Derk Pereboom
My research areas are in free will and moral responsibility,
philosophy
of mind, history of modern philosophy, and philosophy of religion, and
I
have published articles in each of these areas. In my book on free will
and moral responsibility, Living
Without Free
Will, I argue that we human beings do not have the sort of
free
will
required for praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, but conceiving
ourselves
as lacking this sort of free will this does not undermine what is
important
for morality and meaning in life.
I teach courses on free will and responsibility, philosophy of
mind, history of
modern philosophy,
and philosophy of religion.
Office telephone: (802) 656-3136, academic
office
co-ordinator: (802) 656-4042.
E-mail address: Derk.Pereboom@uvm.edu
Address: Department of Philosophy,
University of Vermont, 70
South Williams Street, Burlington, VT 05401
Curriculum Vitae
pdf
(Highlighted items are
available online.)
Books:
Articles:
- "Kant on Intentionality," Synthese 77
(1988), pp. 321-52.
- "Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy," Synthese
85 (1990), pp. 25-54. pdf
- "Kant's Amphiboly," Archiv für
Geschichte der
Philosophie 73 (1991), pp. 50-70. pdf
- with Hilary Kornblith, "The Metaphysics of
Irreducibility," Philosophical
Studies 63 (1991), pp. 125-45. pdf
- "Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist," Synthese
88 (1991), pp. 341-58.
- "Is Kant's Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent?" History
of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1991), pp. 357-72. pdf
- "Mathematical Expressibility, Perceptual Relativity, and
Secondary Qualities," Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science
22, (1991), pp. 63-88.
- "Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of
Introspection," Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994), pp. 315-29
pdf
- "Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza," Faith
and
Philosophy 11 (1994), pp. 592-625. pdf
- "Determinism Al Dente," Noûs
29 (1995),
pp. 21-45. pdf
JSTOR
- "Self-Understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction," Synthese
103 (1995), pp. 1-42. pdf
- "Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content," Philosophical
Perspectives 9 (1995), pp. 401-26. pdf
- "Kant on God, Evil, and Teleology," Faith and
Philosophy
13 (1996), pp. 508-33.
- "On Bilgrami's Belief and Meaning," Philosophy
and
Phenomenological Research 58 (1998), pp. 621-26.
- "Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories," Philosophical
Perspectives 14 (2000), pp. 119-37.
- "Hard Incompatibilism," in The Oxford Companion
to Free Will,
Robert Kane, ed., Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 477-88.
- "Robust Nonreductive Materialism," Journal of
Philosophy
99 (2002), pp. 499-531. pdf
- "Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities,"
Michael
McKenna
and David Widerker, eds., Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency:
Essays
on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Ashgate,
2003, pp.
185-99.
pdf
- “Meaning in Life Without Free Will,” Philosophic
Exchange
33
(2002-3), pp. 19-34.
- "The Problem of Evil," The Blackwell
Guide to
Philosophy
of Religion, William E. Mann, ed., Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers,
2004,
pp. 148-70. pdf
- “Free Will, Evil, and Divine
Providence,” God and the Ethics
of
Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, Andrew Chignell
and
Andrew
Dole, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 77-98.
pdf
- "Is Our Conception of Agent-Causation Coherent?" Philosophical Topics
32 (2004), pp. 275-86. pdf
- "Defending Hard Incompatibilism," Midwest Studies 29
(2005), pp.
228-47. pdf
- "The Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions," A Companion to to Kant,
Graham
Bird,
ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006, pp. 154-68. pdf
- "Kant on Transcendental Freedom,"Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 73 (2006), pp. 537-67. pdf
- "Reasons Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and
Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism; Reflections on John
Martin Fischer's My
Way," Philosophical Books 47 (2006) pp. 198-212. pdf
- "Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy," forthcoming in Appearance,
Reality, and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew
Adams, L. M. Jorgensen and Samuel Newlands,
eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press. pdf
- "A Compatibilist Theory of the Beliefs Required for
Rational Deliberation," forthcoming in The Journal of Ethics.
pdf
- "Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again," forthcoming in
Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility," Nick Trakakis and Daniel
Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. pdf