CLAS 196/PHIL196
Stoicism

Brennan, Chapter 14

• Stobaeus 1.138f. (Long and Sedley, transl., 55a)
• Zeno says that a cause is 'that because of which, ' while that of which it is the cause is an attribute; and that the cause is a body, while that of which it is a cause is a predicate. He says that it is impossible that the cause be present yet that of which it is the cause not belong. This thesis has the following force. A cause is that because of which something occurs, as, for example, it is because of prudence that being prudent occurs, because of soul that being alive occurs, and because of temperance that being temperate occurs. For it is impossible, when someone possesses temperance, for him not to be temperate, or, when he possesses soul, for him not to be alive, or, when he possesses prudence, for him not to be prudent. Chrysippus says that a cause is 'that because of which'; and that the cause is an existent and a body, <while that of which it is the cause is neither an existent nor a body>; and that the cause is 'because', while that of which it is the cause is 'why?' He says that an explanation [aitia] is the statement of a cause [aition], or statement concerning the cause qua cause.
• Aetius1.28.4 (Long and Sedley, transl., 55j)
• The Stoics [describe fate as] a sequence of causes, that is, an inescapable ordering and interconnexion.
• Gellius 7.2.3 (Long and Sedley, trans.)
• In 'On Providence' book 4, Chrysippus says that fate is a certain natural everlasting ordering of the whole: one set of things follows on and succeeds another, and the interconnexion in inviolable.
• Cicero On Divination 1.125-6 (Long and Sedley, transl., 55L)
  
• By 'fate', I mean what the Greeks call heimarmene--an ordering and sequence of causes, since it is the connexion of cause to cause which out of itself produces anything. It is everlasting truth, flowing from all eternity. Consequently nothing has happened which was not going to be, and likewise nothing is going to be of which nature does not contain causes working to bring that very thing about. This makes it intelligible that fate should be, not the 'fate' of superstition, but that of physics, an everlasting cause of things--why past things happened, why present things are now happening, and why future things will be.
• Stobaeus 1.79 (LS 55M)
• Chrysippus calls the substance of fate a power of breath, carrying out the orderly government of the all. That is in 'On the world' book 2. But in 'On seasons' book 2, in 'On fate', and here and there in the other works, he expresses a variety of views; 'Fate is the rationale of the world', or 'the rationale of providence's acts of government in the world.' or' the rationale in accordance with which past events have happened, present events are happening, and future events will happen.' And as substitute for 'rationale' he uses 'truth,' 'explanation', 'nature', 'necessity', and further terms, taking these to apply to the same substance from different points of view.
• Alexander, On Fate 191.30ff (LS 55N)
• They [the Stoics] say that since the world is a unity which includes all existing things in itself and is governed by a living, rational, intelligent nature, the government of existing things which it possesses is an everlasting one proceeding in a sequence and ordering. The things which happen first become causes to those which happen after them. In this way all things are bound together, and neither does anything happen in the world such that something else does not unconditionally follow from it and become causally attached to it, nor can any of the later events be severed from the preceding events so as not to follow from one of them as if bound fast to it; but from everything that happens something else follows, with a necessary causal dependence on it, and everything that happens has something prior to it with which it causally coheres. For nothing in the world exists or happens causelessly, because none of the things in it is independent of, and insulated from, everything that has happened before. For the world would be wrenched apart and divided, and no longer remain a unity, forever governed in accordance with a single ordering and management, if an uncaused motion were introduced. And an uncaused motion would be introduced, were everything that exists or happens not to have some preceding causes from which it necessarily follows. For something to happen causelessly is, they say, both similar to and as impossible as something's coming to be out of what is not. Being of this kind, the government of the all goes on from infinity to infinity self-evidently and unceasingly. In setting out the difference which exists among causes they list a swarm of causes--preliminary causes, joint-causes, ...sustaining causes, and others (we need not prolong our account by including all the ones they name, we need only indicate the intention underlying their fate doctrine); but, given this plurality of causes, they say that it is equally true with regard to all of them that it is impossible, where all the same circumstances obtain with respect to the cause and that to which it is the cause, that a result which does not ensue on one occasion should ensue on another. For if this happened, there would be an uncaused motion. They say that the very fate, nature, and rationale in accordance with which the all is governed is god. It is present in all things which exist and happen, and in this way uses the proper nature of all existing things for the government of the all.
  

• Clearly, Stoics think that the fact that everything is fated ought to somehow be comforting to us, or perhaps that we ought to align our thoughts such that we accept it contentedly.
• Pseudo-Plutarch On Fate 574e
• Sages are content with events, on the grounds that everything happens according to fate. (Brennan transl.)
• Epictetus Discourses 3.17
• When you make any charge against Providence, consider, and you will learn that the thing has happened according to reason. “Yes, but the unjust man has the advantage.” In what? “In money.” Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the wonder? But see if he has the advantage over you in being faithful, in being modest: for you will not find it to be so; but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you have the advantage.
  
• Musonius Rufus 42
• Such is the nature of the cosmos, and such it was, and is, and will be and what happens cannot happen otherwise than as it now is ... If you make the attempt to incline your mind to these things, and to persuade yourself to accept the necessary things willingly, then you will live your life most moderately and harmoniously. (Brennan Transl.)
• Seems to say that our beliefs about Zeus and fate can affect our beliefs about the good and the bad: the right attitude towards God, i.e. piety, might help us accept whatever comes our way.
• Brennan finds that implausible. I don't particularly.
• Brennan thinks that we first have to see that whatever happens to us is neither good nor bad, and then after that we can be pious towards God.
  
• From Epictetus Discourses 1.22
• What then is education? Education is the learning how to adapt the natural precognitions to the particular things conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of things some are in our power, but others are not; in our power are will and all acts which depend on the will; things not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children, country, and, generally, all with whom we live in society. In what, then, should we place the good? To what kind of things shall we adapt it? “To the things which are in our power?” Is not health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life? and are not children and parents and country? Who will tolerate you if you deny this?
  
• Let us [for the sake of argument] then transfer  the notion of good to these things [health, wealth, power]. Is it possible, then, when a man sustains damage and does not obtain good things, that he can be happy? “It is not possible.” And can he maintain toward society a proper behavior? He cannot. For I am naturally formed to look after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbor. If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to steal it from the bath. This is the origin of wars, civil commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be still able to maintain my duty toward Zeus? for if I sustain damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me; and what is he to me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am? I now begin to hate him. Why, then, do we build temples, why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil demons, such as to Fever; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the Giver of rain, and the Giver of fruits? And in truth if we place the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows..
  
• Epictetus 1.27.12 ff
• For the origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then, at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for me, what are they to me? “Yes, but you will be an impious man.” In what respect then will it be worse for me than it is now? To sum up, remember this that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man.
  
• In these passages, Epictetus says that our attitude towards God follows from our view of the good, not vice versa, and so we must first see what is truly good, then we can be pious.
• It seems to me that it goes both ways: our view of God influences our view of what is good and our view of what is good influences our view of God.
  

•  God's goodness and the world
• The fact that God is good does not mean that all the world is good.
• It remains indifferent.
• Any arrangement of indifferents is indifferent.
• This is not "the best of all possible worlds" in that sense, according to Stoicism.
  
• Stoics did, however, believe that this is the most rational of all possible worlds (it might suffice if this is simply a rational world), and so it is the best of all possible worlds in that sense.
  
• "Zeus's goodness consists in his maximally wise and rational arrangement of the indifferents."
• So says Brennan: I wonder if perhaps he (or the Stoics) should modify this to say "Zeus's goodness consists in his maximally wise and rational approach/way to deal with/reaction to the indifferents."
• it's not so much that this set of indifferents is more rational than any other possible one
• rather it's that the underlying system and rule-governing structure of it that Providence or Zeus arranges is (maximally) rational
• are there degrees of rationality? How?
  
• God's goodness is parallel to our goodness, which also consists in the maximally wise and rational way to deal with whatever indifferents we are faced with.
• but God seems to be totally automatic.
  

• Two chief attacks against the Stoic theory of fate:
• Personal responsibility disappears: moral credit or blame is pointless if whatever anyone does is fated.
• The Lazy argument: whatever happens is fated, so effort is pointless at best and really just a waste. Either it will happen or it won't. The rational (i.e. virtuous) woman will kick back and (try to) enjoy the ride.