CLAS 196/PHIL 196
Stoicism

Continuing tracking Brennan's book The Stoic Life, we are now on chapter 11.


Although the Stoic is fiercely egotistical, that egotism is limited to one sphere, virtue.
When it comes to virtue, the Stoic Sage places him- or her-self first and foremost.
The Sage is not unconcerned about other people's virtue, but it is not up to her.
Her own virtue is entirely up to her.
In fact, virtue or lack of it is just about the only thing that is up to her.

But with regards to indifferents, the Sage is free to place others ahead of herself.
That is because the ONLY thing the Sage thinks is truly good is virtue.
Thus her own comfort, wealth, health, etc. are not better or worse than another's.
By the process of oikeiosis, the Stoic will expand her view of which indifferents are preferrable.
The Stoic can and will view other people's welfare as just as important as her own (welfare defined as ordinary-English goods, not Stoic good).
Oikeiosis is a process whose origins are found in the natural impulse to love one's children.
This need not mean that one has children: every human has the capacity for that kind of love and caring.

• It seems to me that in one way, this is a tremendously negative take on human nature, but in another way, it is tremendously positive. Most of us are egotistical in many ways, but most of us are also more egotistical than we would like to be. The Stoics say that desire not to be egotistical is the desire that leads to oikeiosis, and it too is part of human nature. They say that our egotistical nature can be tamed by rational reflection on what really matters in life, and that will lead us to conclude that our virtue is all that really matters, which will free us to be non-egotistical about all the things which we should be non-egotistical about.
• There is not a fully satisfactory account of oikeiosis, however, largely because our sources are not forthcoming. It also does not sufficiently show WHY a Sage will be virtuous in the ordinary meaning of virtuous (i.e. will favor justice in terms of indifferents). But it does show that the Stoics thought THAT the sage would be someone with the same priorities as common ideas of virtue require.
• A question NOT addressed is whether one can be generous as a stoic in terms of what truly is good: can a sage "share the wisdom"? and would that be a good? Is Education the most important good thing there is in relation to others?
  

A key to understanding more about why and how the Stoic will be virtuous in our ordinary meaning of the term 'virtuous' lies in their theory of "befitting" action, kathekon.

• kathekon
• translations include
  
• proper functions
• duties
• offices
• appropriate actions
• befitting actions
• none are perfect translations
  
• Brennan uses "befitting"
• it's good because it's not used much in English and its meaning is not wrong
• Definition of kathekon
  
• Stobaeus 2.85,13-86,4
  
• Proper function is so defined; 'consequentiality in life, something which, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification'. The contrary to proper function is defined as the opposite of this. Proper function also extends to the non-rational animals, for these too display a kind of activity which is consequential upon their own nature. In the case of rational animals it is specified in the words: consequentiality in one's way of life. They [Stoics] say that some proper functions are perfect, and that these are also called right actions The activities which accord with virtue are right actions, such as acting prudently, and justly. Those which are not like this are not right actions, and they do not call them perfectly proper functions, but intermediate functions, such as marrying, serving on embassies, conversing, and the like. (Transl. from LS 59b)
• The Sage sets the standard for justification and reasonable.
• The Sage has perfect and infallible reason.
• But the justification does not need to actually be present to the agent or anyone else: it need merely be available.
• Even plants and animals perform "befitting" actions.
  
• When a Sage does a "befitting action," it is also a "prefectly befitting action"
• Just as both sages and non-sages can have katalepsis, but only in the sage does it constitute knowledge
• The sage has a mental disposition which provides the background: someone else doing "the same action" does not have that disposition
• When a non-sage does an action, the Stoics notice and emphasize the fact that the non-sage's mental disposition will in one instance produce befitting actions, in another not.
• Thus the non-sage cannot do "perfectly befitting actions"
• Remember that all actions are the direct result of impulses, and impulses are assent to an impulsive impression
• some such impressions are kataleptic
• some are not
• some assent is strong
  
• some is weak
• some is true
• some is false
  
• The assent of a sage is always strong, and the impressions they assent to are always kataleptic (and not just by chance: they are the sort of person who would always only assent to kataleptic impressions)
  
• Thus it seems that the Sage's virtue just IS the Sage's mind: it is a machine that only ever produces strong assent to kataleptic impressions: that is virtue.
• And the non-sage's viciousness just IS his or her mind too.
• Sextus Empiricus Against the Professors 11.200
• The characteristic function of the Sage is not "attending to parents and generally honoring them'; the characteristic function of the Sage is doing this from wisdom.
  
• Lists of Befitting actions
• We find various lists of befitting actions
• some contrast befitting with non-befitting actions AND actions which are neither befitting nor non-befitting
  
• honoring parents v. not honoring parents v. picking up a twig
• some contrast actions which are befitting without regard to circumstances with those that are befitting in some circumstances.
• taking care of one's health v. self-mutilation
• some contrast actions which are always befitting with those that are not always befitting
• living according to virtue v. walking
• the lists make it clear that befitting actions are not the subset of actions which have to do with fellow humans
• that is why "duties" is not the right translation of kathekon
  
• and yet "duty" is frequently used to translate it (see next quotation, for instance)
  
• the nature of the agent, circumstances, the nature of the universe: that is what makes an action befitting
• befitting actions are all somehow in accord with the agent's nature
• Every action seems to us "befitting": it may not in fact be befitting
  
• Epictetus Handbook 42
• 42. When any person harms you, or speaks badly of you, remember that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if anyone should suppose a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."
  
• That is what it means to assent to an impulse: to think it is befitting
• but one can be mistaken
• every action: the befitting is always there
  
• The person very close to virtue
• Stobaeus 5.906ff
• Chrysippus says: 'The man who progresses to the furthest point performs all the proper functions without exception and omits none. Yet his life, he says, is not yet happy, but happiness supervenes on it when these intermediate actions acquire the additional properties of firmness and tenor and their own particular fixity.
• Happiness comes exactly when virtue does
• this progressor is outwardly identical to a sage
• he is also inwardly identical with respect to those particular actions
  
• but he is not virtuous or happy (yet)
• because his inner disposition is not sufficiently stable
• this is important in terms of figuring out the difference between virtue and vice
  
• "The Sage's disposition to assent is so stable and reliable that no matter what circumstances they find themselves in they will never assent to anything non-kataleptic." Brennan 177
• In Christianity, the Christian good person's goodness is supposedly accomplished by Grace and Forgiveness
• What we need now:
• We need to understand more about the inner state of agents and what makes the Sage's inner state so different
• why prize reliability and fixity so very much?

Some texts relevant to the above:

• Diogenes Laertius 7.107
• It [proper function] also extends to plants and animals. For proper functions can be seen in them as well. Zeno was the first to use this term kathekon, the name being derived from kata tinas hekein, 'to have arrived in accordance with certain persons'. Proper function is an activity appropriate to constitutions that accord with nature.
• Cicero de Finibus 3.18ff.
• With the principles thus established that those things which are in accordance with nature are to be taken for their own sake, and that their opposites similarly are to be rejected, the first 'proper function' (this is my term for kathekon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitutions; the second is to seize hold of the things that accord with nature and to banish their opposites. Once this procedure of selection and rejection has been discovered, the next consequence is selection exercised with proper functioning; then, such selection performed continuously; finally, selection which is absolutely consistent and in full accordance with nature. At this point, for the first time, that which can truly be called good begins to be present in a man and understood. For a man's first affiliation is towards those things which are in accordance with nature. But as soon as he has acquired understanding, or rather, the conception which the Stoics call ennoia, and has seen the regularity, so to speak, the harmony of conduct, he comes to value this far higher than all those objects of his initial affection; and he draws the rational conclusion that this constitutes the highest human good which is worthy of praise and desirable for its own sake. Since that good is situated in what the Stoics call homologia ('agreement' will be our term for this, if you don't mind)--since it is in this, then, that that good consists to which everything is the means, that good which is the standard of all things, right actions, and rectitude itself, which is reckoned the only good, though later in origin, is the only thing desirable through its intrinsic nature and value, whereas none of the first objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. But since those things which I call proper functions originate in nature's starting-points, it must be the case that the former are the means to the latter; so it could be correctly said that the end of all proper functions is to obtain nature's primary requirements, but not that this is the ultimate good, since right actions is not present in the first affiliations of nature. It is an outcome of these, and arises later, as I have said. Yet it is in accordance with nature, and stimulates us to desire it far more strongly than we are stimulated by all the earlier objects... (LS 59D transl.)
  
• 3.58-9
• But although we declare rectitude to be the only good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform a proper function, even though we count this neither in good things nor in bad ... It is self-evident too that some of the wise man's actions are in this intermediate region. So he judges when he acts that his action is a proper function, and since he never errs in making a judgement, proper function will exist in the intermediate region. This is also established by the following argument: we see that something exists which we call a right action; but this is a perfectly proper function; so there will also be such a thing as an imperfect one. For instance, it is a right action to return a deposit in the just manner, to return a deposit should be counted as a proper function. It becomes a right action by the addition, 'in the just manner,' but the act of return just by itself is counted a proper function. Since it is certain as well that the region we call intermediate includes things which are to-be-taken, and others which are to-be-rejected, everything so done or described is embraced by proper function. This proves that since love of self is natural to everyone, a fool just as much as a wise man will take what accords with nature and reject the opposite. So the wise man and the fool possess some proper functions in common, and this leads to the result that proper functions belong among the things we call intermediate. (LS 59F transl.)
• Philo on the Cherubim 14-15
• There are times when what ought to be done is not enacted as it should be, and sometimes something which is not a proper function is done in a proper way. In the case, for instance, of returning a deposit, when this does not take place on the basis of a sound judgement, but with a view to the injury of the recipient ... and action which is a proper function is performed as it should not be. But if a doctor does not tell the truth to a sick person, when he has decided to evacuate him or use surgery on him or cauterize him, for his own benefit ... an action which is not proper function is performed as it ought to be.
• Stobaeus 2.96-97
• Furthermore, they [the Stoics] say that actions are divided into ones which are right, wrong, and neither of these. The following are right actions: behaving prudently, moderately, justly, gladly, kindly, and cheerfully, and walking about prudently, and everything which is done in accordance with right reason. The following are wrong actions: behaving foolishly, immoderately, unjustly, grieving, fearing, and stealing, and quite generally acting contrary to right reason. The following are neither right nor wrong actions: talking, asking and answering questions, walking about, leaving town, and the like.
• Epictetus Discourses 2.10
• How we may discover the duties of life from names
  
  Consider who you are. In the first place, you are a man; and this is one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other things subjected to it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from what things you have been separated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated from domestic animals. Further, you are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient, but one of the principal parts, for you are capable of comprehending the divine administration and of considering the connection of things. What then does the character of a citizen promise? To hold nothing as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything, otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he would cooperate toward his own sickness and death and mutilation, since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the part and the state to the citizen. But now, because we do not know the future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other things for this.
  
  After this, remember that you are a son. What does this character promise? To consider that everything which is the son’s belongs to the father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another, nor to say or do anything which does him injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, cooperating with him as far as you can. After this know that you are a brother also, and that to this character it is due to make concessions; to be easily persuaded, to speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to him any of the things which are independent of the will, but readily to give them up, that you may have the larger share in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing it is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is the advantage.
  
  Next to this, if you are senator of any state, remember that you are a senator: if a youth, that you are a youth: if an old man, that you are an old man; for each of such names, if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties. But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, “You have forgotten who you are and what is your name.” In the next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you have forgotten the brother and instead of a brother have become an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man, who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost nothing? But, you must lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage? And does the loss of nothing else do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar or music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you shall lose modesty, moderation and gentleness, do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent of the will, and the second by our own fault; and as to the first neither to have them nor to lose them is shameful; but as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shameful and matter of reproach and a misfortune. What does the pathic lose? He loses the man. What does he lose who makes the pathic what he is? Many other things; and he also loses the man no less than the other. What does he lose who commits adultery? He loses the modest, the temperate, the decent, the citizen, the neighbour. What does he lose who is angry? Something else. What does the coward lose? Something else. No man is bad without suffering some loss and damage. If then you look for the damage in the loss of money only, all these men receive no harm or damage; it may be, they have even profit and gain, when they acquire a bit of money by any of these deeds. But consider that if you refer everything to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in your opinion damaged. “Yes,” you say, “for he is mutilated in his body.” Well; but does he who has lost his smell only lose nothing? Is there, then, no energy of the soul which is an advantage to him who possesses it, and a damage to him who has lost it? “Tell me what sort you mean.” Have we not a natural modesty? “We have.” Does he who loses this sustain no damage? is he deprived of nothing, does he part with nothing of the things which belong to him? Have we not naturally fidelity? natural affection, a natural disposition to help others, a natural disposition to forbearance? The man then who allows himself to be damaged in these matters, can he be free from harm and uninjured? “What then? shall I not hurt him, who has hurt me?” In the first place consider what hurt is, and remember what you have heard from the philosophers. For if the good consists in the will, and the evil also in the will, see if what you say is not this: “What then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act to him?” Why do we not imagine too something of this kind? But (we imagine instead) where there is any detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm there; and where the same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there is no harm; for he who has been deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than these things. But whether we shall have the will modest and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the least, except only in the school so far as a few words are concerned. Therefore our proficiency is limited to these few words; but beyond them it does not exist even in the slightest degree.