• Stoic view of emotions
• Emotions always include a belief: the belief that some thing is good (or bad).
• That belief is false.
• Because the thing is really indifferent, neither good nor bad.
• Emotions also always include a belief that the thing is to be pursued (or avoided) because it is good (or bad).
• Once we know that the thing is not good or bad, we will no longer assent to the idea that it is good or bad.
• Once the belief that it is good or bad is gone, the belief that it is to be pursued or avoided has far less urgency.
  
• That will defang the emotions.
• It will deprive them of the power to cause action.
• And demote the object of the belief to a preferred or dispreferred indifferent.
  
• It is all about recognizing and fully prioritizing what is truly good or bad.
  
• And that will 'naturally' lead us to getting rid of our emotions.
  
• The disposition of our mind (our 'hegemonikon' or 'executive center') is what contains all those recognitions and prioritizations.
• While the Sage might indeed "grit her teeth" against the feelings and physiology of what causes emotions in others, she will not feel their pull, because she will know that they present a false impression.
• Thus Stoicism rejects the idea that emotions/passions are what make us do things:
• Hume, on the other hand, thinks that beliefs are just so many "idle chatterers" and it is our passions/emotions which do the work of motivating us. Without them, says Hume, we would be sapped of our motivation.
• Can the stoics somehow have their cake and eat it too?
  
• Plutarch de Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1057a
• What is the subject most argued about by Chrysippus himself and Antipater in their disputes with the Academics? The doctrine that without assent there is neither action nor impulsion, and that they are talking nonsense and empty assumptions who claim that, when an appropriate impression occurs, impulsion ensues at once without people first having yielded or given their assent.
• Brennan P. 311:
• On the whole, I am inclined to think that the Stoics are wrong here; in the light not only of evolutionary theory but of developmental psychology, it seems to me that the motivational dynamics of adult human beings cannot be as radically different from the motivations of other animals, and human children, as the Stoics would make it be. But this debate is not easily settled, and the Stoic position is far from silly.
• It seems that the Stoics think humans have the ability to move beyond the stage animals are at to a new stage, one where they think, prioritize, and act based on thinking.
• They also think this ability is potentially strong enough to transform human life.
  
• Let's keep this in mind as we approach Lawrence Becker's modern  effort to revive Stoicism.
• In place of emotions such as fear, desire, pain, or pleasure (and all the subtypes of those four basic types), we can have selection (or disselection)
• While recognizing the thing as an indifferent, we can nonetheless perceive that pursuing (or avoiding) it is preferable, because the pursuit (or avoidance) is a befitting action.
• But we don't think we are doing it because it is good.
• Therefore it is entirely optional and does not rise to the level of important.
  
• We will care about indifferents in a radically different way from the way in which we care about good and evil.
• Good we pursue egotistically
• Indifferents we pursue with equal or greater regard for others than ourselves.
• That all our actions are determined is supposed to comfort us.
• It supposedly helps us to accept whatever happens to us, to reject the anguish of negative emotions that arise in reaction to the dispreferred occurrences themselves, and also helps us not be carried away by the more preferred occurrences.
• Moral responsibility and determinism may well be compatible,
  
• BUT the lazy argument causes problems (unless you think we defanged it with what we said earlier)
  
• Brennan points out that there is a further problem:
• Suppose I want some breakfast, but the toaster quits, then we are out of butter, there is no milk, etc. At what point do I say, "OK, it was fated that I not have breakfast" and just accept it?
  
• I think that at every stage, we are supposed to accept it, whatever happens, but still keep choosing preferred indifferents: our task is to not give up in the face of whatever the world throws at us.
• Knowing that these things are indifferent could help us take a more productive attitude.
• So even the pileup of little things that might lead one to 'give up' does not have pull.
  
• Is it really a problem?
• Occasionally, a Stoic text makes it seem as if some Stoics thought that fate applies to everything except what goes on in our souls.
• If that is true, we have to ask, what causes the things that happen in our souls?
• We might answer that it is God, and that God's causality is independent of the external world (but the Stoics think god just is the world's causal structure)
  
• But we might just think that thru some mysterious faculty, "we" really are deciding what to do and that our decisions are just independent of the causal chains that course through the external world.
• Brennan wants to refute this with a nice new formulation of the argument:
  
• UPSTREAM ARGUMENT: going up the causal chain backward in time
  
• If we affect the external world, we have causal effects on it.
• If the effects were fated to occur, then so were their causes, and thus many mental events are fated.
• If the effects were not fated to occur, then there are many many things that happen to the external world that are not fated, BUT that contradicts determinism.
• So there are many many mental events that are in fact fated.
• INNER CITADEL ARGUMENT
  
• Maybe there are some left that are not fated.
• THE INNER CITADEL: our mind has an inner citadel that is immune to fate.
  
• Namely, we can either resist or embrace fate, and that resistance or embracing is not fated.
• BUT then that resistance or embracing must itself have no effects whatsoever that are perceivable, because that would mean it had external effects, and we have just seen that external effects must be fated or determinism breaks down.
• So maybe we have an inner citadel, but there is no way whatsoever for us to know that, for knowing it might lead to external happenings (audible groans, sighs, or elation). We are free to resist or embrace fate, but we cannot know about it and fate cannot be changed by the resistance or embracing! It's more like being walled up in a stone room.
  
• Our biggest problem with Stoicism is the lack of a crisp and ready definition of "nature," "human nature," and any other "natural" things.
• Our idea of a "default" does help a great deal:
• by default, humans are social creatures, can think rationally, etc.
  
• but is that just another way of saying that "normal" humans do this and that?
  
• why privilege normality?
  
• and isn't the Sage anything but normal and anything but the default option?
• The evidence is just not amenable to creating a nice clear definition of Stoic "Nature."
• And in any case, we today are not likely to accept it. We know so much more about what humans are.
  
• Let's keep this idea as we go forward and see what Lawrence Becker has to say about it.

Some texts about reason, nature, god, and their interrelations and existence (there will not be time in class to read these: you have probably read them in your readings already).

• Marcus Aurelius Meditations IV.4
• If our intellectual part is common, then reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.
• Cicero De Natura Deorum 2.6-8
• Yet even from this inferior intelligence of man we may discover the existence of some intelligent agent that is divine, and wiser than ourselves; for, as Socrates says in Xenophon, from whence had man his portion of understanding? And, indeed, if any one were to push his inquiries about the moisture and heat which is diffused through the human body, and the earthy kind of solidity existing in our entrails, and that soul by which we breathe, and to ask whence we derived them, it would be plain that we have received one thing from the earth, another from liquid, another from fire, and another from that air which we inhale every time that we breathe.
  Vll. But where did we find that which excels all these things — I mean reason, or (if you please, in other terms) the mind, understanding, thought, prudence; and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be possessed of every other perfection, and be destitute of this one, which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is nothing better, or more excellent, or more beautiful than the world; and not only there is nothing better, but we cannot even conceive anything superior to it; and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all perfections, they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be the most excellent.
• VIII. “That which reasons is superior to that which does not; nothing is superior to the world; the world, therefore, reasons.” By the same rule the world may be proved to be wise, happy, and eternal; for the possession of all these qualities is superior to the want of them; and nothing is superior to the world; the inevitable consequence of which argument is, that the world, therefore, is a Deity. He goes on: “No part of anything void of sense is capable of perception; some parts of the world have perception; the world, therefore, has sense.” He proceeds, and pursues the argument closely. “Nothing,” says he, “that is destitute itself of life and reason can generate a being possessed of life and reason; but the world does generate beings possessed of life and reason; the world, therefore, is not itself destitute of life and reason.”
  He concludes his argument in his usual manner with a simile: “If well-tuned pipes should spring out of the olive, would you have the slightest doubt that there was in the olive-tree itself some kind of skill and knowledge? Or if the plane-tree could produce harmonious lutes, surely you would infer, on the same principle, that music was contained in the plane-tree. Why, then, should we not believe the world is a living and wise being, since it produces living and wise beings out of itself?”
• ibid. 14
• But man himself was born to contemplate and imitate the world, being in no wise perfect, but, if I may so express myself, a particle of perfection; but the world, as it comprehends all, and as nothing exists that is not contained in it, is entirely perfect. In what, therefore, can it be defective, since it is perfect? It cannot want understanding and reason, for they are the most desirable of all qualities. The same Chrysippus observes also, by the use of similitudes, that everything in its kind, when arrived at maturity and perfection, is superior to that which is not — as a horse to a colt, a dog to a puppy, and a man to a boy — so whatever is best in the whole universe must exist in some complete and perfect being. But nothing is more perfect than the world, and nothing better than virtue. Virtue, therefore, is an attribute of the world. But human nature is not perfect, and nevertheless virtue is produced in it: with how much greater reason, then, do we conceive it to be inherent in the world! Therefore the world has virtue, and it is also wise, and consequently a Deity.
• ibid. 22
• According to this manner of reasoning, every particular nature is artificial, as it operates agreeably to a certain method peculiar to itself; but that universal nature which embraces all things is said by Zeno to be not only artificial, but absolutely the artificer, ever thinking and providing all things useful and proper; and as every particular nature owes its rise and increase to its own proper seed, so universal nature has all her motions voluntary, has affections and desires (by the Greeks called 'hormas') productive of actions agreeable to them, like us, who have sense and understanding to direct us. Such, then, is the intelligence of the universe; for which reason it may be properly termed prudence or providence (in Greek, 'pronoia'), since her chiefest care and employment is to provide all things fit for its duration, that it may want nothing, and, above all, that it may be adorned with all perfection of beauty and ornament.
• Ibid. 30
• First, then, we must either deny the existence of the Gods (as Democritus and Epicurus by their doctrine of images in some sort do), or, if we acknowledge that there are Gods, we must believe they are employed, and that, too, in something excellent. Now, nothing is so excellent as the administration of the universe. The universe, therefore, is governed by the wisdom of the Gods.
  
• Ibid 31
• XXXI. But supposing, which is incontestable, that there are Gods, they must be animated, and not only animated, but endowed with reason — united, as we may say, in a civil agreement and society, and governing together one universe, as a republic or city. Thus the same reason, the same verity, the same law, which ordains good and prohibits evil, exists in the Gods as it does in men. From them, consequently, we have prudence and understanding, for which reason our ancestors erected temples to the Mind, Faith, Virtue, and Concord. Shall we not then allow the Gods to have these perfections, since we worship the sacred and august images of them? But if understanding, faith, virtue, and concord reside in human kind, how could they come on earth, unless from heaven? And if we are possessed of wisdom, reason, and prudence, the Gods must have the same qualities in a greater degree; and not only have them, but employ them in the best and greatest works. The universe is the best and greatest work; therefore it must be governed by the wisdom and providence of the Gods.
  
• Is this just anthropomorphizing? Just writing ourselves into the universe?

• NATURE:
• Cicero de Natura Deorum
  
• XXXII. It is now incumbent on me to prove that all things are subjected to nature, and most beautifully directed by her. But, first of all, it is proper to explain precisely what that nature is, in order to come to the more easy understanding of what I would demonstrate. Some think that nature is a certain irrational power exciting in bodies the necessary motions. Others, that it is an intelligent power, acting by order and method, designing some end in every cause, and always aiming at that end, whose works express such skill as no art, no hand, can imitate; for, they say, such is the virtue of its seed, that, however small it is, if it falls into a place proper for its reception, and meets with matter conducive to its nourishment and increase, it forms and produces everything in its respective kind; either vegetables, which receive their nourishment from their roots; or animals, endowed with motion, sense, appetite, and abilities to beget their likeness.
  Some apply the word nature to everything; as Epicurus does, who acknowledges no cause, but atoms, a vacuum, and their accidents. But when we say that nature forms and governs the world, we do not apply it to a clod of earth, or piece of stone, or anything of that sort, whose parts have not the necessary cohesion, but to a tree, in which there is not the appearance of chance, but of order and a resemblance of art....
• That which inclines to the center, that which rises from it to the surface, and that which rolls about the center, constitute the universal world, and make one entire nature; and as there are four sorts of bodies, the continuance of nature is caused by their reciprocal changes; for the water arises from the earth, the air from the water, and the fire from the air; and, reversing this order, the air arises from fire, the water from the air, and from the water the earth, the lowest of the four elements, of which all beings are formed. Thus by their continual motions backward and forward, upward and downward, the conjunction of the several parts of the universe is preserved; a union which, in the beauty we now behold it, must be eternal, or at least of a very long duration, and almost for an infinite space of time; and, whichever it is, the universe must of consequence be governed by nature. ...
• XXXIV. Now, the universe sows, as I may say, plants, produces, raises, nourishes, and preserves what nature administers, as members and parts of itself. If nature, therefore, governs them, she must also govern the universe. And, lastly, in nature’s administration there is nothing faulty. She produced the best possible effect out of those elements which existed. Let any one show how it could have been better. But that can never be; and whoever attempts to mend it will either make it worse, or aim at impossibilities.
  But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that nothing could be better for use or beauty, let us consider whether this is the effect of chance, or whether, in such a state they could possibly cohere, but by the direction of wisdom and divine providence. Nature, therefore, cannot be void of reason, if art can bring nothing to perfection without it, and if the works of nature exceed those of art. How is it consistent with common-sense that when you view an image or a picture, you imagine it is wrought by art; when you behold afar off a ship under sail, you judge it is steered by reason and art; when you see a dial or water-clock, you believe the hours are shown by art, and not by chance; and yet that you should imagine that the universe, which contains all arts and the artificers, can be void of reason and understanding?...
• XXXVII. Is it possible for any man to behold these things, and yet imagine that certain solid and individual bodies move by their natural force and gravitation, and that a world so beautifully adorned was made by their fortuitous concourse? He who believes this may as well believe that if a great quantity of the one-and-twenty letters, composed either of gold or any other matter, were thrown upon the ground, they would fall into such order as legibly to form the Annals of Ennius. I doubt whether fortune could make a single verse of them. How, therefore, can these people assert that the world was made by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, which have no color, no quality — which the Greeks call 'poiotes', no sense? or that there are innumerable worlds, some rising and some perishing, in every moment of time? But if a concourse of atoms can make a world, why not a porch, a temple, a house, a city, which are works of less labor and difficulty?...
• XLVI ... Besides, nature has also given these beasts appetite and sense; in order that by the one they may be excited to procure sufficient sustenance, and by the other they may distinguish what is noxious from what is salutary. Some animals seek their food walking, some creeping, some flying, and some swimming; some take it with their mouth and teeth; some seize it with their claws, and some with their beaks; some suck, some graze, some bolt it whole, and some chew it. Some are so low that they can with ease take such food as is to be found on the ground; but the taller, as geese, swans, cranes, and camels, are assisted by a length of neck. To the elephant is given a hand, without which, from his unwieldiness of body, he would scarce have any means of attaining food.
• ...
• With regard to animals, do we not see how aptly they are formed for the propagation of their species? Nature for this end created some males and some females.