Seneca Epistulae ad Lucilium CXXIV

SENECA LVCILIO SVO SALVTEM  

This letter contains many Stoic claims about the good, what it is, its relation to rationality, and the idea that as humans we should pursue above all perfect rationality in order to achieve the good. It does not contain much argument that would persuade a critical non-Stoic. Rather, it explains parts of Stoic positions and how they fit together: knowledge from outside of this letter is crucial to understanding Seneca's points. Readers should consult Anthony Long and David Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers for a thorough introductory guide to the ancient arguments and their source texts on such matters, or Brennan's The Stoic Life for a good introduction to Stoic ethics.

[1] Seneca hooks Lucilius by flattery: surely Lucilius won't despise Seneca's tenuis curas. Next, he introduces the topic, whether we grasp 'the good' by our senses or our intellect.

[1] Possum multa tibi veterum praecepta referre, ni refugis tenuisque piget cognoscere curas. Non refugis autem nec ulla te subtilitas abigit: non est elegantiae tuae tantum magna sectari, sicut illud probo, quod omnia ad aliquem profectum redigis et tunc tantum offenderis ubi summa subtilitate nihil agitur. Quod ne nunc quidem fieri laborabo. Quaeritur utrum sensu conprendatur an intellectu bonum; huic adiunctum est in mutis animalibus et infantibus non esse.

Sentence structure:
 [2] Seneca thinks the good is grasped by the intellect: those who think the good is pleasure think it is grasped by the senses, as is clear from the fact that pleasure attracts everyone. If pleasure, or some pleasures, are intellectual, or if there are good and bad pleasures, or if pleasure and pain are not opposed to each other in the right way, the argument may not work, but Seneca is not really trying to establish his case beyond a doubt (or if he is, he is not doing it well).
Note the parallelism of the last 5 clauses: Seneca frequently constructs such parallels.

[2] Quicumque voluptatem in summo ponunt sensibile iudicant bonum, nos contra intellegibile, qui illud animo damus. Si de bono sensus iudicarent, nullam voluptatem reiceremus; nulla enim non invitat, nulla non delectat; et e contrario nullum dolorem volentes subiremus; nullus enim non offendit sensum.

Sentence structure:

[3] Seneca bolsters his case by the empirical claim that people find fault with those who are overly pleased with pleasure or fearful of pain: that begs the question, however, for those who think pleasure is the good won't find fault with people overly pleased with pleasure. Perhaps they think them enlightened. Likewise, Seneca's judgements about lust and those who lack courage out of fear of pain have no purchase on someone who doesn't already agree with him. This means that Seneca is 'preaching to the choir' and explaining the stoic position to someone already disposed toward stoicism, a fine task to undertake.

[3] Praeterea non essent digni reprehensione quibus nimium voluptas placet quibusque summus est doloris timor. Atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemnimus illos qui nihil viriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu. Quid autem peccant si sensibus, id est iudicibus boni ac mali, parent? his enim tradidistis adpetitionis et fugae arbitrium.

Sentence structure:

[4] Seneca explains that those who let sense instead of intellect judge the good are entrusting judgement to the less capable of the two faculties: humans have dull senses compared to animals, and their reason is a superior faculty.

[4] Sed videlicet ratio isti rei praeposita est: illa quemadmodum de beata vita, quemadmodum de virtute, de honesto, sic et de bono maloque constituit. Nam apud istos vilissimae parti datur de meliore sententia, ut de bono pronuntiet sensus, obtunsa res et hebes et in homine quam in aliis animalibus tardior.

Sentence structure:
 [5] The senses are the wrong instrument to use to detect the good.

[5] Quid si quis vellet non oculis sed tactu minuta discernere? Subtilior adhoc acies nulla quam oculorum et intentior daret bonum malumque dinoscere. Vides in quanta ignorantia veritatis versetur et quam humi sublimia ac divina proiecerit apud quem de summo, bono malo, iudicat tactus.

Sentence structure:
[6] As he often does, Seneca creates an imaginary interlocutor to argue and discuss an issue: here the interlocutor invokes a principle that every area of knowledge originates from some clear sense perception, and so knowledge of the ultimate good too ought to have clear phenomena that the senses perceive as its origin.
[6] 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'omnis scientia atque ars aliquid debet habere manifestum sensuque conprehensum ex quo oriatur et crescat, sic beata vita fundamentum et initium a manifestis ducit et eo quod sub sensum cadat. Nempe vos a manifestis beatam vitam initium sui capere dicitis.'

Sentence structure:

[7] Further explanation of the Stoics' position (the 'we' of dicimus) in contradistinction to the anonymous interlocutor (tu here). The principle of the previous section leads to discussion of the meaning of secundum naturam, which Stoics use to describe what is good. The idea seems to be that the state of a human being before things may have gone wrong, i.e. at birth, might be where the good is manifest. Seneca rejects that, stating that the natural state at birth is the initium, not the pinnacle, of human good.

[7] Dicimus beata esse quae secundum naturam sint; quid autem secundum naturam sit palam et protinus apparet, sicut quid sit integrum. Quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum, sed initium boni. Tu summum bonum, voluptatem, infantiae donas, ut inde incipiat nascens quo consummatus homo pervenit; cacumen radicis loco ponis.

Sentence structure:

[8] Seneca is still explaining the Stoic position, but this section contains some argument, argument which some non-Stoics might accept. The argument is that the newborn is not capable of good. One premise is the claim that birth is not a particularly important breaking point for rationality: the fetus is as rational as the newborn. Another premise is the claim that the newborn is no more capable of good than a tree or any old animal. If those two premises are accepted as accurate, the newborn is not at all capable of good. But people will still reject this argument if they think rationality has nothing to do with being, grasping, or doing good.

[8] Si quis diceret illum in materno utero latentem, sexus quoque incerti, tenerum et inperfectum et informem iam in aliquo bono esse, aperte videretur errare. Atqui quantulum interest inter eum qui cum [que] maxime vitam accipit et illum qui maternorum viscerum latens onus est? Uterque, quantum ad intellectum boni ac mali, aeque maturus est, et non magis infans adhoc boni capax est quam arbor aut mutum aliquod animal. Quare autem bonum in arbore  animalique muto non est? quia nec ratio. Ob hoc in infante quoque non est; nam et huic deest. Tunc ad bonum perveniet cum ad rationem pervenerit.

Sentence structure:

[9] Seneca is clearly back to preaching to the choir: no argument is offered for the claim that reason brings the good with itself. Once that claim is granted, Seneca's argument is granted.  While it is not an implausible claim for Stoics, it may be for others.

[9] Est aliquod inrationale animal, est aliquod nondum rationale, est rationale sed inperfectum: in nullo horum bonum, ratio illud secum adfert. Quid ergo inter ista quae rettuli distat? In eo quod inrationale est numquam erit bonum; in eo quod nondum rationale est tunc esse bonum non potest; <in eo quod rationale est> sed inperfectum iam potest bonum <esse>, sed non est.

Sentence structure:


[10] Seneca sums up the argument so far: the good is not in people at just any stage of development, newborn babies, fetuses, or sperm. It will emerge in the next section that Seneca is not talking of just any 'good,' but the 'good' that is specific to humans, for he admits that there is 'good' for a tree, etc., and so there is likely a 'good' for a baby, but it is not the human good: see ยง13.

[10] Ita dico, Lucili: bonum non in quolibet corpore, non in qualibet aetate invenitur et tantum abest ab infantia quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum; ergo nec in tenero, modo coalescente corpusculo est. Quidni non sit? non magis quam in semine.

Sentence structure:
 [11] Seneca explains that the good of a thing is found in its fullest development, not in its early stages.

[11] Hoc sic dicas: aliquod arboris ac sati bonum novimus: hoc non est in prima fronde quae emissa cum maxime solum rumpit. Est aliquod bonum tritici: hoc nondum est in herba lactente nec cum folliculo se exerit spica mollis, sed cum frumentum aestas et debita maturitas coxit. Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est.

Sentence structure:
 [12] The human good is only attainable after long hard studious work, which means that it is graspable by the intellect. alia subiciens sibi, se nulli apparently refers to independence, autonomy, and autarky.

[12] Quod autem hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus, alia subiciens sibi, se nulli. Hoc bonum adeo non recipit infantia ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute si ad illud longo studio intentoque pervenit. Si hoc est bonum, et intellegibile est.

Sentence structure:

[13] The good of a tree, for instance, is not good full stop: it is good 'for a tree,' but not truly good. Because each thing has a nature, it has a sort of good which it has as that thing, but that good is not good without qualification. Reason alone can arrive at good without qualification.

[13]  'Dixisti' inquit 'aliquod bonum esse arboris, aliquod herbae; potest ergo aliquod esse et infantis.' Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus: hoc quod in illis bonum est precario bonum dicitur. 'Quod est?' inquis. Hoc quod secundum cuiusque naturam est. Bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est. Nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est.
[14] Seneca explains that some things, such as plants and animals, are good "in their nature": they are good as plants or as animals. Other things, humans and divine things, can be good in an unqualified way, the humans by their cura, the divine by their nature, which is rational. 

[14] Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei: haec duo, quae rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt quod alterum inmortale, alterum mortale est. Ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non vere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. Hoc enim demum perfectum est quod secundum universam naturam perfectum, universa autem natura rationalis est: cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta.
[15] Seneca makes a series of claims which are not argued for, but add up to the conclusion that the good is not in mute animals.

[15] In quo non potest beata vita esse nec id potest quo beata vita efficitur; beata autem vita bonis efficitur. In muto animali non est beata vita <nec id quo beata vita> efficitur: in muto animali bonum non est.
[16] An interesting section for its claims about animal awareness: they grasp things present via their senses, they are reminded of things past by things present (but only when things are present to their senses), but they have no awareness of the future. Seneca relies on empirical observation for these claims.

[16] Mutum animal sensu conprendit praesentia; praeteritorum reminiscitur cum <in> id incidit quo sensus admoneretur, tamquam equus reminiscitur viae cum ad initium eius admotus est. In stabulo quidem nulla illi via est quamvis saepe calcatae memoria [est]. Tertium vero tempus, id est futurum, ad muta non pertinet.
[17] This section claims that beings which have no experience of 'perfect' (completed?) time cannot have perfect natures. Animals have no experience of the past unless it is being currently called to mind by a current sensory input, and no experience at all of the future, and so, for some reason that involves perfect time, they cannot have perfect good.

[17] Quomodo ergo potest eorum videri perfecta natura quibus usus perfecti temporis non est? Tempus enim tribus partibus constat, praeterito, praesente, venturo. Animalibus tantum quod brevissimum est <et> in transcursu datum, praesens: praeteriti rara memoria est nec umquam revocatur nisi praesentium occursu.
[18] Seneca's words have the form of conclusions and arguments here and in the previous section (ergo among other things): the argument, however, is not clear. Evidently habent et sata is meant to be an absurd idea, which makes what precedes a reductio ad absurdum. Perhaps absolute good must include awareness of absolute good to be absolute good. Perhaps absolute good must include awareness of its own absence (in the past) to be absolute good.

[18] Non potest ergo perfectae naturae bonum in inperfecta esse natura, aut si natura talis [habet] hoc habet, habent et sata. Nec illud nego, ad ea quae videntur secundum naturam magnos esse mutis animalibus impetus et concitatos, sed inordinatos ac turbidos; numquam autem aut inordinatum est bonum aut turbidum.
[19] Seneca claims that animals lack a capacity for ordinem, and so cannot have it or lack it: it is not clear what Seneca means when he suggests that animals move perturbate et indisposite ('agitated and disorderly'). But Seneca's point is that just as we don't say that fire lacks long division, because fire just isn't the sort of thing that could have long division, so with animals, we can't say that they lack ordinem because their nature is not such as to have ordinem. The same is true of virtue and vice: things which have no capacity for them cannot have either.

[19] 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'muta animalia perturbate et indisposite moventur?' Dicerem illa perturbate et indisposite moveri si natura illorum ordinem caperet: nunc moventur secundum naturam suam. Perturbatum enim id est quod esse aliquando et non perturbatum potest; sollicitum est quod potest esse securum. Nulli vitium est nisi cui virtus potest esse: mutis animalibus talis ex natura sua motus est.
[20] Animals lack reason and so cannot have full virtue and full goodness: they have only a sort of good, a sort of virture, and a sort of perfection.

[20]Sed ne te diu teneam, erit aliquod bonum in muto animali, erit aliqua virtus, erit aliquid perfectum, sed nec bonum absolute nec virtus nec perfectum. Haec enim rationalibus solis contingunt, quibus datum est scire quare, quatenus, quemadmodum. Ita bonum in nullo est nisi in quo ratio.
[21] The point of what has been said up to now has been to benefit Lucilius' soul.

[21] Quo nunc pertineat ista disputatio quaeris, et quid animo tuo profutura sit? Dico: et exercet illum et acuit et utique aliquid acturum occupatione honesta tenet. Prodest autem etiam quo moratur ad prava properantes. Sed <et> illud dico: nullo modo prodesse possum magis quam si tibi bonum tuum ostendo, si te a mutis animalibus separo, si cum deo pono.
[22] Why strive for strength, speed, or beautiful hair when animals handily outdo all human efforts in those regards.

One might ask why strive to be like god, when god handily exceeds all human efforts. Seneca has yet to explain why reason is so much better that other things (it might well be, but Seneca has not explained it here).

[22] Quid, inquam, vires corporis alis et exerces? pecudibus istas maiores ferisque natura concessit. Quid excolis formam? cum omnia feceris, a mutis animalibus decore vinceris. Quid capillum ingenti diligentia comis? cum illum vel effuderis more Parthorum vel Germanorum modo vinxeris vel, ut Scythae solent, sparseris, in quolibet equo densior iactabitur iuba, horrebit in leonum cervice formonsior. Cum te ad velocitatem paraveris, par lepusculo non eris.
[23] As a rational animal, Lucilius' greatest good would be perfect rationality. Hence, he should devote his attention to that.

[23] Vis tu relictis in quibus vinci te necesse est, dum in aliena niteris, ad bonum reverti tuum? Quod est hoc? animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens. Rationale animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? perfecta ratio. Hanc tu ad suum finem hinc evoca, <sine> in quantum potest plurimum crescere.
[24] It is permissible to prefer things most humans desire, but not to desire them: reliable joy comes from the self. These are important Stoic ideas: virtue alone is good, while everything else is at best 'preferable.' While emotions are to be gotten rid of, because they are based on false beliefs, once one has done that and become a Stoic sage, true joy will come from one's self. Seneca leaves Lucilius with an aphoristic parting thought, as is common in the Epistulae: the 'fortunate' are least fortunate.

[24] Tunc beatum esse te iudica cum tibi ex te gaudium omne nascetur, cum visis quae homines eripiunt, optant, custodiunt, nihil inveneris, non dico quod malis, sed quod velis. Brevem tibi formulam dabo qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse iam sentias: tunc habebis tuum cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices. Vale.