of empirical analysis, the female share of employment, the structure of the economy, and economic growth are potentially distinct factors that affect gender norms and stereotypes.⁹ Social role theory undergirds the choice of female share of employment as the indicator of women’s increased control over material resources. If the requisite data were available, it would also be useful to test the effect of female relative wages and female share of income on gender norms and stereotypes, insofar as these better capture female relative economic power identified by Blumberg (1988) as a mechanism for change. However, gender-disaggregated income data is lacking; there are no sources of internationally comparable data on female share of income.¹⁰

Agriculture as a share of GDP is used to capture the structure of the economy. We would expect a society to reflect more patriarchal attitudes, the larger the share of agriculture in GDP. This follows from Iversen and Rosenbluth’s (2005) hypothesis, mentioned earlier in this paper, that different modes of production shape intrahousehold bargaining power.

Because norms and stereotypes are slow-changing variables, it is likely that women’s economic activity and macroeconomic variables will operate

with a lag. Little research in economics literature gives guidance on how long it takes for norms and stereotypes to change. The social psychology literature, however, shows that attitudes that reflect underlying norms can change in relatively short periods of time.¹¹ For instance, cross-cultural evidence demonstrates that norms and stereotypes have changed relatively quickly in response to political and economic transitions (Amanda Diekman, Wind Goodfriend, and Stephanie Goodwin 2004; Amanda Diekman, Alice Eagly, Antonio Mladinic, and Maria Cristina Ferreira 2005).

An interesting example of the flexibility of gender norms and stereotypes is outlined in a study that evaluates the effects of an experimental intervention in Brazil (Gary Barker, Marcos Nascimento, Marcio Segundo, and Julie Pulerwitz 2000). “Program H” (“H” refers to *homens*, Portuguese for men) was designed to improve attitudes and reduce risk behaviors of young Brazilian men as a means to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS.¹² Studies increasingly recognize that the promotion of safe sex requires a change in the attitudes of young men. Risky behaviors have been associated with more traditional gender attitudes among young men (Alison Clarke, Sherry Hutchinson, and Ellen Weiss 2004). “Program H” used interactive group activities and “social marketing” to help young men question traditional gender norms related to masculinity and to promote the abilities of men to engage in more gender-equitable relationships with their female partners. Barker, Nascimento, Segundo, and Pulerwitz (2000) found a substantial reduction in gender inequality attitudes from the baseline after six months. A one-year, follow-up study showed that the change in attitudes persisted. While this intervention represents a concerted effort to change norms, it is clear that change is possible in a relatively short period of time.

For the purposes of this study, then, I chose five-year lags under the assumption that some time is required for women’s employment to affect their perceptions of their status and to influence societal attitudes. It would be useful, as more data becomes available, to test the data for rates of change using longer lags. However, data constraints make such an investigation in the present study impossible.

DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN NORMS AND STEREOTYPES

The World Values Survey provides a mechanism to capture gender norms and stereotypes because it contains a series of gender questions that span four waves, conducted over a twenty-year period. The first wave only covered twenty-two countries, so it is not included in this analysis. This paper uses data from the second, third, and fourth waves to assess the causes of differences in gender attitudes over time and across political units. The 1990–3 survey covers forty-two political units; the 1995–7 survey covers fifty-four political units; the 1999–2001 survey covers sixty. In all,

over eighty independent countries and Puerto Rico have been surveyed in at least one wave of this investigation. These include almost 85 percent of the world's population.

The World Values Survey data are collected through face-to-face interviews. In most countries, some form of stratified multistage random probability sampling was used to obtain representative national samples. Other sampling procedures used included cluster sampling, multistage sampling utilizing the Kish-grid method, purposive sampling, and quota sampling (Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basáñez, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Loek Halman, and Ruud Luijkx 2004).¹³

This paper analyzes two sets of questions from the World Values Survey. One set directly reflects the degree of adherence to norms and stereotypes about the gender division of labor, gender power, and men's and women's relative rights of access to resources and opportunities. The second set of questions reflects gender attitudes more indirectly, providing information on views towards those with less power and resources in society (a measure of respondents' altruism), as well as a self-assessment of control over the respondents' lives and well-being and their interest in politics. Table 1 shows both sets of questions.

Each wave added new countries to the sample, and thus the survey results for the full sample are not strictly comparable over time. I therefore present trends only for a fixed sample, restricted to those countries included in the

Table 1 World Values Survey questions on gender norms and stereotypes and attitudes

Gender norms and stereotypes

1. When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women. (Q 61)
2. Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled, or is this not necessary? (Q 93)
3. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. (Q 98)
4. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay. (Q 99)
5. Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income. (Q 100)
6. Men make better political leaders than women. (Q 101)
7. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl. (Q 103)

Social attitudes

1. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days (Scale of 1 to 10, with 1 = unsatisfied)? (Q 65)
 2. Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out. (Q 66)
 3. How interested would you say you are in politics? (Q 117)
 4. Should incomes be made more equitable, or do we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort? (Q 125)
-

second, third, and most recent waves. Only four of the relevant questions were asked in all of these waves. (See Appendix, Table A.2 for a list of countries in the fixed and full samples.) Table 2 illustrates gender-disaggregated responses by region as well as the change in responses.¹⁴

Several observations are relevant about these data. First, in almost all cases, men's opinions suggest they adhere more strongly to gender inequitable norms and stereotypes than women. The difference is quantified as the "gender gap" in attitudes – simply the female percentage in agreement less the male percentage; the gap is statistically significant in most cases.¹⁵ The size of the gender gap varies, by region and statement. Second, the change in responses to these questions indicates an attenuation of patriarchal norms and stereotypes in most cases. For example, in response to the prompt, "When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women," all regions show a decline in the percent of females who agree, with the exception of Asia. In most regions, male agreement has also declined, with the exception again of Asia as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. The case of the transition economies is noteworthy. Agreement with this question has dramatically declined among both men and women. It is possible that the 1990 survey coincided with privatization and the rapid rise of unemployment in these economies that resulted in fierce competition for the sharply reduced number of jobs. If this is the case, it would seem to suggest that economic crisis can lead to resurgence of gender inequitable norms.¹⁶

Asia is an interesting case. Responses in 2000 may have been influenced by the Asian financial crisis, which led to sharp increases in unemployment. In some countries, such as South Korea, women were exhorted to leave jobs to make room for men as the "rightful breadwinners" (Ajit Singh and Ann Zammit 2002). The result was that women's unemployment rate rose much more rapidly than men's during the crisis in South Korea. Again, economic crisis that threatened men's access to jobs may have led to a resurgence and reacceptance of patriarchal norms by both men and women.

Interestingly, the increase in the percentage of Asian women surveyed who agree with the statement that men have more right to jobs in times of scarcity is greater than that for men and is statistically significant. The gap, especially in 1990, is very large – more than 9 percentage points.

In contrast, the percentage of men in Sub-Saharan Africa who agree with that statement jumped by ten percentage points between 1990 and 2000, while the percentage of women in agreement declined. Given that the Sub-Saharan region has undergone a long-term growth slowdown as compared to Asia's abrupt crisis and given that women have greater financial responsibility for care of children in Sub-Saharan Africa, the gender gap in change of attitudes is not surprising. The Asian and Sub-Saharan examples underscore the final observation on the responses to this question, which is also valid for the remaining questions: that differences in responses

Table 2 Gender norms and stereotypes: Responses by region, 1990 to 2000 (percent in agreement, unless otherwise noted)

	1990					2000					Percentage Point Change 1990 to 2000				
	All	Asia	Latin America	OECD	Sub-Saharan Africa	All	Asia	Latin America	OECD	Sub-Saharan Africa	All	Asia	Latin America	OECD	Sub-Saharan Africa
When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.															
Males	37.7	45.4	30.9	28.6	48.3	49.7	33.6	46.3	31.7	18.0	58.6	29.2	0.8	-10.6**	10.3**
Females	30.9	36.3	25.0	26.7	39.0	41.9	26.2	39.6	23.7	16.1	37.5	23.5	3.3**	-10.6**	-1.5**
Gender Gap	-6.8**	-9.2**	-5.9**	-1.9**	-9.3**	-7.8**	-7.3**	-6.7**	-8.0**	-1.9**	-21.1**	-5.7**			
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled, or is this not necessary? (% reporting that a woman needs children to be fulfilled).															
Males	58.75	70.3	59.0	43.3	76.1	87.0	54.7	69.5	53.6	39.2	68.7	69.5	4.1**	-0.8	-5.4**
Females	58.68	73.0	58.2	40.6	76.2	87.4	54.6	70.5	55.1	36.1	69.4	71.2	-4.0**	-2.5**	-3.2**
Gender Gap	-0.1	2.7**	-0.7	-2.7**	0.1	0.4**	-0.1	1.0	1.5	-3.1**	0.7	1.7**			
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.															
Males	66.49	69.9	66.2	66.5	66.7	61.9	74.6	81.8	71.9	74.0	74.6	74.5	8.1**	11.9**	5.7**
Females	71.72	70.2	73.5	74.3	69.9	66.0	80.1	85.8	82.4	81.3	80.7	79.6	8.4**	15.6**	8.9**
Gender Gap	5.2**	0.3	7.3**	7.8**	3.2**	4.1**	5.5**	4.0**	10.4**	7.3**	6.1**	5.1**			
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.															
Males	68.02	72.6	70.8	62.7	48.1	71.0	66.9	82.2	72.1	63.1	54.3	64.0	-1.1	9.6**	1.4
Females	64.47	69.8	65.1	59.7	49.9	64.6	63.5	83.7	68.0	58.8	54.3	56.8	-1.0	14.0**	2.8**
Gender Gap	-3.6**	-2.9**	-5.7**	-3.1**	1.8	-6.4**	-3.4**	1.5**	-4.2**	-4.3**	0.0	-7.2**			

Notes: The gender gap is simply the female percentage in agreement with the statement minus the male percentage. Two asterisks (**) denote statistically significant difference (or change) at 5% level.

"All" refers to all countries in the fixed sample, measured as an unweighted average.

between regions are sometimes as large as or larger than gender differences.

The remaining three questions in Table 2 refer to stereotypes about women's roles as parents. The results here are somewhat contradictory. Roughly the same percentages of women and men hold the view that women must have children to be fulfilled across regions, though the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Latin American countries adhere less strongly to this view than other regions. Over time, however, there has been a marked decline in the percentage of both men and women who hold this view, and in all cases, the decline is statistically significant. The most pronounced change is in transition economies with declines of 17.5 percentage points for men and 16.2 percentage points for women.

Even in 1990, a large majority of respondents, both male and female, agreed that working mothers can have close relationships with children, although more women than men held that view. Since that time, there has been a substantial increase in the percentage of men and women in agreement with that statement, again with women reflecting a greater increase in gender-equitable attitudes.

On the other hand, the high level of agreement with the statement that being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay suggests some nostalgia and ambivalence about changing gender roles for both men and women. In Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, both regions where crisis and/or slow growth have led to greater unpaid labor and care burdens for women, the increase in percentage of women and men agreeing with this statement is particularly pronounced. This trend may be read as a compensatory shift in attitudes to accommodate and adjust to changing economic fortunes and women's more limited access to remunerative employment.

It is often claimed that men are threatened by women's movement into the paid labor market, leading to a backlash in attitudes calling for women's return to their role as caretakers (Claudia Minolti, Alejandra Rotania, and Irma Vichich 1991; Susan Fleck 1998). These results do not support that view and are particularly noteworthy because the period 1990 to 2000 is one of slow growth, increasing joblessness, and economic crisis in transition economies and for some regions, including Asian, Latin American, and African economies. However, as the next section will demonstrate, the econometric results are not entirely consistent with this generalization and instead, suggest a negative effect of economic crisis on equitable norms and stereotypes.

Table 3 presents descriptive gender-disaggregated data on norms and stereotypes for questions asked only in the 1995 and 2000 waves. The percentages are unweighted country averages. In addition, I provide some illustrative data on questions reflecting social attitudes on degrees of life

Table 3 Gender differences in norms/stereotypes and social attitudes, all countries, 1995 to 2000 (percent in agreement, unless otherwise noted)

	1995	2000	Change
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.			
Males	47.8	46.2	-1.5**
Females	37.4	35.9	-1.5**
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-10.4**	-10.3**	
Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income.			
Males	82.3	82.2	-0.1
Females	85.9	84.1	-1.8**
<i>Gender Gap</i>	3.7**	2.0**	
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.			
Males	26.0	24.5	-1.5**
Females	20.9	19.2	-1.7**
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-5.1**	-5.3**	
Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? (% very happy or happy)			
Males	79.7	66.3	-13.5**
Females	79.4	57.2	-22.2**
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-0.3	-9.0**	
How much freedom and control (1-10 with 1 no control)?			
Males	6.9	6.6	-0.3
Females	6.8	6.3	-0.5
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-0.1	-0.4	
How interested would you say you are in politics? (% very interested)			
Males	19.7	12.0	-7.7**
Females	12.8	6.4	-6.4**
<i>Gender Gap</i>	-7.0**	-5.7**	
Should incomes be made more equal?			
Males	17.3	15.3	-2.0**
Females	19.4	16.1	-3.2**
<i>Gender Gap</i>	2.0**	0.9**	

Notes: The gender gap is the female percentage in agreement with the statement minus the male percentage. Two asterisks (**) denote statistically significant difference (or change) at 5% level.

satisfaction, control, and altruism. The results were mixed. Between 1995 and 2000, the percentage of men and women who believe that men make better political leaders fell slightly. The gender gap in attitudes was quite wide but did not diminish over this time period.

The percentage of men and women who believed both the husband and wife should contribute to income was very high in both waves, with a small gender gap. One explanation for this result is that the role of the male parent, whose primary concern is for his children's welfare, trumps masculinist norms that are threatened by female contributions to income. Between 1995 and 2000, there was little change in male agreement that both the husband and wife should contribute, but the percentage of women agreeing declined. There was also a decline in the belief that boys

deserve a university education more than girls; most striking about these data is the low percentages of both women and men who hold that attitude.

Interestingly, there was a sharp decline in life satisfaction for both men and women but much stronger for women over this time period. The gender gap reported for feelings of freedom and control over lives was very small, and the changes are not statistically significant for men or women.¹⁷

Women and men rated the degree of control they feel over their lives quite similarly in 1995. Both groups perceived themselves as having less control by 2000, but the decline is not statistically significant. There was a wide gender gap in interest in politics, however. Interestingly, both men and women indicated a declining interest in politics, a trend that was slightly more accentuated for men.

The last question in Table 3 reflects attitudes towards income equality. A common theme of the feminist economics literature is that globally, women are more economically vulnerable than men due to their greater representation in contingent employment and limited access to social safety nets (Diane Elson and Nilufer Cagatay 2000; Benería 2003). This experience could lead to women's stronger support for redistributive programs.¹⁸ On the other hand, if women are experiencing increases in access to and control over income relative to men, their support for redistributive programs may decline. The results are consistent with the latter hypothesis. Between 1995 and 2000, the percentage of men and women who believed incomes should be made more equal decreased, though for men, the decrease was smaller. Economic trends that have destabilized men's perceptions of their security may be a causal factor as well as shifts in men's economic status relative to women and other men.

Most striking about these data is that, for most questions and most regions, the trend is toward more gender equitable attitudes both from 1990 to 2000 and from 1995 to 2000. The magnitude and direction of change in men's attitudes is quite similar to that of women and, in some cases, their movement towards gender equitable attitudes exceeds that of women. The one exception to this generalization is from 1995 to 2000 in which there was an increase in the percentage of both men and women who believed that women must have children to be fulfilled.

ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Do improvements in gendered norms stem from women's increasingly visible economic role that empowers them in the home and in the public domain? I test this hypothesis econometrically for several questions in the World Values Survey. The econometric analysis uses generalized least squares (GLS) estimation with robust standard errors.¹⁹ The data set is the three most recent waves of the survey and covers seventy-eight countries and Puerto Rico. Due to missing observations, the panel is unbalanced.

This should not present problems of consistency so long as the reason for the unbalanced panel is uncorrelated with the error term. In the case of the World Values Survey data, addition or exclusion of questions in various waves of country surveys appears to be random, and therefore, estimates are likely to be consistent.

The independent variables are female share of employment, female share of parliamentary seats (for one question), agriculture value-added as a share of GDP to capture the structure of production, and growth rate of GDP.²⁰ (See Table A.1 in the Appendix for a list of variables, definitions, and sources.) All except the agriculture variable are measured as the average over the previous five years.²¹ The lagged approach is used since independent variables are likely to affect attitudes with some delay. Agricultural share of GDP, a slower moving variable, is measured for the current period.²² I perform a robustness check, using female share of the labor force in place of female share of employment and include levels of per capita income as an explanatory variable to proxy for level of development and structure of production.²³ As noted previously, wage (and income) data would be good measures of women's economic empowerment. Wage data are sparse, however; relying on this variable would markedly reduce the sample size.²⁴

Specifically, in these tests, the goal is to determine whether women's share of economic activity has an independent effect on gender norms and stereotypes, after controlling for region (intended to capture cultural differences), agriculture's share of GDP to reflect the economic structure, the growth rate of GDP, and time dummies to capture exogenous changes that influence gender norms not otherwise specified in the empirical model. Table 4 reports results for males and females for each question. The omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa.

The percentage of men and women in each country who agree with a statement serves as the dependent variable. For the statement: "Men have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce," female share of employment has a negative effect on the percentage of both men and women who agree with this statement. While the effect on men is stronger, the difference is not statistically significant. The share of agriculture in GDP has a positive effect on agreement with this statement, suggesting a gender inequitable correlation if not causation. Growth of GDP has a negative effect on the belief in men's right to a job, and again, the effect on men is stronger than on women. Several regional dummies are also statistically significant and are very large. For example, the percentage of Asian women who agree with this view is over 13 percentage points greater than of women surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa. The twenty-two-percentage point difference between views held by OECD and Sub-Saharan men is notable, as are the stark differences between MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa for both men and women, indicating that culture and level of development

EVIDENCE ON GLOBAL TRENDS IN GENDER NORMS

Table 4 Influence of gender equality and macroeconomic variables on attitudes between 1995 and 2000

	Q61 Men right to job		Q93 Women need children to be fulfilled		Q98 Working mom can have as good relationship with children		Q101 Men better political leaders		Q103 University education more impt. for boys	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
F share employment	-0.371 (0.19)*	-0.336 (0.14)***	-0.305 (0.16)*	-0.287 (0.16)*	0.710 (0.20)***	0.719 (0.30)**	0.241 (0.18)	-0.108 (0.18)	-0.053 (0.13)	-0.268 (0.15)*
Agriculture	0.414 (0.14)***	0.581 (0.17)***	0.644 (0.20)***	0.474 (0.16)***	-0.191 (0.19)	-0.154 (0.21)	-0.094 (0.17)	0.188 (0.20)	-0.025 (0.12)	-0.001 (0.14)
Growth GDP	-0.636 (0.20)***	-0.698 (0.23)***	0.218 (0.35)	0.004 (0.28)	-0.348 (0.26)	-0.179 (0.31)	-0.606 (0.17)***	-0.551 (0.24)***	-0.467 (0.18)***	-0.676 (0.18)***
Asia	13.40 (5.69)**	0.811 (5.33)	2.312 (5.80)	5.026 (6.31)	8.771 (7.68)	7.524 (7.88)	19.07 (20.43)	2.663 (17.38)	0.432 (6.55)	-7.374 (9.79)
Transition	0.974 (6.08)	-10.98 (5.78)*	0.827 (5.03)	-0.641 (5.54)	-0.833 (7.10)	-4.380 (7.80)	6.278 (19.81)	1.232 (7.14)	9.16 (6.71)	-18.38 (9.24)
MENA	32.95 (9.77)***	22.83 (9.87)***	-0.101 (7.55)	2.701 (8.19)	5.249 (8.98)	-5.085 (11.24)	33.84 (21.21)	27.99 (18.71)	-5.631 (7.33)	-8.31 (12.12)
LAC	-3.824 (6.01)	-16.63 (6.25)***	-15.14 (6.02)***	-13.57 (5.97)**	0.533 (7.44)	-2.166 (7.82)	-1.155 (21.39)	-9.92 (17.58)	-11.26 (6.52)*	-19.46 (9.72)**
OECD	-6.912 (6.38)	-22.33 (6.61)***	-34.48 (6.61)***	-31.37 (7.33)***	2.972 (8.00)	-1.365 (8.53)	-11.18 (20.31)	-22.74 (17.71)	-17.85 (6.51)***	-28.02 (9.50)***
F share parliament										
Constant	33.76 (9.05)***	57.32 (9.13)***	76.14 (10.25)***	76.32 (7.44)***	46.33 (12.55)***	41.77 (16.51)**	20.41 (23.31)	58.34 (21.36)***	30.95 (9.31)***	53.52 (14.08)***
Adjusted R ²	0.713	0.809	0.740	0.743	0.345	0.435	0.782	0.790	0.606	0.637
N	90	90	100	100	93	93	50	50	63	63

Notes: N is the number of countries in the sample with data measured as country averages. GLS panel data estimation with robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) denote significance at the 1 percent level, two (**) at the 5 percent level, and one (*) at the 10 percent level. Omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa. Coefficients on time dummies, significant only for Q93, are not reported here. MENA is Middle East and North Africa.

matter (insofar as regions reflect similar stages of development). It is notable that even when controlling for regional differences, female share of employment has an independent effect on norms and stereotypes.

The significant effect of growth on attitudes is also of interest, although the size of the effect is relatively small, with a 1 percentage point increase in growth leading to a less than 1 percentage point decline in both women and men agreeing with the statement. The negative sign on this variable may be a signal that periods of economic crisis – a shrinking economic pie during macroeconomic contraction – contribute to more gender inequitable attitudes. This would occur particularly if men had also suffered during these downturns, challenging traditional lines of gendered power in the household. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the extensive analyses by feminist economists that have highlighted the negative effects of economic crisis on families and the tendency for women to engage in “distress” sales of labor as a response to crisis.

The results for the statement “Women need children to be fulfilled” are quite similar to those for the first prompt, that men have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce. The OECD, Latin American, and the Caribbean (LAC) dummies indicate a much lower percentage of men and women who adhere to this view as compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. Other regional dummies were not significant. Also, the impact of economic growth on the view that women need children to be fulfilled was much smaller than for the question about men having more of a right to jobs. The difference between the coefficients on female share of employment for men and women are again not significantly different. The share of agriculture in output, however, has a positive significant effect on the coefficients for both men and women, but the effect on men is smaller, and significantly so. The size of this effect on both women’s and men’s views is nevertheless quite small.

On the ability of working mothers to have as good a relationship with their children as compared to housewives, female share of employment has a positive and indeed virtually identical effect on men and women’s attitudes. The social experience of women moving into paid employment, it appears, undermines negative stereotypes about the effect of women’s paid work on children’s well-being. The growth rate of GDP is not significant in this case nor are any of the regional dummies or agriculture’s share of GDP. The R^2 on this regression is relatively lower than the others, indicating additional important factors may be at work here that are not specified in the model.

In the regression assessing the determinants of agreement with the statement that men make better political leaders than women, female share of parliamentary seats (lagged five years) is included as an additional explanatory variable. In the same way that increased female employment may ameliorate perceptions of women’s worth as economic beings, their

participation in political life might be expected to enhance perceptions of their value as leaders. The effect of that variable on women's responses to this question is not significant (but negative, as would be expected). Men's agreement also declines as the female share of parliamentary seats increases, but this effect is statistically significant. While it is difficult to assess the importance of the size of this coefficient, what can be said is that the difference between women and men is not coincidental. Female share of employment has no effect, nor does the agricultural variable. Regional dummies are surprisingly not significant after controlling for these other factors. The coefficient on growth is negative, indicating that economic downturns lead to less acceptance of women as political leaders – or that growth contributes to more positive perceptions of females as leaders. Why this would be so is not readily apparent.

Finally, on the statement that university education is more important for boys than girls, female share of employment has a negative statistically significant effect on this bias for men but is not significant for women. Thus, a 1 percentage point increase in female share of employment contributes to a decline of one quarter of a percentage point in the share of men who believe a university education is more important for boys. This may seem to be a small effect. Nevertheless, given the large sample size of the survey, this causal link on the impact of women's increased visibility as income generators is noteworthy. Growth has a strong negative effect for both men and women, while the share of agriculture in GDP is not significant. Dummies for LAC and OECD countries are statistically significant and indicate substantially smaller percentages of men and women hold those views than in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.

In sum, the results for all five questions consistently identify the potential for increases in women's economic activity relative to men's to reduce gender-biased norms and stereotypes, an effect that is independent of the performance of the economy and regional cultural norms. On the two questions related to women's role as workers in the productive sector of the economy, the share of agricultural output in GDP appears to contribute to inequitable gender norms and stereotypes.

As a robustness check, I reran these regressions using female share of the labor force in place of female share of employment. The reason for using female share of the labor force is two-fold. First, the data for this variable are more readily available, and its inclusion allows us to expand the number of observations in our sample. Second, it may be that women's identification of themselves as being economically active (even if they can't find a job) is sufficient to leverage changes in norms and stereotypes.

In addition, I control for natural log of per capita GDP to account for the possibility that a country's level of development can contribute to greater gender equity in line with the reasoning of Inglehart and Norris (2003), although to some extent, regional dummies capture level of development

as noted earlier. The inverted-U hypothesis, which links women's increased labor force participation with the level of development, might be expected to lead to collinearity between these two variables. As seen below, this does not appear to be a problem with these data, perhaps because this analysis uses female share of the labor force rather than the simple female rate of participation.

Table 5 reports the results of these regressions. Increases in per capita GDP are associated with more gender-equitable attitudes. Inclusion of this variable causes the standard errors on the OECD dummy to become larger in some questions, suggesting that the OECD dummy is proxying for per capita income. The results are otherwise very similar to those with female share of employment: female share of the labor force attenuates rigid gender norms and stereotypes for men and women. This result suggests that, apart from the effect of "modernization" on cultural values (Inglehart and Norris 2003), women's role in the economy has an independent effect on gender norms and stereotypes.²⁵

A NOTE ON CLASS

Women's and men's class locations may affect the degree to which they adhere to traditional gender norms and stereotypes. Women's class positions, which can of course be influenced by their male partners' class positions, may be a factor in determining the extent to which they are motivated to work in the paid labor force. Globalization has led to deterioration in outcomes for low-income males as well as females. Competition for employment and family tensions over shifting gender access to income may cause there to be differences in norms and stereotypes held by men in low-income households and men in other classes.

To consider this question, I examine the data from the 1995 wave for several questions by class and gender. Table 6 presents the data, with class self-reported by respondents. Two generalizations can be made from these data. First, men in all classes hold more patriarchal views than women on every question, whether in reference to economic, political, or educational issues. Second, among men and women, the richest and poorest hold the most discriminatory attitudes, while those in middle-income groups have more gender-equitable attitudes.

There is one caveat to this last generalization. On the question of whether both husband and wife should contribute to household income, if we were to infer that agreement indicates a more gender equitable attitude, both rich men and rich women could be considered less egalitarian than those in other classes, including low-income groups. This could be due to the fact that masculinist norms trump economic need in high-income households, underscoring the role of wealth as a contributing factor to the disempowering "trophy wife" effect.

EVIDENCE ON GLOBAL TRENDS IN GENDER NORMS

Table 5 Robustness check: Influence of gender equality and macroeconomic variables from 1995 to 2000

	Q98						Q101		Q103	
	Q61		Q93		Working mom can have as good relationship with children		Men make better political leaders		Univ. ed. more impt. for boys	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
F share of labor force	-0.851 (0.22)***	-0.878 (0.22)***	-0.322 (0.35)	-0.410 (0.33)	0.856 (0.28)***	0.840 (0.41)**	0.001 (0.32)	-0.345 (0.32)	-0.128 (0.21)	-0.512 (0.27)*
Log(Per capita GDP)	-3.471 (0.75)***	-5.047 (1.02)***	-4.988 (0.43)***	-3.856 (1.37)***	2.807 (1.45)*	3.152 (1.57)**	-4.641 (0.99)	-2.622 (1.268)**	-1.961 (0.75)***	-2.745 (1.39)
Growth GDP	-0.638 (0.92)***	0.759 (0.12)***	0.030 (0.26)	-0.074 (0.22)	-0.185 (0.27)	-0.103 (0.26)	-0.890 (0.18)***	-0.745 (0.19)***	-0.311 (0.11)***	-0.449 (0.13)***
Asia	12.27 (3.78)***	4.804 (4.54)	7.274 (7.07)	8.436 (7.06)	0.362 (5.89)	-1.214 (6.26)	6.513 (10.43)	-2.626 (10.03)	7.577 (5.45)	5.131 (8.02)
Transition	5.95 (3.80)	-2.721 (4.59)	7.010 (6.99)	6.557 (6.61)	-3.01 (4.71)	-7.960 (4.78)*	0.582 (9.70)	0.724 (9.24)	1.005 (5.32)	-1.317 (7.50)
MENA	27.01 (5.84)***	22.65 (5.57)***	3.224 (8.06)	4.682 (8.10)	-2.757 (6.28)	-11.44 (6.67)*	15.41 (11.33)	14.83 (11.52)	3.502 (5.86)	6.421 (8.77)
LAC	-11.16 (3.88)***	-20.86 (4.92)***	-15.30 (7.71)*	-14.21 (7.62)*	2.340 (5.49)	-1.601 (5.80)	-11.47 (10.27)	-15.63 (9.63)	-2.860 (5.71)	-8.074 (8.72)
OECD	-12.27 (4.09)**	-12.14 (5.45)**	-26.16 (9.04)**	-23.63 (8.42)***	-3.725 (6.30)	-10.96 (6.33)*	-19.50 (9.16)**	-24.42 (8.61)***	-5.207 (5.05)	-8.581 (8.17)
F share parliament							0.111 (0.15)	-0.183 (0.14)		
Constant	93.41 (10.8)***	123.57 (10.2)***	121.84 (15.8)***	115.51 (15.5)***	18.67 (13.4)	14.28 (18.4)	63.21 (20.1)***	95.47 (21.3)***	40.21 (10.8)***	71.01 (14.8)***
Adjusted R ²	0.708	0.789	0.706	0.689	0.570	0.269	0.735	0.770	0.605	0.564
N	136	136	149	149	138	138	58	58	73	73

Notes: N is the number of countries in the sample with data measured as country averages. GLS panel data estimation with robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) denote significance at the 1 percent level, two (**) at the 5 percent level, and one (*) at the 10 percent level. Omitted region is Sub-Saharan Africa. Coefficients on time dummies, significant for all but Q101, are not reported here. MENA is Middle East and North Africa.

Table 6 Class-disaggregated responses to selected questions, 1995 wave (percent that Agree/Strongly Agree)

	<i>Upper</i>	<i>Upper-Middle</i>	<i>Lower-Middle</i>	<i>Working</i>	<i>Lower</i>
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.					
Males	50.1	47.1	53.0	51.2	67.0
Females	34.6	38.8	40.5	37.8	48.7
<i>Gender gap</i>	-15.5**	-8.3**	-12.5**	-13.4**	-18.3**
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.					
Males	33.5	25.4	29.4	27.4	40.1
Females	19.4	16.9	18.1	19.5	29.2
<i>Gender gap</i>	-14.1**	-8.6**	-11.3**	-7.9**	-10.9**
Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income.					
Males	82.6	79.2	81.7	82.7	84.3
Females	84.5	85.2	87.6	88.6	87.3
<i>Gender gap</i>	1.8	6.0**	5.9**	5.9**	3.0**
Men make better political leaders than women do.					
Males	61.3	54.7	59.5	57.0	67.8
Females	43.6	41.9	43.2	42.1	55.6
<i>Gender gap</i>	-17.7**	-12.8**	-16.3**	-14.3**	-12.2**
If a woman earns more than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.					
Males	55.0	43.0	47.1	46.3	56.1
Females	44.0	44.0	46.2	46.2	52.8
<i>Gender gap</i>	-11.0**	1.0	-0.9	-0.1	-3.3**

Notes: The gender gap is the female percentage in agreement with the statement minus the male percentage. Two asterisks (**) denote statistically significant difference (or change) at 5% level.

Interestingly, the gender gap in attitudes (again measured as female percentage minus male percentage) was smallest for the statement “If women earn more than men, it is bound to create problems,” with the exception of the wealthiest income group. This question is not strictly a values question. It reflects observations about the effect on household dynamics of women transgressing a long-held gender norm that men are the breadwinners and heads of household. There seems to be gender agreement that income inequality in favor of women is likely to be disruptive, and this view again is especially pronounced in high and low-income households.²⁶

These results suggest that although there are class differences in attitudes, the gender difference persists across income groups, to a greater or lesser extent. More investigation into the causes of greater degree of patriarchal attitudes at the extremes of the income distribution would be a fruitful endeavor. This finding raises another question. Given the growth of income inequality globally, with the size of the middle-income groups shrinking, will there be greater movement toward gender inequitable attitudes if this trend persists? Perhaps not, as the data in this paper imply a trend toward more gender equitable attitudes. Nevertheless, given the time

that it takes for norms and stereotypes to solidify via the transmission to children (a kind of cohort effect), this is a potential problem in the future.

CONCLUSIONS

The expression “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” implies that while surface phenomena may change, profound transformation is harder to come by. Is that the case with gender-biased norms and stereotypes? I seek to answer this question using data from the World Values Survey, and find evidence that things do change. All in all, the evidence suggests that norms and stereotypes are shifting in a gender-equitable direction. This is true for both men and women; although the gap between men’s and women’s attitudes continues to exist, it has closed on a few issues. Even though women internalize gender norms and stereotypes, they appear to do so to a lesser extent than men.

The regression results further suggest that women’s economic empowerment is one factor in this shift, whether that occurs by example or through persuasion. Previous studies have argued that structural change of the economy and modernization are the major factors behind this shift, with women’s increased share of employment as an outcome of those processes (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2005). The results presented here show that women’s increased share of employment has an independent effect on norms and stereotypes, even after controlling for region, macroeconomic conditions, and the structure of production, although each of these additional variables also explains some of the differences and trends in norms and stereotypes.

It is somewhat more challenging to interpret the results on the effects of growth. It would seem simplistic to infer that economic growth in the recent period has been of a kind that unambiguously reduces patriarchal attitudes, given the widespread evidence of harsh and often insecure work arrangements women have been able to secure. It may be more useful to explain the role of macroeconomic conditions as related to the social effects of an expanding or contracting economic pie. One interpretation is that as the economic pie expands, there is less male resistance to female economic empowerment, even though relative economic standing is shifting in favor of women. Another interpretation is that during periods of economic crisis (negative GDP growth), patriarchal attitudes resurge.

The policy implications of these results are important. Barbara Bergmann (2001), for one, has long advocated that the key to gender equity is expanding women’s participation in paid labor, arguing that policies that glorify women’s caretaker role and keep them out of the labor market will undermine the possibilities for progressive change. Her stance seems to be vindicated by the results presented here. Policies that enable women to combine work with care responsibility thus appear to be a fruitful

avenue to promoting still greater improvement not only in well-being but in hastening the dismantling of restrictive norms and stereotypes that inhibit women and give men justification for their greater material and social status.

*Stephanie Seguino, University of Vermont, Department of Economics,
Old Mill 237, Burlington, Vermont 05401, USA
e-mail: stephanie.seguino@uvm.edu*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to three anonymous referees for their incisive comments. I would also like to acknowledge the impressive research assistance of James Lovinsky and Tarik Yeasir. Irene van Staveren, Heather Antecol, Johannes Jütting, and Nancy Folbre generously provided useful comments as well. To all, thank you.

NOTES

- ¹ “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” is a French idiomatic expression that literally translates as “The more things change, the more things stay the same.” Metaphorically, it can be translated as “History repeats itself.” Or, to expand that, “That which has been is what will be, and that which has been done is that which will be done. So, there is nothing new under the sun.”
- ² Individuals may have multiple goals and diverse identities that sometimes clash. Gender identity, however, has been cited as being of singular importance in shaping individual actions and societal pressures. For analyses of how identity affects economic behavior, see Nancy Folbre (1994) from a gender perspective, and George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000).
- ³ How children absorb gender roles continues to be debated. Social learning theory (Julian Rotter 1982) emphasizes the importance of direct reinforcement and modeling in shaping children’s behavior and attitudes. Cognitive theories, such as gender schema theory, posit that children very early recognize that they are a boy or a girl, not both (Sandra Bem 1981). This categorization serves as a magnet for new information and the child begins assimilating new experiences into this schema. Broad distinctions between what kinds of behaviors and activities go with each gender are acquired by observing other children and through the reinforcement they receive from their parents.
- ⁴ It should be noted that while Iversen and Rosenbluth (2005) may be accurate in their representation of agricultural societies in earlier periods, their generalization of the gender division of labor is not universally applicable today. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, both women and men participate in agriculture, but often there is a gender division of labor in crop production.
- ⁵ “Distress” sales of labor refer to women’s increase in paid labor time in response to declines in income or wages of other family members (often husbands), with the idea that in order to maintain a target level of household income, women must increase their time in paid labor.
- ⁶ Structural adjustment programs that lead to economic crisis, informalization of labor, and more insecure work conditions have also, in some cases, created the conditions

EVIDENCE ON GLOBAL TRENDS IN GENDER NORMS

for an increase in sex work – one of the few viable alternatives for generating income for women (Kamala Kempadoo 1999, 2004). Both women and men (but primarily women) are engaging in this work. Given the sexualization of women’s paid labor, it is unclear to what extent this affects gender norms.

- ⁷ Post-industrial societies are defined in this study as the twenty most affluent countries in the world.
- ⁸ Morriison and Jütting (2005) argue that these institutions are exogenous in that they have been in practice for many years, if not decades or centuries. For this reason, they view the customs as pre-dating current trends in female employment.
- ⁹ It is useful at this point to recall the evidence on the U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation and GDP per capita. This finding implies that poor and rich countries experience high female labor force participation rates, whereas middle income countries are characterized by low female labor force participation. Theorists have attributed this relationship to changes in labor market structure, social norms regarding the nature of women’s work, and cultural factors such as religion, social mobility, and family structure (see, for example, Claudia Goldin [1995]). This argument is compatible with that made by Inglehart and Norris (2003) who assert that modernization of cultural norms leads to gender equitable changes in norms and stereotypes. Using a relative measure, Cagatay and Olzer (1995) find that at earlier stages of development, women’s share of the labor force falls and attribute this to urbanization and a separation of productive from reproductive work, with women finding it difficult to combine both roles. As growth proceeds, however, relative female labor force participation rises with the commodification of domestic labor, falling fertility, and more education for women. Both approaches use per capita income as a measure of the stage of development. This suggests that in the empirical analysis, there may be some collinearity between GDP and women’s share of employment or feminization of the labor force.
- ¹⁰ Two possible sources are the International Labour Organization’s *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (various years) and the United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) *Human Development Report* (various years). In the former, gender-disaggregated wage data, primarily for the manufacturing sector, are reported, but data for many countries are missing. With regard to the UNDP, which provides data on female share of income, data are often only estimated, based on the assumption that on average women earn 75 percent of men’s income. This is because, again, country-level data that can be used to make reliable estimates are simply not available. I have, therefore, used only female access to paid employment as a second best alternative.
- ¹¹ Psychologists who investigate the dynamics of gender norms and stereotypes, however, are not so much focused on the length of time it takes for change to occur as they are on the factors that induce change.
- ¹² Attitudes, of course, are not strictly speaking norms and stereotypes. But attitudes towards various subject matters are based on the underlying set of gender definitions that a person holds.
- ¹³ For a more detailed discussion of the World Values Survey’s sampling methods, see Inglehart, Basáñez, Díez-Medrano, Halman, and Luijkx (2004). The Kish-grid system ensures that the household member to be interviewed is selected entirely at random and has an equal chance of being interviewed. It thus avoids the possible bias that can be caused by interviewers interviewing only the most accessible household members. The modified quota sampling approach used is described as follows. “Some surveys used a probability model (area sampling) down to the household level, but switched to a quota design at this last stage” (2004: 390).
- ¹⁴ No countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were included in the 1990 wave.

- ¹⁵ The gap is positive in those cases where the question is posed in a gender equitable fashion and negative when the question is posed such that agreement suggests a more patriarchal attitude.
- ¹⁶ To some extent, an explanation for the declines in the transition economies must be found at the country level. The data reveal a wide dispersion in average male and female attitudes to the question about jobs. For example, in Russia the percentage of men who agreed with this statement was 50.0 percent in 1990, falling to 42.5 percent in 2000, while Slovenia reveals, on average, more equitable norms held by men, with 34.0 percent agreeing in 1990 and 17.9 percent in 2000.
- ¹⁷ Regionally disaggregated data, however, show a sharp decline in feelings of control over lives in Sub-Saharan Africa.
- ¹⁸ It is sometimes claimed that women are more altruistic than men, that is, that women exhibit greater empathy (James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund 2001; Alessandro Innocenti and Maria Grazia Paziienza 2006). This may also be a factor motivating women's greater support for redistributive programs (Torben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth 2006; Torben Iversen, Frances Rosenbluth, and David Soskice 2005). Insofar as this is viewed as a fixed trait, we would not expect to see evidence that gender differences in empathy change over time. And yet, the evidence presented in this paper suggests changes over time in both men's and women's attitudes towards redistribution.
- ¹⁹ GLS is a method for dealing with cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity may be a problem in a panel data analysis such as this if, for example, the quality of enumeration differs between countries, leading to larger variances in responses. I also conducted these analyses with OLS and results were very similar.
- ²⁰ GDP is inherently a problematic measure. While it is often viewed as an indicator of access to material resources, it undercounts much of women's production and gives credit to some kinds of economic activity that have harmful effects. There is a good deal of research that shows that growth is not equal to well-being, and indeed, it was precisely this recognition that led to the development of Amartya Sen's capabilities approach (Sen 1999). Interpretation of the effects of this variable then should be viewed with caution and a clear understanding of the limitations of this measure. In fact, it may be useful to read this variable as a measure of commodification of economies rather than as an indicator of the size of the economic pie. The question of how to measure material resources available for distribution is one that feminist economists have been grappling with in recent years when exploring the impact of globalization-*cum*-liberalization on well-being. Absent a more generalizable measure of material well-being, however, GDP remains the single quantifiable measure widely available.
- ²¹ Thus, for example, the average of female share of employment from 1985–9 is used to explain gender norms and stereotypes in 1990 and so on.
- ²² Agriculture's share of GDP in 1990 is used to explain gender norms in stereotypes in 1990. For consistency, it would have been useful to measure agriculture with the same lagged approach as used for the remaining variables. However, that would have caused a dramatic reduction in the sample size since, for most of the transition economies, these data are not available before 1990.
- ²³ Robustness checks seek to determine how sensitive the results are to the model specification. In this case, I vary the choice of variables used to measure female access to work and the structure of the economy to assess whether these variables continue to produce the same effect on norms and stereotypes.
- ²⁴ For the regressions (not reported here) in which I did use female relative wages, that variable was insignificant. But the sharply reduced sample size leads me to be cautious about those results.

- ²⁵ Inglehart and Norris (2003), as noted, also make the point that the relationship between the level of development and gender equitable attitudes may well have to do with the role of the state in implementing policies such as affirmative action, equal pay, reproductive rights, and equitable access to education may play an important mediating role. Governments in higher income countries have been more active in implementing such policies, although certainly some lower income countries have also adopted some of these policies (e.g., Viet Nam and a number of transition economies). Thus, level of development does not adequately proxy for the role of the state in influencing gender norms and stereotypes.
- ²⁶ In the regionally disaggregated data, we find that in the OECD and LAC regions, a higher percentage of women than men agreed with this statement.

REFERENCES

- Akerlof, George and Rachel Kranton. 2000. "Economics and Identity." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(3): 715–53.
- Andreoni, James and Lise Vesterlund. 2001. "Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116(1): 293–312.
- Barker, Gary, Marcos Nascimento, Marcio Segundo, and Julie Pulerwitz. 2000. *How Do We Know If Men Have Changed? Promoting and Measuring Attitude Change with Young Men: Lessons from Program H in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Oxfam.
- Bem, Sandra L. 1981. "Gender Schema Theory: A Cognitive Account of Sex Typing." *Psychological Review* 88: 354–64.
- Benería, Lourdes. 2003. *Gender, Development, and Globalization: Economics as if People Mattered*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Bergmann, Barbara R. 2001. "Subsidizing Child Care by Mothers at Home." *Feminist Economics* 6(1): 77–88.
- Blumberg, Rae Lesser. 1984. "A General Theory of Gender Stratification." *Sociological Theory* 2: 23–101.
- . 1988. "Income Under Female vs. Male Control: Hypotheses from a Theory of Gender Stratification and Data from the Third World." *Journal of Family Issues* 9(1): 51–84.
- Burnell, Barbara and Johanna Ratzel. 2005. The Effects of Social Norms and Perceptions on the Relationship Between Labor Market Opportunities and Women's Status in India. Paper presented at annual IAFFE meetings, Washington, DC.
- Cagatay, Nilufer and Sule Ozler. 1995. "Feminization of the Labour Force: The Effects of Long-Term Development and Structural Adjustment." *World Development* 23(11): 1883–984.
- Chafetz, Janet Saltzman. 1989. "Gender Equality: Toward a Theory of Change," in Ruth Wallace, ed. *Feminism and Sociological Theory*, pp. 135–60. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Chant, Sylvia. 2002. "¿Crisis en la familia? ¿Crisis en la masculinidad? Reflexiones sobre las masculinidades, el trabajo y la familia en el noroeste de Costa Rica [Crisis in the Family? Crisis in Masculinity? Reflections on Masculinities, Work, and Family in Northwestern Costa Rica]," in Eugenia Rodríguez, ed. *Un siglo de luchas femeninas en América Latina*, pp. 177–96. San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad de Costa Rica.
- Clarke, Alison, Sherry Hutchinson, and Ellen Weiss. 2004. *Involving Young Men in HIV Prevention Programs*. Washington, DC: Population Council.
- Diekman, Amanda, Alice Eagly, Antonio Mladinic, and Maria Cristina Ferreira. 2005. "Dynamic Stereotypes about Women and Men in Latin America and the United States." *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36(2): 209–26.

ARTICLES

- Diekman, Amanda, Wind Goodfriend, and Stephanie Goodwin. 2004. "Dynamic Stereotypes of Power: Perceived Change and Stability in Gender Hierarchies." *Sex Roles* 50(3/4): 201–15.
- Dollar, David and Roberta Gatti. 1999. *Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times Good for Women?* Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper Series 1, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Elson, Diane. 1991. "Male Bias in Macro-Economics: The Case of Structural Adjustment," in Diane Elson, ed. *Male Bias in the Development Process*, pp. 164–90. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- . 2002. "Gender Justice, Human Rights, and Neo-Liberal Economic Policy," in M. Molyneux and S. Razavi, eds. *Gender Justice, Development, and Human Rights*, pp. 78–114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elson, Diane and Nulifer Cagatay. 2000. "The Social Content of Macroeconomic Policies." *World Development* 28(67): 1347–64.
- Fleck, Susan. 1998. *Choice or Bargain? Married Women's Labor Force Participation in Honduras*. PhD diss., American University.
- Floro, Maria S. 1995. "Economic Restructuring, Gender, and the Allocation of Time." *World Development* 23(11): 1913–29.
- Folbre, Nancy. 1994. *Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and Structures of Constraint*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Goldin, Claudia. 1995. "The U-shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Development and Economic History," in T. Paul Schultz, ed. *Investment in Women's Human Capital*, pp. 61–90. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hsiung, Ping-Chun. 1996. *Living Rooms as Factories: Class, Gender, and the Satellite Factor System in Taiwan*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald, Miguel Basáñez, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Loek Halman, and Ruud Luijckx. 2004. *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Surveys*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores.
- Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Innocenti, Alessandro and Maria Grazia Pazienza. 2006. *Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game*. Working Paper 5/2006, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development, University of Siena, and Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato, University of Florence.
- Iversen, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth. 2005. *Gender Socialization: How Bargaining Power Shapes Social Norms and Political Attitudes*. Working Paper, Department of Government, Harvard University and Department of Political Science, Yale University.
- . 2006. "The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross-National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 1–10.
- Iversen, Torben, Frances Rosenbluth, and David Soskice. 2005. "Divorce and the Gender Division of Labor in Comparative Perspective." *International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 12(2): 216–42.
- Kabeer, Naila. 2000. *The Power to Choose: Bangladeshi Women and Labour Market Conditions in London and Dhaka*. London and New York: Verso.
- Kempadoo, Kamala. 1999. *Sun, Sex and Gold: Tourism and Sex Work in the Caribbean*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- . 2004. *Sexing the Caribbean: Gender, Race, and Sexual Labor*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Larraín, Soledad. 1999. "Curbing Domestic Violence: Two Decades of Action," in Andrew Morrison and María Loreto Biehl, eds. *Too Close to Home: Domestic Violence in the Americas*, pp. 105–30. Washington, DC: Inter-American Bank.

EVIDENCE ON GLOBAL TRENDS IN GENDER NORMS

- Lim, Joseph. 2000. "The Effects of the East Asian Crisis on the Employment of Women and Men: The Philippine Case." *World Development* 28(7): 1285–306.
- Minolti, Claudia, Alejandra Rotania, and Irma Vichich. 1991. *Textile Workers in Brazil and Argentina A Study of the Interrelationships between Work and Households*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Morrisson, Christian and Johannes Jütting. 2005. "Women's Discrimination in Developing Countries: A New Data Set for Better Policies." *World Development* 33(7): 1065–81.
- Peterson, V. Spike. 2003. *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Prügl, Elisabeth. 1999. *The Global Construction of Gender: Home-Based Work in the Political Economy of the 20th Century*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rotter, Julian B. 1982. *The Development and Application of Social Learning Theory*. New York: Praeger.
- Seguino, Stephanie. 2006. "The Great Equalizer? Globalization Effects on Gender Equity in Well-Being in Latin America and the Caribbean," in Anwar Shaikh, ed. *Globalization and the Myths of Free Trade*, pp. 177–214. New York and London: Routledge.
- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Singh, Ajit and Ann Zammit. 2002. Gender Effects of the Financial Crisis in South Korea. Paper presented at New Directions in Research on Gender-Aware Macroeconomics and International Economics: An International Symposium, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY.
- World Bank. 2001. *Engendering Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- World Values Survey. Various years. Data from the World Values Survey. www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed October 2006).

APPENDIX

Table A.1 Data definitions and sources

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Source</i>
Agriculture Value Added as % of GDP	World Development Indicators 2005 (online)
Female share of employment	<i>Laborstat</i> , International Labour Organization (http://laborsta.ilo.org/)
Female share of labor force	World Development Indicators 2005 (online)
Female Share of Parliamentary Seats	Millennium Development Goals, Taskforce on Gender Equality (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp)
GDP growth	World Development Indicators 2005 (online)
Per capita GDP	World Development Indicators 2005 (online)

ARTICLES

Table A.2 Countries represented in the World Values Survey

		<i>Fixed sample</i>		
		Argentina		
		Britain		
		Bulgaria		
		Chile		
		China		
		Finland		
		Germany		
		India		
		Japan		
		Mexico		
		Nigeria		
		Poland		
		Portugal		
		Russia		
		Slovenia		
		South Africa		
		South Korea		
		Spain		
		Sweden		
		USA		
		<i>Full sample</i>		
Albania	Czech Republic	Israel	Poland	Venezuela
Algeria	Denmark	Italy	Portugal	Vietnam
Argentina	Dominican Rep.	Japan	Puerto Rico	Zimbabwe
Armenia	Egypt	Jordan	Romania	
Australia	El Salvador	Latvia	Russia	
Austria	Estonia	Lithuania	Singapore	
Azerbaijan	Finland	Luxembourg	Slovakia	
Bangladesh	France	Macedonia	Slovenia	
Belarus	Georgia	Malta	South Africa	
Belgium	Germany	Mexico	South Korea	
Brazil	Ghana	Moldova	Spain	
Britain	Greece	Netherlands	Switzerland	
Canada	Hungary	New Zealand	Tanzania	
Chile	Iceland	Nigeria	Turkey	
China	India	Norway	Uganda	
Colombia	Indonesia	Pakistan	Ukraine	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Iran	Peru	Uruguay	
Croatia	Ireland	Philippines	USA	

Copyright of *Feminist Economics* is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Copyright of *Feminist Economics* is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.