CLAS 196/PHIL 196
Stoicism

Chapter 4 of Becker's A New Stoicism

• Whereas what we have discussed so far has been a declarative survey, which was a sort of inventory of concepts relevant to ethics, mostly intra-personal phenomena, this chapter is about logic. It does not contain the logical calculus of Becker's stoicism. That is relegated to an appendix for those who are heartily interested in it.
• This chapter is "about" logic in that it describes the logic which Becker lays down as the foundation of his stoic ethics.

• Axioms of Stoic Normative Logic (P. 42): these are meant to be obvious aspects of what we can do as agents / humans in life
  
• Axiom of Encompassment: The exercise of our agency through practical intelligence, including practical reasoning all-things-considered, is the most comprehensive and controlling of our endeavors.
• Axiom of Finality: There is no reasoned assessment endeavor external to the exercise of practical reasoning all-things-considered.
• Axiom of Moral Priority: Norms generated by the exercise of practical reasoning all-things-considered are superordinate to all others.
• Axiom of Futility: Agents are required not to make direct attempts to do (or be) something that is logically, theoretically, or practically impossible.
• These axioms are explained more fully below.
  

• Important caveat: as Aristotle says, the conclusions one can reach in any area should not be more precise than the area allows for.
  
• Furthermore, as Hume says, the logic of ethics is often profoundly difficult to discover.
• And what is more, it is important not to start too close to the destination: don't illegitimately build the answer into the question.

• Becker wants us to see that his ethical method:
• can represent the full range of human behavioral norms and normative propositions
• assigns clear meanings to moral judgements (as opposed to other sorts of normative judgements)
• derives moral judgements from facts about the world (without resorting to legerdemain)
• is logically sound, non-trivial, and has systematic coherence

• Norms and Normative Propositions
• a "norm" is a fact about a particular agent's goal-directed behavior: "Jacques wants to build a wall," for instance.
• a normative proposition is a statement about a norm: "Jacques ought to lay the foundation of the wall here," for instance
• it can be either true or false
• Becker introduces three sorts of normative proposition:
• requirement
• ought
• indifference
• These differ from the more common ethical normative propositions of obligation, permission, and prohibition, which are interpreted in terms of necessity, possibility, and impossibility.
• OUGHTS
• saying that an agent ought to do X is to say that doing X is advisable given X's endeavor to do something
• simply means that doing X is a step on the way to some goal
• there might be other steps that would be less, more, or equally effective steps toward the same goal: all are oughts
  
• REQUIREMENT
• saying that an agent is required to do X means one of the following:
• X is necessary for some goal the agent has
• if the agent does not do X, she ought to be sanctioned for not doing X
• saying that an agent is prohibited from X means that the agent is required to not do X
• requirements are different from oughts in that requirements can frustrate or constrain the agent in her pursuit of some goal, whereas oughts do not
• INDIFFERENCE
• saying that X is indifferent means that it is neither required nor prohibited, neither advisable nor inadvisable (given some goal?)

• Hierarchies of normative propositions
• "Moral" normative propositions are those that are parts of the most inclusive, comprehensive, and dominant endeavor
• Axiom of Moral Priority: Norms generated by the exercise of practical reasoning all-things-considered are superordinate to all others.
• submoral normative propositions are those that are lower in the hierarchy: they are not "all-things-considered"
• Chapters 5-7 explore what the dominant endeavor is (it is virtue and following nature)
• When norms conflict:
• requirements trump oughts and indifferents
• oughts trump indifferents
• when requirements conflict with requirements, whichever belongs to a more dominant/comprehensive norm trumps
• same applies for oughts and indifferents
• when requirements conflict with requirements, and they are on the same level, there is a "forced choice"
• faced with toast or conflakes and no good reason to prefer or disprefer either, we construct a normative proposition that is one level higher than the toast or conflakes conflict. That normative proposition says "you ought to choose something for breakfast, even if the options are equally attractive": a forced choice.
• when faced with more important things, like which college/university to apply to, or what to major in, or what career to try for, the same applies: if there is conflict at the same level, a superordinate ought appears: "you ought to choose one rather than be paralyzed by choices"
  

• Possibility and Necessity
• Axiom of Futility: Agents are required not to make direct attempts to do (or be) something that is logically, theoretically, or practically impossible."
• Remember that possibility and necessity were said in the "Declarative Survey" to be of three kinds: logical, theoretical, and practical:
• It is logically possible to run 600 miles per hour
• It is not practically possible for a human to do so
• that means that given the human body, it is not logically possible to do so
• in other words,  "practical" possibilities or impossibilities are simply logical possibilities/impossibilities that are embedded IN a certain practical context
• It is logically possible to move faster than light
• Given the way our universe works, it is not theoretically possible
• once again, the theoretically possible is simply the logical found IN a certain theoretical context
  

• Normative Constructs
• Given the rules of a game, and facts about what certain players can do, it is legitimate to construct oughts that are confined to the game being played:
• white ought to move knight to king's bishop 6
• he should shoot
• he should move on to the essay portion of the exam
• she should invoke the right not to incriminate herself
  
• Expand the sphere a bit (let's say include the game and some broader context: maybe the game and practice sessions and the whole season OR maybe the game and the social institutions surrounding it), and it is legitimate to construct oughts confined to that sphere
• Keep expanding, and eventually, you get to "all-things-considered"
• Once you reach the "all-things-considered" level, the normative propositions are like categorical imperatives and they are moral
  
• that is because they must consider all things in order to be at that level.

• How to get to the "all-things-considered level"
• Follow nature: follow the facts
• All practical reasoning has as a foundation means-ends reasoning.
• You cannot reason practically about eudaemonia, but you can about the means to it.
• If there is an action X that is the best of the practical options and will achieve some goal or more than one, the agent ought to do X nothing else considered.
• If the agent is caught between equal alternatives, like Buridan's ass, who could not decide between two bales of hay and so starved to death, then the agent ought to construct a normative proposition one level higher than the alternatives that says "I ought to choose one in spite of there being no sufficient reason to choose one rather than the other": in other words, force a choice, because it's more important that you choose than that there be a reason to choose this rather than that.
• Now, how to get from the particular, which let's just call level 0, to the all-things-considered norm?
• it's a problem: how to escape from the building of higher and higher levels to get to the transcendent over-all level?
• do we just keep escalating until we can think of nothing else to include in our deliberations?
• Some additional information about this would be nice (perhaps the escalation idea is right, however)