CLAS 196/PHIL 196

Impulses and Emotions
As usual, these lecture notes are a distillation and rearrangement (in some cases) of Tad Brennan's Stoic Life chapter 7 in this case.

Quotation from our reading:
SENECA CXX:
"How we first acquire the knowledge of that which is good and that which is honourable. Nature could not teach us this directly; she has given us the seeds of knowledge, but not knowledge itself."

Epictetus 1.27
Epictetus' attempt to meet the epistemological skeptic
"Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. ... With what evidence then am I satisfied? With that which belongs to the matter in hand. How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain: for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. “How do you know it?” When I intend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your month, but to my own. When I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, but I always go to the bread as to a mark. And you yourselves who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill?"

• Practical rationality: reason's role in our actions
• The "standard view" is as follows (this is Hume lite)
• We have a desire
• It's just a brute fact about us
• we can't argue with it
• it's just there
• want food
• want unicycle
• no reason, really
• We acquire a belief that the object of our desire is at hand
  
• And so, we act.
•  Desire + Belief >>action!
• That explains our action
• It also goes some ways towards explaining how we are in charge of our action
• it is "our" desire, with no apparent origin outside of ourselves
• it is a "brute fact" about us: we can't very well change it, so most people think (the Stoics don't)
  
• It also explains what caused the action: what was happening inside of us
• All of that does not need to be something we are explicitly aware of
• we can act and only become aware of the belief and desire afterwards
• no antecedent thought is needed
• animal behavior can be explained this way
• i.e. it does not involve "rationality" in any strong sense
  
• The belief and the desire have to combine in the right way, as Aristotle says
• we could have a desire to scratch
• we could have a belief that there is a backscratcher in front of us
• we might nonetheless never think of using the backscratcher to scratch our itch
• We have to be aware of an occurrent desire to scratch
• We have to be aware of the backscratcher as something that can satisfy our desire
• We have to connect the two awarenesses
  
• Aristotle says that we do not have to mentally conclude: "Therefore, I should pick up the backscratcher and scratch that itch"
• Rather, connecting the two awarenesses simply IS action
• actually, I bet Aristotle can be read as saying that we, as rational agents, can potentially stop and examine things at any point short of action. So it is not necessary in us that the conclusion BE an action: dogs are different: hungry! bone! GET BONE!
  
• But why might Aristotle deny that we need to have such a conclusion?
• Aristotle fears an infinite regress
• If we have that mental conclusion, don't we have to be aware of it as the conclusion to the belief and the desire, and so don't we need a fourth mental entity/action/event?
• Then won't we need a fifth to combine the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th?
  
• Then a 6th?
• What is needed is a mental event that is the last thing that runs through your mind before action
• Aristotle said, let's just have the action be the conclusion to the practical syllogism. The desire and the belief are sufficient for action.
  

• Stoic action
• Stoics believe that the last mental entity before action is a belief
• They call it an impulse (horme) (another technical word: not your garden variety English 'impulse')
• not always whimsical
• not always like "impulse buy" or "anti-social impulse"
• Rather, a Stoic "impulse" on their technical definition makes you act: if you have the impulse, you cannot not act
• by itself, an impulse is sufficient to produce action
  
• The definition of an impulse is:
• "An impulse is a belief that attributes a certain kind of value to the agent's potential action."
• This is not altogether different from the standard view given above:
  
• the belief  of the standard view is found in the stoic definition in "the agent's potential action," by which is meant something like, for example, "eat this chip now"
• the desire of the standard view is captured by the evaluative judgement that this action would be good
• every belief is an assent to an impression, and so we can also define impulse as:
  
• "An impulse is an assent to an impression of a certain kind, i.e. an impression that attributes a certain kind of value to the agent's own potential action."
• because impulse is an assent, it is movement of the mind. An action/event that occurs in the mind.
• each impulse is a movement towards a certain impression-proposition combination
• the proposition of an impulse is in the form:
• "It would be good to ...." (or "It would be bad to ..." in the case of avoidance)
  
• Whatever fills in the ellipse (...) is the 'predicate': the predicate contains reference to the action
  
• Impulses can be true or false
• How?
• It is a matter of fact whether or not the action would really be good, and so it can be true or false.
• Thus we can say that "my impulse to drink this now" is false
• Sounds a bit strange.
• always remember that impulses are an assent to an impression-proposition combination, and the proposition within them is what can make the impulse false
• all propositions are either true or false: they must be, logically
  
• Stoics believe impulses involve claims about things that have factual answers

• Fear and desire and pleasure and pain
  
• all are emotions according to the Stoics
• the word "emotion" is, however, in a way somewhat misleading
• they are not the "feeling" or "what it is like" to be afraid, feel pleasure or pain, or feel desire
• Why?
  
• Stoics hold that only existent (i.e. material) things can act or be acted upon
• Thus they often use ordinary words in unordinary ways that they think are more accurate
• e.g. "winter" is not a time period (incorporeal), but rather physical phenomena
  
• They said winter was the cooling of the air caused by the distance of the sun
• we can say "it's winter," but that says nothing about a cause
• when we say "winter is killing my fruit trees," however, we are making a causal statement about real things
• thus the Stoics thought that the causally effective meaning of winter was really what winter is, not the time period
• so they use words that translate as "emotion," or "pleasure," but they mean the causally effective part of the phenomena, not the "feelings," which they think have no necessary causal efficacy, since they are not corporeal (what are feelings for Stoics, then? and why can't feelings be "in relation" to the mind just as incorporeals stand in relation to kataleptic impressions of incorporeals?)
  
• when we act in accordance with the feelings, we are giving in to temptation (see below)
• temptations are bad
  
• Stoics are interested in the aspect of pleasure which does causal work, which is an impulse
• for the sage, that impulse is good
• for the vicious, it is usually an emotion (a false belief with weak assent)
  
• Fear and desire and pleasure and pain are all false impulses
• they are false because they judge that a thing is good which is actually indifferent
• they are impulses because they are the last mental event before action
• on the Stoic definition of knowledge, we vicious non-sages know neither what we are doing nor what its value is
• "Desire is the opinion that some future thing is a good of such a sort that we should reach out for it."
• "Fear is the opinion that some future thing is an evil of such a sort that we should avoid it."
• "Pleasure is the opinion that some present thing is of such a sort that we should be elated about it."
• "Pain is the opinion that some present thing is an evil of such a sort that we should be depressed about it."

• 	about the GOOD	about the BAD
  about the PRESENT	Pleasure (opinion of a present good: an irrational elation)	Pain (opinion of a present bad: an irrational depression)
  about the FUTURE	Desire (opinion of a future good: an irrational elation)	Fear (opinion of a future bad: an irrational aversion)

• in all cases, one is either assenting to a false proposition or one is assenting from a weak disposition
  
• sages have Kataleptic Impulses
• the sage KNOWS what she is doing and its value
• the sage never has fear, desire, pleasure or pain
• These are replaced in the sage with the following impulses, called eupatheiai in Greek:

• 	about the GOOD	about the BAD
  about the PRESENT	JOY (knowledge that a present thing is a good of the sort to be elated about)	Nothing here: vice alone is bad: sage has no vice
  about the FUTURE	VOLITION (knowledge that a future thing is a good of the sort to reach out for)	CAUTION (knowledge that a future thing is a bad of the sort to avoid)

• These are analogous to their corresponding impulses in the previous table
  
• the difference in each case is that the sage's impulse is rational, informed by knowledge
• Interesting consequences: Epictetus Discourses 2.22
• "“How is this?” a man may say; "I am foolish, and yet love my child.” I am surprised indeed that you have begun by making the admission that you are foolish. ... It is in truth because you are often disturbed by appearances and perplexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you; and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad; and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are changed. ...  “Yes; I have these feelings also.” Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about a man is his friend? “Certainly not.” And he who has selected a man as his friend and is of a changeable disposition, has he good-will toward him? “He has not.” And he who now abuses a man, and afterward admires him? “This man also has no good-will to the other.” Well then, did you never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another, so that you might say there is nothing more friendly? but, that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh among them, and you will learn. Throw between yourself and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to die. Then you will change your tone and say, “What a son I have brought up! He has long been wishing to bury me.” Throw a smart girl between you; and do you, the old man, love her, and the young one will love her too, If a little fame intervene, or dangers, it will be just the same.
  
• In other words, only the sage can truly love another
• only the sage has her priorities set in a strong way on the path of virtue
• and will not be tempted by indifferents (a little estate, a smart girl, a bit of fame are the above examples)
  
• Seneca CXX
• "that perfect man, who has attained virtue, never cursed his luck, and never received the results of chance with dejection; he believed that he was citizen and soldier of the universe, accepting his tasks as if they were his orders.  Whatever happened, he did not spurn it, as if it were evil and borne in upon him by hazard; he accepted it as if it were assigned to be his duty. "Whatever this may be," he says, "it is my lot; it is rough and it is hard, but I must work diligently at the task."
• "Necessarily, therefore, the man has shown himself great who has never grieved in evil days and never bewailed his destiny; he has given a clear conception of himself to many men; he has shone forth like a light in the darkness and has turned towards himself the thoughts of all men, because he was gentle and calm and equally compliant with the orders of man and of God.  He possessed perfection of soul, developed to its highest capabilities, inferior only to the mind of God - from whom a part flows down even into this heart of a mortal.  But this heart is never more divine than when it reflects upon its mortality+, and understands that man was born for the purpose of fulfilling his life, and that the body is not a permanent dwelling, but a sort of inn (with a brief sojourn at that) which is to be left behind when one perceives that one is a burden to the host."
  

• What about indifferents: how does the sage act vis-a-vis indifferents?
• The sage practices selection of some and disselection of others
• But the sage is under no illusion that they are good or bad
• They are simply things that the sage prefers
• it makes sense to say that, as long as what I really care about is not harmed, I would rather be healthy, rather have good food, rather help others be comfortable, etc.
• Selection= belief that an indifferent future thing is preferred and thus that we should take action to obtain it (corresponds to volition)
  
• Disselection= belief that an indifferent future thing is dispreferred and thus that we should avoid it (corresponds to caution)
  
• there is no belief relating to present things that are preferred/dispreferred that leads to action (nothing corresponding to joy or pain here)
  
• In the sage's case, the beliefs are knowledge (strong assent + true)
• In our case, the beliefs are opinions (weak assent + true or false)
• What makes something preferred/dispreferred?
• "planning-value": in itself, it has no worth, but in terms of planning for the future, it is worth obtaining: in any given present, it has no value
• Seneca Epistle CXX
• "Some believe the Good to be that which is useful; they accordingly bestow this title upon riches, horses, wine, and shoes; so cheaply do they view the Good, and to such base uses do they let it descend. ... we regard nothing as good which can be put to wrong use by any person."
• these things have only instrumental value: they are only good in a way  relative to the future, but not good in any now.
  
• so today I choose to do things that will make me healthy tomorrow, but when tomorrow comes, my health is an indifferent

• Temptation
• the non-sage is tempted
• temptation is a persuasive appearance/impression that something indifferent is good or bad.
• give in (i.e. assent) to it and it becomes an impulse
  
• pain is not bad, but it feels bad: it presents that impression, and it is persuasive
• if I give in, I will assent to doing something on the grounds of a false belief that the pain is bad, and I might in fact do something like betraying friends.
  
• only virtuous behavior will lead to my happiness
• if you really know what is good and bad, in the same way that you know that you have a heart or that 1=1, no amount of persuasive appearances will sway you from the good.
• VIRTUE IS AN UNSHAKEABLE AND CONSISTENT DISPOSITION TO ASSENT ONLY TO KATALEPTIC IMPULSE IMPRESSIONS
• VICE IS AN INCOHERENT AND VACILLATING DISPOSITION TO ASSENT TO IMPULSE IMPRESSIONS WHICH ARE NOT KATALEPTIC
• temptation is a sort of invitation to a downward spiral
• being tempted involves picturing yourself as having wealth, or having this family, etc.
• thus it creates an expectation: another way to say it is that it makes a promise
• by getting you to imagine yourself in the situation of having your desire satisfied or avoiding what you fear, these emotions entrench themselves in you and make you more disposed to have more of them
• to counter the pull of the promise of emotions, we need to continually remind ourselves:
•  that the future is uncertain
• these things are not sure
• one thing can be sure: our inner goodness
• thus when selecting an indifferent, one always does so "with reservation"
• the reservation is that what you are selecting may not come to pass
• the truth of a selection such as that I should eat dinner tonight has nothing to do with whether I do eat dinner tonight
• it is simply a matter of following nature to select eating dinner
• but if dinner does not happen, we should know that it does not really matter
• so select what is according to nature, but with the reservation that it might not come to pass
• even do all within your power to get dinner (short of compromising your virtue), but when it doesn't come to pass, don't give in to the temptation to be disappointed
  

• One's Overall Disposition
• The Stoics demanded that the sage be the sort of person who:
• would never make the wrong assent
• that demand is not a demand that the sage never actually wrongly assent:
  
• it is much much stronger than that.
• it is the demand that the sage WOULD never wrongly assent
• that is why so much discussion in Stoicism revolves around extreme cases: suicide being the most common
  
• They think of people as assent and suspension-of-judgement machines
• complex machines
• One has an overall pattern of assent and suspension-of-judgement: it is called "prohaeresis"
• Seneca CXX
  
• "The greatest proof of an evil mind is unsteadiness, and continued wavering between pretence of virtue and love of vice. ... a man never the same, never even like himself; to such an extent does he wander off into opposites.  Did I say many are so?  It is the case with almost all. "