• THE 'LAZY' ARGUMENT
• Cicero de Fato 28-29
  
1. If it is fated that you will recover from a disease, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
2. If it is fated that you will not recover from a disease, then you will not recover whether you call a doctor or not.
3. One or the other is fated.
4. Therefore, calling a doctor does not change the outcome from what it was fated to be.
   

• Called the 'lazy' argument, because its conclusion is that effort is superfluous. That is, it does not change outcomes.
  
• The argument can be applied to just about any future event.
• Thus it is fully general and can apply to all of our actions.

• What is the point of this argument?
  

• It was used against Stoics, because Stoics believe in determism about everything that has happened, is happening, and will happen, by an inexorable causal nexus.
• The idea is that if determinism is true, then one should never bother to do anything that has a cost to it, whether that cost be effort, disgust, etc.
• One should not willingly choose to do something for the sake of some result, because the result will happen if it's going to happen regardless of what you do .
  
• But it is a problem that applies whether one is a stoic or not.

• Question: is it sufficient to meet the lazy argument with that? the claim that it applied whether one is a stoic or not?

• Seems like that's not enough: what about the following:
• Whether you survive or die from this disease is fated: that means simply that your survival or death will be part of the inexorable network of causal things in the world.
• Let's call that inexorable network of causes in the world the "Causal Nexus."
  
• You are part of that causal nexus.
  
• Whatever part you play in that causal nexus is fated by your own character plus the causes that influence you.
  
• No matter what happens, it is part of the causal nexus.
• Thus there is no more reason to make than not to make an effort. The "lazy argument" is no argument for laziness specifically.
  
• You may prefer to be lazy, but if so, that itself is caused. Imagining that your decision whether to be lazy or not "makes a difference" and so can "change" the causal nexus is ridiculous. Your decision is just part of the causal nexus, and always has been fated to be so.
  
• Moreover, the fact that things are determined does not itself cause things to be determined. Rather, the things themselves are causes, and the fact of their being determined is just an aspect, a description, a naming of the things that you can know.
  
• As such, that fact is itself a thing: the Stoics would say that it is an incorporeal proposition that supervenes on a body (a neuron? a mind?) and can be assented to.
  
• Thus saying that the fact of determinism justifies laziness is not saying that determinism itself justifies laziness. 
• Another way to put that last point is that "fate" or the "causal nexus" is just a name for the network of ordinary causes that lead to what happens. It is not something separate from or in addition to those ordinary causes. Thus saying that "it was fated" is the same as saying "it came about because of ordinary causal mechanisms."
  
• So be lazy or don't be lazy, but don't use the causal nexus as an excuse or justification.

STOP HERE

• Bailly digression to see if we can wriggle out of determinism and deal with the lazy argument.
• The Stoics either need to show that the lazy argument does not sap motivation and determinism is true, or come up with an alternative to determinism (but they don't really want to do that: we, however, might).
  
• What alternative is there to the idea that everything is fully determined by causes?
• That there are some events that have no causes?
• Then they are just random?
• If not just random, then there is a pattern? Is there a cause to the pattern? NO, there can't be, because then there would be a cause.
  
• Now, if there are such uncaused random events, let's see what happens to the 'lazy' argument:
1. If it is fated that you will recover from a disease, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
1. remember that "fated" just means "a product of a fully determined causal nexus"
   
2. If it is fated that you will not recover from a disease, then you will not recover whether you call a doctor or not.
3. But an uncaused event may interfere with what would otherwise be fate's causal nexus, and so in addition to the causal nexus you may recover or not recover because of an uncaused event.
   
4. Such an uncaused event will happen whether you call the doctor or not.
   
5. Therefore, calling a doctor does not change the outcome from what it was fated to be.
• Any other alternative to full determination by causes?
• Probability:
  
• Doing X leads to Y 75% of the time, but to Z 25% of the time.
• This sounds promising: you might want to "place your bets" by making that call to the doctor if you conclude that calling the doctor is probabilistically the best bet.
  
• But it's a dead end, really:
• There either are causes for each instance, and those causes lead to the 75-25 split, or there are not causes, in which case, we're back to an uncaused event.
• We're back where we started.
• Any other alternatives?
• Maybe there is a pattern, but it is not accessible to us at all: something is causing it all, but we simply cannot know about that something.
  
• Some sort of divinity could fit the bill.
• Maybe there is a pattern, and we can know about it, but there is no way we can manipulate it reliably.
• Some sort of chaotic system?
  

• THE UPSHOT? THE LAZY ARGUMENT IS A PROBLEM, BUT NOT JUST FOR STOICS.

• Nonetheless the Stoics were particularly engaged with it because it was part of opponents' attacks on Stoicism.

• Brennan draws a parallel to "Newcomb's Problem," a situation modern philosophers discuss:
• You are faced with a choice:
  
1. Choose the box only.
• OR
2. Choose the box PLUS  $1,000
• NOW THE TWIST: Science has now reached the point at which the scientists can quite accurately predict which option each person will choose. Before they approach you, they do or do not put $1,000,000 in the box. So it is now a fact of the matter whether there is or is not money in that box.
  
• The only situation in which they have put $1,000,000 in the box is if they predicted that you would choose #1
• So if you choose the box only, you almost certainly get $1,000,000
• But if you choose the box plus $1,000, you almost certainly get only $1,000.
  
• You must choose now. You do not know what the scientists predicted about you.
• But you know that there either is or is no money in the box, and you know that no matter what you decide, your decision itself cannot possibly change the fact of the matter (causes cannot affect the past).
  
• Brennan says that Newcomb's problem is similar to the lazy argument: fate is the Scientists, being lazy is taking the $1,000, and making an effort is passing up the $1,000.
• Which should you choose?
• You know by reliable evidence that in the past, their predictions have just about always been true (no verifiable instance of their being wrong has ever surfaced).
  
• How should you think about the choice?
• Remember that whatever you do now cannot possibly influence what the Scientists predicted about you or whether there is $1,000,000 in the box.
• What you decide now cannot possibly change the fact of the matter about whether there is $1,000,000 in the box.
  
• You cannot change the past by your decision now.
• So there either is or is not $1,000,000 in the box.
• Which do you choose?
• WAIT A SECOND: if these scientists have really figured out how to understand and follow the causal chain reliably, then in a way what I do now actually does affect the past! Because their PAST perception of the future caused them to put or not put the money in the box IN THE PAST. So all I have to do is to figure out which one I would choose, then choose the other one? But maybe they foresaw that too? So I should choose the one I would choose? But maybe they foresaw that too... it becomes random and unpredictable?
  

• Brennan: "It is not up to you what Fate does. But no matter what it does, you get a better pay-off by not trying than by trying. So it is only rational not to try. If the theory of Fate is true, then it is rational to be lazy. But we know that it is crazy to be lazy; so the Stoics must be wrong about Fate." P. 274 I would add that the Stoics themselves try desperately to get out of this cul-de-sac that they've driven into, but cannot.
  

• One point: this whole argument presupposes that being lazy is preferable. That's not altogether implausible, but it's not altogether plausible either. Being really lazy (doing nothing at all that is goal-oriented) is boring, unrewarding, and impossible for a fully functioning human being to do for long. After a while, being lazy takes effort: it becomes work, and it's not worth it. I'd rather do something, even if I know it might not work.
• But no one aside from me seems to think that way, right?
  

• Stoics' reaction
  
• Cicero de Fato 30
• This argument is rejected by Chrysippus. For certain things, as he says, are 'simple,' whereas others are 'connected.' A simple one is, e.g., 'Socrates will die on that day'; whether he does something or not, his day of death is determined. But if something is fated in the way that it is fated that Oedipus will be born to Laius, then one cannot also say 'whether or not Laius has intercourse with a woman.' For this matter is connected, and 'co-fated'--Chrysippus calls it this, because what is fated is both that Laius will sleep with his wife, and that he will beget Oedipus with her. It's as though someone said ' Milo will wrestle in the Olympics'; if someone responded ' so he'll wrestle whether or not he has an opponent,' then he'd be wrong. Milo's wrestling is 'connected,' since there is no wrestling without an opponent. So this whole class of fallacious arguments can be rejected in the same way. 'You'll recover whether or not you call in a doctor' is fallacious, for whether or not you call in a doctor is just as much fated as whether or not you recover. As I said before, these two are what Chryippus calls 'co-fated.'
• Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica 6.8, 286d
• If it were said Hegesarchus the boxer will come out of the ring without taking a single punch, then it would be absurd for someone to suppose that Hegesarchus would fight with his guard lowered, on the grounds that he is fated to come off without taking a punch. For the original statement was made on account of how good he is at guarding himself against punches.

• Brennan replies:
1. We are almost never faced with a choice between doing or not doing X in which we know absolutely certainly that doing X is necessary for some later result.
• And for Chrysippus' solution to the lazy argument to work, he needs to be able to trace the causal chain back from the desired result to an action RIGHT NOW that is essential for the result. I.e. we need to KNOW that doing X is necessary for a later result.
  
• But humans cannot do that: they don't have that kind of certain knowledge.
• All sorts of things can happen differently that can lead to the desired result (or avert it): any action RIGHT NOW can plausibly be seen as not necessary for the desired result (it could be done later, something else could be done, situation could change radically, etc.)
• Bailly wonders: So Brennan has refuted Chrysippus' solution, but his argument reveals that the lazy argument is unrealistic and not so general after all?
  
• Bailly wonders additionally: the less certain we think the link is between X and some desired result, the less motive there is to do X, and the more motive there is to be lazy. Not knowing about the adamantine chains of fate could give us more reason, not less reason, to be lazy.
  
• Why not just act based on probabilities?
• in Newcomb's problem, choose the box only, based on the record of the past
• That, however, is preposterous: how we act now cannot possibly affect whether the money is in the box or not.
• But isn't it rational? You know that there either is or is not money in the box, and you know that if you choose the box only, the scientists would have predicted that and put $1,000,000 in the box. Who cares how it happens: $1,000,000 is $1,000,000 dollars. Take it and figure it out later.
  
• What I do NOW is not plausibly connected to the result in the right way. At least, I cannot possibly KNOW that it is.
• Back in the real world: place your bets in a way that is most likely to win. Sure, some people die because they went to a doctor, but more are cured.
• If you're of a mind to think about it and you conclude that determinism is true, the lazy argument affects not just actions that might or might not lead to some result, but it affects every single action. There is no reason to do anything at all, is there? But you have to do something. Even being lazy is doing something. In the end, the argument could be used to push for effort or laziness, and so it seems irrelevant.
  
2. The stuff about co-fated events will not solve the problem, says Brennan.
   
• It's like replying to someone trying to break a chain who is having problems with one link that there are other links linked to that link.
  
• But all the links in the causal chain are bound by the same sort of link, equally strongly.
  
• We're in the chain and it will happen to us regardless of what we do now.
• Co-fated events solve nothing: they are equally inexorable.
• What is needed is something that can be done to avert or bring on a result: all those co-fated events simply form part of the causal nexus, and there's a lazy argument that can be applied to every link in the chain.
  
• Think of being trapped in a rocket headed toward the sun: nothing you do will change that result.
• It does not help to be told that it was co-fated that you would first pass by Venus' orbit path, then Mercury's orbit path. Those are co-fated events. They don't help.
• But Brennan seems now himself to be ignoring the fact that in real-life situations, we do not know what is fated: we cannot know that it is fated that I will die from this disease no matter what I do. We cannot know that we are in a rocket which cannot help but hit the sun. 
• We don't know what the causal chain has in store for us, but we do know things like "If I want to have children that are mine biologically, I have somehow to get my egg fertilized or get my sperm to fertilize an egg."
  
• Just so, if we have any sort of desire at all in life, we can figure out some things that either have to happen or are most likely to be necessary in order to fulfill that desire. That's the point of things being "co-fated." It's to defeat the idea that if you are fated to win the lottery, it will happen whether or not you ever have a lottery ticket.
  

• The upshot of Brennan's chapter is that the Lazy argument is unrefuted by the Stoics. But I want to emphasize that it's not just a problem for Stoics. It's a problem for any causal determinist and it's hard to see a way out of it. If you don't like laziness, then the argument makes determinism itself more distasteful (but distasteful things may be scientifically correct). Determinism too is hard to see a way out of.